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Women Peace and Security in Europe – The Implementation of UNSCR 1325 in Europe

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1 INTRODUCTION

The European Union (EU) has increasingly positioned itself as an international security provider in the last two decades. Since 2003, it launched 44 missions and operations responding to conflict and crisis in Europe, Africa and the Middle East (see Appendix 1.). These EU interventions are often characterized and framed by the Union's liberal-normative self-image, which leaves these missions —including those of military nature—with the task of transferring the norms deriving from this approach. One of these norms is gender equality, also enshrined in the constitutional treaties of the EU. The Union has promoted the norm of gender equality in its security and defence policy, including military interventions, primarily informed by the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) normative framework.

By the time the EU began its continuous engagement in security force assistance in the 2010s, the promotion of gender equality as a norm had become an institutionalized strategic priority within the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Advancing what is considered 'normal' in gender relations and equality in Europe became an integral part of the work carried out by both civilian and military CSDP missions in places such as Somalia and Mozambique, where local norms often significantly differ from European concepts of gender equality. However, the prioritization of gender equality in military CSDP is based not only on normative reasoning but also on functionalist arguments, asserting that gender mainstreaming contributes to operational effectiveness. This reasoning is often invoked even though the assessment of gender equality norm promotion and the effectiveness of CSDP missions remains largely underdeveloped from conceptual, empirical, qualitative, and quantitative perspectives. Consequently, this dissertation seeks to explore what lies behind the EU's discourse on gender mainstreaming and how it influences one of the most common types of EU military interventions—EU-led SFA missions—in theatres where the norm(al) in gender relations is often dominantly different.

1.1 Introduction

The EU initially founded on an idea of consolidation and sustainable peace in Europe has become a unique contemporary actor in international politics (Jakusné Harnos and Molnár, 2024). After the initial, historic focus on critical resources influencing power relations in Europe, the EU has slowly turned into the embodiment

of liberal institution-building and multilateralism (Koops, 2010; Moravcsik, 2021, 1993; Wagner, 2017). Furthermore, by the end of the 20th century the European Union has become a roadmap to several countries in Europe—especially those of Central and Eastern Europe—to both break historic political and economic chains and barriers of the Cold War. The international community started to see the frame of the EU we know today expanding its portfolio with the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSFP) and other changes as a result of the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. Development and humanitarian policy, foreign policy and overall EU external action emerged and progressed with the unique element of enlargement, as a foreign policy tool, specific to the European Union. While neighbourhood policy and enlargement processes largely dominated foreign policy as well as scholarly interest in Europe, after 9/11 the attention of many NATO ally nations turned to the question of international terrorism. As Sicurelli also asserted, 9/11 brought a new wave of securitization between EU and developing countries, including distinct features of EU-AU relations (Sicurelli, 2016, p. 10). This new, enhanced focus on counterterrorism as well as the memory of failed European engagement in the Yugoslav War resulted in the adoption of the European Union's first security strategy, the European Security Strategy (ESS) in 2003 (European Union, 2003). In the same year, the EU launched its first missions and operations with establishing both civilian and military missions in the Balkans, Africa and in the Middle East (see Appendix 1. EU missions and operations database). This 'flying start' of EU crisis management and peace operations opened a new chapter in its role in international politics: the EU unequivocally started its own journey to become an international security provider in the 21st century.

The subsequent constitutional milestone, the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, further expanded the Union's opportunities to engage in international politics by granting legal personality to the EU (Gálik and Molnár, 2019; Moravcsik, 2021). Additionally, the security and defence angle of CSFP was strengthened with the institutionalization of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). This included the expansion of the EU's crisis management structures, as well as the list of areas of action—also known as the Petersberg tasks—in which the EU can and would possibly engage (EUR-Lex, 2024). These tasks were: humanitarian and rescue tasks, conflict prevention and peacekeeping, military advice and assistance, joint disarmament operations, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making, and post-conflict stabilization (Hornyák and Tánczos, 2024, p. 109).

By the time the Lisbon Treaty came into force in 2009 the European Union hadlaunched 23 crisis management missions and operations, 17 of civilian nature and 5 military ones (see Appendix 1.). Nevertheless, with the broadened list of crisis management options and tasks integrated into the EU's international profile, security cooperation, most specifically different aspects of security force assistance (SFA), have become a more and more commonly used tool of the EU CSFP (Gracza Hornyák, 2024a). These new missions launched in different, predominantly African states from 2010 were aiming at providing basic or specialized military training to uniformed personnel—in most cases the national armed forces— of an EU partner country. In ~~more~~ broader terms, these new EU-led SFA missions intended to contribute to the capacity building of the partner's defence governance, armed forces and other local, national security providers in the broader framework of Security Sector Reform (SSR) efforts (see e.g. Skeppström et al., 2015; Van Der Lijn et al., 2022).

In parallel with the aforementioned EU-specific developments in the first decade of the 21st century, a new normative framework, the Women, Peace and Security agenda (WPS or WPS agenda), arose in international relations with regards to war and peace. Contextually, the WPS agenda was also directly connected to many of the previously mentioned Petersberg tasks guiding EU crisis management. The launch of the first EU operations in the early 2000's coincided historically with the emergence of the Women, Peace and Security agenda born in 2000 with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325). This UN Security Council resolution— often referred to as the 'milestone WPS resolution'— highlighted the disproportionate effect of war and armed conflict on women and girls, and also urged for the enhanced inclusion and participation of women in peace processes and conflict resolution (see e.g. Kirby and Shepherd, 2016; Molnár and Hornyák Gracza, 2024; Solanas, 2020). UNSCR 1325 and the subsequent resolutions[1]—at the time of writing, in total, ten UN Security Council resolutions the last being adopted in 2019—all together constitute the Women, Peace and Security agenda (Almqvist, 2020; Basu et al., 2020; European Parliamentary Research Service, 2014; Hornyák and Petrikkos, 2022; Kirby and Shepherd, 2016). WPS as a normative framework gained momentum in a relatively short time subsequent to the Third and Fourth World Conference on Women in Nairobi

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[1] The ten Women, Peace and Security resolutions of the United Nations Security Council in chronological order are: 1325 (2000); 1820 (2008); 1888 (2009); 1889 (2009); 1960 (2010); 2106 (2013); 2122 (2013); 2242 (2015); 2272 (2016); 2467 (2019).

(1985) and in Beijing in 1995[2] due to several different factors. These catalysators included major regional and national conflicts, such as the Yugoslav Wars[3] or the Rwanda genocide[4], shedding light on the highly violent nature of gender-based violence in war and armed conflict.

In many ways, the WPS agenda as a normative framework changed the way of thinking about war, peace, and conflict, as well as warfare and conflict prevention or resolution. One of the most important elements and practical implications of this normative framework integrated into *ius in bello*[5] is recognizing rape as a weapon and tactics of war with the adoption of another WPS resolution in 2008, UNSCR 1820 (United Nations Security Council, 2008). The WPS framework being cross-fertilized with national ambitions and political will has also led to this normative framework directly effecting the foreign and security policy of European nations, including many EU member states. Denmark, Sweden, Spain and the Netherlands, for instance, were among the first countries adopting WPS National Action Plans (WPS NAPs)[6] beginning in 2005 to further enhance the transfer of WPS norms and principles into their respective national legislation and security sector (Biddolph and Shepherd, 2022; Hornyák and Petrikkos, 2022; Kirby and Shepherd, 2021).

From early on from the launch of CSFP, EU foreign and security policy, as well as crisis management has been directly building on UN principles, such as provisions of the UN Charter, which is also reflected in the first EU security strategy, recognizing the UN Charter as the "*fundamental framework for international relations*" (European Union, 2003, p. 9; see also in Gálik, 2019). In a rather similar fashion, the Women, Peace and Security framework also made its way to Europe relatively quickly and the

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[2] The 1995 UN Conference on Women in Beijing is considered a definite precursor of the subsequent development and adoption of WPS resolutions see Basu et al. 2020; Kirby and Shepherd, 2021. and Guerrina. 2020. specifically on EU WPS.

[3] see more on the gender-based violence in the Yugoslav wars in United Nations. 2024. International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Crimes of Sexual Violence. https://www.icty.org/en/features/crimes-sexual-violence

[4] see more on the gendered nature of violence in the Rwanda genocide in United Nations. 2014. Background note: Sexual Violence: a Tool of War. Outreach Programme on the Rwanda Genocide and the United Nations. UN Department of Public Information. https://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/assets/pdf/Backgrounder%20Sexual%20Violence%20 2014.pdf

[5] International Humanitarian Law (IHL) or the law of warfare. See more in: https://www.icrc.org/en/law-and-policy/jus-ad-bellum-and-jus-bello

[6] see more on Women, Peace and Security national action plans on the common database of the London School of Economics Women, Peace and Security Center and the University of Sydney at https://www.wpsnaps.org/

first concrete steps were made to integrate WPS principles into Union's external action as early as 2005 (Council of the European Union, 2005). By 2008 the individual EU member states national integration efforts[7] coinciding with and reinforcing the top-down UN influence led to the adoption of the EU's first strategic document on the implementation of the then-existing WPS resolutions, UNSCR 1325 and 1820, and the integration of a gender perspective into its institutionalized framework of security and defence (Council of the European Union, 2008a, 2008b). This early EU engagement on the WPS primarily between 2005 and 2008 also made it possible to further integrate this normative framework into the constitutional changes resulting from the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty. Consequently, this provided continuity for the integration of a gender perspective and WPS principles between the CSDP and its pre-Lisbon predecessor, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

1.1.1 Research problem, research questions and hypotheses

The two parallel processes—external UN influence and the adoption of additional WPS resolutions together with the internal individual commitment of EU member states—led to the WPS agenda continuously strengthening and providing a normative framework for both CSFP and CSDP in the post-Lisbon era. The latter was complemented and further strengthened by the EU utilizing its already existing experience in promoting gender equality in other policy areas, such as employment, as well as introducing and applying these into all policy areas in the EU (Guerrina, 2020; Lombardo and Meier, 2008; O'Connor, 2014; Peto and Manners, 2006). Consequently EU-implementation efforts on integrating the WPS agenda into its foreign policy toolbox gained more and more impetus since the early 2010's through gender mainstreaming—understood as the integration of gender perspective into all policy areas—also impacting CSDP. This integration was both reflected in institutional structures, including in the newly set up European External Action Service (EEAS) and in EU missions and operations, as well as policy development through strategic documents and advocacy (Molnár and Gracza Hornyák, 2024). Gender equality being a fundamental value of EU incorporated in the Union's constitutional Treaties[8]

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[7] By 2008 seven EU member states adopted national action plans on Women, Peace and Security, in chronological order, Denmark (2005), Sweden and the then still member UK (2006), Austria and Spain (2007), Finland and the Netherlands (2008). See more at: http://1325naps.peacewomen.org/

[8] Treaties refers to constitutional, international treaties on which the functioning of the European Union is based, most specifically the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

provided further internal legitimacy to for gender mainstreaming noting that "*in all its activities, the Union shall aim to eliminate inequalities, and to promote equality, between men and women*" (European Union, 2012a). Gender mainstreaming, as a result, continuously strengthened and followed different strategic and policy developments from enlargement to crisis management, including the launch of EU-led SFA missions as a new tool in CSDP from 2010.

The EU launched its first non-executive military training mission, EU Training Mission Somalia (EUTM Somalia), as the first of its kind in EU external action, in 2010. While capacity building as a fundamental aspect of security sector reform was a familiar and important practice in CSDP, since the launch of EUTM Somalia the EU increasingly integrated specific military training and advising missions (EUTMs) into its foreign policy toolbox (Gracza Hornyák, 2024a). This was followed by several other similar types of military crisis management missions as part of the EU's increasing efforts influencing its own security, but also addressing crisis situations outside of its borders moving beyond the use of humanitarian action (see Appendix 1.). Since 2010, the EU launched six of these security force assistance missions, five in the African continent and one in EU territory, Germany and Poland, for the capacity building of the Ukrainian armed forces in the face of the Russian aggression (European External Action Service, 2023a). Moreover, since 2016, all these SFA missions by the EU were integrated into a single unified EU command and control structure (European External Action Service, 2023b; Hornyák and Tánczos, 2024).

The systematic integration of the gender perspective in EU external action including crisis management through CSDP missions and operations means direct implementation efforts and expectations in all missions and operations regardless of the mandate or the nature of the conflict addressed. This includes all ongoing security force assistance missions launched by the EU in the African continent including EU training missions, EUTM Somalia and EUTM Mozambique, which ~~ones~~ serve as case studies in this dissertation. Apart from relying on the normative argumentation for promoting gender equality in all external action—primarily based on the aforementioned provisions of the Lisbon Treaty—, the EU narrative increasingly suggests that gender mainstreaming in CSDP contributes to operational effectiveness (Meiske, 2015). EU strategic communication, policy documents and other sources assert that "*human rights and gender mainstreaming helps to achieve these overall objectives by bringing in the human dimension to the security, justice and defence*

sectors and therefore increases the EU's crisis management effectiveness and impact"
(European External Action Service, 2022a, p. 92).

Nevertheless, due to the different gender roles in African partner countries—as well as some of these states being heavily affected by armed conflict—mainstreaming gender equality, and the promotion of women's right and equality integrated to the mission's work serves as a possible conflict source causing norm clashes between the EU and the host country. EU partner countries in Africa, where most EU military training missions are ongoing, such as Somalia and Mozambique, are burdened by serious security challenges mainly posed by the presence of Islamist militia groups. Moreover, both Somalia and Mozambique are countries where gender inequalities are (still) encoded in the societies, and were women often lack physical safety, as well as being exposed to patriarchal governance and security provision mechanism (Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security and Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2023; Hudson et al., 2020; The WomanStats Project, 2024).

EU civilian and military missions, including SFA missions, are expected to conduct gender mainstreaming efforts in such complex contexts while training local troops, as well as leading by example including demonstrating leadership and military potential of women (Council of the European Union, 2018a; European Commission, 2020a). As Ansorg and Haastrup also noted with regards to these GM requirements that "*when CSDP planners request gender advisers and gender-balanced teams from Member States, these are not as forthcoming*" (Ansorg and Haastrup, 2018, p. 1139). These policy expectations resulted in several resource and capacity allocation questions in EU SFA missions which, in many cases, are already burdened by the overall EU military structures being understaffed as well as facing the general challenges stability operations often encounter (see e.g. Reykers and Adriaensen, 2023; Van Der Lijn et al., 2022; Williams and Ali, 2020). The fact that the EU creates specific gender advisor positions in these missions that are often left vacant suggests either or both member states' lack of capacity or political will for gender mainstreaming (European Commission, 2023; Lackenbauer and Jonsson, 2014; Williams and Ali, 2020).

Gender mainstreaming understood as the promotion of gender equality in the CSDP context requires the EU to put both resources—staff, budget, expertise as mentioned above—and political will behind these policies. Simultaneously, there is still a lack of comprehensive and systematic monitoring and data collection on both

gender mainstreaming efforts and the effectiveness of EU SFA. Additionally, there appears to be a lack of empirical evidence on how specific EU gender mainstreaming policies in place impact SFA efforts strategically, operationally and/or tactically. Concurrently, the EU engaging in training troops of partner countries is still a relatively new phenomenon in international politics, also leaving many unanswered questions of the overall impact and effectiveness of EU SFA efforts in Africa and beyond (see AfricaNews, 2023; Deneckere et al., 2020; Guiryanan et al., 2021; Ostanina, 2023; Van Der Lijn et al., 2022). Consequently, the research problem lies between the gender mainstreaming efforts and security force assistance practices, including their impact. Moreover, there is very limited empirical data on both SFA impact and WPS effectiveness while the EU systematically connects the two variables in its strategic and policy documents and allocate resources for promoting gender equality as a fundamental norm of the EU as an international security provider. Additionally, the same policies and policy expectations might be difficult to be translated to distinct areas of operations and mandates, such as EUTM Somalia and EUTM Mozambique (Molnár and Gracza Hornyák, 2024).

From this dilemma the following research questions emerge: What arguments does the EU use for gender mainstreaming specifically in military CSDP and in SFA efforts and how do these arguments translating into policies and mandates impact EU training and advising efforts in African partner states?

In spite of the predominantly inductive nature of this research, five hypotheses or initial propositions lead the analysis demonstrated in Table 1. below. Hypothesis 1. suggests that the Normative Power Europe concept coincides with the Union's own self-conceptualization as integral part of the role conception as an international security provider. This means that the EU believes that as a SFA provider it has the ability to shape normal including gender norms in the society. Hypothesis 2. asserts that the EU conducts gender mainstreaming because it views gender equality as a constitutional principle, which shapes its normative self-conceptualization as part of its identity as an international security provider. This hypothesis is best explained with the opening reasoning of the EU Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025 stating that "*Gender equality is a core value of the EU, a fundamental right and key principle of the European Pillar of Social Rights. It is a reflection of who we are.*" (European Commission, 2020b, p. 1).

Research questions	Hypotheses
Why does the EU persist in conducting gender mainstreaming in its SFA efforts in Africa?	**H1**: The EU's own role conception coincides with the Normative Power Europe concept.
	H2: The EU conducts gender mainstreaming because of GE being one of its fundamental, constitutional values and because of its normative self-conceptualization.
	H3: The EU's GM practices and arguments (including the approach to the contribution to operational effectiveness) was influenced by two main factors: 1) WPS effect (both top-down and bottom-up) and 2) EU Ms experiences in Afghanistan (bottom-up)
To what extent these gender mainstreaming efforts impact EU-led SFA missions in Africa?	**H4**: The link between GM and mission effectiveness is not a direct/ linear one. EU GM as norm transfer can have both negative and positive impact on SFA effectiveness and often results in norm clashes and become a source of role conflict in these missions.
	H5: The direct inclusion of WPS or gender mainstreaming related provisions into the mission mandate results in the enhanced implementation of GM in the role performance and role impact.

Table 1. Research question and related hypotheses guiding this research.

The third hypothesis suggests that the EU narrative building on both the right-based—as *"the right thing to do"*—and the functionalist argumentation—as "*the smart thing to do*" (Egnell and Alam, 2019)—for gender mainstreaming derives from two main factors:

A) the "WPS effect" understood as both norm diffusion through external influence from the United Nations, and internal push from individual member states politically committed to WPS implementation;

B) and EU member states and NATO allied experiences and lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan integrating a gender perspective in counterinsurgency operations and SFA efforts.

While factor A) is directly connected to the right-based and normative argumentation for both WPS and integrating a gender perspective in external action, factor B) derives from a more field-based approach and functionalist argumentation building on operational experiences from a specific mission context.

Furthermore, hypotheses 4. and 5. seek to answer the question of to what extend gender mainstreaming impacts these EU-led SFA missions in Africa. Hypothesis 4. argues that gender mainstreaming as norm transfer can contribute to effective mandate implementation, but the causal link is not self-explanatory. It further asserts that promoting gender equality in SFA missions often results in tensions in the field and

can become a source of role conflict. Finally, the last hypothesis, Hypothesis 5. indicates that having explicit reference to WPS or GM issues in the mission's mandate does not result in stronger gender mainstreaming implementation in terms of role performance (training and advising) or role impact (mission effectiveness) due to internal capacity problems of SFA missions.

1.2 Research questions and hypotheses in the context of theoretical and conceptual framework

In search of answers to the aforementioned questions, the dissertation applies Role Theory (RT)—previously dominantly used in sociological and psychological research—first introduced to foreign policy analysis (FPA) by Kalevi Holsti (Holsti, 1970; Harnisch, 2012; Harnisch et al., 2011). Contemporary role theory research differentiates between three possible levels of analysis to facilitate the role(s) of the European Union in international politics:

a) theorizing the EU 'meta-role', and its role performance as part of international politics as macroscopic;

b) theorizing the EU's interaction with others in international politics in specific settings as mesoscopic;

c) and/or theorizing the EU in institutional settings looking at internal processes as microscopic level (Elgström & Smith, 2006).

This research engages in mesoscopic level of analysis through role theory application of a special role context theorizing the EU as the actor, while partner countries of the EU in Africa receiving EU security force assistance, Somalia and Mozambique, as the "*generalized others*" (Harnisch et al., 2011). Analysis of on the mesoscopic level addresses the role of an actor in a specialized setting, often also referred to as conflict-specific role, in contrast with the meta-role on the macroscopic level which focuses on an actor's role in global, international politics (Elgström & Smith, 2006). The conceptual elements of role theory, such as role conception and role institutionalization, further allow the theorization of the *provider* vs. *beneficiary* or *partner* relations (see Figure 1.1 below). The role concept is influenced by both the actor's self-conceptualization, in this case the EU, as well as the role expectation from the African countries benefiting from EU security assistance. The institutionalization of EU's role as an international security provider in this context is the deployment of EU-led SFA missions in partner countries in Africa, with UN Security Council

Resolutions and/or the official invitation of the partner country. The latter is true in case of both Somalia and Mozambique. The request of security cooperation and assistance by the partner countries, and the EU acting on this invitation are the cornerstones of the origins of the EU's conflict specific role as an international security provider in this setting. Accordingly, both the role concept and the role institutionalization are determined by the fact that the Union's is present with a military SFA mission to perform the role of an international security provider legitimized by the request or invitation of the beneficiary partner country.

A crucial part of the role concept is the EU's own self-conception, in other words, how the European Union views itself as in international security provider in this specific context. Providing security force assistance to partner countries in Africa the Union's self-conceptualization is heavily affected by its normative, Eurocentric approach (Haukkala, 2008; Lucarelli, 2008; Staeger, 2016). To theorize the EU's self-conceptualization in this setting this dissertation applies the Normative Power Europe (hereinafter: NPE) concept by Ian Manners (2002). The NPE suggests that the EU is a unique, *sui generis* actor in ~~the~~ international politics which makes it necessary to step away from the binary conceptualization of civilian versus military power only providing a capability-focused understanding of EU power (Manners, 2002). Instead, in the NPE concept Manners argues that the EU shaping norms and perceptions by "*not what it does or what it says, but what it is*" and that is what makes the EU a normative power (Manners, 2002, p. 252). This dissertation looks at why the EU persists in conducting gender mainstreaming in its SFA efforts in Africa and to what extent do gender mainstreaming efforts impact these SFA missions. In other words, paraphrasing Whitman, this research seeks to understand "how the EU acts, and what impact the EU has by attempting to judge its own normative power" (Manners, 2008, p. 46; Whitman, 2011a, p. 7).

NPE's contribution to understanding the research problem of the dissertation is also beneficial as it allows insights on not only how EU power relies and is based on the ability to shape "normal", but by looking at how the EU as an actor engages in norm diffusion with other actors based on its normative self-conception (Whitman, 2011a). In the current research problem and context, the example of this norm diffusion attempt is gender mainstreaming based on one of the EU's "*constitutional norms (…) crucial constitutive factors determining its international identity*", such as gender equality, equality between women and men (Manners, 2002, p. 241; Orbie, 2011; Peto

and Manners, 2006). Putting it in the context of role theory in this specific international institutional setting of security force assistance missions, the EU's normative identity is an integral part of its self-conception, which impacts its role performance—training and advising—and the expected impact as an international security provider through mainstreaming one of its core norms, gender equality. This research asserts that the EU shapes norms through "*what it is*"—being ranked as the best/safest region for women around the world (Hudson et al., 2020)—and "*what it does*"—mainstreaming gender equality through all policy areas—, including CSDP and its missions and operations dominantly affects its self-conceptualization as an international security provider. Moreover, the conceptual framework suggests that this normative self-identification of the EU becomes more prevalent during the role performance and the conceptualization of the role impact explored in the next paragraphs (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Complete Conceptual Map of the dissertation: introducing the Normative Power Europe concept and gender mainstreaming.

The role performance in this specific institutional setting of the EU acting as an international security provider in African partner countries, is based on the common elements of the mandates of these military missions, training and advising as core pillars. This means that the Union, as a part of its role enactment, institutionalizes its role through the launch of a military (training)/or SFA mission, in which the performance of the EU's role primarily derives from the mandate of the mission. Performing these activities in EU SFA missions as institutionalized forms of EU's role in the context the expected role impact of EUTMs is mission effectiveness; the successful implementation of the mandate to contribute to the peace and security of

these countries by effective security force assistance (van der Lijn et al. 2022). Nevertheless, according to EU strategic and political documents, gender mainstreaming as a holistic agenda/ policy is systematically integrated in all levels of activities: strategic, operational and tactical ones. Consequently, this means that EU carrying out its activities as an international security provider in EU SFA institutional settings includes integrating gender mainstreaming in training and advising activities through the role performance in SFA missions.

Implementation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda, or in broader terms, gender mainstreaming activity, as a requirement, is integrated either directly into the mandate of the missions or indirectly into mandate-related tasks (Molnár and Gracza Hornyák, 2024; Gracza Hornyák, forthcoming, 2025a). Accordingly, the promotion of gender equality as a norm or value becomes an integral part of its role performance as an international security provider. Performing these tasks connected to gender mainstreaming as a norm transfer in this context is also directly supported by gender advisors, special advisors of the operational commander on the field (European External Action Service, 2022b) (Gracza Hornyák, forthcoming, 2025a). Nonetheless, the normative self-conceptualization of the EU further impacts the dynamics with the partner countries of the EU SFA by its normative expectation to its (role) impact as a security provider in this context. Political and strategic documents of the EU continuously refer to gender mainstreaming as an element contributing to operational effectiveness, but the very same documents are lacking clarification and explanation on how the EU defines effectiveness in the case of CSDP mission, including those of non-executive military training missions/SFA missions and how gender mainstreaming contributes to operational effectiveness (see e.g.: EUNAVFOR.eu, 2023; Council of the European Union, 2018).

1.3 Research methodology

To investigate the aforementioned initial guiding propositions, this dissertation applies a constructivist approach relying predominantly on qualitative methodology. In accordance with this research paradigm the primary methods used in this dissertation are discourse analysis, strategic document analysis, participatory observation, semi-structure interviews and comparative case study method. Data collection included the analysis of both primary and secondary sources in three languages, Hungarian, English and Spanish, and was conducted between September

2020 and 2024. The most important primary sources studied in this research through document and discourse analysis are EU official documents, such as strategies or Council conclusions, EU strategic communication materials, and 26 semi-structure interviews conducted with EU officials in EEAS headquarters, EU delegations and missions, as well as other stakeholders working with EU SFA missions. After identifying a first core pool of interviewees, the snowball method was used to further facilitate the engagement of relevant stakeholders to be interviewed with also focusing on the diversity of thought and perspectives reflected in the overall list of interviewees.

The aforementioned primary sources are complemented with data collected through participatory observation method on several events organized by the European Security and Defence College (ESDC)—a semi-autonomous training and education organization of the European External Action Service—between 2021 and 2024. During these events and conferences, the author was present as a doctoral researcher and fellow of the European Doctoral School on CSDP—in some cases as a speaker— where EU officials, policymakers and practitioners spoke under Chatham House rules about different aspects of EU external action, foreign, security and defence policy. Lastly, two ongoing EU SFA missions, EU Training Mission Somalia (EUTM Somalia) and EU Training Mission in Mozambique (EUTM Mozambique), serve as comparative empirical case study as part of this research. Table x in Chapter 4. demonstrates some of the most important characteristics of the two missions to make the case for the most-distinct case study approach.

The overall data collection of this dissertation started with data from 2003 when the first EU Security Strategy was adopted, and the first missions and operations were launched to understand the overall context of EU crisis management and security cooperation. However, the comparative case studies analysis in Chapter 8. is limited to the time period from 2010 when EUTM Somalia, the first EU SFA missions was launched and subsequently served as an example since then for other similarly non-executive military CSDP missions. The limited time frame compared of the case study analysis between 2010 and 2024 to the overall data collection period (2003-2024) is based on the argument that the EU has only started to deploy SFA missions as part of its external action since 2010 with the launch of EUTM Somalia (Gracza Hornyák, 2024a). Accordingly, the scope of the comparative empirical chapter is limited to the analysis of data between 2010 and September 2024.

While the comparative case study analysing EUTM Somalia and EUTM Mozambique provides the opportunity to explore four different elements of role theory application—the role concept, the role institutionalization, performance and impact—the importance of this empirical chapter lies in exploring the operationalization of the EU's role as an international security provider in this specific context. Further detailed description of the research methodology applied in this dissertation can be found in Chapter 4.

1.4 Research impact and the contribution to existing scholarship

Egnell and Alam (2019) in their book on gender mainstreaming and military effectiveness—one of the very few scholarly pieces dedicated to this specific issue—acknowledged that there is great variation between how and why different countries or international organizations integrate a gender perspective (or the WPS agenda) in their military organizations and/or military operations (Egnell and Alam, 2019). They also highlighted that while the impact assessment is challenging, understanding how and why certain steps and decisions are made and integrated into the different policy levels, from the strategic to the tactical one, is vital. Such understanding would not only facilitate further research on the casual link between different elements of gender mainstreaming, but can also deepen our comprehension on the empirics of such policy implementation on the field (Egnell and Alam, 2019, p. 4). Egnell and Alam as well as their co-authors also posed the question whether it is possible to measure gender mainstreaming or impact due to the relatively new nature of many aspects and possible variables of gender mainstreaming policy. Nevertheless, they also asserted that in order to eventually understand the impact of gender mainstreaming to operational effectiveness in a more quantifiable and generalizable way more initial qualitative and empirical findings are necessary.

In agreement with the argument for the importance of studying political and institutional processes as essential steps to further assess the connection between gender mainstreaming and military effectiveness, this dissertation contributes to the scholarship on studying conceptual and empirical elements of gender mainstreaming in EU external action, foreign and security policy, as well as military interventions specifically vis-à-vis security cooperation and SFA. Additionally, while several policy papers, institutional documents as well as scholarly pieces were born in the last two decades exploring the EU efforts on gender mainstreaming in EU external action, the

body of literature on conceptualizing EU as an international actor specifically focusing on gender mainstreaming in EU missions and operations is very limited. However, the gender regime in CSDP missions of a military nature, including security force assistance missions as a unique instrument of the EU foreign policy toolbox has yet to be researched comprehensively. This gap in the literature is rather important to fill specially in the light of the sustained institutional and policy commitment and resource allocation for gender mainstreaming in EU external action in the last two decades described in this introduction and in Chapter 7. in details.

Similarly to gender mainstreaming, the evolving nature of EU security and defence policy and EU security cooperation practices—especially in the face of emerging regional and transnational threats—as a policy answer from the Union are to be further studied. EU security cooperation and assistance in broader terms as a relatively new phenomenon also requires more understanding both conceptually and empirically including EU-specific SFA efforts in Africa and beyond. As the author of this dissertation argued in previous policy-focused pieces, the security cooperation and security force assistance angle of CSDP, as well as its rather unique conceptual framework is still understudied (Gracza Hornyák, 2024a, 2024b). Security force assistance practices of the EU since 2010, the different SFA missions unified under a single EU military command structure since 2016, as well as their further support with financial military assistance by the European Peace Facility (EPF) since 2021 are one of the newest emerging areas in EU foreign and security policy with still limited scholarly attention and coverage.

Accordingly, this research intends to produce knowledge on different aspects of EU foreign, security and defence policy specific to two main variables: gender mainstreaming and the effectiveness of SFA. While the author acknowledges the limitations of the generalizability of this research, she stands firm in the argument that both gender mainstreaming as a norm transfer as a fundamental, highly institutionalized element of EU foreign and security policy as well as the Union's role as a security assistance provider needs further understanding which this dissertation intends to facilitate. The expected input and added value of this research is to provide both scholarly, conceptual as well as relevant contributions for the broader fields of EU studies and Security Studies. The primary addition to the existing scholarship can be divided into four different elements or subfields:

- the EU as an international security provider: Researching one of the fundamental constitutional norms of the European Union, gender equality, vis-à-vis foreign and security policy allows this dissertation to analyse how the EU's normative identity influences its self-conceptualization and actions as an international security provider. Moreover, focusing on a specific instance of Global North-Global South[9] interaction through security force assistance, the research sheds light on a unique angle of EU-Africa relations and security cooperation.

- Overall CSDP literature: Additional value of the research is highlighting the lack of definition and conceptualization of operational effectiveness in CSDP missions and operations with special focus on the unique aspects of measuring and defining impact vis-à-vis security force assistance and EU military capacity building efforts to partner countries. The conceptual contribution to this subfield also includes the explanation of EU specific elements of security force assistance and localizing it in the CSDP framework.

- Norm transfer in SFA and in specific military settings: As Sándor Fábián argued „*stronger theoretical foundations for military norm transmission, better discussion of casual mechanisms, qualitative analysis of specific cases and better data are just some elements that need significant efforts from scholars to help better understand the investigated relationship.*" (Fábián, 2021, p. 58) In accordance with this argument, the dissertation contributes to the broader scholarly debate on the role of norms and norm transfer in security force assistance. With the number of SFA providers proliferating, scholarship needs to be further expanded to accommodate more non-US case studies and atypical or new SFA providers, like the European Union. Moreover, this research can serve as guidance in studying other 'cross-cutting'[10] norms and principles transferred through SFA practices, such as human rights or climate change in the EU context or beyond.

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[9] see more on the conceptualization of Global North vs. Global South in Dados and Connell, 2012.

[10] Cross-cutting issues is a collective term, concept referring to different topics comprehensively effecting different policies. The term is frequently used by both international organizations, such as the United Nations as well as individual states and often includes gender equality, climate change as common issues. See e.g.: UNODC. 2024 https://www.unodc.org/unodc/es/firearms-protocol/cross-cutting-issues.html or U.S. Department of State. 2024. https://www.state.gov/cross-cutting-issues/

In addition to the aforementioned dominantly conceptual contributions of this dissertation, the more practical, policy-oriented added value of this research can be further separated into two main issues:

- EU gender mainstreaming policy: This dissertation analyses EU gender mainstreaming policies, instruments, institutional and strategic framework and its application to specific CSDP contexts. Such analysis facilitates the understanding of both internal institutional, capacity and resource allocation questions of EU CSFP and CSDP vis-à-vis gender mainstreaming, as well as external dimensions in different foreign policy contexts, such as SFA or other capacity building efforts of non-military nature. Better understanding of EU gender mainstreaming policies in security and defence can contribute to enhancing or reevaluating such policies in the EU and beyond, including the integration of women in armed forces as a result of the changing nature of warfare and transformation of modern armed forces in the EU.

- EU security force assistance as a policy instrument: Similarly to gender mainstreaming, this dissertation is expected to contribute to the understanding of EU SFA missions as tools of EU foreign and security policy, as well as its connected institutional, budgetary and resource allocation elements. With stability and SSR-focused interventions becoming an integral part of warfare especially since 9/11, "*the aim of (such) military operations have often changed from the pursuit of concrete military strategic objectives to the establishment of certain conditions from which political outcomes can be decided*" (Egnell and Alam, 2019, p. 7). In agreement with Egnell and Alam, the contribution of this research to EU SFA effectiveness can further facilitate not only future scholarship in understanding of why and when the EU chooses in engaging security cooperation and security force assistance, but whether the strategic objective of such military engagement is effectiveness or rather power projection. These question are important to look at as SFA is more and more understood as a tool of great power competition, including the EU invoking this policy instrument with SFA missions and interventions.

As a final point, the author of this dissertation hopes that this research facilitates a more nuanced scholarly and policy discussion on the integration of a gender perspective in the security and defence realm, including the armed forces, which has

been too often polarized by different arguments neglecting the realities of both benefits, struggles and challenges arising from this issue.

1.5 Structure and chapters

To understand the research context and answer the questions leading this investigation the dissertation follows the subsequent structure. After this introductory chapter, Chapter 2. provides a comprehensive review of the literature including important scholarship guiding the theoretical and conceptual framework, as well as relevant policy documents primarily for understanding the EU-specific context of the research. In Chapter 3. the dissertation introduces the most important theoretical and conceptual elements of this research, role theory, the Normative Power Europe concept, gender mainstreaming and security force assistance as well as contextualizing them in the larger framework of constructivism. Subsequently, Chapter 4. is responsible for laying out the methodology of this research by highlighting the most important methods used and their operationalization for both data collection and analysis. Additionally, this methodology chapter also further elaborate and facilitate the understand of the limitations which the applied methodology inherently imposes on this dissertation.

Chapter 5. addresses the topic of the EU as an international security provider and seeks to explain the Union's self-conceptualization primarily from 2003, when the first EU missions and operations were deployed. Beyond answering the question of how the EU views itself as a security provider divided the focus of the inquiry into three major time periods by applying discourse analysis this chapter also serves as a background chapter. Accordingly, Chapter 5. also engages in explaining the most important institutional and policy developments leading CSFP and CSDP to the current state of affairs in EU external action. After elaborating on the EU's role conception while it is acting as an international security provider, Chapter 6. takes a step closer to the specific aspect of CSDP missions and operations including SFA. This chapter outlines an important conceptual bridge between contemporary, largely US-based SFA literature and the highly EU-specific CSDP jargon. In other words, Chapter 6. addresses what is describe in this dissertation as the EU model of SFA. Chapter 7. focusing on EU gender mainstreaming—again similarly to Chapter 5. —serves both analytical and descriptive purposes. On the one hand, it describes the development of gender mainstreaming and the specific EU approach to the integration of a gender

perspective into external action following the time frame since when the EU launched its first missions and operations. On the other hand, Chapter 7. studies the EU-specific institutional and policy framework of gender mainstreaming by mapping strategic and operational documents specifically and engages in discourse analysis to understand how these documents connect gender mainstreaming to operational effectiveness in CSDP.

In Chapter 8. the theoretical and conceptual framework and EU-specific findings are triangulated with data collection of two empirical case studies, EU SFA missions, EU Training Mission Somalia and EU Training Mission Mozambique. Accordingly, Chapter 8. provides space for a comparative analysis of the two EU military missions to understand how EU gender mainstreaming as norm transfer impacts these missions on the field. Finally, Chapter 9. is the concluding part of this dissertation primarily engaging in drawing conclusions, making policy recommendations as well as outlining possible future lines of research building on research outcomes.

2 LITERATURE REVIEW

Literature and available sources were studied for this dissertation in English, Hungarian and Spanish in a systematic manner. In accordance with the highly interdisciplinary nature of this research, a large variety of scholarship was studied across the board from different disciplines, including political science, security studies, international relations and EU studies, or women and gender studies.

Beginning with the broader theoretical perspectives and moving toward articulating the more detailed concepts and definitions on which this dissertation builds, the review of the literature follows a logical structure. Where possible, the literature review explores existing scholarship on the aforementioned elements following a chronological order as well as being thematically structured first in broader terms and secondly focusing on EU-specific application and literature. First, this dissertation provides a review of the literature on role theory as the guiding theory in the broader framework of constructivism including role theory application in EU studies. Subsequently, relevant scholarship is studied in four different sections alongside the key elements, concepts in this research:

- EU power and actorness in the framework of EU external action with specific focus on the Normative Power Europe concept by Ian Manners;
- Gender mainstreaming as a concept with special focus on EU conceptualization and institutionalization;
- EU Common Security and Defence Policy including missions and operations;
- Security force assistance and SFA effectiveness;

2.1 *Constructivism and Role theory*

Role theory (RT) application in International Relations (IR) and Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) builds on the intellectual legacy of sociological and phycological research on roles. Role theory was first introduced to FPA by the seminal article of Kalevi Holsti in 1970 (Holsti, 1970). In the midst of the Cold War and the heavy focus of the literature on the US and Russia, Holsti argued that studying national role conceptions of states—especially that of severely understudied regional subsystems or small states—can shed light on the different aspects and origins of foreign policy articulation. He found this necessary as he asserted that the "*balance of power, polar, and even multi-polar models do not adequately alert us to some aspects of*

contemporary international politics" (Holsti, 1970, p. 289). The importance of Holsti's research is highlighting the lack of conceptualization and definition of role(s) in FPA and providing a flexible and more nuanced framework of analysis of foreign policy behaviour. Furthermore, Holsti rightly asserted that his article primarily focused on a small fragment of the possible theoretical contributions provided by role theory which are discussed in the subsequent chapter of this dissertation. Nevertheless, Holsti's research was able to open a new discussion in broader FPA, also labelled as the 'first wave' of RT application and subsequently in IR scholarly communities on the different roles that states and policymakers perform in (international) politics (Thies and Breuning, 2012).

Role theory research since Holsti's work was enriched by several scholars touching upon different angles in special volumes, seminal articles and books (Breuning, 2022; Harnisch et al., 2011; Thies and Breuning, 2012). These contributions are combining selected case studies, such as states, regional and international organizations and different research questions arising from the theorization of the empirical problems in the context of role theory. Michael Barnett applied RT for the exploration of role conflict in the case of Arab states with focusing on the institutional perspectives and the effect of role conflict for regional stabilization efforts (Barnett, 1993). Sebastian Harnisch contributed to the further development of the research on role theory in FPA (2011a, 2011b, 2012) and conducted context-specific and comparative research on different role theory elements, as well as individual states, especially China (2016). Another RT application focusing on regional/sub-regional dynamics in a somewhat similar fashion to Barnett's exploration of often understudied areas, was conducted by Leslie E. Wehner (2016). Using a symbolic interactionist approach[11] to apply RT, Wehner explored Chile's role in contrast with a larger regional power, Brazil, with the "*triad of inter-role conflict, role strain and role play*" through looking at economic and security cooperation between the two states (Wehner, 2016, p. 66)

Similarly to Sebastian Harnish, Marijke Breuning enriched the literature on role theory with empirical case studies, such as Belgium (2016) and Russia (2020), as well as making important contributions to the ontological, epistemological and

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[11] Additional insights and exploration of the most frequently used approaches in role theory research are discussed in Chapter 3 of this dissertation.

methodological aspects of role theory application in FPA (Breuning, 2022, 2019, 2017, 2012). Together with Cameron G. Thies in 2012, Marijke Breuning argued that role theory allows scholars to integrate FPA and IR theory comparing the mostly US-dominated Role Theory application through FPA and the somewhat different framework of analysis from predominantly Europe-based constructivist IR scholars (Thies, Breuning, 2012). Additionally, Breuning summarized the history of role theory research as well as advancing the literature with further clarifying crucial concepts of RT, such as role conflict, role enactment or role prescription (Breuning, 2022). These definitions and concepts connected to RT and the application of its conceptual vocabulary in this dissertation are explained in Chapter 3.

Role theory scholars has also been following the development of EU external action and Common Foreign and Security Policy applying different levels of analysis and taking advantage of the conceptual richness of this theoretical framework. Ole Elgström and Michael Smith contributed to the early theorization of the developing EU external action with the volume titled "*The European Union's Roles in International Politics: Concepts and Analysis*" in 2006 in the wake of the EU's developing foreign and security policy, including its first attempt to conduct missions and operations in 2003 (Elgström et al., 2006). This special volume was an important contribution to RT research as one of the first, key collection of largely European or EU-based constructivist application of role theory in IR. This new wave of RT application—highlighted by Thies and Breuning (2012)—was epistemologically different from the previously dominant US-based FPA approach. In this volume, Sonia Lucarelli explored the limits of the self-conception through role theory given the EU's distinct nature in international politics (Lucarelli, 2008). Lucarelli argued that these limitations stemming from elements such as institutional characteristics, the level of integration or the continuously changing self-identity of the EU. Moreover, the author also highlighted that these elements shaping the EU's role conception are highly interconnected to role performance affecting one another constantly. She noted that the EU's "*somehow missionary without being crusading*", strong normative and value-based nature causes two main difficulties for EU external action: struggles of having coherence between the role conception(s) and role performance, and, partly stemming from the first, being rather ineffective in its external action (Lucarelli, 2008, p. 61). These struggles are also highlighted by the initial research propositions of this

dissertation asserting that the gender mainstreaming as a norm transfer can be a potential cause of role conflict in EU-led SFA efforts in Africa.

In 2012, Rikard Bengtsson with Ole Elgström explored the EU's role conception and role expectations in the context of EU neighbourhood policy and external partnership with ACP countries.[12] Subsequent to the institutionalization of EU external action through the establishment of EEAS in 2011 the authors conceptualized the EU as a "*normative great power*" (…) having an agenda that "*encompasses a set of core values, notably, peace, democracy and the rule of law, and an ambition to spread these to the rest of the word*" (Bengtsson and Elgström, 2012, p. 95). Lisbeth Aggestam gave important insights again on the flexibility of role theory in conceptualizing role conflict and role conceptions focusing on the interaction between nation-state level and European level (Aggestam, 2018). The author—similarly to the original work of Holsti—explored how national role conceptions are linked and influencing European role conception and EU external action through CFSP. In the same year Stephan Klose analysed the EU's '*emerging actorness*' from an interactionist role theory perspective providing a new theoretical framework on the frequently discussed issue of EU actorness. Klose contributed to moving beyond the debate about the determination of EU as a power. In contrast with the existing literature which either focused on actorness or capacity, Klose, linking the two conceptualized the actorness of the EU as a capacity to (re)imagine and (re)create its own role providing a combination of Role Theory research and the concept of actorness (Klose, 2018).

The research of Klose is important in that sense that it includes almost all important elements leading the debate on EU external action such as EU *power*, *actor(ness)*, (military) *capacity* and *capability*, EU *identity*. Klose also introduced the Normative Power Europe concept by Ian Manners as the EU's meta-role[13] with also acknowledging the significance of the context-specific role theorization of EU external action, which is in the focus of this research. The latter was highlighted by Aggestam as well, emphasizing the highly context-sensitive nature of role enactment or role performance (Aggestam, 2018, p. 88). Aggestam revisited the theorization of EU external action in the framework of role theory again in 2021 focusing on the question of leadership as microscopic RT application for the EU as a case study. Aggestam's

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[12] the African, Caribbean, and Pacific states
[13] Meta-role in role theory is the most generic role of an actor in international politics which can be complemented and or questions by different conflict specific roles.

work is one of the most recent work on RT application and the EU predominantly focusing on internal elements affecting the construction of the EU's role conception connected to external action (Aggestam, 2021).

2.2 *EU External Action: actorness and the "Normative Power Europe" concept*

To be able to review literature in a structure manner, the author divided the relevant sources on EU external action into two large sections. These sections include the early years of EU ESDP from 2009 to 2009, and post-Lisbon literature from 2010[14] until present. Differentiating between ESDP and post-Lisbon literature is crucial as the institutionalization of EU Common Security and Defence Policy, as well as the establishment of the EEAS, were milestone developments of EU external action which is also reflected in the literature. As already noted through the work of Aggestam or Klose, Role Theory application in EU studies often intersects with the contemporary debate on EU power and actorness in international politics, which has been and are the subject of scholarly interest since the early years of EU integration.

2.2.1 *EU actorness and power in the pre-Lisbon era (2003-2009)*

During this first period, several different concepts surfaced on the topic of EU power, such as, one of the first of its kind, the "*civilian power Europe*" by François Duchêne in 1973 (Duchêne, 1973). Ever since, the EU has been vested with different concepts and roles in different contexts, such as "*normative power*" (Manners, 2002), "*ethical power*" (Aggestam, 2008), "*civilizing power*" (Manners, 2006) "*regional normative hegemon*" (Haukkala, 2008), an "*integrative power*" (Koops, 2010), a "*normative great power*" (Bengtsson and Elgström, 2012)*,* a "*liberal power*" (Wagner, 2017), or most recently a "*geoeconomic power*" (Biscop et al., 2022). A common element in all these different conceptualizations is that they all assert both indirectly and explicitly that the EU is a power, and/or the EU is vested with some kind of power as an actor in international politics. Additionally, another important common element in the literature referring to the EU as different 'kinds of power' is the overwhelming positive approach towards the EU, while critical voices, such as referring to the Union as a neocolonial or postcolonial power are rather scarce (see e.g. Mikelis, 2016; Staeger, 2016; Tholens and Ruffa, 2023). While this can stem from EU

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[14] While the Lisbon Treaty was signed in 2008 and came into force in 2009, I decided to categorize literature published from 2010 defined as post-Lisbon literature in this case considering the possible time of data collection and publishing times especially in the case of articles and books which are the most frequently used sources in this part of the literature review.

scholars being biased towards the subject of their professional interest and research, it can also be the consequence of the fact that most of these conceptualizations were born out of or directly built on previous conceptualizations of the Union, such as Duchene's civilian power Europe, or Manner's NPE concept. These were dominantly conceptualized before Brexit and the surge of critical approaches to the EU, its external action and its "value-based" nature.

Regardless of the underlying assumption on what kind of power the EU is, one of the most salient or most frequently revisited conceptualizations to date out of aforementioned ones is the Normative Power Europe (NPE). The NPE concept by Ian Manners has been shaping and reshaping thinking on EU's role in international politics ever since (Manners, 2021, 2006, 2002). Manners laying out the NPE concept first in 2002, argued that the EU was both created and built on values deeply rooted and explicitly mentioned in the Treaties[15] which *"predisposes it to act in a normative way in world politics"* (Manners, 2002, p. 252). Manners in the original establishment of the NPE also building on Duchene's *civilian power Europe* idea arguing that the unique power identity of the Union derives from three key notions, elements: European historical context; the special hybrid identity or polity of the EU; and—what Whitman later describes as "*political-legal constitutionalism*"—the EU's treaty-based legality and nature (Manners, 2002; Whitman, 2011a, p. 5). In Manners' NPE concept, EU power's normative nature lies with the EU's ability to shape '*normal'* with not necessarily "*what it says or does, but what it is*" (Manners, 2002, p. 252). A crucial aspect of Manners idea on EU power is how this normative identity is mirrored in norm diffusion such as the "*relative absence of physical force in the imposition of norms*" (Manners, 2002, p. 244). This piece of literature sparked a debate on the EU's unique nature and role in international politics predominantly between European scholars in the early years of EU European Security and Defence Policy (Aggestam, 2008; Diez, 2005; Hyde-Price, 2006; Sjursen, 2006). One of the reasons for such vibrant scholarly debate on the issue was that the EU launched its first military operations in 2003, a year after Manners' published the NPE concept, as well as in an era, where the EU was largely understood and viewed as a civilian power relying on soft power or non-military instruments.

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[15] Constitutive treaties of the European Union: Treaty on European Union – TEU and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – TFEU

Diez and Hyde-Price both provided critical insights on the NPE concept from a realist perspective, while Sjursen pointed out the relative nature of what is '*normal*', and the possible distinct interpretations of values and norms (Diez, 2005; Hyde-Price, 2006; Sjursen, 2006). Aggestam further reflecting on the debate around the NPE introduced a new concept, the "*ethical power Europe*" to the literature as the EU's own self-conceptualization for "*doing good*". This understanding of EU power resonated with the valued-based approach deriving from the Treaties also highlighted by Manners (Aggestam, 2008, p. 2). While not directly reflecting to the NPE concept, Janne Haaland Matlary enriched the literature on EU actorness from exploring the contribution of the human security approach and the "*force for good*"[16] reasoning behind EU military capability development (Matlary, 2006). Matlary's idea conceptually coincides with Aggestam's ethical power Europe.

Additionally, Manners revisited and further clarified the NPE concept in 2006. He emphasized that while the enhanced militarization of the EU can be a risk for its normative identity, referring to the Petersberg Tasks, also previously highlighted by the author as an important element in guiding EU external action. However, he argued that being a normative power allows carrying out such interventions of military nature "*in a critically reflexive context, on a clear, normative basis*" (Manners, 2006, p. 195).

Haukkala analysed the EU neighbourhood policy—a popular topic at the time right after the "*Big Bang Enlargement*"[17] —and the EU's role as "*regional normative hegemon*" has found that the prospective EU membership in approving EU regional normative power was a great legitimizing force (Haukkala, 2008). In the same year, Asle Toje pointed out that the prerequisite of the EU's normative power is the relative peace in the continent allowing the EU further seeking "*stability along its borders through positive measures, notably the prospect of EU membership*" (Toje, 2008, p. 208). Toje also highlighted that EU power and intervention was different in African regional context than in other areas of strategic interest, or in neighbourhood policy, as the EU had space to use hard power due to the continent being less of a space for great power competition than other regions (Toje, 2008). This piece of literature is important as it provides a glimpse of the opportunities at the disposal of the EU to live

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[16] the "*force for good*" referenced to previous British prime minister, Tony Blair, is frequently cited in connection with the first EU Security Strategy (ESS) from 2003 as a legitimizing argument for developing and using military capabilities in the (early) years of ESDP between 2003 and 2009.

[17] Big Bang Enlargement refers to the EU enlargement in 2004, when 10 new members joined the European Union together.

up to its value-based expectations in its role as a normative power during the 2000's in contrast with the new reality of the regional security dynamics in the last decade. This contemporary reality is also true to the African continent, which in contrast with Toje's argument today is an important theatre of strategic competition where one of the main tools of the competition is through being a security assistance provider (Abdulle and Gurpinar, 2019; Bailey, 2024; Deneckere et al., 2020; Egmont Institute, 2019; Guiryanan et al., 2021). See more on this aspect of SFA by different providers including the European Union in subchapter 2.5. Lastly, as an important piece of literature and primary source for this research, the EU's first security strategy, the European Security Strategy (ESS) adopted in 2003 has to be mentioned. This is analysed in Chapter 5.

2.2.2   EU actorness and power after the Lisbon Treaty (2010-2024)

The early years of institutionalization of the Common Foreign and Security Policy upon the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty made scholars to rethink the NPE idea and boosted the discussion on EU external action in general in the scholarly world. Manners himself, again, contributed to the post-Lisbon literature as well as several occasions (Manners, 2021, 2013, 2006). In 2011, a book was published dedicated to the Normative Power Europe concept edited by Richard Whitman in 2011 and titled *Norms, Power and Europe: A New Agenda for Study of the EU and International Relations* (Whitman, 2011b). Whitman summarizing the NPE-related literature and the result of the theorization and conceptualization of the normative approach on the EU highlights that the evolution of the concept made it possible to look at the EU in a framework which goes beyond the hard power versus soft power dichotomy (Whitman, 2011b). From a role theory perspective this further facilitated the diversification of the role of states and international actors, such as EU moving beyond the civilian vs. military or great power vs. small power binary.

As highlighted previously, the aforementioned argument led not only early role theorist, including Holsti himself, but also Manners' line of thought on EU power in the light of the Union's unique nature and identity. Chapters of the book allowed scholars exploring different perspectives on EU normative power such as noting its limitations from a political perspective (Bickerton, 2011), and linking NPE with different aspects of EU external action, such as military operations (Björkdahl, 2011), development policy (Birchfield, 2011) or conflict transformation (Diez and Pace, 2011). Björkdahl, researching the normative power identity of Europe vis-à-vis

multinational peace operations argued that *"EU can be both normative and powerful but it needs to couple its traditional normative powers with its newly developed military capacity in order to meet the security challenges and expectations from conflict-ridden societies around the world"* (Björkdahl, 2011, p. 103). While some researchers claimed that being a normative power is incompatible with the use of force, most authors, including Björkdahl and Manners himself, further reiterated that normative power is not the opposite of military power (Björkdahl, 2011; Manners, 2006). Instead, both Manners and Björkdahl suggest that being a normative power presupposes the 'proper' use of hard power or military instruments.

Daniela Sicurelli used the normative approach combined with sociological institutionalism in exploring the EU's Africa policies, including foreign policy and conflict management (Sicurelli, 2016). Sicurelli highlighted how the normative approach of the EU—and its institutions— and the different understanding and institutionalization of norms can lead to distinct norm diffusion, which she explored through the EU's external action towards Sub-Saharan Africa. Similarly to some scholars applying role theory who chooses a meso-or microscopic level of analysis[18] for EU external action, Sicurelli focused on the role of different EU institution in foreign policy articulation instead of solely conceptualizing the EU as one single actor towards the Sub-Saharan Africa region (Sicurelli, 2016). Jan Orbie highlighted that NPE was beneficial for several reasons, including being a force that "*shifted the attention to cross-cutting objectives of the EU*", which term is widely and commonly used to characterize gender equality related topics both in EU communication as well as in academia, as it was also highlighted in Chapter 1. of this dissertation (Orbie, 2011, p. 161).

Gender equality as closely connected to the core norms constituting the normative nature of EU power was also addressed by both EU and NPE research in several cases including by Manners himself co-authoring with Andrea Pető in 2006 (Peto and Manners, 2006). Feminist voices and gender perspective in exploring EU external action and the normative power Europe idea have also become more present in the literature lately. For instance, Roberta Guerrina and Katharine A. M. Wright linking feminist perspectives with NPE inquired about the "*normative gender power Europe*" as well as other elements of the gender architecture or "*gender regime*" in

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[18] see more on the different levels of analysis in Role Theory research in Chapter 3.

EU external action (Chappell and Guerrina, 2020; Guerrina and Wright, 2016).[19] These perspective specific to gender equality and gender mainstreaming in the EU are explored in the subsequent subchapter.

Manners summarizing the first ten years of literature on NPE in 2013 concluded that by the early 2010's a strong body of literature was constructed on the topic leading to the creation of the *normative power approach* (NPA) also extending the discussion to non-EU actors and cases (Manners, 2013). NPE or NPA have become somehow present and discussed in all major special volumes, books and issues connected to EU external action, including the advancing literature on EU strategic actorness. Moreover, the line between NPE as a concept and NPA as an approach has been rather blurry in the literature with scholars sometimes using the two interchangeably. This differentiation and their use in this research are elaborated in Chapter 3. dedicated to the theoretical and conceptual framework.

Building on the first ten years of EU military operations as well as the early years of institutionalized EU external action, CFSP and CSDP implemented by the EEAS, scholars further enriched the literature on EU power, actorness and its normative nature. In 2014, Trineke Palm researching the case of North Macedonia found that EU military operation, Operation Concordia does not contradict the EU's normative identity or approach. Nevertheless, she noted that the operation was "*more important for the EU itself to show that it was able to intervene militarily and to rectify the European failure to act in the past, than that the security situation in Macedonia itself required military intervention*" (Palm, 2014). Palm's argument is important vis-à-vis the issue of mission effectiveness as well when considering whether being military effective or being present and demonstrate power by military deployment is the goal of security force assistance or any CSDP engagement.

Important element of the post-Lisbon literature is the rather new approach towards EU external action with conceptualizing EU as a security provider, which was frequently connected to repeated EU engagement and military intervention in the African continent. In 2015 Gorm Rye Olsen argued from a realist perspective that French and US foreign and security policy dominantly influenced the EU intervention in Africa. Olsen noted analysing why EU foreign and security policy started to stretch

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[19] Literature on gender equality and gender mainstreaming as elements of EU's normative profile and EU external action is further explored subsequently in Subchapter 1.3.

from the close neighbourhood to Sub-Saharan Africa regions that the EU gained "*inspiration from the US Global War on Terror*" while supporting African countries in countering terrorism as it was previously also highlighted in the introductory chapter (Olsen, 2015, p. 236). In 2016, exploring another perspective on EU external action from a normative approach vis-à-vis Africa, Ueli Staeger highlighted the neocolonial, paternalistic approach towards Africa stemming from the NPE narrative (Staeger, 2016). As previously noted, similar reflections were made questioning "what normal is" by Sjursen. Additionally, Staeger's piece was an example of a growing list of critical reflections on the EU's normative power in contrast with the dominantly positive early conceptual contributions highlighted before 'naming EU power'.

While referring to the EU as a security provider got more and more attention in the post-Lisbon literature, theoretical and conceptual contributions on this angle of EU external action were often neglected in these accounts. Reflecting on this deficiency of the literature was addressed by Annemarie Peen Rodt, A. P., Richard G. Whitman & Stefan in 2016 "*in search of a mid-range theory for theorizing EU as an international security provider*" (Peen Dodt et al., 2016). The authors in this piece made important conceptual contributions to EU actorness and power in the context of being a security provider. This piece also facilitated the understanding of why it is a challenging task to do so invoking the reasoning of the EU's unique, sui generis nature also argued by Manners (2002).

In 2019, Trineke Palm and Ben Crum analysed EU's actorness and normative power vis-à-vis military operations in the context of justification and policy-embeddedness. They concluded "*on the one hand, that the political/strategic embeddedness of EU military missions and operations has significantly strengthened since the beginning in 2003, on the other hand, on the interest-based/ value-based axes, interest-based reasons for peace operations have been on the rise pushing the EU's identity to a more realist direction*" (Palm and Crum, 2019; Gracza Hornyák forthcoming 2025a,) Most recently, Simone Tholens and Chiara Ruffa's addition to the literature explored EU as a security provider specifically from a security assistance (SA) perspective formulating a decolonial critique to the topic focusing on empirical cases in the Mediterranean region (Tholens and Ruffa, 2023). This piece is another example of the critical reflections—in line with Staeger—addressing EU external action from postcolonial perspectives.

Lastly, one of the most important pieces of literature also recently referencing both NPE and NPA is the work of Sieglinde Gstöhl and Simon Schunz from 2021. This book serves for both analytical purposes and as a textbook-style guidance for those interested in contemporary EU external action. The authors argued that the rich literature on EU external action gathered throughout the two decades of EU working towards a common policy on security and defence led to a new discipline, called EU External Action Studies (EUEAS) in the intersection of EU Studies, IR and FPA research (Gstöhl and Schunz, 2021a). In this book Manners revisited his previous articles on NPE providing theoretical and conceptual insights on a broader normative approach in the framework of planetary politics (Manners, 2021). Moreover, Guerrina contributed with feminist insights to EUEAS, while Aggestam highlighted vital elements of role theory application in contemporary EU foreign, security and defence policy (Gstöhl and Schunz, 2021a).

Finally, similarly to the pre-Lisbon era, the two security strategies as important guiding documents and primary sources are to be mentioned with regards to the time frame of 2010 and 2024: the European Global Strategy (EUGS) from 2016 and the European Strategic Compass (ESC) from 2022, which are analysed in detail in Chapter 5. of the dissertation.

