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DOCTORAL SCHOOL OF MILITARY SCIENCES



**MILITARY POWER AS FOREIGN POLICY INSTRUMENT:
POST-1991 ETHIOPIAN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN
THE HORN OF AFRICA**

PH.D. DISSERTATION

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**IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN
MILITARY SCIENCES**

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DECLARATION

I declare that **Military Power as Foreign Policy Instrument: Post-1991 Ethiopian Peace Support Operations in the Horn of Africa** is my original work and has not previously been submitted by me for a degree at another university. All primary and secondary sources used have been duly acknowledged.

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Colonel Dr. Boldizsár Gábor

ABSTRACT

A foreign policy consists of two elements: national objectives to be achieved and the means for achieving them. Simultaneously, military power is the crucial machinery of government against internal and external security threats. The Military apparatus is also vital in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy and the state's functioning in the international system. This study analyzes the juncture of foreign policy and military power in the Ethiopian peace support operation in the Horn of Africa until 2019.

In the Horn of Africa region, security matters. The region is known for protracted civil wars, interstate wars, drought, terrorism, religious fundamentalism, state collapse, political tension, large-scale human displacement, piracy, cattle rustling, militarization, and environmental degradation. One of Ethiopia's key foreign policy objectives is its national security, and the means to achieve it through vigorous peace support operations carried out in Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, and Abyei are a manifestation to preserve its own and the region's peace and security.

The research design of this study is a mixed-method research approach that is both quantitative and qualitative. Primary and secondary data sources to address this research objective and justify the fact of conceptual issues for the investigated require a holistic data discussion. This study is descriptive research, based on the previous studies by Buzan and Waever and Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier showing in the regional security complex of Horn of Africa how Ethiopia is becoming influential in the region's security order due to its extensive peace support operations in the region.

The study finds out that Ethiopia's approach to the Horn of Africa regional security has been primarily influenced by minimizing its vulnerabilities and immediate national security threats. Its national role in peacekeeping emanates from, and this role has become the defining paradigm for its foreign policy engagement.

Moreover, Ethiopia is a crucial player in the Horn of Africa, and, despite the recent internal conflict, its peace support operations have been crucial for maintaining stability in the region. Its role aided by its military's strength and active participation in regional peace and security operations; its capacity and willingness to combat terrorism; a Pan-Africanist legacy; and its effective utilization of multilateral platforms; will keep Ethiopia's regional hegemony and visibility.

ABSTRACT IN HUNGARIAN

A külpolitika két elemből áll: az elérendő nemzeti célokból és azok elérésének eszközeiből. Ugyanakkor a katonai hatalom a kormányzat döntő mechanizmusa a belső és külső biztonsági fenyegetésekkel szemben. A katonai apparátus létfontosságú a külpolitika és az állam nemzetközi rendszerben való működésének megfogalmazásában és végrehajtásában is. Ez a tanulmány elemzi a külpolitika és a katonai hatalom kapcsolatát az Afrika szarván található etiópai béketámogató műveletben 2019-ig.

Afrika szarvának régiójában a biztonság számít. A régió elhúzódó polgárháborúkról, államközi háborúkról, aszályról, terrorizmusról, vallási fundamentalizmusról, állam összeomlásáról, politikai feszültségről, nagymértékű emberi kitelepítésről, kalózkodásról, szarvasmarhák zúgásáról, militarizációjáról és a környezet pusztításáról ismert. Etiópia egyik legfontosabb külpolitikai célkitűzése a nemzetbiztonsága, és a Szomáliában, Szudánban, Dél-Szudánban és Abyei-ben végrehajtott erőteljes béketámogató műveletek révén történő elérésének eszközei saját és a régió békéjének és biztonságának megőrzése.

A tanulmány kutatási felépítése vegyes módszerű kutatási megközelítés, amely kvantitatív és kvalitatív egyaránt. Az elsődleges és a másodlagos adatforrások ennek a kutatási célnak a kezelésére és a vizsgált fogalmi kérdések tényének igazolására holisztikus adatmegbeszélést igényelnek. Ez a tanulmány leíró kutatás, amely Buzan és Waeber, Stewart-Ingersoll és Frazier korábbi tanulmányain alapszik, és Afrika szarvának regionális biztonsági komplexumában bemutatja, hogy Etiópia miként válik befolyásosvá a régió biztonsági rendjében a kiterjedt békefenntartó műveletek miatt. vidék.

A tanulmány megállapítja, hogy Etiópia Afrika szarvának regionális biztonságához való hozzáállását elsősorban sebezhetőségének és azonnali nemzetbiztonsági fenyegetések minimalizálása befolyásolta. A békefenntartásban betöltött nemzeti szerepe származik, és ez a szerep a külpolitikai szerepvállalásának meghatározó paradigmájává vált.

Ezenkívül Etiópia kulcsfontosságú szereplő Afrika szarván, és a közelmúltbeli belső konfliktus ellenére békefenntartó műveletei kulcsfontosságúak voltak a régió stabilitásának fenntartása szempontjából. Szerepét katonai ereje és a regionális béke- és biztonsági műveletekben való aktív részvétel segíti; képessége és hajlandósága a terrorizmus elleni küzdelemben; pánafríkista örökség;

és a multilaterális platformok hatékony felhasználása; meg fogja őrizni Etiópia regionális hegemoniáját és láthatóságát.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AIAI	Al Ittihad Al Islamiya
AU HIP	AU High-Level Implementation Panel
UNISFA	UN Interim Security Force for Abyei
SFG	Somalia Federal Government
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AU	African Union
CJTF– HOA	Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa
COE	Contingent Owned Equipment
CTSAMM	Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism in South Sudan
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DPPA	Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs
DPO	Department of Peace Operations
DPKO	Department for Peacekeeping Operations
ENDF	Ethiopian National Defense Force
EPRDF	Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front
EU	European Union
EU NAVFOR	
EU NAVFOR Somalia	European Union Naval Force Somalia (Operation Atalanta)
EUCAP Somalia	EU Regional Maritime Capacity Building for the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean
EUTM Somalia	EU Training Mission

FDRE	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
LAPSSET	Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia-Transport
MoD	Ministry of Defense
MSCHOA	Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
POC	Protection of Civilian
RCI-LRA	Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord’s Resistance Army
RPF	Rwandese Patriotic Front
SNA	Somali Police Force
SPF	Somali National Army
TCC	Troop Contributing Countries
TPLF	Tigray Liberation Front
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	AU–UN Mission in Darfur
UNC	United Nations Command
UNDPKO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operation
UNMID	African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNSOM	United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia
UNSOS	United Nations Support Office in Somalia

USSR	United Soviet Socialist Republic
WIO	Western Indian Ocean

CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTIONS

This section discusses the background, statement of the problem, research questions, the study's hypothesis, and the methodological tools applied in this research. It gives an overview of the study's central points, the methods and the reasons for adopting the methodological strategy used in the dissertation, why specific methods are chosen over others, and the justification for choices made.

1.1 Background of the Study

Peacekeeping is an operation involving military personnel, undertaken by the United Nations or by other multinational organizations to help maintain or restore international peace and security in conflict areas. United Nations or other organization, which deploys troops in conflict areas, do not have their military. It is the member states, which contribute troops for peacekeeping missions. In this regard, different states have their motives to contribute to international peace support missions. This can be because of international pressure, to exert regional influence, spread their values and perspectives, gain greater prestige and influence internationally, national security and political gains, or monetary profit for the country, and increased size quality of their military.

In the Horn of Africa, there have been a high presence of AU, EU, NATO, and UN military support operations in the region. There is currently a presence of peace support missions¹ in Darfur, Sudan; the Abyei Sudan–South Sudan border; Somalia; and South Sudan. In the past, there were missions in Somalia, in the Ethiopia-Eritrea border, in Uganda-Rwanda border, and Sudan. From the first UN mission in the region in 1992 until 2019, there were 19 multinational peace support operations by AU, EU, IGAD, and UN. Twelve of them are current, three in the past, and also four others failed missions.

The Horn of Africa consisted of Ethiopia, Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, and the world's newest state South Sudan, one of the most volatile regions in the world for almost half a century. The region has been rocked by and known for civil war, drought, famine, state failure, a rogue state, piracy, and migration. Ethiopia has been a center of all the conflicts and

¹ The terms peacekeeping operation and peace support operations will be used interchangeably. The detailed differences between these words will be discussed in Chapter 3.

peace support operations. Especially Ethiopia directly involved in deploying thousands its troops in all current AU and UN peacekeeping missions. The United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) in Sudan, Darfur, United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), in South Sudan, United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), in Abyei, and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in Somalia. Ethiopia, besides maintains one of the region's most effective armed forces, battle-hardened and experienced following a history of combat operations, since 2015 – 2019, Ethiopia has been the top overall troop contributor to UN peacekeeping missions. Adding its AU peacekeeping and its unilateral involvement in Somalia, it is the second country in the world next to the US with foreign deployed troops.

Besides all these peace support missions in the region, the Horn of Africa has become one of the world's most militarized regions. Currently, there are fifteen states with operational military bases, one under construction and two with possible existing military facilities, in Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, and Somaliland. Besides, there is a high military naval presence in the nearby waters of the Red Sea, Gulf of Eden, and Bab al-Mandab.

Ethiopia is found at the Horn of Africa's nucleus, where the turbulent political condition and political atmosphere affect foreign policy-making and execution since the reign of Emperor Tewodros II. Even today, Ethiopia's approach to the Horn of Africa regional security has been primarily influenced by minimizing its vulnerabilities and its immediate national security threats where its national role in peacekeeping emanates from, and this role has become the defining paradigm for its foreign policy engagement.

The study is focused on Ethiopia, and it is surrounding the Horn of Africa region. It analyses the region's security complex and analyses the rationales behind Ethiopian peacekeeping operations in its next-door neighbors. It reveals that, in post-1991 Ethiopia, the Ethiopian military is not there only to fight a war but to involve in humanitarian assistance where no civilian alternative exists.

As a result, this study, by studying the missions mentioned above, and the region's security complex, will contribute to the field of military science a strategic level recommendation that can be used for national defense policy. It also contributes to the knowledge of the security threats of the region that are also concerns of the global community.

The study concludes that the spillover effects are felt in Ethiopia and other regions of the Horn of Africa because of conflicts in neighboring states, and these make sending peacekeeping troops to neighboring states to help to create a strong and functioning government is not a matter of altruism but a matter of national security. That is why Ethiopia responded to AU and UN peacekeeping operations and sent its troops to all conflict zones in the region.

1.2 Research Objectives

The following are the main research objective of the study:

- * To investigate reasons for Ethiopia's participation in peacekeeping operations.
- * To analyze trends in Ethiopian peace support operations from 1952 until 2019.
- * To investigate the current Ethiopian peace support operations capabilities and limitations.
- * To examine the Ethiopian foreign policy trends concerning Ethiopian peacekeeping deployment.
- * To analyze the Horn of Africa security complex and Ethiopian security interest in the region vis-à-vis the nature of Ethiopia's peace operations.
- * To examine Ethiopian Ethiopia as a Regional Hegemon or Regional Power influence in the Horn of Africa in relation to Ethiopian peace support operation in the region.
- * To analyze Ethiopian Geopolitical Interest and Security Risk Responsiveness vis-à-vis its Peace Support Operation Deployment

1.3 Statement of the Problem

A research problem is a statement about an area of concern, an under-explored subject in the research area, or it can be a knowledge gap. In this regard, there are quite plenty of works of literature on most countries, security dynamics, participation, and a reason behind their participation in peace support operations; however, though Ethiopia is one the top contributor in peacekeeping operations in the world for about a decade, there is lack comprehensive research and limited literature are available. Similarly, there are adequate studies on the security matters in the Horn of Africa region, and still, Ethiopia's extensive peace support operation involvement is lacking.

Currently, there is Ethiopian presence of peace support missions in the Horn of Africa, in the United Nations Mission in Darfur, (UNAMID) in Sudan, Darfur, United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), in South Sudan, United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), in Abyei, and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in Somalia.

With all its internal security challenges at home, Ethiopia keeps its position of sending a large number of troops to be deployed through the African Union, United Nations, and unilaterally in the region. This is supposed to be studied, and the how and why Ethiopia continues to play this role, and Ethiopian foreign policy interest regarding peacekeeping troop contribution has to be answered.

1.4 Research Questions

Following the identified research problems above, the following are the research questions addressed by this research;

- * What is the reason for Ethiopia's participation in peacekeeping operations?
- * What is the reason behind Ethiopia's peacekeeping deployment focus mostly at the Horn of Africa? And what are the security rationales behind it? What factors shape the policymakers' choice to participate?
- * What is the Security complex of the Horn of Africa and its relations with Ethiopian participation in peacekeeping?
- * What is the outlook of the Ethiopian army on Ethiopian peacekeeping participation?
- * How the peacekeeping missions Ethiopia has been undertaking is being used to promote and maintain Ethiopia's national interest, regional standing, and its contribution to peace-making efforts.

1.5 The Hypotheses of the Study

- * The study's central hypothesis is the post-1991 Ethiopian government's use of its military power capability or show of force and force presence through peacekeeping operations as its foreign policy instrument to deal with its security challenges in the neighboring Horn of African states. In addition to this, the following are also the hypotheses of the study.

- * Ethiopia's security is tied up with its regional complex of the Horn of Africa region; the region's countries involved high display levels of security interdependence. It considers this when it formulates its foreign policy. This is manifested in its peace support operations which are focused on its next-door neighboring states.
- * Ethiopia's approach to the Horn of Africa regional security has been primarily influenced by minimizing its vulnerabilities and immediate national security threats. Its national role in peacekeeping emanates from, and this role becomes the defining paradigm for its foreign policy engagement.
- * The Ethiopian government peacekeeping operations in the Horn of Africa were established by the Ethiopian hegemonic regional power and used as a political and foreign policy influence in the region.
- * Because of the states' nature in the Horn of Africa and the regional security complex of the Horn states, Ethiopia's multilateral (UN and AU) and unilateral interventions are justifiable for its security and stabilizing the region.

1.6 Description of Variables

This research addressed three variables of the study, foreign policy, military power, and peacekeeping operation. The first two were independent variables when the last one was not. A country's decision to participate in a peacekeeping mission is rooted on its national values, interests, its foreign policy and the capability of its military power. Thus, this study discusses Ethiopia's foreign policy, military power and analyzes Ethiopia's peace support operations.

1.7 Research Design

As the research's overall objective is to assess the post-1991 Ethiopia's use of its military through peacekeeping operations in the Horn of Africa as its foreign policy instrument until 2019, this research is intended to be descriptive. As Kothari noted, research design makes research as well-organized as possible, hence yielding maximum evidence with a minimal outlay of struggle, time,

and money.² Besides, the research design is the blueprint that facilitates the smooth functioning of all research operations.

1.8 Research Methodology

The research design of this study is a mixed-method research approach that is both quantitative and qualitative. Primary and secondary data sources to address this research objective and justify the fact of conceptual issues for the investigated require a holistic data discussion.

The rationale for employing the qualitative method is that the qualitative research method aims to address questions concerned with developing an understanding of the meaning and experiences of humans' lives and social worlds.³ Qualitative research also explores attitudes, behavior, and experiences through interviews with key informants who know the issue under study.

This study is based on the previous studies by Barry Buzan,⁴ and it further show in the regional security complex of Horn of Africa how Ethiopia is becoming influential in the regional security order due to its extensive peace support operations in the Horn of Africa.

This study is descriptive research, which provides an accurate portrayal of characteristics of a particular individual, situation, or group. These studies are a means of discovering new meaning, describing what exists, determining the frequency with which something occurs, and categorizing information.⁵

1.8.1 Methodological Strategy (Level of Analysis)

Studies in the international political system like foreign policy or security studies have five most frequently used levels of analysis that can provide a framework: International Systems (which encompasses the entire globe), International Subsystems (International Organizations), Unites

² Kothari, C.R. *Research Methodology: Methods and Techniques*. New Delhi: New Age International Limited, Publishers, 2004. 14.