2.3   *Gender mainstreaming and the EU*

Literature on gender mainstreaming as a new, predominantly policy-focused concept started to arise in the late 20th century. A Council of Europe (CoE) document from 1998 defined and conceptualized gender mainstreaming (GM) building on the legacy of the United Nations Third Conference on Women taken place in 1985 in Nairobi, where gender mainstreaming, "*as a new concept, appeared for the first time in international texts*"(Council of Europe, 1998, p. 12). This was further reinforced by the 1995 Fourth UN conference in Beijing previously highlighted. The 1998 CoE document clarifies how GM is different, but closely related to gender equality policy (GEP), and offers best practises and methodology on how GM can be implemented. The main difference between the two as asserted by CoE is that while GEP is one, single and specific policy to enhance gender equality, gender mainstreaming—as a cross-cutting issue—is a policy or perspective integrated in all different policy areas from agriculture to trade (Council of Europe, 1998).

With rather similar timing, the European Union also indirectly introduced GM to its functioning and core values on the highest possible, constitutional level with integrating it into the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 with a direct focus on employment (Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997). However, with the adoption of the first Women, Peace and Security resolution by UNSCR1325 in 2000, gender mainstreaming's focus was broadened and applied to foreign and security issues as well, specifically conflict resolution and sustainable peace (United Nations Security Council, 2000). Correspondingly, subsequent WPS resolution and broader literature[20] have directly impacted not only the integration of the WPS agenda into EU ESDP in the late 2000's, but EU specific scholarship on the topic as well. EU and gender equality in broader terms has a rather extensive literature (Abels et al., 2021; Eulriet, 2009; Johnston, 2021). However, specific to the focus of this research the subsequent review of relevant scholarship studies three angles of the EU and gender topic specifically: gender equality as a norm in EU power and identity; gender mainstreaming in EU external action, including CFSP and CSDP; and finally, gender mainstreaming in EU missions and operations, including capacity building practices. Accordingly, this literature review does not cover gender mainstreaming practices or gender equality policy in other policy areas, such as agriculture, trade or industrial policy. However, it touches upon scholarship specific to overall and EU-specific Women, Peace and Security implementation. As one of the initial research propositions suggests, this research asserts that the WPS normative framework fundamentally effected EU gender mainstreaming practices vis-à-vis external action, specifically CSFP and CSDP. This argument is built on position of Kirby and Shepherd—one of the most prominent scholars on WPS—that the Women, Peace and Security normative framework has become "*a major international gender equality initiative in its own right and as a prominent example of the broadening of security practices in global politics*" (Kirby and Shepherd, 2021, p. 1).

As one of the earliest accounts, Christine Booth and Cinnamon Bennett (2002) explored opportunities and challenges stemming from gender mainstreaming in the EU (Booth and Bennett, 2002). Subsequently Andrea Pető with Ian Manners—the

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[20] see e.g.: Davies, S. E. & True, J. 2018. *The Oxford Handbook of Women, Peace, and Security*. Oxford University Press; Basu, S., Kirby, P., & Shepherd, L. 2020. Women, Peace and Security: A Critical Cartography. In S. Basu et. al. ed. 2020. *New Directions in Women, Peace and Security* (pp. 1-26). Bristol University Press; Shepherd, L. ed. 2022. *The Women, Peace and Security Agenda: Place, Space, and Knowledge Production*. Routledge;

author of the Normative Power Europe concept—in 2006 summarized the EU gender equality policies from a normative point of view elaborating on how gender equality as a value was presented in EU policies from early in the integration (Peto and Manners, 2006). Specifically focusing on development and enlargement policies, both being strongly connected to the EU external action, the authors noted that the "*EU seeks (...) the promotion of gender equality as part of its development policy*" and gender equality in the EU has become a "*consensual public value*" in the 2000's (Peto and Manners, 2006, pp. 101–103). In 2014, Alison E. Woodward and Anna van der Vleuten highlighted in their piece on the EU exporting gender equality as a norm that being a gender equality champion is core part of the identity of the European Union (Woodward and van der Vleuten, 2014). These two pieces of literature also both demonstrated the early focus on employment as a first EU policy building on the norm of gender equality, as well as development and enlargement policy as further basis of EU GM practices subsequently leading to a broader understanding of gender equality in the post-Lisbon era. Moreover, Woodward and van der Vleuten also highlighted that many norms are "*imported from international interactions, while the export frequently occurs in a multilevel game of actors, agents, stakeholders, structures and institutions*" (Woodward and van der Vleuten, 2014). This reinforces both the top-down UN-originated import of WPS principles into EU ESDP and subsequently CSDP, as well as indirectly asserting that these norms, including gender equality are further exported through norm transfer.

Katharine A. M. Wright contributed to the literature by looking at the issue of security from perspective of Feminist Security Studies (FSS) with arguing that "*security is a deeply gendered issue*" (Wright, 2019, p. 1). Establishing her argument on the gendered nature of security, Wright analysed institutional aspects of CSDP from FSS perspective and the link between CSDP and the WPS agenda (Wright, 2019). Roberta Guerrina—an important researcher enriching EU studies with gendered perspectives through many scholarly pieces—summarized how gender mainstreaming developed and has been integrated to the EU processes and institutions in the last 20 years, while together with Laura Chapell explored how GM has become an institutionalized policy of the EU External Action Service (Chappell and Guerrina, 2020; Guerrina, 2020).

In addition to scholarly pieces, a number of policy-focused articles enriched the literature on the three angles in the focus of this literature review on EU WPS, GM and

gender as an important normative element in EU external action. Policy-focused analysis on EU external action from a gender perspective was also discussed by the EU's own think tank, the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS). EUISS—"*an autonomous EU agency that is intellectually independent and funded by the EU Member States*"—policy brief by Maline Meiske (2015) highlighted many important issues, including challenges of GM in CSDP (European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2017; Meiske, 2015). Meiske noted, for instance, that no sex-disaggregated data is was specifically collected from CSDP mission at the time of the writing in 2015, and cited the approximated ratio of females present in missions by the EU Military Staff as an estimated 3-8% of current uniformed personnel (Meiske, 2015). Importance of this piece is clearly differentiating conceptually between gender mainstreaming and gender balancing, which, as the author noted is a challenge which can be primarily addressed by individual member states, not the EU or its policies. This was an important contribution of the book authored and co-edited by Egnell and Alam (2019). Empirical case studies in this book also highlight the different arguments and their origins which countries, such as Sweden and the Netherlands, or international organizations, like NATO adopted trying to legitimize "gender" in a military environment (Egnell and Alam, 2019).

Finally, Taina Järvinen (2017) studied EU action on WPS in the framework of CSDP focusing on existing policies and institutional structure as well as notes on gender balance in EU security and defence (Järvinen, 2017). Lastly, Karin L. Johnston in 2021 reported on core pillars of gender mainstreaming in the EU, including CSDP, such as participation, representation and institutional framework (Johnston, 2021).

2.3.1 *EU gender mainstreaming literature specific to CSDP missions and operations and capacity building practices*

Literature also includes pieces within the intersection of EU CSDP, gender mainstreaming and security sector reform (SSR). Nadine Ansorg and Toni Haastrup while focusing on EU SSR efforts in the cases of Afghanistan and Ukraine from a feminist institutionalist perspective argued that EU's own limitations affect the effective integration of gender mainstreaming in SSR efforts (Ansorg and Haastrup, 2018). Important findings of this research showed not only the critical role of

individual agents, called "*femocrats*"[21], in SSR in EU capacity building efforts, but also pointed out how GM policy expectations are reflected in civilian CSDP missions. The authors also concluded based on anecdotal evidence from the Ukraine and Afghanistan, that the EU internally was not able to translate and operationalize gender mainstreaming practices agreed at a political-strategic level.

Similar critical feminist reflections on EU SSR came from the contribution of Shyamika Jayasundara-Smits who researched the topic and the NPE debate through two civilian missions case studies. Jayasundara-Smits found that EU "*missions' visual representations are thus not only gendered, but also conditioned by geo-political relations and racialised, inadvertently exposing continuities in historically entrenched biases and prejudices about "Eastern" and "Southern" local partner communities and actors, both men and women*" (Jayasundara-Smits, 2021, p. 103). The authors findings are vital in terms of enriching the NPE literature specific to gender in the context of EU and third country security cooperation specific to Global South, which is also in the focus of this research. Maria-Adriana Deiana and Kenneth McDonagh (2018) explored how different actors and personnel perceives and interprets WPS and gender mainstreaming related issues in EEAS and EULEX Kosovo civilian mission relying on qualitative methodology (Deiana and McDonagh, 2018). The authors argued that WPS implementation and practices are highly dependent on individual interpretations on gender issues in general, which frequently shows ambivalence and different associations internally in the mission and in EEAS (Deiana and McDonagh, 2018). Such findings reinforcing the arguments of Ansorg and Haastrup (2018) with regards to the role of individual agents in gender mainstreaming in EU external action based on their varying understanding on gender, gender equality or gender mainstreaming.

Lastly, Lackenbauer and Jonsson (2014) addressing WPS implementation in capacity building missions studied EUTM Somalia and Mali, the latter being in place for only for a couple of months at the time of the writing in 2013-2014. Relying on qualitative interviews as dominant methodology, this piece is rich in anecdotal evidence specifically on the early years of EUTM Somalia with regards to WPS

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[21] femocrat is a concept theorized by feminist scholars, referring to feminist agent who are often act as important agents of change in gendered processes, institutions, etc. In the EU context, femocrats are EU experts, practitioners and policy-makers who are pushing for gender equality and or gender mainstreaming in different policy contexts.

implementation. Additionally, as the interviewed personnel for this research as well as the conceptual assumption are based on doctrines and practices of the Swedish Armed Forces, this article is an important point of reference for the Swedish influence on the integration of WPS and GM practices into CSDP and SSR. Finally, an article written by the author of this dissertation on GM in EU military training missions argued that non-executive, training missions of the EU can be seen as "*the stronghold of the EU normative power*" (Gracza Hornyák, forthcoming, 2025a, p. 1). In 2024, the author of this dissertation co-authoring with Anna Molnár explored the implementation of the WPS agenda in EU CSDP missions with the most distinct approach comparing EULEX Kosovo civilian missions and EUNAVFOR Med Irini naval military operation. The findings reinforced that gender mainstreaming principles and policies are highly context-specific and different elements of military CSDP, such as troop contributing countries or deployed assets cause high variety in possible implementation efforts (Molnár and Gracza Hornyák, 2024).

Likewise in the case of EU security strategies as important literature and primary sources vis-à-vis EU external action, report, strategic and operational documents and policies on WPS implementation and gender mainstreaming are integral part of the literature. In this regard, one of the most relevant and recent documents is the EU Strategic Approach to Women, Peace and Security (Council of the European Union, 2018). This strategic document replaced the Comprehensive Approach (2008) to the EU implementation of the UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 on WPS, and was reinforced with a more operational one, the EU Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) 2019-2024 (Council of the European Union, 2019). These are studied in detail in Chapter 7. of this dissertation.

Additional important documents allowing the exploration of EU internal and external gender mainstreaming procedures and institutional background. The *Guidelines for Mission Management and Staff on Gender Mainstreaming* elaborated by civilian mission commander of the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability in EEAS (CPCC, 2018, 2024), which, despite their specific civilian nature contributes to the understanding and conceptualizing gender mainstreaming in EUTMs as well. Documents specific to military CSDP to be mentioned are the Training Requirement Analysis on Gender by the EU Military Staff (2020), the Standard Operating Procedures 112-22 EUMS Gender Expertise and Coordination (2022) and the Gender Action Plan of the EU Military Staff (2022). Some of the most relevant documents on

military CSDP and gender mainstreaming were adopted very recently in 2024. These includes the European Union Military Concept on Integrating a Gender Perspective in the Military CSDP (2024). As Chapter 7. on gender mainstreaming and its subchapter on GM specific to military CSDP and SFA centres its analysis around these documents, they are not detailed in the literature review.

2.4 Literature on CSDP military missions and operations

As also underlined regarding the academic debate on EU actorness and power, scholars following the development of CSDP in the post-Lisbon era were challenged by theorizing and conceptualizing EU external action, EU military intervention and different forms of security assistance. The struggle mainly stems from the fact, as Nováky argued, that '*it had never happened before in the long history of international relations that an actor that began its life as a regulator of coal and steel production among its members eventually created a capability to deploy military force*.' (Nováky, 2018, p. 8). From the first deployments of EU missions and operations in 2003, the early years of engagement with this new tool of the EU foreign and security policy in the framework of ESDP has led to great scholarly attention. However, literature was more focused on civilian missions mostly for practical reasons. On the one hand, most EU missions launched between 2003 and 2009 were of civilian nature, in total 16 out of the 22 (Gracza Hornyák, 2024; see also Appendix 1.). On the other hand, the six military operations conducted by the EU apart from EUFOR Althea in Bosnia were short term, small footprint operations, which made the data collection complicated both due to the novelty of EU military intervention itself, as well as the nature of military operations (Peen Rodt, 2014).

Marking the end of the first decade of ESDP intervention Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane (2009) summarized the major milestones and lines of development, including missions and operations, while Luis Simón wrote specifically on the command and control (C2) structure and planning of EU military operations (Grevi et al., 2009; Simón, 2010). Besides these comprehensive, most dominantly descriptive summaries, Beata Gorka-Winter reported from the 2nd EU Strategic Forum in her article "*EU Operational Engagement: Struggling for Efficiency*" (Gorka-Winter, 2007). While the author argued that EU engagement in the early years of ESDP was quite successful, she further emphasized that the efficiency of EU interventions are directly connected to a) whether the EU clearly outlines its

role as an international actor, and b) whether the EU has a clear "*entry strategy*" when intervening (Gorka-Winter, 2007, pp. 8–9). Alexander Mattelaer also focused specifically on EU missions and operations and highlighted that EU command and control (C2) structures and operational planning mechanisms are building on existing NATO doctrines including using them for civilian missions (Mattelaer, 2010). Most of these accounts on the early years of EU CSDP and military intervention were heavily policy-focused with the aim of trying to make 'sense' of these new elements of EU security and defence policy—not yet theorized and conceptualized as it was highlighted earlier in this chapter—and how it is embodied in external action, crisis management and stability operations. In other words, many pieces rather focus on questions on 'what' instead of 'how' or 'why'.

In the post-Lisbon structures—with the establishment of EEAS and ESDP becoming another common policy—the number of more theoretical and conceptual-focused articles, books on the issue proliferated, with more enhanced emphasis on military CSDP. In 2013, Katarina Engberg analysed EU military operations and "*the dynamics behind the EU's collective use of force*" finding that local actors and the advanced role of regional organizations in the given conflict or crisis context are key influencing factors in whether the EU decides to intervene militarily (Engberg, 2013). Tommi Koivula in 2016 focusing explicitly on military operations provided a comprehensive view on the military dimension on CSDP including linking important approaches and concepts, such as NPE or the human security approach to EU military intervention (Koivula, 2016). Nováky (2018) theorizing EU military operations with collective action approach highlighted the specificities of deployment arguing that in the CSDP context, the conceptualization and understanding the deployment is crucial, because the decision-making or the force generation processes are immensely different from other cases. With these findings Nováky provided evidence for the lack of what Gorka-Winter (2007) called as a clear 'entry strategy' referring to the consistency in when and how the EU intervenes with crisis management or stabilization operations a decade later. Furthermore, Nováky noted that despite the expectation of the biggest enlargement of the EU in 2004 would seriously challenge the ability of EU Member States to agree on launching military missions and operations, it did not cause such impact, as trust in military crisis management stayed intact (Nováky, 2018). Petros Violakis in his book exploring the Europeanization of EU security and defence policy as well as missions and operations made important conceptual and comparative

contributions to CSDP (Violakis, 2018). Nevertheless, the author fell short on highlighting the difference between distinct CSDP missions and operations of military nature and touching upon the enhanced use of non-executive military missions, or security force assistance in contemporary EU security and defence policy. Bejnamin Pohl (2014) studied on how engagement through military intervention in the CSDP toolbox linked to different theories, concepts—including NPE—and empirical analysis on different case studies, including Bosnia, Kosovo or Chad. However, similarly to Violakis, in spite of highlighting that "*there is widespread consensus across the Atlantic that the training of local security forces, including the police in particular, needs to be enhanced*" referring to the case of Afghanistan, EU-led security force assistance and military missions are only mentioned between the listing of existing EU-led CSDP missions (Pohl, 2015)xy). These early, post-Lisbon accounts were in many cases examples of an interim period in terms of largely neglecting EU military train and equip missions, and not yet differentiate between executive and non-executive CSDP interventions of military nature. This can also be explained by only EUTM Somalia being in place at that time—and EUTM Mali being in the making—as new elements of EU CSDP still waiting to be analysed and conceptualized as a new emerging policy tool in EU external action.

Additionally, a number of literatures have also examined EU missions and operations with different focuses such as mandate, country-specific context or institutional framework, and from different angles. These included feminist insights and gender perspective also described in the previous subchapter (Olsson et al., 2014) or from the angle of the local population and civil society (see e.g. Zarembo, 2016; Palm, 2017). Anna Molnár and Mariann Vecsey explored CSDP efforts vis-à-vis migration in 2022 (Molnár and Vecsey, 2022). Recently, Péter Dely and the author of this dissertation with Mariann Tánczos (2024) analysed EU C2 and planning structures with a more descriptive approach comparing the procedures in the case of civilian and military CSDP missions and operations (Dely, 2021; Hornyák and Tánczos, 2024). Fernando Moreno, as a previous EU military planner and practitioner, contributed to the understanding of the institutional process of EU CSDP military planning, including operation planning of military missions and operations in 2021 (Moreno, 2021). These pieces, while all dominantly focused on policy or institutional and procedural aspects of CSDP missions and operations are important additions to the literature. These accounts often helped understanding EU procedures from the perspective of looking

at the Union as a military actor and security provider, as well as reflecting on the quickly evolving nature of military CSDP, such as the already highlighted diversification with the establishment of the first EU non-executive military mission in Somalia, and later in Mali and the Central African Republic (CAR) (see Appendix 1.). Similarly, in 2020 synthesis report by the EU think tank, EUISS, reflecting on the 20 years of CSDP development pointed out important limitations of EU missions and operations, including referring to EU military capabilities as *"over-institutionalised, under-equipped and strategically divided"* by Claudia Major and Christian Mölling, but also reflecting on the EU becoming a *"military actor"* by Daniel Fiott (Fiott, 2020).

Finally, EU institutional documents as well as report, policy documents and strategies issued by EU institutions and body served as important part of the literature. European Parliament comprehensive report on CSDP missions and operations from 2020, and monthly updated individual mission/ operation factsheets provided vital and up-to-date facts and figures on personnel, troop contributing countries, or mandates (European Parliament, 2024a; European Parliament Directorate General for External Policies of the Union, 2020). Such documents often provided much needed data for analysis, such as number of personnel deployed, which was and is still hard to obtain in the case of EU CSDP mission outside of the organization. Lastly, conclusions and decisions of the Council of the European Union, as well as strategic and operational documents by EEAS and the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) also essential primary sources. Similarly, publications by the European Security and Defence College provided important annual updates on CSDP, including special perspectives on missions and operations (see e.g. European Security and Defence College, 2020, 2020; European Security and Defence College., 2022).

2.4.1 *CSDP capacity building and security (force) assistance*

Different perspective on EU-led civilian and military capacity and capability building of partner countries is also present in the literature with reference to such activities through different concepts, including, most often, security sector reform (SSR). Alicia Cebada Romero focused on EU SSR efforts in the framework of EU external action more broadly in 2013 and explored the topic through civilian CSDP in case study Democratic Republic of the Congo (Cebada Romero, 2017, 2013). Timothy Edmunds, Ana E. Juncos and Gilberto Algar-Faria (2018) addressed EU capacity building, including SSR efforts referring to them as issues in the heart of CSDP missions and operations (Edmunds et al., 2018). The authors studying three different

case studies, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Somaliland, concluded that EU SSR efforts are primarily focused on enhancing local partner capacities in security and defence which ultimately is an added value to the Union's own security. However, the Edmunds et al. also concluded that this approach also resulted in EU SSR efforts suffering from "*legitimacy deficit*" (Edmunds et al., 2018, p. 236). The launch of the new financing mechanisms for military purposes by the EU, the European Peace Facility (EPF) in 2021 also gave new impetus to scholars exploring EU military training missions. EPF as an advanced tool for financing military CSDP missions and partnerships for the EU also led to the revival of the 'arming peace' discussion among scholars and practitioners, which was and is present in broader security assistance and SFA specific scholarship, and in the literature on EU CSDP in Africa previously financed by the African Peace Facility (APF) (Frisell and Sjökvist, 2021)[22].

Nevertheless, relevant literature exclusively on EU military missions—also known as non-executive military missions and conceptualized as SFA mission[23]—which are in the centre of this dissertation is still rather limited. This relative scarcity of EU SFA related literature is due to several different elements, including the continuously evolving, relatively young nature or EU-led SFA as well as the often very small footprint of these mission (Gracza Hornyák, 2024a). Since the first military training mission was launched by the EU in Somalia in 2010, most scholarship provided predominantly empirical perspectives relying mostly on qualitative or mix-method methodology. Mariann Vecsey (Vecsey, 2023, 2016; Wagner and Vecsey, 2022) noted papers on EU military training missions in the context of EU action in the African continent and to Ukraine, while Pierre Minard (2017) focused on the lessons learned processes as a form of institutional learning through EU military training missions (Minard, 2017). In many instances these case studies on EU military missions were part of the discussion or research on a broader regional focus of the EU, such as the Sahel region or the Horn of Africa (Borrajo and de Castro, 2016; Molnár and Vecsey, 2022; Raineri and Baldaro, 2020).

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[22] see also in: Patricia L. Sullivan, Leo J. Blanken & Ian C. Rice (2020) Arming the Peace: Foreign Security Assistance and Human Rights Conditions in Post-Conflict Countries, Defence and Peace Economics, 31:2, 177-200, DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2018.1558388; and Claes Nilsson, Kristina Zetterlund (2011) Arming the Peace- The Sensitive Business of Capacity Building, FOI, https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI-R--3269--SE; Wanki, J.E., 2011. Disarming war, arming peace: The Congo crisis, Dag Hammarskjöld's legacy and the future role of MONUC in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. African Journal on Conflict Resolution, 11(1).

[23] Typology, definitions and conceptual elements of EU CSDP is discussed in detail in Chapter 6.

However, there are very few case studies with specific and sole focus EU military training missions or SFA missions, such as that of EUTM Somalia (Williams and Ali, 2020), or EUTM RCA (Hickendorff & Acko, 2021). Many of the existing few pieces on EUTMs were published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in recent years, including the one of most comprehensive analysis published in 2022 by Jaïr van der Lijn, Virginie Baudais, Annelies Hickendorff, Paul D. Williams, Igor Acko, Souleymane Maïga and Hussein Yusuf Ali (Van Der Lijn et al., 2022). SIPRI's *"EU Military Training Missions: A Synthesis Report"* gathering existing knowledge on EU military training missions[24]—as the most comprehensive piece specifically EUTMs in the time of the writing of this dissertation—found that these missions are burdened by numerous different challenges, such as being understaffed, functioning with a very limited mandate, or struggling with adequately coordinating properly with other international partners on the ground (Van Der Lijn et al., 2022). Additionally, as it is also detailed in Chapter 6. of this dissertation, there are only a handful of scholarly pieces which go beyond policy analysis and engage in conceptualizing EU military missions or EU-led security force assistance. Emma Skeppström et al. (2015), as one of the few scholarly pieces, explored the possible conceptualization of EU military training missions, the effects of EU training missions on security sector reform (SSR) and state security in case of fragile states such as Mali and Somalia. Skeppström et al. understanding EU military training missions as a pillar of overall EU SSR argued that '*additional steps are needed to make the EUTM missions fully consistent with EU policy on SSR*' (Skeppström et al., 2015, p. 365). In contrast with this idea, other researchers explicitly refer to training missions, such as EUTM Somalia, as SSR missions (Oksamytna, 2011a). These conceptual differences, such as viewing EU SFA missions as SSR mission or one pillar of SSR, and the lack of clarity on framing definitions led the author of this dissertation to engage in a more conceptual discussion on EU military training missions as SFA missions and localizing them in the current EU CSFP framework in Chapter 6.

Lastly, EU Training Mission Mozambique, in Ukraine and in Niger due to their very young nature, Mozambique launched in 2021, while Ukraine and Niger in 2023, have not been analysed thoroughly yet. Only a couple of scientific sources and EU

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[24] The report covers EUTM Somalia, EUTM Mali, EUTM RCA, as the ongoing EU training missions in the time of the writing.

policy documents and factsheets make it possible to study the newest EU CSDP mission (Gracza Hornyák, 2024a; Ostanina, 2023; Wagner and Vecsey, 2022; Zajączkowski, 2021).

2.4.2 Effectiveness and impact in CSDP and EU capacity building

The issue of effectiveness is frequently present not only in the EU's own communication and discourses on CSDP intervention, but in the literature as well. The phenomenon of citing impact, effects and effectiveness as goals without conceptualization and explanation is the case in EU CSDP and military missions' scholarship as well. As Jobbágy noted about the terms 'effects and effectiveness' being widely used in very different realms, or "*common wisdom and academic knowledge*" these references "*can have multiple meanings that do not promote precision and clarity in military language*" (Jobbágy, 2019, p. 39). In case of the EU this translates into the practice where the word or phrase, effects and effectiveness, is widely used in strategic and operational documents of CSDP, in many cases including arguments for different variables contributing to or increasing effectiveness without a clear conceptual context on what effectiveness is or how it is measured or it can be measured at all (See e.g. Andersson and Cramer, 2023; European Defence Agency., 2023; European External Action Service, 2023; European Parliament, 2024b).

In terms of scholarly pieces, the dominant element in the literature is the discussion of overall external effectiveness of the EU or the EU's foreign and security policy (Smith, 2013; Niemann and Bretherton, 2013; Conceição-Heldt and Meunier, 2015). At the same time, scholarship addressing EU CSDP missions and operations, or specifically the impact of EU military capacity building missions is limited to a few accounts. Oksamytna looking at the possible impact of EU Training Mission in Somalia just a year after its establishment, as the first of a kind SFA mission by the EU, argued that EUTM Somalia is an example of "*liberal peacebuilding*" and suggested that the early EU SFA effectiveness was hindered by "*only a tactical but not the political end-state*" being defined (Oksamytna, 2011a, p. 111). Frisell and Sjökvist (2021) discussed the potentials of the European Peace Facility (EPF), established in 2021, in transforming EU training missions. The authors noted that EPF is frequently pictured as a direct and essential contribution to the effectiveness of the missions— based on the presumption that 'more is better'—, which were struggling with providing the basic necessities for trainees, such as uniforms or drinking water (Frisell and Sjökvist, 2021). The "more" is better approach vis-à-vis the impact of more

funding through EPF as a variable of effectiveness was also presented through critical reflections by Andersson (2024) mentioning the heavy costs of US intervention to Afghanistan or Iraq as contradictory examples. In parallel, the author also noting US SFA literature referred to the challenge of what Knowles and Matisek problematized as "*unintentional king-making*" of SFA, when trainees conduct coups against the residing government authorities, leaders (Andersson, 2024a; Knowles and Matisek, 2019).

However, while the existing scholarship often touched upon or engaged in discussing different variables and indicators of effectiveness, conceptualizing effectiveness in the case of EU missions and operations has been very rarely explored as a main focus of the scholarly interest. A unique exception of the latter and contribution to the literature is noted by Annamarie Peen Rodt (2014) offering a framework for analysis for the success of EU-led military operations. Rodt's book has filled the gap in the literature both theoretically and conceptually defining success as through goal attainment and appropriateness internally and externally (Peen Rodt, 2014). While Rodt's work offers important empirical contributions as well with regards to EU military crisis management operations, for the present research primarily her analytical framework for defining success proved to be helpful (see in Chapter 3.).

Another account qualitatively analysing, rather than measuring the effectiveness of EU military capacity building missions was aforementioned SIPRI report on EUTMs. The authors explored the effectiveness of EUTMs in Somalia, Mali and the Central African Republic in the framework of the Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network, in short EPON[25], through 11 qualitative indicators: *(a) prevent armed conflict and sexual violence; (b) build confidence among local parties; (c) stabilize the area; (d) protect civilians; (e) strengthen public safety; (f) promote human rights; (g) contribute to peace dividends; (h) extend state authority; (i) support institution building and development; (j) reform the security sector; (k) promote the rule of law; and (l) support community policing and transitional justice* (Van Der Lijn et al., 2022, pp. 1–2). This approach—in line with the conceptualization of SFA in the framework of security sector reform (SSR) —understands effectiveness of EU SFA in the broader term, where the external effectiveness of SFA is not equal to the increase of military effectiveness of the partner forces which is often the case in broader SFA literature.

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[25] See more on the EPON framework here: https://effectivepeaceops.net/

This conceptualization of effectiveness asserted that EU military training and advising is expected to strengthen "*effectiveness, accountability and governance*" of the partner forces and their defence institutions as part of overall SSR efforts (Van Der Lijn et al., 2022, p. 12). Mosty recently Andersson tackled the issue of effectiveness in CSDP under the conceptualization of "*impact assessment*" and explored briefly the six-monthly, regular reporting cycles as well as less periodic Strategic Reviews by the Political and Security Committee (PSC)[26] of the EU as modes of EU CSDP effectiveness assessment (Andersson, 2024a). Andresson also differentiated between assessing mandate-related activities as well as "*technical and administrative efficiency (e.g. how many troops trained, how much budget spent, etc).*" (Andersson, 2024a, p. 2). in this context the first is external effectiveness while internal effectiveness is understood as efficiency, or as Peen Rodt conceptualized it, internal appropriateness.

2.5 SFA literature

While some important policy-focused contributions have been already made to EU SFA literature as highlighted above, theoretical and conceptual approaches to EU security assistance, especially SFA and foreign military training (FMT) are still a scarcity due to it being a relatively new phenomenon starting from 2010. Empirical inquires, case studies and reports on EUTMs are almost exclusively follow the broader SSR framework relying on European scholars and EU-led narratives and frequently lack causal explanations (see e.g. Oksamytna, 2011; Skeppström, Hull Wiklund and Jonsson, 2015; Van Der Lijn *et al.*, 2022). To reflect on these shortfalls and gaps in the literature on EU military training missions, the author of this dissertation turns to the rather rich, broader literature exploring security force assistance.

The last decade brought significant development in terms of both policy and academic attention to security force assistance mostly due the lessons learned from the Middle East and African theatres, such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia or Niger (see e.g. Payne and Osburg, 2013; Karlin, Dubik and Mennes, 2018; Reno, 2018, 2019; Wilén, 2021; Costantini and O'Driscoll, 2023; Peltier, Schmitt and Ali, 2024). Available scholarship specifically focusing on SFA, especially theoretical perspectives are mainly present in the literature looking at the rather long history of cases where the United States was the single or the most prominent security provider (see e.g. Biddle

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[26] Political and Security Committee consists of the ambassadors of members states and responsible for the political-strategic oversight, monitoring and policies of CSFP and CSDP in the EU.

et al., 2018; Matisek and Reno, 2019; Talmadge, 2015). Such investigations often rely on mixed-method research, qualitative approaches or comparative analysis—similar to approach and methodology applied in the present research. More recently, single case study-focused empirical accounts of individual missions and providers also became frequently discussed in the literature especially in the forms of research articles, policy papers, or reports (Harkness, 2022; Levy and Yusuf, 2022; Van Der Lijn et al., 2022; Wilén, 2021; Williams and Ali, 2020).

Knowles and Matisek (2019) highlighted the proliferation of these different providers, where the co-existence of trainings, doctrines and approaches to SFA in the same recipient country or military creates a highly complex operational environment; a phenomenon which is often referred to in the case of Somalia, as one of the case studies of this research. Frisell and Sjökvist (2021) interpreted this diverse foreign presence vis-à-vis SFA in the framework of great power competition where leveraging influence is often a core political objective in these conflict-affected environments. The same angle of growing competition and power projection between SFA providers is also explored in the literature by Seabra (2021) looking at the emerging role of China and other, historically atypical security providers. These pieces also show a very different approach to international intervention and presence in Africa from what Toje (2008) described it in the pre-Lisbon era.

Theorization of SFA through the Principal-Agent theory (PA problem/theory) is an approach often present in the literature. Eric Rittinger (2017) offering a constructivist approach to the PA problem found that US forces while performing SFA activities adopt a variety of approaches trying to overcome the PA-related asymmetries based on altering and typologize the provider and the recipient forces (Rittinger, 2017). Jesse D. Savage and Jonathan D. Caverley (2017) exploring US foreign military training provided to partner countries found that military training, more than any other type of security assistance—regardless of being civilian or military—double the probability that the recipient state will experience a military coup, in several cases backed and directly led by previous US trainees (Savage and Caverley, 2017). Caitlin Talmadge, exploring battlefield effectiveness, also pointed out that an effective military can be an "*active liability*" to authoritarian regimes specifically (Talmadge, 2015, p. 1; see also Harkness, 2022).

Stephen Biddle (2017) also theorized SFA as a typical principal-agent problem, and subsequently explored case studies with Julia Macdonald and Ryan Baker (Biddle

et al. 2018). In this article the authors argued that in SFA "*agency losses will often be high*" regardless of the size of the footprint or investment, and the payoff largely dependent on six main elements: interest alignment, information alignment, monitoring and conditionality, adverse selection and moral hazard (Biddle et al., 2018, p. 126). As noted in Subchapter 1.4.1, similar "*legitimacy deficits*" were identified in the EU literature on SSR and capacity building by Edmunds and coauthors (Edmunds et al., 2018). Øystein H. Rolandsen, Maggie Dwyer and William Reno, again in the PA framework, highlighted how state fragility plays a major role in SFA (2021). However, Rolandsen and co-authors also highlighted the limitations of the applicability of the PA theory arguing that "*challenges are different in highly fragile states like Somalia compared to recipients whose armed forces are firmly under the control of an effective and democratically elected government*" (Rolandsen et al., 2021, p. 570).

Conceptualizing SFA as an "*independent variable of military effectiveness in wars with nonstate actors*", Levy and Yusuf explored US security force assistance to the 'Lightening brigade'—locally called 'Danab' units or forces—, of the Somali National Army (Levy and Yusuf, 2022, p. 2). Levy and Yusuf argued that the military effectiveness angle of SFA remains understudied due to being "*largely seen as analytically distinct from conventional warfare and its associated studies of military effectiveness*" (Levy and Yusuf, 2022, p. 5). This article is an important addition to the existing scholarship as it locates SFA in the broader framework of military sciences providing a brief, but clear, conceptualization of SFA from a military-strategic perspective.

2.5.1 Norm transfer in SFA literature

Literature on SFA provided by the US also touched upon norm transfer and different elements of the training, such as humanitarian law (Joyce, 2020; Karlin, 2017; Knowles and Matisek, 2019; Rolandsen et al., 2021). In 2022, Renanah Joyce explored how liberal (great) powers deliver in training mission in terms of transmitting liberal norms. She named the civilian control of armed forces and the respect of human rights as the two of the most prominent elements to be taught for armed forces of partner nations. Joyce's also argued that when previous socialization process and the transmitted liberal norms are in conflict the "new" norms become less prominent undermining the trainees' "*power to restrain decision-making*", when they have to choose between complying with previous or newly introduced liberal norms transferred by SFA (Joyce, 2022). Moreover, crucial element of Joyce's work that it

built on the agency of the trainees by stating that "*norm conflict invites cost-benefit calculations and creates openings to pursue self-interest. Conflict thus produces incentives for militaries to strategically choose among norms in an effort to satisfy both norms and interests*". (Joyce, 2022, 51).

International Humanitarian Law (IHL) training as case study is also present in the literature by Knowles and Matisek (2019). The authors looking at SFA in fragile context argued that purely or predominantly technical/tactical approaches to SFA are insufficient—in some cases even counterproductive—in weak states burdened by fragmentation of power, elitism and sectarian or clan tensions or violence. As a solution, Knowles and Matisek suggested a more comprehensive "peacebuilding approach" to SFA when training and assistance is actively "*seeking out ways and means to use SFA to increase cooperation between various formal and informal elites in a weak state*" (Knowles and Matisek, 2019, p. 18).

Another angle of security cooperation and often SFA was covered by Sándor Fábián's work on norm transfer through education and broader SC efforts, such as International Military Education and Training (IMET) (Fábián, 2021). Fábián understood IMET as the improvement of the recipient's "*military human capital*" from a more practical point of view, such as the preparation of the recipient for the proper use of the material aid provided, rather than as a norm transfer attempt (Fábián, 2021, p. 46). He also highlighted that military norm diffusion and SC and SFA practices in this regard are still required to be further examined, which is the goal of this research looking at gender mainstreaming as a norm transfer in EU-led SFA efforts.

2.5.2 Impact and effectiveness in SFA literature

Vis-à-vis the desired impact of SFA, a majority of the existing scholarship draws an equal sign between SFA effectiveness and military effectiveness of the partner/recipient state. In this approach SFA effectiveness is external effectiveness understood as making the recipient partner forces more militarily capable and effective. Talmadge, for instance, pointing out three types or variations of military effectiveness, "*cross-national, "over-time, and cross-unit*", argued that SFA is effective if it can increase the battlefield effectiveness of the trained units/army (Talmadge, 2015, p. 3). Similarly, Levy and Yusuf, as previously highlighted also directly understood US SFA efforts being effective if the military effectiveness of the Danab forces increase (2022). Mara Karlin looking at US SFA practices in fragile context found that SFA effectiveness depends on two main indicators: the provider's

willingness of involving into sensitive and highly political military affairs, and the presence of "*antagonistic external actors*" (Karlin, 2017, p. 4). Karlin suggested that the more involvement from the provider's side into the sensitive issues of militaries in these fragmented and highly sensitive contexts, and less other external actors intervene, the more effective the SFA can be (Karlin, 2017). Similarly, Biddle et al. (2018) explored US SFA effectiveness considering that effective SFA increases the partner's military effectiveness. Biddle and coauthors argued based on analysing three historic US SFA case studies that while small footprint and investment from the provider side often results in "*small pay-offs*", the alignment of interests between the provider and the partner can significantly increase the effectiveness of even relatively small SFA efforts (Biddle et al., 2018). These findings, again, suggest that the question of effectiveness is highly depending on political interests and objectives of both the provider and partner country, as well as the conceptualization of effectiveness or impact.

The peacebuilding approach to SFA in fragile context evoked by Knowles and Matisek (2019) argued for focusing on strengthening the security sector and the coordination and capacity of its institutions instead of allocating efforts solely on building conventional military capacities. Highlighting the difference of civil-military relations (CMR) and power dynamics in the host country, the peacebuilding approach would require changes in ownership both from the side of the SFA provider and the recipient moving beyond the military-to-military interactions (Knowles and Matisek, 2019). Accordingly, the authors suggested that the effectiveness (or sustainability) of SFA outcomes are not only highly context-specific requiring sensitive "*power mapping*" to find the most capable beneficiary institution, but also depending on the short-term acceptance of local civil-military (power) dynamics mostly being very different from the dominant Western ideas (Knowles and Matisek, 2019).

Two other important additions to the literature suggesting a new or different model for conceptualizing effectiveness comes from Matisek (2018) looking at military effectiveness in African countries with highly complex and fragmented CMRs, and from Jobbágy (2019) exploring the effects of joint operations within the NATO framework. Matisek in his doctoral dissertation suggested a new model for assessing military effectiveness in Africa. He argued that due to the historic development of African militaries—with the exception of a very few, atypical examples like Botswana—applying the Western ideas of effectiveness on African

militaries could rarely contribute to real increase in military effectiveness (Matisek, 2018). His argument demonstrated the controversy where providers focus on recreating the Western professional militaries in African states where "*armies are a major part of the political process and power sharing for various actors and groups*"; a CMR model which is fundamentally different from US or European realities (Matisek, 2018, p. 363). Jobbágy (2019) focusing on the effects of NATO Allied Joint Operations serves as another important, but different angle both for theorizing and conceptualizing effects and effectiveness. While not specifically focusing on SFA, this dissertation asserted that Jobbágy's work exploring effectiveness of Allied joint operations is highly relevant to SFA missions, where several states, allies or security providers working together as it is more and more the characteristic of contemporary SFA efforts. This Allied perspective to effectiveness in modern warfare and military operations is vital to consider when looking at SFA. Jobbágy argued that contemporary thinking about effects of joint operations is heavily influenced by deduction and causality. He further suggested that people tend to think about actions and effects having direct causal relations, but the fluidity of war usually overrides these assumptions. He argued that „*military activities have a dynamic nature and are shaped by changing tactical actions, which defy most assumptions regarding direct causality*" (Jobbágy, 2019, p. 18). Again, while not directly referring to SFA practices, the argumentation of is in line with the findings of Matisek as a result of his extensive analysis of African militaries.

Jobbágy's work serves as an important benchmark in terms of how training provider might think and should think about the forces or security actor it addresses. Jobbágy asserted regarding assumptions about the belligerent forces "*there is a difference between thinking in terms of passive complicated systems, or complex systems that have the ability to learn and adapt*" (Jobbágy, 2019, p. 18). Cross-fertilizing this line of thinking with Matisek's approach to military effectiveness in Africa, the applicability to SFA provider-partner relations becomes highly relevant. Western, including US and EU assumptions of the partner forces to be trained, as "*passive complicated systems"*, are frequently both rigid and less informed by local realities, with failing to assert the possible ability of the recipient forces "*to learn and adapt*" (Jobbágy, 2019; Matisek, 2018). While from different angles, both Matisek about recipient partner forces and Jobbágy about belligerent, enemy forces emphasize that putting deduction and causality deriving from Western or Allied ideas and norms

can hinder the understanding of the systems, forces which we are studying either to build them or to defeat them.

2.6   *Chapter Conclusion: Reflecting on the literature*

This chapter reviewed, categorized, summarized and reflected on the existing literature starting from the broader theoretical perspective, constructivist role theory application closing into the most important concepts and definitions on which this research builds: EU external action through actorness, power and the NPE concept; CSDP missions and operations, including EU and broader SFA literature; and lastly, gender mainstreaming with special focus on EU context. Reflecting on existing literature, several gaps have been identified to be filled to which this dissertation hopes to contribute. Vis-à-vis research specifically on EU external action, role theory scholars, including the ones in EU external actions studies, such as Lisbeth Aggestam or Stephan Klose, typically focused their inquiry on how different actors, agents in the EU—such as institutions, leaders, member states—interact with each other and what role they play in articulating EU policies, including EU CFSP and CSDP. However, this research concerned with a different level through a mesoscopic level of analysis, conceptualizing the EU as one single actor and applying role theory to interpret its (role) performance in a specific and very much circumscribed context with regards to EU military training missions.

Literature on NPE, CSDP and gender mainstreaming in the EU as well showed some similar features. Characteristics of the existing literature on EU external action and EU CSDP is almost exclusively dominated by European scholars which indirectly and inherently caused the internalization of the topics included in the discussion with heavy use of EU "parlance". An example of this is the approach to research and write about capacity building and security assistance by the EU in partner countries in the literature which almost exclusively[27] uses security sector reform (SSR) as a framework to explore security assistance (SA), security cooperation (SC), security force assistance (SFA) and foreign military training (FMT) cases as well; an approach which originates the EU conceptualization. European voices, predominantly from the Nordic and Western-European countries, such as Lisbeth Aggestam, or Ole Elgström led the way

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[27] one of the handful exceptions is Nina Wilén (2021) Analysing (In)formal Relations and Networks in Security Force Assistance: The Case of Niger, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 15:5, 580-597, DOI: 10.1080/17502977.2021.1958546

in role theory application in EU studies as well. Additionally, while some sources, like Asle Toje (2008), Michelle Pace (2023) provide unique insights on the EU's distinct power relations with different regions, subregions, or states, most research to date using the NPE concept fed on existing literature from 2010's, when EU external action debates were more prominently dominated by neighbourhood policy, EU integration and development policy or the EU as a humanitarian actor. With the changing security landscape and the post-Lisbon institutionalization of EU CSDP, EU missions and operations started to proliferate in the "far neighbourhood", such as the African continent with having five ongoing military training and partnership missions. Nevertheless, the most prominent gap in the literature which this research is keen to fill in is the lack of research on EU military training missions and their conceptualization in the framework of security force assistance.

While a handful of sources touched upon empirical case studies, there is no existing literature on EU non-executive military missions as a tool for foreign military training and their role in norm transfer despite the EU's growing intention on relying on them in Common Security and Defence Policy. With deploying more and more EUTMs in the Africa the presumably changing role of the EU as an international security provider in the continent, as well as the impact of this role performance needs to be further explored contributing to the literature. Effectiveness of EU military training missions and their role in norm transfer and socialization is largely absent from the contemporary literature, as well as how EU's normative self-conception influences these missions.

Finally, literature on gender mainstreaming in EU external action, including CSDP, is rather rich, but limited in terms of methodology and approaches. Scholarship on the issue only exist research through feminist approaches, including Feminist IR, Feminist Security Studies, or Feminist Institutionalism. These inquiries provide important critical insights on how the Union often falls short on 'walking the talk' when it comes to gender equality policies and gender mainstreaming and addressing the gap between policy and practice. However, existing feminist scholarship often reiterates existing narratives on gender mainstreaming, including the Union's discourse on the contribution of a gender perspective to operational effectiveness.

3   THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

EU conducts gender mainstreaming in CSDP military training missions based on both right-based and functionalist arguments. The latter have become more and more prominent in EU discourses, citing the contribution of gender mainstreaming to the effectiveness of CSDP missions and operation as one of the main reasoning for the integration of a gender perspective and WPS principles into both policy and practice. However, the EU arguments fall short on conceptualizing mission effectiveness, as well as often lacking further explanation on this link between gender mainstreaming policies and CSDP effectiveness. Additionally, the EU applies similar discourses to highly varied operational environments and different CSDP tools across the board from civilian missions in Europe to EU-led SFA missions in Africa; the latter being in the focus of this research. In order to theorize this research problem, Chapter 3. introduces the most important conceptual elements of this research and its overall theoretical framework to answer for the research questions of why the EU persist in conducting gender mainstreaming and to what extent policy impacts EU-led military training missions in Africa.

An interdisciplinary approach is an inherent part of this inquiry as the research problem lies within the intersection of Security Studies, European studies or—as previously noted in the literature review based on the conceptualization of Gstöhl and Schunz—European External Action Studies, and Women Studies and/or Gender Studies. As it was also highlighted while reviewing the relevant literature, this interdisciplinary approach is also mirrored in the theoretical and conceptual framework, which builds on role theory (RT) and its main conceptual elements. This is further complemented with the Normative Power Europe concept, and the unique conceptual vocabulary of EU security and defence policy, including EU-led missions and operations. Lastly, gender mainstreaming specific to the European Union is conceptualized and studied in this chapter understood as a norm transfer of the Union's constitutional norm, gender equality. These, fundamental theoretical and conceptual underpinnings are visually structured in Figure 2. below.

Figure 2. Theoretical and conceptual structure of the dissertation

3.1   Role theory application through constructivism

Theorizing EU external action has been an immensely challenging issue for academia in the last 20 years especially with the continuously evolving security landscape in Europe as well as the development of CSDP. In 2015, Rodt, Whitman and Wolff in a special volume dedicated to the topic titled their opening piece "*The EU as an International Security Provider: The Need for a Mid-range Theory*" in search of a framework of analysis that facilitates the understanding of the EU in contemporary international politics (Rodt et al., 2015). EU scholars turned to "*analytic eclecticism is a response to this dilemma*" resulting in a large variety of different approaches to theorize EU external action (Pohl and van Willigen, 2015, p. 179). This diversity— also mirrored in the literature review— is also reflected at the work of Gstöhl & Schunz (2021) stating "*there seemed to be a lot more 'out there' to make sense of EU external action than had regularly been acknowledged by many scholars*" (Gstöhl and Schunz, 2021b, chap. Preface). The authors highlighted that institutionalism, neofunctionalism, neorealism, liberal intergovernmentalism, as well as constructivism also had its own mark on the literature, while the concepts on EU external action, including post-Lisbon accounts on EU as a security provider, is even more diverse.[28] However, many of these approaches and theoretical solutions are often confined by their research paradigm often lacking the flexibility to follow the dynamic development of the EU external action. This is especially true vis-à-vis the growing and more systemic use of military tools as the part of the EU CSDP.

Acknowledging this need for continuous reflection on the evolving nature of CSDP as well as the added value of rather specialized conceptual approaches to EU research, this dissertation argues that role theory is one, highly beneficial theoretical framework to explore EU external action. The flexibility of role theory allows theory

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[28] see also Europeanization by Olsen (2002) and other examples listed Chapter 2.

application to keep up with how the actorness and/or capability-based debate on EU military intervention is developing. Moreover, the conceptual richness of RT introduced in this chapter provides a unique framework offering multiple possible levels of analysis worth exploring in contemporary EU external action, including institutional aspects, as well as the role of different agents in EU intervention.

As briefly summarized in the literature review, role theory originally being used in sociological and psychological studies was integrated into Foreign Policy Analysis by Kalevi Holsti in the 1970's. One of Holsti's main argument for RT application was to diversify the way of thinking about different roles which states (can) play in international politics (Holsti, 1970). Inherently connected to the agent-structure debate, role theory application helps researchers highlighting multiple different aspects and components of the role(s) which *agents*, such as states, international organizations, etc., play in the *structure*, like international politics, international or regional blocks, organizations, or others (Harnisch et al., 2011; Thies and Breuning, 2012).

While Holsti has not reflected explicitly on the possible connection of role theory to any grand theory[29] in International Relations due to the FPA approach in his work, RT has proven to be flexible enough to be used in the framework of different theories and epistemological settings in the field since his article was published in 1970. During this first period of role theory application, the theory was used dominantly by the American FPA scholarly community including some early attempts to find connections to IR theory (Harnisch et al., 2011; Thies and Breuning, 2012). However, by the early 2000's role theory application has become somewhat divided between two rather different school of thought: American FPA scholars dominantly informed by social psychology and European and other non-US-based academics establishing role theory application primarily on constructivist principles (Thies and Breuning, 2012, pp. 2–3). As Thies and Breuning (2012) asserted this, 'second wave' of role theory application by European scholars with a constructivist approach was very much connected to EU studies and EU scholars intending to understand the role(s) of the Union played, plays and can play in international politics. While it is important to acknowledge these different approaches of the utilization of role theory in distinct epistemic communities, this research directly builds on this European constructivist heritage in EU studies and

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[29] The author refers to grand theory in this dissertation as grand theories of international relations, realism, liberalism and constructivism.

IR and considers contemporary role theory being most closely connected to the constructivism (Breuning, 2022; Elgström et al., 2006; Harnisch et al., 2011). The constructivist European role theory community played a crucial role in identifying the different roles and identities of the Union, including several different conceptualizations in the literature with regards to EU power and actorness. Many of these different concepts, such as civilian power, normative power or integrative power were also highlighted throughout the review of the literature (see e.g.: Koops, 2010; Manners, 2002).

Constructivist role theory scholars, such as Marijke Breuning often referred to one of the constitutional pieces of constructivism written by Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* while using role theory (Breuning, 2022; Wendt, 1999). In one of her pieces Breuning argued that "*role theory is inherently constructivist, in the sense that it accepts that international politics is defined by what states and their decision makers make of it*" (Breuning, 2022, p. 193). The argument of Breuning did not only highlight this fundamental constructivist underpinning of role theory, but also allowed to further connect constructivist RT application to how 'states make international politics'. The answer to this 'how'—according to one of the main pillars of constructivism—is discourses and their normative considerations. As it is detailed in the following subchapters, norms and normative frameworks in international politics, such as gender equality or the Women, Peace and Security agenda and connecting discourses are core parts of this inquiry, both further reinforcing the constructivist nature of this research.

Using a constructivist lens through the application of role theory allows looking at individually or collectively constructed self-conceptualizations as role concepts, such as one of the main foci of this dissertation, the EU's own self-conceptualization as an international normative security provider. This also consequently suggests that this dissertation acknowledges the EU's actorness and agency as a single power moving away from the structuralist/realist approach. The latter argues that the Union is not a single actor in international relations, and not separate or separable from the member states embodying it and their respective interests (see e.g.: Hyde-Price, 2006; Whitman, 2011a). Additionally, this research does not focus on individual agents or institutions, bodies of the European Union, such as the EEAS, but understands the EU as a single actor.

Role Theory application under this broader constructivist umbrella provides a unique framework for analysis with offering three major levels or dimensions indicated in Figure 3., which was also briefly summarized in the introduction of this dissertation.

Macroscopic level of analysis:
EU's role in the international system

Mesoscopic level of analysis:
EU's role in a specific and demarkated context

Microscopic level of analysis:
EU's internal role conception creation and processes

Figure 3. *Three levels of analysis of EU external action through Role Theory.*
Source: Elgström and Smith (2006)

The macroscopic level allows the exploration of the role or roles of the European Union in international politics globally which can accommodate larger debates on what the EU is, what kind of power the EU is, or how this power concept influences the EU's action in the global realm. With looking at the mesoscopic level, scholarship can make claims about specific role(s) the EU plays or possibly can play in a more circumscribed or highly context sensitive environment. These two levels of analysis are also characterized in role theory research as '*meta-roles*' (macroscopic) versus '*conflict specific roles' (mesoscopic)* previously explained briefly in Subchapter 2.1. While looking at the macroscopic level, scholarship predominantly makes assumptions about the EU's meta-role, in the mesoscopic level inquiry is more focused on the different conflict specific role(s) the EU can play in a region, theatre, or in bilateral relations. Lastly, the microscopic dimension zooms into an even more specific area, where the focus in on internal processes and procedures in role creation inside the European Union (see e.g. Aggestam, 2021; Elgström et al., 2006). The microscopic level might analyse, for instance, how certain EU institutions or individual agents influence or can influence the EU's own role conceptualization internally. With focusing on EU SFA in Africa this research is a mesoscopic analysis of the Union's role in a specific setting.

The aforementioned different levels are highly interconnected and continuously impacting each other which can also be in the focus of role theory application in research. Concepts in the framework of role theory also offer explanation to the situation when these, sometimes multiple different roles are conflicting, such as the

concepts of '*role conflict*', '*role strain*' or '*role contestation*' (Breuning, 2022). How an internal agent's perception on the role of the EU in the world influences the actual role performance of the EU as a power in the international system—if it influences it at all—or, from another perspective, how an international partner's perception on EU power might contradicts the perceptions of EU institution, bodies and officials internally. Again, if it has an influence or impacts it at all. Additionally, scholarship on role conflict specifically as one of the most important concepts in role theory intend to provide answers to when and how role(s) might clash, such as conflicting meta-and conflict-specific roles of an actor. This is also where research paradigm and different lens complement role theory application based on the how different scholars with distinct approaches acknowledge and use agency and structure, which might result in diverse foci and findings from liberal institutionalist application to symbolic interactionist ones.

3.2 Conceptual mapping – Role Theory and the institutionalization of the EU's role as an international security provider

The rich "*conceptual vocabulary*"—as Lisbeth Aggestam (2021) described it—of role theory imposes the need for clear conceptual mapping for this research as well, which also helps defining the limitations of this analysis. In the researched context the EU is in the focus as the actor whose role is conceptualized and defined as an international security provider (see Figure 4.). This *role conception* is predominantly shaped by the EU's self-conceptualization, but also influenced by the *role expectation* posed by others in the respective context; in the researched empirical context, by the African partner countries being recipients of the EU military training mission. Both are inherently affected by the fact that EU military training missions are deployed to partner countries in the African continent where a) the partner either formally requested the EU's assistance in this specific form of security cooperation; or b) the EU intervened in accordance with a United Nations Security Council resolution. Both cases assert that in the given context of EU training missions the Union is present in role of an international security provider. Accordingly, this role conception can also be interpreted as the "*social identity of the actor*" in this conflict-specific setting (Harnisch et al., 2011; Wendt, 1999).

Referring back to Figure 3., the highly specialized, context-and conflict-specific nature of EU interventions in these cases makes the present research a predominantly

mesoscopic level of analysis through the application of role theory as previously noted. The common role conception of the actor (the EU) and the 'generalized other(s)'—as referred to in role theory literature—resulted in the institutionalization of the EU's conflict-specific role in these partner countries as security cooperation, specifically in the form of security force assistance. In this circumscribed setting, the EU does this through the deployment of a non-executive military mission or EU training missions.

Figure 4. Conceptual map of Role Theory application in the dissertation

The institutionalized role of the EU as an international security provider in these dominantly African partner countries are performed through mandate performance of EU military training missions largely based on two pillars: training and advising. The latter, the *role performance* of the EU's role in this context, also prescribes the (expected) impact of this role, also conceptualized as *role impact*, which is mission effectiveness or effective mandate implementation. This conceptual map of the application of role theory including how the different conceptual elements such as role institutionalization and role performance are connected in this dissertation is visualized in Figure 4. While—as highlighted in the literature review through accounts from for example Andersson (2024) or Peen Rodt (2014)— there are several different approaches to conceptualizing effectiveness of EU intervention, this research chooses to focus on role impact understood as mission effectiveness.

3.2.1   Localizing EU SFA in the framework of CSDP

As part of the conceptual mapping, it is important to link role institutionalization and performance directly to the existing EU CSDP toolbox dominantly influencing the empirical context. The latter is done by synthetizing EU jargon and concepts with conceptual elements of role theory used in this research. While Chapter 6. provides a

detailed analysis of EU CSDP missions and operations and their unique conceptual framework specific to capacity building, the following subchapter serves as an important theoretical and conceptual bridge between role theory, EU CSDP missions and security force assistance.

EU military missions, understood as *de facto* EU SFA missions in this research are functioning in the framework of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy, which is part of the broader Common Foreign and Security Policy structure. In 2018, the EU introduced the most important ruling principle till date guiding both CSFP and CSDP vis-à-vis crisis and conflict management, the "*Integrated Approach to External Conflict and Crisis*" (hereinafter: Integrated approach) (Council of the European Union, 2018b). This approach intends to ensure that the EU consistently and comprehensively apply different policy instruments and institutional resources for conflict prevention, including diplomacy, mediation, humanitarian response, or the deployment of a CSDP mission or operation. Figure 5. demonstrates how non-executive EU military missions—understood as EU SFA missions as the institutionalization of the EU's role in the researched context—are integrated into the broader CFSP policy framework in the EU.[30]

Figure 5. Localizing EU military (training) missions in the framework of the broader EU CFSP structure.

As highlighted in previous chapters, EU CSDP missions and operations have been the part of the EU external action since 2003. However, in the pre-Lisbon era only two types existed: civilian missions and military operations (see Appendix 1.).

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[30] Figure 3.4 contains only those elements of this policy framework which are directly linked to EU military missions and are crucial for understanding and elaborating on the conceptual framework of this research. Accordingly, the Figure does not demonstrate other elements of CFSP, such as public diplomacy, or CSDP, such as defence cooperation.

The EU launched its first security force assistance mission in Somalia in 2010, with which the Union further diversified the instruments at its disposal in the current CSDP toolbox (Gracza Hornyák, 2024a). As a result, contemporary CSDP intervention can be categorized through three main types of engagement or interventions: a) civilian missions; b) military operations; and c) military missions. These are referred to throughout this research as the '*contemporary CSDP triad*'.

Civilian missions are focusing on a variety of issues depending on the context specific needs from monitoring to complex security sector reform[31] or judicial reforms missions involving capacity building of government institutions, national police forces and close cooperation with local organizations, including civil society organizations (CSOs). Military CSDP, however, depending on their respective mandates are either categorized as military operation or military missions. In case of military operations of an executive nature, EU troops perform or take over tasks from local security forces in the case of missing national capacities, such as patrolling, searches or peacekeeping. In contrast with military operations, EU-led military missions—also called non-executive military missions—focus on assisting, supporting and training partner countries with military assets without taking over executive tasks (Hornyák and Tánczos, 2024).

These CSDP missions and operations are also different in terms of command-and-control structures. Civilian CSDP missions are commanded by Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), non-executive military missions, including EU military training missions, are all commanded by Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC). However, executive military operations are not under unified EU command, but commanded by individual member states or by utilizing NATO command structures through the Berlin Plus Agreements (Gracza Hornyák, 2024a).[32] These aforementioned important elements differentiating between the tools of the contemporary CSDP triad are also reflected in Appendix 1. containing the database for EU-led missions and operations since 2003.

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[31] see more on Security Sector Reform in: DCAF – Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance. 2019. Security Sector Reform. SSR Backgrounder Series. Geneva https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/DCAF_BG_02_SecuritySectorReform_Nov2022.pdf

[32] see more on CSDP missions and operations, C2 structures and institutional background in Chapter 5. and Chapter 6.