³ Creswell, J. W. and J. David Creswell. *Research design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches*. 5th Edition. Sage Publications Inc, 2009. 189.

⁴ Buzan, Barry. *People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*. 2nd Edition. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester, 1991.

⁵ Kothari, *Research Methodology*... 37.

(states), Subunits (organized groups within units), and Individuals.⁶ This study primarily focused on the analysis of four of them: International Systems, particularly the UN, which operates at the system level and that authorize PKO across the world. International Subsystems like AU, IGAD are chief peace and security actors in the security of Africa and in the Horn of Africa sub-region. The Unites for this study of analysis are the states in the sub-region Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda; and finally, Subunits of state bureaucracies like Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, National Armies and other armed groups or terrorist organizations are the main focus.

1.8.2 Sampling Design

The sampling methods used is stratified random sampling. This method is used when the population is stratified into several non-overlapping subpopulations or strata, and sample items are selected from each stratum. When the items selected from each stratum are based on simple random sampling, the entire procedure, first stratification, and then simple random sampling are stratified random sampling.⁷ In this study, the study population, members of Ethiopian armed forces, at Hurso Contingent Training School, was first stratified into two, those who were about to deploy and those who returned from deployment. Then randomly selected the population from each group. The total number surveyed was 420 men and women in uniform, 410 contingents, 210 pre-deployment, 200 post-deployments, and 10 Staff Officers.

⁶ Buzan, Barry et al. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. London: Lynne Rienner Publisher Inc, 1998. 5-6.

⁷ Kothari, *Research Methodology*... 16.

1.9 Source of Data for the Study




Figure 1.1 Source of Data for the Study

For this research, qualitative data collected from secondary and primary sources; this study gathers multiple forms of data through various means such as interviews, questionnaires, and document reviews rather than depend on a single data source. The primary data was collected using questionnaires and interviews. On the other hand, secondary data are one step removed from the actual event or experience and provide criticism or interpretation of a primary source.⁸ Secondary

⁸ Babbie, Earl. *The Basics of Social Science Research*. New York: Thomson Wadsworth, 2008. 306.

sources like books, published and unpublished materials, relevant academic literature, official reports, and research documents were used to complement, strengthen, and make it reliable the data collected from primary sources. The research is used Chicago Manual of Style of referencing for citing secondary resources as it is the tradition in the Journal of the Hungarian Defence Forces, Defence Review.

1.10 Structure of the Study

This study took shape eight chapters. The first chapter is the introduction, which covers the study's background, statement of the problem, research objective, research question, the hypothesis, the variables of the study, and the research methodology.

The second chapter deals with the conceptual and theoretical background. It discusses four concepts: first foreign policy and its objectives, instruments, and factors that affect foreign policy. Second, military power its purposes and ranges, the third one of the core theoretical framework, regional security complex, and the fourth, regional hegemon or regional power theory is covered. The third chapter is the continuation of the second chapter with deals with the peace support operations, which is the central conceptual framework of this study.

The fourth chapter, as a background, deals with Ethiopian foreign policy and military power. It describes the historical trend of foreign policy and military capability and goals. The fifth chapter deals with the regional security complex of the Horn of Africa, where Ethiopia is playing a significant role. It describes the states of the region, trends of conflict, trends of peace support operations, and finally, it reviews Leenco Leta's peacekeeping concept⁹ in the region.

The sixth chapter is about the historical and contemporary peace support operation of Ethiopia. Mainly it divides and analyses the four generations of Ethiopian peacekeeping operations and describes the trends and capabilities of Ethiopian peacekeeping operations, including reimbursement. Most importantly, it covers 25 survey questions of 420 ENDF members' outlook on Ethiopian peacekeeping deployment.

⁹ Leenco Lata, in his book, (Leta, Leenco. *Peacekeeping as State Building: Current Challenges for the Horn of Africa*. London: The Red Sea Press. 2012. 11-12). argues peacekeeping operations in the Horn of Africa are used as state-building mechanisms, not only for solving existing conflicts but also 'engaged in either state deconstruction or reconstruction.'

The seventh discussion chapter of the study deals with the nexus of national security, foreign policy, military power, and Ethiopia's peace support operations. First, it outlines four geopolitical interests and security risks of Ethiopia: the neighboring Horn of Africa region, the general African countries, the Red Sea region, and the global arena. Then it describes the Ethiopian next-door peace support operation and its justification. Next, it gives four rationales of Ethiopian peace support operations. Lastly, it analyses the justification of Ethiopia as a regional hegemon in the region. The final eighth chapter is the conclusion and recommendation of the study, including the scientific results learnt.

CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW: CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

“Domestic policy can only defeat us; foreign policy can kill us.”

John F. Kennedy

“We must begin by acknowledging the hard truth that we will not eradicate violent conflict in our lifetimes. There will be times when nations — acting individually or in concert — will find the use of force not only necessary but morally justified.”

Barack Obama

This chapter will deal with two focal concepts of discussion in this study – foreign policy and military power. Two principal theoretical backgrounds and frameworks are also discussed: first, regional security complex, which postulates that international security should be examined in the pattern of regionally-based clusters to be precise, security complexes, second regional hegemonic theory, which is a realist approach in the study of international relations.

2.1 Foreign Policy

2.1.1 Defining Foreign Policy

When we discuss any actions of a given state in global affairs, foreign policy is the very indispensable area to study because it is the ‘wheels with which the process of international politics operates.’¹⁰ Moreover, interdependence is one of the main features of international politics. Different scholars give different definitions for foreign policy from different viewpoints.

For K.R. Gupta and Vatsala Shukla, foreign policy is a ‘set of goals that seek to outline how a particular country will interact with other countries of the world.’¹¹ K.J. Holsti defines foreign policy as ‘the dealings of states with each other.’¹² Chris Alden and Amnon Aran defined foreign policy as ‘the conduct and practice of relations between different actors, primarily states, in the

¹⁰ Srivastava, L.S. and V.P. Joshi. *International Relations: From 1914 to Present Day*. Meerut: GOEL Publishing House, 1978. Part III, 3.

¹¹ Gupta, K.R. and Vatsala Shukla. *Foreign Policy of India*. Volume I. New Delhi: Atlantic Publisher and Distributors Ltd, 2009. 1.

¹² Holsti, K.J. *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*. 7th Edition. Prentice-Hall International Inc, New Jersey. 1995. 83.

international system.¹³ William Wallace defined foreign policy as ‘a stable set of attitudes towards the international environment, an implicit or explicit plan about a country’s relationship with the outside world.’¹⁴ For George Modelski, foreign policy involves all activities of a nation by which that nation is trying to change other nations’ behavior and adjust its behavior in the international environment.¹⁵ These scholars see foreign policy from the point of view of state relations with other states.

Padelford and Lincoln see foreign policy as ‘the key element in the process by which a state translates its broadly conceived goals and interests into a concrete course of action to attain these objectives and preserve interests.’¹⁶ With the same approach for Aliou S. Bojang foreign policy ‘leads a state in fulfilling its national interests and acquiring rightful place among the community of nations’¹⁷ and Cecil V. Crabb foreign policy ‘consists of two elements – national objectives to be achieved, and – means for achieving them.’¹⁸ For David Vital, Foreign policy is ‘a formulation of desired outcomes which are intended (or expected) to be consequent upon decisions adopted (or made) by those who have authority (or ability) to commit the machinery of the state and a significant fraction of national resources to that end.’¹⁹ Taye Brhanu also defined foreign policy as ‘strategy or planned course of action developed by decision-makers of state vis-à-vis other states or international entities. It determines the direction upon which a country’s international activity is based.’²⁰ From these definitions when we talk about foreign policy, there must be objective or interest of state, and state machinery or national resource, which will be used to get the desired outcome outside the boundary of that state. Additionally, there is a decision making body that decides on both the outcome and the machinery used.

¹³ Alden, Chris and Amnon Aran. *Foreign Policy Analysis: New Approaches*. Routledge. New York. 2017. 1.

¹⁴ Wallace, William. *Foreign Policy and Political Process*. London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1971. 11.

¹⁵ George Modelski cited in Gupta, Foreign Policy ... 1

¹⁶ Padelford and Lincoln cited in Srivastava, International Relations... 3.

¹⁷ Bojang, A. S. “The Study of Foreign Policy in International Relations.” *Journal of Political Science & Public Affairs*, 6/337. 2018. 3.

¹⁸ Cecil V. Crabb cited in Gupta, Foreign Policy ... 1

¹⁹ Vital, D. cited in Joseph Frankel. *National Interest*. London: Pall Mall Press Ltd, 1970. 18.

²⁰ Berhanu, Taye. *An Introduction to Ethiopia’s Foreign Policy: Its Process and Reflections pre-1991*. Addis Ababa: Far East Trading, 2010. 1.

Another aspect of foreign policy is that it is a continuation of domestic policy. Taye Berhanu defines foreign policy as a ‘reflection ... continuation, or expression of the domestic policy whereby a state may achieve some aspects of its national interests through its activities in international relations.’²¹

K. J. Holsti sees foreign policy as ‘ideas or actions designed by policymakers to solve a problem or promote some change in the policies, attitudes, or actions of another state or states, in non-state actors (e.g., terrorist groups), in the physical environment of the world.’²² Here, foreign policy is as tools of a state to peruse its national interest; whatever its national interest might be. Mostly security, economic, religious, or ideology. This leads to another important topic, national interest. What is the national interest of a state or an objective of a state’s foreign policy? Ultimately, to use the words of Andrew F. Cooper et al., ‘the overriding goal of foreign policy [is] the promotion, pursuit, and defense of the national interest.’²³ Furthermore, national interest’ is the center of foreign policy decision making for realists.

2.1.2 Objectives of Foreign Policy

Fundamental interests of the state, which are important for the state’s survival, are correlated with foreign policy. Foreign policies are designed to safeguard the state. K. J. Holsti listed the following as major foreign policy goals or objectives of states: security, autonomy (the ability to formulate and carry out domestic and external policies in terms of a government’s priorities); welfare (provide their citizens with social services and promote economic growth and efficiency); status and prestige; protection of ethnic, ideological or religious colleagues; and dreams of world recognition or creating a global empire.²⁴

²¹ Berhanu, An Introduction ... 1.

²² Holsti, K.J. *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*. 7th Edition. Prentice-Hall International, Inc, New Jersey. 1995. 83.

²³ Cooper, Andrew F. et al. “Introduction: The Challenges of 21st Century Diplomacy.” In Cooper, Andrew F. et al. (eds.). *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2013. 21.

²⁴ Holsti, *International Politics* ... 84 – 112.

2.1.3 Instruments of Foreign Policy

Studying foreign policy includes both the study of national objectives and the means or the instruments used for securing the national objectives.²⁵ The following are instruments of foreign policy that K. J. Holsti lists.²⁶

1. Diplomacy: Which is ‘the established method of influencing the decisions and behavior of foreign governments and peoples through dialogue, negotiation, and other measures short of war or violence.’²⁷ Diplomacy consists of diplomats involved in the diplomatic work and mainly are the employee of the ministry of foreign affairs inside and outside of a state.

2. Propaganda: This means disseminating information—facts, arguments, rumors, half-truths, or lies—to influence public opinion.²⁸ For this case, mainly the opinion of foreign governments or the international community.

3. Economic rewards and coercion: The following are major techniques of rewards and coercion in the international arena: tariffs, quotas, boycott, embargo, loans, credits and currency manipulations, blacklist, licensing, freezing assets, granting or suspending aid, including military sales or grants, expropriation and withholding dues to an international organization.²⁹

4. Clandestine actions and military intervention: Clandestine activities are ‘intelligence recruitment of, or collection by, a foreign intelligence asset, and military sensitive site exploitation of, or surveillance of, a facility in a denied or hostile area’³⁰ or assassination of government officials, diplomats, party leaders, or economic elites.³¹ Military intervention, which can be unilateral intervention or collective intervention, will be discussed in Chapter 3.

²⁵ Crabb Jr., Cecil V. *American Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age*. 3rd Edition. New York: Harper & Row, 1972. 1.

²⁶ Holsti, *International Politics*... 130 – 239.

²⁷ Freeman Chas. W. and Sally Marks Article. “Diplomacy.” britannica.com. 17 January 2019, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/diplomacy>, Accessed on 08 November 2019.

²⁸ Smith, B. L. *Propaganda*. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. November 07, 2019 <https://www.britannica.com/topic/propaganda>, Accessed on 08 November 2019

²⁹ Holsti, *International Politics*... 168 – 170.

³⁰ DeVine, M. E. “Covert Action and Clandestine Activities of the Intelligence Community: Selected Definitions in Brief.” fas.org. June 14, 2019. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R45175.pdf>, Accessed on 08 November 2019.

³¹ Holsti, *International Politics*... 199.

5. Weapons and war: Keeping the sovereignty of a state from foreign aggression or any attack is conventionally through weapons and war. The issue of acquiring a nuclear weapon or the global arms race became a key phenomenon in global politics. Obtaining the weapons by itself sends a message to other states. As Carl von Clausewitz pointed out, it can be said that ‘war is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce of [foreign policy], a carrying out of the same by other means.’³² Weapons and military force are an important instrument of a state in the institutional form.

2.1.4 Factors that Affect Foreign Policy

The formulation (of the national interest or objective) and implementation (the means and actions to achieve the objectives) of foreign policy should consider these factors or foreign policy elements. The following sixteen factors are taken from Gupta, K.R., and Vatsala Shukla,³³ which are not limited to.

1. Size of State Territory: Both human and non-human resources can be included in the size. Countries with large size mostly managed to be a big power in the world. For example, the USA, Russia, China, India, Brazil, and France. On the other hand, most Middle Eastern states, because of their oil recourses, able to have an important role in the international arena, or Israel and the United Kingdom, despite their small size, can influence their region and globally.

2. Geographical Factor: A geographical location of a state is the most durable factor. The landscape, the climate, being an island or landlocked, or having access to a sea, an ocean, share a navigable or non-navigable river with its neighbors are important determinants for a foreign policy.

3. Level and Nature of Economic Development: Having high or less economic power or being industrialized or agrarian highly determines the foreign policy’s objective or a state.

4. Cultural and Historical Factors: The traditions of a state in a given country or its religion, cultural or religious similarities with the neighboring state are important factors in formulating and setting foreign policy objectives. History is also an important factor. The historical formation

³² Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*. Hertfordshire: Wordsworth, 1997. 22.

³³ Gupta, *Foreign Policy* ... 4 – 12.

of a state, the artificial borders with its neighbors (especially in Africa) are the main determinates of foreign policy.

5. Social Structure: The nature of the society in a state, unified, or competitive will determine the strength or weakness of a state, which is also reflected in the foreign policy of that state.

6. Government Structure: The structure of government, the organizational foreign policy decision-making process, and the actors involved, democratic or authoritarian, determines both the means and the objective of foreign policy.

7. Internal Situation: The internal environment of a state, change of government or military coup, death of a prominent political leader, revolution are always factors of a change in the course of a foreign policy of the state.

8. Values, Talents, Experiences, and Personalities of Leaders: The values, talents, experiences, and personalities of the states' leaders, the diplomats, are always important in foreign policy. If the leader was an academician or a military officer can impact the foreign policy of a state.

9. Political Accountability: The issues of a competitive multi-party system or the nature of democratic accountability or the political system are significant in what kind of foreign policy a particular state follows.

10. Ideology: Foreign Policy is always based on a particular principle and ideology; liberalism, socialism, or developmental state or based on religious ideology. The ideology the state follows determines the objectives of the foreign policy and the means. A state's foreign policy towards states that follow the same ideology and with others is different.

11. Diplomacy: Diplomacy is a political activity and, well-resourced and skillful, a major ingredient of power ... which allows states to meet the goals of their foreign policies without resort to force, propaganda, or the law.³⁴ Diplomacy service and carried out, directed, and administered by most states' ministry of foreign affairs. The diplomatic skills or methods of a state's diplomats (ambassadors, ministers, attaches, councilors, etc.) are a major factor for the quality of its foreign policy and its foreign policy's success or failure objectives.

³⁴ Berridge, G. R. *Diplomacy Theory and Practice*. 4th Edition. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. 1.

12. International Power Structure (Global Strategic Environment): Global power relations determine foreign policy. The bipolar world system of the Cold War-era influenced the foreign policies of states. Currently, China's rise has highly influenced the foreign policies of most African states and rival states like the USA.

13. Public Opinion: Public opinion is another important factor that foreign policy considers when they formulate their foreign policy. The public's opinion about a particular issue sways the foreign policy for a reason not to lose their political base at home.

14. Technology: 'Technological changes can alter society's military and economic capabilities and thus its status and role in the international system.'³⁵ The state's technological power determined its foreign policy because it is crucial to leverage in the global economic, security, or political arena.

15. External Environment: The external environment of a state or the political, security, or economic situations in its neighboring states are essential determinants of its foreign policy tools and objectives. A state's foreign policy towards a civil war-ridden neighbor or economically powerful will be very different.

16. Alliances and International Treaties (Bilateral and Multilateral): Alliances, Coalitions, International Organizations (IOs), and Regional Economic Communities (RECs between two or more countries for *ad hoc* or long-term economic or security purposes can regulate actions of foreign policy towards the member states.

2.2 Military Power

Military power is the most crucial tool in international relations. Military forces have many tasks, 'ranging from defending national territory to invading other states, hunting down terrorists, coercing concessions, countering insurgencies, keeping the peace, enforcing economic sanctions, showing the flag, or maintaining domestic order.'³⁶ Michael Howard describes the importance of the military in international relations as follows:

³⁵ Rosenau cited in Gupta, *Foreign Policy* ... 9.

³⁶ Biddle, Stephen. *Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004. 5.

The power which states exercise in international affairs is compounded of many attributes, economic, diplomatic, cultural, and ideological, as well as military. But military power, the capacity to use violence for the protection, enforcement, or extension of authority, remains an instrument with which no state has yet found it possible completely to dispense. Indeed, it is not easy to see how international relations could be conducted and international order maintained if it were totally absent. The capacity of states to defend themselves, and their evident willingness to do so, provides the basic framework within which the business of international negotiation is carried on. ... Attitudes towards the place of armed forces in international relations fall somewhere between two extremes. On the one hand, is the view that armed forces constitute a purely destabilizing factor on the international scene and that their abolition would lead to greater stability among nations.³⁷

Military power can be defined as a state's war-making capability. Military power is one of the most significant and palpable for states in global politics. It is the key machinery of government against internal and external security threats. Military power or the army is also 'one of the most visible and powerful forms of social organization.'³⁸ Klaus Knorr defines military power as 'the ultimately the power to destroy and kill, or to occupy and control, and hence to coerce. In the international system, military power – like other forms of influence – is a relation among states that permits one government to induce another to behave in a way which the latter would not have chosen freely.'³⁹

According to Michael Howard, war has been an indispensable aspect of societies for a long time. He said:

In most of the societies known to history, war has been an established and usually rather enjoyable social rite. In Western Europe until the first part of the seventeenth century, warfare was a way of life for considerable sections of society, its termination was for them a catastrophe, and its prolongation, official or unofficial, was the legitimate objective of every man of spirit. Even in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, war, elaborate and formal as its conduct had become, was an accepted, almost an indispensable part of the pattern of society, and it was curtailed and intermittent only because of its mounting expense.⁴⁰

³⁷ Howard, Michael. "Military Power and International Order" In Garret, John. (ed) *Theories of Peace and Security: A Reader in Contemporary Strategic Thought*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1970. 47.

³⁸ Watson, Cynthia and Constantine Danopoulos. "Introduction." In Danopoulos, Constantine P. and Cynthia Watson (eds.) *The Political Role of the Military: An International Handbook*. London: Greenwood Press, 1996. xi.

³⁹ Knorr, Klaus "The International Purposes of Military Power." In Garret, *Theories of Peace* ... 50.

⁴⁰ Howard, Michael. "Military Power and International Order" In Garret, *Theories of Peace* ... 42.

Mao Zedong said, 'every communist must grasp the truth, political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.'⁴¹ Prakash Chandra described war as 'the use of organized force between two human groups, pursuing contradictory policies, each seeking to impose its policy upon the other.'⁴² Sun Tzu said, 'The art of war is of vital importance to the state. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected.'⁴³

The issue of military power is also related to modern states' existence and more or less monopolized by the state. Buzan, B. et al. pronounced it as follows.

The modern state is defined by the idea of sovereignty – the claim of the exclusive right to self-government over a specified territory and its population. Because force is particularly effective as a way of acquiring and controlling territory, the fundamentally territorial nature of the state underpins the traditional primacy of its concern with the use of force. Throughout history, the right to govern has been established by the capability to assert and defend that the claim against armed challengers from within and without.⁴⁴

... The most extreme modern form of the state, the European or Westphalian state, has consolidated itself by a progressive disarming of the citizenry and a movement toward an ideal in which the state is the only legitimate wielder of force in society and effectively commands far greater instruments of force, both domestically and externally, than those illegitimate (mostly criminal) armed elements that remain.⁴⁵

States can have diverse powers or forces to perpetuate their interest. Nevertheless, none can be compared to military power. The states' ability to carry out and project its violent armed forces and military machine strength is vital. International Strategic Analysis states the use of military power as follows:

One country with a strong military typically enjoys a higher degree of security and stability than a state that is militarily weaker than its neighbors and potential rivals. ... For many states, it was the development of their military power that proved to be the catalyst for their rise to great power status. For others, a lack of military power proved to be the undoing of states that were either once-great powers or who had the capability to rise to

⁴¹ Tse-tung, Mao. *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*. Vol. II. Oxford: Pregramon Press, 1965. 224

⁴² Chandra, Prakash. *International Politics*. Third Revised Edition. New Delhi: Bikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd, 1995. 125.

⁴³ Tzu, Sun. *Sun Tzu on the Art of War: The Oldest Military Treatise in the World*. Leicester: Allandale Online Publishing, 2000. 1.

⁴⁴ Buzan, Barry et al. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc, 1998. 49-50.

⁴⁵ Ibid. 51.

great power status but failed to do so. History is littered with states whose ultimate downfall came on the battlefield, even if it was a decline in other aspects of power that resulted in their eventual military defeat.⁴⁶

Joseph S. Nye compares military power as important as oxygen for the human-being. He argues as follows that without the military, there is no order in human interactions.

A military force, along with norms and institutions, helps to provide a minimal degree of order. Metaphorically, military power provides a degree of security that is to political and economic order as oxygen is to breathing: little noticed until it begins to become scarce. Once that occurs, its absence dominates all else.⁴⁷

For Paul D. Williams argue war is more than ‘the clash of armed actors,’ it is:

An intense form of political relations that impacts upon virtually every dimension of human life. It has caused huge amounts of suffering and destruction but it has also been a major engine for social, political, economic and technological change. It has influenced many of our most enduring cultural reference points, shaped the deep meaning of masculinity and femininity, and set the contours of many of our laws, institutions and customs.⁴⁸

For Carl von Clausewitz, War ‘is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will.’⁴⁹ For him, ‘war as being rational, national, and instrumental.’⁵⁰ It means ‘the decision to employ the military instrument by waging war ought to be made based on a rational calculation taken by the political authority concerned to achieve some specified goal.’⁵¹ From his experience of his lifetime (1780–1831), ‘war was widely viewed as a legitimate instrument of state policy,

⁴⁶ International Strategic Analysis. “The Importance of Military Power in the 21st Century.” isa-world.com. 9 May 2018 https://www.isa-world.com/news/?tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=411&cHash=3c3785562e7d5a836189b87d09c8182e, Accessed on 01 December 2019.

⁴⁷ Nye, Joseph S. “Is Military Power Becoming Obsolete?” belfercenter.org. January 13, 2010. <https://www.belfer-center.org/publication/military-power-becoming-obsolete>, Accessed on 01 December 2019.

⁴⁸ Williams, Paul D. War. In Williams, Paul D. (ed.) *Security Studies: An Introduction*. 2nd Edition. London: Routledge. 2013. 187-188.

⁴⁹ Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*. Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions. 1997. 5.

⁵⁰ Williams, Paul D. War. In Williams, Paul D. (ed.) *Security Studies: An Introduction*. London: Routledge. 2008. 152-153.

⁵¹ Ibid.

albeit one that should be used only with a clear purpose in mind.’⁵² In Prakash Chandra’s words, ‘war cannot be separated from politics [and] war is nothing but politics with violence.’⁵³

Military security for states is ‘universal for all states’⁵⁴ except Costa Rica, Iceland, Mauritius, Panama, and other tiny states and small islands.

All commit a significant (1 to 30 percent) proportion of their total economic output (GNP) for arms dedicated to maintaining internal and external security. These expenses may be used to deter or to cope with crime, rebellion, secession, revolutions, and *coup d’état*. Governments also maintain armed forces to deal with the eventuality that as some time in the future, some other state or a non-state actor such as a terrorist group will present a threat. That threat can be directed against the lives of citizens or their private activities, against territorial integrity, against a country’s ‘way of life,’ or against the independence of the state and its institutions.⁵⁵

2.2.1 Purposes of Military Power

For Carl von Clausewitz, war is ‘an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will.’⁵⁶ Here its primary purpose is to impose the choice of the winner on the loser. Klaus Knorr argues that governments use war or the threat of war:

... as an instrument of statecraft because they expect political utility from its employment. It is political utility precisely because resort to force is an allocative mechanism, because it is a major, though by no means the only, basis on which the competition of states for various objects of value is settled; it is meant to affect the international distribution of such things as territory, trade, security, diplomatic influence, prestige, and of power itself.⁵⁷

He also goes arguing in international conflict resolutions, states use military force as a ‘form of power that sustains will’⁵⁸ of warring parties. Even in any diplomatic relations between states, Knorr said:

⁵² Williams, Paul D. War. In Williams, Paul D. (ed.) *Security Studies: An Introduction*. London: Routledge. 2008. 152-153.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Holsti, K.J. *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*. 7th Edition. Prentice-Hall International, Inc. New Jersey. 1995. 85.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*. Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions Limited. 1997. 5.

⁵⁷ Knorr, Klaus “The International Purposes of Military Power.” In Garret, *Theories of Peace* ... 52.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

In the absence of war, diplomacy may be the salient method for settling the conflict. But as, to begin with, the choice of foreign policy is determined by a government's perception of the external environment, including power relationships, so [military] power is often introduced into the diplomatic process.⁵⁹

Knorr furthermore claims that military power is used in most Asian and African states as an instrument of foreign policy objectives because 'the present political boundaries-often drawn arbitrarily by former imperialist powers' so that there is a tendency to 'incorporate unassimilated ethnic groups that may aspire to independence and resort to violence in order to achieve it.'⁶⁰

According to K.J. Holsti, governments maintain their army:

... to deal with the eventuality that at some time in the future, some other state – or a non-state actor such as terrorist groups – will present a threat. The threats can be directed against the lives of citizens or their private activities, against the territorial integrity, against a country's 'way of life,' or against the independence of the state and its institutions.⁶¹

Robert J. Art forwarded four primary military power purposes for states: defense, deter, compelling, and swagger.

Type	Purpose	Mode	Target	Characteristics
Defensive	Fend off attacks and/or reduce the damage of an attack	Peaceful and physical	Primarily military Secondarily industrial	Defensive preparations can have dissuasion value; Defensive preparations can look aggressive; First strikes can be taken for defense.
Deterrent	Prevent adversary from initiating an action	Peaceful	Primarily civilian; Secondarily industrial; Tertiary military	Threats of retaliation made so as not to have to be carried out; Second strike preparations can be viewed as first-strike preparations

⁵⁹ Knorr, Klaus "The International Purposes of Military Power." In Garret, *Theories of Peace* ... 52.

⁶⁰ Ibid. 57.

⁶¹ Holsti, K.J. *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*. 7th Edition. Prentice-Hall International, Inc. New Jersey. 1995. 257.

Compellent	Get adversary to stop doing something or start doing something	Peaceful and physical	All three with no clear ranking	Easy to recognize but hard to achieve; Compellent actions can be justified on defensive grounds.
Swaggering	Enhance Prestige	Peaceful	None	Difficult to describe because of its instrumental and irrational nature; Swaggering can be threatening

Table 2.1 Robert J. Art's 'The Purposes of Force'⁶²

The Military apparatus is vital in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy and the state's functioning in the international system. In the word of Alexander L. George, 'The proposition that force and threats of force are a necessary instrument of diplomacy and have a role to play in foreign policy is part of the conventional wisdom of statecraft.'⁶³ Thus, it is clear that military power in a hard power sense is apparent. On the other hand, besides the direct use of force, military power has a soft power role. Concerning this, there is a widely used term, 'Defense diplomacy.' Defense diplomacy can be considered merely 'tasks and international functions completed by the armed forces and the leadership of the Ministries of National Defense.'⁶⁴ This can be sending defense attaches to foreign states, training foreign military personnel, or joint military exercises to deploying troops to peace missions and operations in a foreign state. Martin Edmonds and Greg Mills define Defense diplomacy as 'the use of armed forces in operations other than war, building on their trained experience and discipline to achieve national and foreign objectives abroad.'⁶⁵ Thus, defense diplomacy or the user of military power as a foreign policy instrument

⁶² Art, Robert J. 'The Four Functions of Force'. In Art, Robert J. and Kenneth N. Waltz (Eds). *The Use of Force*. 4th Edition. Lanham; University Press of America. 1993. 11.

⁶³ George, Alexander L. *The Role of Force in Diplomacy: The Continuing Dilemma for U.S. Foreign Policy*. Talk at CSIS Security Strategy Symposium, Renaissance Washington DC Hotel, June 25, 1998. <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/military/force/article.html>, Accessed 12 October 2019.

⁶⁴ Drab, Lech. 'Defense diplomacy – an important tool for the implementation of foreign policy and security of the state'. *Security and Defense Quarterly*, 20/3. 2018. 57.

⁶⁵ Martin Edmonds and Greg Mills cited in Winger, Gregory. 'The Velvet Gauntlet: A Theory of Defense Diplomacy'. In A. Lisiak, N. Smolenski, (ed.) *What Do Ideas Do?*, Vienna: IWM Junior Visiting Fellows' Conferences, Vol. 33. 2014. <https://www.iwm.at/publications/5-junior-visiting-fellows-conferences/the-velvet-gauntlet/>, Accessed on 13 March 2019.

in today's international relations manifests itself paramountly in a peacekeeping operation.⁶⁶ In addition to this, 'developing the peacekeeping capabilities of foreign militaries so they can contribute to UN Peacekeeping Operations, the number of which has increased considerably since the end of the Cold War' is another way of defense diplomacy.⁶⁷

No state can be neutral from the use of force. In international relations, there are different views and ideologies about the use of force, and however, in terms of its security, force becomes mandatory. KJ Holsti summarizes it as follows:

The legitimacy of force as an instrument of foreign policy, although often denounced by philosophers, historians, and reformers, has rarely been questioned by those responsible for foreign policy decisions of their countries. Some states have traditionally maintained orientations on nonalignment or isolation, but no nation is 'neutral' with respect to its own security, and neutrality does not imply unconditional renunciation of force.⁶⁸

Some countries may be more prone than others to using force as an instrument of foreign policy.⁶⁹

The international environment limits the policymakers' choices in many ways. For example, a state's geographical position is the most permanent limiting factor.⁷⁰

Efraim Karsh stated the relations between military power and foreign policy as follows:

For every state, there exists an interrelationship between the availability of military power and the setting of foreign policy goals. The nature and scope of the quest for military power is a direct consequence of the world view held by a state's leadership, which is in turn translated into national goals. At the same time a state's military capabilities at any given moment can determine the limits of a forceful foreign policy. Any successful pursuit of foreign policy goals depends to a considerable extent on the state's assessment of its military power in relation to its external environment. Since the assessment of military power and the perception of external threats are as much subjective as objective, any state can commit on of two errors in evaluation. It can set itself goals which are beyond its

⁶⁶ Cheyre, Juan E. 'Defense Diplomacy' In Andrew F. Cooper and et al. (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2013. 374 -375.