Localizing EU military training missions or non-executive military missions conducted in the framework of CSDP guided by the Integrated approach is crucial part of understanding the institutionalization of the EU's role as an international security provider in the researched context. However, the relatively young nature of these EU SFA mission through a single unified EU command, MPCC, as well as the uniqueness of EU as an international security provider makes it necessary to look beyond the EU conceptualization of EU military missions. As also argued throughout the literature review, there is a need to step out of the 'EU or European way' of looking at the conceptualization of EU military missions in the framework of CSDP as it is usually limited to EU crisis management, EU external action, or the as part of overall SSR efforts. As a result of CSDP conceptualization being confined by EU jargon, this research asserts that inquiring about EU military missions as the institutionalized role of the EU as a security provider in several cases in Africa can greatly benefit from connecting the scholarship of security cooperation and SFA led by the United States. Moreover, referring to security force assistance as a type of security cooperation[33]—while conceptualizing building military capacities of partner countries—is largely absent in the literature on EU military training missions. Building this conceptual bridge between the two bodies of literature also emphasized in the previous chapter this dissertation conceptualizes EU military missions provided by the EU as an international security provider in the respective context as security force assistance missions. Accordingly, when referring to EU security force assistance missions, this dissertation conceptualizes these as EU-led military interventions with an exclusively non-kinetic, non-executive nature, where the use of force is exclusively reserved to self-defence, and with the primary aim of military capacity and capability building of an EU partner nation. This wording and conceptualization cover different approaches and phrasing in the literature including EU military training missions (EUTMs), EU military missions, or non-executive military missions which are present in policy and practice as well. Additionally, it is also important to highlight that the 'security force assistance' verbiage is also applied by NATO, which is also detailed in Chapter 6.

Lastly, the conceptual similarities between SFA missions by the U.S. and those deployed by the EU allows drawing on the lessons identified and learned by SFA

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[33] see more on the typology of security assistance, security cooperation and security force assistance in: Chapter 6.

literature especially in the case of mission performance, mission effectiveness or impact. These common elements were also highlighted throughout the review of the literature. Both US provided SFA missions and EU military missions are based on specific shared objectives of the provider and the recipient or partner country to tackle—in principle and primarily—internal security threats, such as terrorist organizations with which the recipient country faces (Rolandsen et al., 2021; White, 2014). Additionally, both U.S. and EU SFA missions are primarily '*train and equip*' missions, where training provider supports the "*development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions*" (White, 2014, p. 2). The cross-fertilization of CSDP jargon and concepts with US SFA conceptualization results in focusing on EU military missions in Somalia and Mozambique as SFA missions in this dissertation addressed in the empirical comparative chapter.

3.3 *Normative Power Europe – a self-conceptualization of the European Union as an international security provider*

Figure 4. highlighted how the theoretical and conceptual framework provides a unique perspective to conduct a mesoscopic level of analysis through role theory application in EU external action. Serving as an additional layer to the conceptual framework in Figure 4. role theory application is complemented with the integration of the Normative Power Europe concept and gender mainstreaming as important elements of the research problem. This dissertation argues that performing the role of an international security provider in this context, the EU's self-conceptualization is predominantly a normative one, which coincides with the *Normative Power Europe* (NPE) concept first described in the early 2000's by Ian Manners (Manners, 2002). As previously discussed in the Chapter 2. in reviewing the literature, NPE has been the part of the scholarly debate on the EU external action for more than 20 years being flexible enough to allow further conceptualization of several instruments in the EU CFSP and CSDP toolbox. While the NPE argument opened the floor for further academic discussions on the ontological aspects of the EU searching for answer focusing on what the EU is, the Normative Power Europe concept also deliberately— in line with the academic trends in the 80-90's—intended to cause a shift from classical theories and concepts of IR on the EU (Manners, 2002, p. 252; Whitman, 2011b).

One of the core elements of the success and sustainability of the concept is that Manners built his argument around the constitutional treaties of the EU, which have stayed relatively stable in the last twenty years in spite of the drastically changed security landscape. NPE has also lived through the paradigm change of the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) resonating with the *principled pragmatism*[34] approach described by the document and stayed part of the scholarly and policy conversation (European Union, 2016; Tocci, 2017a). The success of the NPE concept also reflected on its ability to break the already mentioned hard power vs. soft power or civilian vs. military power dichotomy. While the Normative Power Europe concept—as it was also highlighted in Chapter 2.—started as an attempt to define the Union's as a unique power in international politics, it has later been further developed to an approach (Normative Power Approach– NPA), which serves as a broader framework for analysing other actors and their normative considerations in navigating throughout the international system (Manners, 2013). In the meantime, the original NPE idea was labelled as a notion, concept, or approach, while it was used both from a theoretical perspective as well as a more conceptual tool for analysing EU external action or other common policies. With acknowledging such evolving nature of scholarship on the NPA, this dissertation applies the Normative Power Europe (NPE) in its original form established in the early 2000's by Manners. As Haukkala puts it, NPE is not only an approach or concept, but can be used as an "*analytical device*" vis-à-vis norm diffusion (Haukkala, 2008, 162). Accordingly, this research uses NPE as a concept to reflect on the EU's self-conceptualization in constructing the role concept as well as looking at how this normative identity is reflected in the CSDP in the empirical context of EU SFA in Africa.

Using NPE as the EU's self-conceptualization as an international security provider is based and strengthened by the provisions of constitutional Treaties of the EU. The Union's identity is highly influenced by the normative framework provided by the Treaties and reinforced by strategic and policy documents throughout the last 20 years of CSFP since the first missions were launched in 2003. As Whitman noted, the work of Manners in 2002 put the discussion of norms in the agenda of EU studies arguing that "*norms and principles consist of the inner crust of the EU's identity and*

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[34] principle pragmatism as an approach appeared in EU literature with the EU Global Strategy understanding as the combination of interest and values directing EU action internally and globally.

shape its role in the international arena as a foreign policy actor" (Whitman, 2011b, p. 2).

The EU views itself as an international security provider who implements its external action based on strong normative consideration deriving from the Treaties, such provisions of the TEU in Article 3. para. 5. declaring that "*in its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security (...) the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.*" (Treaty on European Union, 2012,17). This treaty-driven aspect of EU external action is referred to by Manners as "*political-legal constitutionalism*" (Manners, 2002, p. 241).

Conceptualizing the Union's self-identification with the Normative Power Europe concept asserts that the EU believes that it has the ability as an international security provider to shape what is considered 'normal' in international politics (Manners, 2002).

Figure 6. Complete Conceptual Map of the dissertation: introducing the Normative Power Europe concept and gender mainstreaming.

Theorizing the Union's self-conceptualization through the NPE concept this dissertation also in line with the Diez and Pace asserting the NPE is a discursive construct (Diez and Pace, 2011). Consequently, this thesis argues that NPE as a discursive construct rules the EU's self-conceptualization as an international security provider. Based on the same normative considerations and self-conceptualization the

EU is integrating gender perspective and implementation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda into CFSP, including CSDP missions and operations. Introducing the Normative Power Europe concept as the EU's self-conceptualization as an international security provider in this context is also beneficial for further understanding how the Union integrates gender mainstreaming policies as norm diffusion attempt into performing this role through SFA in Africa (see Figure 6.).

3.4   Gender mainstreaming as a concept in the EU context

The concept of gender mainstreaming inherently carries gender equality as a value and norm it itself, which is also laid down in the Treaties and part of the normative basis on which the Union builds its foreign and security policy (Peto and Manners, 2006). Scholarship on gender mainstreaming in the EU—as explored in the previous chapter— is evolving, including directly connecting the NPE concept and gender mainstreaming, inquiring about the EU as a normative gender power in international politics (Guerrina, 2020; Peto and Manners, 2006). However, with rather dynamic development of the concept itself creates the need to clarify both the understanding of gender mainstreaming as a concept as well as its EU-specific framing.

In the early years of opening the debate about gender mainstreaming in the 90's the conceptualization was closely connected to the work of the UN on women empowerment—such UN conferences on the Status of Women in Nairobi (1985) and in Beijing (1995)—, and the adoption of the Women, Peace and Security agenda. On such basis, gender mainstreaming was defined as cross-cutting policy to address inequalities between sexes, men and women, and to promote female agency (UN Women, 2024). Nonetheless, in the wake of evolving scholarship from critical scholars around the world, both this dominantly UN-led conceptualization of gender and gender mainstreaming has been contested in several context because of the binary conceptualization of gender (see e.g.: Bacchi and Eveline, 2010; Fisher-Onar, 2023; Shinners, 2020). While acknowledging the contribution of critical scholars on the concept of gender and gender mainstreaming, this dissertation understands gender and its mainstreaming in its original form similarly as it is laid down in EU Treaties and documents as the basis of the value leading to norm transfer. Accordingly, in this research '*Gender refers to the social attributes and opportunities associated with being male and female and the relationships between women and men and girls and boys*

(...)' (Council of the European Union, 2018, 71). With regards to conceptualizing gender mainstreaming this dissertation understands it as defined in the provisions of the TEU promoting equality between men and women. This includes Article 3. paragraph 3. stating that the EU "*shall combat social exclusion and discrimination, and shall promote social justice and protection, equality between women and men, solidarity between generations and protection of the rights of the child.*" (European Union, 2012a, p. 17).

With regards to this UN influence on the birth of gender mainstreaming, Manners also highlighted that the values and norms on which the EU built its identity is not necessarily uniquely European but shared in the post-Cold War era throughout many liberal powers and international organizations, such as the UN. The EU integrated these into its constitutional foundations, from UN principles to the EU Treaties, and then consequently into its foreign policy (Manners, 2010; Whitman, 2011b). Gender mainstreaming and the WPS framework were also examples of integrating values and norms from international organizations, namely the United Nations, including the EU explicitly building on the 1998 Council of Europe document conceptualizing gender mainstreaming based on previous UN documents.

The policy and/or strategy of promotion of "*equality between women and men in all activities and policies at all levels*"—the norm transfer which is understood as gender mainstreaming in this research—looks beyond gender equality policies with the integration of gender equality policy into all policy areas. In the case of CFSP and CSDP gender mainstreaming was translated as an issue which need to be integrated into "*each phase of the policy-making cycle as well as all areas within policies and processes such as procurement or budgeting*" (EC, 1996, 2; EIGE, 2023). The EU's normative framework for this push for gender equality is based on a dual approach: internal gender mainstreaming for EU institutions, personnel, etc. and external gender mainstreaming in external action in CFSP, CSDP, including missions and operations (Gracza Hornyák, forthcoming, 2025a; Interviewee 1°, 2022; Interviewee 26°, 2024). This dissertation focuses on both aspects, internal and external of EU-specific gender mainstreaming application in the context of role theory in the empirical cases, which is detailed in Chapter 7.

Furthermore, it is important to highlight other, slightly different conceptual approaches to gender mainstreaming. Some scholars argue that gender balancing, or increasing women's participation in missions and gender mainstreaming is

conceptually different, as gender mainstreaming can occur without enhanced female representation (see. e.g. Egnell and Alam, 2019; Karim, 2019). As previously highlighted briefly throughout the literature review, the book of Egnell and Alam, as unique contribution to the gender mainstreaming specifically in the military and defence context, shares this different approach based on findings from different empirical context. While in this conceptualization gender mainstreaming does necessarily includes gender balancing, in the EU policy context—in line with the participation pillar of the WPS agenda—action for gender balance is part of gender mainstreaming both internally and externally.

Egnell and Alam's observations on the right-based approach vs. functionalist approach to gender mainstreaming are also important conceptual perspectives for this dissertation helping to understand why the EU conduct GM in SFA and how that might impact missions on the ground. In this context, the right-based approach is understood as the need to integrate gender perspective in military operations based on normative consideration as "*the right thing to do*" (Egnell and Alam, 2019, p. 53). This argumentation can be directly connected and can be explained by the normative self-conceptualization of the EU. But as Egnell and Alam asserts, right-based considerations does not resonate well with military organizations because of their inherently functionalist nature, pushing the argumentation for gender mainstreaming increasingly towards its contribution to operational effectiveness; in other words "*the smart thing to do*" (Egnell and Alam, 2019, p. 53). The book argued that while gender mainstreaming is considered the 'right' thing because it can serve as a benchmark for the local population of what norms are valued (such as gender equality), as well as improve the effectiveness of military operations especially how military force is used in order to achieve the political-strategic aims of the missions (Egnell and Alam, 2019). The 'right vs. smart thing to do' dichotomy as arguments leading to gender mainstreaming policies and the attempt to transfer these norms through military CSDP, including SFA missions is one which is important to keep in mind as they directly influence on what gender mainstreaming is in the EU setting.

While acknowledging the existence of different approaches and conceptualizations on gender mainstreaming, as noted previously, in this dissertation the definition relies on the EU policies, practices and argumentation where gender mainstreaming is a systematic integration of a gender perspective into all policy areas, including security and defence policy. Accordingly, while gender equality as

understood the equality between men and women is the norm, gender mainstreaming understood as the integration of a gender perspective in all policy areas including CSDP is the method of transferring this norm in the EU with both internal and external policy tools. Applying the NPE concept as the EU's self-conceptualization stresses that the EU views itself as an international security provider who possesses the ability to shape what is 'normal' in gender relations and roles in African countries. As an example—which is further discussed in Chapter 7. —one of the most important aspects of gender mainstreaming is 'leading by example', entailing the ability to shape its partner countries perception of normal about women and men and their role in the society. Leading by example as an important element of EU gender mainstreaming also emphasized in several strategic documents (see e.g. GAP III and Strategic Approach to WPS in Chapter 7.) also reinforce that the EU specific gender mainstreaming concept also includes internal gender balancing.

But what does gender mainstreaming mean in the EU context beyond the aforementioned integration of a gender perspective into different policy areas—in this case, foreign and security policy? While there is no clear conceptual or practical list of what the EU gender mainstreaming is, as an essential theoretical foundation for this dissertation it is crucial to understand the high level of heterogeneity in terms of topics and issues. These, in the EU specific context, include two important conceptual approaches: internal and external. Chapter 7. is dedicated to further understand based on EU strategic documents and discourses what key topics are addressed under the broad umbrella term of gender mainstreaming and what practical implications EU GM has in CSFP and CSDP. An important theoretical foundation for gender mainstreaming in EU foreign and security policy is understanding it as a norm promotion directly connected to the normative framework as an example of „*the preeminent manifestation of the international security politics of gender*" (Kirby and Shepherd, 2021, p. 1). This means that EU gender mainstreaming can provide a framework for promoting women's participation in the security sector, prevention of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) with training partner countries or engaging in diplomatic bargaining in addressing practices, such as female genital mutilation deemed as something against what the EU considers normal in gender relations and gender equality.

NPE also provided further intellectual space for connecting with critical theories and concepts, such as Feminist IR and Feminist Security Studies (FSS). While this research draws on the contribution of Feminist IR and FSS literature, as it was

highlighted previously, this dissertation seeks to work with gender mainstreaming not applying such feminist approach, but rather building on the overall normative nature of the EU's self-conceptualization. Feminist scholarship has been successful in finding the implementation gaps and pointing out existing inconsistencies such as institutional barriers, or deficiencies in feminist voices in leadership, as an important contribution to the critical perspectives on EU from FSS, FIR and EU Studies perspective. Feminist scholars working on EU gender mainstreaming issues, including the provisions of the Women, Peace and Security agenda stay predominantly critical about EU implementation both in quantity and quality (Chappell and Guerrina, 2020; David and Guerrina, 2013; Guerrina et al., 2023; Woodward and van der Vleuten, 2014). However, existing feminist accounts often accept or reinforce the EU's narrative and arguments for more push on inclusivity and or intersectionality in CSDP. With regards to gender issues and military operations specifically, FSS often relies on the underlying assumption that gender mainstreaming's contribution is almost exclusively or predominantly positive on contemporary militaries and military missions and their effectiveness. Consequently, this frequently results in (over)emphasizing the positive effects and falling short on elaborating on the challenges and possible negative impact (see e.g. Egnell and Alam, 2019; Hörst et al., 2018; Kaski, 2011). Furthermore, some feminist scholarship and FSS is often fundamentally critical and or even hostile against military organizations, which is not aligned with the approach of this research (see e.g. Mukalazi, 2024; Tickner, 2004; Wibben, 2018).

Furthermore, gender issues in EU external action, including CSDP have only been addressed through feminist lens. Nonetheless, this dissertation asserts that the existing literature as well as policymakers would benefit from looking into EU gender mainstreaming policies and their impact on one of the most common military CSDP effort, SFA missions without feminist ontology, but with relying on certain elements of feminist epistemological perspectives. With looking at gender issues first time without such feminist approach this research seeks to identify why does the EU persist in conducting GM in SFA missions as well as how this policy impacts missions on the ground. In the conceptual framework of this dissertation gender mainstreaming derives from the Union's normative self-conceptualization. As visualized in Figure 6. gender mainstreaming as a norm transfer having its roots in the Treaties of the EU referring to gender equality understood as the equality between men and women, as a constitutional norm of the Union. This norm integrated and 'put into action' in EU

external action is not only connected to how the EU views itself as an actor, but also directly influencing how it performs its role as an international security provider through SFA practices (see Figure 6). In this dissertation norm diffusion and norm transfer as concepts are used interchangeably to describe how the EU integrates gender mainstreaming into its role performance throughout training and advising partner forces in Africa. As it is demonstrated, gender mainstreaming as norms transfer is 'activated' in the role performance aspects, with the implementation of training and advising pillars of SFA missions. Integrating a gender perspective to role performance through internal and external gender mainstreaming, this norm transfer attempt reaches mandate implementation as the expected role impact of SFA missions.

3.5   *Role impact and SFA effectiveness – conceptual and empirical challenges*

As highlighted in the literature review, there are multiple different approaches and conceptualizations for SFA effectiveness (see subchapter 2.4 and 2.5.). Moreover, when it comes to wording, the list of possible concepts used in the literature are also rather long, including phrases such as effectiveness, impact or success (see. e.g. Andersson, 2024; Brooks and Stanley, 2007; Conceição-Heldt and Meunier, 2015; Oksamytna, 2011; Peen Rodt, 2014). The scholarly debate can be divided into two fundamentally different theoretical underpinnings when it comes to partner capacity building or SFA specifically depending on the goal of the provider: a) those who focus their work on the assumptions that the goal of the provider with SFA is to make the partner more (militarily) effective (see e.g. Karlin, 2017; Levy and Yusuf, 2022; Talmadge, 2015); and b) those who fundamentally critical towards the first approach and often argue that SFA is primarily a tool of (great) power competition. The latter emphasizes the essence of SFA as a foreign policy tool and its inherent nature to demonstrate alliance, partnership, strengthening influence or be present for project power reasons considering these indicators as much a variable or objective of SFA efforts as the questions of effectiveness (Rolandsen et al., 2021). As an example, SFA referred to as a leverage, or the tool of great power competition in the existing literature has been cited previously (Frisell and Sjökvist, 2021; Marsh and Rolandsen, 2021; Robinson and Matisek, 2021; Seabra, 2021). Additionally, Sicurelli highlighting the distinct nature of EU policies towards Africa, also asserted as one of the core pillars of this EU-Africa relations is providing space for the Union to "*build an international identity as a global player and regional power*" (Sicurelli, 2016, p. 10). Similar

arguments and findings were highlighted by several other EU scholars (de Magalhães, n.d.; Toje, 2008).

However, there are rather few approaches to SFA which consider both aspects at the same time, and accordingly, include the political-strategic element of SFA 'entry strategy' and the more operational/tactical approach where SFA effectiveness can be a variable directly connected to military effectiveness of the partner forces. The latter also often results in oversimplifying SFA effectiveness with the increasing destructive power of the partner forces; in other words, asserting that the more destructive the partner force can be on the battlefield, the more effective the SFA mission is. As Robinson argued these approaches often result in situations when "*forceful personalities are attuned toward breaking things on the battlefield, however, not slow consensus building to make things in a starkly different culture.*" (Robinson, 2024, p. 59).

Regardless of the overall objective being effectiveness, or 'solely' reinforcing presence and influence—or both—most practitioners and scholars would agree that the question of effectiveness of SFA is one to be addressed continuously considering the trend of the proliferation of these interventions and the ongoing diversification of providers. While overall SFA specific literature rarely addresses the internal-external nexus in conceptualizing effectiveness, EU external action literature often considers the division between the two as it was highlighted in the literature review. An important example in the existing EU-specific scholarship is the work of Peen Rodt (2014) who separated the two as internal and external goal attainment as indicators of what she conceptualized as overall "success" of EU crisis management operations. While Peen Rodt's (2014) framework also highlighted in the literature review is an important addition to the theorization of success or effectiveness of EU external action, her work focuses specifically on executive crisis management military operations. This empirical context, particularly the tasks deriving from this mandate, and accordingly, the role performance is fundamentally different from non-executive, non-kinetic and primarily capacity building centred SFA missions.

Furthermore, to be conscious of the separation of the aforementioned different approaches is essential while working with contemporary SFA theatres due to two main reasons: firstly, to understand the different political considerations behind deploying these missions—as in 'is it the goal to be effective or rather to project power?'; and secondly, to acknowledge that one-on-one training efforts are

increasingly atypical due to the diversification of providers and the role of SFA in power projection in the era of renewing great power competition (see e.g. Marsh and Rolandsen, 2021; Rolandsen et al., 2021). Accordingly, addressing SFA effectiveness, it is vital to clarify whose effectiveness we are investigating, and how that conceptualization matches contemporary realities including the presence of different providers and actors on the field working with security assistance or advising.

Due to these rather different approaches in the literature as well as the unique empirical context of EU security force assistance to African countries, it is important to further explain what perspective and conceptualization is applied in this research. Based on the theoretical and conceptual underpinning of this research as well as the empirical context, this research utilizes a provider-centred perspective and understands SFA effectiveness as mission effectiveness. Deriving from the Union's self-conceptualization as an international security provider the expected role impact of EU SFA missions is mission effectiveness, which the provider comprehends as the successful implementation of the mandate. This conceptualization also bridges the gap between the previously highlighted approaches to SFA theorization: political-strategic perspective on SFA as a power projection tool as a security provider, and the operational/tactical understanding where SFA effectiveness conceptualized as contribution to the military effectiveness of the partner. Theorizing role impact as mission effectiveness also suggests that the Union expects from EU SFA missions both: a) to increase its legitimacy as a security provider or global/regional power—as Sicurelli suggested (2016)—and b) to build the capacity of the partner forces, including their military effectiveness. The first element with regards to role impact is further reinforced by other existing literature suggesting that different elements of foreign policy, such as 'internal cohesiveness', reinforce the Union's legitimacy as a power or actor in international politics (see e.g. Conceição-Heldt and Meunier, 2015; Ingo Peters et al., 2018).

Conceptualizing SFA mission effectiveness in the context of role theory as the element of role impact also allows this dissertation to focus on the impact of the EU's normative role-conception through the NPE concept and gender mainstreaming on the effectiveness of the mission on the ground. This primarily provider-focused approach is important as the EU's interest and political goals with deploying SFA missions dominantly influences the effectiveness of its SFA missions in Africa. As Biddle et. al. (2018) asserted with regards to US-provided SFA, interest alignment—or

misalignment—is considered to be one of the most dominantly indicator of SFA effectiveness. In accordance with this approach, this dissertation applies a primarily provider-focused understanding of mission effectiveness as successful mandate implementation based on the assumption that the 'entry strategy' directly influences how the provider thinks about role performance (mandate) and role impact (effectiveness of the mission by mandate implementation). This provider-centred understanding was conceptualized by Peen Rodt as 'internal goal attainment' as one of the pillars of success in her framework for looking at the success of EU crisis management (Peen Rodt, 2014).

This aforementioned, provider-focused conceptualization is also fundamental to understand the unique empirical context deriving from two main elements: the acknowledgement of the EU being an atypical SFA provider and unique to EU-Africa relations. Empirically speaking the footprint and scope of EU-led SFA missions are not shaped to be able to impact overall military effectiveness due to limitations both in terms of personal, and geographical outreach. The EU as a provider exclusively deploys relatively small footprint military capacity building missions and is often only a complementary effort to other existing international or state SFA efforts in a partner country, such as the case with EU Training Mission in Somalia. As a result of these characteristics of EU SFA assessing the effectiveness of EU training missions vis-à-vis the overall military effectiveness of the Somali Nation Army neither feasible empirically nor conceptually. This reinforces that the goal of SFA deployment is not solely to increase military effectiveness of the partner. While EU military presence and the SFA mission itself surely have an impact on the trainees it works with and institutions it advised, the mission's overall effort in increasing SNA capabilities would probably demonstrate very low contribution to effectiveness in that conceptualization. However, this does not mean that on the mission's own scale, mandate and responsibilities, the SFA provided cannot be effective relative to its efforts and ambitions.

While the author acknowledges the limitations of this conceptualization of effectiveness of SFA in this research, she argues that looking at role impact as mission effectiveness can shed light on how the Union's normative self-conceptualization and gender mainstreaming as norm transfer impacts the work of the missions on the ground. Additionally, it serves as a conceptual bridge between the political-strategic and operational/tactical levels in understanding SFA as a foreign policy tool and its

impact. This is particularly important as the Union is a unique, new case study as an atypical SFA provider which has yet to be conceptualized and comprehensively address by the scholarship from both political-strategic and operational aspects. Lastly, conceptualizing role impact from the provider's perspective as mission effectiveness also builds on the theoretical assumptions made by Matisek (2018) and Jobbágy (2019). While Jobbágy (2019) argued that direct causal links in war and conflict are extremely challenging to make due to the fluid nature of these operational environment, Matisek (2018) asserted that as a result of the highly different CMR power dynamics at African countries the Western ideas of military effectiveness are hardly applicable while building and training forces in these contexts.

3.6 *Chapter conclusion: application of the theoretical and conceptual perspective and its limitations*

After introducing and clarifying the theories, concepts used in the dissertation, this subchapter intends to summarize and highlight the most important elements linking them directly to the research problem and the question.

In the contemporary strategic framework of EU external action, the Union conducts gender mainstreaming in all CSDP missions and operations, allocating budget, personnel and different specific resources to these missions to ensure the integration of the integration of a gender perspective in all levels. This is done internal and external aspects of gender mainstreaming, such as deployment of gender advisors, or funding projects through EU missions for women's empowerment (see e.g Gracza Hornyák, forthcoming, 2025a; Molnár and Hornyák Gracza, 2024). Focusing on a specific aspect of gender mainstreaming through military CSDP, specifically SFA missions, this research addresses the research question why the EU conducts gender mainstreaming and how this policy impacts missions on the ground.

To answer these questions the dissertation turns to the rich analytical and conceptual toolbox of role theory with a constructivist and interdisciplinary approach. As it was highlighted throughout conceptual mapping in this chapter, role theory provides a unique set of apparatus to theorize and conceptualize EU external action. With applying RT this dissertation conceptualizes the Unions role conception as a normative self-conceptualization through the Normative Power Europe concept. NPE serves as the EU's conflict specific role as an international security provider in the context of SFA missions conducted in Africa in the framework of a mesoscopic level

analysis. This EU role conception relying on the NPE concept asserts the Union attribute its power and legitimacy founded on its constitutional values and norms, including gender equality (Whitman, 2011b). The institutionalization of the EU's role as an international security provider in the empirical context of Somalia and Mozambique are the SFA missions deployed to these two African countries, EU Training Mission Somalia and EU Training Mission Mozambique.

Furthermore, the research question connects and explores the link between the EU's normative self-conceptualization of the role concept and the performance and impact of the role via looking at gender mainstreaming as a norm transfer. The conceptual map suggests that the Unions normative self-conceptualization through NPE leads to the transfer of one of the EU's constitutional values, gender equality through the role performance of these two SFA missions, specifically training and advising. This normative element deriving from the EU's normative self-conceptualization subsequently impacts mission effectiveness or mandate implementation in EUTM Somalia and EUTM Mozambique (see Figure 3.5). This reinforces the constructivist approach to this research and the added value of integrating the NPE concept in the dissertation in agreement with Whitman highlighting that "*principles, actions and impact are equally important for NPE*" (Whitman, 2011a, p. 8). This makes the cross-fertilization of conceptual framework of role theory and NPE adequate to analyse the question how normative consideration and norm transfer implemented through CSFP can impact EU-led SFA missions in the given context. Moreover, as previously highlighted both role theory and the NPE concept was invoked in an attempt to step away from realism vs. liberalism and civilian vs. military binary often binding scholars to understand the complexities of EU decision-making, policies especially the usage of military tools.

Gender mainstreaming as norm transfer contributes to the conceptual framework by explaining how the constitutional norm and value of gender equality is understood and active in external policies by the EU including SFA missions in Africa. In such institutionalized contexts the EU promotes gender equality through gender mainstreaming as a norm transfer asserting that it has the ability to shape gender norms in these African partner countries. While there are several different approaches to the conceptualization of gender mainstreaming, this dissertation understands gender mainstreaming as the integration of a gender perspective in different policy areas in line with the EU conceptualization. In contrast with a single-focused gender equality

policy, gender mainstreaming as a normative policy is integrated in CSFP and CSDP allowing the diffusion of the Union's constitutional value of gender equality to be translated into military SFA missions.

Conceptual mapping through this chapter as an important baseline of this dissertation offered more benefits than directly connecting role theory and its most common concepts to the research questions and the empirical case studies. Chapter 3. also allowed further reflections on the literature and contributed to bridging the gap between the four main theoretical and conceptual elements of this research: Role theory, the Normative Power Europe concept, gender mainstreaming and EU security force assistance and its effectiveness.

4 METHODOLOGY

4.1 Overview and relevance of the methodology

As was briefly discussed in previous chapters, in this dissertation takes an inductive approach in order to analyse why the EU conduct gender mainstreaming in SFA missions in Africa and how this policy impacts these missions on the ground. Role theory application in the broader framework of constructivism—as well as study of norms, values in foreign policy—in many cases the scholarship presupposes the use of mixed-method or qualitative research (Breuning, 2022; Harnisch et al., 2011). In line with these trends in the constructivist epistemic community and role theory application, the research works with qualitative methods, which are the following: strategic document analysis, discourse analysis, participatory observation, interviews and comparative case study method.

The different methods and multiple layers of the overall methodology are applied in concert to facilitate data gathering, which, given the sensitive nature of military issues, could not rely on a single type of primary source. This is particularly important, as the previous chapters highlighted that not only is the literature on EU SFA missions relatively limited, but primary sources—also being a scarcity—are often exclusively available from the Union's own records. Solely relying on an analysis of EU discourses on gender mainstreaming, norm transfer, and security force assistance risks merely reproducing and reinforcing those discourses, rather than enabling a more comprehensive examination of their actual impact on policy and practice.

While many of these methods, such as discourse analysis and interviews, are often applied in constructivist research in security studies, participatory observation, as an ethnographic method is more dominantly present in anthropological research. Strategic document analysis and comparative case studies are also frequently used in different fields, including IR and FPA research, and serve for the benefit of this investigation as well. Furthermore, all methods applied as the part of the present research methodology are apposite and often employed in role theory as the guiding theoretical framework of this dissertation. As highlighted in Chapter 3. vis-à-vis the flexible applicability of role theory with distinct research approaches, in a very similar fashion, RT research—depending on the overall approach as well as the three level,

macroscopic, mesoscopic or microscopic—can make use of different methods (see also in: Harnisch, 2012).

As Ties and Breuning asserted, role theory was first applied predominantly by the US-based FPA scholars by the "*first wave of Role Theory analysis*" and then later made its way to across the Atlantic where the European constructivist IR academic community started to utilize it (Elgström et al., 2006; Thies and Breuning, 2012, p. 2). Building on this constructivist role theory application in IR particularly in Europe and in EU studies, the dissertation invokes various methods for the exploration of different conceptual elements of role theory in the given context. As outlined in Chapter 3., the rich conceptual vocabulary of role theory opens the possibility for researchers to apply different methods—while staying consistent with the epistemology of the research—in understanding and analyse role conception, role conflict or self-conceptualization of actors and their role impact. This is also reflected in the present research and the structure of the dissertation where different conceptual elements of role theory are studied in the specific context of EU security force assistance missions in Africa through various methods.

First, in order to understand the EU's self-conceptualization as an international security provider as part of the role concept, the research engages in discourse analysis and strategic document analysis between the time period of 2003 and 2024. This is further complemented with the data collected and analysed through participatory observation and interviews. The time frame of the analysis was given based on the argument that 2003 served as a milestone year for EU security and defence policy; not only the Union adopted its first security strategy in the year of 2003, but the EU also launched its first civilian and military crisis management operations (European Union, 2003; see also Appendix 1.). This part of the research connected to the first research question and hypothesis 1. and 2. is primarily explained in Chapter 5. analysing the EU's self-conceptualization as an international security provider.

Subsequently, moving on to role institutionalization and role performance, Chapter 6. explores the Union's engagement in security force assistance in the framework of CSDP. This chapter serves both descriptive purposes and also contribute to the understanding and further conceptualization of EU SFA. Accordingly, while methodologically this chapter also works with qualitative methods, including document analysis, participatory observation and interviews, the conceptual nature and focus of this chapter put the emphasis on secondary sources more dominantly than in

other more empirical ones. Moreover, this chapter builds on Chapter 5. exploring the EU's role as an international security provider and zooms in on the time frame of 2010-2024. This further scrutinizes how that self-conceptualization specifically affected the conceptual understanding of "providing security" through security force assistance missions, training and advising.

Chapter 7. engages in strategic document analysis specific to EU gender mainstreaming in external action within the same time frame as Chapter 5., from 2003 to 2024. The reason behind the focus on this time period is that EU gender mainstreaming is explored in connection with its integration into CSDP missions and operations specifically SFA practices. The chapter relies on data collected through participatory observation, interviews and the review of relevant strategic documents as primary sources to both understand EU gender mainstreaming conceptually as well as to be used for further analysis. The latter is conducted through the application of discourse analysis with special focus on argumentation for gender mainstreaming policies in military CSDP. This primarily includes the examination by discourse analysis on not only how the EU understands gender and gender mainstreaming in CSDP, but also on how the EU argues for the integration of a gender perspective vis-à-vis mission effectiveness. This methodology applied in this chapter facilitates the analysis of gender mainstreaming as norm transfer and its connection to role performance and role impact through hypothesis 3. and 4.

Lastly, the comparative case study analysis allows this dissertation to explore the EU's conflict-specific role as an international security provider being institutionalized through the same policy instrument and policy framework, SFA missions as a tool of CSDP. Comparative case study is also one of the three methods most commonly used in role theory research (see e.g. Bengtsson and Elgström, 2012; Harnisch, 2012; Aggestam, 2018; Breuning, 2022). Moreover, different types of case studies are also integral part of EU studies as well as scholarship on CSDP missions and operations and the integration of the WPS agenda/ gender perspective into these missions (see e.g. Peen Rodt, 2014; Petrikkos and Hornyák, 2022; Van Der Lijn *et al.*, 2022; Sabatino *et al.*, 2023; Molnár and Gracza Hornyák, 2024).

The following subchapters detail the main data collection methods, participatory observation and qualitative interviews and their implementation in the research process. Both data collection methods provided opportunity for working with primary sources, which were also complemented with secondary sources and relevant

literature, from scholarly books to policy-oriented analytical pieces. Subsequently, the two main data analysis methods, strategic document analysis and discourse analysis is introduced, including their operationalization in order to respond to the research questions of this dissertation.

4.2 Data collection methods

This research relies on the systematic triangulation of both qualitative and quantitative data collected from both primary and secondary sources. Reliance on primary sources, such as participatory observation and interviews provides with the opportunity to obtain data with highest possible level of reliability. However, in a few cases, where different primary sources showed different quantitative data, such as the number of troops or personnel deployed to EU SFA missions, a footnote serves as further explanation of the nature and possible reasons for that difference.

Moreover, data collection was complemented with the creation and maintenance of a dataset on all EU-led civilian and military interventions since 2003. The data was gathered through the revision of relevant literature and then continuously updated and cross-checked with primary sources, such as interviews between 2020 and 2024. This dataset, which is enclosed as Appendix 1. contains both quantitative and qualitative data on EU missions, including their start and—where applicable— their end date, full name of the mission, their respective commanding authority, and their respective nature out of the three types of interventions of the contemporary CSDP triad. The latter is further visualized through color-coding in the dataset. This dataset provided with the opportunity to cross-check data from other primary and secondary sources, as well as for comparative data analysis in order to identify different trends in EU CSDP interventions overtime.

4.2.1 Qualitative Research Interviews

Interviewing as a data collection method for qualitative research is very popular across different disciplines (Bryman, 2019; King et al., 2019; Kvale, 1994). However, the 'whys' and the 'hows' in interviewing are highly contested as Kvale (1994) also asserted. Most debates are focusing on the ethical considerations of, and while conducting interviews in different fields, while other discussions are informed by the distinct research approaches in scholarly research and epistemic communities. As Mojtahed and co-authors note, the "*operationalization of qualitative interviews' underlying epistemological principles remains complex and at times controversial*"

(Mojtahed et al., 2014, p. 88). Feminist epistemology, for instance, considers the lived experiences of the researcher(s) as well as his/her experiences and assertions during dominantly unstructured interviews as integral part of the research process and analysis (Grasswick, 2011; Hills Collins, 1990). Constructivist research, including this one, often use semi-structured interview format, with the purpose of understanding human perceptions of a certain phenomenon while keeping the interviewee focus on the questions and propositions guiding the research and propositions (Burns et al., 2022; Denicolo et al., 2016; Mojtahed et al., 2014).

In order to collect data for this dissertation semi-structured, elite interviews were conducted between September 2021 and October 2024 dominantly with a snowball sampling method. Interviews specifically focusing on the data collection provided both qualitative and quantitative information, as well as the verification of information from other primary and secondary sources in order to deepen the understanding of the cases. The semi-structured format for interviews was chosen in pursuance of having guiding questions and possible follow-up prompts for more focused the data collection to the research questions. Additionally, the semi-structured nature of the interviews also kept the opportunity open for the interviewees to further elaborate and express their thoughts and experiences with regards to the phenomenon investigated in question and respective to their expertise. The semi-structure format, as Bryman also asserted, is especially useful in case of multiple interviewees, where the subsequent analysis of the interviews can also serve for data comparison (Bryman, 2019).

A small core circle of stakeholder as possible interviewees was first identified initially in order to start the snowball sampling method. During this first round of sampling and planning the interviews the author first focused on EU personal, officials both in Brussels and in the field. This pool of EU officials and experts included previous and current gender advisors as key stakeholders from all existing EU training missions in Africa. The second circle of people interviewed were nationals of the partner countries, Somalia and Mozambique as well as non-EU experts and practitioners working in these countries, such as UN experts. These interviewees included perspectives from the highest-ranking female officer in the Somali National Army or the director of a leading women's rights NGO in Mozambique. Lastly, a small group of academics—including anthropologists with deep knowledge on local realities working with Somalia or Mozambique— were interviewed complementing the previous views on the research topic. The list of interviewees ranges from EU experts

on gender and security, EU military personnel responsible for planning and commanding EU military training missions, including Somalia and Mozambique, as well as academics, and experts outside of the Brussels/EU realm. The author of this dissertation finds the latter crucial, specifically to reach as many Somali and Mozambican professionals as possible on the ground or internationally who are engaged in local/national politics and policymaking to further understand realities on the ground. This is of utmost importance, since the author argues, that EU-based EU-focused researchers oftentimes fall short on data collection outside of the "EU realm" further reinforcing and reciting the EU's own narrative and discourses. The sampling of interviewees was primarily based on snow-ball method, but the author strived to make sure to have perspectives across various sectors and walks of life.

In total 70 people were contacted between 2021 and 2024 August, and 26 interviews were conducted including 14 civilians and 11[35] military personnel. academics, practitioners as well as policymakers. With the wide variety of interviewees reflecting on EU gender mainstreaming and its impact on SFA missions, this dissertation agrees and in line with the argument of Whitman noting that "*studying NPE requires a deep analysis of its various impacts at different levels (individual level, legal level and non-Europeans' level)*" (Whitman, 2011a, p. 7). From the EU-side in-depth interviews were conducted with people engaged in high-level political discussions, diplomacy, but also practitioners and officials who have worked or are currently working on the field with EU missions. Accordingly, a comprehensive and 360 degree outlook on both EUTM Somalia and EUTM Mozambique as case studies was kept as crucial principle during the interview processes for both the descriptive and explanatory nature of the comparative case study for the interviews to be able to serve as *"good snapshots at a series of specific moments"* (Collier, 2011, p. 824). These "snapshots" provided insights and data from different points in time, under the different mandates of EUTM Somalia and EUTM Mozambique since the starts of their operation. Considering the fact that while the EU's self-conceptualization as a security provider was in the focus of this research, the role expectation of the partner countries benefiting from EU SFA also shape the overall role conception, for both case studies, local stakeholders and nationals of the respective countries were included in the

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[35] one military interviewee was interviewed two different occasions, because of extensive experience with one of the case study missions both on the military-strategic and operational levels.

interview sample. Moreover, both in the case of Somalia and Mozambique considering the specific focus on the gender perspective and gender mainstreaming in EU SFA efforts, national interviewees both included women and men. An important limitation to note here is most Somali and Mozambican nationals the author interviewed were working together with the EU or UN in some aspect, which likely made them national stakeholders who are more prone to embrace European (or Western) values and norms or tend to be less critical towards international intervention in their countries. The latter in an important principle and element in feminist epistemology which also guided the sampling of interviewees.

Prior to the interview process a detailed interview guide was created with interview questions specific to different data collection purposes of this research. An interview guide, as Bryman also argued, is an important element of focused data collection on a specific issue for subsequent compering and analysis (Bryman, 2019). This interview guide for the present dissertation research can be found in Appendix 3. The guide and its questions were structured based on two principles: first and foremost, to support data collection in order to answer the research questions; and second, to reflect on the different foci of the chapters. In both wording and phrasing the questions and prompts the most important principle was not to have guided questions. Moreover, to have consistency and coherence in the focus of the data collection in many cases similar or same questions were asked of different interviewees. Prior to the interviews these were complemented with additional questions and prompts in order to reflect the expertise of the interviewee in questions.

Additionally, the interviews have been conducted after and in agreement with the interviewees who signed a research consent form (see research consent form used for the interviewees in Appendix 4). Through filling in and signing the consent form, the interviewees had the opportunity to ask for anonymity and/or express their preferences on how they would like to be referred to in case the interview material is cited in this dissertation. Many, especially EU policymakers and practitioners, only with a very few exceptions, requested anonymity and were only open to being interviewed if their names do not appear in the present research. Because of the high number of interviews as well as the relatively large percentage of interviewees requesting anonymity, the list of interviewees numbered is also attached in Appendix 6. and cited primarily by their numbers, such as 'Interviewee 5.' across the dissertation.

Finally, in terms of operationalization of the interviews, where possible, they were conducted in-person. In other cases, interviews were conducted via Microsoft Teams' online videoconferencing platform. Interviewees with a few exceptions gave their authorization to make recording during the interviews, which then subsequently provided the opportunity to transcribe them. These transcribed materials were highly beneficial during the analysis as well as revisiting their content later at any point in time during this doctoral research was conducted. Lastly, it is important to highlight that some of the interviews were conducted for previous specific research with findings vital for this dissertation. Interviewees interviewed for this previous research were subsequently contacted and asked for their authorization to use the interview material in this doctoral research.

4.2.2 *Participatory or participant observation*

Ethnographic data collection is also part of this research in the form of participatory observation (PO). Also known as participant observation, PO is a unique qualitative method often applied in anthropological and sociological research. With engaging in participatory observation the researcher has the opportunity to collect data which are otherwise mostly inaccessible from the perspective of an outside observer who is not involved or part of the institution (Jorgensen, 2015; Kawulich, 2005).

During this research participant observation method was utilized as data collection during the activities of the European Security and Defense College (ESDC), the main educational and training entity of the European External Action Service (EEAS). EEAS is the *de facto* ministry of foreign affairs and ministry of defence of the EU (European External Action Service, 2024a). Since 2021 the author has been a doctoral fellow at the Doctoral School on CSDP, which is a part of ESDC, and has participated in multiple activities providing with the opportunity for data collection from EU experts, policymakers including civilian and military personnel from missions and operations under the Chatham House rules. ESDC, founded in 2005, is an important pillar of EU CSFP integrated into the organigram of the European External Action Service (European External Action Service, 2024b). According to its mission, the aim of this institution is to "*deliver strategic-level education on CSDP, and provide knowledgeable personnel, within both EU Institutions and EU Member States*" and "*to further promote EU values and share best practices in security and defence*" (European Security and Defence College, 2018). Accordingly, ESDC is a crucial place for EU member states to make strategic decisions about what kind of

education and training priorities they want to further strengthen when it comes to CSFP and CSDP, including pre-deployment training for diplomats, as well as EU civilian and uniformed personnel. The offered compulsory and optional courses—where EU institutions and member states (can) send their representatives, diplomats, policy-makers or uniformed staff—include a wide range of topics from SSR to armament cooperation as well as specific pre-deployment training opportunities, such as the Hostile Environment Awareness Training (HEAT) (European Security and Defence College, 2024). ESDC is a place where EU external action strategic priorities are well-reflected in many different aspects, including the promotion of EU values and norms in external action, for instance, through training on the integration of a gender perspective in CSDP.

Participatory observation included four one-week long summer universities across Europe between 2021 and 2024, two annual conferences of the ESDC Doctoral School on CSDP, as well as one course provided by the European Security and Defence College specifically focusing on integrating the gender perspective in CSDP. Throughout these events the author of this dissertation was present as a participant, and in two cases also as a presenter/speaker (see the detailed list of dates, locations and other details on the events included in the participatory observation data collection in Appendix 2.). The data collection was done by note-taking as live recording the sessions and presentations was not allowed during these events, however, in some instances, taking pictures of slides and presentation materials was allowed and used by collecting data for this research respecting the requests of the presenter. Where referring to notes and data collected throughout this ethnographic method the date and location of the presentation is noted, and if possible, the position/rank or institution of the speaker cited.

Throughout participating in ESDC activities for almost four consecutive years the author of this dissertation was able to obtain important insights on the development of EU external action, strategic priorities including gender mainstreaming in CSDP. During these couple of days or weeks per a year the author of the dissertation gained insights on how high-level policymakers and practitioners shaping EU CSDP and CSDP, including security cooperation and SFA efforts 'think and talk' about the EU as an actor in international relations as well as the values on which EU identity is 'built'. Finally, while acknowledging the limited time and specific nature of these interactions and data collection the author shares the argument that participatory observation, "*even*

when it is used on a limited basis, there is no denying the power of this technique to produce penetrating insights and highly contextual understanding" (Guest et al., 2013).

4.3 Data analysis methods:

4.3.1 Document analysis

Document analysis is an often-used tool in both qualitative and mixed-method research, and it can serve not only data collection purposes, but as an analytical tool as well. Nevertheless, it is often highlighted and argued in the literature that this method— also called strategic document analysis or documentary analysis research—, is frequently underused and underappreciated as a research method (see e.g. Merriam and Tisdell, 2016; Tight, 2019; Morgan, 2022). Furthermore, while document analysis can be a dominant methodology in a research, more often it serves as a complementary element alongside other methods (Morgan, 2022; Rapley, 2007). Document analysis is also widely used throughout disciplines, such as history, behavioural sciences or security studies, which all use distinct types of documents, texts, manuscripts, as well as engage in different type of analysis depending on the focus on the research. The diversity of approaches alongside the wide variety of applicability for different reasons, such as ethical, physical or national security reasons is well-explained by Morgan (2022).

Whether used as a single methodology or as a complementary element, scholarship on documentary analysis agrees that the careful selection of documents and their explanation in a research is necessary and essential (Creswell, 2014; Merriam and Tisdell, 2016; Rapley, 2007; Tight, 2019). Morgan (2022) lists the most important aspects of selecting the right documents for analysis such as authenticity, credibility, representativity and significance. This research focusing on EU external action, more specifically CSFP and CSDP and the Union's self-conceptualization in such policies inherently narrowed down the document selection criteria to two main types of documents vis-à-vis the European Union: constitutional documents of the EU, also referred to as Treaties in this dissertation, as well as strategic documents specific to external action and gender equality. The idiosyncratic nature of the Union—in line with the NPE concept—in international politics makes it quintessential to understand the constitutional context of EU external action and identity which can be done by first looking at the Lisbon Treaty, including the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the

Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (European Union, 2012b, 2012a). While these are not strategies *per se*, the strategic documents guiding EU external action cannot be understood without the *de facto* constitutional foundation provided by the TEU and TFEU. Additionally, strategic documents-especially security strategies-are primarily tools for understanding the self-conceptualization of an actor in international politics understood in the framework of role theory and beyond (Biscop and Coolsaet, 2003; Cantir and Kaarbo, 2012; Chin, 2023). As Biscop and Coolsaet noted a "*security strategy is a policy-making tool which, on the basis of given values and interests (...) serves as a reference framework for day-to-day policy-making in a rapidly evolving and increasingly complex international environment*" (Biscop and Coolsaet, 2003, p. 1).

While this research also engages in document analysis for data collection purposes, the main element of the application of this method is used for analysing strategic documents both from qualitative and quantitative perspectives. Strategic document analysis is an important part of this inquiry both vis-à-vis understanding the EU's self-conceptualization as an international security provider through relevant documents as well as mapping and analysing the existing strategic framework and network of strategies for gender mainstreaming in EU external action, including CSDP. This method is applied in Chapter 5. to study all three existing EU security and defence related strategies, EU Security Strategy from 2003, EU Global Strategy from 2016 and the EU Strategic Compass from 2022 (European Union, 2022, 2016, 2003). The three strategic documents included in the document analysis are also covering the same time period as the overall research from 2003 when the EU launched its first civilian missions and military operations. Considering the specific focus of this research vis-à-vis EU external action through CSDP and security cooperation, the sample of the strategic document analysis did not include security and defence related strategies aiming at predominantly internal security issues, such as the EU Security Union Strategy[36] from 2020. Based on similar reasoning documents focusing on other specific aspect of foreign policy, such as strategic documents on development

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[36] EU Security Union Strategy (EUSUS) is a strategic document from 2020, which primarily focuses on internal security, safety and the protection of EU citizens within EU borders stating that "*Its goal is to offer a security dividend to protect everyone in the EU*". https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52020DC0605&from=EN

cooperation, neighbourhood policy or trade, are not covered due to their foci being different.

Chapter 5. both applies qualitative and quantitative document analysis to study the Union's self-conceptualization as well as its reliance of militarized discourses and military instruments through ESDP (2003-2009) and CSDP (2009-). Qualitative aspects of the analysis focus on EU discourses on its own role in international security as well as its interpretation of values in constructing its identity as a security provider. A complementary quantitative analysis facilitates the understanding of military aspects of security and crisis management in the three existing EU security strategies. Seven key words were coded as indicators of such military aspects facilitating the understanding of militarized discourse of the Union's strategic documents leading its own self-conceptualization as an SFA provider. This quantitative element allowed data visualization of this militarized discourse in EU external action individually and comparatively between the three strategic documents (see Table 2. below).

	Key words coded for quantitative document analysis	European Security Strategy (2003)	EU Global Strategy (2016)	EU Strategic Compass (2022)
1.	military	10	11	106
2.	defence	8	57	195
3.	armed forces	0	0	15
4.	military mission(s)	0	0	10
5.	(military) operation(s)	0	1	74
6.	force	7	9	47
7.	command	1	0	9
Mentions/Total word count ratio		~1:180	~1:211	~1:44

Table 2. Quantitative document analysis key words and number of mentions in the three strategic documents analysed.

Chapter 7. of the dissertation also utilizes strategic document analysis to understand the EU gender mainstreaming practices in the context of external action. The unique nature of gender mainstreaming and its connection to the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda makes it crucial to conduct a document analysis with a comparative element in order to understand which EU strategic document is relevant to and influencing CSFP and CSDP specifically. Accordingly, Chapter 7. identifies and analyses four such strategic documents: the EU Gender Equality Strategy from 2020-2025, the EU Gender Action Plan for External Action 2021-2025, the EU Strategic Approach to the Women, Peace and Security Agenda and the EU Action Plan for the Women, Peace and Security Agenda 2019-2024 (see Table 7. in Chapter 7.). This chapter also briefly notes other WPS and GM focused

documents specific to military CSDP in order to understand the operationalization of strategic documents and their provisions in military missions. However, the document analysis is centred to the aforementioned four strategic documents identified as not only representative, but also the most significant ones in constructing the contemporary framework for EU GM considering Morgan's argument on sample selection (2022). In this sense, document analysis method was first applied for data collection with regards to relevant strategic framework which then was subsequently followed by a thematic contextual analysis of the documents including discourse analysis explored in the next subchapter.

4.3.2 *Discourse analysis*

Discourse analysis (DA) is a classical method often used in constructivist research, but, as Rapley asserted, different scholars and scholarships can interpret and use this method in distinct ways for varying research contexts (Rapley, 2007). Alongside the wide array of scholars from different epistemic communities from phenomenology to postmodernism engaging in DA, discourse analysis is also an important scientific tool for policy analysis. FPA field also applies discourse analysis method for studying how different policy actors operate within a specific discursive framework in order to either consolidate existing policy or spread new policies. These actors can include politicians, policy strategists, as well as practitioners (Lynggaard and Triantafillou, 2023; Rapley, 2007).

In agreement with the policy-relevant use of discourse analysis, this dissertation utilizes and understands discourse analysis as a method to uncover the "*discursive framing of real-world problems, arguments over policy goals, and policy solutions*" (Lynggaard and Triantafillou, 2023, p. 2). But what is discourse, what is or what can be the unit of analysis in case of the application of DA? Schmidt argues that discourse is "*the representation of ideas (how agents say what they are thinking of doing) and the discursive interactions through which actors generate and communicate ideas (to whom they say it) within given institutional contexts (where and when they say it)*" (Schmidt, 2008, p. 306). She further asserts that discourses can be either communicative or cooperative, where the first is understood as the actors external communication to others, while cooperative happens between policy actors (Schmidt, 2008). In line with this conceptualization, the discourses studied in this research are the representation of the EU's ideas about its own actorness and role as an international security provider as well as on gender mainstreaming in external action.

In terms of operationalization of DA as an analytical tool, it is used for studying both strategic documents, notes from the participant observation as well as relevant interviews and their transcripts as samples of the discourses of the EU. This method is applied specifically to investigate how the Union refers to its role as an international security provider in strategic documents and discourses in order to 1) understand what kind of security provider the EU views itself and 2) how the normative element of this self-conceptualization is present in these discourses. In both cases the discourses are largely communicative by nature—based on the aforementioned categorization of Schmidt (2008)—directed towards the public or other actors, such as through strategic documents, or the interviews conducted as they happened towards a member of a public, a researcher, the author of this dissertation. Nevertheless, some discourse samples and data collected to the participatory observation can be understood and categorized as cooperative, as the speakers were invited by an internal, EU institutions, ESDC, and most of them spoke under Chatham Housed rules, which provided a different discursive environment for these policymakers and practitioners to speak.

When concentrating on the normative nature of the Union's role conception in line with the specific focus of this research, gender equality as a norm or value—which then feeds gender mainstreaming as a policy and norm transfer—as well as the discourses legitimizing and explaining GM in external action including SFA missions are studied. Discourse analysis, accordingly, is used as an important tool to compare verbal discourses of interviewees on the EU's role in international politics and the normative nature of this role and the role of norms and principles in constructing the Union's self-conceptualization in strategic documents describing similar aspects of EU external action and identity. The latter was operationalized primarily through Chapter 5., but Chapter 6. specifically focusing on SFA aspects and military CSDP also benefited from the discourse analysis method.

Finally, Chapter 7. focusing on EU gender mainstreaming and how the Union connects gender mainstreaming and operational effectiveness of CSDP missions also relies heavily on the discourse analysis of four strategic documents on GM and WPS previously mentioned in 1.3.1 subchapter as well as interview materials and transcripts. The interview guide with its semi-structured questions and prompts facilitated that the interviewees in their answers to directly reflect on the priorities highlighted in the discourses present in the strategic documents and also possibly further elaborate on issues described and framed in the documents.

4.4 Comparative case study analysis

While some scholars argue that different types of case study analysis are part of the research approach or design, this dissertation applies comparative case study as a method in order to examine the foreign policy implementation in a unique empirical context (Lamont, 2017; Yin, 2014). As Yin asserted, a case study is "*an empirical inquiry which investigates a phenomenon in its real-life context.*" (Yin, 2014, p. 18) Priya further argued for the research design-nature of case studies due to their in-dept focus to investigate a specific "social unit" (Priya, 2021). This research design approach is also called 'case study strategy' by Creswell (Creswell, 2014). Nevertheless, in spite of the existence of multiple different approaches to case studies, there is a rather solid consensus in the scholarly communities that a researcher should be aware of different case selection methods, the opportunities they provide as well as the biases and limitations they impose on the research.

Case studies of different nature, including comparative ones are frequently used methods in studying conceptual and empirical aspects which are in the foci of this research, such as gender mainstreaming (Minto and Mergaert, 2018; Molnár and Gracza Hornyák, 2024), CSDP missions and operations (Vecsey, 2016) and security force assistance (Biddle et al., 2018; Karlin, 2017). The present research applies a comparative analysis as a case study method—rather than a comprehensive research design—where contrasting the case studies serves as a data analysis method of data collected through the aforementioned different qualitative methods.

While Priya argued that a single-case or within-case study can be justified by the case being a "*quintessential example of a particular phenomenon under investigation*", such as EUTM Somalia, she further asserted that it is generally accepted that multiple-case studies are more robust and convincing. She also noted that reason behind this is because they are more likely to filter out biases and inaccuracies in data gathering and yield a more satisfactory outcome (Priya, 2021, p. 100). In agreement with this argumentation this research engages in comparative case study analysis of EUTM Somalia and EUTM Mozambique. The case selection in the case of EUTM Somalia was both a logistical and contextual one as EUTM Somalia was the European Union's inaugural security force assistance mission, marking the EU's first attempt to mainstream gender as part of its integrated approach to conflict and crisis in SFA. Hence, this EU military mission serves as a benchmark for institutional memory and lessons learned, not only concerning overall EU security force assistance efforts but

also regarding the integration of gender mainstreaming considerations in such contexts.

The case selection is further reinforced by the continuous renewal of the mandate for EUTM Somalia, which is entering its 14th year of operation in 2024. Such longevity in the case of EUTM Somalia is an essential preliminary step that paves the way for further exploration into subsequent EU "train and equip" missions within a comparative framework. EUTM Somalia of itself with its 14 years in progress would be able to serve as a rich and in-dept within-case analysis. Nevertheless, with the explicit integration of gender mainstreaming into mandate-related activities of EUTM Mozambique this dissertation is able to contribute to the existing scholarship with a comparative case study. The mandates and the possible changes they result(ed) in the conduct of gender mainstreaming in the respective missions serve as an important benchmark and longitudinal element of the case study analysis. As Bryman asserted, observing and understanding the longitudinal element in case studies in crucial in order to understand and analyse possible trends or changes (Bryman, 2008; Priya, 2021). Continuous and rigorous reflection of this longitudinal element through the different mandate renewals is an essential part of this dissertation as well and further facilitated by the visualization of mandate renewals in the comparative case study chapter for both cases for clarity. This longitudinal element was taken into consideration during the data collection especially vis-à-vis interviews, which intended to be covered all mandates either on the field or as a policy officer in the Brussels headquarters.

EUTM Mozambique was launched in 2021 based on the request of the Mozambican government to the European Union (Council of the European Union, 2021a). Similarly to Somalia, Mozambique also faces the threat posed by Islamist militia group also called as al-Shabaab, which, despite of sharing the name with the al-Shabaab in Somalia, is a different organization (Elias and Bax, 2024). In both cases the countries requested the support of the Union for their national armed forces and the ministries of defence with training and advising to tackle the threat posed by these Islamist armed groups. While the circumstances of the deployment of the EU military training missions in terms of role institutionalization are very similar as a result of the invitation of the partner country in order to tackle internal security threats by non-state actors, there are significant differences between the two cases making their comparison highly beneficial for of this research.

As Table 3. below aims to demonstrate EUTM Somalia and EUTM Mozambique share some important similarities. Nevertheless, from the perspective of this research their differences, particularly with regards to gender mainstreaming and how the institutionalization of the role of the EU as a security provider is performed, are also crucial. One the one hand, while EUTM Somalia and subsequent similar EU SFA missions did not have WPS implementation explicitly integrated into their mandate, in the case of EUTM Mozambique the integration of the Women, Peace and Security agenda was part of the mission's mandate explicitly (Council of the European Union, 2021a). Moreover, in the case of Mozambique the EU took a different approach to role performance from the first deployment narrowing down the SFA training and advising related tasks to special forces units of the Armed Forces of Mozambique (see Table 2.). As a consequence, EUTM Mozambique's direct focus on counterinsurgency training of special units—similar to the 'Salvador model' conceptualized by Biddle and explored in Chapter 2.—stands in contrast with previous practices of EU SFA between 2010 and 2021 in other SFA missions (see.: Biddle, Macdonald and Baker, 2018; Gracza Hornyák, 2024). This angle of EU-specific SFA practices is explored in Chapter 6. in detail.

	EUTM Somalia	**EUTM Mozambique**
Established (year)	From 2010 (mandate until 12/2024); Initially in Uganda then from 2012 in Somalia	2021 (mandate ends 2 years after FOC[37] is reached); 2024 transitioning to an advisory mission
WPS in the mandate	not included	included
Training focus	Basic military training	Special operation forces training
Recipient focus	Somali National Armed Forces (SNAF)[38]	5 units of navy marines and 6 units of army special forces
Territorial focus	Limited to Mogadishu/capital area	Limited to Cabo Delgado province
Major security threat to tackle	Non-state actors/terrorist organization(s): Al-Shabaab	Non-state actors/terrorist organization(s): Islamist militia (Al-Shabab[39])
Other EU presence in the country	EU Delegation to Somalia; EUCAP Somalia civilian mission; EUNAVFOR Atalanta naval military operations	EU Delegation to Mozambique

Table 3. EU Training Mission Somalia and EU Training Missions Mozambique as empirical case studies of this dissertation and their most important characteristics.

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[37] Full Operational Capacity
[38] Different recipient names in different sources: EUTM website vs. EEAS mandate renewal press release
[39] The two Al-Shabab Islamist militias are not the same or organization (see Elias and Bax, 2024)

From these two important perspectives, the author of this dissertation asserts that EUTM Mozambique can be viewed as a 'new generation' EU SFA mission with 'role performance 2.0' as well as the gender mainstreaming integrated into the mandate from the first deployment. This is also reflected by the EU applying a largely different approach to training and advising as role performance. In line with Yin's three-fold categorization of case study—descriptive, explanatory and explorative—the comparative analysis of the EUTM Somalia and EUTM Mozambique serves for descriptive and explanatory purposes to understand why the EU conducts gender mainstreaming in SFA missions and Africa and how this impact the missions (Yin, 2014). However, especially in the case of EUTM Mozambique the case study serves for explorative purposes as well, since this EU SFA mission have not been explored from a scholarly perspective yet in the time of the writing.

Additionally, as further justification of the case selection, it is important to clarify what other possible cases could have been in the focus of this investigation. In the data collection and research period (2020-2024) three other missions were present as possible units of the case study analysis: EU Training Mission Mali (EUTM Mali), EU Training Mission in Central African Republic (EUTM RCA) and EU Military Partnership Mission in Niger (EUMPM Niger). EUTM Mali was initially sampled as a case study, but soon after this research started the mission was suspended and since then it is expected to be fully closed in the foreseeable future. As a result of the rather long suspension of mandate related activities during the time of research period, EUTM Mali was eventually excluded from the sampling. EUPMP Niger was launched in the first trimester of 2023 with being scheduled to reach its full operational capacity later that year. The novelty of this EU SFA mission made the possible data collection period narrowed down for only a couple of months resulting insufficient data for the examination in the time of the writing. Moreover, shortly after EUPMP was launched, a military coup was conducted in Niger, which made the EU deciding not to review the missions mandate "*beyond 30 June 2024, in view of the grave current political situation in the country*" (Council of the European Union, 2024a).

Furthermore, the EU engagement in the Central African Republic (CAR/RCA) and the circumstance of the deployment of a military training mission to the country in 2016 was drastically different from the situation in Somalia and Mozambique. The EU has been engaged in CAR long before it deployed its SFA mission with three previous CSDP interventions: in 2008-2009 with EUFOR Tchad/RCA, in 2014-2015

with EUFOR RCA—both crisis management stabilization operations—, and subsequently through the bridging period between 2015 and 2016 through the EU Military Advising Mission to the Central African Republic (EUMAM RCA) (Beech, 2015; European External Action Service, 2020a; Nováky, 2016) (see also Appendix 1.).

Lastly, as this research specifically focuses on gender equality norm transfer through SFA in the African continent with highly fragile security sector the dissertation did not include EU Military Assistance Mission to Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine) as a case study. This exclusion was based on two main arguments: (a) the distinct nature of SFA efforts in fragile states with fragmented security sectors compared to those in states where Western ideals of civil-military relations are relatively stable, such as Ukraine; and (b) the differing challenges the EU encounters in promoting gender equality in Europe versus in the African continent, where relations are often already strained by the legacy of colonialism.

4.5 *Chapter conclusion:*

This dissertation applies methods both relevant and frequently used in constructivist research as well as inquiries applying role theory as a theoretical framework. The research builds on qualitative methods both for data collection and analysis. Data collection is heavily focused on primary sources and conducted through document analysis, semi-structured interviews and participant observation. The data is subsequently analysed by strategic document analysis and discourse analysis both centred at EU discourses on a) its own self-conceptualization as a security provider and the normative nature of this role conception, and b) overall gender mainstreaming as norm transfer and the narrative link between gender mainstreaming and mission effectiveness in CSDP, specifically in security force assistance. Lastly, this dissertation engages in comparative case study analysis in order to investigate how the aforementioned discourse impact SFA missions in Africa, EUTM Somalia and EUTM Mozambique.

4.5.1 *Limitations:*

Researching conflict-affected countries and nations combined with exploring military perspectives, especially that of performance and/or impact inherently carries its limitations due to the highly sensitive and political nature of these issues. As Checkel put it regarding fragile, conflict-related contexts and post-conflict situations,

carrying out research in such environment and contexts, these circumstances raise "*additional challenges, including enhanced incentives for interviewees to lie, personal safety concerns, and ethical issues.*" (Checkel, 2018,). While acknowledging these limitations, the author strived for both precision and confidentiality when collecting data especially through interviews and participant observation contributing to the highest possible reliability of information in the given context. Integrity and respect to the requests of interviewees combined with the sensitivity of the issues discussed the number of interviews remaining anonymous somewhat contributed to overcome the risks these persons took with expressing their views and experiences regarding the questions posed. Additionally, a somewhat connecting issue to the safety and security in connection with conducting research on conflict-related context, the author acknowledges the added value of prioritizing filed work and more ethnographic approaches by conducting semi-structured elite interviews, as a safer option for gathering primary sources.

Additionally, in case of qualitative research, the question of generalizability is one which always arises. Some qualitative methods, such as collecting data through interviews and strategic documents inherently means that the overall access to information is limited to what the interviewee or the penholder of that certain document (and its decision-makers) want to highlight or want to keep confidential (Morgan, 2022). In the case of this research, the Union's self-conceptualization directly focuses and want to understand what EU policymakers, practitioners and decision-makers want to tell the world about the EU as a security provider. As Morgan asserted "*for example, when allowing outsiders to examine its documents, an organization can provide access only to content aligning with the values of its chief executives*" (Morgan, 2022, p. 66). However, in case of looking at the role performance and role impact of the EU's such role, interviewees with EU officials and analysing EU strategic documents would result in deliberately or unwillingly concealing data and information crucial in answering the research question of how gender mainstreaming impacts SFA missions. The pragmatic selection of non-EU sources and interviewees both in the case Somalia and Mozambique intended to somewhat break this barrier and bias in fully understanding role performance and impact of EU SFA missions in the respective countries. Additionally, building on feminist epistemology for interviews the gender diversity of interviewees was also taken into consideration acknowledging the highly gendered nature of discourses around gender equality.

Finally, the author initially wanted to follow a mixed-method approach and coded measurable indicators for gender mainstreaming and mission effectiveness to contribute to the empirical comparative case study chapter with statistical analysis. However, throughout the data collection interviews conducted with EU experts on both gender mainstreaming and military CSDP, it has become clear that the EU itself is till often lacks comprehensive and longitudinal data from missions and information on many of the indicators which would make the contribution of gender mainstreaming to mission effectiveness quantifiable. While some interviews confirmed that data collection, including sex-disaggregated data from missions in the case of gender mainstreaming has somewhat started to be a structured process, these data(sets) were not available in the time of the writing of this dissertation. Consequently, the author focused her efforts to solely qualitative methods and analysis.

5   THE EU AS AN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PROVIDER

Many of the interviewees expressed that the role of the European Union in international politics has been constantly evolving. Some asserted that it is "*a changing role*" (Interviewee 10°, 2024) or argued that it is "*a moving issue. It is something which is growing day by day*" (Interviewee 4°, 2023). But how did this role changed in the last two decades and how did this self-conceptualization of the Union about its role in international politics impact its external action with regards to promoting its values in CSDP? And what are these values?

This chapter engages in analysing these aspects of EU foreign and security policy and discusses how the Union views itself as a security provider. Relying on constructivist principles, this identity of the Union—as previously argued—is created primarily through discourses. These are observed and analysed via different samples in this chapter, including strategic documents, interviews and data from participant observation. The chapter looking at the development of the EU's normative self-conceptualization as an international security provider between 2003 and 2024 seeks to investigate Hypotheses 1. and 2. in search of an answer to why the EU conducts gender mainstreaming. These initial research propositions are conceptually connected to the self-conceptualization element of role theory, the role concept, and posit that a) the Union's has a normative self-concept which coincides with the Normative Power Europe concept; and b) that gender equality is a viewed as a fundamental, constitutional value as part of this normative self-conceptualization.

As the empirical focus of this research is EU-led security force assistance in Africa, and more broadly, EU-led interventions, this chapter is limited to an analysis of the time frame from 2003; the year when the Union launched its first missions and operations. As it was highlighted in previous chapters, narrowing done this inquiry to the last 21 years—between 2003 and 2024—is also reinforced by the fact that the Union adopted its first security strategy in 2003. This further provides a starting point to conceptualize the EU as a security provider and explore its self-positioning in global politics vis-à-vis international security. While different arguments can be made on how the Union has provided security previous to 2003, such as development assistance in order to support economic or food security in several countries, this research focuses on assistance vis-à-vis the security sector.

Following this framework of analysis, Chapter 5. is divided into four subchapters out of which three reflect on different time periods throughout the historic development of EU CSFP and CSPD: 2003-2009 shaped by the European Security Strategy (ESS) adopted in 2003; 2010-2021 marked by the constitutional changes of Lisbon Treaty and later the strategic priorities in the 2016 EU Global Strategy; and the contemporary status quo strategized by the Strategic Compass in 2022. Subsequent to these three historic phases exploring the EU's self-conceptualization as part of the role concept, the last subchapter serves as a chapter conclusion. In order to provide further explanatory framework for the development of the EU's self-conceptualization as a security provider, critical junctures, such as strategic and institutional developments of CFSP and CSDP, as well as their influence and connection to EU-led missions and operations are also laid out in this chapter. Exploring the major political-strategic and subsequent institutional and policy changes allows this chapter to identify "means and ways" of promoting the norms of gender equality in CFSP and CSDP throughout the three time periods.

5.1   2003 and 2009, the 'flying start'

As briefly discussed in the introduction, by the end of the 20th century the EU started to engage more openly in foreign and security policy identifying these efforts as struggles to be a 'force for peace' or 'force for good' (Barbé and Johansson-Nogués, 2008; European Union, 2003). The lack of somewhat collective action and framework for intervention by European and EU nations in the Balkan Wars in the 90's as well as the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the U.S. have alarmed and shaken up NATO allies, including several EU member states, to focus more on security and defence. These external factors, as well as parallel internal institutional changes, such as the establishment of CSFP and ESDP in the 1990's, paved the way for the Union to dive into restating and reshaping its attitude towards security and defence on a political-strategic level.

With the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty in 1991—coming into in force in 1993—the EU formally institutionalized its external action through the establishment of CSFP. Through signing the Treaty on European Union (TEU) in Maastricht, the EU also laid down the foundation of a rather sound liberal normative framework, including the respect of human rights, equality, democracy and the rule of law as fundamental elements of EU CSFP (European Union, 2012a; Peen Rodt, 2014). In agreement with

this liberal, multilateral framework, the Maastricht Treaty was also a direct call to action for the newly created European Union to "*preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter*" (Maastricht Treaty, 1992, art. J.1/2). However, these news ambitions being constitutionalized by Maastricht as principles for EU foreign policy needed to meet with subsequent action for operationalization and implementation. Accordingly, reflecting on its deficiencies of both political action and crisis management capacities the EU launched the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in 1999. Part of this institutional development was the establishment of EU Military Committee (EUMC) in 2001 as the highest military decision-making body of the Union consisting of Chiefs of Defence of EU member states (MSs). In the same year, a more operative and advisory military body was also created, the EU Military Staff (EUMS) (Reykers and Adriaensen, 2023; Simón, 2010). These internal changes were substantial preliminary steps for the EU to be able to adopt is first security strategy and start constructing its identity as an actor in international security from a perspective of crisis management and military CSDP.

The fairly brief EU Security Strategy (ESS) in 2003 outlined the geopolitical and security situation assessing that "*Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free*" (European Union, 2003, p. 1). While painting a rather positive picture of the regional security landscape seemingly ignoring the 'open wound' of Europe left by the Yugoslav Wars, the document highlighted many global challenges, such as terrorism reflecting on the post 9/11 sentiments and priorities. Furthermore, regional conflicts and state fragility were also named as main threats to European security. The document also clearly advocated for a stronger EU involvement in tackling these regional and global threats. The existence of a security strategy itself, as a single document laying out a basic threat analysis and the vision of strategic priorities, was an essential element of not only subsequent action and operationalization of these as policies but demonstrated actorness, cohesion and willingness for common action. The political agreement acknowledging the necessity for the Union to have such a document was an indication of the EU's determination to improve its external action and to reframe itself as a player and security provider in global politics was.

Furthermore, content-wise ESS has clearly testified of the Union's future ambition to take a larger share and "*responsibility for global security and in building a better world*" and be a "*force for good*" (European Union, 2003, p. 1,13). The

strategy also outlined a link between state-failure, "*bad governance*", conflict, organized crime and poverty indirectly asserting that good governance and values, such as democracy, inherently leads to prosperity and peace (European Union, 2003, p. 4). With this sentiment, ESS resonated with the Democratic Peace Theory[40] led by arguments of liberal thinkers, such as Michael W. Doyle[41] or Francis Fukuyama[42]. In accordance with this theory, the underlying assumption of the ESS was that because the EU has never been so prosperous and peaceful, its model of governance based on its liberal values is something to be exported to other countries so they can be as "*secure and free*" as Europe (European Union, 2003, p. 1; see also Tocci, 2017a). These liberal sentiments and fundamentally peaceful security perceptions meant that the first time the Union self-conceptualized as a security provider, it built this role conceptualization to liberal normative framework.

The promotion of liberal international order, democratic governance, the rule of law and the protection of human rights have been the part of the EU's constitutional premise since Maastricht. Building on that foundation, the ESS also reinforced what the EU views as norm or 'normal', valued, and as a result, promotable (Sjursen, 2006). The document noted that the Union's fundamental values have to be integrated into its foreign and security policy asserting that "*spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order*" (European Union, 2003, p. 10). This rather strong liberal normative framework permeating the ESS also inherently meant that subsequent EU strategies building on this first one will—to some extent—carry on these sentiments also reinforced by being constitutionally instated in the Treaties. This was later reinforced by the penholder of EUGS, Natalie Tocci (Tocci, 2017a, 2017b).

The 'what'—in terms of what values, norms should be promoted—were mostly codified in the constitutional documents in and after the Maastricht Treaty, such as democracy rule of law, respect for human rights, including "*equality between men and women with regard to labour market opportunities and treatment at work*" (Maastricht

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[40] See more on the Democratic Peace Theory and its origins at https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/display/document/obo-9780199756223/obo-9780199756223-0014.xml
[41] See e.g. Liberal Peace: Selected Essays. 2012. Routledge
[42] See e.g. Francis Fukuyama: The End of History and the Last Man 1992.

Treaty, 1992, art. 2./1). As previous chapters noted, many of these EU values were not specifically European, but were integrated into EU foreign policy dominantly from UN documents, like the UN Charter (Manners, 2006; Pirozzi, 2013). However, the 'why' and the 'how' these values and norms should be promoted in EU external action were further explained in ESS with the aforementioned aim of promoting liberal democratic values as tools of providing peace. The main policy instruments as a means of promoting and developing these norms were neighbourhood policy, development assistance, diplomacy and CSFP intervention (Lucarelli, 2008; Panebianco, 2006; Sedelmeier, 2006). Launching EU Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004, this policy was the most dominant, early way of promoting EU values with the underlying assumptions that the more these close and far neighbours integrate these norms into their domestic policies, the more peaceful the Union and its surrounding will be (Barbé and Johansson-Nogués, 2008; Haukkala, 2008).

In addition to different policies highlighted previously, such as the ENP, one of the most direct policy implications of the EU's enhanced commitment to international security was the deployment of the Union's first civilian missions and military operations in 2003. This type of CSFP intervention presaged the establishment of ESDP in 1999 opened the way for the Union to operationalize and integrate the promotion of these norms into its crisis management through missions and operations. Nevertheless, while ESS managed to underline the main risks threatening the Union and its citizens, it failed to identify and clarify under what circumstances the EU would use military force as a mean for crisis management (Nováky, 2018). This lack of focus also became salient through the quantitative document analysis of the ESS looking at seven specific phrases connected to the use of military force (see Figure 7.).

Figure 7. Frequency of phrases related to the use of force in the ESS, 2003.

Key words, such as '*military*' or '*defence*', are present in the ESS, while referring to the use of force or military means and instruments is often addressed with a rather cautious approach, as a necessary last resort option. The latter, as well as the epochal role concept of soft, civilian or normative power in and around the millennium was also reflected in not only the rather narrow focus on military means, tools and defence in the document, but also the underlying assumptions of ineffectiveness of solely military crisis management. ESS asserted that "*none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means*" and also noted the essentiality of civilian or soft power instruments with arguing that "*in almost every major intervention, military efficiency has been followed by civilian chaos*" (European Union, 2003, pp. 9–13). This duality of looking at military tools as necessary, but preferably something to avoid and the liberal-normative self-conceptualization focused on non-coercive means, including norm promotion as the substantial tool of conflict prevention and management, are dominant elements of ESS. Despite of this approach to the use of military force in parallel with the adoption of ESS the Union already deployed two military crisis management operations in 2003. With these EU military interventions ongoing, while the word 'military' is mentioned 10 times in the altogether 14 pages long document, only three of these instances referred to EU military capacity or the military as a mean of crisis management. When using the word 'defence' or 'force', ESS often used these terms in a broader, general way, only addressing self-defence or its own defence capabilities, and forces in a handful of instances. However, in those few references, ESS advocated for a more robust military capacities in order to be ready when crisis arises (European Union, 2003).

While being a milestone in asserting that the EU wants to step up its external action, the document itself maintained a rather premature and broader vision statement by the EU including its first attempts to conceptualize its own role in the aforementioned liberal normative framework. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the protection of civilians mandate was not named as an important principle in ESS despite subsequent EU military actions were often justified by this element, such as Operation Artemis (Tomolya, 2015). Such a focus on the protection of civilians was legitimized by the protection of human rights mandate in the Treaties but was absent from the ESS. This, as previously noted by Nováky (2018), was part of the larger deficiency of ESS not addressing directly why and under what circumstances the EU would deploy military force. Additionally, following and building on the adoption of ESS the Union

put emphasis on the creation of role as a security provider based on the normative framework provided by the Treaties, the human security (HS) approach and importance of civilian instruments of crisis management. This approach—as previously noted—was the result of the underlying understanding also articulated in ESS that conflict management should not rely solely on the use of military force (Pirozzi, 2013). Additionally, this also implied that the EU was thinking and internally debating about its foreign and security policy while already doing it; in other words, in these early years the Union was 'doing foreign policy without having a foreign policy'. An EU policy officer interviewed also articulated this problem "*when CSDP missions started out, we had more missions than foreign policy (…) Back then we did not even have a diplomatic service when we started doing military and police missions*" (Interviewee 10°, 2024).

5.1.1   First EU missions and operations

The first EU missions and operations were deployed in the aforementioned strategic environment in the framework of ESDP under the broader Common Foreign and Security of the EU. This '*flying start*' of EU-led conflict and crisis management interventions resulted in the launch of 23 EU missions and operations between 2003 and 2009, when the Lisbon Treaty came into force (see Appendix 1.). These first EU deployments were characterized by being relatively small footprint interventions either that of civilian nature—including uniformed police and border control authorities other than regular military as the previous quote from an EU policy officer also referred to it—or short-term military operations with limited mandate objectives. As the first High Representative for EU CFSP, previous NATO secretary general, Javier Solana noted on the conclusion of one of the EU's first military operation "*while the mission was small, the Union has showed that (…) it is able to deploy a capable military force. It has also proven that, like few other international actors, it can bring together different instruments and capabilities: political leadership, military force, and economic support.*" (Solana, 2003, p. 1).

The EU launched two civilian missions and two military operations as well as adopted its first security strategy in 2003 less than a year within the greatest enlargement of the Union's history in 2004. Naturally, these early years on the way to the Lisbon Treaty coming into force in 2009 were formidable for the future implementation of the strategy and the stabilization of the new European '*strategic profile*' (Grevi et al., 2009). These first attempts to embody the EU's role and profile

in international security especially missions and operations were also heavily building on UN principles and tools for conflict management through the Petersberg tasks[43] as previous chapters noted (Hornyák and Tánczos, 2024; Manners, 2006; Tardy, 2007). Additionally, the Brahimi report[44] reshaping UN peace-building and peacekeeping generally made the mandates of these crisis and conflict management operations more stabilization focused, with SSR and WPS principles integrated into the normative framework of how liberal powers approach crisis and conflict (Egnell and Alam, 2019; Guerrina and Wright, 2016; Karim, 2019; Kirby and Shepherd, 2021). These development were directly connected to the changing approaches between second and third generation of peacekeeping (Szente-Varga and Guajardo, 2024).

However, while the EU has been actively engaged in deploying missions and operations—all together 23 of them before Lisbon—, this worked in parallel with building the institutions and procedures based on these early experiences for the EU as a security provider. Before arriving the established of the new era with the Lisbon Treaty, the EU adopted the European Union Concept for Military Planning at the political and strategic level, and reorganized the EU Military Staff (EUMS), including the establishment of the Civilian/Military Cell with an Operations Center, and the Military Assessment on Planning Branch (Council of the European Union, 2008c). In parallel, the EU also developed its civilian capabilities establishing the Civilian Planning and Control Capability (CPCC) in 2007 led by the Civilian Operation Commander (CivOpCom) being responsible for all EU-led civilian missions since its creation (European External Action Service, 2024c). Additionally, in 2004, the Union launched the Africa Peace Facility (APF). The APF was created to provide financial support for African led peace-support operations (PSOs) as well as capacity building for African forces, specifically PSOs by the African Union (AU) (Pirozzi, 2009; Vecsey, 2023). Despite facing the fundamental limitation of EU constitutional documents prohibiting the financing of military expenditure from common EU

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[43] Petersberg tasks refer to the following type of interventions: "*humanitarian and rescue tasks; conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking; joint disarmament operations; military advice and assistance tasks; post-conflict stabilisation tasks*." (EUR-Lex, 2024).

[44] The Brahimi report from 2000 was aimed at reshaping UN intervention and peacekeeping reflecting on the failures of the international community to timely respond to violent conflicts in the 90's in Rwanda and in Bosnia. see more on the Brahimi report in United Nations. 2000, Identical letters dated 21 August 2000 from the Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council. https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/a_55_305_e_brahimi_report.pdf

funding, APF was further expanded in 2007 (European Parliament, 2009). While APF was an important new addition in the toolbox of the EU being present in the African continent as a security provider supporting the African Union (AU) alongside its own military operations, the Union had yet to conduct specific SFA efforts by EU troops. These institutional developments also demonstrated that the EU tried to consolidate the institutional and policy framework after the 'flying start' of first years of operations.

To summarize this period, as previous argued, the years between 2003 and 2009 can be explained as a 'flying start' of the Union acting as an international security provider. Early EU missions and operations also brought institutional knowledge and lessons learned for further development and refinement of this role of the Union. By the time the Lisbon Treaty was signed in 2007 ESDP was considered to be a crucial component of the EU's external action shaping its international profile and leading to its transition to CSDP (Grevi et al., 2009, p. 405). In this first period, the Union built its early strategic vision about its own role as a security provider with rather great ambition, largely undertaking a liberal normative framework, but already asserting that EU action is unique and there is a "European Way" to security (Pirozzi, 2013). This was also reinforced by document reporting on the implementation of ESS (European Union, 2008).

The EU's self-conceptualization was primarily led by liberal norms and values constitutionalized in the Treaties with the principles of crisis and conflict management also based on democratic norm promotion as core part of stabilization, peacekeeping and peacebuilding; the elements of international security to which the Maastricht Treaty intended to contribute with the adoption of CSFP. Geopolitical changes in the 1990's as well as regional and national conflicts led the Union to further focus its efforts and common action to security and defence leading to the adoption of ESDP in 1999 and first EU security strategy in 2003. Additionally, while ESS only touched upon military and defence-related issues from a rather general perspective instead of explaining how or when the EU would engage militarily, it was the security strategy of an era where the EU deployed several military operations (see Appendix 1.). As it was also highlighted by interviews, this was primarily the result of the EU's flying start embarking on the journey to become a security provider without having a sound strategic and institutional framework to its external action. This was somewhat acknowledged in ESS stating that "*if we are to make a contribution that matches our*

potential, we need to be more active, more coherent and more capable" (European Union, 2003, p. 11). In this sense ESS was a first clear strategic demonstration of the Union's willingness to engage in international security as a security provider, but at this time, it was phrased as an ambition, rather than a reality.

Moreover, in ESS the Union already touched upon the promotion of liberal values as an important aspect of EU external action demonstrating what is considered normal or value(d), such as democracy, rule of law or the protection of human rights, as well as how and why these are to be promoted. The main and most crystallized tools of norm diffusion were development assistance and neighbourhood policy in the absence of the aforementioned sound institutional and policy framework for crisis management, especially that of military nature. As Lucarelli noted with regards to the dissonance between the Union's role conception and its performance in these early years, the EU wanted be "*somehow missionary without being crusading*" while trying to match its strategic vision and self-conceptualization to the reality of its capabilities and its limitations to be a normative international actor (Lucarelli, 2008, p. 61).

5.2 2010-2021: The EU's self-conceptualization after Lisbon and the implications of the EU Global Strategy

Representing a crucial constitutional milestone for member states of the EU following the largest enlargement in its history in 2004, the Lisbon Treaty adopted in 2007 and coming into force in 2009 was particularly significant in granting full legal personality to the Union (European Union, 2012a, 2007). While this is a less frequently highlighted aspect of the Lisbon Treaty, it was a crucial step for the EU in building its profile as an international security actor and provider. Additionally, with the establishment of the Common Security and Defence Policy as a predecessor of ESDP after Lisbon, EU-led conflict and crisis management have gained new impetus.

The EU gaining legal personality and expanding its portfolio as a security provider with the institutionalization of CSDP made it essential to have a permanent and more specialized institution carrying the flagship of EU external action. The embodiment of this development was the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) which is the main institution responsible for implementing both EU CFSP and CSDP coordinating EU diplomatic efforts since 2011. With the establishment of the EEAS, previously fragmented responsibilities—mainly covered by different directorate generals of the European Commission (EC)—for different

instruments of the CSFP and CSDP have been harmonized and institutionalized under various secretariats of the EEAS (Tocci, 2017b). These elements, now carried out by the EEAS led by the High Representative and Vice President of the EU (HP/VP), included diplomacy, conflict prevention and crisis management, military-strategic planning and advising, as well as overall security cooperation and security assistance efforts. Residing in Brussels, the EEAS has also been overseeing the network of EU delegations around the world since including different sub-secretariats and departments responsible for the planning and conduct of EU-led missions and operations (European External Action Service, 2024a). Further strengthening EU crisis management and CSFP the Union introduced its "Comprehensive approach" (CA) to conflict and crisis in 2013 in order to utilize "*the full range of its instruments and resources – to make its external action more consistent, more effective and more strategic*" (European Union, 2013). While the Union argued adopting such new doctrine towards its crisis and conflict management in the framework of CSFP that it has been acting according to the CA, it felt the need to reinforce it with such document (European Union, 2013; Pirozzi, 2013; Tardy, 2017a). Pirozzi highlighted that before introducing the Comprehensive approach, the Union heavily relied on the NATO framework, where comprehensive approach is a part of CIMIC rooted in the understanding that crisis management cannot be solved only with military means (Pirozzi, 2013). This approach to the use of military force was reflected in ESS as it was highlighted in the previous subchapter. Nevertheless, the quickly changing geopolitical situation in Europe made the Union revisit and somewhat reform its strategic priorities and approach with the adoption of the Global Strategy.

Accordingly, the freshly set-up EEAS has immediately faced a quickly deteriorating security environment in the 2010's (Tocci, 2017b). The EU and its newly established post-Lisbon structures, including CSDP, encountered several strategic shocks in and around the Union between 2011 and 2016. Such critical junctures were, for instance, the Arab Spring, the 2015-16 migration crisis, the annexation of Crimea, and Brexit, as well as relatively unprecedented, dominantly Islamist terrorist attacks in major European capitals. Moreover, Brexit made the EU face with unexpected internal challenges specific to CSDP and crisis management, including British troops and military expertise slowly leaving EEAS structures (Zyla, 2020). These were military capabilities on which the EU has been heavily reliant since during the first ten years of EU external action (Giegerich, 2019). Accordingly, while different security

threats challenged CSDP externally, Brexit hindered EU military capability development internally (Simón, 2010, p. 17). In the midst of these turbulent years, the EU felt the need to update the already more than a decade old first security strategy, the ESS, which led to the preparation and adoption of the EUGS in 2016 (Tocci, 2017b).

EUGS brought both a new strategic framework for EU foreign and security policy, including CSDP issues and instruments specifically. As highlighted with regards to initially shaping what is normal or valued by ESS, Tocci, the penholder of EUGS noted, EUGS "*had to provide a degree of formal and substantive continuity with the ESS, but on the other had to respond to a fundamentally different geostrategic context*" (Tocci, 2017a, p. 54). Compared to ESS starting with referring to the regional security situation being the most prosperous and peaceful it has ever been, EUGS defined the actual 'geostrategic context' as a time of "*existential crisis, within and beyond the European Union*" (European Union, 2016, p. 8). Compared to the 15 page-long ESS, the EUGS was a more comprehensive, almost 60 page-long strategic document with more detailed vision, as well as more operational expected policy implications. With the institutional and policy changes taken place since early ESDP efforts, EUGS was able to pair institutional capacities, such as the EEAS, to the ambitious policies for itself to strengthen its profile as a security provider both internally and externally. Additionally, reflecting on the increasing regional security concerns, EUGS demonstrated a heavier emphasis on military and defence issues, also explicitly noted that "*for Europe, soft and hard power go hand in hand*" (European Union, 2016, p. 4). Accordingly, EUGS presented a different discourse on the use of military force than ESS did with more ownership about military action.

Figure 8. Frequency of phrases related to the use of force in the EUGS 2016.

In contrast with the ESS, where several of the military-related keywords tracked were completely missing or were only referred to in a broader, general non-EU context, EUGS used phrases, such as 'military', 'defence' or 'force(s)' predominantly vis-à-vis its own capabilities and external action (see Figure 8.). Moreover, while ESS was only advocating a more coherent approach and effort from EU member states towards security and defence in and around the Union, the EU Global Strategy brought changes and started to explicitly refer to the Union as an international security provider, including also specifically naming the EU as a "*global maritime security provider*" (European Union, 2016, p. 41). The title of the document meant to also refer to the Union's aspirations to exercise this role not only regionally, but globally as well. Nevertheless, this was viewed not only as an opportunity for EU external action, but as a necessity as well to reflect on the interconnected nature of different security threats and conflicts (Tocci, 2017a). In spite of this global aspiration to 'secure', deterrence or defence was still less dominant in the text referring to NATO as the main guarantor of European security. However, EUGS noted that "*as Europeans we must take greater responsibility for our security. We must be ready and able to deter, respond to, and protect ourselves against external threats*" (European Union, 2016, p. 19).

Additionally, EUGS extensively addressed security cooperation and security force assistance for the first time under a broader framework of partnerships, security sector reform, and capacity building. Important element of the EUGS wording is that it explicitly linked EU CSDP efforts to UN peacekeeping stating that EU conflict and crisis management in fragile contexts need to enhance its interoperability with UN efforts on the ground (European Union, 2016). While this UN-influence was also indirectly guiding the vision of the ESS both normatively and on crisis management policies, EUGS rather extensively elaborated on this direct impact guiding its external action asserting that the UN and the UN Charter is "*the bedrock of the multilateral rules-based order*" (European Union, 2016, p. 39). While the UN Charter was core part of the ESS, EUGS built more visibly on UN peacekeeping practices and principles including in the context of security cooperation, and partner capacity building in fragile states and conflict affected countries.

Moreover, EUGS also brought new impetus to the promotion of gender equality in EU external action. The document has not only built on the aforementioned peacekeeping principles by the UN, but also directly integrated the Women, Peace and Security agenda and WPS UNSC resolutions as a guiding normative framework to

CSFP and CSDP. While as highlighted in previous chapters, several EU documents—including strategic and operational ones—were adopted to implement WPS in the pre-Lisbon era, with the integration to EUGS the Women, Peace and Security as a normative framework has been prioritized on the highest strategic level. Accordingly, this more assertive role for the EU as a security provider in the world also meant a reinforced strategic focus on promoting gender equality as a core value of the Union in security and defence. EUGS had rather extensive references on what the EU should do in its external action with regards to gender mainstreaming as norm promotion. This included "*stronger advocacy, prevention of Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV), and enhanced participation of women in conflict prevention and peacebuilding*" (European Commission, 2023, p. 21; European Union, 2016).

The discourse in EUGS also introduced two new concepts for EU external action. First—building on the 2013 Comprehensive approach—EUGS introduced the Integrated approach (IA) to conflict and crisis, which was already described in Chapter 3. (Faleg, 2018). As Tardy argued, while an Integrated approach was part of EU foreign and security policy since the early years, it was introduced to the EU jargon on a conceptual level through the EUGS (Tardy, 2017a). In addition to IA, the Global Strategy also instituted 'Principled Pragmatism' (PP) as the new approach in EU's foreign policy. The PP, as Rabinovych and Reptova asserted, intended "*reconcile the EU's self-interest and its normative commitments*" (Rabinovych and Reptova, 2019). However, many remained critical on the utilization of the principled pragmatism approach arguing that it neither conceptualize or nor fully explain how this will influence CSFP and CSDP. Moreover, this explanation or conceptualization was also virtually absent from the 2019 EUGS implementation report (Rabinovych and Reptova, 2019).

The EUGS penholder, however, highlighted that the Principled Pragmatism (PP) approach was connected to the interest vs. values dichotomy, which the PP was intended to resolve with the understanding of "*interest and values*" rather these thinking of them as mutually exclusive (Tocci, 2017a). The text of EUGS referred to this noting that the EU "*have an interest in promoting our values in the world. At the same time, our fundamental values are embedded in our interests*" (European Union, 2016, p. 13). With the PP, the EU intended to reflect on the geopolitical realities of the decade, as well as keeping its principles and values in their place, which stayed intact and led by liberal normative thinking and international law. This also meant that the

Union while choosing to pursue a more pragmatic approach to its external action including security and defence policy, it wanted to uphold its dominantly normative self-conceptualization and the promotion of its values. Moreover, the Principled Pragmatism approach, as previous chapters highlighted, also provided new impetus to revisit the NPE concept arguing that the use of military force is not incompatible with being a normative power (Manners, 2006). EUGS asserted that the EU as an international actor has values and interest, which are not only going hand in hand, but it is in the Union's interest to promote its values. This approach reinforced that at the time of "existential crisis", the Union adhered to its original idea where the promotion of (its own) values and norms contribute to international peace and security in line with the Democratic Peace Theory from ESS provisions, asserting that promoting democracy and liberal values will eventually make the world, the EU, more secure.

In light of the acknowledgement and legitimization of the EU focusing on its interests alongside its values, the EUGS opened a window of opportunity for EU member states to adopt and reinforce a set of defence-related initiative and instruments at the disposal of the EU. As an answer to the increasingly securitized geopolitical environment, this also brought along the long-awaited creation of a permanent structure for EU military planning and control command. The Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) was established in 2017 summer, as the military counterpart of the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC). However, in contrast with the latter commanding all EU-led civilian CSDP missions, MPCC, the first permanent military command and control structure of the EU was not tasked with commanding all military interventions but was made responsible only for the once with a non-executive mandate. Similarly to the Civilian Operation Commander (CivOpCom), the head of MPCC, the Director General of the EU Military Staff (DGEUMS) was created as a unique position in terms of putting all military missions under a single command on the strategic level, and operating with operational commanders in OHQ in the mission (Tardy, 2017b, p. 3). To enhance the cooperation between the civilian and military pillars of CSDP, the EU also created the Joint Support Coordination Cell (JSCC) inside the EEAS. The JSCC's role was justified as particularly important to coordinate between civilian and military instruments in line with the Integrated approach explained in Chapter 3. (see Figure 5.). JSCC was establish to support the harmonization of EU external action in theatres where the EU was present with different crisis management tools, such as Somalia, where an EU

delegation, a civilian mission EUCAP Somalia, and a military training mission (EUTM Somalia) and a naval operation EUNAVFOR Atalanta, was in function simultaneously (EUNAVFOR Atalanta, 2024).

MPCC's initial capacities were rather limited in terms of staffing which was maximized in 60 people—as an already raised number—after reviewing the first year of MPCC in function in 2018 (European External Action Service, 2018). Nevertheless, capacity building of MPCC, as an emerging structure inside the EEAS, still kept the EU on its toes, as allocating budget for opening new positions for additional staff did not directly mean that these positions were easily filled by seconded experts from member states (Reykers and Adriaensen, 2023). While these institutional changes meant significant advancement for EU actorness, they have not solved permanently all the challenges of the Union acting as an international security provider. One of the reasons of the latter is that these challenges were not only institutional or operational, but political as well as directly connected to the EU's own internal debate on strategic autonomy (Tardy, 2017b). Nonetheless, with the establishment of MPCC the EU has largely overcome a huge structural block, which used to be the "*sign of its incompleteness as a security actor*" (Tardy, 2017b, p. 2).

5.2.1   Missions and operations between 2009 and 2021, and the emergence of SFA practices

The establishment of CSDP with the Lisbon Treaty—as an integral part of the broader foreign and security policy portfolio of the Union—facilitated the consolidation and harmonization of member states' vision for European regional security. Furthermore, it also served as a mechanism for shaping security cooperation (SC) practices specific to the Union. With regards to SC and security force assistance practices the Lisbon Treaty further developed the EU crisis and conflict management options expanding the list of tasks authorized in the Petersberg tasks with the counter-terrorism objectives, and military advising and assisting tasks (Peen Rodt, 2014; Tardy, 2015). The inclusion and expansion of these additional options specific to security force assistance were a crucial step for the Union to start engaging in military capacity and capability building of its partners and establish training missions starting from 2010. As Rodt noted, the Lisbon Treaty "*made the Union's foreign policy ambition clear: the EU wants a significant role in the provision of international security*" (Peen Rodt, 2014, p. 4). This ambition was then reinforced both institutionally by the creation of EEAS and further strengthened in 2016 EU Global Strategy explicitly self-

conceptualizing and declaring the EU's strategic vision to act as an international security provider. Moreover, in addition to the launch of the EU's first SFA missions, the Union also reinforced its commitment to maritime operations into its CSDP toolbox in the post-Lisbon era (see Appendix 1.). First EU maritime operation, EU Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) Operation Atalanta in the Horn of Africa was launched in 2008 to address organized crime and piracy in the Horn of Africa and protect its economic interests vis-a-vis blue economy (Gracza Hornyák, 2024b).

As Tardy highlighted already in 2015, the length of EU military intervention seems to be inversely proportional to the risks posed by the tasks and the area of operations, as well as falling "*short of war-fighting or openly coercive operations*" (Tardy, 2015, p. 23). While EU military missions and operations are a more and more commonly used tool of the EU CSFP—and quantitatively speaking the EU relies on them more than ever in its two decades long history—these missions are still viewed mostly as part of the solution, instead of being the solution. The latter can be explained to the general conceptualization of the EU external action most specifically the Comprehensive approach from 2013 and the Integrated approach from 2016. Through the aforementioned institutional, procedural and strategic developments CSDP missions and operations as political tools started to work as a "*part of a much more coherent and comprehensive foreign policy approach*" (Interviewee 10°, 2024).

From the institutionalization of EU security and defence policy and the setup of the EEAS after Lisbon, the Union launched 16 CSDP missions and operations; eight civilian missions and eight military missions and operations (see Appendix 1.). These years have not only brought an extent of consolidation after the 'flying start' of the pre-Lisbon ESDP, but also led to the diversification of different CSDP military tools. As highlighted with regards to the expansion of the Petersberg tasks, a new asset was introduced to the Union's toolbox as previously noted: specific military capacity building missions, or security force assistance missions (Gracza Hornyák, 2024a). Moreover, naval military operations, first launched in parallel with the Lisbon Treaty changes, also started to proliferate. Out of the eight military missions launched between 2010 and 2021 five were security force assistance missions in Africa alongside with three naval operations. In contrast with this trend, during ESDP engagement the main military tool used was land-based crisis management operation (see Appendix 1.).

EU SFA efforts have been also benefiting from the European Peace Facility (EPF) launched in 2021 as the successor of the African Peace Facility. While APF supported capacity building of AU forces, including their training, since 2021 EPF serves an off-budget instrument for financing military capacity building activities by partner countries as well as funding the Union's own military missions and operations. Since its launch, EPF was used several times to subsidize EU partner countries in Eastern Europe, the Western Balkans, Africa and the Middle East, as another demonstration of the Union's willingness to overcome the barriers posed by its own constitutional principles. While—as previously highlighted with regards to the limitation of the APF—the TEU both underlined the Union's role in international security to promote peace, but at the same time the document forbade the usage of EU common budget for "*military and defence implications*" (European Union, 2012a). EPF being a financial instrument outside of the EU's common budget allowed the Union to overcome this limitation with structuring the fund for dual-purpose for 'operations' and 'assistance measures' pillars (European External Action Service, 2024d). While the 'operations' pillar was created to fund CSDP missions and other missions led by international partners, such as the previously mentioned African Union peace support operations, the 'assistance measures' intended to serve as direct funding for EU security assistance to partner nations.

To summarize the analysed time frame between 2010 and 2021, while the Lisbon Treaty was a clear indication that the EU wants to pursue a more active role in international politics with its newly acquired legal personality, the EUGS consolidated its ambition to act as a security provider. This consolidated role was discursively guided by the Principled Pragmatism approach to foreign and security policy and by the Integrated approach specific to crisis response and management. Additionally, this broad decade also provided space for the EU to fill institutional and policy gaps and create a more robust framework for carrying out CFSP and CSDP. This was most visible within EU external action, EU crisis management and the development of internal military capabilities, such as establishing the EEAS, and EU C2 structure, MPCC, and putting EU SFA missions under its command previously led by individual member states. The years between 2010 and 2021 were also formidable in terms of the Union's self-conceptualization of its role as an international security. Not only strategic discourses started to refer to the EU explicitly as a security provider, but also special contribution to international security in this role, such as being a maritime security

provider. EUGS already in its name intended to demonstrate that the Union as an actor has global aspirations when thinking of itself as a security provider.

Most importantly, in contrast with the rather general, vision-statement formatted ESS focusing on laying down fundamental values of the EU as an international actor, EUGS was primarily concerned with the ontological security of the European Union and its member states rather than the importance of promoting its fundamental values (Rabinovych and Reptova, 2019). While Rabinovych and Reptova asserted the primary importance of promoting EU values was "*virtually absent*" from EUGS, the findings of this chapter highlighted that their importance was not diminished but rather presented in a different discursive setting. In contrast to ESS, EUGS referred to EU values as rather self-explanatory simply either pointing directly to the Treaties or referring to them as "*European values*" or "*European way*". Accordingly, EUGS only restated these EU values once through the document as a non-exhaustive list, including "*respect for and promotion of human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law (…) justice, solidarity, equality, nondiscrimination, pluralism, and respect for diversity*" (European Union, 2016, pp. 15, 19). As the quote also explicitly mentions, EUGS also referred to not only upholding, but promoting these values as the Union fulfils its role as international security provider. However, in the post-Lisbon setting the EUGS made the Union look like not only a more established security provider, but also made the assumption that there is no need to (further) explain the EU values as it is something already evident and known. Lastly, in contrast with ESS which put emphasize on what are the values and norms of the EU, EUGS focused more on explaining how these EU values are to be promoted instead through the PP and IA approaches.

5.3 *The EU as security provider in 2024: EU Strategic Compass and a contemporary self-conceptualization*

The draft of the Strategic Compass (EUSC) was finished right before the Russian Federation (Russia) launched its full-scale war against Ukraine. This eventually delaying the adoption of the document by a couple of months as EU policy-and decision-makers wanted to reflect on such important geopolitical change in Europe (Participant Observation, ESDC Summer University, Belgium, 2022). Accordingly, the document's language was also directly influenced by the initial shock caused by the Russian attack with highlighting that even if the Union has been strengthening its

role in international security since 2016, it need to reflect on the "*new strategic landscape*" (European Union, 2022, p. 23). This critical timing of the EUSC also contributed to the heavy reliance of militarized discourse in the document reflecting on the military nature of the threat posed by the Russian aggression. For the first time, the EU adopted not only a security strategy, but a *de facto* defence strategy, with the aim of outlining the Union's strategic vision for tackling contemporary security threats.

Figure 9. Frequency of phrases related to the use of force in the EUSC 2022.

While ESS perceived Europe as peaceful, EUGS asserted that the Union was under threat. This security perception was also present in EUSC, but with a distinct kind of threat perception. As a result of this changing threat perception, the EUSC demonstrated a more militarized discourse as the quantitative document analysis also showed (see Figure 9.). This can be explained with the different threat perception of the EUGS and EUSC. While EUSC also fundamentally built its security perception, the nature of the threat posed by Russia was perceived as more traditional military threat which are to be addressed through conventional military power in contrast with risks posited by irregular migration or international terrorism in EUGS in 2016. Due to this threat perception dominated by "*strategic competition (…) conflicts, military build-ups and aggressions*" the Union's response was also predominantly a defence-focused one centred around military instruments and capabilities.

Accordingly, EUSC is heavily defence-focused where the discourse on the role of the EU a security provider as well as the role of its forces heavily relies on militarized language. An important indicator in the text of EUSC is the continuous citation of military forces of the Union, such as "*our forces*", our "*our armed forces*".

When observing the presence and the use of the phrase 'force' in the document it also showed that in 31 cases out of the 46 references the text addressed the capability, readiness and applicability of Member States' military forces. This was largely absent from both ESS and EUGS previously. In spite of the extensive defence-focus of the document, but also in line with the primary responsibility of NATO to protect and deter, EUSC made specific references on the Union's responsibility to deterrence vis-à-vis cyber threats. However, in other domains there were no such direct reference except the already highlighted enhanced actorness as a maritime power.

While the text reflected on a more militarized security perception in Europe, the Union's self-conceptualization stayed relatively same referring to itself as an international security provider. While this was already present in the EU Global Strategy, EUSC reinforced this role concept of the Union in the face of a traditional military threat in the direct neighbourhood. EUSC also provided space for the Union to refer to itself as an already established security provider, which acknowledging that it needs further reinforcement and enhanced capabilities to reflect on this new, more militarized perception of security. EUSC asserted that "*the EU is a norm setter and has been a consistent leader investing in effective multilateral solutions. With our crisis management missions and operations operating on three continents, we have shown that we are ready to take risks for peace and shoulder our share of global security responsibilities*" (European Union, 2022, p. 14). This aspect—emphasizing the crucial role of the CSDP triad legitimizing the Union's self-conceptualization as a security provider—of the strategic discourse was reinforced by several interviews and data from participatory observations.

Moreover, the EUSC demonstrated a self-conceptualization and the role of the EU as a security provider as (a more) militarily capable normative security provider. In this contemporary self-conceptualization of the EU, military capability or the use of force is presented as a tool for protecting and promoting its values; similar to how it was presented in EUGS through the PP. As the sub-title of the document also asserted EUSC conceptualize "*a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security*" (European Union, 2022). At the same time, the Principled Pragmatism approach was not carried to the EUSC discursively. However, the Integrated approach, human security and the normative foundation provided by the Treaties stayed the part of the Union's strategic discourse on its own role as a security provider in EUSC too in spite of the militarized language.

While EU values—which are to be protected and promoted according to EUSC—similarly to the language of EUGS are visually present both in the sub-title above and appear in the text many times as a common phrase, they are not listed or specified explicitly. Instead, EUSC referred to its own constitutional document, the TEU, noting that the fundamental values of the EU are laid down in Article 2. which includes classical liberal democratic values, such as freedom, equality, the rule of law (European Union, 2012a, art. 2). Besides the human security, human rights focused discourse on the normative nature of EU external action, two major cross-cutting issues, gender equality and climate change are dominant in EUSC. Both gender equality and climate change are addressed as rather dominant normative frameworks of EU external action including CSDP and missions and operations. This human security approach, as well as continuous guidance of UN principles are rather dominant elements of the EUSC on CSDP. As one EU military officer asserted "*as a force for good we have to be abided by the rules, like in the case of the United Nations, puts a lot of efforts to make sure that people do not do ugly things*" (Interviewee 11°, 2024). Similar to the approach expressed by this EU military official, EUSC placed emphasis on the normative approach to the use of military force which is often reflected directly in both gender equality and climate change principles, such as decreasing the ecological footprint of EU troops or avoid sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) by EU troops while deployed and working with partners (European Union, 2022).

Lastly, one of the main points of action contained within the Strategic Compass, the EU's most recent strategic document published directly following the launch of Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine in 2022, was to develop multilateral and bilateral security partnerships. This specific focus on military assistance, training and capacity building, became a reinforced and more concrete, contemporary conceptualization of what the EU understands as security cooperation and security force assistance. The security force assistance implications of EUSC and contemporary conceptualization and practices are detailed in Chapter 6.

5.3.1 *EU missions and operations since 2022*

As described in the aforementioned subchapters, while the institutional and policy framework around EU missions and operations has significantly changed in the last two decades, the overall political nature of these interventions stayed relatively stable. However, as an EU military advisor stated "*behind every mandate there is a*

mix of values and interests", analysis by Palm and Crum (2019) found that the interest- and "utility-based" arguments have been increasingly represented in EU interventions (Palm and Crum, 2019; Interview with EU Military Advisor, 2024). This was also openly reinforced and acknowledged by the PP approach by EUGS, but not carried along textually in the Strategic Compass.

Similarly, as argued previously, the contemporary EU foreign policy, CSDP missions and operations are crucial aspects of the EU's self-conceptualization and visibility as an actor. As an EU official phrased it: "*the missions are very often – and I don't think that they are the most important part of the foreign policy engagement in a given place -, but they are the most visible part and they can a very tangible asset for us to explain something to our partners saying, that we are on the ground, we are contributing*" (Interviewee 10°, 2024). This visibility also relies on relative geopolitical spread-out of the ongoing EU interventions in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East as well as rather significant maritime presence in the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea (European External Action Service, 2024e). The latter was also reinforced by an updated maritime security strategy building further the Union's self-conceptualization specifically as a maritime security provider since 2016 (Gracza Hornyák, 2024b).

In the time of the writing in late 2024 the Union currently has 24 active CSDP missions and operations with a more balanced civilian-military ratio than ever before. EUSC also contributed to the conceptualization of the different elements of the CSDP triad with specifically referring to the three different types of missions: civilian missions, military missions and military operations in the text. This discursive explicit differentiation of the CSDP triad was the first conceptualized only in EUSC. Currently 41% of the EU's crisis management engagements—with 14 civilian missions and 10 military engagements—in the framework of the CSDP is military intervention. Compared to the pre-Lisbon era, between 2003-2009 only the 26% of the deployments were military operations with a 17:6 civilian-military ratio (see Appendix 1.) Moreover, the maritime domain—as previously emphasized—seemed to gain more and more impetus having three active naval operations conducted by the EU at the time of the writing of this dissertation (Gracza Hornyák, 2024b).

In terms of specific characteristics of EU engagement as an aspiring security provider, the Union still seemed to opt primarily for low intensity, low risk, and relatively small footprint military interventions in the framework of CSDP

implemented within the EU's Integrated approach (Council of the European Union, 2018b). This risk-averse approach also became apparent in the conduct of the most recent EU naval operation in the Red Sea. In Operation Aspides being a *de facto* naval air-defence operation, the Union explicitly uses its firepower for the first time, but only for protection mandate. Accordingly, as opposed to the US-led international coalition naval operation with similar mandate, Aspides cannot fire on targets not threatening the area of operations (Gracza Hornyák, 2024b). At the same time, EU engagement in security force assistance often follows previous or ongoing US security cooperation practices in shared, predominantly African theatres, such as Somalia, Niger or Mozambique (Gracza Hornyák, forthcoming, 2025b). This rather risk-averse approach and complementary nature of EU SFA to other international efforts in the overall application of military CSDP tools is the result of several internal and external elements including a core obstacle, namely budgetary restrictions on financing EU military intervention. This long-standing and rather obvious missing element of overall EU security force assistance was resolved in 2021 by aforementioned EPF, as an off-budget instrument. While EPF allows the EU to finance these efforts all decision need to be approved which due to its political nature doesn't provide sustainability for these EU actions.

Finally, as previously highlighted SFA specific aspects of CSDP are explored in the subsequent chapter, in Chapter 6., but some additional important CSDP related changes are to be highlighted vis-à-vis the contemporary status quo. EUSC advocated for military capability development of the Union CSDP engagement in Africa—as well as the direct security threat posed by the Russian-Ukrainian war in the Union's backyard—started to slowly restructure strategic priorities of CSFP. The African continent, as one of the main foci of overall CSDP interventions with 50% of all EU missions and operations deployed to the continent[45], has experienced several military coups since the adoption of EUSC, and also made the EU question some of its previous military CSDP engagement (AfricaNews, 2023). While EUTM Mali is closing, EUTM Mozambique is transforming, and EUTM Niger is pending due to the latest military coup, EU focus in terms of CSDP seems to be centred around the maritime domain and SFA to Ukraine with keeping the civilian missions intact. In parallel reacting on

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[45] 50% of the all EU missions and operations, 22 out of the 44, were conducted in the African continent (see Appendix 1.)

the war in Ukraine, defence capability development, cooperation and funding got new impetus, with EPF launched in 2021 funding increased keeping its relatively multinational focus but heaving Ukraine as the largest beneficiary (European External Action Service, 2024d). Additionally, as a direct implementation of EUSC as well as demonstrating that the "*EU is becoming a stronger security and defence actor and a more capable security provider to contribute to international peace and security, protect EU citizens, values and interests, and to support its partners*", the Union conducted its first every live military exercise, MILEX 24 (European External Action Service, 2024f). While these most recent developments are outside of the direct scope of this research, they are vital to be mentioned considering their future implications both in terms of research and policy.

5.4 Chapter Conclusion

This chapter was dedicated to analysing the EU's self-conceptualization as part of the role concept in order to understand how the EU views itself as a security provider. The initial research propositions suggested that the Union's self-conceptualization is a normative one, which coincides with the Normative Power Europe concept. Through the analysis of three existing strategic documents as well as observing institutional and policy changes between 2003 and 2024, this chapter found that while both the geopolitical situation and the Union's security perception have rather significantly changed, the EU upheld its normative self-conceptualization. It is also confirmed that the CSDP triad has a significant role in legitimizing the Union's self-conceptualization as a security provider actively engaging in international security.

While ESS was more of a vision statement rather than a comprehensive strategic document, it laid down the most important normative elements of EU external action without explicitly self-conceptualizing the Union as a security provider. Instead, ESS described the Union as a force for good and liberal normative power who promotes peace while promoting its values was crucial for being the first time the Union laid down its self-conceptualization about its role in international politics. This meta-role, which the EU visualized in ESS for itself also inherently meant that subsequent documents would build on this normative meta-role both in terms of conflict specific role as well as overall EU actorness. As Natalie Tocci, penholder of the 2016 EUGS referred to this first period of EU external action, "*In 2003, we lived in an international*

liberal order in which the belief in an imminent End of History was widespread" (…) "*The ESS was premised on the understanding of a Union as an island of peace and prosperity, whose mission in the world was to radiate outwards its internal achievements thus transforming others*. (Tocci, 2017a, p. 51).

In contrast with ESS after the early years of the post-Lisbon CFPS reflecting on the changing security dynamics and its first decade conducting missions and operations, the EU started to explicitly refer to itself as a security provider in the EU Global Strategy. While this ambition was already clear from the Lisbon Treaty and its policy and institutional implications, naming this endeavour in the discourses of strategic documents came only in 2016. Although the three security related strategies were addressing different geopolitical threats, the major changes of the documents derived from fundamentally distinct security perceptions. The ESS perceived that Europe is secure and free, while EUGS asserted that the Union is under threat. EUSC coupled this security perception with focusing more on military threats referring to the new strategic landscape as the return of great power competition. Based on the discourses present in the three documents, this chapter found that ESS was dominantly 'peace-focused', EUGS was security centred, while the major narrative in EUSC was on defence. Both the quantitative and qualitative analysis demonstrated this curve of the Union's discourses on security and defence policy fundamentally impacting the policy tools and institutional framework it uses.

Figure 10. Comparison of document analysis of three EU security strategies

As Figure 10. demonstrates, the Strategic Compass brought a completely new era in terms of defence-focused, militarized language in the strategic documents of the Union. This rather visible shift was primarily the result of the EU's changing security perception from global, largely non-military threat perceptions by the EUGS in contrast with understanding the start of the full-scale war between Russia and Ukraine perceived as a conventional military threat. The timing of the adoption of EUSC in February 2022 also reinforced this heavily militarized strategic response from the Union. Nevertheless, it is important to highlight that despite the increasing militarization of the discourse of the Union's security strategies, all three documents referring to defence or military issues posit that the first and foremost guarantor of European security is NATO. However, having such increased focus and ownership on defence once again sparked debate on avoiding duplications between EU-NATO structures.

Additionally, despite this more militarized language, the Union's self-conceptualization as an international security provider stayed relatively stable in spite of interest-based action and policies started to be more dominant from the early 2010's. EUSC maintained the self-perception of acting on the value-based nature of EU external action as it was also highlighted in many EU officials through the interviews. However, as these norms and values stayed stable due to their constitutional nature, EUGS and EUSC put less emphasis on repeating or listing them specifically. Instead, narratively these two strategic documents referred to these values and principles with possessive pronouns as shared or common European values. These predominantly liberal democratic norms, such as rule of law, protection of human rights, and gender equality were integrated into the Treaties starting with Maastricht. Constitutional changes have not diverged from these, instead, some provisions have been further strengthened subsequent changes in the Treaties, such as in the case of gender equality which was initially introduced only vis-à-vis employment and then was further expanded comprehensively in later stages. These constitutional values then were present in security strategies by the EU more and more in the light of being an unquestionable part of the Union's identity EU norms being framed as universal and self-explanatory. As highlighted in previous chapters this was a result of norms and values consisting of the *"inner crust of the EU's identity and shape its role in the international arena as a foreign policy actor"* (Whitman, 2011b, p. 2). The discourse analysis showed that as this "inner crust" stayed the same, there was less focus on

continuously reiterating them and more emphasis on operationalizing them in external action as it was highlighted vis-à-vis gender equality and climate change specifically in EUSC.

In spite of the difference in referring to "EU values" in ESS and in contrast in EUGS and EUSC, primary source accounts from PO and interviews reinforced the sentiment that part of the Union's self-conceptualization is defined by the *sui generis* nature of the EU as an actor in international politics and the "EU" way of doing things. In many cases when the interviewees were talking about this "European" way, they were indirectly referring to the normative nature of the EU and its external action, including the value-based foundations; fundamental aspects of the NPE concept as well. However, some interviewees were more cautious with the norm promotion aspect of the Union's self-conceptualization despite the strategic documents clearly indicating that the EU shall promote these in its external action. All aforementioned aspects reinforced the importance of the NPE concept as the Union's self-conceptualization as a security provider.

Moreover, findings of this chapter supported the NPE argument that being normative is not necessarily defined by what the EU does, but what it is; in this case, how it conceptualizes its own role in international security. For instance, using military CSDP tools and instruments are not deemed to contest the normative self-conceptualization of the EU, because of the "European way" of doing it and because of what this way represents as a normative power. The EU "*is unique in particular on the ability to combine a number of instruments that no other international organization or state has it in its disposal*" and "*the European Union is probably the only actor who mainstream all these principles and values into all action*" (Interviewee 4°, 2024). Similar sentiments were expressed by another EU official saying that the Union "*provide security in a different sense*" (Interviewee 25°, 2024). To summarize, according to the Union's self-conceptualization the European way of providing security is inherently normative deriving from the value-based nature of EU external action laid down in the Treaties. However, the findings also highlighted that this normative role concept also directly influences how the Union approaches conflict, which is dominated by the Integrated approach. Many of the interviewees asserted that the IA to conflict and crisis is an essential part of the Union's normative self-conceptualization as a security provider who utilizes military tools only in the framework of such approach.

The normative, human rights and value-based nature of the EU external action also built its argumentation not only on what the EU is promoting or doing, but what it refrains from while taking foreign policy action. As a number of interviewees phrased it, these values are "*also a constrain in terms of how we react to something*" (Interviewee 11°, 2024), and "*that values inform not only what we do, but what we don't do. And in some cases what we stop doing. CSDP missions in Africa for example are very clear examples of how this is a constant analysis internally whether our presence changes in certain cases when the political situation changes*" (Interviewee 10°, 2024). This further reinforces the utility of the NPE as the Union's self-conceptualization which was first conceptualized by Manners through the empirical study of the EU's policies on the abolition of the death penalty (Manners, 2002).

In terms of instruments of promoting the liberal norms, CSDP, including its missions and operations plays a very important role. "*When CSDP missions started out, we had more missions than foreign policy. And that has caught up, and that changes the political nature of how we use them. We still have a lot of missions, but now they are the part of a much more coherent and comprehensive foreign policy approach*" (Interviewee 10°, 2024). CSDP intervention used as a part of the contemporary foreign policy of the EU serves as crucial instrument in both demonstrating EU actorness and role as a security provider as well as the normative nature of this role. In other words, CSDP missions and operations are the visualization of the EU's self-conceptualization vis-à-vis its meta-role as an international security provider. As noted by many interviewees CSDP missions contribute to the visibility of the Union and "*strengthen the view of the role of the European Union as an ongoing security provider*" (Interviewee 11°, 2024).