⁶⁷ Storey, Ian. 'China's Bilateral Defense Diplomacy in Southeast Asia', *Asian Security*, 8:3, 2012. 287-310. 289.

⁶⁸ Holsti, K.J. *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*. 7th Edition. Prentice-Hall International, Inc. New Jersey. 1995. 213.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Wallace, William. *Foreign Policy and Political Process*. London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1971. 18.

military power to achieve, or it can underestimate its power and pursue policies and goals that are narrower or more limited than its 'objective' power base might make possible.⁷¹

Advocates of Realism in international relations emphasized peacekeeping's defense diplomacy as their national interest because peacekeeping directly benefits themselves.⁷²

Scott Firsing, giving the example of Nigerian peacekeeping, argues as follows:

Nigeria has used peacekeeping as a foreign policy tool from the 20th century. The Nigerian government proclaims itself as the 'regional stabilizer, conciliator, and peacebuilder' in West Africa. For strategic reasons, Nigeria takes on this role to protect its economy, as it does not wish to be surrounded by failing states. It needs to be a secure investment destination with secure borders.⁷³

2.2.2 Ranges of Military Operations

The range of military operations is a fundamental construct that helps relate military activities and operations in scope and purpose within a backdrop of the conflict continuum, from peacetime to war.⁷⁴

These ranges of operations are three the first one is peacetime operations to promote peace; the second one is resolving conflict or deter war; the third, a time of war where the aim is to fight a full-fledged war and win. See the table below for detail.

⁷¹ Karsh, Efraim. *Military Power and Foreign Policy Goals: The Iran-Iraq War Revisited*. Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), 64/1. Winter, 1987-1988. 83.

⁷² Firsing, Scott. 'Thinking through the role of Africa's militaries in peacekeeping: the cases of Nigeria, Ethiopia and Rwanda'. *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 21/1. 2014. 47.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ US Army. *JP 3-0, Joint Operations*. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 2018. V-1.




Table 2.2 Range of Military Operations⁷⁵

Peacekeeping operations belong to the second range of the conflict continuum, an operation to resolve conflict or deter war. On the other hand, Peace enforcement is both a conflict time and wartime operation, which is conducted to resolve conflict or deter war. Also, it includes warfighting.

2.3 Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT)

“Most states historically have been concerned primarily with the capabilities and intentions of their neighbors.” Aaron L. Friedber

After the end of the Cold War, the regional approach to international security has become significant. Barry Buzan first applied security complex theory in 1983 in his book ‘People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations.’ He defined the security complex ‘as a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another.’⁷⁶ He also identified four major types of threats and their interaction, which are:

⁷⁵ Source: US Army. *FM 100-5 Operations*. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1993. 2-1.

⁷⁶ Buzan, Barry. *People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*. Brighton: Wheatsheaf. 1983.106.

Balance of power contests among great powers; lingering conflicts that emerge between neighboring states; intra-state conflicts, which are usually spillovers of internal politics; and conflicts that arise from transnational threats caused, for instance, by the rise of religious fundamentalism and informal networks, state fragility, demographic explosion, environmental degradation, and resource scarcity.⁷⁷

In 1998 Buzan with Waever and de Wilde reformulated the definition of regional security complex as a 'set of units whose major processes of securitization, de-securitization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another.'⁷⁸

According to Matteo Legrenzi and Fred H. Lawson, regional security complex makes it possible to clarify the emergence and impact of a wide range of threats confronting policymakers, most notably the tendency for conflicts that break out in one country to spread across the border into neighboring countries and the growing incidence of disputes over scarce water resources.⁷⁹

Barry Buzan's contribution to international relations theory was mainly to draw 'attention away from the extremes of national and global security and focus it on the region, where these two extremes interplay and where most of the action occurs'⁸⁰ Buzan called this, 'the territorialization of security relations' this is because most threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones.'⁸¹ Buzan emphasized geographical proximity and security as follows:

Adjacency is potent for security because many threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones. The impact of geographical proximity on security interaction is the strongest and most obvious in the military, political, societal, and environmental sectors.⁸²

He added:

⁷⁷ Buzan, Barry. *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, Hemel Hempstead, Harvester, 2nd edn, 1991. 3.

⁷⁸ Buzan, Barry et al. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers: 1998. 201.

⁷⁹ Legrenzi, Matteo and Fred H. Lawson. Regional Security Complexes and Organizations. In Gheciu, Alexandra and William C. Wohlforth. *The Oxford Handbook of International Security*. Oxford Handbooks Online. March 2018.

⁸⁰ Buzan, Barry et al. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers: 1998. 14-15.

⁸¹ Buzan, Barry. *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*. 2nd ed. New York: Wheatsheaf Harvester, 1991. 12.

⁸² *Ibid.* 45.

A handful of states at the top of the power league play a truly global game, treating each other as a special class and projecting their power into far-flung regions. But for the great majority of states, the main game of security is defined by their near neighbors.⁸³

Moreover, Buzan and Wæver argue as follows:


The relative autonomy of regional security constitutes a pattern of international security relations radically different from the rigid structure of superpower bipolarity that defined the Cold War. ... RSCT distinguishes between the system level interplay of the global powers, whose capabilities enable them to transcend distance, and the subsystem level interplay of lesser powers whose main security environment is their local region. The central idea in RSCT is that, since most threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones, security interdependence is normally patterned into regionally based clusters: security complexes. ... Processes of securitization and thus the degree of security interdependence is more intense between the actors inside such complexes than they are between actors inside the complex and those outside it. ... RSCT offers a conceptual framework that classifies security regions into a set of types, and so provides a basis for comparative studies in regional security.⁸⁴

To be qualified to be called a regional security complex, 'a group of states or other entities must possess a degree of security interdependence sufficient both to establish them as a linked set and to differentiate them from surrounding security regions.'⁸⁵

⁸³ Buzan, Barry. *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*. 2nd ed. New York: Wheatsheaf Harvester, 1991. 14.

⁸⁴ Ibid. 3-4.

⁸⁵ Buzan, Barry and Ole Wæver. *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 48.



Map 2.1 Patterns of Regional Security Post-Cold War⁸⁶

Buzan and Wæver distinguished nine regional security complexes, two proto-complex and two super-complex: namely, North American RSC, South American RSC, European RSC, post-Soviet RSC, Middle Eastern RSC, Central Africa R.S.C., Southern African RSC, South Asian RSC, and East Asian RSC; Horn proto-complex and West African proto-complex; Asian super-complex and European super-complex. They also distinguished states, which are buffers and insulators.

Africa is likely to become the home of four RSCs. Southern Africa is the only part of Africa that qualifies without question as a longstanding RSC, and it has extended its boundaries to include a swath of Central Africa. Partly as a result of the same developments, Central Africa is also emerging as an RSC. West Africa and the Horn are proto-complexes. In Africa, the open question is about the formation and evolution of RSCs in a subcontinent dominated by state failure.⁸⁷

⁸⁶ Buzan, Barry and Ole Wæver. *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2003. xxvi.

⁸⁷ Ibid. 451.

Buzan and Wæver developed descriptive RSCT, which is a matrix for area studies. This matrix is a framework organizing empirical studies of regional security at four levels of analysis.⁸⁸ The four levels are:

	Levels of Analysis	Descriptions
1	Domestic (domestically generated vulnerabilities)	If a state is strong or weak due to the stability of the domestic order. The specific vulnerability of a state defines the kind of security fears it has and sometimes makes another state or group of states a structural threat even if it or they have no hostile intentions
2	State-to-state Relations	It is a group of states with interaction, which generate a region.
3	The region's interaction with neighboring regions	This is supposed to be relatively limited, given that the complex is defined by interaction internally being more critical. But if significant changes in the patterns of security interdependence that define complexes are underway, this level can become significant, and in situations of gross asymmetries, a complex without global powers that neighbors one with a global power can have strong interregional links in one direction
4	The role of global powers in the region	The interplay between the global and regional security structures

Table 2.3 The Four Levels of analysis of RSCT

David A. Lake develops another study, Patrick M. Morgan, in their edited book 'Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World' they argue that 'The world has now changed. The regional

⁸⁸ Buzan, Barry and Ole Wæver. *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2003. 51.

level stands more clearly on its own as the locus of conflict and cooperation for states and as the level of analysis for scholars seeking to explore contemporary security affairs.’ Moreover, states are focusing ‘increasingly on regional conflict and conflict management.’⁸⁹ The three of their four significant arguments of their studies are the following:

First, regions are now more salient features of international politics. With the end of the Cold War, regional conflicts are more likely to stay regional, responding to their individual circumstances and developments. Second, the end of the Cold War has opened new possibilities for more cooperative regional orders. Greater responsibility now falls on local states to manage their own conflicts. Third, regions are not simply “little” international systems that behave in ways identical to their “larger” counterparts. Nor they *sui generis*, understandable only through unique theories. We need general theories that incorporate regional relations. Theories, concepts, and analogies based on the analysis of great-power politics cannot, in most cases, be applied to the regional level without significant amendment or even wholesale revision.⁹⁰

The book ‘highlights the increasing importance in the contemporary world of regional security complexes as the loci of both violent conflict and efforts to manage such conflict more effectively.’⁹¹

Regions are defined in terms of the mode of security management or ‘regional order.’⁹² Regional orders can shift from the simple balance of power systems or concerts to more comprehensive communities or integrated polities. Lake and Morgan suggest an alternative definition of regional security complex: ‘the states affected by at least one trans-border but local security externality.’⁹³

For forty-five years after World War II, conflict among nations was dominated by the significant bipolar struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. With the end of the Cold War, states in differing regions of the world are taking their affairs more into their own hands and

⁸⁹ Lake, David A. and Patrick M. Morgan. “The New Regionalism in Security Affairs,” In Lake, D. A. and Patrick Morgan, *Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World*. Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997. 6-7.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Ibid. 18.

⁹² Lake, David A. and Patrick Morgan. *Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World*. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press. 1997. 46

⁹³ Ibid.

working out new security arrangements that best suit their needs. This trend toward new ‘regional orders.’⁹⁴

More recently, Rodrigo Tavares suggested that its content should define the regional unit of analysis and proposed the idea of regional peace and security clusters (RPSC), defined as a set of peace and security relations that occur in a broad territory (region), driven by agents, operating at various levels of regional integration, who use various instruments to change the patterns of security, conflict, and positive peace.⁹⁵

2.4 Regional Hegemon/ Regional Power⁹⁶

Theoretically, it has been established that a powerful state’s hegemonic presence is an ingredient for stability within a specific region.⁹⁷ In continuation from Buzan and Wæver’s Regional Security Complexes (RSCs), Robert Stewart-Ingersoll and Derrick Frazier study ‘the functions that regional powers play in developing and maintaining regional security orders.’⁹⁸ They also argue ‘certain states, due to both their substantial relative capabilities and their unique behaviors, disproportionately influence security within their RSCs.’⁹⁹ These capabilities which crate a regional hegemon or a regional power are ‘mostly regarded as an outflow of relative superior material power-in terms of the economy and the military on the global level of international politics or, regionally, in a geographically limited area of the world.’¹⁰⁰

⁹⁴ Lake, David A. and Patrick Morgan. *Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World*. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press. 1997.

⁹⁵ Tavares, Rodrigo. “Understanding of Regional Peace and Security: A Framework of Analysis,” *Contemporary Politics*. Vol. 14, No. 2. 2008, 107–127. 110.

⁹⁶ The terms ‘regional hegemon’ and ‘regional power’ in this study is used interchangeably with the same meaning. However, ‘regional power’ used mostly for a group of states with a common characteristics and the term ‘regional hegemon’ is frequently used to describe a single country in a particular region.

⁹⁷ Nye J.S. cited in Olusola Ogunnubi and Ufo Okeke-Uzodike. Can Nigeria be Africa's hegemon? *African Security Review*, 25/2. 2016. 110.

⁹⁸ Stewart-Ingersoll, Robert and Derrick Frazier. *Regional Powers and Security Orders: A Theoretical Framework*. London: Routledge, 2012. 1.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Prys, Miriam. Hegemony, Domination, Detachment: Differences in Regional Powerhood. *International Studies Review*. Vol. 12, No. 4, December 2010. 489.

Cora Wu & Moritz Hessler,¹⁰¹ Detlef Nolte,¹⁰² and Martin Beck¹⁰³ put forward about criteria and implications a regional power should acquire. First, a delineated region or definable region is geographically, economically, politically self-perception, and this delimitation and own identity should be widely accepted within and beyond the region. Second, the regional power should claim its role as the only regional leading power, which is certain self-conception, aim for rulemaking, avoid foreign interference, try to keep other regions divided.

Third, the regional power should have power over outcomes in geopolitical delimitation and political-ideational construction of the region. It should be the agenda settler on activities and outcomes of the region. Forth, it should have some regional governance and regional leadership or a cooperative hegemony towards regional institutions, and there might be the likelihood of oppositional alliances within the region. Fifth, it defines the regional security agenda and takes responsibility for the regional security agenda as part of power transition theory. It stabilizes its region; it guarantees regional cooperation and provides public goods, and avoids regional competitors.

Sixth, it projects power into the region in terms of military, economy, demography, and political ideology. Seventh, it creates inter-linkage or integration within the region in economic, political, and cultural; Eighth, it should be commonly accepted within and beyond the region as leader and representative for the region. Ninth, it should strive for an increased global weight of the region to protect regional cooperative hegemony, niche-specialization in a multilateral-cooperative approach.¹⁰⁴

In his study, Daniel Flesmes identify and classify regional powers in international relations into four key criterias: First, ‘formulation of the claim to leadership,’ means ‘to have the political will

¹⁰¹ Wu, Cora and Moritz Hessler. *Regional Powers*. June 2, 2011. <https://www.slideshare.net/Moricex/regional-powers>, Accessed on 20 November 2019.

¹⁰² Nolte, D. *Power and Power Hierarchies in International Relations. An analysis concept for the Research on regional leaders*. In GIGA Working Paper No. 29, Hamburg: GIGA, 2006. 28,

¹⁰³ Beck, Martin. *Regional Powers in Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Near and Middle East*. Conference Paper. December 11 and 12, 2006 GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg. https://web.archive.org/web/20090327080130/http://www.giga-hamburg.de/content/forumregional/pdf/giga_conference_RegionalPowers_0612/giga_RegPowers0612_paper_beck.pdf, Accessed on 08 January 2018.

¹⁰⁴ Wu, Cora and Moritz Hessler. *Regional Powers*. June 2, 2011. <https://www.slideshare.net/Moricex/regional-powers>, Accessed on 20 November 2019.

to take on the mantle of leader in both regional and global terms.’¹⁰⁵ Second, ‘possession of the necessary power resources’ can be military economic or demographical resources and capabilities. Third, ‘employment of foreign policy instruments,’ which are mechanisms or tools that it advocates its interests with. And Forth, ‘acceptance of the leadership role by the third state’, acceptance of its visions and actions in the states under its influence and beyond.

It has been established that a powerful state's hegemonic presence is an ingredient for stability within a specific region.¹⁰⁶ Stefan A. Schirm said, ‘regional hegemons could also be considered role models and leaders within a particular region by carrying out leading activities that are generally accepted by neighboring states.’¹⁰⁷ Ogunnubi and Okeke-Uzodike, in their study to answer the question ‘What makes a regional hegemon?’ most of the described features are mainly based on the state’s economic, military and demographic power.¹⁰⁸

Dustin Dehéz, in his study on African Hegemonies, said the following:

Assessing African states’ hegemonic capacity is a rather recent exercise, and no formula has yet emerged as the leading paradigm in doing so. ... They command enough leverage and power to shape their regional environment but lack the influence to shape the broader global power distribution. Instead, their foreign policy – the means through which their hegemonic conduct is usually exercised – is characterized by the necessity to maneuver between the inescapable and oftentimes stark extra-continental and intracontinental influences and the desire to shape their respective regions to their advantage or according to their image. But their actions are also constrained by regional factors: the willingness of neighboring countries to embrace the hegemon and his role, traditional regional rivalries, the depth of regional integration, to name but a few.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁵ Flandes, Daniel. *Conceptualizing Regional Power in International Relations: Lessons from the South African Case*. Working Paper No. 53, German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg. 2007.