	ESDP (2003-2009)	CSDP (2009-2021)	CSDP since 2022
Leading Academic Concepts	- Civilian Power Europe, - Normative Power Europe, - Ethical Power Europe,	- Normative Power Europe, - Liberal Power, - Security Provider	- International Security Provider, - Maritime Power
Underlying security perception	- Europe is peaceful, security threats are that of international nature	- Europe is threated both internally and externally	- Europe is threatened by conventional military power in the era of great power competition
EU Self Concepts	- Force for Good, - Comprehensive approach (ESS, 2003)	- Emerging Security Provider, - Principled pragmatism (EUGS, 2016)	- International Security Provider, - Maritime Power, - Integrated Approach
Primary Instruments of External Action	- Neighbourhood Policy, - Land Operations, - Civilian Missions	- Diplomacy, - Maritime Operations, - Civilian Missions, - Military Training Missions	- Diplomacy, - Maritime Operations, - Civilian Missions, - Military Training Missions, - Neighbourhood Policy

Table 4. Summary table about key elements of the three time periods.

Moreover, as the summary of the three observed time periods, Table 4. also demonstrates neighbourhood policy and humanitarian assistance were the primary tools for promoting EU norms in early ESDP era. However, with the changing regional security landscape and security perceptions, and less 'appetite' from the Union to accept new member states, the policy toolbox of CSFP and CSDP changed shifting opening new channels for norm promotion, such as EU SFA missions and other CSDP instruments. EUSC specifically put emphasis on climate change and gender equality as a 'norms/values' to be promoted.

Lastly, while some might argue that the ongoing militarization of CSFP and CSDP alongside with the militarization of discourses framing these policies challenge the Union's normative power nature, this chapter found that the EU still considers itself as a normative security provider. Moreover, it also asserted that as a normative security provider it's contribution to international security is idiosyncratic because of this normative, value-based nature and the integrated approach builds on this when approaching conflict and crisis.

6   CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS AND THE EU MODEL FOR SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE

As described in Chapter 5. the European Union established its first missions and operations more than two decades ago in 2003 and the Union's security and defence policy has come a long way since then. Although the security perceptions of the Union based on its strategic documents have significantly changed, as highlighted in the previous chapter, the normative element in the EU's self-conceptualization stayed intact. However, primarily due to the different threat perception of EUGS and EUSC compared to ESS and the pre-Lisbon era, the institutional and policy framework of CSFP has gone through significant development in search of the answer of how to be a more assertive, but still normative security provider. Since the very beginning, multinational peacekeeping missions carried out in the framework of what we know today as the EU's Common European Security and Defence Policy, CSDP, were subject to changes and influenced by the changing political and security environment regionally and globally. Since the early years of EU external action, CSDP missions and operations have been proliferating and diversifying as the EU kept finding itself in the need of responding to a wide spectrum of different threats and crises. The number of missions launched is continuously growing with close to 50 missions established since 2003 demonstrating the EU's unveiling trust in CSDP intervention as a foreign policy tool (Interviewee 10°, 2024). In parallel, the Union has expanded its ambition to act as an international security provider engaging in a wide range of security cooperation and security assistance efforts from comprehensive security sector focused missions to specialized military operations for crisis management (Hornyák, 2023).

Since the 2010's, building partner capacities under the broader framework of security cooperation, security assistance, and most specifically through security force assistance missions (SFA), has also become the stable and permanent parts of the EU CSDP toolkit since 2010 (Gracza Hornyák, 2024a). The EU has first launched SFA missions in the African continent, deploying military training missions to Somalia, Mali, the Central African Republic and Mozambique between 2010 and 2021. Nevertheless, as argued in the previous chapter, Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine since 2022 February has significantly changed the threat perceptions and dynamics in

Europe with European member states refocusing efforts on military capacity and capability building also shaping other dimensions of security and defence. As a result, the EU has launched its first non-executive military mission on European soil in 2022, the European Military Advisory Mission to Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine) to help training Ukrainian forces in the territory of Germany and Poland (Ostanina, 2023). In the same year the Union also established another military mission in African, in Niger, which is the fifth ongoing EU security force assistance mission in the continent (Council of the European Union, 2022a). Additionally, in 2024 January, as a reinforcement of the EU's focus on maritime security, the Union decided to use a military CSDP tool again by establishing a maritime operation, Operation Aspides, in the Red Sea against the Houthi aggression in the region (Allard et al., 2024; Andersson, 2024b; Hornyák and Vecsey, 2023).

Building on Chapter 5. exploring the political-strategic realm, as well as milestones, strategic challenges and institutional changes shaping and shaped by the contemporary EU self-conceptualization as a security provider, Chapter 6. takes a closer look at the military-strategic and operational levels of CSDP and EU SFA. In other words, while Chapter 5. looked at EU power and actorness as a normative security provider, Chapter 6. examines a specific foreign policy of this actor, CSDP and its toolbox. Accordingly, this chapter seeks to elaborate on the following questions: what are the main characteristics of contemporary EU CSDP missions and operations, specifically EU SFA missions as a foreign policy tool? What perceptions and practices do the EU have in place for assessing the effectiveness of these interventions?

Conceptually while Chapter 5. focused on the role concept, more specifically on the self-conceptualization of the EU as a security provider, Chapter 6. is primarily concerned with other conceptual elements of role theory application: role institutionalization, role performance and role impact. As explained in Chapter 3., EU SFA is understood as the role institutionalization of the Union, while mandate related tasks and their implementation are considered as role performance and role impact. Aiming at exploring this issue, Chapter 6. intends to deconstruct the specific jargon and conceptualization of the contemporary CSDP triad, including capacity building efforts and their distinct characteristics in order to further reflect on the question of effectiveness in these interventions. This chapter serves both as a background chapter as well as providing space to thoroughly scrutinize the conceptual framework of CSDP missions and operations, including EU SFA missions. Reflections and analysis are

conducted to look at the EU's effectiveness conceptualization in line with Rodt's (2014) argument emphasizing for the importance of conceptual clarifications especially in bridging the gap between the diverse set of people, experts and practitioners, be civilian or military engaging with the issue of EU CSDP. Chapter 6. is structured with the following sub-points: While the first subchapter explains the conceptual toolbox of CSDP and the typology of EU missions and operations, Subchapter 6.2 is dedicated to EU non-executive military training missions understood as EU SFA missions. Subsequently, before a brief chapter conclusion, Subchapter 6.3 analyses the question of effectiveness and impact of CSDP with special focus on the unique nature of military capacity building efforts in EU SFA missions.

6.1 The Contemporary CSDP Triad and the conduct of EU missions and operations – typology and concepts

Since the launch of the first EU missions and operation in 2003, unique conceptualizations and a specific jargon was born out of EU ESDP and CSDP interventions as the part of the broader parlance on EU foreign and security policy. Scholarship by Gstöhl and Schunz suggested that the distinct nature of EU external action, as well as the specialized concepts and scholarship dedicated to this issue led to the creation of a new academic subfield, "*EU External Action Studies*" (Gstöhl and Schunz, 2021b). The evolving development of conceptualizing the EU as a security provider and its engagement in military operations is also argued by other scholars explaining the novelty and singularity of this phenomenon noting "*it had never happened before in the long history of international relations that an actor that began its life as a regulator of coal and steel production among its members eventually created a capability to deploy military force*" (Nováky, 2018, p. 8). This subchapter presents how the aforementioned unique circumstances are mirrored and became institutionalized in the three main types of CSDP missions and operations; the Contemporary CSDP Triad: civilian missions, military missions and military operations in EU external action. (see Table 5. below). In accordance with the theoretical framework provided by role theory, the contemporary CSDP triad represents different role institutionalization, role performance and impact opportunities due to their distinct nature explored in this chapter.

The uniqueness of the EU functioning and self-conceptualizing as an international security provider made their military intervention and the conceptual

vocabulary similarly idiosyncratic. EU-led interventions are exclusively referred to as '*CSDP missions and operations*' as a collective term which primarily derives from the rather strict differentiation between the typology of EU-led civilian or military engagements (Hornyák and Tánczos, 2024). This conceptual framework and language could be observed first in the EU Strategic Compass, which specifically used the three concepts referring to different instruments in CSDP. Although the distinction was already present in CSDP practices in the early 2010's with the establishment of EUTM Somalia as the first specifically military-to-military capacity building mission, or SFA mission, the conceptual consolidation of the different elements of contemporary CSDP triad was not present in the discourses of EUGS in 2016.

Type of CSDP intervention	CSDP Civilian missions	CSPD Military missions	CSDP Military Operations
Staff Deployed	**Civilians** (including uniformed personnel other than military)	**Mainly Military** and Civilians	**Mainly Military** and Civilians
Mandate	Capacity Building, Training, Monitoring, Advising, or other executive tasks replacing missing capacity/ capabilities	Capacity and Capability Building, Training and Advising	Patrolling, and other executive tasks replacing missing capacity/capabilities or addressing imminent threat, security risks
Executive Functions	Can serve **both executive and non-executive mandate** objectives	**Purely non-executive** mandate functions and objectives	**Predominantly executive mandate** objectives, non-executive functions are present as complementary
Host country Authorities or Recipient Partner Institutions	Police/uniformed personnel other than the military, Government institutions, Judiciary/ other state institutions, authorities	Armed Forces or specific military units, Defence-related government institutions,	Varying
Command and Control Structure	Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC, EEAS, Brussels)	Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC, EEAS, Brussels)	Individual EU Member States; Member States' coalitions or NATO under Berlin Plus Agreements
Example	European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo	EU Training Mission in Somalia	EUNAVFOR Med Irini Maritime Operation

Table 5. The contemporary CSDP triad: Typology of EU CSDP missions and operations vis-à-vis security force assistance in the EU model. 2024

In CSDP, civilian and military interventions are mutually exclusive; these missions and operations are either conceptualized as civilian or military. While the EU has been advocating for different aspects of having a comprehensive approach[46] to crisis, the EU has never launched a hybrid crisis management operation that is both civilian and military nature at the same time (Peen Rodt, 2014). Moreover, while the

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[46] see more on the Comprehensive Approach, the Integrated Approach and Principled Pragmatism as normative frameworks for EU external action in Chapter 5.

phrase '*operation*' in the CSDP realm can only mean an intervention of military nature, '*missions*' can be either civilian or military depending on the mandate and the EU personnel deployed to implement it (Hornyák and Tánczos, 2024).

But what makes the difference between an EU military operation and EU military mission in the EU parlance? While this is an important and rather unique element of the EU conceptual vocabulary of CSDP, clarifying the difference between the two has been rarely addressed in the literature. In 2014, Peen Rodt also noted that there is often no clarification and conceptual understanding of the difference between the two phrases. Additionally focusing specifically on the distinct nature of missions and operations in military parlance citing a British army officer, she argued that missions are more operational and tactical by nature, being "*something quite small and specific*", while operations are directly connected and deriving from the strategic level (Peen Rodt, 2014, p. 13). While this might be an important practice in overall, traditional Western military parlance, and this differentiation was accurate before the consolidation of SFA missions in the EU as a permanent tool in the CSDP toolbox, the Contemporary CSDP triad suggests otherwise. The difference in conceptualization between an '*EU military mission*' and an '*EU military operation*' point towards the rules of the engagement and the mandate of EU CSDP interventions. This angle of the executive nature of the mandates throughout these CSDP interventions or EU-led peace support operations also demonstrated in Table 5.

Additionally, in contrast with the observations in Peen Rodt's work on the difference between missions and operations, in the EU context both CSDP instruments are part of a larger regional strategy, such as in the case of EUTM Somalia, EUCAP Somalia and EUNAVFOR Atalanta. These three different CSDP instruments from an EU strategic perspective serve as different pillars or tools in order to support the achievement of different strategic objectives through an integrated approach. Moreover, Peen Rodt's research pointing out the lack of conceptual clarification between missions and operations in the EU jargon in her work in 2014 further reinforces the previous argument that while Union has not consolidated the conceptualization of the different elements of the CSDP triad in strategic documents their application was already in practice in the early 2010's. As highlighted, such conceptual awareness was not present in EUGS but was a crucial part of the discourse in EUSC.

Executive missions and operations serve to replace functions and tasks contingent upon missing authority, capacity, or capability and also serves as direct military crisis management operations[47]. In this executive vs. non-executive dichotomy, civilian CSDP missions can serve both executive and non-executive mandate objectives, such as EULEX Kosovo civilian mission both performing monitoring and advising tasks (non-executive) while being the secondary police responder in Kosovo (executive). As opposed to civilian EU missions, military operations are predominantly executive, while military missions are exclusively non-executive, meaning that it cannot replace missing host country capacity, or act instead of or on behalf of local authorities. The non-executive nature also dominantly reinforces when and how troops can engage in the use of force, as an EU military officer put it, "*the question comes up: when do you fire? For the European Union is very clear it is only in case of self-defence and that is non-executive*" (Interviewee 11°, 2024). In the contemporary CSDP triad, military operations and military missions are both directly serve political-strategic, military strategic purposes, as well being embedded in the area of operations through in-theatre OHQs. In this sense, the EU jargon overrode the common understanding of the phrases of '*operation*' or '*mission*' and created a new, conceptually distinct understanding and categorization between the two phrases in the CSDP realm, which are not only reflected in the civilian-military dichotomy, but also through the command structure of EU interventions.

The three types of missions and operations in the Contemporary CSDP Triad which are explored in Table 5. are also distinct in the way they are commanded further reinforcing their distinct nature especially with regards to role performance. The command and control (C2) structures responsible for EU civilian missions and military missions are both located in EEAS in Brussels. The Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) leads all ongoing EU civilian interventions, while the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) commands all EU non-executive military missions (Hornyák and Tánczos, 2024). Both CPCC and MPCC serve as strategic headquarters ensuring close alignment with the political leadership in the EU, such as the Political and Security Committee (PSC) of the Council (Rehrl, 2021; Interviewee 10°, 2024). The Joint Support Coordination Cell—as also highlighted in Chapter 5.—

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[47] see more in Peen Rodt's work (2014) on executive EU military operations conceptualized as military conflict management operations.

is responsible for coordinating between military and civilian personnel in support of civ-mil synergies in CSDP (Tardy, 2017b). The JSCC's role is essential, as the EU has been using both civilian and military tools in the same countries or regions (see, Mali or Somalia where both EU civilian and military missions are deployed, in Appendix 1). Moreover, the presence of a coordinating unit between civilian and military CSDP is further legitimizes Peen Rodt's observation on the lack of hybrid operations, as well as the argument of this dissertation on the mutual exclusivity of CSDP being either civilian or military. Lastly, in contrast with this 'in-house' C2 structure of civilian and military missions, the third pillar of the CSDP triad, EU military operations are commanded by member states, or in the case of EUFOR Althea Operation in Bosnia, commanded by NATO through the Berlin Plus Agreements. The Berlin Plus agreements signed between the EU and NATO in 2003 provide the opportunity for the Union to use NATO capabilities, such as planning or command and control structure to enable EU-led military engagements under ESDP, now CSDP (Rittimann, 2021).

The uniqueness of the EU CSDP intervention typology also points to the question of how and when the EU relied on different civilian, military or specific SFA tools throughout the last twenty years and whether the contemporary realities differ from the early ESDP engagements. As it was thoroughly explored in Chapter 5. the EU has laid down the foundations for its external action, including the induction of missions and operations through the establishment of the CSFP with the Maastricht treaty in 1991, and subsequently the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in 1999 in Cologne (Molnár et al., 2024; Rehrl, 2021). These early efforts allowed the evolving EU to develop a more operational ability and character for the its external action (Grevi et al., 2009, p. 19). This 'flying start' of EU crisis management and ESDP intervention resulted in the Union launching 23 missions between 2003 and 2009, 17 civilian missions and 5 military operations. Out of the 23 missions, 3 civilian missions and 2 military operations are still ongoing one of them being the previously highlighted EUFOR Althea Operation in Bosnia Hercegovina under NATO command (see Appendix 1.).

In the early years of ESDP, the EU relied heavily on civilian instruments in line with the normative and civilian power profile, also explored in Chapter 5., having a 17:6 civilian-military ratio between the missions and operations (Gracza Hornyák, 2024a; Sabatino et al., 2023). Having close to 75% of launched intervention being of civilian nature also derived from practical reasons, as the EU had no permanent

military-strategic command and control structure until 2017, and EU military missions and operations were able to function under two of the following options: under NATO command, based on the '*principle of presumption of availability*' or Member states command, meaning that the operational headquarters (OHQ) is not directly led by the Union (Simón, 2010, p. 15). However, contemporary CSDP intervention shows a more balanced civilian-military ratio today than in the ESDP. These changes, as explored in Chapter 5., can be primarily attributed to the institutional consolidation and reinforcement of CSDP after the Lisbon Treaty and EUGS, as well as the development of the EU's own self-conceptualization with regards to its role in international politics as a normative security provider.

Currently there are 24 EU missions and operations ongoing with 3.500 military and around 1.300 civilian personnel being deployed in different theatres (Andersson, 2024a). The growing reliance on military CSDP and the Union's changing role concept was also demonstrated by the content analysis of security and defence related references and key words in EU strategic documents in the previous chapter. As a result, while most EU CSDP military engagement "*are lacking serious warfighting capabilities, mostly focusing on security assistance and the training of partner nations' armed forces, it should be acknowledged that EU member states have become much more comfortable using military tools for crisis management.*" (Hornyák, 2023). Crucial element of the application of military CSDP was the establishment of a unified EU command structure, MPCC, as a direct implementation effort of the 2016 EUGS. As also noted in literature, while facing many challenges, this EU command structure substantially supported its capacities to better implement CSDP missions and operations (Reykers and Adriaensen, 2023; Sabatino et al., 2023; Tardy, 2017b). Similarly to the legitimization aspect of CSDP missions and operations vis-à-vis the Union's role as a security provider, having a unified military command structure was an important element in the EU's journey in taking command of its own interventions. As Table 6. shows, without an EU C2 structure there was no mission under a unified EU command, but all missions were building on the previously highlighted Berlin Plus Agreements providing access to NATO command structures or were led by individual member states. In the post-Lisbon era until the adoption of the Strategic Compass, the with the establishment of MPCC as a direct implementation of EUGS, the EU kept EUFOR Althea operation under NATO command, while having two naval operations under member states commands, EUNAVFOR Operation Athea and Operation Sophia,

later succeeded by Operation Med Irini.[48] MPCC took charge of the EU's non-executive missions, EUTM Somalia, EUTM Mali, EUTM RCA and EUTM Mozambique. Since the adoption of the Strategic Compass the EU launched five missions, out of which three were military ones: EUNAVFOR Aspides naval operation and two SFA missions, EUMPM Niger and EUMAM Ukraine. (see also in Appendix 1.) As a result, currently six out of the 10 ongoing military CSDP missions are under the Union's own command.[49]

	2003-2009	2010-2021	2022-2024
number of EU military operations under NATO command	2	1	1
number of EU military operations under member states' command	4	2	3
number of EU military missions under EU command through MPCC	0	4	6

Table 6. EU CSDP military missions and operations and their respective command structure between 2003 and 2024.

Additionally, it is worth looking beyond the quantitative elements of CSDP developments. While Table 6. and Appendix 1. show data on the growing reliance on military tools by the EU, there is another important aspect to be emphasized regarding overall characteristics of CSDP military engagements: the duration of these deployments. Between the two types of military CSDP tools explored in Table 6.1, the rather vital importance between military operations and military missions is that military operations tend to be shorter, while EU military missions or SFA missions have been traditionally long-term investments by the EU (see Appendix 1.). The EU invoking SFA as a CSDP tool more and more, also resulted in a more sustained EU military presence in different theatres. In 2024, as Appendix 1. shows, all EU SFA missions launched by the EU are still ongoing starting with Somalia since 2010, while the duration of military operations—with some exceptions, such as EUFOR Althea Operation in Bosnia or EUNAVFOR Atalanta Operation—tends to stay between three months to one year typically. Additionally, the data shows that the EU sustains maritime operations longer than dominantly land-based operations (Appendix 1.). Again, EUFOR Althea Operation is a unique exception, which is the only EU CSDP engagement under NATO command through the Berlin Plus Agreements and the only

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[48] Technically the EU had three naval missions in this time frame, but only had two at upheld simultaneously as EUNAVFOR Operation Med Irini was a successor of Operation Sophia with rather similar command structure and assets, but with different mandate.

[49] At the time of the writing the EU is expected to close EUTM Mali mission by the end of 2024.

and the most vital practical and operational cooperation between EU and NATO (Rittimann, 2021). With the aforementioned trends in mind, current strategic priorities in CSDP demonstrate the EU's willingness to engage more in the maritime domain, as well as deploying SFA missions or military missions as an important tool of the contemporary CSDP toolbox (Gracza Hornyák, 2024a).

6.2 The 'EU model' for Security Force Assistance – building partner military capabilities by the European Union

Building on the previous observations, this subchapter focuses on the specific instances of EU-led military capacity building missions, also known as EU non-executive military missions, which are conceptualized as SFA missions in this research. Agreeing with the Rolandsen et al. (2021) referring to SFA being an "*ubiquitous in today's relations between Western states and the global South*" (Rolandsen et al., 2021, p. 564)—as previously argued—that in this emerging SFA realm, the *EU model* of SFA has become the essential part of the evolving new subfield of EU External Action Studies described by Gstöhl and Schunz (Gracza Hornyák, forthcoming, 2025b). This, *EU model* for security force assistance is based on three major elements: a) SFA missions conceptualized as pillars or parts of overall SSR efforts; b) the aforementioned special EU jargon where EU SFA missions are conceptualized as EU (non-executive) military missions; c) EU model relying on US practices of SFA, but differing in policy and concepts (Gracza Hornyák, forthcoming, 2025b).

European perspectives—especially looking at EU-led capacity building efforts as a rather new phenomenon—are rich in policy accounts, but the list of scholarly works on contemporary EU military engagement is still rather short (see Subchapter 2.4). This scarcity of scholarship is especially true regarding literature that concentrates on conceptualizing this specific angle of EU external action. This relative absence of literature on EU-led security force assistance specifically derives from the fact that the Union is still considered as an 'atypical' SFA provider which only started to engage in such missions since 2010. Beyond the novelty of the EU's role in SFA, the small footprint and scale of these operations also contribute to this relatively low visibility (Gracza Hornyák, 2024a). As Seabra asserted by examining what he referred to as 'non-traditional', 'rising power' as SFA providers—such as China or India with regards to Mozambique—these contemporary efforts still often require more

understanding both with regards to their entry points and their overall different approaches to SFA. He argued that "*while there is increasing consensus over what they want, the same cannot be said of how they go about achieving it*" (Seabra, 2021, p. 685). This research considers the EU as such, non-traditional SFA provider, which, because of its colonial past of many of its troop contributing countries—such as Portugal in the case of Mozambique—can be considered as an 'old-new' provider, but has a unique approach to SFA, the 'EU model'. Moreover, Seabra's argument about non-traditional SFA providers asserts that non-traditional means non-Western. This chapter points out the uniqueness of the EU and understands it as a non-traditional, Western security provider.

Most pieces position these EU-led partner capacity building missions as a part of the broader Security Sector Reform efforts, concerning "*all state and non-state actors involved in security provision, management and oversight, and emphasizes the links between their roles, responsibilities and actions. SSR also involves aspects of justice provision, management and oversight, because security and justice are closely related*" (DCAF – Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, 2019, p. 2; see also: Oksamytna, 2011; Rehrl, 2021; Van Der Lijn et al., 2022). As the definition[50] indicates, this concept involves a wider pool of possible recipients of security assistance and puts special emphasis on civil-military relations and the rule of law. While this framework results in a much broader understanding of partner capacity building going well-beyond the military-to-military interactions, the SSR framework still dominates the scholarship on EU building military capacity of its partners. Literature on EU CSDP missions and operations frequently conceptualizes the similar capacity building practices (Edmunds et al., 2018), security assistance (Deneckere et al., 2020) and other capability building, training and advising activities through the SSR framing.

This specific EU model for SFA heavily relies on the SSR framework for partner military capacity building and is rooted in the EU's own approach and concepts.[51] EU documents address capacity building as part of "*an EU-wide strategic framework to support security sector reform*" applying to "*all EU actors, instruments and contexts*

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[50] this definition for SSR was chosen because the Union's action on security sector is advised by an expert consortium, the Security Sector Governance Facility, EU SSGF coordinated by DCAF. (European External Action Service, 2024g)
[51] See more on the comparison between the EU and US model of SFA in: Hornyák Gracza, 2024.

and will provide guidance for the identification, planning and/or implementation/execution of all EU security-sector reform related external action instruments/programmes/projects." (Council of the European Union, 2016; European Parliament, 2024b, p. 1). Additionally, SFA being a part of a larger SSR framework or efforts in a partner country can be also explained by the Union's long-standing commitment in strategic documents to Integrated approach to conflict and crisis as it was discussed in the previous chapter. This is further reinforced by the institutional framework within the EEAS structure ensured by the Integrated approach for Security and Peace (ISP) Directorate (European External Action Service, 2024g). Furthermore, scholars specifically focusing on EU CSDP tools are often bound by the EU's unique jargon and its own conceptualization of its actorness. Additionally, the EU's own conceptual vocabulary is often reinforced by policy and research papers written by EU institutions, such as the European Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) or the European Parliamentary Research Services (EPRS) (Andersson, 2024a; Andersson and Cramer, 2023; European Parliamentary Research Services, 2017; Ionel Zamfir; Elena Lazarou, 2021; Rehrl, 2021). The latter is further reinforced by the EU's ongoing efforts in fulfilling its relatively new role as a security provider and its learning how to do security force assistance "*on-the-job*" (Gracza Hornyák, 2024a).

The SSR-focused EU approach to partner capacity building is also a practice in the case of looking at specific military-to-military training efforts as a unique role institutionalization of the EU's security provider actorness; however, the scholarship often presents no additional conceptual bridge between these train and equip missions and broader SSR efforts. In many instances, the reason for lacking overall theoretical framework or conceptualization in these accounts on EU military training and capacity building efforts is the previously highlighted heavy policy focused pieces of the literature. One of these examples is the report on EU military training missions by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)[52] which is the most comprehensive policy analysis at the time of the writing dedicated specifically to EU external military capacity building. This report also asserted that the goal of EU military training missions is "*to contribute to security sector reform (SSR) that enables*

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[52] SIPRI is one of the leading European institutions which had specifically looked at EU train and equip missions both on single-case study approach as well as overall EU CSDP aspects. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2022-05/2205_eutm_synthesis_paper_0.pdf

and enhances EU partners' military capacities to deliver security within the rule of law, thereby contributing to the peace and security of populations" (Van Der Lijn et al., 2022, p. 7). Interestingly, this SSR-framed understanding of SFA did not lead to the conceptualization or phrasing of specifically military training missions as "*defence sector reform*"[53] as the unique pillar of overall security sector reform efforts in the *EU model* scholarship.

While this research acknowledges the close connection between SSR and SFA it proceeds with a more cautious approach drawing a direct line between the two concepts and solely conceptualizes EU SFA as a part of EU SSR efforts. Rolandsen et al. (2021) clarifying the differences between SSR and SFA also pointed out that based on the context-specific mandate and tasks SFA processes can contribute to the overall SSR efforts, but they can also directly hinder the long-term stabilization of the security sector and the normalization of civil-military relations (CMR) (see also Knowles and Matisek, 2019 or Matisek and Reno, 2019). These arguments emphasize that empowering one elite group of soldiers in the hope of short-term battlefield gains or counterinsurgency successes can potentially have a negative effect on the overall, long-term and sustainability-oriented SSR (Cimini and Santini, 2021; Dwyer, 2021; Marsh and Rolandsen, 2021; Rolandsen et al., 2021). These approaches to the SFA-SSR dynamics reveal views fundamentally different from the dominant practices in most EU-specific literature looking at SFA as a pillar of overall SSR.

The application of US SFA conceptualization drawing on United States Armed Forces "*Joint Doctrine Note 1-13, Security Force Assistance*" (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013) is only present in a few instances in the EU-focused literature. Due to the relatively new nature of deploying specifically military-to-military SFA missions—starting only from 2010 with EU Training Missions Somalia—the phrase or concept of security force assistance is rarely found in the same sentence with the European Union.[54] In 2024, there is one scholarly piece conceptualizing EU military capacity

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[53] While not widely used in the literature, 'Defence Sector Reform' as an exact phrasing is present in the United Nations policy documents as a specific concept or phrasing. See e.g.: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, 2011.

[54] Rare example specifically addressing EU security force assistance is recent conference hold by the Egmont Institute (Belgian Royal Institute for International Relations) titled: "European Security Force Assistance and the rise of Great Power Competition" co-organized with the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). https://www.egmontinstitute.be/events/european-security-force-assistance-and-the-rise-of-great-power-competition/ Both PRIO and Egmont Institute with the leadership of scholars, such as Nina Wilén, Nicholas Marsh and Øystein H. Rolandsen, have recently started to pave the way

building efforts as security force assistance—following the US doctrine phrasing—and the EU as an SFA provider by Marsh and Rolandsen looking at Mali as a case study (Marsh and Rolandsen, 2021). Concurrently, there is no example in the CSDP scholarship applying the Principal-Agent Theory to partner military capacity building, which is the dominant framework for theorizing SFA in the largely US-based and US-focused academic literature on the topic (Gracza Hornyák, forthcoming, 2025b).

It is important to note that all three types of intervention in the contemporary CSDP triad (see Table 5.) can have a training or capacity building element. However, the EU-focused literature almost exclusively uses the SSR umbrella for capacity building in the framework of EU civilian missions and military missions, which is quite rare in case of military operations. This is true in spite of the fact that several military operations, such as EUNAVFOR Med Irini maritime operation has a capacity building component; in the case of Irini Operation it is to train the Libyan coast guard personnel (European External Action Service, 2020b). However, civilian CSDP missions are conceptualized as civilian due to the implementation through force and personnel other than military. These civilian missions with their highly diverse mandates and tasks are demonstrating the heart of SSR objectives, which indeed includes capacity building, including working with the security sector, such as police forces, but never involve a military component which makes them located outside of the traditional military-to-military approach in SFA.

In the conceptual vocabulary of the *EU model*, EU CSDP military missions are *de facto* security force assistance missions considering their pure capacity and capability building focus and non-executive nature. EU military missions are predominantly military-to-military train, equip and advise missions, where trainers are not allowed to engage with or on behalf of the partner forces due to the strict non-executive character of these EU interventions (Gracza Hornyák, forthcoming, 2025b). As an EU military official argued, their limited use of force makes them non-executive (Interviewee 11°, 2024). Military personnel deployed by the EU to military training missions cannot be involved with any combat-related actions, which—as a consequence—can also hinder monitoring and follow-up (Frisell and Sjökvist, 2021). This problem, phrase as the "*train-and-release approach*" with regards to EUTM

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for EU SFA research with special focus on fragile contexts being the first accounts where EU launched military training missions, such as Somalia, Mali, or the Central African Republic.

Somalia was also emphasized in some of the relevant interviews (Interviewee 5°, 2023, Interviewee 6°, 2024).

The conceptualization of exploring EU military missions as SFA missions is reinforced by the fact that these missions can be financed through the European Peace Facility (EPF)[55] since 2021, which was established specifically to channel "*the EU's assistance to defence and military actors*" (Frisell and Sjökvist, 2021, p. 5). This further strengthens the applicability the SFA conceptualization to EU military missions. With the establishment of EPF as a more permanent, more material-focused tool to enable EU-led security assistance and capacity building also resulted in some recent accounts criticizing this approach known as 'carrots and sticks'[56] in US-focused literature (Gracza Hornyák, forthcoming, 2025a). Frisell and Sjökvist (2021), for instance, pointed out EU internal debates on the conditionality of providing lethal military equipment. The latter—as noted in Chapter 5. —also derives fundamentally from the constitutional limitation imposed by TEU.

Another vital element while looking at EU as a security provider conducting SFA is the fact that EU military missions are the only military CSDP tools under the EU's own command and control structure, the MPCC. As discussed earlier, established in 2017 as a direct result of the implementation of the 2016 EUGS strategic priorities, the Brussels-based MPCC serves as the military-strategic headquarters of all EU-led SFA efforts. Previous to the creation of MPCC, all, in that time three EU SFA missions, EUTM Somalia, Mali and CAR, were functioning through their respective in-theatre operational headquarter covering military-strategic, operational and tactical levels (Tardy, 2017b). Moreover, these were led by individual member states as previously indicated with regards to Table 6. The establishment of MPCC further reinforced the EU's ownership over its own military engagements, including SFA missions and was "*symbolic of a certain evolution of mindset after more than 15 years of politicised discrepancies among member states on the virtues of an EU proper command structure*" (Tardy, 2017b, p. 1). MPCC's as the EU's permanent C2 structure is led by

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[55] See more on the European Peace Facility and the assistance and operations pillars in EEAS, 2024. European Peace Facility Factsheet.

[56] "*The 'carrots and sticks' concept in SFA refers to the political economy of the assistance provided representing different tools of conditionality. While carrots can be more money, more salary for the trainees or better equipment as a promise used for gain leverage in these processes, sticks are the demonstration of 'tough love' where conditionality of SFA is achieved by more coercive tools or sanctioning.*" (Gracza Hornyák, forthcoming, 2025b)

a director who also serves as the director general of the EUMS in a double-hatted position. As the dual position of EU military leadership also presupposes, while MPCC's establishment was both vital and symbolic, the EU's C2 structure has been continuously struggling with being understaffed, while both the number of EU SFA missions under their command and their responsibilities increased as also demonstrated by Table 6. (Reykers and Adriaensen, 2023).

The EUSC in 2022 rather significantly expanded the portfolio of MPCC with being responsible for handling EPF, the EU's financing mechanism for SA, including its own SFA missions, and in parallel currently serving as the OHQ of the EU BG and EU Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC) (European External Action Service, 2023c). Since its establishment, but specifically since the addition of EPF responsibilities as well as additional tasks by the Strategic Compass, MPCC has become the EU's most important institution for SFA distributing SA as well as commanding the Union's SFA missions. Nevertheless, MPCC with its portfolio and responsibilities substantially expanded is expected to reach FOC by 2025 while being responsible for six EU SFA missions from Mozambique to Ukraine. EU CSDP missions and operations—as emphasized by several interviewees—are the most visible parts of EU security and defence policy. However, in spite of the EU's engagement through EUMAM Ukraine putting the EU on the map of security providers globally, it did not significantly resolved the staffing, resource and capacity issues of MPCC institutionally responsible for EU SFA (Gracza Hornyák, 2024a; Reykers and Adriaensen, 2023). While it is outside of the scope of this research, it is important to highlight EUMAM Ukraine as a critical juncture in EU SFA not only because of its novelty with regards to its geopolitical significance, but also due to the different needs of the partner country compared to Somalia or Mozambique. As most recent empirical findings asserted with EUMAM Ukraine the EU is somewhat engaged in reversed security force assistance, where "*advisors are meant to make the Ukrainians more militarily effective, but through the process of training Ukrainians, the advisors learn more about modern warfighting, thereby making their own military more effective*" (Chinchilla et al., 2024). This phenomenon is one which can have a short-term impact on MPCC as the command structure responsible for EUMAM Ukraine as well as overall EU SFA practices in the close future.

6.3   Effectiveness and impact assessment in CSDP

After exploring the institutional and conceptual framework of overall CSDP as well as EU SFA, this subchapter turns to the question of impact assessment and effectiveness. What is effectiveness in CSDP? Is it measured? What mechanisms are in place to monitor and review the impact of military CSDP in the EU?

First, it is important to highlight that many EU strategic and operational documents frequently use the word effective or effectiveness. EU Handbook on CSDP from 2021 refers to the word effective 49 times and effectiveness 28 times in different contexts, the EUGS mentions effects and/or effectiveness 18 times, while most recently the Strategic Compass 32 times (European Union, 2022, 2016; Rehrl, 2021). These are just some high-level strategic and policy documents which systematically invoke the phrases impact, effect, and effectiveness without conceptualizing or specifying it to different CSPD contexts.[57] The issue of effectiveness is frequently present not only in the EU's own communication and documents on CSDP intervention, but in the literature as well as it was explored Subchapter 2.5. The phenomenon of citing impact, effects and effectiveness as goal without definition or clarification as in the case in EU security and defence policy is often present in the scholarship, while conceptualization or the examination of assessment structures and processes are rather scarce (Asseburg and Kempin, 2009; Hörst et al., 2018; Tardy, 2015).

As Jobbágy argued vis-à-vis this trend of 'effects and effectiveness' being widely used in very different realms, or being assumed as "*common wisdom and academic knowledge*", referring to effectiveness "*can have multiple meanings that do not promote precision and clarity in military language*" (Jobbágy, 2019, p. 39). In the case of the EU this translates into the practice where the word or phrase, effects and effectiveness, is widely used in strategic and policy documents of CSDP, in many cases including arguments for different variables contributing to or increasing effectiveness without any conceptual context on what effectiveness is or how it is measured (see e.g. Andersson and Cramer, 2023; European Defence Agency., 2023; J. European External Action Service, 2023; European Parliament, 2024). In other words, EU CSFP and CSDP documents rely on the effectiveness as 'common wisdom', without any

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[57] Chapter 7. analysis the context and EU discourses on effectiveness vis-à-vis gender mainstreaming.

conceptualization or clarification regarding how or under what circumstances CSDP missions and operations are considered effective.

While the lack of defining effectiveness is obvious, there are internally institutionalized processes for impact assessment in CSDP. While the interviews further reinforced the result of the EU document analysis that there is no conceptualization or mechanism on how to measure effectiveness in CSDP, interviewees highlighted that an internal assessment mechanism exists with continuous reflection and monitoring on mandate implementation in the light of in-theatre reports, political changes, as well as feasibility (Interviewee 10°, 2024; Interviewee 11°, 2024; Interviewee 4°, 2023; Participatory Observation, Hamburg, 2024). The aim of this monitoring and review process is to (re)assess "*the parameters around the CSDP mission/operation (scenario, situation, EU interests and objectives, CSDP added value, needs and opportunities, other parties' engagement*" (Moreno, 2021, p. 85). These review processes and mechanisms are similar in nature across all CSDP engagements. This means that the evaluation and review of an executive maritime military operation led by a military-strategic HQ outside of the EEAS structure is evaluated through the same mechanism as an EU SFA mission commanded from Brussels. This structural-institutional aspect of evaluating CSDP engagement is often left unaddressed in the literature also hindering further inquiry to explore how impact and effectiveness of CSDP missions and operations are substantially different due to the diversity of their mandates. In line with the main research question of this dissertation, the following analysis of internal assessment mechanism focuses primarily on military CSDP tools, specifically EU SFA missions in exploring assessment and effectiveness.

There are two, major impact assessment mechanisms currently in place internally in EU CSDP: a six-month[58] regular review process, which is dominantly attached to the operational and military-strategic levels; and a comprehensive Strategic Review (SR) process which includes the political-strategic level with the involvement of the PSC (see Figure 11.). The main institutional ownership of impact assessment resides with the three main actors taking part in the strategic review process: the Operational Commander of the in-theatre OHQ; the commander of MPCC, a three-

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[58] one interviewee recalled 4-months (EU Military Advisor, 2024), but 6-months was the most cited and reinforced by secondary sources, such as Andersson 2024.

star general, as *de facto* mission commander and head of the military-strategic HQ of all CSDP military missions; and the PSC, providing political-strategic oversight over the application of EU SFA missions as foreign policy tools.

Figure 11. Strategic Review Process of EU CSDP military missions.

Strategic Reviews comprehensively involve all levels of military planning and decision-making and are directly connected to the political-strategic level through the PSC. This reinforces what was often emphasized by EU officials throughout the interviews: the "*inherently political*" nature of CSDP (Interviewee 10°, 2024; Interviewee 4°, 2023). This notion is further strengthened by the fact that the Strategic Reviews do not only evaluation a certain mission, but the EU's overall engagement in a region/country. For example, in the case of EUTM Somalia, the Strategic Review of the mission is part of a larger comprehensive political review involving the assessment of "*the progress of the CSDP operation ATALANTA and the Missions of EUCAP Somalia and EUTM Somalia against their mandates (...) It assesses the achievements of EU political and strategic objectives while considering the holistic Strategic Review of 2020 and its recommendations.*" (European External Action Service, 2022c, p. 8). This means that through the Strategic Reviews process the military SFA missions are evaluated primarily as political-strategic tools similarly as a civilian mission in the region regardless of their specific military nature of the engagement. This poses serious limitations in terms of military-strategic evaluation and overlooks the sensitive nature of using military force—either executive or non-executive—through CSDP engagement. However, this further reinforces the EU's own conceptualization which is also reflected in the literature that the Union views SFA missions 'only' as part of the overall SSR efforts. As outlined earlier, this approach of conceptualizing EU SFA

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as part of SSR largely neglects already available empirical findings by SFA literature noting its possible contribution to military coups (see e.g. Knowles and Matisek, 2019; Matisek and Reno, 2019; Robinson and Matisek, 2021).

Moreover, the SR mechanism primarily evaluates 'internal goal attainment' and appropriateness described by Peen Rodt, predominantly reflecting the interest of the security provider reinforcing the EU's own conceptual assumptions. While the latest SR on Somalia from 2022 asserts that the assessment process was carried out in consultation with Somali authorities, specifically the Federal Government, and other "*relevant stakeholders*", it does not substantially change the dominantly internal, EU-focused nature of this evaluation mechanism (European External Action Service, 2022c, p. 8). Another limitation of the Strategic Review process is that it does not have a regular cycle, such as annual or biannual, which is the case on the six-monthly military-strategic and operational reviews (Andersson, 2024a). For example Mozambique, where the EU deployed its SFA mission in 2021 and has since extended its mandate until 2024 has not seen a comprehensive strategic review process since 2024.

In contrast with the Strategic Reviews, the most important actors of the six-monthly review process involving primarily the military-strategic and the operational levels, are the in-theatre operational commander (OHQ) and the MPCC. In parallel, as visualized in Figure 11. other units and branches in the EEAS structure are or can be integrated into this process, if necessary, such as the EUMS, or the Integrated Approach to Peace and Security managing directorate, or the JSCC. These other, mostly EEAS's based departments and units are responsible for ensuring the integration of different subject-matter expertise, such as gender advisors, or civilian-military cooperation to the review processes. In addition to the SR mechanism and the six-month regular reviews, it is important to highlight that there are additional complementary and more informal aspects of assessment and evaluation on military-strategic and operational levels. The annual conference of EU operational commanders, for example, is an important platform, where the in-theatre OpComs can engage in an in-person dialogue with their mission commander, the head of MPCC, and meet with other, dominantly Brussels-based experts and policy-makers to inform them about the realities on the field (Czech Department of Defence, 2023).

While reference to these aforementioned two major institutional processes is also highlighted in different academic and policy accounts (see e.g. Andersson, 2024,

Moreno, 2021), the actors and participants of this assessment and review process are rarely connected to the different levels of military planning and decision-making, which is an important and distinctive characteristic of the EU structure. Another missing aspect of analysing EU impact (or effectiveness) assessment in the literature is highlighting that military missions and military operations are significantly differ in their C2 structure, which directly influences the ownership of the evaluation. While other, more operational issues are frequently highlighted in the literature, most accounts addressing impact assessment or effectiveness are listing examples that make CSDP military missions less effective. The lack of language capacities, limited influence and information on the identity of the trainees, and follow-up mechanism are among the most cited obstacles of EU SFA being effective (Andersson, 2024b; Van Der Lijn et al., 2022; Williams and Ali, 2020; Interviewee 4, 2023). However, as it has become clear form Peen Rodt's framework for the assessment of the success of EU military operations, the effectiveness of military missions and military operations are substantially different as a result of their mandate, responsibilities and tasks. Thus, the most substantial different between the assessment and accordingly, the effectiveness of military operations and military missions is the available enforcement opportunities deriving from their executive vs. non-executive nature.

The Strategic Review could offer important political-strategic oversight, evaluation and an opportunity for revising the mandate, as well as political and security threat assessment in the given region/country. However, the SR only provides both institutionally and structurally limited options for evaluation and assessment for effectiveness. With regards to the utility of a few interviews cited that this is the way because of the difficulties to measure effectiveness in military context, especially SFA. As a previous EU military planner asserted "*the effectiveness depend on a lot of what others are doing*" and it "*cannot be measured mathematically*" (Interviewee 4°, 2024). However, another EU military official also highlighted the deficiencies of the current review and assessment process specifically on the operational levels. He argued that "*there are more structured ways to do that on the operational level, they are very demanding, that is for example, operations assessment, operations research, for that people study that then apply that, but you usually see that in much bigger headquarters than the EU has the ground. (...) But the EU to my knowledge does not have that, I don't think that that capacity is fully embedded in EU missions and operations.*" (Interviewee 11°, 2024).

Lastly, Sabatino et al. argued „*EUTM can be only as effective as local authorities can be, because at the end of the day these are training and advisory missions, they are not executive ones, they do not make decisions*". (Sabatino et al., 2023, p. 32). This differentiation of how Western countries look at effectiveness explored by Matisek, when what the EU official refers to internally effective here is in line with how Western CMR and democratic values, use of force, etc. would dictate. From a mission effectiveness perspective, EUTMs are limited primarily by "train and release" approach, as well as their own inability deriving from the non-executive mandate and force protection measures to follow-up or monitor the trainees. In other words, even if EUTMs would be effective, and their trainees would perform well when deployed or when training their own soldiers, EUTM personnel would hardly know about it or could have very limited understanding of the measurable impact.

6.4   Chapter Conclusion

The EU developed a unique conceptual vocabulary for contemporary CSDP, which is specific to its external actorness and role conceptualization as an international security provider. The typology of EU missions and operations implemented through CSDP is consolidated through the 'Contemporary CSDP Triad' collectively referred to as missions and operations, including the three main engagement types: civilian missions, military operations and military missions. While the first two have been the part of EU external action since the first interventions in 2003, the CSDP triad has been consolidated after institutional and policy changes by the Lisbon Treaty and EUGS. The Lisbon Treaty and the institutionalization of CSDP provided momentum for expanding the Petersberg-tasks to military capacity building activities, while EUGS implementation's major contribution was to establish the EU's permanent military C2 structure, MPCC. Directly connected to these policy and institutional changes, the EU has permanently added security cooperation through SFA into its CSDP toolbox to be able to further enhance its role as a security provider. While the EU's first SFA mission was launched in 2010 in Somalia, today all six ongoing EU military missions are under central EU command through the MPCC residing in Brussels.

EU SFA missions—as the institutionalization of the Union's role as a security provider—today are conceptualized in the EU vocabulary as non-executive military missions or shortly, military missions. This element of the CSDP triad refers to a

military engagement where the deployed military personnel only perform capacity building, training, advising and assistance tasks, and cannot act on behalf of or instead of local authorities. In other words: the use of military force is exclusively resolved to the case of self-defence. The consolidation of EU SFA into the CSDP toolbox, and the drastic changes in the European security landscape resulted in the Union continuously engaging in international crisis management and security cooperation, currently having 24 CSDP missions and operations ongoing. The application of the 'Contemporary CSDP Triad' in 2024 shows a more balanced civilian-military ratio than in the previous, ESDP interventions throughout the pre-Lisbon era. At the same time, EU military deployments has become longer, which is the direct consequence of the EU's increasing engagement in SFA through currently six military missions, which tend to be longer-term deployments than military operations (see Appendix 1.). Accordingly, through enhanced presence as an SFA provider, the EU has a permanent and sustained military presence in different parts of Africa, and since 2022 Europe through EUMAM Ukraine.

EU SFA missions, or military missions are rather small-scale, small-footprint military deployments, which are primarily focusing on training and advising partner military forces, or its specific units. These missions rely on US practices and policies based on experience through shared theatres, such as Afghanistan or Iraq, while on the policy levels they serve as, and conceptualized as part of the EU's overall SSR efforts in a certain country or region (Gracza Hornyák, forthcoming, 2025b). With the launch of EPF since 2021, as the EU's main financial mechanism for security assistance, EU-led military missions further enhanced their alikeness to US-led SFA efforts with providing military equipment, including lethal appliances. This is in contrast with the previous CSFP and CSDP security cooperation practices where EU military missions only served as *de facto* knowledge transfer missions being hindered by lack of material support and resources for implementing their mandate (Interviewee 3°, 2023; Interviewee 5°, 2023). With the heavy reliance on the SSR framework as part of the Integrated approach of the EU to SFA, the Union's attitude to security force assistance is inherently guided by a concept which is heavily political, especially in countries with fragmented power and security sector, but often handled as a technical tool. Additionally, the very concept of SSR as a guiding framework for EU SFA was built on the idea of liberal norm promotion with the aim of transforming a "*security system, which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions, working together*

to manage and operate the system in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance" (OECD-DAC, 2005, 20) (Abdulcarimo Lala, 2014). With this SSR-focused approach the EU is following the underlying assumption of liberal peacebuilding that institutionalization has to happen before liberalization; making the institution consistent with liberal norms, such as rule of law or gender equality. However, institutional capacity building in itself can be very challenging in fragile contexts, such as Somalia or Mozambique, where the institution, in this case the national armies are actively engaging in combat in parallel with SSR-focuses SFA activities (Interviewee 5°, 2023).

The EU has come a long way in terms of overcoming institutional, policy and structural hurdles obstructing its growing ambition as an international security provider. Nevertheless, this development could not permanently solve the continuous capacity and personnel problems on the military-strategic level of military CSDP. As a result, for instance, MPCC, which had its responsibilities and portfolio substantially expanded through the Strategic Compass remains understaffed and in waiting of reaching FOC by 2025 while commanding six EU SFA missions simultaneously (PO, 1°, Brussels, 2021; PO 6°, Hamburg, 2024).

Additionally, while EU documents, policies and discourses are reinforcing the striving for effectiveness and impact over and over again, the lack of conceptualization of CSDP effectiveness, as well as assessment mechanisms seriously limits the Union's ability to measure its impact specifically on the military-strategic level. On the political-strategic level Strategic Reviews intend to serve as a benchmark on the CSDP performance and effectiveness by looking at mandate implementation and adjusting to political and security realities on the field. However, the SR process assesses all EU CSDP engagement under a broader geopolitical and/or geographical umbrella and does not differentiate between the assessment of civilian CSDP missions, military operations or military missions. While on a military-strategic and operational level six-months regular reviews provide systematic feedback on mission performance and evaluation, the investment into CSDP is substantially bigger than the effort put into reflecting on the contemporary realities of CSDP, specifically military engagement to assess impact and effectiveness of missions, including EU SFA missions.

Lastly, the primary sources on effectiveness and impact assessment through the strategic reviews showed a large variety of perspectives on the utility of this process. Many emphasized that the SRs are tools in the hands of the EU to make political

decisions about the implementation of CSDP missions and operations as primarily political tools. These views were largely shared by people and officials working on the political-strategic level, while this process was largely neglected from discourses on the ground, such as those of gender advisors and other EU personnel working on the operational and tactical levels.

7 GENDER MAINSTREAMING: CONCEPTUALIZATION, STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK AND DISCOURSE IN THE EU

Previous chapters focused on the role concept and its institutionalization and performance in the case of EU-led SFA missions. Further building on the theoretical framework and role theory application, this chapter focuses on gender mainstreaming as norm transfer in such empirical context through exploring two key a) how does the Union reason and argue for the importance of gender mainstreaming in CSDP; and b) how does this narrative link gender mainstreaming to operational or mission effectiveness as the expected role impact. With such foci, the chapter seeks to contribute to answering the research questions and exploring the research propositions on the WPS effect on CSDP as well as the impact of allied and member states' efforts in Afghanistan on gender mainstreaming in military operations. To investigate how the EU "thinks and talks" about gender mainstreaming, Chapter 7. engages in document and discourse analysis to study official documents on the topic of Women, Peace and Security and gender mainstreaming more broadly connected to EU external action.[59] Additionally, in a similar fashion to Chapter 5. the chapter also provides an overview on the institutional framework of EU gender mainstreaming from a descriptive-analytical point of view in order to outline the contemporary environment of this norm transfer in CSFP and CSDP.

The chapter is divided into four main sections working its way from the larger strategic picture to most specific and case-based narratives on EU gender mainstreaming. First, studying the EU's early efforts vis-à-vis gender mainstreaming it explores what specific elements led to the development of EU gender mainstreaming in security and defence. Looking at the brief history of gender mainstreaming as a concept and its origins in Europe, this first subchapter touches upon the main milestones of EU gender mainstreaming in chronological order with special focus on conceptualization and integration into EU legal instruments and policies. The second

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subchapter (7.2) zooming into the current strategic documents, policies and processes in place, analyses how contemporary EU gender mainstreaming works with special focus on CSDP missions and operations. Subsequently, the third subchapter is dedicated to the study and the discussion narratives on EU linking gender mainstreaming and the effectiveness of missions and operations. The final subchapter (7.4) provides the summary of the findings in a form of a chapter conclusion.

7.1   EU gender mainstreaming brief historic overview and institutional aspects

As highlighted both in reviewing the literature as well as outlining the conceptual framework, the 1990's have been crucial years vis-à-vis the conceptualization of gender mainstreaming both in Europe and internationally. Several important documents which are still foundational for EU gender mainstreaming and narratives on gender equality in Europe were adopted during these historically important years. Moreover, this decade was decisive not only in terms of defining gender mainstreaming and the main arguments behind it, but also clarifying why and how gender equality policy is different from gender mainstreaming. While EU treaties adopted in the 1990's, such as the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties, have been focusing on gender equality and equal opportunity in line with liberal feminist ideals at the time, document published by the Council of Europe in 1998 defined the framework for gender mainstreaming (Council of Europe, 1998).[60] The document titled 'Gender Mainstreaming: Conceptual framework, methodology and presentation of good practices', which is still referred to in EU documents 25 years later, laid down the definition of both gender equality and gender mainstreaming. The text refers to gender equality as "*equal visibility, empowerment and participation of both sexes in all spheres of public and private life. Gender equality is the opposite of gender inequality, not of gender difference, and aims to promote the full participation of women and men in society*." (Council of Europe, 1998, p. 7).

The document also intended to move away from the classical liberal (feminist) thought primarily arguing for equality before the law and positioned the European gender equality narrative on an egalitarian, outcome-based foundation asserting that "*equality de jure does not automatically lead to equality de facto*" (Council of Europe,

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[60] Council of Europe is an international organization outside of the European Union institutions. While the establishment of the Council of Europe and the European Union were happening in parallel, the Council of Europe remained an organization independent from the EU. See more on the differentiation on EU and the Council of Europe. See in the bibliography: Council of Europe. 2024.

1998, p. 7). While both were part of the liberal feminist thought, the second wave of feminism was characterized by not only advocating for *de iure* equality—equality before the law—, but equal opportunity. The CoE document discussing gender equality and mainstreaming through more than 80 pages also argued that women in Europe (as a region) have achieved *de iure* equality, but further asserts that gender mainstreaming is needed as gender equality policies often function and proceed in isolation instead of comprehensively addressing inequalities. Accordingly, the Council of Europe document suggested—based on the outcomes of the UN World Conferences in Nairobi (1985) and Beijing (1995)—gender mainstreaming as an action towards gender equality understood as "*the (re)organisation, improvement, development and evaluation of policy processes, so that a gender equality perspective is incorporated in all policies at all levels and at all stages, by the actors normally involved in policy-making*" (Council of Europe, 1998, p. 15). While this document was not created in the framework of the EU, it was the first comprehensive and regionally focused effort in Europe to conceptualize and reconceptualize gender equality and gender mainstreaming later translated and implemented by the Union as well.

7.1.1 Pre-Lisbon EU gender regime

In parallel with the aforementioned processes of defining gender mainstreaming, the last decade of the 21st century provided momentum for the EU to create its own framework for gender equality. Gender mainstreaming in the Union and the argument behind its integration into the Union's policies was primarily built in line with two main categories or axes: internal and external[61] influences, as well as normative/rights-based and functionalist arguments. Different elements of these two dimensions have simultaneously affected the adoption, internalization and personalization of gender mainstreaming in the EU framework. The internal and external influences mutually reinforcing each other in the early years of EU gender mainstreaming are also recognised in the literature. Pollack and Hafner-Burton asserts that "*the official adoption of a gender-mainstreaming approach by the European Commission in 1996 (…) can be explained in terms of the increased political opportunities presented by the Maastricht Treaty and the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women, the*

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[61] the conceptualization of internal and external instead of using internal versus external phrasing is an intentional one, as evidence shows that internal and external factors (and actors) mutually reinforced each other and resulted in the adoption of gender mainstreaming in the EU, which is explained in the chapter conclusion subchapter (7.4).

supranational network of women advocates at the EU level, and the resonance or fit of mainstreaming with the EU's institutional structure" (Pollack and Hafner-Burton, 2000, pp. 423–433). Similar is argued by Kirby and Shepherd (2021) of the normative effect of the WPS ecosystem on the articulation of security and defence policy in the last two decades.

Looking at the other, the legal and/or normative angle[62], the legal foundation of the gender equality derives from the constitutional treaties of the EU, directly connected to the constitutionalisation of the Union itself after Maastricht. As previous chapters highlighted, with the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty, the EU codified "*equality between men and women with regard to labour market opportunities and treatment at work*" and "*adopting measures providing for specific advantages in order to make it easier for women to pursue a vocational activity or to prevent or compensate for disadvantages in their professional careers*" (Maastricht Treaty, 1992, pp. 91–92). Subsequent amendments, such as the Treaty of Amsterdam, has reinforced and codified a more egalitarian approach into the EU's main legal instrument by establishing the responsibility for the EU to "*aim to eliminate inequalities, and to promote equality, between men and women*" (Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997, p. 25).

Alongside this legal basis given by the Treaties, the normative element primarily originated and was reinforced by the UN work on gender equality. This UN influence also noted in previous chapters was present in EU gender mainstreaming norm transfer efforts both directly—such as the integration and implementation of UNSCR 1325 in ESDP in the early 2000s—or indirectly—for instance, the Council of Europe's conceptualization of gender mainstreaming based on the outcomes of the Fourth UN World Conference on Women in Beijing 1995. However, the most prominent and direct effect was the localization of the WPS agenda. The main arguments of the Women, Peace and Security framework—such as acknowledging the disproportionate effect of war and armed conflict on women and girls and recognizing the contribution of women to conflict resolution and peacebuilding—have significantly informed and transformed policy, narrative and decision-making in international security (Kirby and Shepherd, 2021). Accordingly, WPS has become a unique, highly complex normative framework which reproduces itself through norm

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[62] the phrasing of legal and/or normative suggests that while in some cases the two arguments can stand together, and mutually reinforcing ones, but also can be used individually as an argument for gender mainstreaming.

diffusion, this chapter looks at EU gender mainstreaming as a norm transfer dominantly affected by the WPS agenda. Moreover, the adoption of the UNSCR 1325 further facilitated the codification of different protection mechanism into international law, such as the recognition of rape as a tactics of war in subsequent WPS resolutions as an important element of this normative framework. The latter with its integration to international law, as previously noted in the Chapter 1. was one of the most important institutionalizations of the WPS normative framework into international law.

As also briefly noted in the introductory chapter, another prominent process of WPS norm diffusion was the adoption of national action plans as a localization of the international normative framework born out of UNSCR 1325 and subsequent resolutions. EU countries between the first ones *"adopting their own NAPs, ensuring the contextualisation and implementation of the agenda in a national context"*, as well as pushing for overall EU's action on the implementation on the regional and institutional level (Petrikkos and Hornyák, 2022, p. 15). Vis-à-vis the regional level, the WPS framework provided the opportunity to bridge the gap in EU gender mainstreaming and its emerging security and defence policy in the second half of the 2000's. The previously dominant focus areas of gender equality were employment, social services, childcare and education primarily deriving from liberal feminist considerations in order to eliminate barriers for women to further integrate into the workforce (Walby, 2004). However, these efforts were largely different policy environments to mainstream gender equality than crisis and conflict management to which the WPS agenda offered normative framework to cover.

For filling the gap between gender equality policy and security and defence, the EU adopted one of its first documents introducing the EU's perspective on WPS implementation in the context of the ESDP in 2005. The Council document noted that *"at the time when the EU is continuing to develop its crisis management capacity and launch new operations, efforts should be made to integrate gender related issues in ESDP policy, not as a separate issue, but as an aspect that permeates all action taken within this area."* (Council of the European Union, 2005, p. 3). Furthermore, in the following year the EU adopted additional documents, such as 'Check list to ensure gender mainstreaming and implementation of UNSCR 1325 in the planning and conduct of ESDP Operations' (Council of the European Union, 2006a) and 'Council Conclusions on promoting gender equality and gender mainstreaming in crisis management' (Council of the European Union, 2006b). As earlier emphasized, these

efforts by the EU—and some of its member states—in the 2000's were between the very first efforts globally to localize WPS efforts through action plans (Biddolph and Shepherd, 2022). Being between the first actors in international politics to integrate the WPS normative framework into its foreign policy further contributed to the Union's normative self-conceptualization through strengthening one of its constitutional norms, gender equality. Furthermore, as it was previously argued, this early integration also facilitated continuity and further institutionalization of WPS principles into the post-Lisbon framework of EU security and defence policy, and its structures, such as the EEAS. As the investigation of the nexus between the normative and legal angles and how they reinforced each other in the historic context vis-à-vis gender equality is outside of the scope of this research this aspect is referred to as legal/normative angle and argued as WPS top-down effect on gender mainstreaming in CSFP and CSDP in one of the research propositions of this dissertation.

7.1.2 Post-Lisbon EU gender regime

With these initial steps taken by the Union, a year after to the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007 turning ESDP into another common policy of the Union, CSDP, the EU has also become the first adopting a regional action plan for WPS implementation called the 'Comprehensive approach to the EU implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 on women, peace and security' in 2008 (Council of the European Union, 2008a).[63] The document (Comprehensive approach to WPS) established the baseline for EU gender mainstreaming in external action, including CSDP, with directly referring to and building on the conceptualisation of gender mainstreaming by the 1998 CoE document. (See EU WPS action between 2000 and 2024 in Appendix 5.)

The internal and external, as well as legal/normative elements reinforcing each other has resulted in both the TFEU[64] and TEU[65]—as main constitutional treaties of the contemporary EU—codifying gender equality as the core value of the Union, as well as promoting this European value as a key task. These elements have also led to the creation and institutionalization of gender mainstreaming in contemporary EU

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[63] This comprehensive approach is different from the CA concept explored in Chapter 5. which was a specific principle though which the EU approached conflict and crisis in the early 2010's until EUGS in 2016 brought in the Integrated approach in exchange.

[64] Articles 8, 10, 19 and 157 referring to gender equality in TFEU.

[65] Articles 2 and 3 referring specifically to gender equality as the „equality between men and women" in TEU.

external action with both building on the legal basis of the Treaties, as well as the normative framework of the WPS agenda. In similar fashion, internal factors, such as the Nordic states and other EU member states being active in promoting the WPS implementation has further enforced the external UN influence.

In the subsequent years with the institutionalization of CSDP, and the creation of the EEAS with specialized expertise for gender resulted in the continuous development of the institutional framework and the operationalization of EU gender mainstreaming. As Guerrina argued the "*the neo-liberal foundations of the EU permeate the way the EEAS incorporates the principle of equality*" (Guerrina, 2020, p. 277). One of the first institutional component of the EEAS gender regime as an attempt to harmonize the internal-external dimensions of gender mainstreaming in CFSP and CSDP by HP/VP Federica Mogherini was the creation of the position of the Principal Advisor on Gender (PAG) in 2015 (see also in Appendix 5.). PAG was created to "*ensure coherence between the EU's external and internal policies, to enhance visibility in this field, and to realize closer cooperation with other EU institutions, with member states, and with other international and national actors, such as civil society organizations or the UN*" (Molnár and Gracza Hornyák, 2024, p. 6). Moreover, the PAG as "*a visible position especially in the political level*" was also intended to reiterate the political-strategic importance of gender mainstreaming in EU external action (Interviewee 1°, 2021).

However, a few years later the position ceased to exist and an EU Ambassador on Gender and Diversity (EUAGD) was appointed in 2021 functioning as the single political-strategic level leader on gender mainstreaming in the framework of the EEAS (Desmidt, 2021; Interviewee 8°, 2024, Interviewee 26°, 2024; see also in Appendix 5.). This reinforcement of the EU's gender regime was partly the result of the commitment of EC president Ursula von der Leyen to advance gender equality (Gracza Hornyák, 2024c; von der Leyen, 2019; Zamfir, 2023). At the time of the writing the EUAGD serves as the "*WPS representative*" for the Union similar to the special representative for WPS in NATO, while the Gender and Diversity Department (GDD) functions as a task force at the level of the Secretary General of the EEAS as the main administrative and expert department in the EEAS for gender mainstreaming in the EU (Interviewee 8°, 2024). This strategic location of GDD intends to ensure that WPS and gender issues are presented at the highest political levels and the task force has "*access to the House*"—the whole EEAS structure (Interviewee 8°, 2024).

Beyond the GGD being a flagship of institutional 'in-house' EU expertise on gender and WPS issues, the EEAS has several dedicated gender experts in different departments, such as the 'Integrated Approach for Security and Peace Directorate', the CPCC or the EUMS (Interviewee 1°, 8°, 25°, 26°, 2024). In the latter the gender expertise was integrated to the system through the horizontal coordination expert at the time of the writing (Interviewee 8°, 26°, 2024). In addition to these experts located in EEAS HQ in Brussels, gender advisor positions were created in EU CSDP missions and operations also strategically located in the office of the Head of the Mission (HoM) or the mission commanders. Vis-à-vis the internal and external gender-mainstreaming efforts in CSDP gender advisors are responsible to "*makes sure that internally, mission members and operation members are aware of this gender dimension and how it should be considered in their work*" (Interviewee 1°, 2021). While as previously highlighted there is a policy expectation to have gender advisors in all CSDP areas of operation, gender expertise has been identified multiple times as a missing capability with several positions left unfilled from time-to-time (Chappell & Guerrina, 2020, Gracza Hornyák forthcoming, 2025a; Interviewee 26°, 2024).

In addition to the gender advisor network—which also have its annual conference in order to share lessons learned and concerns mentioned by several gender experts interviewed for this dissertation—the EU has been trying to maintain a gender focal point network in the missions and EU delegations around the world. These EU personnel are either appointed or voluntarily serving as a gender focal point in missions and EU delegations coordinating with the gender advisor and EEAS gender department on top of their full-time position. While this gender focal point network existed nominally for more than a decade in EU missions and operations, the continuous rotations and staff changes—especially military personnel—kept the building and maintaining of this network on the agenda in EEAS (Interviewee 8°, 2024; Interviewee 26°, 2024).

7.2 *Contemporary strategic framework of EU gender mainstreaming in CSFP*

As described in the previous subchapter by the early 2020's the EU established a solid strategic framework for gender mainstreaming and women's empowerment in its external action including its security and defence policy (see also Appendix 5.). Gender mainstreaming, similarly to WPS in the UN and global context, has become "*an umbrella term for an array of campaigns, policies, and blueprints that take "a*

gender perspective" on the causes, character, and resolution of war and associated forms of violence" in EU security and defence policy (Kirby and Shepherd, 2021, p. 2). Theorized as a norm transfer in the context of this dissertation, gender mainstreaming has a stable institutional and policy regime in EU external action with several documents, action plans both for overall gender mainstreaming and WPS specific action reinforcing each other, but also frequently being overlapping. At the time of the writing, as Table 7. also intends to visualize, these different documents covering EU gender mainstreaming efforts, including some with explicit focus on external action, or the implementation of the WPS in EU CSFP. While not all documents titled as strategies in Table 7., they have strategic importance vis-à-vis EU gender mainstreaming efforts as it was also explained in Chapter 4. with regards to sampling the documents for the document analysis.

2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
		EU Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025					
			EU Gender Action Plan for External Action 2021-2025				
EU Strategic Approach to Women, Peace and Security Agenda 2018							
	EU Action Plan for the Women, Peace and Security Agenda 2019-2024						

Table 7. Contemporary Strategic framework of EU Internal and External Gender Mainstreaming, 2018-2025.

In order to outline this contemporary strategic framework of EU gender mainstreaming in external action, what gender mainstreaming means and what is the nexus between WPS and GM, the following subchapters analyse all four documents.

7.2.1 EU Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025 (GES 2020)

The EU's current Gender Equality Strategy for the period of 2020-2025 (GES 2020) was adopted as the contemporary credo of the Union on gender equality. Moreover, the document further reinforced the EU's normative self-conceptualization as a "*global leader in gender equality*". GES 2020 argued that the EU "*has made significant progress in gender equality in the last decades*", but also noted that no member state reached full gender equality and that progress has been "slow" (European Commission, 2020, 1-2). The evidence provided to support this self-conceptualization of "*gendered normative power*"—as argued by Chapell and Guerrina (2020)—is based on UN Sustainable Development Goals' (SDGs or Agenda 2023) Goal 5 indicators, as well as on the Gender Equality Index (GEI) of the EU's

own institution for gender equality, the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE)[66].

GES 2020's title is "*towards a gender equal Europe*". Nonetheless, the document did not specify whether referring to "Europe" it talked about the EU internally, or the region including non-EU member states. While the GES 2020 stated that its primary focus is enhancing gender equality in Europe internally, many of its provisions are directly connected to external action and CSDFP. As an EU policy officer also articulated with regards to gender mainstreaming, there are "*several documents that directly are not necessarily related to CSDP but influencing the decision-making on the strategic level*" (Interviewee 1°, 2021). The GES 2020 also provided the opportunity to understand not only the EU's self-conceptualization as an actor in international politics vis-à-vis gender equality, but also the Union's overall understanding on what gender and gender equality is. The strategy shed light on the how the EU's conceptualization is largely in line with liberal feminist ideals with focusing on participation, equity and opportunity, as well as protection against violence as the main elements of gender equality. The liberal feminist approaches aiming at redistributing "*power, influence and resources in a fair and gender-equal way, tackling inequality, promoting fairness, and creating opportunity*" is reinforced by the predominant focus on women's rights and women's physical security in the strategy (European Commission, 2020, 15). GES clearly reinforced the Union's normative self-conceptualization as well as how gender equality—and its promotion through gender mainstreaming—is perceived as fundamental part of the EU's identity. It posited that "*the promotion of equality between women and men is a task for the Union, in all its activities, required by the Treaties. Gender equality is a core value of the EU (...)*" (European Commission, 2020b, p. 1).

A relatively new component in line with adding diversity to the profile of the EU Ambassador on Gender and Diversity only appearing in the footnote in the strategy is a reference to intersectionality. The document elaborating on "diversity" noted that "*where women or men are mentioned, these are a heterogeneous categories including in relation to their sex, gender identity, gender expression or sex characteristics. It affirms the commitment to leave no one behind and achieve a gender equal Europe for*

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[66] EIGE was established in 2006 in order to enhance the EU's overall engagement in gender equality. EIGE's gender equality index measures gender equality in the Union's member states, comparing them to each other instead of a global perspective.

everyone, regardless of their sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation" (European Commission, 2020, 2). Previous to GES 2020 and the establishment of EUAGD different aspects of intersectionality, such as race, ethnicity or sexual orientation was largely absent from EU discourses on gender equality and gender mainstreaming (Lombardo and Meier, 2008; Lombardo and Rolandsen Agustin, 2016). However, despite the reference in the footnote to intersectionality, the overall understanding of gender equality and gender in the EU stayed predominantly binary referring to women and men as also noted in Chapter 3. Accordingly, gender is defined by GES 2020 as "*the socially constructed roles, behaviours, activities and attributes that a given society considers appropriate for women and men*" (European Commission, 2020b, p. 1). Nevertheless, it is also important to highlight that while the document is titled gender equality strategy and the highlighted quote also suggested that GES 2020 is directed action towards equality for both men and women, the text is clearly focused on women's empowerment as well as gender-based violence specifically against women.

Despite of the dominantly internal focus of the GES 2020, the document is significant in terms of understanding how the EU views itself as an international actor vis-à-vis gender equality around the world. GES 2020 is relevant for EU gender mainstreaming practices reinforcing the liberal feminist conceptualization of gender equality and gender mainstreaming as a core identity of the EU as the strategy informs both internal and external gender mainstreaming efforts in the EU. With reference to EU bodies and institutions the document directly provides the conceptualization and guidelines for internal gender mainstreaming for the EEAS and EU missions and operations, specifically reinforcing the narrative on equity referred to as "gender parity" in the strategy (European Commission, 2020, 14). As also noted in subchapter 3.4. the Union understands gender balance as a part of gender mainstreaming efforts. Lastly, the strategy falls short on identifying the direct links and overlaps between the 2019 EU WPS Action Plan, which is only mentioned namely in the document referring to its continuing implementation by the EU. One of the possible explanations of this discrepancy can be the different institutional ownership over the strategy held by the Commission, while WPS related documents are authored by the EEAS. This institutional argument is reinforced by the fact that reference to GES 2020 was completely absent from the discussion with EEAS gender experts as well as gender advisors from missions during the interviews.

7.2.2   EU Gender Action Plan 2021-2025 (GAP III)

As was previously pointed out, while GAP III is titled as an action plan and has a more operational nature in terms of understanding gender mainstreaming as norm transfer, its strategic importance was made clear by being continuously referred to by several EU gender experts during the interviews. While the GES 2020 predominantly addresses overall gender equality issues with an internal focus, the GAP III is the specifically focused on the externalization of the EU gender equality efforts in CFSP and CSDP. This external focus is well reflected in the subtitle of the document 'An Ambitious Agenda for Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment in EU External Action'. GAP III and the GES 2020 have been adopted only a few months apart and both administered primarily by the European Commission. Nevertheless, GAP III being a joint communication between the Union, the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament in cooperation with the HP/VP reinforcing the strategic importance of the document. Somewhat clarifying the difference between the main focus of the GES 2020 and GAP III, while GES 2020 calls for a *"gender-equal Europe"*, the GAP III "*calls for a gender-equal world*" (European Commission, 2020a, p. 1). However, the Action Plan repeated the same avowal for gender equality as a core principle of the EU similar to the GES 2020 narrative. Additionally, it also reinforced the EU's self-conceptualization as a "*global front-runner in promoting gender equality*" in addition to the recognition of gender equality as a "*key political objective*" of the EU's external action (European Commission, 2020a, p. 1).

GAP III is a crucial document not only in terms of directing policy commitments of the EU and members states, but also further strengthening the contemporary glossary of EU gender mainstreaming in external action as an overall conceptualization of gender issues specifically in CFSP and CSDP. The document defines—similarly to GES 2020 mostly in footnotes—phrases like intersectional(ity), gender-responsive, gender-transformative, while focusing on five target areas:

1) making engagement "more effective";
2) "promoting strategic engagement" in all levels;
3) focused and targeted action alongside six key areas (gender-based violence; health and reproduction; economic and social rights; implementing the WPS agenda; green and digital solution for gender equality);
4) "leading by example";
5) reporting on and disseminating results (European Commission, 2020a, p. 2).

While GAP III specifically highlighted its external focus to achieve gender equality in the world, two out of the aforementioned five targeted actions are addressing internal gender mainstreaming issues. Similar to the primarily internal focus of GES 2020, GAP III addressed GM in external action by addressing several internal aspects, such as the aforementioned gender balance in CSFP. Connected to equal representation and gender parity, pillar 4. of GAP III referring to EU leading by example calling for an "*institutional cultural shift*", "*gender-responsive leadership*", as well as "*institutional capacity and ownership*" are all primarily internal elements (European Commission, 2020a, pp. 20–21).

GAP III also further legitimized gender mainstreaming as a norm transfer in EU external action through internal and external aspects. GAP III's focus on effectiveness started with one of the key policy objectives being making the action on gender mainstreaming "*more effective*". While effectiveness is not determined or defined in the 'EU gender mainstreaming glossary', the text demonstrated that the EU already sees itself as being effective on promoting gender equality in external action, but want to do "more", want to be "more effective". Moreover, GAP III repeatedly reinforced the gender issues equals women issues narrative in multiple ways similar to the discourse in GES 2020. This issue was historically present in EU focus on gender equality (Gracza Hornyák, 2024c; Lombardo and Meier, 2008). GAP III referred to the importance of engaging both boys and men for "*examining, questioning, and changing rigid gender norms and imbalances of power which disadvantage women and girls*" (European Commission, 2020a, p. 9). However, while the word 'women' appeared 196 times in the text, the word "men" were present in 15 cases out of which only one occasion acknowledged that men can also be victims of GBV by referring to conflict-related sexual violence, war crimes and crimes against humanity (European Commission, 2020a, p. 9). As such, the GAP III unintentionally reinforces the 'women as victims' and 'men as agents/perpetrators' dichotomy. While the framework of this dissertation does not allow elaborating on the different narratives specifically on sex and gender, it is one to be kept in mind in understanding what the EU means on gender equality.[67]

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[67] This "*problem of naming*" was and is in the centre of many gender equality related topics in the literature, including gender-based violence in different legal, linguistic and cultural settings. See e.g. Carbin, 2021; Gracza Hornyák, 2024.

Vis-à-vis the WPS implementation as one of the points on more targeted action, the GAP III touched upon the importance of "*targeted training for the military, justice and security forces*" without clarifying whether it refers to internal training for EU troops, personnel and experts or external training provided through CSDP missions and operations (European Commission, 2020a, p. 17). While overall practices showed emphasis put both on internal and external training requirements on gender to be reinforced and enhanced, the EU GAP III listing WPS related actions referred only to internal staff-related training elements, such as "*mandatory training on mainstreaming gender perspectives for all staff at HQ, EU delegations, CSDP missions and operations, etc*" (European Commission, 2020a, p. 18). Despite GAP III addressing EU external action, a number of specifically internal gender mainstreaming issues, such as the aforementioned mandatory trainings, are integral part of the document. Particularly determining the EU's action on "leading by example" and reporting and monitoring pillars, as well as several WPS implementation related elements, the integration of internal gender mainstreaming as a part of the normative self-conceptualization is heavily present in the text. While this derives from the internal-external implementation possibilities of gender mainstreaming, these are largely left unexplained both in GES 2020 and GAP III in terms of how internal and external gender mainstreaming efforts are integrated into internal EU focused actions (GES 2020) or specific external action elements (GAP III).

The language of GAP III is also rather permissive with only a very few cases or points of action are phrased with an imperative, non-negotiable phrasing. While the word *should* is present in the document 53 times—on average twice per page—actions wording with a *must* occur in five cases with only a single one using the word in an active way assigning a specific task (European Commission, 2020a). This instance under the pillar of "leading by example" asserts that "*EU leadership, including heads of EU delegations, must promote gender equality and women's empowerment as an integral part of their appointment and performance assessment, continuing to reinforce an institutional 'gender equality culture'.*" (European Commission, 2020a, p. 21). While this, uniquely imperative element in the document referred to an internal gender mainstreaming task, specifically staffing, it addressed EU personnel and leadership individually.

In contrast with the latter, another vital element of the internal gender mainstreaming efforts, namely the ownership of individual member states addressed

very differently in the document. In spite of gender mainstreaming being referred to as a "*responsibility of all*" in GAP III, referring to the ownership of EU member states the document returned to the permissive language noting that "*Member States are encouraged to join*" the effort of promoting gender equality in EU external action (European Commission, 2020a, p. 4). While this is not present in the text, but this permissive language as well as the 'encouragement' of member states is a result of "*diverging priorities between a couple of more progressive Member States and then couple of more conservative Member States*" on gender and "*that's why we also see that the Gender Action Plan was only agreed with Presidency Conclusions and not Council Conclusion*" (Interviewee 8°, 2024). As this EU official also explained these political challenges of strategizing gender mainstreaming are not to publicize directly; "*It's mentioned when necessary, but I mean this kind of like division within the EU on gender equality is something that's should not be too publicly out there*" (Interviewee 8°, 2024). This evidence suggests that while the EU faces internal challenges with regards to gender mainstreaming beyond the aforementioned staffing issue, GAP III is still considered one of the most important strategic documents on EU gender mainstreaming in external action also reinforced by several interviews.

7.2.3 The EU Strategic Approach and Action Plan for the Women, Peace and Security Agenda.

As the previous subchapter highlighted, the implementation of the WPS agenda was part of both the provisions of GES 2020 and GAP III. The WPS normative framework has been part of EU external action since 2005 when the first documents were adopted to localize it to the EU context. Although WPS had its own policy development curve since then in the EU, the current strategic framework of documents suggested that WPS has been integrated into the overall EU external action framework with staying a relatively unique element of gender mainstreaming in CSFP and CSDP. In addition to being the part of both GES 2020 and GAP III, two other strategic documents about the implementation of the WPS agenda were also integrated into EU gender mainstreaming in external action: the EU Strategic Approach to Women, Peace and Security Agenda from 2018 and EU Action Plan for the Women, Peace and Security (hereinafter: WPS Action Plan).

WPS related documents of the European Union are part of the historic legacy of regional EU-focused implementation of UNSCR 1325 and 1820 described in Subchapter 7.1. While the EU Strategic Approach to WPS agenda succeeding the

Comprehensive Approach from 2008 provides a guiding framework, the newest WPS Action Plan intends to ensure operationalization of the strategic objectives on WPS pillars in the EU. Moreover, the early EU action on WPS from 2005 and the network of WPS action plans born since the early 2000's globally and regionally predestined the EU to further build on its previous action in line with its normative self-conceptualization. This is important because having a WPS action plan (or action plans) and being the part of the WPS *"policy ecosystem"* have become an indication of being a normative international actor in the 21st century (Kirby and Shepherd, 2021, p. 2, 2016). Beyond this external influence of the WPS framework some interviewees expressed an internal motivation behind keeping the WPS line in parallel with the existing GAP III provisions due to the previously highlighted political debates on gendered language vis-à-vis GAP III. WPS—as also emphasized by an EU official—is supported by all member states, "*but when it comes to gender equality, it's a bit of a different here (...) important to know that the background on it, that there is not an equal footing of both agendas*" (Interviewee 8°, 2024).

The aforementioned 'less divisive' nature of WPS also makes it important to understand how this normative framework is integrated into overall gender mainstreaming and how it contributes to the norm diffusion through CSFP and CSDP. While the previous Comprehensive Approach on Women, Peace and Security from 2008 only covered UNSCR 1325 and 1820, the current EU Strategic Approach to WPS from 2018 integrated the measures and topics of the eight WPS resolution adopted between 2000 and 2015. This inherently means that the last two resolution of the WPS agenda adopted in 2019, UNSCR 2467 (2019), and UNSCR 2493 (2019) are yet to be integrated fully into the Strategic Approach framework. In terms of political-strategic significance, the 2018 WPS Strategic Approach was a milestone in EU-led WPS implementation efforts as it was adopted through the as conclusions of the Council, which, while not being legally binding, it represents an important political-strategic guidance in the EU (Council of the European Union, 2024b; European Commission, 2023). The institutional ownership with the establishment of the EEAS in 2011 also meant significant changes between the Comprehensive and the Strategic Approaches, the latter being already fully elaborated by the EEAS. Incorporating all but two WPS resolutions, the EU Strategic Approach was a significant step in EU CSDP as it reinterpreted WPS implementation in the framework of contemporary EU strategic documents and security environment addressed in the EU Global Strategy adopted in

2016. For instance the Strategic Approach locates WPS as a part of the Integrated approach, as a guiding element of EU external action laid down in the EU Global Strategy (Council of the European Union, 2018a). With regards to the WPS Strategic Approach document some interviewees expressed that at the time of the writing the EUGDD is working on the extension of its time frame until 2027 in order to line it up with the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). MFF is the most important financial planning framework for the EU budget which is always determined and adopted for a six-year period since the Lisbon Treaty (European Parliament, 2024c).

While none of the four strategic documents address or claim priority over the other, there is a tacit, *de facto* hierarchy between these strategies suggesting that gender mainstreaming in external action in the EU is part of the overall gender equality strategy. Several guiding principles as well as action points overlap in GAP III and in the WPS Action Plan due to the nature of the documents. One of them is "leading by example", which is both referred to as a principle and as an action point (European Commission, 2020a, p. 17). In comparison to the GES 2020 and the GAP, the EU Strategic approach to WPS agenda is slightly more balanced in terms of referring to men apart from identifying them as stakeholders of change. The 82-page long document mentioned men (and boys) 44 times and referred to them as victims of conflict-related gender-based violence or being negatively affected by societal gender norms in nine cases. Nevertheless, the "*engage men and boys as positive agents for change*" narrative is still present seven times in the document (Council of the European Union, 2018a, p. 3). Moreover, in terms of training as an internal gender mainstreaming tool in the heart of EU policies, the WPS Strategic Approach uses the same wording for taking action on training of uniformed personnel as a "specific measure" similar way to GAP III (Council of the European Union, 2018a, p. 4; European Commission, 2020a, p. 17).

An important element of the narrative presiding over both GAP III and the EU Strategic Approach on WPS is the repeated use of gender equality and gender mainstreaming directly together with women's empowerment in relevant documents. As previously noted, this discursive practice reinforced the agency of men and the victimization of women in the strategic documents. Nevertheless, the EU Strategic Approach, again demonstrating a somewhat more inclusive discourse, acknowledged the question and importance of agency oftentimes directly using the word agency vis-à-vis women, which phrase and wording is completely missing from GAP III. This

intention was also reinforced by an EU official stating that "*we have the women and the victim's role usually. And that's not where we want to keep them, because also the conflict related sexual violence can affect men*" (Interviewee 8°, 2024). In accordance with this intention, while the WPS agenda specifically aims at focusing on women and girls in war and armed conflict, the WPS-related documents are more balanced in referring to women and men both as agents and victims trying to step away from the men as agent vs. women victim dichotomy which is repeatedly present in the overall gender equality discourse of the EU, especially in the Gender Equality Strategy and GAP III. This is especially concerning considering the fact that the Strategic Approach was adopted in December 2018, while the GES and GAP are more recent documents from 2020 and 2021, which shows the EEAS authored document being more inclusive then the jointly adopted strategies in the hierarchy. However, different institutional ownership—as argued previously—can be an explanatory variable for such differences.

Finally, the fourth document framing the strategic level framework of gender mainstreaming in the Union, specifically in the realm of security and defence policy is the EU Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security (2019-2024) (see Table 7.). The document is authored by the EEAS and was then adopted and redistributed to the EU delegation as the conclusion of the Council, one of the highest priority and decision-making documents in the Union. The latter further reinforces the argument that while the nature of the WPS Action Plan is rather operational, from the perspective of CSFP and CSDP it has strategic significance and influence on political-strategic and military-strategic decisions, specifically in missions and operations.

The WPS Action Plan serves dual purposes: while the document explicitly implies that it "*complements and reinforces*" GAP III and ensures the implementation of the EU Strategic Approach, existing global trends on WPS implementation suggest another purpose (European External Action Service, 2019). Since the first national action plans were adopted in 2005 and 2006 on WPS, the EU has become one of the first international actor adopting a regional implementation plan. Countries traditionally investing in gender equality has been adopting and renewing action plans on Women, Peace and Security, some of them currently working with their third or fourth NAP for WPS implementation (Biddolph and Shepherd, 2022). In parallel, critical scholars in the field of Security Studies have been using the WPS action plans individually as "gender lens" to look at conflict, or to address how the gender

perspective "should be mainstreamed" in governance or state building[68]. In other words: the WPS—as a *"reproducing ecosystem"*—has reconstructed the discourses as a on what gender equality is in war, armed conflict and peacekeeping, while the adoption and renewal of national action plans have become an important indicator for being a normative actor in international politics (Kirby and Shepherd, 2021). Accordingly, in this "ecosystem", an updated WPS action plan is the *de facto* prerequisite to be recognized as a global leader in gender equality; a goal clearly stated in GAP III. The latter not only suggests that the EU as an international (security) provider is "leading by example" in gender mainstreaming, but also reinforces the EU normative self-conceptualization to support other partners adopt and implement their own national action plans, which was the case for example in EU Training Mission Mali (EUTM Mali, 2021).

The EU WPS Action Plan provided a glimpse into how the EU personalized WPS implementation, but its ambitions went well beyond regional implementation. While WPS action plans, specifically national action plans are primarily aimed at localizing the four main WPS pillars[69] the action plan reinforced the internal and external elements of making the EU a global gender champion and explained the way WPS and broader gender equality is promoted through gender mainstreaming. Accordingly, EU WPS Action Plan equally addressed internal and external gender mainstreaming efforts, both aiming at making the EU "more effective" and better leader in gender equality and operationalizing how to externalize and use this leadership role. This is reflected in the six objectives of the Action Plan being the four WPS pillars complemented with the "leading by example", as an *"institutional cultural shift"*, and gender mainstreaming (European External Action Service, 2019, p. 5). The subsequent operational part of the document broke down the six objectives into several indicators determining short, medium or long-term goals for each indicator as well as the responsible(s) for implementation, including missions and operations (European External Action Service, 2019).

Lastly, there is an additional document which are to be mentioned, which was highlighted as a highly relevant guiding framework for WPS issues in the EU, the 2022 Council Conclusions on Women, Peace and Security. As one EU official noted, the

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[68] see, e.g. Shepherd, 2021; Cohn et al., 2004; Olonisakin et al. (ed), 2011;
[69] the four pillars of the WPS agenda are: relief and recovery, protection, participation, and prevention

2022 Council Conclusions on WPS together with GAP III is "*the EU language on Women, Peace and Security, when it also comes to those emerging security challenges, when it comes to the shifting geopolitical environment*" (Interviewee 8°, 2024). This is important to mention as the Strategic Approach on WPS and the WPS Action Plan were both built on the 2018 Council Conclusions on WPS, which were then superseded by the newer 2022 Council Conclusions despite the strategic documents are still in place. The extension of the EU Strategic Approach would not only make it possible for the EU to align it with the MFF, but to integrate the 2022 Conclusions and reflect on the changing geopolitical environment also highlighted in EUSC in the previous chapter.

7.3   CSDP missions and operations: effectiveness and gender mainstreaming

EU CSDP missions and operations were part of the consultation process of drafting and creating the EU Strategic Approach to WPS, as well as being responsible for the implementation of the WPS Action Plan. This was made possible by the ownership and authorship of EEAS over these two documents, while larger, more general strategies, such as the GES, are less likely to benefit from the direct input of personnel serving in CSDP missions and operations. In the realm of CSDP, especially in military missions and operations, ensuring effectiveness is in the forefront of the EEAS policies, as well as the whole Union. Nevertheless, words "effective" or "effectiveness" are more likely to be present in WPS-related texts with EEAS having a larger share in authorship (see Table 8.) However, this is not specifically an EU or EEAS specific language, but rather the influence of the overall liberal-normative international framework constructed by the Women, Peace and Security agenda through resolutions and discourses around 'effective implementation' (Shepherd, 2021).

Strategic Document	Number of times "effective" or "effectiveness" words present in the text	Lenght of the document (with
EU Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025	7	19
EU Gender Action Plan for External Action 2021-2025	4	22
EU Strategic Approach to Women, Peace and Security Agenda 2018	37	81
EU Action Plan for the Women, Peace and Security Agenda 2019-2024	7	13

Table 8. Mentions of the words effective or effectiveness in gender mainstreaming documents connected to EU external action.

Vis-à-vis EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, and more specifically the CSDP, the Union's liberal-normative approach is paired with military intervention and military power, often associated with more realist or legalist viewpoints and arguments.[70] In the current state of EU external action different approaches on military intervention and using military instruments—either of executive and non-executive nature—are cross-fertilized with the Union's unique approach and self-inflicted role to mainstreaming gender equality based on liberal feminist ideals both internally and externally. This is the result of the legal-normative foundation and argumentation of gender equality in the EU constitutional treaties as well as previously highlighted effect of the WPS ecosystem.

In EU SFA missions—or non-executive military missions—and in mission theatres, gender mainstreaming is further translated into top-down and bottom-up approaches, such as training individual soldiers or advising the highest governmental bodies and institution in the security sector architecture, such as ministries of defence (see Figure 12.). This is the empirical-practical implication of EU gender mainstreaming in SFA missions. As previously argued, non-executive military training missions in the framework of CSDP provide the Union with a unique opportunity to institutionalize its role as a security provider through training partner forces. This argument is built on the EU's own self-conceptualization with regards to its normative, unique identity where gender mainstreaming is the part of all policies and actions, including security force assistance.

As visualized in Figure 12., gender mainstreaming in SFA is conceptually considered being the part of external gender mainstreaming through the integration of a gender perspective and WPS principles into the work of these missions. However, while the overall framework is considered to be part of external gender mainstreaming primarily focusing on relations with the partner countries and their stakeholders, including training and education on gender issues for their troops, EU SFA also incorporates internal gender mainstreaming elements in order for the Union to reinforce its normative role concept. The responsibilities of gender advisors also reinforce that while SFA is considered conceptually part of external gender mainstreaming, GENADs are tasked with promoting gender equality and ensuring the

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[70] See example of comparing different approaches to military intervention by Yoshihara, S. 2010. Waging war to make peace: U.S. intervention in global conflicts. Praeger Security International.

implementation of WPS principles inside of the mission as well. These internal duties are to ensure that the mission delivers on the implementation of GAP III and WPS Action Plan indicators, as well as creating and monitoring the "*proper procedures in case there would be a cases of harassment*" (Interviewee 8°, 2024; Interviewee 26°, 2024).

Figure 12. Complementary nature of external gender mainstreaming in EU training missions, 2021

While the internal and external dimensions of EU gender mainstreaming are somewhat identifiable from the strategic documents, clear differentiation or explanation of how these two angles are immensely interconnected, or how are they translated into actions specifically in CSDP missions and operations stay largely unaddressed. The new position, however, provided a much broader portfolio to the EU ambassador on Gender and Diversity promoting a more intersectional approach which is largely absent from the strategic documents discussed in the previous subchapter. With such institutional changes, as well as acknowledging the need for harmonizing internal and external gender mainstreaming efforts were closely connected to the idea(l) of effectiveness both in civilian and military missions, still, the ambivalent nature of the tasks deriving from the strategies and the institutions paired for their implementation and monitoring leaves effectiveness hardly likely. In addition to the latter, the EEAS responsible for CSDP missions and operations, has yet to conceptualize or define effectiveness, or to create a clear system for measuring it. Moreover, there is currently no identification on how internal and external effectiveness is defined or differentiated within the EEAS. As Chapter 6. found, with

regards to CSDP missions and operations they are rather are continuously evaluated and monitored with the six months reviews and strategic reviews instead of being measured to already set indicators. These ambiguities leave the effectiveness-focused discourse on gender mainstreaming in the EU external action rather empty, whether aiming to making something "effective" or "more effective". As previously noted, quoted Jobbágy (2021), this approach to effectiveness can be rather unhelpful with regards to military activities, such as military CSDP missions.

Despite lacking clarity on what effective(ness) is and how to achieve it, EU narratives connecting gender mainstreaming to the effectiveness of CSDP, including missions and operations, are frequently present both official formal and informal communications, documents, or press materials. The ownership of this narrative lies with the EEAS being the one responsible specifically for implementing CSFP and CSDP. Commission authored, but jointly communicated Gender Action Plan III, for instance, does not draw a link between gender mainstreaming and external effectiveness, but rather focuses on making gender mainstreaming itself "more effective" (European Commission, 2020a). GES 2020 and GAP III primarily applied the right-based argument for gender mainstreaming which is in-line with liberal-normative ideological framework the EU follows. In contrast with the GAP III, the WPS Strategic Approach clearly reinforced the functionalist arguments and asserted that "*a strengthened commitment to gender equality and women's empowerment in the EU's activities can improve their efficiency and effectiveness*" (Council of the European Union, 2018a, p. 24). Most mentions in the document refers to gender mainstreaming or the promotion of the WPS agenda contributing to conflict resolution and peacebuilding addressing overall CSDP processes but does not specifically focus on security force assistance as an ever-emerging part of EU external action. The Strategic Approach to WPS being adopted in 2018 must be considered and interpreted in the framework of current EU trends in CSDP, which are more and more frequently lean towards the application of some form of military power, such as security force assistance missions as it was argued in the previous chapters. Previous heavy reliance on civilian CSDP tools, like civilian missions with peacebuilding focus, and the changing security dynamics in the European region, specifically the war in Ukraine, has shifted the pivot of EU security and defence policy towards security cooperation and military CSDP instruments (Gracza Hornyák, 2024a).

This suggests that the higher level a policy document is adopted, the more the argumentation relies on the right-based approach, including constitutional foundations of gender equality, such as the Treaties. In contrast with these, the newest military CSDP documents are more balanced in emphasizing both aspects and dedicate specific provisions to the functionalist argument of gender mainstreaming as a contribution to operational effectiveness. Higher level official documents are less likely to explicitly mention the link between gender mainstreaming and the effectiveness of CSDP missions and operations, while other forms of official communications, such as guidelines, or specifically press releases and other heavily media-oriented and public accounts use it rather often. For instance, guiding document authored by the commander of control structure of the civilian CSDP missions, the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability stated that "*the starting point is that gender mainstreaming does contribute to the effectiveness and impact of CSDP Missions, and hence to mandate deliver*" (Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability, 2018, p. 1). Furthermore, the EU military CSDP missions and operations also seemed to reiterate the functionalist arguments. EUNAVFOR Med Irini, the Union's naval operation in the Mediterranean repeatedly reinforced the narrative over gender mainstreaming's contribution to effectiveness in CSDP with noting "*the importance of gender perspectives for the operational effectiveness of CSDP missions and operations*" and stating that "*the correlation between equal treatment and involvement in military missions and operations and increased operational effectiveness has been identified long time ago*" (EUNAVFOR Med Irini, 2023).

Another specifically military CSDP-related press release reporting on the establishment of the Missions and Operations Gender Monitoring Team by the EU Military Staff highlights gender perspective as an "*essential component*" of CSDP effectiveness and specifically diversity as an element enhancing the effectiveness of missions and operations (European External Action Service, 2022d). While existing literature on such link between gender mainstreaming and mission/ operational effectiveness—either in or outside of the EU CSDP structure—often reinforced this narrative strongly displayed in EU discourses, these articles or policy papers are frequently state the correlation without referencing the source, similarly to the EU practices (see e.g. Kaski, 2021). Nevertheless, most recently, a study based on evidence collected through interviews with EU and EEAS personnel indicated that "*there has been a lack of integrated monitoring and evaluation, including of how gender and*

WPS policies and activities have improved the effectiveness of missions and the situation of women and men within, and of those who interact with, the missions." (Salzinger and Desmidt, 2023, p. 21). The latter finding also demonstrated that despite the clear narrative on EU gender mainstreaming contributing to the effectiveness of CSDP missions and operations, staff working either in Brussels in mission headquarters or on the ground has also been questioning on the narrative due to the lack of evidence. This leads me back to my earlier argument on how the current strategic framework on gender mainstreaming reflects poorly on the contemporary realities of CSDP with more focus on military instruments, security cooperation and security force assistance. Currently neither the conceptualization nor the discourses heavily present in EU external action show evidence on gender mainstreaming contributing to effectiveness in the prevailing institutional and strategic framework.

Lastly, at the time of the writing of this dissertation the EU has adopted several new specifically military CSDP-related documents, namely the EUMS Standard Operating Procedure Gender Expertise and Networking 2022 (SOP); EUMS Gender Action Plan 2022; the Operational Guidance on Gender Mainstreaming in the military CSDP 2022; and the European Union Military Concept on Integrating a Gender Perspective in Military CSDP 2024 (EU Military Concept on gender, 2024) (see in Appendix 5.). These documents were the results of identifying the absence of operational documents helping military CSDP missions and operations to integrate gender mainstreaming better into their planning day-to-day functioning.

While all four documents brought new impetus to the operationalization of gender mainstreaming in military CSDP, the most important document was the Military Concept adopted in 2024 June. As one of the penholders of this document also highlighted, the essentiality of the concept came from the fact that "*it was discussed in the Council, so it actually became a document from the EU Military Committee and that means that it's been really explicitly approved by the Member States*" (Interviewee 26°, 2024). As another EU expert asserted that this document meant that now there is a "*hook for every single mission and operation and the gender advisors there in particular to tell their leadership on the ground like 'it's just agreed by Member States', 'this is agreed by your military representatives in the Military Committee in Brussels'. So, 'this is Member States will, and you have to deliver on that'*" (Interviewee 8°, 2024). The EU Military Concept on gender started to refer to all aforementioned documents, including WPS resolutions, the 2022 Council

Conclusions, GAP III, the EU Strategic Approach to WPS as well as the Strategic Compass. As such, with the adoption of this document the Union, for the first time, synthesized all existing primarily external focused EU documents on gender and or WPS and well as argued for the integration of a gender perspective in military CSDP based on both the functionalist and legal/normative arguments. Five main reasons are listed in further details for gender mainstreaming: the protection of civilians; human security; situational awareness; legitimacy and credibility; and leading by example (Council of the European Union, 2024c).

7.4 Chapter conclusion

Contemporary strategic framework of EU gender mainstreaming clearly indicated that gender equality is a core element of the Union's self-conceptualization. Gender equality being a fundamental, constitutional value of the EU is also reinforced by the legal/normative or right-based approach often argued by EU strategic documents, such as the GES 2020 and GAP III. While the functionalist argument building on the understanding of gender mainstreaming as a contribution to operational effectiveness was somewhat also present in these two high level documents, both WPS-related strategic documents were more likely to invoke this argument in contrast with the legal/normative ones. Additionally, further studied operational documents, especially newest military CSDP related ones, such as the EU Military Concept on gender from 2024 seemed to balance out the two approaches. This suggest that the political-strategic level uses primarily the right-based argumentation building on the Treaties and the constitutional nature of gender equality as a norm in the EU, while document of more operational nature a more likely to cite the link between gender mainstreaming and operational effectiveness or most recently building on both equally.

Furthermore, the discourse analysis showed that while the EU repeatedly acknowledged that there is more to do on gender equality, the EU as a normative power coincides with the Union's self-conceptualization in international politics; accordingly, the EU "leading by example" is an inherent part of the role performance as an international security provider with both internal and external implications in CFSP and CSDP. This reinforced the EU's self-conceptualization as a normative actor through the NPE process, in which the EU is trying to "walk the talk"; not only being a normative power but actively promoting the norm of gender equality through both internal and external aspects of gender mainstreaming. Leading by example as an

internal aspect of gender mainstreaming could also be understood by the concept of "procedural normative ethics" by Manners, which "*requires first the EU to turn itself into a virtuous example by applying the same principles at home. Consistency between home and abroad would ensure that the EU is not hypocritical in promoting norms*" (Manners, 2008, p. 55; Whitman, 2011a, p. 8). In line with this thinking, the chapter found that gender mainstreaming in external action and the Union's normative self-conceptualization is one of the main catalysator for internal norm promotion efforts with the goal of the EU living up to its own expectations being a gender equality champion and lead by example. As EU official put it "*we'll have to start with breaking those stereotypes in our very own rank and the units actually and with our very own staff, who we deploy*" (Interviewee 8°, 2024).

The conceptualization of EU gender equality and gender mainstreaming is limited and constrained for three main reasons: 1. the fundamentals of the gender mainstreaming policy is building on the EU law through different articles of EU Treaties, which are highly likely to stay untouched; 2. the same or very similar concepts are used by different EU bodies and institutions which are mutually reinforcing each other including the realm of CSDP as well. 3. lastly: the conceptualization itself is deriving from the predominantly Liberal Feminist thought which leaves intersectionalities largely unaddressed also reinforced by the international normative framework built around the Women, Peace and Security agenda. The latter also contributes to the fact that while both EU strategic documents and existing practices are trying to move away from the "gender = women" narrative, the overall discourse keep reinforcing the EU approach being equal to what Dharmapuri described as "*add women and stir*" (Dharmapuri, 2011). All four primary sources on contemporary EU gender mainstreaming policies and strategies reinforced this narrative with articulating gender perspective and women's empowerment together while often referring to 'men and boys' only as agents to be 'engaged' for gender equality. However, in contrast with GES 2020 and GAP III, WPS related strategic documents were more likely to move away from this dichotomy and address gender-based violence in war and conflict as not only a 'women's issue'.

Moreover, strategic documents on gender mainstreaming do not work with one single definition on gender equality, but rather mutually reinforce the constitutional value and nature of gender equality in the EU. In different texts, gender equality is labelled as "*a core value of the EU*", a "*key political objective*" (European

Commission, 2020a, p. 2), or "*a principle that flows through the engagements of all EU Institutions in all their internal and external activities and it is mainstreamed throughout the different stages of EU policies, strategies, action plans and projects on development, humanitarian aid, education, migration, etc.*" (Council of the European Union, 2018a, p. 6). As previously highlighted normative considerations are often present hand-in-hand or interchangeably with right-based approaches, referring to international law, and arguing that gender equality is "*a universally recognised human right*" (European Commission, 2020a, p. 2) or directly building on the EU Treaties as the fundamental legal instruments guiding the Union's actions.

Moreover, despite of its reinforced focus on external action, GAP III does not connect gender mainstreaming neither to CSDP effectiveness in general or that of missions and operations but rather focusing on reinforcing the EU's normative self-conceptualization gender equality as a core element of its identity. In contrast with GAP III, specifically EEAS authored documents tend to repeatedly use the functionalist argument on gender mainstreaming contributing to mission effectiveness either referring to CSDP in a broader context or its specific elements. This chapter found that while the narrative on gender mainstreaming contributing to mission effectiveness is a frequently used one, these arguments lack two main elements for legitimacy: a clear conceptualization of effectiveness, including its internal and external dimensions, and possible measuring tools in EU external action; and empirical evidence proving the link between the two variables.

Additionally, the internal-external aspect vis-à-vis gender mainstreaming was—with a very few examples—were always present in both strategic documents and other discourses, such as interviews. However, the framing of what is external and what is internal and the nexus between the two pillars of gender mainstreaming were often missing from the examined discourse samples. Despite both GES 2020 and GAP III had an alleged internal or external dominant focus when it comes to gender equality norm promotion, their strategic priorities and target areas addressed both internal and external aspects. This can be explained by the very nature of gender mainstreaming horizontal—or with the common phrase used by the EU, cross-cutting—and as such also internal and external at the same time. While the internal aspect was often connected to achieving gender balance or internal gender-based discrimination, gender mainstreaming externally is often focused at promoting liberal/democratic ideals about gender equality and gender roles in a society. This latter is the case even if the recipient

or beneficiary state has an inherently different cultural, religious or societal structure which goes well beyond the democracy vs. non-democracy dichotomy.

Lastly, the chapter reinforced both the constitutional nature of gender equality as a norm in the EU and the WPS effect in mainstreaming gender equality in CSFP and CSDP as initial research propositions of this dissertation. Nevertheless, it did not fully confirm that EU member states experiences in Afghanistan or Iraq where the gender perspective was first institutionalized impacted the discourse on gender mainstreaming contributing to operational effectiveness. While many interviewees mentioned especially the Swedish and Dutch lessons learned in Afghanistan and Iraq as important in articulating the contribution the gender perspective to the effectiveness of military operations in general this anecdotical evidence was completely missing from EU strategic documents.

8   EUTM Somalia and EUTM Mozambique

Previous chapters looked at how the EU self-conceptualizes as an international security provider through a dominantly normative role concept and explored what makes EU-led security force assistance. Moreover, Chapter 7. studied gender mainstreaming as a norm transfer deriving from the Union's predominantly normative self-concept. Building on these previous chapters as well as largely primary sources, such as EU documents and semi-structured interviews, this comparative chapter analyses how this normative role concept and norm transfer impacts two ongoing EU-led security force assistance missions. The chapter compares the EU's oldest standing and very first SFA mission, EUTM Somalia with EUTM Mozambique established in 2021, as a second-generation EU SFA mission.

While the analysis of the political-historic context of the two case study countries, Somalia and Mozambique, is not the main focus of this dissertation, two brief chronological tables were created in order to facilitate this research (see Appendix 7. on Somalia and Appendix 8. on Mozambique). Additionally, building on these chronological tables, separate subchapters introduce the political security context as the areas of operations of EU SFA missions before moving on to the overview of the missions themselves. Following the latter, subsequent parts briefly outline gender relations and gender equality in the two countries. Subchapter 1.1.3 and 1.2.3. engages in a detailed analysis of EUTM Somalia and EUTM Mozambique looking at their role performance and role impact, including practices with regards to impact assessment based on the EU model of SFA detailed in Chapter 6. Lastly, subchapters are dedicated to specific gender mainstreaming practises in the respective missions. These primarily build on the aforementioned primary sources, such as interviews with mission personnel to explore how the EU links gender mainstreaming and operational effectiveness in SFA. The chapter closes with a comparative analysis between EUTM Somalia and EUTM Mozambique as a conclusion.

8.1   EUTM Somalia

"*We are also a complicated society, and we are trying to position ourselves between the West and the East, you know, but we are part of the Arab world, for example we are also part of the Arab League. Another thing is that as a nomadic society, our lives depend on the camels. And many times, in an indirect way, Europeans*

perceive that as a kind of barbaric way of living. It is kind of a clash of cultures, but this is how our ancestors lived" (Interviewee 9°, 2024).

8.1.1 *Political and security context of SFA in Somalia*

Somalia has gain independence in 1960 from its former colony, Italy, while Somaliland stayed under British protectorate until the 1991 when it declared its independence (Chuter et al., 2016). The post-independence period in Somalia was characterized by the decades-long regime of Siad Barre between 1969-1991 (Reno, 2018) (see also Appendix 7.). While this era meant continuity in leadership, Somalia experienced several inter-state conflicts during and after it collapsed in 1991 (Chuter et al., 2016). As Reno asserted "*clan-based militias played a central role in the political strategy of the last pre-collapse president, Siad Barre (1969–1991), and are important elements of the contemporary political scene*" (Reno, 2018, p. 499). This "*clanocracy*" and "*mosaic of power*" characterizing Somali politics live on after the Barre regime, including the two self-declared, *de facto* independent provinces in the north, Somaliland and Puntland (Ainashe, 2023; Reno, 2018).

The Somali Civil War in the 90's was also the result of this mosaic of power compelling the international community to take action with two UN-led peacekeeping operations UNISOM I (1992-1993) and UNISOM II (1993-1995), and an operations under the US-led United Task Force (UTF) between 1991-1995 (Hettyey, 2011; Marsai, 2020; Nagy, 2020). In spite of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) being established in 2000 the fragmentation of power and the invasion of Somalia by Ethiopia left the country in a continuous low-intensity civil war since then. While the TFG enjoyed rather wide-range external legitimacy being recognized also by the UN and the majority of its member states, it largely lacked internal legitimacy which further contributed to the destabilization of the Somali state structures (Hettyey, 2011). The 2000's brought the raise of the Islamist armed group, al-Shabaab which core was established by Somalis returning from Afghanistan, including al-Qaeda members. Al-Shabaab has rather quickly gained momentum building on the power vacuum left behind after international peacekeeping efforts and by 2008 ruled most of Somalia's South-Central regions including the capital until 2011 (Marsai, 2020). The international community this time answered with the deployment of a 20.000 troops-strong African Union peacekeeping mission, the AU Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) in 2007 to tackle the advance of al-Shabaab in the country. AMISOM forces were able

to recapture Mogadishu in 2011 enabling the TFG to relocate and elections to be held (Hettyey, 2011) (see Appendix 7.).

Map 1. Map of Somalia federal member states and provinces, May 11ᵗʰ 2021,
Source: Italian Institute for International Political Studies,
https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/somalia-states-and-regions-30387

With Mogadishu being retaken, the TFG was able to move back to the capital providing a window of opportunity to start building government institutions, including the defence sector and the SNA (Reno, 2018). In 2012, a new parliament was set-up and the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) was formed under the presidency of Hassan Sheik Mohamud which shortly after was recognized by the US and several EU member states (Ainashe, 2023). However, with the existence of the FGS corruption in Somalia has not ceased to exist, or even decreased as the "*systematic misappropriation, embezzlement and outright theft of public resources have essentially become a system of governance, as private individuals, inside and outside the government, made personal demands on state resources that officials cannot resist, due to obligations of kinship or political clientage*" (Reno, 2018, p. 504). This was also reinforced by Somali interviewees estimating that at least 50% of any public money disappears in the current political climate (Interviewee 9°, Interviewee 17°, Interviewee 21°, 2024; see also Marsai, 2020).

Moreover, despite the initial successes of AMISOM forces in recapturing the capital and other, dominantly Southern territories, al-Shabaab demonstrated high-level or resilience to renew its forces. This again led to increasing international intervention, including US-led drone attacks on al-Shabaab leadership in the subsequent years

(Marsai, 2020; Appendix 7.). By the early 2020's, the proliferation of foreign actors, including those specifically present as SFA providers, has made Somalia as well as the broader Horn of Africa region "*ever more geopolitically crowded*" (Lanfranchi, 2023, p. 1). Nevertheless, more assistance did not automatically lead to a better or more stable security sector in Somalia. As one of the leading Somali think tanks, the Heritage Institute asserted in 2021 vis-à-vis the Somali Security Forces (SSF)—military, police and intelligence—that continuous international and regional efforts to stabilize the apparatus were unable to bring significant development; the SFF remained heavily fractured, politicized with overall low capabilities and resources (Heritage Institute, 2021).

The aforementioned is one of the main reasons why the previously planned withdrawal of AMISOM peacekeeping forces from Somalia in 2017 were delayed with more than a half decade (Williams, 2023, 2024a). Nevertheless, the mission started its transformation transitioning into African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) in 2022 while in late 2024 ATMIS is preparing to turn over its responsibilities to the newly set-up AU Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) in 2025 (Williams, 2024b, 2024c). This gradual withdrawal and the handover of forward operating bases (FOBs) and other essential infrastructure and capabilities from ATMIS to SNA provided new momentum for al-Shabaab again. As several sources reported—despite the ceremonial handovers and praising of Somali capabilities and development—the SNA was not able to hold these and al-Shabaab started to both regain its footing in Central Somalia and increase in numbers; this time in cooperation with Yemeni Houthis (Babb, 2024; Barnett, 2023; *Documentary*, 2023; Williams, 2024a, 2024c). These recent developments threaten with Somalia reproducing the Afghanistan withdrawal scenario (Williams, 2024a). As one of Somali interviewees also asserted "*My biggest fear is that I do not want Somalia becoming the next Afghanistan. The Europeans and Americans, they will never be there forever, like in Afghanistan. That is my fear actually. If that would happen there would be questions in the EU and in America, like why did we spend billions of euros or dollars, and then left?*" (Interviewee 9°, 2024).

Lastly, the lack of political reconciliation and the still existing heavy impact of aforementioned kinship-based clientelism continuously hindering overall SSR efforts in consolidating a federal state led by FGS. Additionally, the disagreement between federal member states (see Map 1.) also delays the compromise and subsequent

adoption of a federal constitution primarily dominated by the dispute over the jurisdiction of security forces under FGS in the self-declared independent provinces, Somaliland or Puntland (Interviewee 5°, 2023). This division further deteriorated after Somaliland's agreement with Ethiopia in the beginning of 2024 providing maritime access to the neighbouring country to the coastal areas (Dahir and Otieno, 2024; Williams, 2024a). The aforementioned circumstances including colonial history and kinship/clan-based power struggles also resulted in a distinct nature of the relationship between military and politics "*making the concept of civil-military relations one of limited usefulness*" (Chuter et al., 2016; see also Matisek, 2018). Somalia, while on a developmental curve in the last 10 years, it is still one of the most poorly governed African states further threatened by the gradual withdrawal of AU forces (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2024).

8.1.2 *Somalia as a theatre for gender mainstreaming*

While Somalia counts with a rather large and long-sustained international presence, it is one of the least documented countries with regards data, especially longitudinal and reliable datasets. In many datasets Somalia is the only country marked with blank or 'no data' (see e.g. Chuter et al., 2016). This problem can be attributed not only the long-standing effects of the civil war, conflict and fragile public administration, but the often misleading data provided by government authorities, such as the well-documented issues of 'ghost soldiers' in SNA (Heritage Institute, 2021). Similar relative absence of data is true with regards to different societal and gender equality indexes. However, the few datasets reporting on Somalia continuously have it ranked between the most dangerous places in the world for woman. A few examples are the Women, Peace and Security Index (WPS Index) ranking countries based on three categories: women's inclusion, justice, and security. In the 2023/2024 edition of the WPS index Somalia is ranked 169th place out of the 177 countries covered (Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security and Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2024). The Womanstats dataset based on data collected between 2010-2015 ranks Somalia in the so-called Syndrome scale between the countries where women lack physical security (Hudson et al., 2020). In the ordinal Syndrome scale[71], where

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[71] The Syndrome scale was created based on evidence gathered from 11 variables from women's property rights to societal sanctioning of femicide and son preference and argue that countries who ranks above 11 in the Syndrome scale are suffering from the "*Patrilinear/Fraternal Syndrome*", where male kinship groups are still the first and (almost only) security provision mechanism.

the higher a country is scaled the less physical security women have, Somalia has one of the highest scores (14). Lastly, the Ibrahim Index on African Governance in 2024 ranked Somalia in the last, 54th place between African nations with regards to its Women's Equality indicator (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2024).

Interviews—including those with Somali women (and men)—also reinforced the rather rigid gender roles in Somalia showing that women are subjected to discrimination not only because of their sex, but also because of dominantly clan-based differences. However, while existing quantitative data leaves little room for Somali women's agency—similar to GAP III and other EU documents building on the 'women victim vs. men agents' dichotomy—interviews outlined a more complex picture on gender roles in Somalia. While the first all-female media outlet's chief editor, Hinda Abdi Mohamoud highlighted that "*though we are different because of the regions that we are coming from, but in general I think that's the one thing that the community of Somalis they share is like not giving women a chance to lead, or to make decisions*", she further asserted that internal clan dynamics often further hinder women's aspirations in politics (Interviewee, 17, 2024). Interviews also touched upon how and where Somali women find agency in the current, complex power structures in a conflict-heavy environment. Farhia Mohamud, a Somali researcher, reflected on the relative invisibility of women's agency especially in wartime stating that "*Somali women are really the movers and shapers of this country. If it's not even acknowledged, for instance, we can talk about the Civil War. Although this country went into complete collapse, it was the mothers who helped children go to school, feed them and help reconciliation between the warlords and the clan militia and all that*" (Interviewee 21°, 2024). Mohamud also highlighted that this invisibility also contributed to Somali women being present in service roles in security sector, such as logistics, but also in intelligence. She further asserted that Somali women working in intelligence especially between 2017 and 2022 serving as informal and formal informants has become a source of employment for many women (Interviewee 21°, 2024).

However, not all women in intelligence are 'employed' by the government, as seeking income for their families, women often also serve as informants for al-Shabaab as well. "*There were a lot of areas, you know that the government controls right now, but what they [as in al-Shabaab] do before they leave that specific area, they meet with the women, they mobilize them and hire them as intelligence. So, when the government forces come in, and al-Shabaab leaves the area, also men flee from the area, so only*

the females are in that area, and everybody thinks that those are just mothers and, you know, having their children and all that. But most of them are reporting back to the group so that that is how things are mostly" (Interviewee 21°, 2024). This reinforces one of the main reasoning behind the contribution of gender mainstreaming and a gender perspective to military operations through enhanced intelligence and better interaction with the whole population, including "*just mothers*". This element was a key indicator for the creation of female engagement teams (FETs) and mixed-teams in Afghanistan and Iraq with the goal of interacting with local women, gain their trust and as a result has better intelligence, enhanced force protection and societal legitimization for the missions (Egnell and Alam, 2019). These aspects were also highlighted in a number of different interviews (Interviewees 7°, 8°, 14°, 16°, 20°, 22°, 23°, 25°, 26°, 2024).

Lastly, it is important to highlight that Somali gender roles and female agency is constantly subjected to changes primarily driven by international efforts, including the UN and the EU itself. The WPS effect highlighted in Chapter 7. as the footprint of international norm diffusion also reached Somalia not only through the direct UN impact, but also through norm transfer from the EU and EU member states. The FGS adopted its first WPS national action plan in 2022 through its Ministry of Women and Human Rights Development "*with the support of Government of Sweden through UN Women Somalia*" (UN Women, 2023). As one of the Somali interviewees also asserted the "*international community's pressure is really needed*" to advance gender equality, but many local male leaders communicate this as Western norm transfer, "*Western culture*" (Interviewee 21°, 2024). This also leads to the questions of what are the real chances for operationalization of a WPS national action plan in peacekeeping and conflict resolution by the FGS, which only has *de facto* jurisdiction over Somalia and where SSF, such as SNA, has little to no legitimacy in large territories, including Somaliland and Puntland. If WPS implementation is challenged even in countries with stable government and SSR structures not burdened by inter-state conflict what real impact can the 2022 Somali National Action Plan make. These questions are relevant especially as many interviewees international and local, Somalis expressed that in many aspects the main hindrance for development comes from within, from political elites (Interviewee 6, 2024; Interviewee 21°, 2024).

8.1.3   EUTM Somalia: mandate, impact and challenges

EU CSFP action in Somalia started in parallel with the Lisbon Treaty as a response to the multifaced problems the country—and the region—faced. The Horn of Africa as an important region on the doorstep of the South-East Mediterranean and an essential trade and maritime route was first addressed by EUNAVFOR Atalanta naval operation in 2008. Atalanta was followed by EUTM Somalia in 2010 and EUCAP Nestor, the predecessor of EUCAP Somalia civilian capacity building mission (see Appendix 7.). The Union also adopted its first regional action plan towards the Horn of Africa in 2011 in order to consolidate the different instruments deployed to the region (de Langlois, 2014; Soliman et al., 2012). Alongside these CSDP instruments, by the early 2010's the Union was present in Somalia with an EU delegation with three offices around the country as well as an EU special representative to Somalia. However, in these early years of EU action there was poor coordination between the instruments and a lack of visibility despite the multiple actors on the ground or the adoption of the 2011 action plan towards the Horn of Africa (de Langlois, 2014).

EUTM Somalia was initiated by HP/VP Javier Solana in the fall of 2009 as an EU answer to UNSCR 1872 (2009) and 1879 (2009) calling for technical assistance to the SNA in order to support the FGS of Somalia (Council of the European Union, 2010; Nagy, 2020). This was followed by the decision-making and operational planning process to eventually launch the mission in May 2010 with approximately 150 soldiers (de Langlois, 2014). While due to security concerns, EUTM was first located in Uganda, the timing of the deployment made sense from a policy perspective considering the fact that AMISOM—which has been enjoying EU support through APF—were able to drove out al-Shabaab from the capital. This provided momentum for the Somali government to start consolidating the security sector. EUTM was initially set-up in Bihanga Training Center (BTC) in Uganda as the Ugandan forces has already been training Somalis (Nagy, 2020). However, the EU's first training mission quickly faced not only its own deficiencies early on, but with the challenge of building a national army from scratch (Interviewee 2°, 2022; Interviewee 4°, 2024; Nagy, 2020). This was an important aspect as SFA is different in distinct contexts depending on whether the (re)building takes place in a country where historically there has been a national army ("Irregular Warfare Podcast," 2020). However, in the case of Somalia, there have never been a fully functioning, multiclan national army due to the clan-based nature of the Somali society and the Barre regime. "*Warfare was an*

occupation of young males, and in most African societies professional soldiers were unknown." (Chuter et al., 2016, p. 11). Therefore the lack of national army meant the absence of a professional, national army with civilian oversight based on Western ideals of civil-military relations.