¹⁰⁶ Nye cited in Ogunnubi, Olusola and Ufo Okeke-Uzodike. Can Nigeria be Africa’s hegemon? *African Security Review*. 2016. 25:2. 110-128.

¹⁰⁷ Schirm cited in Ogunnubi, Olusola and Ufo Okeke-Uzodike. Can Nigeria be Africa’s hegemon? *African Security Review*. 2016. 25:2. 110-128.

¹⁰⁸ Ogunnubi, Olusola and Ufo Okeke-Uzodike. Can Nigeria be Africa’s hegemon? *African Security Review*. 2016. 25:2. 110-128. 112.

¹⁰⁹ Dehéz, Dustin. *Ethiopia – A Hegemon in the Horn of Africa Region*. BISA Annual Conference, Exeter, December 2008. <http://www.open.ac.uk/socialsciences/bisa-africa/confpapers/Dehez-exeter-08.pdf>, Accessed on 23 February 2020.

2.5 Summery and Partial Conclusion

Chapter two presented the definitions of the study's critical concepts: foreign policy, military power, regional security complex theory, and regional hegemon. The following are central points covered in the chapter.

Foreign policy can be defined as the manifestation of the relationship between states as a 'set of goals that seek to outline how a particular country will interact with other countries of the world' or 'the dealings of states with each other.' Or else something that involves all activities of a nation by which that nation is trying to change other nations' behavior by which that nation is trying to change other nations' behavior and adjust its behavior in the international environment.

On the other side, Foreign policy can be a tool to achieve an objective or interest of the state in the international arena, state machinery or national resource or a means which will be used to get the desired outcome outside the boundary of that state, and also there is a decision making body both decides on both the outcome and the machinery used; As ideas or actions designed by policymakers to solve a problem or promote some change in the policies, attitudes, or actions of another state or states, in non-state actors (e.g., terrorist groups), in the international economy, or in the physical environment of the world.

Diplomacy, propaganda, economic rewards and coercion, clandestine actions and military intervention, and weapons and war are some of the critical instruments of foreign policy goals. The size of state's territory, geography, level and nature of economic development, cultural and historical factors, social structures, government structures, internal situations, values, talents, experiences, and personalities of leaders, political accountability in a state, ideology, diplomatic capability, international power structure, global strategic environment, public opinion, level of technology, external environment, alliances and international treaties (bilateral and multilateral) are foremost factors that affect foreign policy.

Military power is an essential tool in international relations. The capacity to use violence for the protection, enforcement, or extension of authority, remains an instrument with which no state has yet found it possible entirely to dispense. Most importantly, armed forces constitute a purely destabilizing factor on the international scene, and that their abolition would lead to better stability among nations. A military force, along with norms and institutions, helps to provide a minimal

degree of order. Metaphorically, military power provides a degree of security to political and economic order as oxygen is to breathing: little noticed until it begins to become scarce. Once that occurs, its absence dominates all else.

There are four primary military power purposes for states: defense, deter, compelling, and swagger. Correspondingly, there are three ranges of military operations: the first one is peacetime operations to promote peace; the second one in the time of conflict to resolve conflict or deter war; third, a time of war where the aim is to fight a full-fledged war and win.

Regional security complex theory is a theory of Buzan and his colleagues Waever and de Wilde. Fashioned by focusing on lingering conflicts that emerge between neighboring states; intra-state conflicts, which are usually spillovers of internal politics; and conflicts that arise from transnational threats. Generally, it is 'the territorialization of security relations' because most threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones.' Buzan emphasized geographical proximity is potent for security because many threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones.

Regional hegemon or regional power is a theory establishing a powerful state's hegemonic presence is an ingredient for stability within a specific region. The hegemonic presence of a powerful state is an ingredient for stability within a specific region. Furthermore, regional hegemons can also be considered role models and leaders within a particular region by carrying out leading activities that neighboring states generally accept.

CHAPTER 3 – PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

“Peacekeeping is not a soldier’s job, but only a soldier can do it.”

Dag Hammarskjold

This chapter is the continuation of the second chapter of the literature review: conceptual framework and theoretical background. Because peace support operation is the central theme of this study, and vast, it dealt with in a separate chapter. The chapter looks first the definitions of peace support operations; secondly, it covers the historical development and generations of peace support operations, thirdly it briefly discusses four concepts of military interventions: intervention by invitation, humanitarian intervention, sovereignty as responsibility, and responsibility to protect. Lastly, it briefly goes through the literature on scholars answering the question ‘why more African states are into peacekeeping?’.

3.1 Definitions

United Nations defines peacekeeping operation as ‘an operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, undertaken by the United Nations to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict.’¹¹⁰ Peacekeeping was not mentioned in the UN Charter. Nevertheless, peacekeeping operations can fall between Chapter 6, which refers to the techniques that the Security Council can adopt in pursuit of the peaceful settlement of disputes, such as mediation, arbitration, negotiation, and fact-finding; and Chapter 7 which gives the Security Council power to enforce decisions, including the use of armed forces if necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security.¹¹¹

Peacekeeping is one of the essential functions of the United Nations. Peacekeeping has proven to be one of the most effective tools available to the UN to assist host countries in a difficult path from conflict to peace.¹¹² However, getting peacekeepers and other resources required has been a

¹¹⁰ United Nations. *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping*. New York: United Nations. 1996. 4.

¹¹¹ Solà-Martin, Andreu and Tom Woodhouse. *The United Nations, Armed Conflict and Peacekeeping*. Barcelona Open University of Catalonia Foundation. 2011. 5.

¹¹² United Nations. ‘What is Peacekeeping?’ <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/what-is-peacekeeping>, Accessed on 19 September 2019.

significant challenge. The former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said in February 2011, ‘Securing the required resources and troops [for UN peacekeeping] has consumed much of my energy. I have been begging leaders to make resources available to us.’¹¹³

The peace support operation concept, commonly used as peacekeeping, is rapidly expanding in international relations and military science. The term ‘peace support operation’ (PSO) was crafted by the UK and later used by NATO and the AU. China¹¹⁴ and the United States used the term Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), and the UN uses the term peacekeeping operation (PKO).¹¹⁵ All three are military interventions with almost referring to the same meaning. However, peace support operations or peace operations is an umbrella term that includes a wide range of activities, which will be discussed later. Stating a precise definition is a difficult task because various organizations have their definitions. However, the below major definitions and related terms tried to be included to create a comprehensive picture of this broad concept.

MOOTW is used as a peacetime operation in the US army. MOOTW encompasses the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war.¹¹⁶ The term is used for activities like ‘training exercises, peace support operations, nation assistance activities, disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, security assistance, shows of force, and support for counterdrug operations’.¹¹⁷

Some scholars consider the term ‘peacekeeping’ as colloquial prefer to use ‘peace support operations.’¹¹⁸ Kai Michael Kenkel stresses the following on the difference between ‘peacekeeping and ‘peace support operations’ and the need to use the term ‘peace support operations’:

¹¹³ Bellamy, Alex J. and Paul D. Williams. *Broadening the Base of United Nations Troop- and Police-Contributing Countries. Providing for Peacekeeping*. No. 1. August 2012. International Peace Institute. 1.

¹¹⁴ Gaoyue, Fan and James Char. “Introduction to China’s Military Operations Other than War.” Policy Report. February 2019. <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/idss/introduction-to-chinas-military-operations-other-than-war/>, Accessed on 12 September 2020.

¹¹⁵ Fitz-Gerald, A. M. “*Military and Post-Conflict Security: Implications for American, British and Other Allied Force Planning and for Post-conflict Iraq*”. In Segal, H. (ed), *Geopolitical Integrity*. Montreal: Institute for Research on public Policy. 2005. pp.275

¹¹⁶ Joint Chief of Staff. *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*. Joint Pub 3-07, 1995. 1.

¹¹⁷ Ibid, Vii.

¹¹⁸ Diehl, Paul F. *Peace Operations*. Cambridge: Policy Press, 2008. 179.

There is much confusion over the nomenclature of blue-helmet missions. “Peace operations” is the most accurate and appropriate term to describe the global category of all types of operations across all the generations below, operated by the United Nations and other organizations. “Peacekeeping” operations refer only to a subcategory of such operations (the first generation below, which presupposes an extant peace to maintain) that now make up a very small part of overall activities and therefore is not an accurate term for the overall activity, as it does not include peace enforcement and peacebuilding. The term “operation” generally refers to a more broadly-cast endeavor than a “mission,” which is a term more prevalent in the military vocabulary. It is therefore conceptually erroneous to refer to the global category as “peacekeeping operations/missions”; rather, the adequate terminology is the more inclusive and accurate “peace operations.”¹¹⁹

Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi define peacekeeping as a ‘task performed by the UN or other multilateral forces in an effort to keep conflicting parties from resorting (or returning) to armed hostilities.’ The same authors also perceive peacekeeping as terms of collective security as follows:

Peacekeeping can be understood as an extension of collective security thinking to cover conflicts that threaten international peace and security, particularly in the regions where these conflicts are being played out. Resolving conflicts involving states and nongovernmental parties are often decades-long projects at best, particularly when territorial issues are linked to competing national, ethnic, or tribal claims. Sometimes the most that can be achieved is to manage these conflicts—to contain and keep them from becoming violent as constructive steps are taken to address the difficult, divisive issues involved.¹²⁰

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) definition peacekeeping mission, it has the following objectives: To facilitate the implementation of a peace agreement; To support a peace process; To assist in conflict prevention and/or peace-building efforts.¹²¹ However, the SIPRI definition of peacekeeping missions does not include activities of good offices, fact-finding and supporting elections, and missions that the UN or regional organizations have not sanctioned.¹²² On the other hand, the SIPRI definition includes: Operations carried out by regional organizations and alliances; Operations carried out by ad hoc coalitions of states that

¹¹⁹ Kenkel, K.M. Five Generations of Peace Operations: from the “Thin Blue Line” to “Painting a Country Blue.” *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* 56 (1) : 122-143, 2013. 122.

¹²⁰ Viotti, Paul R. and Mark V. Kauppi. *International Relations and World Politics* 5th Edition. New Jersey: Pearson Education, Inc. 283.

¹²¹ Lijn, Jaïr van der et al. *Peacekeeping Operations in a Changing World*. The Hague: Clingendael Institute. January 2015. 6.

¹²² Ibid.

have been authorized for the purpose by the UN Security Council resolution. Moreover, peace-keeping missions may include the following activities: Monitoring and multidimensional peace-keeping operations that is carried out by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO); including joint AU/UN hybrid operations such as the one in Darfur (UNAMID); Special political and peace-building missions that are directed by the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and meet the SIPRI definition of peacekeeping missions.¹²³ Others only include ‘uniformed’ the UN presences that have military and/or police personnel and excludes civilian peace-building or political mission that has been deployed under the auspices of the UN DPA¹²⁴

Discussions on peace support operations are known for their conceptual mix-ups because of its common terms: peacekeeping, peacebuilding, peace enforcement, peacemaking, and a host of other terms used interchangeably.¹²⁵ The following figure defines a range of peace operations: first, the post-conflict stage conflict prevention, then, conflict period operations of the second peacemaking, and third, peace enforcement and then the post-conflict period process of peace-keeping, and lastly, peacebuilding.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ In Koops, J. A. et al. *Introduction: The United Nations and Peacekeeping*. In Koops, J. A. et al. *The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2015. 1.

¹²⁵ Diehl, Paul F. *Peace Operations*. Cambridge: Policy Press, 2008. 3.




Figure 3.1 Type of Peace Operations¹²⁶

According to William J. Durch and Tobias C. Berkaman:

‘Peacekeeping’ was the term coined to describe the tasks of UN-mandated troops deployed after the Suez Crisis of 1956. It gained official status of sorts when the UN General Assembly set up the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations in February 1965, just after UN forces finished their first operation in the former Belgian Congo. It was not defined in any UN document, however, until *An Agenda for Peace* appeared in 1992.¹²⁷

Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations describes the following organizational type of Peacekeeping missions¹²⁸:

¹²⁶ United Nations. *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*. New York: United Nations. 2008. 19. & US Joint Chief of Staff. *Joint Publication 3-07.3, Peace Operations*. March 2018. I -7.

¹²⁷ Durch, William J. and Tobias C. Berkaman. ‘Restoring and Maintaining Peace: What We Know So Far’. In Durch, William J. *Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations*. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace. 2006. 5.

¹²⁸ Lijn, Jaïr van der et al. *Peacekeeping Operations in a Changing World*. The Hague: Clingendael Institute. January 2015. 70.

Hybrid Missions: the traditional hybrid operation in which two organizations carry out a mission together (Example, UNAMID, the AU-UN mission in Darfur).

Parallel Missions: various operations carried out in the same theatre with different, adjoining, and sometimes overlapping mandates (the UN's MINUSMA, the EU's EUTM Mali, and French troops in Mali, for example).

Modular Missions: an operation carried out under the leadership of one organization in which modules are handled by another organization or several other organizations (the EU, the OSCE, and UNHCR each handled one of the four pillars on which the UN's UNMIK was based, for example).

Follow-up Mission/Bridging Operations: operations carried out successively by various organizations. Given the allocation of tasks referred to above, various organizations usually handle different phases of an operation (the UN's UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, was succeeded by NATO's IFOR and SFOR when peace had been established, and the IFOR and SFOR missions were in turn succeeded by the EUFOR Althea operation when the country had been stabilized). An example of a traditional bridging mission is EUFOR Chad/Central African Republic, which remained active until the UN's MINURCAT could take over the tasks.

Support missions/over-the-horizon forces: an operation conducted by an organization to support an operation being carried out by a separate organization (the UN's UNSOM in Somalia is explicitly aimed at supporting the AU's AMISOM, for example). An over-the-horizon force is not actually deployed in the theatre of operations. However, it is close enough to deploy as a reserve if necessary rapidly (the EUFOR DRC troops in Gabon that had to assist the UN's MONUC if necessary, for example).

There is also 'co-deployment,' an independent strategic authority, command, and control, and 'joint (multinational) operations' to integrate operational command and control resources.¹²⁹

Based on the ownership and responsibility of the peacekeeping operations, there are three kinds of peacekeeping operations states are involved: first, UN-led missions that are authorized by the UN and under UN command and control; Second, UN-authorized missions which are authorized by the UN but conducted by other actors; and third, non-UN missions which are neither authorized nor conducted by the UN.

According to SPIRI, there were 68 active multilateral peace operations in 2019, including UN and UN operations worldwide. (See Appendix 1). Three operations started in 2019: the UN In-

¹²⁹ Prinsloo, Barend. 'Hybrid Peacekeeping - A Deeper Understanding of Evolving Peacekeeping Practices'. 11 December 2017, <https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/blog/hybrid-peacekeeping-a-deeper-understanding-of-evolving-peacekeeping-practices>, Accessed on 19 December 2019.

tegrated Office in Haiti, which succeeded MINUJUSTH, the UN Mission to Support the Hodeidah Agreement in Yemen, and the European Union (EU) Integrated Border Assistance Mission in Libya. The number of personnel deployed were 137,781 on 31 December 2019.¹³⁰ There were 29 peace operations in Africa, 20 in Europe, 21 in Asia, and 3 in the Americas in 2019 by various international organizations and ad hoc.¹³¹

Though the word ‘Peacekeeping’ does not exist in the UN Charter, the legal bases for the UN peacekeeping operation are the three chapters of the charter: Chapter VI, Pacific Settlement of Disputes (Article 33-38), Chapter VII, Action with respect of the Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the peace, and Acts of Aggregations (Article 39 - 51), and Chapter VIII, Regional Arrangements (Article 52-54), are considered as articles which deal with peacekeeping issues.

The standard terms used to describe the Blue Helmets, the commonly termed UN Military Personnel and Police Personnel contributed to UN peacekeeping operations are the following: Staff Officer, Military Experts on Mission (which include according to their primary roles as Military Liaison Officers, Military Observers, and Military Advisers), Contingent Troops, Formed Police Unit (FPU) and Individual Police Officer (IPO).

Staff Officer is a part of military personnel, who are generated, deployed, and traveled in an individual capacity upon nomination by a Permanent Mission and selection by the Office of Military Adviser, to perform specialized functions at the Force Headquarters or integrated military, civilian, or police structure.¹³²

UN Military Experts on Mission (UNMEM): The UN typically asks the member states to nominate their officers in the rank of Captain and/or Major to serve as a UNMEM. However, depending on the nature of the task, senior officers such as Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels may also

¹³⁰ SIPRI. *SIPRI YEAR BOOK 2020 Armaments, Disarmament and International Security Summary*. Oxford University Press. 2020. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2020-06/yb20_summary_en_v2.pdf, Accessed on 19 September 2020.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² United Nations. ‘Troop and Police Contribution’. <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/data-troop-and-police-contributions>, Accessed on 19 September 2020.

be assigned as UNMEM.¹³³ Military experts are military officers who are not permitted to carry weapons. UNMEM can be UN Military Liaison Officers and UN Military Observers.

UN Military Liaison Officers (UNMLOs) are unarmed officers responsible mainly for keeping constant liaison with the authorities appointed by the warring parties to the disengagement agreement to facilitate personnel, cargo, and supplies the mission area. UNMLOs also maintains contact with the local Embassies of the Security Council and TCCs concerning queries about the operations.

UN Military Observers (UNMOs) are unarmed officers typically provided by the Member States for 12 months and operating in small teams of between two and eight members. Their main task is to monitor and verify the cessation of the hostilities agreement signed by the two warring parties and monitor the re-deployed positions of both parties' forces.

UN Military Advisers (UN MILADs) are responsible for providing military advice in mission areas.

Contingent Troops are mostly the most significant number of military personnel in a mission; they may operate in the form of companies, battalions, or brigades.¹³⁴

Formed Police Unit (FPU) is a cohesive mobile police unit that supports United Nations operations and ensures United Nations personnel and missions' safety and security, primarily in public order management.¹³⁵

Individual Police Officer (IPO) is police or other law enforcement personnel assigned to serve with the United Nations on secondment by the Member States at the Secretary-General's request.¹³⁶

¹³³ Sigatu, Kaleab T. 'Ethiopian Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations since 1991'. In *The Dynamics of Conflicts in Africa in the Early 21st Century*. János Besenyő and Viktor Marsai (Eds). Budapest: Dialóg Campus. 2018. 203.

¹³⁴ United Nations. "e-Guide to the United Nations Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support: A Resource for New Staff at Headquarters". January, 2015. www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/DPKO-DFSe-Guide15-01-08.pdf, Accessed on 20 January 2017.

¹³⁵ United Nations. *Troop and Police Contributions*. <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/data-troop-and-police-contributions>, Accessed on 19 September 2020.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

Traditionally, three basic principles continue to set UN peacekeeping operations apart as a tool for maintaining international peace and security: consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-Defense and Defense of the mandate. Over time, and especially after the 1980s, encouraged by the increasing number of operations deployed into civil wars and complex internal armed conflicts, these principles, and aims evolved.¹³⁷

In 1998, Jocelyn Coulon wrote the following about peacekeeping:

Until very recently, Peacekeeping was a diplomatic activity full of subtleties for the governments involved and a bit of a romantic adventure for the participating soldiers. That time is past. With the end of the ideological rivalry between East and West and the proliferation of local wars, peacekeeping has become a thriving industry. It has also become a dangerous activity for the Blue Helmets, who find themselves in the midst of wars in which the rulers of the past have given way to the anarchy engendered by ethnic and nationalist passions. ... their mandates have become extremely complex: intervening in civil wars, patrolling dangerous regions, organizing elections, disarming militias, rebuilding infrastructures, protecting minorities, evacuating threatened ethnic groups, exchanging prisoners, drawing borders and more.¹³⁸

As originally conceived by Pearson^[139] has evolved In the beginning, the Blue Helmets were simply peacekeepers. Then, for a short time in Somalia, they were warriors of the new world order. In Bosnia and Rwanda, however, they were neither, paralyzed by the diplomacy of the great powers, who refused to grant them any power, and by ethnic conflicts that made a Somalia-style intervention hazardous.¹⁴⁰

3.2 Historical Development and Generation of Peace Support Operations

In May 2018, the United Nations celebrated the 70th anniversary of UN peacekeeping. The first UN peacekeeping mission was established in May 1948. During which the UN Security Council authorized the deployment of a small number of UN military observers to the Middle East to form

¹³⁷ In Koops, J. A. et al. *Introduction: The United Nations and Peacekeeping*. In Koops, J. A. et al. *The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2015. 2.

¹³⁸ Coulon Jocelyn. *Soldiers of Diplomacy: The United Nations, Peacekeeping, and the New World Order*. (English Translation by Phyllis Aronoff and Howard Scott) Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998. ix-x.

¹³⁹ Lester Pearson was a Canadian scholar, statesman, soldier, prime minister, and diplomat, who won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957 for organizing the, UN peacekeeping force (United Nations Emergency Force) to resolve the Suez Canal Crisis between Egypt and Israel.

¹⁴⁰ Coulon Jocelyn. *Soldiers of Diplomacy: The United Nations, Peacekeeping, and the New World Order*. (English Translation by Phyllis Aronoff and Howard Scott) Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998. x.

the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) to monitor the Armistice Agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbors.¹⁴¹ Over the past 70 years, more than 1 million men and women have served under the UN flag in more than 70 UN peacekeeping operations. More than 100,000 military, police, and civilian personnel from 125 countries serve in 14 peacekeeping operations in 2018.¹⁴² Since 1948, more than 3,500 personnel have lost their lives serving in UN peace operations, including 943 killed by violence. Since 2013, casualties have spiked, with 195 deaths in violent attacks, more than during any other five-year period in the UN's history.¹⁴³

Peace support operation is the most recognized activity of the UN. Department of Peace Operations (DPO), formerly known as the Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), is the UN department responsible for planning, preparation, management, and direction of UN peacekeeping operations.

For the first time in its history, the UN authorized the use of force without the host state's consent for the express purposes of protecting civilians from harm.¹⁴⁴ As of December 2019, the UN deploys 9,124 Police, 72,967 Troops, 1,240 Military Experts on Mission, 83,331 personnel, including international civilians, local civilians, and UN volunteers in fourteen peacekeeping missions and nine special political missions.

Professor Kai Michael Kenkel¹⁴⁵ divided peace support operations into five generations, based on: three main factors: the level of force used by operations' military pillar; the type and depth of tasks conducted by its civilian pillar; and in the case of the latest generation, increased UN load-sharing with regional organizations.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴¹ United Nations. *UN Peacekeeping: 70 Years of Service & Sacrifice*. <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/un-peace-keeping-70-years-of-service-sacrifice>, Accessed on 20 December 2018

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ UNSC cited in Hunt, C. T. Emerging Powers and the Responsibility to Protect: non-Linear Norm Dynamics in Complex International Society. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*. 2016. 29:3, 870-890

¹⁴⁵ Kenkel, K.M. *Five Generations of Peace Operations: from the "Thin Blue Line" to "Painting a Country Blue."* *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* 56 (1): 122-143, 2013. 125.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

3.2.1 First-Generation Peace Operations

Peacekeeping operations that were deployed in the Cold War period, broadly between the deployment of UNEF I in 1956 to the deployment of UNTAG in Namibia in 1988, are usually described as traditional, classical, or first-generation peacekeeping.¹⁴⁷ The primary mechanism for such a peacekeeping deployment is the interposition or buffer force that separates the combatants following a cease-fire.¹⁴⁸ Such peacekeeping types took place in areas ‘where there is a peace to keep, following an end to the armed conflict through a truce or ceasefire.’¹⁴⁹ The main objective of such a mission is to establish a political environment for peaceful conflict resolution and create a buffer zone. The core functions of the operation are monitoring borders, verifying demilitarized zones.

Traditional peacekeeping is based on the basic principles of peacekeeping Consent, Impartiality, and non-use of force. The troops deployed are lightly armed and operate under strictly limiting rules of engagement. Examples of traditional peacekeeping are the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, deployed in the Middle East, founded in 1948. The United Nations Monitoring and Observation Group in India and Pakistan, active in Kashmir since 1949—are still active today, as is a force, UNFICYP, deployed to Cyprus following that island’s partition in 1964.¹⁵⁰

3.2.2 Second-Generation Peace Operations

After the end of the bipolar system resulted from the end of the Cold War, ethnic tensions and intrastate conditions increased resulted in an increasing demand for UN peacekeeping. At the time, peace operations became easier to dispatch, but they were sent to ever more complex and dangerous contexts.¹⁵¹ ‘More ambitious mandates and active involvement not only in “freezing” conflicts but in assisting the transition to peace.’¹⁵²

¹⁴⁷ Solà-Martin, Andreu and Tom Woodhouse. *The United Nations, Armed Conflict and Peacekeeping*. Barcelona Open University of Catalonia Foundation. 2011. 5.

¹⁴⁸ Diehl, Paul F. *Peace Operations*. Cambridge: Policy Press, 2008. 4.

¹⁴⁹ Kenkel, K.M. *Five Generations of Peace Operations: from the “Thin Blue Line” to “Painting a Country Blue.”* Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 56 (1): 122-143, 2013. 125.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid. 126.

¹⁵¹ John Hillen cited in Kenkel, K.M. *Five Generations* ... 127.

¹⁵² Kenkel, K.M. *Five Generations* ...127.

According to Bellamy and Williams, second-generation missions has six distinguishing features:

It takes place within a context of ongoing violence; in a context of “new wars”; take on new civilian tasks; must interact with an increasing number of humanitarian actors in complex emergencies; often experience creeping shifts in their mandates, and suffer from a considerable gap in the relationship between their means and ends¹⁵³

The typical feature of the second-generation mission is civilian tasks added on top of classic first-generation military mandates.¹⁵⁴ These mainly includes the organization of elections, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR); humanitarian aid delivery; human rights promotion, refugee assistance, and government capacity-building.

Successful missions include the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia, the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (UNOMOZ), and the United Nations Observer Group in El Salvador (ONUSAL).

3.2.2 Third-Generation Peace Operations

The limitations of the second-generation of peace operations and the failures of the operations in Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda led UN Peace operations in the third generation ‘from a reactive stance that seeks to freeze or palliate conflict to one that is proactive and seeks to influence its outcome.’¹⁵⁵ The third generation peace operations, which are the imposition of peace or peace enforcement, were characterized by ‘increased permission to use force to impose the aims of a mission’s mandate, without significant departure like that mandate from the classic transitional tasks of second-generation mandates.’¹⁵⁶ According to Andreu Solà-Martín and Tom Woodhouse, the new third-generation operation doctrine aimed:

To prevent the deployment of armed forces without adequate training or support in areas of armed conflict. These doctrines were based on the premise that the traditional notions of peacekeeping operations were no longer applicable in a world of civil wars, states in crisis, and declining respect for international law and human rights. According to this new doctrine, future peace operations must have the flexibility, strength, and military capacity to act in a wide range of situations and deal with actors who attempt to discredit the peace

¹⁵³ Bellamy and Williams cited in Kenkel, K.M. *Five Generations* ... 128.

¹⁵⁴ Kenkel, K.M. *Five Generations* ... 129.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid. 125.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid. 129.

process through violence and intimidation or who threaten local populations and the staff of international organizations.¹⁵⁷

The first intervention to claim purely or even predominantly humanitarian motivation was the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) action against Yugoslavia over Kosovo's conflict in 1999.

3.2.4 Fourth-Generation Peace Operations

It consists of robust peacebuilding operations that combine elevated permission to use force with enhanced civilian tasks.¹⁵⁸ According to Andreu Solà-Martín and Tom Woodhouse:

UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali used the term peacebuilding in the 1990s to define post-conflict reconstruction's developmental phase that should follow peacekeeping. When, in his *Agenda for Peace* of 1992, Boutros Ghali defined the role of peacebuilding in the UN as the medium to long term process of rebuilding war-affected communities, it took another ten years before this policy commitment to peacebuilding was institutionally consolidated. The failure of the UN system to implement the prescriptions of the *Agenda for Peace*, especially in the most challenging tests faced in Somalia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, led to a series of investigations and proposals for reform that would eventually result in proposals to institutionalize peacebuilding in the UN system.

An extreme form of peacebuilding is the transitional administration, wherein the exercise of sovereignty over a given territory is effectively transferred to a UN peace operation, and all executive, legislative, and judicial authority temporarily rests with the head of the UN mission.¹⁵⁹ The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) are good examples.

3.2.5 An Emerging Fifth Generation

The UN has started sharing the burden of peacekeeping operations with regional organizations; for example, UN-mandated missions are being carried out by NATO, EU, and AU. In 2015, the former UN General Secretary, Ban Ki-moon, said, 'we have thus entered an era of partnership peacekeeping, where close cooperation among multiple multilateral actors throughout every

¹⁵⁷Solà-Martín, Andreu and Tom Woodhouse. *The United Nations, Armed Conflict and Peacekeeping*. Barcelona Open University of Catalonia Foundation. 2011. 28.

¹⁵⁸ Bellamy, et al. Cited in Kenkel, K.M. *Five Generations* ...129.

¹⁵⁹ Kenkel, K.M. *Five Generations* ... 130.

phase of a crisis is becoming the norm – and an essential component of each organization.’¹⁶⁰ The fifth generation of peacekeeping is a partnership peacekeeping called Hybrid Missions. It is characterized by missions that deploy ‘troops and police personnel under mixed command, with both the United Nations and various regional organizations deploying troops to the same missions under separate chains of command and distinct forms of mandate or simultaneous deployment of UN troops, and those of a regional organization.’¹⁶¹

The United Nations – African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) is the first peacekeeping mission with a hybrid character. It is defined as a ‘combined/joint operation in a particular area of responsibility conducted by forces from different organizations (in this case the United Nations and AU) under a common command and control arrangement, to achieve a common objective or end state, with each force retaining its organization’s identity throughout the operation.’¹⁶²

3.3 Military Interventions

One of the most important concepts related to peace support operations is a military intervention or armed intervention. The militaries interlining in other countries' domestic affairs is questionable based on the principles in the Westphalia treaties, which are the foundation of contemporary international relations. Since the end of the Cold War, military force to resolve people in the suffering of genocide or extreme human rights violation is greater than before. A generation ago, the terms ‘military intervention’ and ‘conflict resolution’ would rarely have been uttered in the same breath.¹⁶³ Large-scale human tragedies that occurred in Rwanda, Somalia, and Bosnia made the military intervention necessary. K.J. Holsti describes the development as follows:

The two great wars of the twentieth century and the development of weapons of mass distraction have changed attitudes toward the use of force. First in the League of Nations Covenant, and later in the charter of the United Nations, norms regulating the use of force were spelled out in detail. At present, force can be used in only two circumstances: (1) in

¹⁶⁰ UN Secretary-General’s Report ‘Partnering for Peace: Moving towards Partnership Peacekeeping’ UN Document S/2015/229, 1 April 2015.

¹⁶¹ Kenkel, K.M. *Five Generations* ... 135.

¹⁶² Prinsloo, Barend. “Hybrid Peacekeeping: A Deeper Understanding of Evolving Peacekeeping Practices.” 11 December 2017. <https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/blog/hybrid-peacekeeping-a-deeper-understanding-of-evolving-peacekeeping-practices>, Accessed on 13 June 2019

¹⁶³ Hauss, Charles. “Military Intervention”. August 2003. <https://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/military-intervention>, Accessed on 23 May 2019.

self-Defense, individually or collectively; and (2) as coercive sanctions approved by the Security Council of the United Nations or some other international organizations. In the latter case, a state can use military means on behalf of *community* objectives.¹⁶⁴

The AU also uses both Peace Support Operations and Interventions as a solution for Humanitarian crises. The Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, which was adopted on 09 July 2002, and came into force on 26 December 2003 article 6 (d) states that ‘one of the functions of the PSC is peace support operations and intervention, according to Article 4 (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act of AU.’ Which says ‘the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State according to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity’; and ‘the right of Member States to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security.’ All AU PSOs are also authorized by the UN Security Council per the UN Charter, Chapter VIII, Article 53(1).