As it was explained in Chapter 6., EUTM Somalia was characterized as the Union's *'first SSR mission dedicated to military training'* (Minard, 2017, p. 83). The mission was mandated to train the SNA; one of the three elements of the SSF alongside the Somali Police Force (SPF) and the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA). SNA is the largest element of the Somali national security apparatus with its estimated force number being between 11.000 and 24.000; however the number has been constantly changing and stayed largely unclear for a long time (Heritage Institute, 2021). While Somali sources, including the FGS often overestimate this number, most independent calculations assert that the actual number of soldiers in SNA is closer to 10.000 than 20.000 (Chuter et al., 2016; Heritage Institute, 2021; Reno, 2018). The ambiguity vis-à-vis number of SNA soldiers is most frequently attributed to the existence of '*ghost soldiers*', troops after whom the different SFA provider pay salaries, or per diems, but they only exist on paper. This has been a commonly cited problem with regards to SNA both in the literature and in interviews as well (Heritage Institute, 2021; Reno, 2018; Interviewee 5°, 2024; Interviewee 6°, 2023; Interviewee 12°, 2024).

During the first two mandates of EUTM Somalia—based on Council Decision 2010/96/CSFP and Council Decision 2011/483/CSFP (see Table 9. below)—was responsible for the basic training of SNA soldiers in BTC up to platoon level, and from 2011 included specialist trainings and instructors' trainings or the 'train the trainers' (TtT) approach was introduced (Interviewee 2°, 2022). However, the early focus was on the basic military training of relatively large number of trainees; in total 2000 soldiers in two 6-months-long training cycles (Nagy, 2020, p. 60). This initial effort was ambitious not only in terms of quantity of trainees, but for the EU's institutional structures as well. The first two mandates were commanded by Spain and subsequently Ireland in the framework of NATO C2 structures in the absence of a central EU command-and-control structure (Gracza Hornyák, 2024b; Nagy, 2020; see also in Chapter 6.). However, the biggest challenge EUTM personnel faced in this early stage was to provide the necessary infrastructure, per diems and salaries for the soldiers, as well as trying to filter underaged trainees and overcome language barriers (Interviewee

2°, 2022, Interviewee 4°, 2023). "*It's not only about delivering training, because to train a Somali soldier in Uganda, that Somali soldier needs to be first recruited in Mogadishu, medically checked in Mogadishu, then transported from Mogadishu to Uganda, then needs to be fed every day, to be accommodated*" (Interviewee 4°, 2023).

	1. mandate	2. mandate	3. mandate	4. mandate	5. mandate	6. mandate	7. mandate	8. mandate
Year	2010-2011	2011-2012	2013-2014	2015-2016	2017-2018	2019-2020	2021-2022	2023-2024
Council Decisions	Council Decision 2010/96/CFSP	Council Decision 2011/483/CFSP	Council Decision 2013/44/CFSP	Council Decision 2015/441/CFSP	Council Decision 2016/2239/CFSP	Council Decision 2018/1787/CFSP	Council Decision 2020/2032/CSFP	Council Decision 2022/2443/CSFP
Mission Command	Spain	Ireland	Italy	Italy	MPCC	MPCC	MPCC	MPCC
Force Command					Italy	Italy	Italy	Italy
Mandate	basic training up to platoon level	basic training up to PLT level - including specialist + instructors training (Train the trainers - TtT)	basic training up to PLT level - including specialist training + TtT + strategic advising	mentoring at the training center + maintaining training, TtT and specialized courses + strategic advising	mentoring expanded + maintaining training focused on leadership, TtT and specialized courses + strategic advising	mentoring expanded + maintaining training focused on leadership, TtT, and specialized courses + strategic advising + Somali Owned Training System (SOTS)	mentoring expanded + maintaining training on leadership, TtT, and specialized courses + strategic advising + SOTS	mentoring expanded + maintaining training on leadership, TtT, and specialized courses + strategic advising + SOTS
Troop contributors	ESP, SWE	ESP, IRL, SWE	ITA, FRA, FIN, HUN, UK, GER, NED, ROM, POR, ESP, SWE + SRB	ITA, FRA, FIN, POR, UK, ESP, SWE, GER, NED, HUN + SRB	ITA, FRA, FIN, POR, UK, ESP, SWE, GER, NED, HUN + SRB	ITA, FIN, ROM, POR, ESP, SWE + SRB	ITA, GRE, ESP, SWE, POR, ROM, FIN + SRB	ITA, FIN, ROM, POR, ESP, SWE, GRE, FRA, NED, + SRB, MOL
Training Location	Bihanga, Uganda	Bihanga, Uganda	moved to Somalia during this mandate	Mogadishu International Airport + Camp Jazeera	Mogadishu International Airport + Camp Jazeera	Mogadishu International Airport + Camp Jazeera	Mogadishu International Airport + Camp Jazeera	Mogadishu International Airport + Camp Jazeera
Footprint/ ~Number of troops	~150	~130	~125	~195	~193	~203	~225	~209
APF/EPF direct funding						€20 million to SNA	€40 million to SNA	
APF/EPF indirect funding	€1.5 billion to AMISOM through APF (2015: 285.5 million)					€207.9 million to AMISOM (EU + UK)	€185 million AMISOM/ATMIS	

Table 9. Summary table of EUTM Somalia, 2024

After AMISOM forces recaptured Mogadishu in 2011 and the FGS moved back to the capital this also gave impetus to EUTM Somalia to relocate to Somalia from Uganda during its third mandate (Reno, 2018; Interviewee 2°, 2022). The mission eventually moved to Somalia by January 2014 to the International Campus in the vicinity of Mogadishu International Airport (MIA) where most UN agencies have their offices, this time under Italian command. In contrast with the focus on basic training of large number of trainees in Uganda, the third mandate also brought a different approach: more specialized training of a smaller number of soldiers, nominally officers, who would be the core of the SNA's officer corps (Nagy, 2020).

However, many of the challenges stayed relatively the same either connected to housing and feeding the trainees, as well as identifying and retaining Somali soldiers. Many of these problems were deriving from the aforementioned absence of a professional national army under civilian instead of political oversight. In the early years of EUTM Somalia, the operations and fundamental functions depended on coordination between different stakeholders on the ground, from individual states, like the US, UK as well as international organizations like the UN and the AU (Interviewee 2°, 2022; Interviewee 4°, 2023). As a previous military planner of EUTM Somalia put it, "*the biggest challenge was to ensure that all other outstanding issues were taking*

care of by someone else" (Interviewee 4°, 2023). For instance, when EUTM soldiers were first ever deployed to Uganda, Spain took responsibility for flying the contingents from Madrid to Entebbe International Airport, while the US helped EU troops to get to BTC from the airport through an approximately six hour long trip from the airport (Nagy, 2020). As the aforementioned part also demonstrated well, EUTM Somalia initially was heavily reliant on this division of labour between EU member states and other external actors. Therefore, the political economy of SFA was not only present between the provider and the beneficiary (EU and FGS/SNA), but between the different providers as well. Accordingly, while the principal-agent theory can be useful for the conceptualization of the first dynamics, it serves with insufficient answer vis-à-vis the more complex environment of SFA characterized by provider-to-provider relationships alongside provider-beneficiary relations.

As Table 9. also demonstrates EUTM Somalia experienced many fundamental structural changes throughout its eight mandates between 2010 and 2024. These included significant variations in the list of troop contributors or the already highlighted C2 framework which was consolidated after the set-up of MPCC in 2016. However, at the same time due to Brexit from the same year onward EUTM Somalia could not count on direct troop contribution from the UK. As data collected from different primary and secondary sources summarized in Table 9. also reinforced that the number of troops varied between 130-220 in the last 14 years, EUTM Somalia has been functioning with around 200 troops on average (see also Williams & Ali, 2020). This footprint can be considered a small-scale mission compared to the overall strength of the SNA yet could be considered as mid-or large footprint in comparison to other EU CSDP engagements. However, force generation on the political-strategic level and as well as personnel and capacity problems on the military-strategic and operational levels has been rather persistent since the early years of the mission (Reykers and Adriaensen, 2023; Williams and Ali, 2020). This was reinforced by interviews occasionally referring to key positions in EUTM Somalia, such as the political advisor, being vacant (Interviewee 13°, 2024).

From 2013-2014 new mandates has gradually brought new tasks for the mission (see Table 9. above). While the first two primarily focused on basic military training up to platoon level and include some additional specialist training, subsequent mandates started to prioritize more specialized training including leadership and instructor training or TtT (EUTM Somalia, 2024). Additionally, strategic advising and

mentoring was integrated into the mandates with special focus on the Somali Ministry of Defence (SMoD) and Somali General Staff (SGF) through the Mentoring Advisory and Training Element (MATE) (EUTM Somalia, 2021). Since 2017, EUTM Somalia, as well as EUCAP Somalia, are officially part of the FGS's Comprehensive Approach to Security (CAS), while EUTM started to focus on supporting the J7[72] of SNA (EUTM Somalia, 2024; Williams and Ali, 2020). While the training capabilities were maintained throughout all mandates, recent ones—especially since 2019 with mandate 6th— started to prioritize the development of a Somali Owned Training System (SOTS). Currently during its 8th mandate EUTM Somalia's training pillar "*primarily delivers specialized training courses to enhance enabling SNA and Somali Police Forces[73] capabilities, Trainer the Trainers (TtT) courses and staff and leadership courses up to Brigade Commander Level*" as well as mentoring (EUTM Somalia, 2024). Furthermore, other crucial component of the mission, the advisory pillar is responsible for providing "*strategic and operational advice to the Somali MoD and SNAF General Staff, supporting the establishment of MoD oversight of SSF*" (EUTM Somalia, 2024).

During its first decade, EUTM Somalia trained around 7000 SNA soldiers from basic C2-related topics to the protection of civilians, human rights, and gender issues, most of these approximately half of these trainees being infantry troops while the other half trained through TtT, NCOs or specialized trainings, such as counter-IAD (Williams & Ali, 2020; Interviewee 4°, 2023; Interviewee 12°, 2024). While this is a significant number considering the overall strength of SNA, the actual number is likely lower considering the persistent problem the Somalis sending the same people to the trainings, sometimes to the very same specialized training again (Interviewee 12°, 2024). EUTM Somalia personnel was struggling to filter these 'returning' trainees not only because they had limited influence on the selection process and often trained who were sent by SNA, but because, initially, the mission did not have an effective identification system confirm the identity of the soldiers (Interviewee 2°, 2022; Interviewee 4°, 2023; Interviewee 12°, 2024).

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[72] J7 in a Joint Functions means join force development (see more on join functions in: Crosbie, 2019)

[73] Observation about the newest mandate: the inclusion of non-military beneficiary, SPF into the training is a new non-typical element and interesting especially in the light having another civilian CSDP instrument (EUCAP) being present in Somalia directly also engaged in police training.

Table 9. also shows how after 2016 the initial experiences of the Union's journey as an SFA provider coinciding with the renewed commitment to CSFP and CSDP through the EUGS somewhat consolidated EUTM Somalia. This was well-demonstrated through the interviews as well showing how the EU tried to reflect and address the lessons and challenges identified through the first few mandates (Interviewee 2°, 2022; Interviewee 4°, 2023; Interviewee 12°, 2024). Nevertheless, despite quantitative success of training thousands of SNA soldiers, many qualitative aspects of Union's role impact understood through EUTM Somalia remained debated in the subsequent mandates as well. Most of the problems hindering the mission effectiveness—some of them already previously highlighted—can be divided into two main categories: technical and human challenges[74].

As professor Paul Williams, Somalia expert, argued that "*there is literally every technical challenge which we can think of exist in Somalia*" and while there was technical advancement since in the last ten years most of these are not sustainable without SFA providers; "*when we talk about radio and communication networks or weapons and ammunition, or just uniforms, vehicles even, none of these is self-sustainable by the Somalis themselves without a lot of help*" (Interviewee 5°, 2023). Technical issues also included training Somali soldiers without weapons—and providing basic infantry training with wooden rifles donated by the Netherlands—or parts of the soldiers' equipment, such as boots offered by Spain (Nagy, 2020). These missing elements of the training were reported from 2017-2018, meaning that most of these capacity issues were not permanently solved throughout close to a decade-long functioning of the mission in Somalia. This again also reflects on the 'any training is better than no training' approach from the FGS, but also reveals important deficiencies especially with regards to military effectiveness for troops who are actively involved in combat (Interviewee 5°, 2023, Nagy 2020).

Technical limitations of EUTM Somalia also arise from the normative self-conceptualization and connected norms of the EU. Strict force protection measures and limited access outside of the International Campus where EUTM is located was one of the most frequently cited aspect hindering EU SFA effectiveness in Somalia

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[74] Professor Paul Williams, expert on peacekeeping and Somalia suggested technical and political problems as the two main types of challenges in an interview conducted for this research in 2023. With the human vs. technical categorization this dissertation prioritizes the reflection on overall societal, anthropological aspects understood as foundational also impacting the political sphere.

(Interviewee 4°, 6°, 13°, 2024). The EU's normative self-conceptualization as a security provider does not allow the loss of life. As an EU military advisor phrased it *"we also cannot have losses; we can't lose soldiers in crisis management operations, that is another thing. That makes them constrained from a pure military point of view, but it is underlying for example with capacity building missions. You cannot lose soldiers there. If you cannot do your mission or if you can do your mission if you lose soldiers, the question comes: do we pull out?"* (Interviewee 11°, 2024). This approach also constrains the mandate in terms of follow-up and monitoring of trainees after they received any kind of training from EUTM Somalia further questions the sustainability of the role impact. The lack of external engagement or the possibility to monitor the trainees hinders any kind of reflection on the overall effectiveness and sustainability of the trainings.

Alongside the aforementioned varied and long-term technical issues and limitations, the human dimension causes even more fundamental problems for EUTM Somalia, but for other SFA providers as well. Human challenges include ones from both the individual and collective-political nature of Somalia and the Somali society. On the individual level EUTM faces language barriers between trainers and trainees, high percentage of illiteracy, which the mission tried to come over with creating educational materials solely based on graphics and pictures (Interviewee 4°, 2023; Interviewee, 12°, 2024). Another issue was the challenge of identifying trainees; a crucial element primarily for two reasons: a) to avoid having underaged trainees and b) not to have the same solider trained for the same thing repeatedly. As a Spanish colonel—the head of training and mentoring team in EUTM Somalia during the 7th mandate—highlighted the translators the mission worked with were not only made sure that the trainees understood the course, but also made the EU aware that they have been training the same trainees over and over again, sometimes for the very same specialized training. As a solution the Union has introduced a biometric system of identification taking pictures of the trainees as well as taking their fingerprints from 2020; approximately a decade after EUTM Somalia started (Interviewee 12°, 2024).

Another important human factor was to make sure that the SNA does not send underaged minors to be trained by the EU. As the first military planner of EUTM Somalia emphasized this was an issue which was highly debated from the Somali side. *"The Somalis think that 18 is an artificial age, which is the reality. Yes, you have to put the bar somewhere. But why 18? Why not 17,5 or 18,5? And those were discussions I*

had in Mogadishu sometimes with the Somalis in that sense" (Interviewee 4°, 2023). Moreover, the argument from the Somali side was that most young man in Somalia already have families in their teenage years as well as fighting as soldiers at the age of 15, 16 protecting their families and livelihoods. Moreover, SNA leadership wanted the soldiers to be trained to "*survive and kill the enemy*" to be able to use more soldiers and quicker in combat (Interviewee 4°, 2023).

Another more collective-political rather than individual problem was that in many cases soldiers and trainees were trained by different SFA providers in different languages or even based on different doctrines leaving units with both scattered knowledge, underdeveloped unit-based capabilities and fragmented cohesion (Seabra, 2021; Williams, 2024c). Another frequently cited problem was the rather sporadic EU support for different actors and stabilization efforts in Somalia with heavy emphasis on AMISOM. Somali interviewees often highlighted as an important delegitimizing factor for overall EU action in Somalia, including less appetite for EUTM training is that Union paying AU soldiers through EPF founding better than Somalis in the SNA (see also Table 9. on APF/EPF funding). EPF founding since 2021 (and previously APF) was used to tackle both human and technical challenges by supporting AU forces as well as the SNA itself. However, the EU has been allocating more budget to supporting AU forces than SNA likely based on the experiences of the aforementioned corruption in SNA and the Somali authorities (Council of the European Union, 2024d). While—as Williams noted—even that AU payment is not enough for the AU soldiers, interviewees noted that AU soldiers being better paid to do the "*same job*" as SNA soldiers is a common frustration towards the EU in Somalia (Interviewee 21°, 2024; Interviewee 9°, 2024; see also Williams, 2024a). Similarly fragmented EU action supporting FGS and the SNA and the *de facto* independent Somaliland (see Edmunds et al.) at the same time, where the FGS and SNA has limited jurisdiction also contributes to the challenges EUTM mission faces.

Lastly, human challenges of a political nature also include the already highlighted high level of corruption—both noted by interviewees and almost all secondary sources available on the topic (Heritage Institute, 2021; Hettyey, 2011; Marsai, 2020; Reno, 2018). Human and technical challenges together lead to the overall poor military effectiveness of SNA. With regards to the continuous battle against al-Shabaab one of the biggest challenges is that while US-trained Danab and

Turkey-trained Gorgor forces[75] can be effective in clearing insurgents from different areas, the conventional SNA troops coming after them are not able to hold these positions (Barnett, 2023; Levy & Yusuf, 2022; Interviewee 5°, 2023). This is one of the threats to the FOBs currently transferred to SNA from AMISOM forces. The 'hold' part of the 'capture-clear-hold' triad is still missing, which is not only caused by the lack of military expertise or cohesion by the SNA soldiers. Deserting or selling equipment also contribute to poor performance of SNA troops in these situations.

Lastly alongside the human and technical challenges mission effectiveness faces is the lack of follow-up mechanism after trainings. This is directly deriving—as previously highlighted-from the non-executive nature of the mission, as well as strict force protection measures—EUTM trainers has very little to no possibility to follow-up on trainees or monitor how trained units perform (Interviewee 5°, 2023; Interviewee 6°, 2024). As the head of training of EUTM Somalia highlighted "*we didn't participate in operations, so we didn't assess how they implement our even our basic training of platoon commanders, company commanders, battalion commanders or counter ID or engineers*"; in other words, EUTM works with a "train-and-release" approach (Interviewee 5°, 2023; Interviewee 12°, 2024). While the cooperation with international partners and other providers and contractors can provide the opportunity for the mission to get occasional feedback on how the forces were used and how they applied what they learned during the training. Nevertheless, this still leaves a very limited understanding of how the trainees and units perform after being trained.

8.1.4   EUTM Somalia gender mainstreaming

During the operational planning of EUTM Somalia in late 2000's there was no requirement to plan with a gender perspective, and the mission did not have a gender advisor (Interviewee 2°, 2022). Upon the deployment of the first gender expert in EUTM Somalia, a civilian one offered by Sweden, the operational utility, in terms of for example, the frequency of the trainings provided by the GENAD was neither always well justified nor efficient in practice; in the first few mandates gender mainstreaming was very ad hoc with very limited external engagement (Interviewee 2°, 2022). Additionally, basic military training up to platoon level in the focus of the first mandates gave rather limited options to integrate a gender perspective

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[75] more on Turkey's and US involvement in Somalia see Abdulle & Gurpinar, 2019; Barnett, 2023; Kheyr, 2024; Levy & Yusuf, 2022.

(Interviewee 2°, 2022; Interviewee 12°, 2024). However,—as Williams and Ali reported based on extensive primary sources through interviews and focus groups from EUTM Somalia—parts of the basic training included courses on international humanitarian law and human rights including a gender perspective (Williams and Ali, 2020).

Nevertheless, it is important to highlight that the GENAD position located directly connected to the force commander, is still one which is rarely filled with personnel who is not only experienced, but also eager to look for implementation opportunities in the given context. Gender expertise in general in CSDP is either a "*missing capability*" or filled in by double-hatted positions (Hornyák Gracza, forthcoming, 2024). Moreover, GENADs are often also limited in their movement and the aforementioned "*operational utility*", for instance the ability to leave the BTC in Uganda or the International Campus in Mogadishu and provide training for trainees. Moreover, sometimes even GENADs themselves were critical to such utility of gender mainstreaming in operations (Interviewee 2°, 2022; Interviewee 4°, 2023; Interviewee 13°, 2024).

Accordingly, EUTM Somalia had several different formations or solutions to reflect on strategic priorities on gender mainstreaming introduced in Chapter 7. and fulfil the policy expectation deriving from these. In 2015, in absence of a gender advisor, one person from the Defence Sector Training Team (DSTT) personnel covered both human rights and gender issues in EUTM Somalia (European Parliament, 2015). During the 7th mandate (2020-2021) in the lack of a single-hatted gender advisor for example, the head of the training team in Somalia, a Spanish coronel, initiated that the mission cooperate on the gender and human rights training with the UN offices based in Somalia (Interviewee 12°, 2024; Interviewee 15°, 2024). One of the UN counterparts praised this cooperation as well as the approach to EUTM for finding a solution to provide the necessary IHL, human rights and gender training to the trainees, but also highlighted that other colleagues previously had fewer positive experiences with EUTM Somalia vis-à-vis gender mainstreaming (Interviewee 15°, 2024). However, it is important to highlight that many of the developments were not only EU-led initiatives. Instead, it was part of the overall WPS effect deriving from the WPS ecosystem in which the EU was a facilitator of norm promotion pushing for implementation efforts through different instruments, including EUTM Somalia. These overall international efforts, as well as interagency cooperation was and is a

crucial element of GM and WPS implementation in the Somali security sector and overall political context. Most important aspect of this was the EU-UN cooperation, through its different UN field offices in Somalia, such as UN Women, or United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) (European Parliament, 2015; Interviewee 12°, 2024; Interviewee 15°, 2024).

The reception of gender mainstreaming efforts from EUTM Somalia the experiences were also varying, but often showed that pushing for gender equality as a norm in the military was challenging the relations with Somali counterparts. As one of the first military planner of EUTM Somalia acknowledged, it took many months of negotiations with SNA leadership in the early mandates to agree them to send female trainees to EUTM Somalia. While the Spanish colonel asserted that gender mainstreaming is "*something we promote and we do, but we must be aware and we need to be aware that not all of our partners have the same vision or the same way to implement that kind of issues. This is what I have learned by doing, in particular with the Somalis*" (Interviewee 4°, 2023). He highlighted that after months of debating and discussing the role of women in the military, the Somalis eventually agreed on sending female trainees; but then the EU wanted to have female officers, which was, again, initially a red flag for Somalis merely because women would have to have male soldiers under her authority. The negotiation with the responsible Somali military leadership around female officers, again, took a long time (Interviewee 4°, 2023).

Some interviewees expressed frustration over the norm promotion part of gender mainstreaming, which in some cases caused tensions between them and SNA personnel. However, interviews and other EU primary sources also shed light on another angle of gender mainstreaming in military CSDP, including SFA; gender mainstreaming as an order. Even in the lack of gender advisors and even with some EU troops themselves being critical towards gender mainstreaming, the nature of the military structure of EUTM was one of the main reasons of slow, but steady progress on external gender issues in EUTM Somalia, such as having female trainees, or female civilian employees in the MoD. As a military GENAD from EUTM Somalia asserted, gender mainstreaming was a job to do, a position to fill regardless of how one's feeling about its utility for the mission (Interviewee 13°, 2024). In other words, if mainstreaming gender is the order coming from the chain of command, it is the task to be done, which was a new argument alongside the usual right-based or functionalist reasonings in the EU.

8.2 EUTM Mozambique

8.2.1 Political and security context of Mozambique and EUTM Mozambique

Mozambique was one of the many African countries where path to independence was the result of a long colonial war between 1964-74. Becoming independent in 1975, Mozambique was one of the last African states gaining sovereignty (Abdulcarimo Lala, 2014; Chuter et al., 2016; Seabra, 2021). The new, post-independence leadership, the Mozambique's Liberation Front[76] (Frelimo)—which has been holding power since the independence without disruption—also went through internal debates to find its new political identity after initially summoning different ideas under the flag of independence (Hanlon, 2021). Eventually, Frelimo emerged as a socialist political party with the dominance of Southern ethnic groups, such as the Shangane (Abdulcarimo Lala, 2014). In quest of a national identity, Frelimo, holding socialist political stance, started to abolish indigenous and religious practices, such as female initiation rites, and embraced not only elements of a Weberian state, but, indirectly and primarily Western, Christian practices as monogamy and marriage with the aim of national unification (Abdulcarimo Lala, 2014; Arnfred, 2011; Central Committee, FRELIMO, 1977).

However, these endeavours for creating a national identity—as well as socialist economic efforts—sharpened the tensions between the South and the North and contributed to the outbreak of the post-independence inter-state conflict between Frelimo and Mozambican National Resistance[77] (Renamo) supported by Cold War great powers on an ideological bases[78] (Abdulcarimo Lala, 2014; see also Appendix 8.). Due to a rather quick transition from independency efforts to inter-state conflict, Frelimo was forced to build national institutions, including the security sector and wage an inter-state conflict at the same time. The first national army was also shaped by this era; the Mozambican Defence Forces[79] (FADM) was dominantly built on the previous armed wing of Frelimo, the Mozambican People's Liberation Army[80] (FPLM). Therefore, Frelimo itself being heavily dominated by Southern ethnic groups this also inherently led to the regional and ethnical influence of the South in the first

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[76] Frente de Libertação de Moçambique
[77] Resistência Nacional Moçambicana
[78] see more on the regional and international support for different parties in the post-independence civil war in A. Lala 2014.
[79] Forcas Armadas de Defesa de Mocambique
[80] Forças Populares de Libertação de Moçambique

national army (Abdulcarimo Lala, 2014). Due to the modernization efforts, the FADM's early experiences and strength in guerilla warfare applied to the colonizers started to fade as Frelimo was intended to build a conventional army with the help of likeminded powers like the Soviet Union and China during the Cold War (Abdulcarimo Lala, 2014; Seabra, 2021). Despite the relative consolidation after the Rome Peace Accords in 1992, "*the legacy of the civil war remains quintessential to this day in explaining the continuing diversity of external partners*" assisting the security sector and the FADM (Seabra, 2021, p. 688).

By the millennium, Mozambique went through two violent conflicts, the independence war and an inter-state conflict. In 2017 a contemporary civil war broke out at the location where the pre-1975 independence war also started—dominantly in the Northern provinces—with rather similar characteristics (Elias and Bax, 2024; Hanlon, 2021). However, this time, natural resources played a crucial role both in the conflict and in the involvement of external partners as well; liquified natural gas (LNG), for instance, provide a major reason for foreign intervention and cooperation with Mozambique as its North-Eastern territories possess the second largest natural gas reserve in Africa. Hanlon (2021) characterized this as the "*resource curse*". Especially since the outbreak of the full-scale war between Russia and Ukraine, European dependence on Russian gas has become a top issues making LNG one of the most demanded alternatives (European External Action Service, 2024h). Accordingly, alongside the normative obligation for the protection of civilians from the contemporary civil war, European countries also had an interest-based incentive to engage with and in the country.

Apart from the 'resource curse', the Northern provinces of Mozambique, especially Cabo Delgado and Nampula (see Map 2.) were historically different from other parts of the country with historic matrilineal societal structures and the long-standing presence of Islam co-existing (Arnfred, 2011; Hanlon, 2021). This, largely Muslim, coastal population often did not benefit from the economic growth concentrated to the urban areas, such as the capital, Maputo, leading to the rise of a fundamentalist version of Islam in the area in the early 2010's. As a result, many sources often referred to Northern provinces, including Cabo Delgado as the "forgotten cape" or forgotten conflict (ADF, 2022; lbadmin, 2022; Lynsey Chutel, 2021). Furthermore, the aforementioned Southern, Frelimo influence on the FADM, as well as the historic influence of the party on the security sector in Mozambique further

contributed to tensions in Cabo Delgado. The grievances of the region, eventually led to the contemporary civil war between the Mozambican state—and moderate local Muslims—and Islamist fundamentalists supported by the Islamic State[81] and "*freelance jihadis*" since 2017 (Hanlon, 2021; Hendricks, et al., 2023). While the initial ISIS support was an important element in the early years of the insurgency, currently local Islamist militias are identified with the name of al-Shabaab; similar in name to al-Shabaab in Somalia, but being a separate organization (Elias and Bax, 2024).

Map 2. Map of Mozambique federal member states and provinces, January 31, 2024, Source: World Atlas.com https://www.worldatlas.com/maps/mozambique

The conflict in Cabo Delgado since has caused immense human suffering in the region dominantly by the hand of insurgents, but sometimes perpetuated by the FADM or the police (de Almeida, 2024; Hendricks, et al., 2023; Perry, 2024). The conflict resulted in the displacement of about a million people primarily in Cabo Delgado, but most recently the other neighbouring provinces, such as Napula (see Map 2.), was also highly affected (Elias and Bax, 2024). Alongside the violent conflict, Mozambique also faces other human security issues, such as food insecurity and a new wave of cholera pandemic (Human Rights Watch, 2023; Nhamirre, 2021; ReliefWeb, 2024;

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[81] originally known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), now Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), but in the African continent it is also known as Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP)

Wood, 2024). Consequently, civilian population has been exposed to mass murders, rape, kidnappings, displacement and other non-conflict related security threats (de Almeida, 2024; Feijó, 2021; Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 2023; Neethling, 2021).

The unfolding insurgency in Cabo Delgado in 2017 was initially treated as a criminal problem and, accordingly, was addressed by riot police under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior. However, with shifting the rhetoric and starting to refer to the situation as the localization of international Islamist terrorism, the Mozambican government were able to attract Western SFA providers, such as the US[82] and the EU (Hanlon, 2021; see also Appendix 8.). Additionally, the initial police response was followed by the deployment of FADM troops to the region through the second reterritorialization of the Cabo Delgado conflict characterized *"by putting the army and international military partners much more in the lead of the counter insurgency efforts, adding new components into the process and redefining the counter-insurgency itself"* (Hansen, 2024, pp. 1–2). Others argued that the internationalization of the conflict in Cabo Delgado was also closely connected to the Palma Massacre[83], as a critical juncture (Nhamirre, 2021; Perry, 2024, 2023).

However, other powers, such as China and India, were already previously involved in security cooperation with Mozambique with a rather different approach, including IMET, technical and financial assistance, and a relatively small or temporary footprint (Seabra, 2021). Additionally, since 2021 both Rwanda bilaterally (approximately 2.000 troops) and Southern African Development Community (SADC) (approximately 2.000 troops) has been present in Mozambique with the SAMIM mission[84] also supporting the counterinsurgency efforts (Elias and Bax, 2024; Mandrup, 2024; Vines, 2021). Mozambique's geostrategic location played a key role in the making an interest for regional SFA providers, like South Africa, who decided to counter maritime threats, such as illegal trafficking, in the Mozambican shores through security cooperation (Elias and Bax, 2024). As a result of the mix of different

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[82] The US has been present in Mozambique with a relatively small footprint yearly joint exercise Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) ongoing since 2020 (U.S. Embassy in Mozambique, 2024).

[83] The Palma Massacre was a violent act carried by approximately 500 al-Shabaab insurgents on March 24th, 2021, killing more than 1000 people and kidnapping an additional 200 (Alex Perry, 2024).

[84] SADC mission was gradually downsized during 2024, but the largest troop contributor, South Africa with around 1.500 troops decided to maintain its forces in Mozambique with a different mandate. SAMIM also received EPF founding from the EU. see Elias and Bax, 2024.

entry points and interests by different providers—toppled with the presence of private military groups[85], such as the Russian Wagner Group—, by the early 2020's Mozambique has become a hub for SFA on the operational level as well as a hot spot for great power competition on the strategic-political level further fired by the 'resource curse' (Hanlon, 2021; Nhamirre, 2021; Perry, 2024).

The main beneficiary of most of these SFA efforts is the FADM, the largest element of the Mozambican security forces alongside the police, Policia da República de Moçambique (PRM), and a security/intelligence service, the Serviço de Informações e Segurança do Estado (SISE) (Hanlon, 2021). The Mozambican security forces have a long-history of human rights violation, corruption and close ties to Frelimo; most recently the country got into international spotlight because election-related violence in both municipal and general elections (Kyed, 2023; Machado, 2024). Such violence and the consequent low legitimacy and trust in the security forces due to their connections to the ruling party, Frelimo, was also noted by the EU election observation missions specific to the police forces (European Union Election Observer Mission, 2019). Vis-à-vis manpower, FADM counts with 11.000 strength total force, consisting of 9.500 strong land forces, 200 navy personnel and approximately 1.000 people in the air force (Chuter et al., 2016). Frelimo's continuation in power since the independence directly affected FADM as well, which—as highlighted before—was built on the Frelimo's military wing after post-independence. FADM's predecessor, the FPLM was often referred to as "*a state instrument but that, given that Frelimo was the only party in government, 'the party and the state acted as a single entity'*" (Abdulcarimo Lala, 2014, p. 134). Furthermore, Frelimo did not only control the formal institutions and institutional structures of the security sector, but maintained informal networks, called "*democratic structures of people's power*" on a the local level in order to "*perform political mobilisation and control, as well as judicial, administrative and security alert (neighbourhood watch) functions*" (Abdulcarimo Lala, 2014, pp. 141–142). This reinforces the argument of Matisek (2018) and Chuther et al. (2016) highlighted previously asserting that Western civil-military dynamics in Mozambique similarly to Somalia are hardly applicable or useful framework for analysis, policy or approach to SFA.

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[85] see more on the role of different private military companies in Nhamirre 2021.

8.2.2   Mozambique and Cabo Delgado region as a theatre for gender mainstreaming

Before diving into the analysis of EU-specific aspects of gender mainstreaming in Mozambique, it is important to highlight some fundamental differences in gender relations in the country, including regional characteristics. In the WPS index 2023/2024 Mozambique is ranked as 134th out of 177 nations; with one of the highest shares of female parliamentary representation (43%) and approximately 85% women being employed (Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security and Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2024). In the Syndrome Scale, while with a lower point than Somalia, Mozambique is also ranked as a country where male-kinship and patrilinear societal structures are the dominant security provision mechanism posing a threat to women's physical security (Hudson et al. 2020). Furthermore, compared to Somalia ranked last in the Ibrahim Index in 2024 with regards to its Women's Equality indicator, Mozambique is ranked 28th (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2024). Therefore, Mozambique is ranked as safer and more equal in almost all indicators and scales compared to Somalia. However, similar to Somalia, WPS was introduced in Mozambique by external, Western, dominantly European action through the cooperation of UN Women, Iceland and Norway facilitating the adoption of the Mozambican WPS NAP (1325Naps.org, 2024).

While gender relations all over Mozambique has been influenced by colonialism, Frelimo and the aforementioned Western/international influence, regional dynamics in different parts of Mozambique, including Cabo Delgado province, resulted in rather significant differences especially between North and South. As Signe Arnfred highlighted based on extensive fieldwork in Mozambique, there were several important differences between Southern patrilineal and Northern matrilineal communities where Islam and matriliny somewhat coexisted (Arnfred, 2011, p. 9). "*Christianity in the inland areas versus Islam at the coast. Northern Mozambique coastal areas represent in many ways an extension of Swahili culture, with specific characteristics due to colonial history and the special combination of Makhuwa matriliny with Sufi Islam.*" (Arnfred, 2011, p. 10). Accordingly, while Mozambique provides a slightly different context for gender mainstreaming than Somalia, the complexity of the political, regional, indigenous and religious context heavily affects how gender equality policies can be implemented. In terms of the EU's work through EUTM Mozambique, mainstreaming gender equality in the dominantly Christian and

more urbanized South can face different challenges than the coastal, primarily Muslim populations with historic indigenous matriliny.

As highlighted previously, the 2017 outbreak of the civil war in Northern Mozambique brought immense human suffering challenging women and men in different ways (Feijó, 2021; Perry, 2024, 2023). The Mozambican population being largely depending on agriculture—which is even more dominant in the Northern provinces—women working in the fields are often easy target for armed groups (Feijó, 2021). As noted previously, human rights abuses and violations towards Mozambican women were committed by both insurgents and government forces. The latter often happened as a retaliation based on the suspicion of supporting insurgents (Hendricks, et al., 2023). Nevertheless, similarly to Somalia, the literature as well interviews highlighted female agency both in peace and conflict in Mozambique, such as the women's role in the army and counterinsurgency. Feijó (2021) argued that in line with the special nature of guerilla warfare and (counter)insurgency, the role of the civilian population, including women in Mozambique was significant, but rather invisible. While this is not articulated in Feijó's argument, the author intended to refer to the inevitable role of civil population in guerilla warfare, where the fighting parties are more dependent on civilian populations than in conventional warfare. An important reference to this from military science literature is coming from Mao Ce-tung who "*compared guerrillas to fish, and the people to the water in which they swim. If the political temperature is right, the fish, however few in number, will thrive and proliferate.*" (U.S. Marine Corps, 1989, p. 8; see also Forgács, 2017). In such environment, Mozambican women has been integral part of the history of violence in many cases as victims, but also present as belligerent forces, including being in Renamo and Frelimo forces during the civil war or working as recruiters for al-Shabaab forces in the current conflict (Feijó, 2021). Such female agency is also present in the form of women peacekeepers in Mozambique including through SAMIM, the Rwanda Defence Forces and EUTM Mozambique (Hendricks, et al., 2023). The percentage of women in the FADM is 12%—which is quite similar to the average percentage in NATO countries being around 13%—with most women serving in service roles, such as logistics or military medicine (Hendricks, et al., 2023; NATO, 2020).

8.2.3   *EUTM Mozambique: mandate, impact and challenges*

When the EU launched EUTM Mozambique in 2021—in parallel with several other aforementioned international and regional actors—it decided to engage in a security sector which was historically influenced by Frelimo. As it was highlighted in the previous subchapter, by the time the EU first engaged with FADM it has been affected by several critical junctures: the historic influence of Frelimo and the corresponding indoctrination; dominance of Southern ethnic groups in the ranks; and the impact of long-standing security cooperation with Russia, China and other atypical security providers, such as India (Seabra, 2021). Additionally, the EU decided to train a FADM with low level of public trust and support. The FADM's early prestige as a product of the independency efforts gradually faded away as a result of lacking capacity to protect civilians as well as abuses against their own citizens, stemming from *"state failure to meet their basic needs such as the provision of food and equipment in the field"* (Abdulcarimo Lala, 2014, p. 136).

In contrast with Somalia, in the case of Mozambique no specific UNSCR granted legitimacy for the EU SFA mission; the deployment was based on the request of the Mozambican government towards the EU to help address the crisis in Cabo Delgado as part of the reterritorialization or changing narrative around the threat argued and previously highlighted by Hansen (2024) (EUTM Mozambique, 2022). The mission was launched with a non-executive mandate with approximately 120 EU troops and reached its FOC in September 2022 (European External Action Service, 2023c). However, in comparison to Somalia, Mozambique only has the EU delegation in Maputo and EUTM Mozambique, now EUTM/EUMAM since 2024 September, also located in the vicinity of the capital in the south of the country. Accordingly, the Union views diplomatic efforts through the Delegation and SFA efforts through EUTM as a part of SSR in Mozambique while engaging with other partnerships especially through civil society (Nhamaze et al., 2022).

During its first mandate between 2021 and 2024 EUTM Mozambique was authorized to train 11 companies of FADM to create a Quick Reaction Force (QRF). This included five companies of Navy marines in Katembe Camp, and six of Army special forces in Chimoio Camp (Council of the European Union, 2021a; EUTM Mozambique, 2022). According to the training locations, the trainers were divided into two groups (EU monitor, 2021). The training—building on previous training conducted by Portugal bilaterally—was aiming at the capacity building of QRF as a

new element of the FADM for crisis management (Council of the European Union, 2021a). Trainings were conducted by the Counter Terrorism Training Team (CTTT) of EUTM *"in specific counter terrorism subjects that were considered essential, such as Prisoner Handling (PH) and Tactical Site Exploitation (TSE)"* (European External Action Service, 2024i). COIN and counter terrorism techniques were in the centre of the training as since the Rome Peace Accord—as highlighted before—Mozambique tried to gain experience in conventional warfare and the FADM eventually lost its expertise on guerilla warfare and COIN tactics by the time it had to face al-Shabaab in the late 2010's (Abdulcarimo Lala, 2014; Seabra, 2021).

The TtT approach used in EUTM Somalia was present in EUTM Mozambique as well training close to a 100 military instructors in order to hand over the training of FADM/QRF troops to them upon completing the first mandate (EUMAM Mozambique, 2024a). Moreover, training by EUTM Mozambique as a single standing CSDP instrument in the country went beyond operational training and counterinsurgency. It included other elements of military education, such as courses on IHL, the protection of civilians as well as specific focus on the Women, Peace and Security agenda (EUTM Mozambique, 2022). Additionally, EUTM Mozambique benefited from EPF funding early on (see Table 10.), primarily in a form of military assistance *"not designed to deliver lethal force"* including equipment for soldiers, such as helmets, and vehicles and support for a field hospital (Council of the European Union, 2022b, 2021b). This resulted in EUTM Mozambique, while still being a small footprint SFA mission, being more specialized as well as better equipped with personnel for mandate-specific issues, including the availability of financial support for the trained forces to overcome technical challenges.

	1. mandate	2. mandate
Year	2021-2023 - EUTM	2024-2026 - EUMAM
Council Decisions	Council Decision 2021/1143/CSFP	Council Decision 2024/1354 /CSFP
Mission Command	MPCC	MPCC
Force Command	Portugal	Portugal
Mandate	training special force units of FADM army and navy	combined SFA with training, mentoring and advising
Troop contributors	POR, ESP, FRA, BEL, AUT, ROM, GRE, FIN, EST, ITA, SWE, LIT	POR, ESP, FRA, BEL, ROM, GRE, FIN, EST, ITA, LIT + SRB
Training Location	Maputo (plus Katembe and Chimoio)	Maputo
Overall Footprint/ ~Number of troops	~120	~83
EPF direct funding	€85 million to FADM	
EPF indirect funding	€20 million to RDF; €15 million to SADC	

Table 10. Summary table of EUTM Mozambique, 2024

The mission was set up with several EU member states contributing to the force generation process, while Portugal, the previous colonial power, who already had troops on the ground took the responsibility of providing mission force command in Maputo (Vines, 2021). That is a rather interesting dynamic since Frelimo was formed and gained power by defining itself against Portugal during the independency effort. The post-independence process also included the expulsion of experienced Mozambican soldiers from the FADM who were previously part of the Portuguese colonial force. Many of these Mozambican soldiers were found themselves in the opposition Renamo forces during the post-independence civil wars further complicating the historic dynamics between Portugal and Frelimo's opposition, Renamo (Abdulcarimo Lala, 2014).

Furthermore, both the relatively small footprint and the non-executive mandate can be attributed to Frelimo political leadership trying to keep its power and avoid the set-up of a full-on peacekeeping mission by EU or the UN. As argued by Hanlon a larger peacekeeping mission would be *"inevitably accompanied by political assessments, which will point to the failure to redress grievances and human rights violations"* (Hanlon, 2021). For instance, at the time of the writing of this chapter in late 2024, investigative journalism shed light on torture and killing of around 200 people by FADM forces during the summer of 2021 in search insurgents in connection with the attack on the Total project; a French company working on gas extraction, *"the biggest private investment"* in the history of the African continent (Perry, 2024).

The human and technical issues as framework is also useful in the case of Mozambique to capture the most important challenges SFA providers, including the EU faces in Mozambique. One of the human factors which is highly relevant in Mozambique is the already noted colonial heritage and its impact on the national army. Colonial armies and militias were often used in order to repress the society especially with regards to social movements, which dominantly violent nature of many of these militaries of the colonial past and *"these repressive traditions, and public suspicion of the security forces, lingered in some cases after independence."* (Chuter et al., 2016, p. 12) Moreover, similar to Somalia, ghost soldiers are also a problem; reported in 2022 by Carta de Moçambique that close to 7.000 ghost soldiers' salaries were going to defence officials and their family members (Hanlon, 2022). Compared to Somalia evidence did not highlight the problem of identification of soldiers, while the dominant

linguistic barrier in the case of Somalia is bridged by Portuguese in EUTM Mozambique.

While the Mozambican army faces multiple technical challenges, it is the most capable African military the EU has ever worked with since it started its journey as an SFA provider in 2010. According to the 2024 Global Fire Power ranking Mozambique is ranked at 93rd out of 145 countries, while Somalia after decades of foreign investment and assistance is (still) ranked 143rd. Moreover, other African militaries the EU trained through SFA are also all ranked behind Mozambique; CAR is 137th, Mali is 106th while Niger is 121st (Global Firepower, 2024). Additionally, EUTM Mozambique launched in 2021 has been able to benefit from EPF funding both for the mission itself as well as supporting FADM's technical capabilities and infrastructure as it was highlighted before. Mozambique received €89 million in EPF founding, while the EU further supported the efforts of the SADC and the Rwandan Defence Forces in Mozambique (Council of the European Union, 2024b; see also Figure 8.4). In this case, however, the EU paid more military assistance to FADM than to other regional providers or actors, which was not the case in Somalia where AMISOM/ATMIS was significantly more subsidized by APF/EPF than the SNA (see Table 10.).

Lastly, after its first two and a half years in function concluding the first mandate EUTM Mozambique has recently transitioned into an even smaller formation focusing more on strategic advising while keeping some elements of the training mandate; this time named as EU Military Assistance Mission Mozambique (EUMAM Mozambique) (EUMAM Mozambique, 2024a) (see Table 10.). While the number of troop contributing countries stayed the same, the number of personnel was reduced to 80 people—including civilian personnel—from 10 member states and Serbia as a non-member state contributor (EUMAM Mozambique, 2024b). EUMAM Mozambique is mandated to make sure that the QRF units trained during the first mandate and the available resources provided by the EPF are used in a more sustainable manner in line with the protection of civilians and respect of human rights mandate of a professional army (European External Action Service, 2024j).

8.2.4   *EUTM Mozambique gender mainstreaming*

EUTM Mozambique was the first EU military CSDP mission where the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda was integrated into the mandate from the beginning. While gender mainstreaming efforts nominally or in practice have been integrated in the EU CSDP elements, including missions and

operations as Chapter 7. explored, the "*promotion of the Women, Peace and Security agenda*" was explicitly part of the Council Decision on launching EUTM Mozambique (Council of the European Union, 2021a). This was translated into both the first and the second mandate primarily as part of the strategic advising and mentoring pillar of the mission, which alongside with human rights and IHL training also trained Mozambican troops in the gender perspective and the Women, Peace and Security agenda.

The mission in Mozambique was also (so far) the very few EU military CSDP missions where the GENAD position was filled almost without any disruption in continuation since reaching its FOC in September 2022. The first gender advisor, a Swedish civilian expert was followed by a Portuguese navy commander, both of them female. In case of EUTM Mozambique, both GENADs were very clear on the internal-external aspects of gender mainstreaming as well as important documents, concepts, including the strategic framework introduced in Chapter 7. Many GENADs, including those of EUTM Mozambique highlighted the operational utility of GAP III facilitating their work on the daily basis. This was less prominent in EUTM Somalia, as briefly noted previously, where anecdotal evidence showed a rather ad hoc gender mainstreaming in contrast with EUTM Mozambique where interviews demonstrated a rather strategic and structured approach to these issues. Similar to all gender advisors interviewed for this dissertation, GENADs in EUTM Mozambique were initially or previously trained by NCGM and were primarily driven by GAP III (Interviewee 14°, 2024; Interviewee 19°, 2024). An interesting aspect observed at EUTM Mozambique was that the GENAD also advised the commander on gendered perspectives in strategic communication and external messaging further reinforcing the Union's normative image and self-conceptualization as a security provider in the context (Interviewee 19°, 2024).

Most prominent aspect of external gender mainstreaming was provided by a training program consisting of two modules created in 2022 by the first GENAD of EUTM Mozambique whose work was guided by her training at NCGM. The two modules were set up in consultation with a local gender activist to have an indigenous perspective. The modules were delivered to QRF units, who—as the gender advisor remembered—where mostly young men between the age of 20 and 40 (Interviewee 19°, 2024). While the first module focused on group discussions on gender equality, the role of men and women in the Mozambican society, and questions of masculinity,

the second one was more specific to conflict, warfare, including WPS principles (Interviewee 14°, 2024). In addition to that both GENADs were in touch with counterparts in the Mozambican government institutions, including the MoD, as well as civil society (Interviewee 14°, 2024; Interviewee 19°, 2024). Both experts also expressed that they have not faced backlash from the trainees or local counterparts when they intended to or when they delivered training or made suggestions. Instead, they felt that the internal understanding of the local cultural context is to be strengthened in the mission, including the comprehension of the power dynamics with local women, including those involved in sex work. Additionally, the first GENAD also stressed that EUTM personnel was often more sceptical about how the FADM would receive gender training arguing that "*this is Africa*" than the trainees were themselves (Interviewee 19°, 2024).

8.3 Chapter Conclusion - Comparative Analysis

This chapter focused on the analysis of EUTM Somalia and EUTM/EUMAM Mozambique as empirical case studies of EU SFA in Africa impacted by the Union's normative self-conceptualization and the norm transfer through gender mainstreaming. With addressing this issue, this chapter inherently built on the argument that the EU self-conceptualization and gender mainstreaming has some kind of impact on these missions, their mandates and their effectiveness.

From the perspective of the area of operation—mainly focused on political and security context—both Somalia and Mozambique showed several similarities. Both countries are considered fragile states in the African continent which were previously colonized by EU member states; in case Somalia Italy (and previous EU member, UK), and in Mozambique, Portugal. Both nations are heavily burdened by ethnic and/or clan-based and religious fragmentation and countries where the state does not possess the exclusive jurisdiction over legitimate violence or have control over the whole of their territory. Both countries face high level of corruption, weak government institutions including fragmented and heavily politicized security sector. At the same time from a human security perspective, local civilian population are threatened by multiple risks from political violence to food insecurity. Additionally, both countries are facing an internal threat posed by Islamist insurgency with a same name, al-Shabaab, largely same objectives and tactics, but representing different organizations. This means that these countries receive benefit from military training while often also

being actively involved in combat which not only poses a challenge for logistics and personnel management, but also on the attitude of troops and military leadership (Interviewee 5°, see also Chinchilla et al., 2024). As Reno asserted, "*people who fight in this environment think constantly about insurance against uncertainty.*" (Reno, 2018, p. 506).

As an additional layer of similarity highly relevant from an SFA perspective is that both in Somalia and Mozambique several international and regional organizations, individual states as well as other non-state actors, such as private military companies, are involved in security cooperation and security force assistance in parallel. As Seabra (2021) argued, overlapping efforts by different providers have become a norm in these African states, both true in the case of Somalia and Mozambique. In both countries due to their resource scarcity as well as continuous internal security struggles, different providers found different entry points to support national efforts due to the "*free training is better than no training approach*" as Seabra (2021) identified. Nevertheless, the relatively accessible entry points likely further marginalize the provider's 'appetite' to strive for effectiveness, because whatever they offer is usually accepted. While this trend was rather prevalent in Africa, Niger, Chad, or Mali suspending their cooperation with France, the EU, and/ or the US as recent examples—out of the scope of this research—demonstrated a changing trend vis-à-vis accessibility for SFA providers (Brown, 2024; Le Monde, 2023; Watling and Wilén, 2024).

Lastly, the wide variety of actors in both countries also means that different interests and values are transferred through military training and assistance to these countries; in many cases contradictory in doctrine, norms and other important elements such as conditionality. Liberal democratic norm promotion is heavily present and rather well-documented in both cases especially from Western providers, such as UN, EU and NATO members, such as the US and the UK. Gender equality, including the promotion of liberal gender norms in the security sector mainly through SSR practices is part of this liberal-normative agenda often also being the elements for conditionality of the assistance. However, as Chapter 6. found EU understands SFA efforts as pillars and direct contributors of SSR, which many scholars counterargued especially in the case of African states due to the different civil-military dynamics of power and the heavy politicization of armies.

Nevertheless, alongside these similarities, Somalia and Mozambique show several differences as well. While in both countries women's position in the society is

rather diverse, their physical security is threatened by multiple issues. However, Mozambican women have a longer history of integration into governance and the security sector including the FADM primarily due to the initial socialist ideals of Frelimo, as well as the presence of matrilineal societies in the Northern part of the country (Central Committee, FRELIMO, 1977). Moreover, vis-à-vis EU strategic priorities while both countries have important EU interests—mainly economic, trade and natural resources—Somalia is a lot more prominent from a geopolitical, geostrategic perspectives. Somalia, being located in the Horn of Africa, is not only considered close neighbourhood, but it also lies in the vicinity of Union's important maritime routes directly impacting EU trade and security. This gives strategic importance for Somalia also explaining the multiple coexisting CSFP and CSDP instruments deployed to the country as well as the more than a decade-long commitment despite of the long list of human and technical challenges for effective role impact. In contrast with Somalia, where all three components of the CSDP triad co-exists, the EU's SFA commitment in Mozambique is a single-standing military missions alongside an EU delegation. Lastly, another important distinction between the two countries is that Mozambique is much more accessibly for EU CSFP and CSDP tools and staff from a linguistic perspective. From diplomatic efforts through engaging with the local population to military training, Portuguese as an official EU language serves as bridge between the EU and Mozambique in contrast with Somalia where linguistic barriers pose a significant challenge. In conclusion from a political and security context perspective, the long list of similarities in contrast with the fewer differences suggests the applicability of lessons learned from Somalia in the Mozambican context.

From an EU SFA perspective the list of similarities and differences is a lot more balanced. Both EUTM Somalia and EUTM/EUMAM Mozambique have its primary focus on the partner states' national armed forces; SNA in Somalia and FADM in Mozambique. Despite the often oversimplified arguments, these African armies have not only been impacted by the colonial past of their countries, but by several historic and/or parallel processes shaping its capacity, capabilities, morale and the perception about the organization and profession as well (Chuter et al., 2016). Both SNA and FADM lack the history of a multiethnic, multiclan professional national armed forces as both were initially shaped under sharp political and kinship or clan-based lines. What is also common in both beneficiaries is their highly politicized nature with a

often lacking of civilian control and oversight, as well as their rather extensive records of human rights abuses historically and in the context of the contemporary counterinsurgency efforts supported by EU SFA. Additionally, both SNA and FADM faces resource scarcity both in terms of infrastructure or equipment which also created rather easy access points for different SFA providers, which trend is recently seemed to change in the African continent as previously argued.

From the perspective of the EU as the provider, both EU SFA missions are commanded from Brussels through the MPCC which was only established in 2017 and had been mostly understaffed ever since (Reykers and Adriaensen, 2023). Consequently, Somalia has been functioning without a unified EU C2 structure in its first seven years, while EUTM Mozambique was launched already in a rather consolidated EU military command structure in 2021. Both missions are under a single mission commander, the director of MPCC, while their force commanders lead on the field. In both cases the previous colonial powers are the main troop contributors as well as the nation which provides the force commander[86] on the ground (see Table 9. and 10.). This also means that the historic grievances and colonial past is highly relevant in both cases vis-à-vis role impact requiring cautious messaging and interactions. Additionally, while both missions are relatively small from a global SFA perspective, but significant as a CSDP deployment of military nature. Lastly, both EUTMs are often challenged by force generation processes, changes in troop contribution as well as missing personnel in key positions (Interviewee 2°, 2022; Interviewee 4°, 2023; Interviewee 13°, 2024).

One of the main differences between EUTM Somalia and Mozambique is that CSDP action in Somalia is part of a larger regional effort and strategic framework, the EU comprehensive approach to the Horn of Africa. This is highly relevant with regards to mission effectiveness and impact assessment as EUTM Somalia is not evaluated on its own, but as a part of a strategic review of the Horn of Africa as it was discussed in Chapter 6. In contrast with that Mozambique as it was already highlighted represents a rather single-standing CSDP engagement in the country, as well as the whole region. In fact, Mozambique was the first CSDP engagement in the region. Another major distinction between EUTM Somalia and Mozambique is the role performance, or mandate objectives and approach in Mozambique. As argued throughout this chapter,

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[86] in the case of Somalia Italy has been the force commander since 2015 (see Figure 8.3).

EUTM Mozambique, established in a more consolidated EU military command structure building on the lessons learned in previous and ongoing EU SFA engagement, such as Somalia, CAR, or Mali. However, EUTM Mozambique as a second-generation EU SFA mission was more targeted and circumscribed focusing on specific action for counterinsurgency instead of starting out with basic military training. Its objective to train eleven companies of FADM as QRF as a more focused effort on special forces training shows that the Union was following rather successful SFA examples from Somalia, such as the US-trained Lightening Brigade in Somalia, the Danab. While is also a better fit in terms of the Union's own rather limited footprint on the ground force protection measures still limit the assessment of the role performance and impact. As a result, while EUTM Somalia as a first of its kind, first generation EU SFA missions went through a decade long consolidation and tailoring the Union's own expectations to its possible impact with SFA both internally and external, the role performance of the EU in EUTM/EUMAM Mozambique was more target and tailored to the EU's own capabilities.

The recent transition to being a more strategic advising-focused SFA mission by EUTM/EUMAM Mozambique suggests that the EU is trying to enhance its role impact by supporting FADM and the Mozambican MoD in properly using the QRF to avoid backlash from possible human rights abuses and other misappropriation of the new capabilities not aligned with the Union's normative self-conceptualization. Accordingly, with EUTM/EUMAM Mozambique the EU instrumentalized its role as an international security provider that it is smarter, better, but not bigger (and not too ambitious) while working with a slightly more stable and capable partner. However, the authoritarian characteristics of Frelimo vis-à-vis legitimate state violence using military and police force raises questions and arguments for more conditionality on EU SFA and EPF funding when the beneficiary is engaging in violence non-coherent with the EU's own normative self-conceptualization.

Gender mainstreaming structurally showed rather similar elements in both missions primarily through the integration of a gender advisor position as a special advisor of the force commander on the field. Their task is to ensure both internal and externally that the gender perspective is integrated into the role performance. In both missions the position was hold by civilian and military seconded personnel as well, both by men and women, with rather striking differences in not only knowledge and skills for the position, but commitment as well. However, especially in the case of

EUTM Somalia, the filling of these positions with appropriate personnel with specialized knowledge and experience was a challenge to the missions often leading to double-hatted positions or interim periods without a gender advisor. At least one GENAD asserted while holding the position that he sees this position as unnecessary for the mission to properly function and less priority over other special advisors to the force commander. Moreover, both gender advisors and other interviewees, especially in the case of EUTM Somalia asserted that gender mainstreaming as a norm transfer cases serious tensions when negotiating and working with their counterparts and often results in backlash from the partners who sees these efforts as contradictory to their traditions and culture. This was specifically highlighted with regards to the usage of the word gender in Somalia. At the same time, some local female Somali perspectives reinforced the importance of the push for gender quality as a norm in their societies arguing that *'it is a very tough environment to be working as security official in Somalia and being women, you know, being subjected to physical abuse and assaults, and all that is really hard. So helping women who are already in the sector and those who want to join, you know, I would really emphasize that."* (Interviewee 21°, 2024).

In contrast with Somalia, in EUTM Mozambique the Women, Peace and Security agenda was directly integrated into the mandate from the beginning and the overall acceptance of women leadership in different walks of life is more enhanced than in Somalia. In this case, the evidence painted a rather positive picture. Neither interviews nor secondary data highlighted backlash about gender training from trainees or local counterparts; instead, both gender advisors were pleasantly surprised on the acceptance and engagement of FADM as well as other civilian counterparts on gender issues. However, similar to EUTM Somalia interviews highlighted the questions around internal legitimacy of external gender mainstreaming by mission personnel especially with regards to gender training to trainees.

Nevertheless, as both in Somalia and Mozambique women are disproportionately affected by the armed hostilities often not only by the hands of the insurgents, but reported by the national armed forces, the legitimacy of IHL and human rights training with the necessary implementation of a gender perspective seems like a legitimate decision to integrate into EU SFA efforts. Added value of both internal and external gender mainstreaming contributing to not only training but force protection and enhanced situation awareness was reinforced by the data especially highlighting the role of women in intelligence collection, as informants. Both in Somalia and

Mozambique where outside of the large urban areas are often the ones affected the most by insurgents, recruiting and engaging women working in agriculture can enhance intelligence on not only the movement and network of insurgents, but identifying recruiters; as anecdotal evidence suggested, also often themselves females. The importance of female soldiers in these SFA missions is also crucial especially considering the different gendered dynamics of Islamic societies and communities, such as large populations in Cabo Delgado, where female and males often does not share the same space and have designated social, working and living courters. This, however, taking the experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq building on FET experiences—especially in case of female-to-female interaction—if GENADs are 1) able to leave the compound and actually engage with local populations; 2) are empowered by other colleagues and units as these interactions are rarely considered one-(wo)man shows.

In contrast with the possible positive impacts of gender mainstreaming of EU SFA in these two African contexts, evidence also highlighted several limitations and flaws often imposed by the EU's own normative self-conceptualization. While there is often very few female personnel in EU military missions, the burden of mainstreaming gender very frequently fall on their shoulders, which if they are not deployed as a GENADs can hinder them from fulfilling their jobs. Additionally, as previously highlighted normative role conception of the EU is challenged through gender mainstreaming by the partners when the Union is advocating for the integration of the military in SNA or FADM with itself having very few to none female troops visible or working on the field with partners. FADM for example has 12% percentage of women in their ranks, which is almost equal to the NATO average (13%) and higher than the CSDP average (7%) (NATO, 2020; Pfeifer, 2022). Adjusting to these realities on the ground EUTM/EUMAM Mozambique gender advisors were more focused on facilitating conversation between FADM female troops and EUTM female troops to be able to share experiences with each other on how it is to be a female in the ranks (Interviewee 14°, 2024).