Technically, Pearson and Baumann define military intervention as:

The movement of troops or forces of one country into the territory or territorial waters of another country, or military action by troops already stationed by one country inside another, in the context of some political issue or dispute. ... to influence either domestic disputes or political conditions in a target state. Conceptually, all wars - i.e. persistent bilateral combat - are preceded by interventions, but not all interventions become wars.¹⁶⁵

Thus based on the above definitions, governments unilaterally or multilateral interventions intervene to influence a target government or armed groups. The following four concepts of armed interventions are based on human security principles rather than political goals associated with peace support operations.

¹⁶⁴ Holsti, K.J. *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*. 7th Edition. Prentice-Hall International, Inc. New Jersey. 1995. 72-73.

¹⁶⁵ Pearson, Frederic. S and Robert A. Baumann. International Military Interventions: Identification and Classification. *International Interactions*, Vol. 14, No. 2, 1988. 173-180

3.4.1 Intervention by Invitation

Intervention by invitation is ‘a military intervention by foreign troops in an internal armed conflict at the government's invitation of the state concerned.’¹⁶⁶ This can be considered an exception for the article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, which states: ‘All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.’ Also, the customary of international law existed for a long time, as governments have a right to invite foreign troops to help deal with internal conflicts.¹⁶⁷ Katharina Coleman refers to intervention by invitation as ‘solidarity deployments.’¹⁶⁸

Though it is not free of controversies, Uganda intervened in South Sudan with the government of South Sudan's invitation.¹⁶⁹ The same is true for Ethiopian intervention in Somalia in 2006. As a matter of principle, governments’ invitations provide a lawful basis for intervention, and rebel groups’ invitations do not.¹⁷⁰

3.4.2 Humanitarian Intervention

The idea of a right to the humanitarian intervention was pioneered in the 1960s by the French humanitarian organization Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) or Doctors without Borders. When there are grave human rights violations, MSF argued, international actors have a right to intervene to stop them.¹⁷¹ World leaders, notably US president Bill Clinton and UK prime minister Tony

¹⁶⁶ Nolte, Georg. *Intervention by Invitation*. in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2010. Available at: <http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1702?prd=EPIL>, Accessed on 26 January 2019.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ Coleman, Katharina “Innovations in ‘African Solutions to African Problems’: The Evolving Practice of Regional Peacekeeping in Sub-Saharan Africa,” *Journal of Modern African Studies* 49, no. 4 (2011).

¹⁶⁹ Mesfin, Berouk. “The full-blown political and military crisis in South Sudan has increasingly important implications for Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea.” 26 May 2014. <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/the-crisis-in-south-sudan-a-game-of-regional-chess>, Accessed on 08 February

¹⁷⁰ Fox, Gregory H. “Intervention by Invitation.” Wayne State University Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 2014-04. 22 March 2014. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2407539, Accessed on January 15 2019.

¹⁷¹ BBC World Service. “Article 28: Right to social and international order permitting these freedoms to be realized.” http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/people/features/ihavearightto/four_b/casestudy_art28.shtml, Accessed on 28 December.

Blair, spoke of the emergence of a new world order where foreign policy decisions are motivated by a fundamental belief in universal human rights.¹⁷²

Sean Murphy defines humanitarian intervention as ‘the threat or use of force by a state, group of states, or international organization primarily to protect the nationals of the target state from widespread deprivations of internationally recognized human rights.’¹⁷³ Military interventions were justified on human rights grounds to varying degrees in Iraq in 1990-1991, Somalia in 1991-1993, East Timor and Sierra Leone in 1999, and the former Yugoslavia throughout the 1990s.¹⁷⁴

Humanitarian intervention can be classified as multilateral intervention or collective intervention and unilateral intervention. Multilateral intervention or collective intervention is humanitarian military intervention authorized and sanctioned by the UN Security Council. On the other hand, unilateral intervention is ‘a military intervention undertaken by a state (or a group of states) outside the umbrella of the United Nations in order to secure human rights in another country.’¹⁷⁵ ‘Collective intervention by the United Nations was morally, politically, and legally acceptable where unilateral intervention was not. Because it appeared more impartial and not self-serving, the UN community was perceived as acting and speaking for the whole community of nations.’¹⁷⁶

3.4.3 Sovereignty as Responsibility

The notion of sovereignty as responsibility is ‘when nations do not conduct their internal affairs in ways that meet internationally recognized standards, other nations not only have the right but

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ Murphy, Sean. *Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving World Order*. Pennsylvania. University of Pennsylvania Press, Inc. 1996. 11-12.

¹⁷⁴ BBC World Service. Article 28: Right to social and international order permitting these freedoms to be realized. http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/people/features/ihavearightto/four_b/casestudy_art28.shtml, Accessed on 28 December.

¹⁷⁵ Richemond, Daphné. “Normativity in International Law: The Case of Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention.” *Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal*, Vol. 6, Iss. 1, 2003. 47.

¹⁷⁶ Doyle, Michael W. The Ethics of Multilateral Intervention. *Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory*. No. 109, The Politics of War, April 2006. 30.

also have a duty, to intervene,’ it means a ‘government that allows its citizens to suffer in a vacuum of responsibility for moral leadership cannot claim sovereignty in an effort to keep the outside world from steeping in to offer protection and assistance.’¹⁷⁷

The ideas of sovereignty have evolved since the modern nation-state was fashioned by the European Treaty of Westphalia of 1648.¹⁷⁸ In the post-Cold War era, sovereignty becomes an internationally shared responsibility, and national sovereignty a privilege dependent on the fulfillment of responsibility.¹⁷⁹ Deng et al. affirm that to meet its responsibilities to protect its people and avoid harming its neighbors ... the principles of collective security mean that the international community should take up some portion of those responsibilities.¹⁸⁰ Weizhun Mao and Yongguang Bu define “Sovereignty as Responsibility” as follows:

Ensuring the safety and welfare of its own citizens, the sovereign state is obliged to take responsibility in providing security protection and development assistance to stabilize the international system, to improve the capacity and function building of weaker states, and to help citizens who are in a humanitarian emergency but cannot get the reliefs from their own government.¹⁸¹

3.4.4 Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

A new paradigm was influenced by a report by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, which introduced the notion of a ‘responsibility to protect’ in December 2001.¹⁸² Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect defines responsibility to protect as follows:

The Responsibility to Protect – known as R2P – is an international norm that seeks to ensure that the international community never again fails to halt the mass atrocity crimes

¹⁷⁷ Deng et al Cited in Etzioni, Amitai. Sovereignty as Responsibility. *Orbis, Foreign Policy Research Institute's Quarterly Journal of World Affairs*, 50/1, Winter 2006. 71-73.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid. 359.

¹⁷⁹ Etzioni, Amitai. Sovereignty as Responsibility. *Orbis, Foreign Policy Research Institute's Quarterly Journal of World Affairs*. Volume 50, Issue 1, Winter 2006. 74.

¹⁸⁰ Deng et al Cited in Etzioni, Amitai. Sovereignty as Responsibility. *Orbis, Foreign Policy Research Institute's Quarterly Journal of World Affairs*. Volume 50, Issue 1, Winter 2006. 74.

¹⁸¹ Mao, Weizhun and Yongguang Bu. “Sovereignty as Responsibility”: Intellectual Sources, Evolving Paths, and Theoretical Debates. *Journal of International Security Studies*, 1/2, 2015. 104.

¹⁸² International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. *The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty*. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre. 2001.

of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. The concept emerged in response to the failure of the international community to adequately respond to mass atrocities committed in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s.¹⁸³

The Responsibility to Protect has emerged from the 2005 UN World Summit, which was unanimously adopted the World Summit Outcome Document during the UN General Assembly's 60th session in 2005. Paragraph 138 says as follows:

Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability.¹⁸⁴

3.4 Why more African states are into Peacekeeping?

The traditional peacekeeping contributing states Canada, Norway, and Sweden, see their role tied to peacekeeping according to Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams, are no longer providing peacekeeping troops this is because:

... since the beginning of the twenty-first century, all three appear to have moved away from this attitude. Today's Canadian military, for instance, is highly skeptical of UN peacekeeping, in part owing to negative and controversial experiences in Somalia and the Balkans. At the same time, Norway focuses its contributions almost entirely on the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan.¹⁸⁵

As a result of high profile failures in the 1990s, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, several members of the Western European and Others Group (WEOG) remain skeptical about the UN's command and control mechanisms and have decided that only in exceptional circumstances would they place anything other than token contributions under the UN chain of command.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸³ Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. globalr2p.org. "What is R2P?" <https://www.globalr2p.org/what-is-r2p/>. Accessed on 21 December 2020.

¹⁸⁴ United Nations. *Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 16 September 2005, 60/1. 2005 World Summit Outcome*. A/RES/60/1. New York United Nations. 24 October 2005.

¹⁸⁵ Bellamy, Alex J. and Paul D. Williams. *Broadening the Base of United Nations Troop- and Police-Contributing Countries. Providing for Peacekeeping*. No. 1. International Peace Institute. August 2012.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

	Motivation	Explanation
1	International pressure and problems	African countries cooperate on international security issues through peacekeeping participation. By doing so, African countries assist in solving problems at the global level (e.g. war on terrorism, international crime).
2	Increase international and regional stature and influence	African countries can project a greater degree of collective African and international interest. It also assists with local morale, seeing one's military working to resolve conflict and restore democracy. Moreover, it can increase a nation's influence in the countries where deployed, in the region and the continent as a whole.
3	Values and perspectives	Democratic countries in Africa can show and have shown willingness to lead peacekeeping operations and over long periods of time. This shows a value basis behind foreign policy. It can also help improve the local perspective of a nation's military that can lead to greater public acceptance.
4	Greater UN prestige and influence	Participating in peacekeeping helps countries such as Nigeria who seek to become a Permanent Member of the Security Council. It also assists other African countries such as Rwanda to gain more leverage in UN bodies.
5	National security	Participation in peacekeeping helps contribute to a state's own national security (i.e., border control, refugees, etc.).
6	Political gains	Peacekeeping can be in the national interest in political spheres by building a reputation with other countries and regional organizations while improving one's leadership, culminating in political returns.

7	Profit for country	UN reimbursement helps a country remedy a lack of resources and keeps its soldiers content. Peacekeeping participation can pay for itself.
8	Increased size and quality of military	African peacekeeping participation develops expertise and experience. It is also a way for a state to grow and professionalize an army, which can be positively used in certain domestic affairs.

Table 3.1 Key motivators for African participation in peacekeeping¹⁸⁷

3.5 Summery and Partial Conclusion

Peace support operation, military intervention, and the literature reviews behind the rationales of why more African states are involved in peacekeeping are the key topics covered by this chapter.

Peacekeeping operation can be defined as an operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, undertaken by the United Nations to help maintain or restore international peace and security in conflict areas.

Peace operations host a range of operations like first the post-conflict stage conflict prevention, then conflict period operations of the peacemaking, and third peace enforcement and then the post-conflict period process of fourth peacekeeping and lastly peacebuilding.

There are five generations of UN peacekeeping operations:

Generations	Key Features
1st Generation	Peacekeeping deployment is the interposition or buffer force that separates the combatants following a cease-fire.
2nd Generation	Civilian tasks, added on top of classic first-generation military mandates, include the organization of elections, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

¹⁸⁷ Source: Firsing, Scott. 'Thinking through the role of Africa's militaries in peacekeeping: the cases of Nigeria, Ethiopia and Rwanda'. *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 21/1, 2014. 45-67.

	(DDR); humanitarian aid delivery; human rights promotion, refugee assistance, and government capacity-building.
3rd Generation	The imposition of peace or peace enforcement was characterized by increased permission to use force to impose the aims of a mission's mandate.
4th Generation	Robust peacebuilding operations that combine elevated permission to use force with enhanced civilian tasks.
5th Generation	UN partnership in peacekeeping operations with regional organizations, for example, UN-mandated missions are being carried out by NATO, EU, and AU.

Table 3.2 Summary of Professor Kai Michael Kenkel's Generations of Peace Support Operations

Four core concepts of military interventions are related to peace support operations. First, Intervention by invitation is military intervention by foreign troops in an internal armed conflict at the state's government's invitation. Second, humanitarian intervention is a threat or use of force by a state, group of states, or international organization to protect the nationals of the target state from widespread deprivations of internationally recognized human rights. Third, sovereignty as responsibility, a notion that a government that allows its citizens to suffer in a vacuum of responsibility for moral leadership cannot claim sovereignty to keep the outside world from stepping in to offer protection and assistance. Lastly, Responsibility to Protect – known as R2P – is an international norm that seeks to ensure that the international community never again fails to halt the mass atrocity crimes of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.

The chapter's last topic points to our eight reasons behind why more African states deploy their troops to peacekeeping missions: International pressure and problems; Increase international and regional stature and influence; Values and perspectives; Greater UN prestige and influence; National security; and Political gains.

CHAPTER 4 – ETHIOPIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND MILITARY POWER

“The right of making war and peace with other nations and commonwealths; that is to say, of judging when it is for the public good, and how great forces are to be assembled, armed, and paid for that end” — Thomas Hobbes

*“A country that demands moral perfection in its foreign policy will achieve neither perfection nor security.”
— Henry Kissinger*

This chapter deals with Ethiopia’s three main topics: It briefly discusses the Ethiopian state from its origin to a modern state formation. The second part deals with an overview of its foreign policy; the part deals with the Ethiopian military from the origin of the modern army until the present day. All divided into pre and post 1991.

4.1 The Ethiopian State

Ethiopia is one of the oldest civilizations with a history of over three thousand years and the only country on the African continent not to have been colonized despite the paramount exertions of Italy. The ancient civilization was centered mainly in the northern Abyssinian¹⁸⁸ territory, with its boundaries expanding or shrinking, depending on the balance of power between the ruling elites. Though there had been earlier attempts to create a unified and centralized empire, this enterprise only became successful at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries. It started at the time of Emperor Tewodros II and finalized ‘during the reign of Emperor Minilik II, most of the treaties that define current boundaries were signed.’¹⁸⁹

Ethiopia’s evolution of government structure, a culture that makes it distinct from most African states. The first “modern” constitution of Ethiopia, of 1931, established by His Majesty Haile Sellasie I, refers that the Ethiopian state is 2,937 years old, starting from Minilik I's mother, Queen Sheba, and there were 225 Kings.¹⁹⁰ This account is based on *Kebra Nagast* (Glory of Kings), a

¹⁸⁸ A historical name for the Ethiopian Empire, that comprised the northern half of present-day Ethiopia.

¹⁸⁹ Berhe, Mulugeta G. Economic Integration as a Peacebuilding Strategy in the Horn of Africa with Particular Focus on Ethiopia and Its Four Neighbors. *Journal of African-Centered Solutions in Peace and Security*. Vol. 1 (1) August 2016. 74.

¹⁹⁰ Sigatu, Kaleab T. *Constitution in Ethiopia: From Fitiha Negest to FDRE*. [Amharic]. (*Hige Menigist Be'itiopia: Ke'fitiha Negest eske Ifedri.*) Addis Ababa: Mega Publishing Plc, 2019. 53.

political and religious document/book. The book is about explaining the reason for the transfer of the Kingdom of David from his Son Solomon, King of Israel, to the country of the *Negus*, Abyssinia.¹⁹¹ The book has played a central role in the Ethiopian empire as a pillar of the Ethiopian state, a source of legitimacy for the government until the 1974 Revolution, and one of the essential books in the Ethiopian Orthodox Church.

The 1974 Ethiopian Revolution took place, and *Derg* (The Armed Forces, the Police and Territorial Army Council) came to power. Later its official name became Provisional Military Administration Council from 1974 to 1987; later, the Workers Party of Ethiopia. The state's official name changed to People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE) in 1975, led by Colonel Mengistu HaileMariam as a chairman of the council and as a president when PDRE was established 1987- 1991.