9   CONCLUSION

The research problem addressed by this dissertation lies within the intersection of two parallel processes influencing EU external action in the last two decades: 1) the development of gender mainstreaming in CSFP building on the Women, Peace and Security agenda and previous EU commitment to gender equality in the labour market; and 2) the evolution and consolidation of security and defence policy in the EU including the contemporary CSDP triad. The first resulted in the establishment of a rather sound strategic framework for EU gender mainstreaming in the last 20 years facilitated by the external influence of the WPS ecosystem as an international normative framework for gender equality, and internal push from members state for overall EU action. In parallel, the second—reflecting on the changing regional security dynamics—brought an ever evolving, enhanced focus on military capability building for the Union and the strengthening of its profile as an international provider. As part of the latter, the EU has been increasingly reliant on security cooperation and security force assistance. In such changing regional and global security landscape, the Union has been advocating for gender mainstreaming internally and externally in CSDP missions, including those of military nature, creating a long list of policy expectations to integrate gender work into their respective mandates. In doing so, the EU engages in gender mainstreaming through CSDP SFA missions in many African countries with largely different gender equality norms than in Europe. This gender regime in EU external action increasingly builds on not only the normative argumentation for gender mainstreaming in military CSDP but on the argument for its contribution to operational effectiveness.

Acknowledging this increased push for gender mainstreaming in military CSDP including military training missions in Africa and beyond, this dissertation posed the question; why does the EU persist in conducting gender mainstreaming in its SFA efforts in Africa and to what extent these gender mainstreaming efforts impact EU-led SFA missions in Africa. In its quest for answers, this dissertation theorized this problem in the framework of role theory under broader constructivist underpinnings, where the role concept of the EU was conceptualized through the Normative Power Europe concept by Ian Manners and EU-led security force assistance missions were understood as the institutionalization of the Union's role as an international security

provider in the given context. The dissertation conceptualized gender mainstreaming as a norm transfer deriving from the EU's normative self-conceptualization and, accordingly, impacting the role performance and impact of these SFA missions in Africa.

9.1 Why does the EU do gender mainstreaming in military CSDP missions? Is the EU overselling gender?

Table 1.1. in the introductory chapter of the dissertation laid down the research questions as well as the initial research assumptions or hypotheses guiding this investigation.

- *H1-H2: The EU's own role conception coincides with the Normative Power Europe concept; and the EU conducts gender mainstreaming because of this normative self-conceptualization as well as gender equality being one of the Union's fundamental, constitutional values*

The first hypothesis suggested that the Union's role conception in the theorized research problem coincides with the NPE concept by Ian Manners in its early form from the early 2000's. This hypothesis was confirmed by the dissertation which—through a mesoscopic level of analysis—found that the EU still upholds its normative self-conceptualization despite the changing regional security dynamics and despite its own increasingly militarized discourses. This normative power image of the EU created and sustained by strategic discourses is not only built on its constitutional values upheld by the Treaties, but also on the *sui generis* nature of the Union. The discourse analysis of interviews, notes from participatory observation and EU strategic documents reinforced that the Union's self-conceptualization is built around the idiosyncrasy of the EU and the "European way" of doing things, which, as found by this research, intrinsically means a normative approach. While this dissertation primarily covered the Union's self-conceptualization through a mesoscopic level of analysis focusing on a special institutionalization and performance of a conflict specific role, these findings can be useful for looking at how the EU thinks (and talks) about itself vis-à-vis its meta-role on the macroscopic level.

Additionally, evidence showed that the Union heavily builds this sustained normative self-conceptualization on gender mainstreaming and gender equality based on a liberal, equalitarian ideals. However, the contemporary Normative Power Europe(an Union) does not only establish this normative self-image on what it is—as

the NPE originally suggests—, but also on what it does; integrating gender equality and women's empowerment even into hard military issues. This normative nature of EU actorness shaped by its self-conceptualization, also encompasses passive actions or inaction. In other words, being normative implies that the Union seeks to avoid engaging in certain activities within the framework of gender mainstreaming—such as sexual exploitation, abuse, or gender-based violence—both internally and externally in the context of CSDP, as these are inconsistent with its normative self-image.

Lastly, in contextualizing the EU's normative self-concept and its connection to the broader role concept at the mesoscopic level, it is important to emphasize that while the Union's self-perception as a normative international security provider shapes the overall role concept, it does not entirely determine it. In other words: solely because the Union perceives itself as a normative power or security provider in the context of military training missions in Africa, it does not mean that this matches to the role expectation—the other variable for role concept—of the beneficiaries (see Figure 3.3 and 3.5).

- *H3: The EU's gender mainstreaming practices and arguments are influenced by two main factors: a) WPS effect and b) EU member states experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq*

Gender mainstreaming, both internally and externally, is integrated into the work of EEAS, including CSDP structures, processes, and instruments, such as EU military training missions. Being present in all these processes as a 'cross-cutting issue', gender mainstreaming—alongside climate action—has become one of the most visible normative elements of EU external action as a constitutive norm integrated into the role performance through different elements. This includes, for instance, training host country soldiers on gender equality, the Women, Peace and Security agenda, or deploying gender advisors to EU-led military missions. As Chapter 5. also concluded, gender equality and climate action —both prominently featured in the 2022 Strategic Compass—will further shape the strategic environment and priorities alongside which EU actorness is built. This provides continuity for the gender mainstreaming as a norm transfer in CSFP and CSDP, including the mission mandates and related activities, such as training and advising.

Arguments for gender mainstreaming in the EU has been varying from mixing right-based and functionalist reasons as it was previously highlighted in other contexts like NATO and individual members states (see Egnell and Alam, 2019). While

acknowledging the conceptual and practical differences between the two, this dissertation worked with the 'rights-based' or 'right-based' approach as an argumentation which includes reasoning based on legal/constitutional rights as well as ethical considerations founded on the sentiment for the 'right thing to do'. This right-based one is often reinforced by the constitutional character of gender equality as a norm as it was found through H2. and explained previously. An important observation through the interviews with EU personnel was that their perception, understanding and reasoning for gender mainstreaming, similar to early EU documents on WPS and gender mainstreaming, was less coherent and rather heterogeneous. Some, when asked of gender mainstreaming started to talk about gender-based violence in peacekeeping, some referred to the importance of engaging with local women and civilian population, while the most often associated issue was to have more women in the military and in missions. Accordingly, this dissertation's interest in different arguments for gender mainstreaming also highlighted the lack of common conceptual understanding of the issue internally in the EU, which likely impact on how the arguments are formed. Across the discourses analysed for this study, only a handful of EU professionals and practitioners—who's discourses were analysed—were able to articulate coherent reasoning for gender mainstreaming as well as differentiate and being aware of the distinction between the right-based and functionalist arguments or the internal-external dimensions. There was no variation between civilian and military practitioners or personnel between these two logics.

Additionally, this dissertation confirmed that the WPS ecosystem or normative framework was an active enabler for EU action on gender mainstreaming in CSFP and CSDP. The Women, Peace and Security agenda through top-down UN influence and internal, bottom-up push from individual member states, such as Sweden and the Netherlands, was particularly important in military CSDP. The research confirmed that the WPS effect was key in facilitating the integration of a gender perspective in EU external action from the mid 2000's, first in ESDP and later in CSDP (see Appendix on WPS Gannt diagram). However, the research also pointed out the gradual 'Europeanization' of the WPS framework through CSFP and CSDP in the last twenty years building on the historic EU commitment and norm transfer of gender equality in employment and the labour market. The Europeanization of WPS action was facilitated by not only through the liberal-normative multilateral ecosystem and UN influence on overall EU external action, but from individual member states pushing

for EU specific implementation as another element of aforementioned "European", normative way. The latter can be understood in this context as localization or regionalization of WPS in the EU lead by single or groups of member states.

Although, while the WPS effect was confirmed through this dissertation, the impact of EU member states' experiences from Afghanistan and Iraq was not validated. While these two cases—both from an SFA perspective and from a gender perspective—were often present in primary sources, including interviews, the discourses connected these two theatres to the functionalist argumentation often present in EU strategic communication and other materials were only sporadic. A possible explanation for this lack of awareness on the applicability and relevance of these experiences can be translated into EU action, but the evidence did not provide satisfactory confirmation.

Lastly, this research brought a new perspective vis-à-vis the different argumentations for gender mainstreaming in military CSDP. An interesting observation was how military personnel often reflected to gender mainstreaming as something to be done not because of moral obligations or functional reasons, but as a rather unquestionable nature of the task coming from the chain of command. While most feminist literature would question the utility of the military and military structures vis-a-vis gender mainstreaming, evidence in this research showed that EU military personnel often referred to gender mainstreaming and the need for implementation just because it was an order to do so. Therefore, alongside the right-based and functionalist arguments, this dissertation shed light on a new reasoning which can be conceptualized as the 'chain of command argument', or gender mainstreaming as an order. This is a rather new element of EU gender mainstreaming specific to military CSDP primarily enabled by the most recent developments between 2022 and 2024, including the adoption of the European Union Military Concept on Gender and the Standard Operation Procedures on gender expertise and coordination in the EU Military Staff (European Union Military Staff, 2022; Council of the European Union, 2024; see also Chapter 7.). These most recent documents created within and in consultation with the EUMS bridge the gap between 'should' and 'must' vis-à-vis gender mainstreaming in military CSDP and rather successfully translated from policy to military language.

Finally, it is important to put this new argumentation of gender mainstreaming into a broader framework as a part of the EU-specific implementation of the WPS

agenda; the manifestation of the WPS ecosystem through EU regulations and institutionalization in CSDP. The latter also suggests that this chain-of-command argument is or will be likely present in military operations and institutions of international organizations, such as the UN and NATO, as well as individual EU member states. Both elements further reinforce the presence of the chain-of-command argumentation on the ground in EU missions often building on and using NATO and UN doctrines, guidelines, etc.

9.2 To what extent does gender mainstreaming impact EU SFA missions in Africa?

- *H4: The link between gender mainstreaming and mission effectiveness is not self-explanatory, but highly context specific. Gender mainstreaming as norm transfer can have both negative and positive impact on SFA effectiveness including a source of role conflict.*

With H4, this dissertation challenged the generalized EU narrative suggesting the gender mainstreaming contributes to operational effectiveness and worked with the initial proposition that gender mainstreaming can be a double-edged sword for mission effectiveness. The dissertation asserted the duality vis-à-vis role impact as mission effectiveness observing a trend in literature, which tends to overemphasize the positive impact and underestimate the negative ones, or vice versa. This created the need to examine such discourse through empirical case studies while also comparing two distinct theatres to better understand the possibilities, challenges, and overall impact of EU-led SFA missions in Africa.

This hypothesis was confirmed by the research shedding light on the more nuanced and varied impact of EU gender mainstreaming policy on the Union's SFA missions in Africa. On the one hand, either we focus on counterinsurgency conducted by SNA or FADM or international stabilization efforts, such as EU SFA missions, the argument of Mao Ce-tung, previously cited in this research on the importance of bringing the water to the "*right temperature*" is one to kept in mind. Based on this assumption, missions have to understand that in making sure civilians are either supportive or at least not actively countering efforts, the role of women is essential. The 'right temperature' in this case depends on women as much as on men in the operational areas. Multiple contributions from a military perspective of gender mainstreaming were found and were reinforced by this dissertation. First of all, gender

mainstreaming in EU SFA, when properly integrated into a mission's work, can enhance intelligence and situational awareness, which are fundamental components of any mission in relation to force protection, legitimacy, and maintaining up-to-date information on both belligerent and friendly forces, as well as other actors. As demonstrated by both case studies, the role of women as informants and recruiters for Mozambican and Somali al-Shabaab, as well as their involvement in enabling or countering violent extremism, is a critical factor that missions must consider as part of their efforts to support the counterinsurgency operations of the respective nations. From an intelligence perspective the Union's functionalist argument to engage with local women found to be crucial not only from a force protection perspective but for overall situational awareness and legitimacy of the missions. However, gender mainstreaming often results in making women who chose to live with their agency in an invisible way visible; putting them in harm's way by depriving them from what makes agency the most powerful: societal perceptions of the lack of female agency. It is important to learn from lessons in Afghanistan, where efforts of empowering women through very visible, oftentimes uniformed service, often made them an even more targeted for gender-based violence (Robinson, 2024). Nevertheless, in a broader SSR sense, gender mainstreaming through external training including as integral part of IHL and human rights training can contribute to protection of civilian population. At this same time, such training can also be conducive to avoiding that the trainees and subsidized forces commit human rights abuses non-coherent with the Union's self-conceptualization.

On the other hand, however, gender mainstreaming and WPS implementation as norm promotion can lead to push back from partners negatively impacting not only the mission itself but overall CSFP and CSFP efforts in the respective countries. As this dissertation found, this backlash can undermine important elements of mission effectiveness both internally and externally. EUTM troops, particularly in Somalia, including personnel holding the GENAD position, questioned not only the prioritization of the gender advisors work, but its overall utility for the mission including the possible harmful effects on the mission in case of external gender mainstreaming. Anecdotal evidence also demonstrated several occasions where gender equality norm promotion, including the push for more women in the partner forces, or more gender training to trainees met with adverse reactions especially from SNA personnel and leadership. In these cases, SNA' role expectation on training soldiers for

combat clashed with the Union's normative self-conceptualization both in terms of its own role as well as the role performance (what and how to do) and what is the expected (role) impact.

Another rather visible clashing point is that the EU is promoting gender equality in partner forces and through SFA in armies with largely similar percentage of women in the ranks as EU countries. Moreover, if looking CSDP military engagement specifically, both SNA in Somalia and FADM in Mozambique have more women in their respective armed forces than the 7% average of female troops in EU military missions (European Parliamentary Research Services, 2017; Pfeifer, 2022). Nevertheless, the reported numbers of SNA and FADM personnel should be approached with caution, given the widespread issue of 'ghost soldiers'—individuals listed on paper but absent in reality. Within this context, the EU's push for integrating female soldiers into partner armed forces may incentivize these beneficiaries to artificially inflate the number of female soldiers as a means to secure additional aid tied to conditionality. At the same time, the EU actively seeks to promote gender equality and recruit women into its own CSDP missions—identified earlier as one of the most frequently referenced aspects of gender mainstreaming among EU personnel. Through this internal norm promotion, the EU attempts to influence an issue that primarily falls under the responsibility of member states. Consequently, this represents an area where EU actorness remains highly limited.

Based on the aforementioned, 'double-edged' findings of gender mainstreaming and its impact on military CSDP mission in Africa, this dissertation showed the risks of "overselling" or overpromoting gender while it also underlined the risks of not integrating it into its CSDP efforts. Moreover, the evidence gathered suggest that while the EU conceptually does not oversell the contribution of gender mainstreaming, it certainly overgeneralizes its application in military operations. Overgeneralization or as a counterargument, tailoring expectations was already argued by the author of this thesis with Molnár vis-à-vis EU CSDP missions (Molnár and Gracza Hornyák, 2024). While the overgeneralization can primarily be attributed to the EU's lack of capabilities and capacities to meet its own requirements outlined in strategic and legal documents for gender mainstreaming, the Union's adherence to its normative self-conceptualization often leads to overlooking the context-specific and sensitive nature of norm promotion in military CSDP missions, including SFA. Not having a gender advisor (or political advisor), or filling capacity gaps with personnel less prepared,

experienced and/or committed to gender equality, can make the mission overlook cultural context, including gender norms, which could both possible enabler or hindrance to the role impact.

Lastly, the EU's adherence to its normative self-conceptualization is also often lacks the conceptual understanding and practical implications of norm promotion where the norms are automatically deemed universal, such as gender equality and norms are conceptualized defined by certain societal groups, regions or organizations (see e.g. Panebianco, 2006; Sjursen, 2006; Orbie, 2011). As Robinson (2024) argued, Western norm promotion efforts are often not considered to be norm promotion, but something which is a moral obligation also leading back to the right-based argumentation. As the case of EUTM Somalia showed that gender mainstreaming as norm promotion can lead to serious backlash from the partner countries as they often view such efforts as disruptive to their culture or own societal norms. It can also erode trust and legitimacy for the mission which negatively impact effectiveness.

- *H5: The direct inclusion of WPS or gender mainstreaming related provisions into the mission mandate results in the enhanced implementation of gender mainstreaming in the role performance and role impact.*

EUTM Mozambique was the first EU military CSDP missions, including SFA mission where WPS was integrated into mandate. While this research found correlation between the integration of WPS into the mandate and an enhanced implementation of gender mainstreaming more case studies need to be analysed for determining causality. Nevertheless, the new reasoning and approach to gender mainstreaming as an order also bring new perspective to this hypothesis. If political-strategic directions and mandates are directly deriving from Council decisions establishing missions, the integration of the WPS into such important document establishes an operationalization requirement in the chain of command. Therefore, it creates a task for the mission commander in MPCC, the force commander on the ground as well as the different elements of the mission, such as force protection, civil affairs or special advisors for the commander, including the GENAD. Moreover, it further provides transparency on the expected role performance and mandate implementation for the mission not solely for the mission itself, but for the partners benefiting from the training and assistance. Accordingly, the integration of WPS into the mandate in EUTM Mozambique not only gave more legitimacy for the GENAD's work and position but impacted overall mission performance and effectiveness by

dedicating resources to specific mandate-related activities. Again, this enabled the troops to work with gender mainstreaming as norm promotion as part of their 'job' instead of something which 'should be done'; this dispositive language of most EU WPS and gender equality documents vis-à-vis external action was highlighted in Chapter 7. On the other hand, it is important to emphasize that compulsory nature of gender mainstreaming based on mandate integration does not automatically mean better implementation, but it likely turned a page from looking at gender mainstreaming as an order instead of an "extracurricular" activity.

In contrast with Mozambique, EUTM Somalia starting in 2010 where the current strategic framework for gender mainstreaming was still developing, the mission was not tasked with WPS implementation officially. However, as an example of internal member states push for implementation, Sweden decided to second a gender advisor who was based in Uganda in an environment where the engagement with trainees was very limited and where the mission's essential functions, as highlighted in Chapter 8. were highly dependent on cooperation with other actors. This is why interviewees asserted that especially in the early mandates of EUTM Somalia the operational utility of GENADs were rather low regardless of the level of expertise they brought with themselves. This was toppled with the fact that WPS related activities were not part of the mandate making the position often viewed as less relevant when it comes to operational challenges, such as transportation of soldiers from and to the training camps, making someone pay their salaries/per diems or make sure that they are not underaged. Therefore, WPS implementation efforts in EUTM Somalia stayed *ad hoc*, exposed to individual commitment or lack of commitment to do something to reflect on the increasing strategic and policy expectations deriving from the developing EU gender mainstreaming framework in CSFP and CSDP.

To circle back to the research questions and summarizing the findings the dissertation found that the EU persist in conducting gender mainstreaming in its external action, including SFA in Africa because it views itself as a normative security provider who invokes the norm of gender equality as one of its constitutional values. Moreover, gender equality as a norm further legitimizes the Union's normative actorness in the time of crisis, as asserted in the Global Strategy and in the Strategic Compass. In this framework WPS implementation and gender mainstreaming supposed to uphold the EU's normative self-conceptualization when its policies or actions, be active or passive, would challenge such normative image; for example,

training SNA or FADM with a long history of human rights abuses and violations, but while engaging with them making sure that liberal-democratic norm promotion is 'part of the deal'.

The dissertation further shed light on the existence of three distinct reasonings for gender mainstreaming in EU CSFP and CSDP of military nature: a right-based or normative argumentation which is directly connected to the Union's previously highlighted self-conceptualization as a normative power; the functionalist reasoning vindicating the operational utility and the contribution of gender mainstreaming to operational effectiveness; and a new approach based on the logic of carrying out an order, the 'chain of command' argument. Whilst all three was detected in the data collected for this research, the last one was the prominent in the two cases studies with EUTM Somalia challenging the operational utility and with EUTM Mozambique showing a dominantly positive impact on role performance and impact.

9.3   Additional non-hypotheses related findings and conceptual observations

In the initial phase of this research the empirical focus of EU gender mainstreaming was on military CSDP. However, early engagement with the existing literature and the evolving security dynamics in Europe, including the launch of an EU military assistance mission to Ukraine, shed light on the importance of security force assistance in contemporary EU external action. The establishment of CSDP and the setup of a long-awaited EU military C2 structure, as Chapter 5. concluded, led to the consolidation of what this dissertation calls the 'contemporary CSDP triad': civilian missions, military operations and military missions or EU SFA missions as conceptualized in this dissertation. Through researching such evolution of the military aspects of EU external action including EU SFA missions in Africa, the research found that the EU's power identity is heavily reliant on its world-wide presence through CSFP with EU delegations and CSDP missions. While being more reliant and more comfortable with using military CSDP instruments, the overall still low level of military readiness and capabilities of the EU toppled with its normative self-conceptualization led to the EU 'playing' military limited by its normative ideals. Therefore, in many CSDP contexts, the Union can 'show up' militarily but cannot be impactful and effective militarily. This suggests—primarily based on the nature and characteristics of EU SFA deployments, such as their footprint or capacity—that the primary aim is not necessary military effectiveness, but rather the institutionalization

and enactment of the EU's self-conceptualization as a normative yet powerful actor in international politics. As Seabra asserted, it is *"crucial to distinguish between providers invested in effective changes of local security forces and those more in tune with lesser tangible gains"* (Seabra, 2021, p. 683). This context is particularly relevant in the case of several African countries, including Somalia and Mozambique, which as highlighted through this research, has become hotspots for great power competition through SFA.

In the EU SSR-focused SFA model this effectiveness is not necessarily identified only with military effectiveness, but rather understood as compliance with international law and liberal democratic values, including the Western understanding of civil-military relations. At the same time, the anecdotal evidence from the missions especially insights from military personnel on the military-strategic and operational levels shows that EU troops are often convinced that the goal of the mission is making the partner forces more effective. With regards to this issue, further research is needed specifically focusing on the foreign policy decisions to launch CSDP missions of military nature, including SFA missions to understand better what factors with what impact are present in these decisions or what makes a CSDP intervention sustainable over time.

Furthermore, through investigating the Somalia and Mozambique case studies this research found that the political economy of SFA as such was not only present between the provider and the beneficiary (EU and FGS), but between the different providers as well. This also underlined that while the principal-agent theory can be useful for the conceptualization of the first dynamics, it serves with insufficient answer with regards to the more complex environment of SFA characterized by provider-to-provider relationships alongside provider-beneficiary relations. Role theory, however, can provide a more flexible framework where the role conceptualization, institutionalization, performance and impact can be studied in relation to other provider and the beneficiary as well. Further applications can include for example on how the EU's role conception is contested or accepted by other stakeholders analysing for example the role expectation of the US towards the EU in a certain SFA context.

9.4   *Contribution to the scholarship and future research*

This research contributes to the existing literature in an interdisciplinary manner through three major topics: EU actorness and its normative constraints; EU gender

equality policy and gender mainstreaming as a norm promotion in EU external action; and CSDP literature, specifically on contemporary CSDP triad and military missions as EU SFA missions. More broadly, the results are applicable throughout different disciplines such as security studies, EU studies and women or gender studies. As the first comprehensive scholarship on EU gender mainstreaming understood as norm transfer the dissertation contributes to the more nuanced understanding of norm promotion in military CSDP setting specific to gender equality. Additionally, this research serves as added value to EU SFA literature as one of the first investigation applying the US/NATO concept of security force assistance to EU military training missions as one of three components of the CSDP triad. Moreover, the empirical contribution is significant not only because it looks at case studies which are highly relevant in global great power competition in 2024, but which likely stay prioritized by primarily atypical SFA providers, such as China in the future. Furthermore, while EUTM Somalia as a case study has been under some scholarly scrutiny since its launch in 2010, the dissertation facilitates further research with being a first empirical case study on EUTM Mozambique as a second-generation EU SFA mission. Lastly, this dissertation contributes not only to the conceptual understanding of gender equality norm transfer and EU security force assistance, but also provides opportunity to enhance the literature with policy focused findings and recommendations discussed in subchapter 9.5.

Two further, major topics arise from the findings of this dissertation: the 'what and how' of EU-led SFA and the 'what and how' of gender mainstreaming.

As briefly addressed in the previous subchapter, these questions include, for instance, what added value could have a very small footprint SFA mission within not only a highly complex local political contexts, but in countries experiencing a proliferation of SFA providers based on 'some assistance and training is better than no training approach'. Moreover, with the EU considering sending military advisors and trainers to Ukraine in 2024, this dissertation can offer an important conceptual framework to bridge the gap between the EU and US/NATO conceptualization of SFA enabling cooperation between likeminded partners supporting Ukraine. With regards to further research on gender mainstreaming, both in- and outside of the EU, it would be interesting to see as whether the aforementioned chain-of-command reasoning behind the why gender perspective is important is present in NATO missions, such as KFOR or UN peacekeeping missions with military components. Moreover, further

research cannot solely investigate how this new argumentation for the WPS agenda or overall gender mainstreaming in military contexts is present, but how it affects implementation institutionally and individually; or how it influences the other two arguments. Will militaries only do gender mainstreaming because it is ordered? Where does this put the moral or right-based argumentation as well as the operational utility in strategic or institutional discourses? Does the chain of command argumentation mean that military personnel and institution look at gender mainstreaming as a chore?

Additional future scholarship can benefit from this dissertation vis-à-vis the application of role theory in EU external action and specific military CSDP intervention. Further research questions can be formed around the role of different agents, such as individuals or single member states, such as Sweden and the Netherlands, in different EU policy processes, including the deployment of SFA mission in the Africa and beyond or the usage of EPF funding for SFA purposes. There are at least three important (new) trends about which future research can benefit from this scholarship: the Union's reconceptualization of its role in the Sahel after the closure of two EU SFA missions, Niger and Mali in the last two years; the Union's role in regional security vis-à-vis the Ukraine war, specifically SSR and SFA processes and EPF funding; and the possible new dynamics the newly appointed HP/VP, previous Estonian prime minister, Kaja Kallas, can bring to EEAS and the EU in global affairs.

9.5 Policy recommendation

a) The present and future of gender mainstreaming in military CSDP and the GENAD system

The question that often arises vis-à-vis the GENAD system, but overall gender mainstreaming in military context is whether the current norm promotion will exponentially increase the legitimacy of a gender perspective and will eventually make the GENAD system unnecessary. This would mean that gender mainstreaming has become an inherent part of all different joint functions, including the responsibilities of key leaders, commanders of the missions. While the current system is aiming at achieving this 'ideal' situation, as this research highlights, it creates internal and external grievances about resource allocation, staffing and utility in terms of often limited external engagement. Moreover, the more concerning issues is that the EU striving for filling these positions in missions, the quality of seconded and deployed experts are highly varied which not only determines how they can perform in the

position, but also directly contribute to the internal grievances against the position and the system itself and gender mainstreaming as a norm transfer.

In order to 'fix' the current flaws, the EU might benefit from focusing more on the quality of GENADs, as well as the practicality of their work, such as ability to leave the compound and the ability to continuously engage with trainees. As an answer to internal gender mainstreaming efforts, EEAS could elaborate a specific induction training programme for new contingents and staff arriving as a part of in-processing where central concepts and practical information would be combined with the local cultural context. This would require coordination between the Gender and Diversity Team at EEAS, the geographical desk (officer) responsible for the region/country and EUMS, and the mission itself, in order to be militarily applicable, conceptually coherent with the EU gender mainstreaming strategic framework, but also culturally context specific. This briefing can be delivered by the GENAD or civil affairs officer of the mission, which would be particularly important in the SFA contexts, and largely land-based operations.

b) *More listening*

While this recommendation might seem self-explanatory, it is still a largely overlooked aspect both in EU SFA and beyond. Reflecting on international and US efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, Robinson suggested more listening and less push for liberal values for more effective and sustainable mission outcomes (Robinson, 2024). However, based on the findings of this research, more listening should not only involve more listening to local perspectives. It is also imperative that actors between different parts of the EU chain of command communicate and listen more given that MPCC director is the commander of all missions, while the force commander is considered to be the operational level. If the EU wants to put more focus on the impact of its SFA deployments and security cooperation, the political-strategic level has to listen to the military-strategic and operational levels; this includes more listening at force commanders, troops on the ground and the mission command at MPCC. This would include more funding and personnel for the EUMS and MPCC and would likely lead to more realistic and specific mandates instead of overgeneralized, largely SSR-focused ones. The EU has to recognize that making EU troops and EU SFA missions doing SSR work is not what the military is primarily trained for even if the past decades member states' armed forces were almost exclusively used for peacekeeping, SFA and other primarily non-kinetic purposes.

c) A niche and specific profile for the EU as a new, atypical SFA provider

If the EU wants to sustain its efforts in the African continent and strengthen its profile as an international security provider, it should consider finding a rather niche portfolio which matches its capabilities instead of sporadically engage and provide EPF funding for different partners. A small footprint advisory mission specialized on military strategic and operational advice to MoDs and general staff—similarly to the new mandate in Mozambique—with using its new 'carrot', EPF. Maintaining a training capability or training pillar which due to its footprint and rather strict force protection measures is almost completely limited vis-à-vis monitoring and follow-up of trainees is neither sustainable nor strategic. It is an impossible task that mostly delegitimizes EU actorness in the long-term. Additionally, these scattered efforts burn EU money; while not taking away from the EU common budget, these resources could be invested in the Union's own military capabilities, interoperability and defence. Lastly, the EU must acknowledge that identifying a niche area of expertise or a portfolio aligned with its specific capacities and capabilities could, in the medium and long term, facilitate partnerships with like-minded allies and SFA providers on the ground, such as the UK and the US. This is particularly important because its normative approach, while often considered an added value, is challenging to translate into effective security cooperation in an era of great power competition in regions like Somalia or Mozambique.

d) A need for an EU SFA strategy, including an 'EU Leahy Law' for SFA

For the EU to find its way for enhanced security cooperation and SFA it should consider adopting a specific security cooperation and security force assistance strategy. While the EU Strategic Compass addresses this topic under 'tailored bilateral partnerships', considering the Union's enhanced engagement as an SFA provider in the last close to 15 years, that this is not enough. This EU SFA strategy could include the conceptualization of the aforementioned EU SFA expertise on strategic advising and mentoring MoD and general staff which would fit into the Union's normative self-conceptualization as well as would be better suited to the Union's conceptualization of SFA as a pillar of SSR. However, this approach would likely make the EU as an SFA provider a less attractive partner for fragile states with fragmented security sector and with heavy resource scarcity. The main reason of this is that these nations are looking for a partner subsidizing their security sector—and often indirectly their political

elites—and they are expecting material resources from a provider, like weapons, vehicles, soldiers' salaries, barracks, etc. This means that while the EU would offer primarily a non-material version of capability development, the partner would expect a more tangible approach to capabilities. Since 2021 the EU has the opportunity to build a bridge between this interest asymmetry—as conceptualized by Biddle et. al. (2018)—or demand-supply asymmetry with the EPF. The EU could offer to subsidies building of barracks, infrastructure, acquisition of weaponry etc. and by being heavily involved in strategic and operational advising on the MoD and general staff levels would be able to better monitor how this money is spent. These acquisitions would also have the opportunity to bolster the EU and European defence industry which has been forcefully (re)vitalized in the last 10 years.

Nevertheless, all the aforementioned action and policies would require strategic guidance on the 'why', 'how' and 'when', including when the EU should say no. In answering the latter, the strategic framework of EU SFA should include provisions similar to the Leahy Law in the US; which, while being fiercely debated vis-à-vis its applicability, would provide the conceptualization of when the EU refuses to provide military assistance. If the EU wishes to uphold the already critiqued normative self-conceptualization, it has to build-up a credible conditionality system while subsidising these partner countries where armed forces often involved in human rights violations against not only belligerent forces, but their own civilian population. This is particularly important as in contrast with its predecessor, APF, military assistance through EPF can include the lethal weapons. With a more strategic approach to SFA including the aforementioned consideration, the EU would be able to create an assistance system which better matches to its normative consideration on the basis of stricter conditionality, while having a niche and sustainable expertise and profile for SFA toppled with EPF as the 'sweetest carrot' in the bucket.

9.6   Concluding thoughts:

If militaries would only deal with quantifiable elements of war and conflict, neither gender equality, nor peacekeeping would be a topic. Drawing a parallel with the topic of culture—which could and should include gender perspective—retired US Marine Corps Major, Dr. Ben Connable argued that culture in Afghanistan was a "*squishy thing that generated no meaningful data. It never stood a chance in the battle for intelligence focus and funding.*" (Connable, 2018). Similarly, integrating a gender

perspective in military operations still proved to be uncountable, which makes the narrative of the EU particularly sensitive about gender mainstreaming and its contribution to operation effectiveness. What is more concerning that most aspects of SFA efforts in the current EU model also barely generate such 'meaningful data'. While anecdotal evidence from the field did highlight possible direct and indirect contributions of gender mainstreaming to effective mandate implementation, these often seem to conceal some counterarguments and operational challenges in particular in Somalia through EUTM. Consequently, as Connable argued with regards to culture in warfare, "*we had to be careful not to oversell*", because as much as the EU would like to emphasize the positive attribution of gender equality as a norm, gender mainstreaming as a policy push to transfer it as a norm can "*easily be misread as a drive to make*" gender "*the dominant consideration in warfare*" (Connable, 2018). Whilst certainly an important element to consider regardless we are thinking about irregular warfare, peacekeeping, security force assistance or more conventional aspects of armed conflict, the author concludes this research with the argument that the gender perspective is and will be an important element of both offence and defence in the future making it worth of learning, reading, writing and most importantly debating.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AMISOM: African Union Peacekeeping Mission to Somalia

APF: African Peace Facility

ATMIS: African Union Transition Mission in Somalia

AU: African Union

AUSSOM: AU Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia

BTC: Bihanga Training Center in Uganda

CA: Comprehensive approach

CARD: Coordinated Annual Review on Defence

CFSP: Common Foreign and Security Policy

CivOpCom: Civilian Operation Commander

COE: Contemporary operational environment

CoE: Council of Europe

CMR: Civil-Military relations

CONOPS: Concept of Operations

CPCC: Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability

CSDP: Common Security and Defence Policy

CSOs: Civil Society Organizations

CTTT: Counter Terrorism Training Team

DGEUMS: Director General of the EUMS

EC: European Commission

EDA: European Defence Agency

EEAS: European External Action Service

ESDP: European Security and Defence Policy

EUADG: EU Ambassador on Gender and Diversity

EU BG: EU Battle Groups

EUEAS: EU External Action Studies

EUGS: EU Global Strategy

EUMC: EU Military Committee

EUMS: EU Military Staff

EUNAVFOR: EU Naval Force

ENP: European Neighbourhood Policy

EP: European Parliament

EU RDC: EU Rapid Deployable Capability

EUTM: EU military training mission

EUMAM: EU Military Assistance Mission

EUSC: EU Strategic Compass

FADM: Mozambican Armed Forces

FGS: Federal Government of Somalia

FHQ: Force Headquarters

FMS: Federal Members States of Somalia

FMT: foreign military training

FPA: Foreign Policy Analysis

FOC: Full Operational Capability

GBV: gender-based violence

GE: Gender Equality

GENAD: Gender Advisor

GEP: Gender equality policy

GM: Gender mainstreaming

IA: Integrated approach

IHL: International Humanitarian Law

HoM: Head of Mission

HR/VP: High Representative and Vice President

IMET: International Military Education and Training

JSCC: Joint Support Coordination Cell

MILEX: Military Exercise

MoEs: Measures of effectiveness

MPCC: Military Planning and Conduct Capability

NPE: Normative Power Europe concept

OHQ: Operational Headquarters

OPLAN: Operation Plan

PESCO: Permanent Structured Cooperation

PP: principled pragmatism

PSC: Political and Security Committee

PSOs: peace support operations

PO: Participant/Participatory Observation

QRF: Quick Reaction Forces (of the Mozambican Armed Forces)

RoE: Rules of Engagement

SA: security assistance

SADC: Southern African Development Community

SAMIM: SADC Mission in Mozambique

SC: security cooperation

SFA: security force assistance

SGBV: sexual-and gender-based violence

SGF: Somali General Staff

SMoD: Somali Ministry of Defence

SNA: Somali National Army

SOP: Standard Operating Procedures

SOTS: Somali Owned Training System

SSF: Somali Security Forces

SSR: security sector reform

TCC: troop contributing country/countries

TEU: Treaty on European Union

TFEU: Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

TtT: train(ing) the trainers

UNSC: United Nations Security Council

UNSCR: Resolution of the United Nations Security Council

UNSOS: United Nations Support Office in Somalia

WPS: Women, Peace and Security

Appendix 1. CSDP missions and operations database[87]

N°	Beginning	End	Name	Civilian/ military	Abbreviation	Alternative name	Personnel	OHQ	Notes:
1.	2003.01.01	2012-06-30	European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina	civilian	EUPM BiH	N/A	774[5]	?	
2.	2003.03.31	2003-12-15	European Union Military Operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	military operation	EUFOR Concordia	Operation Concordia	400[5]	NATO - ACO	
3.	2003.06.12	2003-09-01	European Union Military Operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo	military operation	EUFOR Artemis	Operation Artemis	1800[5]	France	
4.	2003.12.15	2005-12-14	European Union Police Mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia[i]	civilian	EUPOL FYROM	EUPOL Proxima	200[5]	?	
5.	2004.07.16	2005-07-14	European Union Rule of Law Mission in Georgia[e]	civilian	EUJUST Georgia	EUJUST Themis	27[5]	?	
6.	2004.12.02	—	European Union Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina	military operation	EUFOR BiH	Operation Althea	600[5]	NATO - ACO	
7.	2005.04.12	2007-06-30	European Union Police Mission in Kinshasa[g]	civilian	EUPOL Kinshasa	N/A	?	?	
8.	2005.06.08	1905-07-08	European Union Security Sector Reform Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo[f]	civilian	EUSEC RD Congo	N/A	?	?	
9.	2005.07.01	2013-12-31	European Union Integrated Rule of Law Mission in Iraq	civilian	EUJUST LEX Iraq	N/A	?	?	
10.	2005.07.18	2007-12-31	European Union Support to African Union Mission in Sudan[k]	civilian	AMIS EU Supporting Action	N/A	?	?	
11.	2005.09.15	2006-12-15	European Union Monitoring Mission in Aceh	civilian	AMM	N/A	?	?	
12.	2005.11.25	—	European Union Border Assistance Mission to Rafah	civilian	EUBAM Rafah	N/A	?	CPCC	
13.	2005.12.01	—	European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine	civilian	EUBAM Moldova and Ukraine	N/A	?	CPCC	
14.	2005.12.15	2006-06-14	European Union Police Advisory Team in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia[j]	civilian	EUPAT	N/A	?	?	
15.	2006.01.01	—	European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories	civilian	EUPOL COPPS	N/A	?	CPCC	
16.	2006.06.12	2006-11-30	European Union Military Operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2006)	military operation	EUFOR RD Congo	N/A	2300[5]	Germany	
17.	2007.06.15	2016-12-31	European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan	civilian	EUPOL Afghanistan	N/A	?	?	
18.	2007.07.01	2014-09-30	European Union Police Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo[h]	civilian	EUPOL RD Congo	N/A	?	?	
19.	2008.02.12	2010-09-30	European Union Mission in Support of Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau[d]	civilian	EUSSR Guinea-Bissau	N/A	?	?	
20.	2008.03.17	2009-03-15	European Union Military Operation in Chad and the Central African Republic	military operation	EUFOR Tchad/RCA	N/A	3700[5]	France	
21.	2008.10.01	—	European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia	civilian	EUMM Georgia	N/A	?	CPCC	
22.	2008.11.05	—	European Union Naval Force Somalia	military operation	EU NAVFOR Somalia	Operation Atalanta	1200[5]	Spain	Mandate extended until Dec, 2024
23.	2008.12.09	—	European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo	civilian	EULEX Kosovo	N/A	?	CPCC	
24.	2010.04.10	—	European Union Training Mission in Somalia	military mission	EUTM Somalia	N/A	100[5]	MPCC	Mandate extended until Dec, 2024
25.	2012.07.01	—	European Union Capacity Building Mission in Niger	civilian	EUCAP Sahel Niger	N/A	?	CPCC	
26.	2012.07.16	—	European Union Capacity Building Mission in Somalia[a]	civilian	EUCAP Somalia	EUCAP Nestor[b]	?	CPCC	Mandate extended until Dec, 2024
27.	2013.02.01	2014-01-01	European Union Aviation Security Mission in South Sudan[c]	civilian	EUAVSEC South Sudan	N/A	?	?	
28.	2013.02.18	2024-05-17	European Union Training Mission in Mali	military mission	EUTM Mali	N/A	500[5]	MPCC	
29.	2013.05.01	—	European Union Integrated Border Assistance Mission in Libya	civilian	EUBAM Libya	N/A	?	CPCC	
30.	2014.02.10	2015-03-23	European Union Military Operation in the Central African Republic	military operation	EUFOR RCA	N/A	600[5]	Greece	
31.	2014.04.01	—	European Union Capacity Building Mission in Mali	civilian	EUCAP Sahel Mali	N/A	?	CPCC	Mandate changed and extended until Jan, 2025
32.	2014.12.01	—	European Union Advisory Mission in Ukraine	civilian	EUAM Ukraine	N/A	350+	CPCC	
33.	2015.03.23	2016-07-16	European Union Military Advisory Mission in the Central African Republic	military mission	EUMAM RCA	N/A	?	?	
34.	2015.06.22	2020-03-31	European Union Naval Force Mediterranean	military operation	EUNAVFOR Med	Operation Sophia	?	ITA-JFHQ	Italy or NATO?
35.	2016.07.16	—	European Union Training Mission in the Central African Republic	military mission	EUTM RCA	N/A	?	MPCC	Took over from EUFOR RCA
36.	2017.11.22	—	European Union Advisory Mission in Iraq	civilian	EUAM Iraq	N/A	?	CPCC	
37.	2019.01.01	—	European Union Advisory Mission in CAR	civilian	EUAM RCA	N/A		CPCC	
38.	2020.03.31	—	European Union Naval Force Mediterranean	military operation	EUNAVFOR Med Irini	Operation Irini	?	ITA-JFHQ	
39.	2021.12.12	—	European Training Mission in Mozambique	military mission	EUTM Mozambique	N/A		MPCC	
40.	2022.02.22	—	European Military Assistance Mission in Ukraine	military mission	EUMAM Ukraine	N/A		MPCC	
41.	2023.02.20	2023-12-31	European Military Partnership Mission Niger	military mission	EUMPM Niger	N/A		MPCC	initial mandate is for 3 years - why not a EUTM?
42.	2023.02.20		EU Mission in Armenia	civilian	EUM Armenia	N/A		CPCC	
43.	2023.04.24		EU Partnership Mission in the Republic of Moldova	civilian	EUPM Moldova			CPCC	
44.	2024.02.19	—	EUNAVFOR Operation Aspides	military operation	EUNAVFOR Med	Operation Aspides		Italy, Greece (OHQ Larissa)	

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[87] Color coding marking EU military CSDP action; blue maritime operations, green EU SFA missions.

Appendix 2. List of events included in the participatory observation data collection

N°	Date	Location	Organizer	Event	Present as:
1.	2021	Brussels, Belgium	European Security and Defence College, Doctoral School on CSDP	Annual Summer University, Doctoral School on CSDP 2021	Doctoral fellow participant
2.	2022	Brussels, Belgium	European Security and Defence College, Doctoral School on CSDP	Annual Summer University, Doctoral School on CSDP 2022	Doctoral fellow participant
3.	2022	Brussels, Belgium	European Security and Defence College, Doctoral School on CSDP	Annual Conference of the Doctoral School on CSDP	Doctoral fellow participant /Presenter
4.	2022	Larnaca, Cyprus	European Security and Defence College	Integration of a gender perspective in CSDP course	Doctoral fellow participant /Presenter
5.	2023	Bucharest, Romania	European Security and Defence College, Doctoral School on CSDP	Annual Summer University, Doctoral School on CSDP 2023	Doctoral fellow participant
6.	2024	Hamburg, Germany	European Security and Defence College, Doctoral School on CSDP	Annual Summer University, Doctoral School on CSDP 2024	Doctoral fellow participant /Presenter

Appendix 3. Dissertation Interview Guide

1. **EU's normative self-conceptualization as an international security provider**

   Main questions to be answered: How does the EU perceive itself as an international security provider?
   Sample: EU officials, members of EEAS and its institutions: EUMS, CPCC,
   Type of interview: semi-structured

   Questions & Probes:

   ✓ How would you describe the EU's role in international security?
   ✓ Is this role of the EU in international security unique? (If yes, how?)
   ✓ Does the EU have fundamental values? (If yes, what are those?)
   ✓ How does the EU contribute to peace and security?
   ✓ Why does the EU think that its contribution to international peace and security is relevant?
   ✓ What kind of security cooperation is in the focus of EU external action?

2. **EU's assumption that GM contributes to mission effectiveness.**

   Main questions to be answered: How does the EU narrative links gender mainstreaming to operational or mission effectiveness?
   Sample: EU officials, members of EEAS and its institutions: EUMS, CPCC, gender specialists in EEAS, gender advisors in missions. EU personnel trained in GM.
   Type of interview: semi-structured

   Questions & Probes:

   ✓ Have you ever been trained on gender issues by an EU institution, such as ESDC?
   ✓ If yes, what was the main takeaway for you from this or these trainings? (Why do you think this is the main take away (for you?)
   ✓ Could you please elaborate what kind of training you received?
   ✓ Why does the EU conduct gender mainstreaming in CSDP missions and operations?
   ✓ Is there a link between gender mainstreaming and mission or operational effectiveness? (If yes, how does gender mainstreaming contribute to the effectiveness of EU missions and operations?
   ✓ How does the Strategic Approach provide different framework than the Comprehensive Approach?
   ✓ How the gender advisors work differently from a CIMIC advisor? Isn't the GA "only" a CIMIC advisor who is also trained in gender issues?

3. **GM indicators/ variables for quantification and measurement**

   Main questions to be answered: How does the EU measures gender mainstreaming and how does the EU collect data from missions-specific context for localized assessment of gender mainstreaming in CSDP missions and operations?

Sample: EU officials, members of EEAS, gender advisors, gender specialist, members of the EP
Type of interview: semi-structured

Questions & Probes:

✓ Does the EU collect sex disaggregated data from CSDP missions and operations?

✓ If yes, since when did the EU start to collect such data?

✓ How does the EU track gender mainstreaming or WPS implementation efforts from mission-specific environment? (Is it through the reports of the gender advisor on the field?; If there is no gender advisor there is no tracking or is it delegated to one of the GFPs?)

✓ If yes, who and with what frequency reports about WPS implementation from the field?

✓ How frequently the EU can reach personnel and conduct training on gender mainstreaming?

✓ How does the EU do data collection for the gender mainstreaming indicators listed in the EU Action Plan on WPS?

✓ How many gender advisors have been deployed to EUTM Somalia since the beginning of the mission?

✓ How does the EU tracks expenditure specifically on WPS related activities by missions?

✓ Is WPS specific expenditure part of the mission budget or is separately allocated specifically on a project-based budget?

4. Mission effectiveness

Main questions to be answered: How the EU measures mission effectiveness and whether is there a specific way to measure effectiveness in SFA/ military training missions?
Sample: EU officials, members of EEAS and its institutions: EUMS, CPCC, Politico-Military Group, troops or civilian experts served in Somalia or in other training missions
Type of interview: semi-structured

Questions & Probes:

✓ How does the EU define the endstate of CSDP missions? (Is there a specific way to define the desired endstate in the case of EUTMs?

✓ How does the EU define mission effectiveness?

✓ How does the EU measure effectiveness in CSDP missions?

✓ When does the EU measure effectiveness?

✓ Does MPCC use NATO standards for assessing effectiveness?

✓ Does MPCC manage a lessons learned database for missions and operations or only for the missions they command?

✓ Is the method of measuring effectiveness the same in civilian and military missions?

✓ If yes, how are military training missions special in terms of measuring effectiveness?

- ✓ Do you think it is important to look at mission effectiveness in case of EUTMs in a different framework from other CSDP missions and ops of military nature?
- ✓ What is the minimum requirement for soldiers to be deployed to a training mission?
- ✓ Are soldiers deployed based on domestic selection and "offer during the force generation" process?
- ✓ How EUTM's mission effectiveness contribute to the overall ability of Somalia to build a stable security sector and maintain monopoly of violence over its territory?

5. Case Study – Somalia and Mozambique

Main goal of the questions is to obtain data for the two variables.
Sample: EU officials, members of EEAS and its institutions: EUMS, CPCC, Somali stakeholders who interacted or worked with the mission, academics/ experts on Somalia (including Somali experts), troops or civilian experts served in Somalia.
Type of interview: semi-structured

Questions & Probes:

- ✓ Since when has been the EU conducting gender mainstreaming in EUTM Somalia?
- ✓ Why EUTM Somalia does not have a mandate since the 7th one which was concluded in the end of 2021?
- ✓ How many trainees received tactical training in EUTM Somalia?
- ✓ What average drop-out rate EUTM Somalia experienced or experiences in terms of the trainees trained by the mission?
- ✓ Did any high level, high visibility visit take place between EU and Somali counterparts (from mission commander level – Brussels to HPVP)?
- ✓ How does the Somali Owned Training System established by the mission function?
- ✓ Were there any Somali strategic or operational documents created with EUTM support in that time/during that mandate? If, yes, how many?
- ✓ How many women served or serve in EUTM Somalia?[88]
- ✓ Does EUTM Somalia advising component advice SNA in all levels?

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[88] depending on the interviewee's access to data (and memories) – whether it is a former EUTM employee or a previous or current EEAS personnel.

Appendix 4. Research Consent From for Interviews

Research Project: Doctoral dissertation: Gender Mainstreaming as Norm Transfer in EU military training missions

Research Investigator: Veronika Hornyák, PhD candidate

Institution: Ludovika University of Public Service, Budapest, Hungary (Ludovika-UPS); Doctoral School on CSDP within the European Security and Defence College (ESDC)

Hereinafter*: Researcher*

Research Participants Name: ……………………………………………………………..

Institution/Position: …………………………………………………………………….

Hereinafter*: Interviewee*

The Interviewee agrees to participate in the Research Project voluntarily and understands that he/she will not benefit directly from participating in this research.

The Interviewee understands that the information provided during the interview can be used for purpose of the data collection for the Research Project.

The Interviewee confirms that prior to the Interview she/he had the opportunity to ask questions about the Research Project to have a full understanding of the purpose and nature of the study which was explained to him/her by the Researcher.

The Interviewee agrees to being recorded during the interview.

The format of the interview: *Semi-structured*

The Researcher and the Interviewee has agreed on the following terms in connection with confidentiality and the usage of the information obtained via the interview:

    a) The Interviewee does/does not request anonymity.

    b) When cited or quoted in connection with the Research Project, the Interviewee shall be referred to as …………………………………………………………………

    Date: ……………………………

                             …..…………………………………

                                  Interviewee

Appendix 5. Gannt Diagram on EU WPS action 2000-2024

		European Commission is responsible for equality issues and WPS											From the Commission, issues on WPS and gender and security are transferred to the EEAS.								
EU ACTION ON GENDER & SECURITY	2000	2001-2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
WPS resolutions	1325					1820	1888, 1889	1960			2106, 2122		2242				2467, 2493					
Political documents				Council Conclusions on promoting gender equality and gender mainstreaming in crisis management								Non-Paper on ending sexual violence in conflict: A Guide to practical actions at EU level'	Progress Report of 'Non Paper on Ending Sexual Violence in Conflict: A Guide to Practical actions at EU level' / Gender Equality & Women's Empowerment: Transforming the Lives of Girls and Women through EU External Relations 2016-2020'	EUGS; EU 2016-2019 Strategic Engagement on gender equality	EP resolution			REPORT on Gender Equality in EU's foreign and security policy				
Overall EU Strategic documents, actions plans			Implementation of UNSCR 1325 in the context of ESDP (11932/2/05)			Comprehensive Approach to the EU implementation on Women, Peace and Security	Implementation of UNSCR 1325 & UNSCR 1820 in the context of training for ESDP missions and operations		Report on the EU Indicators for the Comprehensive Approach to the EU implementation of the UNSCRs 1325 & 1820 on WPS	Implementation of UNSCR on Women, Peace and Security in the context of CSDP missions and operations (7109/1/25)		2nd Report on the EU Indicators for the Comprehensive Approach to the EU implementation of UNSCRs 1325 & 1820 on WPS (6219/14)	The EU input to the Global Study on WPS (7595/15); 15th anniversary and Global Review of UNSCR 1325 on WPS, Commitments of the EU and MSs (12904/15)	EU GAP II / Third Report on the progress of the 'Non Paper on Ending Sexual Violence in Conflict — A Guide to Practical actions at EU level' (2016 — doc. 14329/16)	EU Policy on Training for CSDP 7838/17 / PAG non-paper: informal Roadmap&work plan on Gender Equality, Women's Empowerment & the implementation of UNSCR 1325 on WPS (665/2017 INIT)	EU Strategic Approach to Women, Peace and Security 2018	EU Action Plan on WPS 2019-2024	EU GAP III				
Action plans & documents (Civilian)				Checklist on gender mainstreaming and implementation of UNSCR 1325 in ESDP Operations				package or 3 draft concepts containing min. standard training elements on Human Rights, Gender and Child Protection Indicators for the Comprehensive Approach to the EU								CPCC Operational Guidelines for mission management and staff on gender mainstreaming						
Action plans & documents (Military)													Guidelines for EU Military Training Discipline Leader (11192/15)			Upgraded Generic Standard of Behaviour for CSDP Missions and Operations		EUMC Training Requirement Analysis Document on Gender in EU Military Training				European Union Military Concept for Gender Mainstreaming
Methodology														Revised Indicators for the Comprehensive Approach to the EU implementation of the UNSCRs 1325 and 1820 on WPS (08085/16)	EUMC Training Requirement Analysis on Gender by Spain as DL					SOP for gender in EUMS		
Institutionalization							Informal Task Force on WPS						Appointment of PAG	Spain appointed Discipline Leader for the Gender EU Military Training				PAG position cease to exist	Ambassador for Gender and Diversity appointed			

Appendix 6. List of interviews

	Name/ preferred reference	Interview Date	Interview Location
Interviewee °1	EEAS expert	05/11/2021	online
Interviewee °2	Fernando Moreno (Col. Ret.), Former EEAS Senior Strategic Planner	04/08/2022	online
Interviewee °3	Colonel Lucero	17/08/2022	online
Interviewee °4	Fernando Moreno (Col. Ret.) Former EEAS Senior Strategic Planner	11/8/2023	online
Interviewee °5	Professor Paul D. Williams, PhD	11/6/2023	online
Interviewee °6	Dr. Colin Robinson	9/10/2024	online
Interviewee °7	Professor Robert Egnell, PhD	9/9/2024	online
Interviewee °8	EEAS Policy officer	7/19/2024	online
Interviewee °9	Anonymus (Somali government)	8/28/2024	online
Interviewee °10	EU official	5/3/2024	Washington D.C.
Interviewee °11	an EU military advisor	5/3/2024	Washington D.C.
Interviewee °12	Colonel Jose Latorre	8/8/2024	online
Interviewee °13	Marco	07/26/2024	online
Interviewee °14	Cdr. Maymone	8/13/2024	online
Interviewee °15	Anonymus	8/8/2024	online
Interviewee °16	LTC Kesselmark	10/2/2024	online
Interviewee °17	Hinda Abdi Mohamoud	8/19/2024	online
Interviewee °18	GENAD EUTM RCA	8/6/2024	online
Interviewee °19	Lisa Arlbrandt	9/25/2024	online
Interviewee °20	Natalie Trogus	8/23/2024	online
Interviewee °21	Farhia Mohamud	9/11/2024	online
Interviewee °22	DoD Gender/WPS actor	9/24/2024	online
Interviewee °23	Maj Nielsen	10/2/2024	online
Interviewee °24	Signe Arnfred	10/22/2024	online
Interviewee °25	EEAS representative	10/3/2024	online
Interviewee °26	EU Official	7/12/2024	online

Appendix 7. Somalia Chronological table

	Year	Event	Note or Further explanation
Somalia political context chronology			
1.	1969	Somalia independence	Somalia gaining independence from previous colonizer, Italy
2.	1969-1991	Siad Barre Presidency	clan-based militas playing a key role in this era which is carried on to the contemporary context
3.	From 1991	"Mosaic of Power"	
4.	1992-1993	Launch of UNOSOM I	UN launched a peacekeeping mission, United Nations Operation in Somalia
5.	1992	US offers the creation of Unified Task Force (UTF) in Somalia	this intervention is also known as Operation Restore Hope happened with the deployment of an international coalition led by the US
6.	1993-1995	Launch of UNOSOM II	UN launched a second peacekeeping mission, United Nations Operation in Somalia; the mission was ended by the evacuation of UNOSOM II personnel by Operation United Shield led by the US
7.	1995-2000	Power vaqum in the absance of international troops leaving Somalia	This period and the subsequent years led to the establishment of al-Shabaab in Somalia which subsequently gained foot in the majority of the country, including the Mogadishu area
8.	2000	Transitional Government Established (TGS)	
9.	2004	Transitional Federal Government established (TFG)	
10.	2006	Ethiopia invaded Somalia	
11.	2007	AMISOM launched	AU-led peacekeeping mission in Somalia AMISOM was launched with more than 20.000 troops being the largest AU mission
12.	2008	EU deploys EUNAVFOR Atalanta	EU deploys its maritime mission against piracy and SFA with Somali coast guard
13.	2008-2011	al-Shabaab takes Mogadishu	most of South and Central Somalia, including the capital is under al-Shabaab rule
14.	2010	EU launches EUTM Somalia	EU launches EUTM Somalia initially in BTC, Uganda
15.		EU Launches EUCAP Somalia	EU launches civilian CSDP mission, EUCAP Somalia
16.	2011	AMISOM forces retake Mogadishu	Transitional Federal Government (TFG) relocates to Mogadishu
17.	2012	new parliament and beginning of Hassan Sheik Mohamud presidency	Federal Government of Somalia is established (FGS), which is still the most often recognized legitimate state authority globally for Somalia
18.	2014	EUTM Somalia moves to MIA	EUTM Somalia moves from Uganda to the capital, Mogadishu to the UN compoud next to Mogadishu International Airport
19.	2017	beginning of Mohamed Abdullah Mohamed "Farmajo" presidency	previous PM, Mohamed Abd. Mohamed is appointed as president
20.	2022	AMISOM transition to ATMIS	AMISOM hand over its responsibilities to a transitional force preparing for the AU peacekeeping forces from Somalia
21.		2nd Hassan Sheik Mohamud presidency	
22.	2024	Somaliland agreement with Ethiopia	Somaliland agrees with Ethiopia allowing access to the neighbouring country to the see in exchange of Ethiopia recognizing Somaliland
23.	2024	ATMIS transition to AUSSOM	UNSCR reinforce that ATMIS will not hand over directly to SNA, but an AUSSOM mission will be established by 2025

*Colour coding: Blue marks UN intervention; yellow marks EU deployment; green marks AU missions

Appendix 8. Mozambique chronological table

	Year	Event	Note or further explanation
		Mozambique political context chronology	
	Year	**Event**	**Note or further explanation**
1.	**1964-74**	Mozambican independency war	Idependency war against the Portugese previous colonial power
2.	**1975**	Mozambique becomes independent	After a long civil war, Mozambique became independent from the previous colonial power, Portugal
3.		FRELIMO Party establishes one-party system	
4.	**1977-1992**	Mozambican civil war	Civil war between Frelismo (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique) and Renamo (Resistência Nacional de Moçambique)
5.	**1992**	Rome Peace accords- end of civil war	UN-led peace deal led to the end of the civil war and the establishment of a multi-party system
6.	**1993-1995**	United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)	ONUMOZ was deployed to monitor the ceasefire agreement and help with DDR after the post-independence civil war
7.	**1994**	Elections won by the Frelimo party wins	First elections in a multi-party system Frelimo (socialist) party wins
8.	**2013**	conflict resurges between Frelimo and Renamo	
9.	**2015-2018**	First Filipe Nyusi presidency	Nyusi, head of Frelimo party is elected as president
10.	**2017**	civil war breaks out in Cabo Delgado province	Civil war breaks out between Islamist group, al-Shabaab and moderate Muslims and the central government
11.	**2019**	2019 Maputo Accord for Peace and National Reconciliation	
12.		First US Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) with Mozambique	Since 2019 the US has been conducting JCET yearly, concluded the 6th JCET with FADM Commandos in 2024
13.	**2021**	Portugal-Mozambique security cooperation agreement	Security cooperation includes small SFA element with the deployment of 60+60 troops to train FADM soldiers in Catembe and Chimoio
14.		EUTM Mozambique deployed	EU deploys EUTM Mozambique, its first CSDP mission in the region and the country
15.		SADC mission SAMIM deployed	Southern African Development Community (SADC) deploys mission to Mozambique
16.		Rwandan Defence Forces deployed	Rwanda bilaterally supporting Mozambique's counterinsurgency
17.	**2020-2024**	Filipe Nyusi presidency	Nyusi reelected
18.	**2024**	EUTM Mozambique transition to EUMAM Mozambique	EUTM Mozambique transition to EUMAM Mozambique in Septermber 2024
19.		Presidency of Daniel Chapo (FRELIMO)	after the elections the FRELIMO party won and Daniel Chapo became president

*Colour coding: Blue marks UN intervention; yellow marks EU deployment

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