The 1987 constitution of PDRE shows that Ethiopia was a socialist state directed by the Marxism-Leninism ideology. Article 1 and 6 states as follows:

The people's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia is a state of the working people founded on the alliance of workers and peasants and the participation of the intelligentsia, the revolutionary army, artisans, and other democratic sections of the society. (Article 1.1)

The People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia shall, while accomplishing the national democratic revolution, lay the foundation for the construction of socialism. (Article 1.3)

The Workers' Party of Ethiopia, which is guided by Marxism-Leninism, is a vanguard party dedicated to serve the working people and protect their interests. (Article 6.1)

The Workers' Party of Ethiopia charts the direction for the development of the country and is the guiding force of the State and the entire society. (Article 6.2)

In 1991 the Ethiopian state underwent significant rearrangement; the unitary state structure changed to a federal system, and in 1995 they adopted a new constitution. It established a democratic federal republic with a parliamentarian and multi-party system with nine states (ten in 2020). Since then, the ruling party is EPRDF until its reform under the new leadership of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed (Ph.D.) and change of its name to Prosperity Party (PP) in December 2019.

¹⁹¹ Budge, E. A. Wallis. *The Queen of Sheba and Her Only Son Menyelek (Kēbra Nagast)*. Ontario: Cambridge. 2000. xxxii.

4.2 Ethiopian Foreign Relations/Policy

The Ethiopian Empire has a long history of foreign relations with the outside world. Here it will be worth citing Edward Gibbon's words about Ethiopians traveling abroad and the perception of Ethiopia in Europe.

For the beginning of the sixteenth century, we actually have a number of itineraries of Ethiopian monks who traveled to Europe through the Holy Land. These early pioneers set the tone of the relations between Europe and Ethiopia until the middle of the sixteenth century. Wherever they met fellow Christians from other countries, they transmitted vivid traditions about their church and its distinctive liturgical practices, about the Christian kingdom and its continuous conflicts with the neighboring Muslim areas, and about the Ethiopian interest in breaking their age-old isolation from the rest of the Christian world. Very often, these monks were too patriotic, and the stories they related about their country seem to have exaggerated the power and wealth of the Christian monarchs.

After the revival of the Christian state under the Solomonic rulers in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, such stories were a true reflection of the sense of power and self-confidence which the Christians felt throughout Ethiopia. The reports of Muslim merchants in Egypt and Syria also corroborated the essential truth of the conquests and expansion of the Christian empire in the African hinterland of the southern Red Sea. Thus, the image which Europe began to have regarding Christian Ethiopia from the early Crusades onwards was one of a very powerful and wealthy state. It seems to be very farfetched now to suggest that this had anything to do with the early development of the European legend about the Prester John of the Indies. But it is true that from the last years of the thirteenth century onwards, there was a gradual identification of the legendary Prester John with the increasingly powerful Solomonic monarchs of Ethiopia.

In 1427 and 1450, we have reliable reports of Ethiopian delegations sent to Europe to establish friendly relations and to ask for European technicians and artisans. It is probable that some of the artisans requested in 1450 had reached Ethiopia, where some Europeans are reported as having been in the emperor's court in the early 1480s. It was, however, the Portuguese, with their remarkable success in navigating the eastern seas, who took most seriously the search for Prester John, with whom they established contact before the end of the fifteenth century.¹⁹²

The dramatic description of Edward Gibbon's about medieval Ethiopia continues as follows:

Encompassed on all sides by the enemies of their religion, the Ethiopian's slept near a thousand years, forgetful of the world, by whom they were forgotten. They were awakened by the Portuguese, who, turning the southern promontory of Africa, appeared in India and the Red Sea as if they had descended through the air from a distant planet. In the first

¹⁹² Edward Gibbon. *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*. eBookMall, Inc. 2001. Volume 4, Chapter XLVII, Part V.

moments of their interview, the subjects of Rome and Alexandria observed the resemblance, rather than the difference, of their faith; and each nation expected the most important benefits from an alliance with their Christian brethren. In their lonely situation, the Ethiopian's had almost relapsed into the savage life. Their vessels, which had traded to Ceylon, scarcely presumed to navigate the rivers of Africa; the ruins of Axum were deserted, the nation was scattered in villages, and the emperor, a pompous name, was content, both in peace and war, with the immovable residence of a camp. Conscious of their own indigence, the Abyssinians had formed the rational project of importing the arts and ingenuity of Europe; and their ambassadors at Rome and Lisbon were instructed to solicit a colony of smiths, carpenters, tilers, masons, printers, surgeons, and physicians, for the use of their country. But the public danger soon called for the instant and effectual aid of arms and soldiers to defend an unwarlike people from the Barbarians who ravaged the inland country and the Turks and Arabs who advanced from the sea-coast in a more formidable array.¹⁹³

4.2.1 The Beginning of Modern Diplomacy

Ethiopia's modern diplomatic history began at the reign of Emperor Theodoros II in the mid-19th century. His foremost intention was the need to obtain technical expertise, mainly military from the western European states. This is because the Ottomans controlled the Red Sea region, ending Ethiopian authority there and particularly Egypt's hostility to control the Blue Nile. The concerns over the Blue Nile and the Red Sea have also been a focus and an essential feature in determining Ethiopia's foreign policy and international relations at different historical periods.¹⁹⁴

Though the Emperor's aspiration to acquire professionals failed and led to war with the British, which ended with the suicide of Theodoros II when he was defeated, the tradition of contact with western powers was closely followed by his successor, Emperor Yohannes.¹⁹⁵

The most important goal and the core of foreign policies of the successive three Ethiopian governments under Menelik II, Haile Selassie I, and Colonel Mengistu HaileMariam was to preserve the geographical entity of Ethiopia, and all three fought against external and internal enemies to

¹⁹³ Edward Gibbon. *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*. eBookMall, Inc. 2001. Volume 4, Chapter XLVII, Part V.

¹⁹⁴ Berhanu, Taye. *An Introduction to Ethiopia's Foreign Policy: Its Process and Reflections pre-1991*. Addis Ababa: Far East Trading, 2010. p. i.

¹⁹⁵ MOFA. *Diplomatic History of Ethiopia*. <http://www.mfa.gov.et/Home/Templatel?PageName=History%20Of%20The%20Ministry&TYPE=The%20Ministry&SUBTYPE=The%20Ministry&Language=English>, Accessed on 25 September 2020.

preserve it. External threats were common in Ethiopian history. Apart from two Somalian invasions in 1964 and 1977, Berouk Mesfin summaries the external threats as follows:

In the sixteenth century, the Turks made repeated and unsuccessful attempts to conquer the northern parts of Ethiopia. Between 1820 and 1876, Egyptian invading forces carried out a series of military raids into Ethiopia from various directions. In the north, they were comprehensively defeated by Ethiopian armies at Gundet and Gura in 1875 and 1876, respectively. There was also the attempt to resist the British expedition commanded by General Napier in 1868. Moreover, warfare against the Italians began in 1887 at Dogali and culminated in the decisive Ethiopian victory at Adwa in 1896. The Italians came back with a vengeance in 1935, invaded Ethiopia, and occupied it for five years.¹⁹⁶

It was the time of Emperor Menelik II, Ethiopia, established modern institutions of administration. The Emperor decided in 1900 to establish a council of ministers composed of nine ministries, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Under Emperor Haile Selassie I and *Derg*, another distinctive and fundamental future of Ethiopian foreign policy is its unwavering policy of supporting liberation struggles in Africa. Two of the prominent supports were military training and an Ethiopian passport with an altered name given to Nelson Mandela¹⁹⁷ during his struggle against the South African Apartheid system by the government of Emperor Haile Sellassie I. Colonel Mengistu HaileMariam also given military supplies. They provided training camps in Ethiopia to the then Rhodesian (Zimbabwean) guerrillas led by Robert Mugabe against the white minority government.¹⁹⁸

Ethiopian foreign policy took its more modern shape under the reign of Emperor Haile Selassie I. At this time, permanent representation has begun, and diplomatic missions opened in many

¹⁹⁶ Mesfin, Berouk. A Study of Decision-Making Process and the Strategies of Ethiopia's Foreign Policy (1974-1991), with Particular Emphasis on Ethio-US Relations. *Ethiopian Journal of the Social Sciences and Humanities*. Vol. II, No. 1. July 2004. 1-44. 16.

¹⁹⁷ SABC Digital News. "Mandela in Ethiopia." December 16, 2013. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RoIO50qckvk>, Accessed on 12 June 2019.

¹⁹⁸ The New York Times. "Ex-Ethiopia Chief Reaches Zimbabwe." May 23, 1991. <https://www.nytimes.com/1991/05/23/world/ex-ethiopia-chief-reaches-zimbabwe.html>, Accessed on 12 June 2019.

countries.¹⁹⁹ Eighty-four ambassadors and nine consular service diplomats have been assigned to various countries during the Emperor's reign.²⁰⁰

Even before assuming his throne, his foreign policy achievement was to peruse Empress Zewditu to allow Ethiopia to be a member of the League of Nations in 1923. He said to the empress 'what Menelik successfully achieved in war, would be now accomplished by a mere putting signature in a piece of paper ... membership to the League was, for no reason other than protecting the country from attack as per the covenant of the organization.'²⁰¹

After he became emperor, Haile Selassie I was responsible for all matters related to foreign relations. Moreover, there was no official foreign policy or strategy, which was documented.

The Constitution in 1955 Article 30 states as follows:

The Emperor exercises the supreme direction of the foreign relations of the Empire. The Emperor accredits and receives Ambassadors, Ministers, and Missions; He alone has the right to settle disputes with foreign powers by adjudication and other peaceful means and provides for the realization of the ends of security and common Defense. He alone has the right to ratify, on behalf of Ethiopia, treaties and other international agreements and to determine which treaties and international agreements shall be subject to ratification before becoming binding upon the Empire.²⁰²

4.2.1 Foreign Policy of the Military Government

In 1974 the Coordinating Committee of the Armed Forces (*Derg*) was formed, composed of junior officers and non-commissioned officers. After few months, it transformed itself into the Provisional Military Administrative Council. Later in 1987, it was converted to establishing the Workers Party of Ethiopia and led the newly structured socialist government, the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.

¹⁹⁹ Abotaa, Arka. *Ethiopia's Foreign Policy under Emperor Haile Selassie I: An Appraisal*. Thesis Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of Addis Ababa University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for the Degree of Master of Arts International Relations. December 6, 2002 Addis Ababa.

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

²⁰¹ Haile Selassie cited in Abotaa, Arka. *Ethiopia's Foreign Policy under Emperor Haile Selassie I: An Appraisal*. Thesis Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of Addis Ababa University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for the Degree of Master of Arts International Relations. December 6, 2002 Addis Ababa. 26.

²⁰² Sigatu, Kaleab T. *Constitution in Ethiopia...* 24.

Ethiopia shifted its affiliation to the Soviet bloc during this time, and its foreign policy base became the left-wing, proletarian internationalism. The 1987 People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia's Constitution, Foreign Policy states the following:

The foreign policy of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia is based on the principle of proletarian internationalism, peaceful coexistence, and non-alignment. (Article 27) The People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, while safeguarding the interests of the country, shall promote relations and cooperation with all states on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. It shall respect the right of states to live under the social and economic system of their choice. (Article 2.1) The People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia shall promote all-around relations and cooperation with socialist states and strengthen its relations with the international working-class movement, revolutionary democratic forces, national liberation movements, and other democratic and peace-loving forces. (Article 2.2) The People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia shall staunchly struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism, and other forms of oppression and exploitation. (Article 2.3)

The People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia shall strive for cooperation among peoples, mutual development, and the strengthening of good-neighborly relation with adjoining states on the basis of respect for the inviolability of national sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, non-interference in their internal affairs, peaceful resolution of conflicts and, in general, the principles of non-alignment. (Article 29)

The People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia shall actively participate in international and regional organizations that stand for peace and for the well-being and progress of mankind. (Article 30)²⁰³

Thus, until 1991 Ethiopian foreign policy was based on socialist orientations, Marxism-Leninism ideology, and unit-imperialism, anti-colonialism, anti-neo-colonialism.²⁰⁴ Moreover, there were 1,200 Soviet forces in Ethiopia, and 16-17,000 Cuban forces were in Ethiopia ²⁰⁵

It was during this time the Ethiopian state, for the first time, had a foreign policy document. The hardly seen 297-page foreign policy document of the military government, *Derg* has three parts in addition to its introduction and conclusion.²⁰⁶ The first part discusses the then-current world conditions and power alignment of first the imperialist domain, second the socialist domain, third

²⁰³ Sigatu, Kaleab T. *Constitution in Ethiopia*... 130.

²⁰⁴ MOFA. *Ethiopian Foreign Policy Directions and Study of Political Affairs*. [Amharic] *Ye'Etiiyopiya Yewichi Polisi Akitachana Yepoletica Gudayoch Tinat*). MOFA: Addis Ababa. 1984.

²⁰⁵ International Institute for Strategic Studies. *The Military Balance: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defense Economics*. 1980-81. London: Arms and Armour Press.

²⁰⁶ MOFA. *Ethiopian Foreign Policy Directions*...1984.

the position of developing countries in the global power alignment, fourth about Africa, and fifth about Ethiopia. Part two discussed Ethiopia's foreign policy purposes, principles, and goals. It also defined twenty specific goals. These were: including; Seeking a lasting solution to the crisis between Ethiopia and Somalia; Ensuring and enforcing Ethiopia's rights in the Red Sea; developing and implement a policy for the use of the Nile River; Strengthen relations with socialist countries; Promote relations with neighboring countries in good neighborliness spirit; Enhancing Ethiopia's role in the African continent; Improving Ethiopia's relations with the Arab world; Enhancing Ethiopia's participation and influence in the United Nations and the African Union, the Non-Aligned Movement and other international forums; and Support national liberation movements, and contribute to the maintenance of world peace and tranquility.

Part three discusses Ethiopian foreign policy's direction and implementation under it with five subtopics of first issues that need attention, second sequence of focus areas for Ethiopian diplomatic effort, third international organizations, fourth Governmental and Non-Governmental Organizations of which Ethiopia is not a member, and fifth Various issues. The sequence of Ethiopian diplomatic focus areas begins from Socialist countries, then Africa (in order of first adjacent neighbors, then Nile valley countries, West African countries, etc.), then Middle East countries, Western Europe, North America, Latin America, and Carrabin and finally Asian countries.

4.2.3 Post 1991 Ethiopian Foreign Policy

After the end of the 1991 Transitional Government tenure, the 1995 Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia's constitution states the principles for external relations on Article 86 as follows:

- (1) To promote policies of foreign relations based on the protection of national interests and respect for the sovereignty of the country.
- (2) To promote mutual respect for national sovereignty and equality of states and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states.
- (3) To ensure that the foreign relation policies of the country are based on mutual interests and equality of states, as well as those international agreements, promote the interests of Ethiopia.
- (4) To observe international agreements that ensure respect for Ethiopia's sovereignty and are not contrary to the interests of its Peoples.
- (5) To forge and promote ever-growing economic union and fraternal relations of Peoples with Ethiopia's neighbors and other African countries.
- (6) To seek and support peaceful solutions to international disputes.²⁰⁷

²⁰⁷ Sigatu, Kaleab T. *Constitution in Ethiopia* ...200.

Since 1991, and especially after the 2002 Ethiopian Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy (EFANSP) release, Ethiopia's national interests primarily focus on the country's internal political and economic vulnerabilities. Affirming as follows:

Our foreign relations and national security policy and strategy can only have relevance if it contributes to the fight against poverty and promotes speedy economic development, democracy, and peace. If we do not realize our goals, one can predict that our country will be exposed to great instability and even collapse, and our very security, and indeed survival, will be at stake.²⁰⁸

The policy and strategy document has two parts. The first part deals with the foundations of Foreign affairs and national security policy, which are: Development and the building of a democratic system; National pride and prestige; and Globalization. The second part lists the objectives, and the third part lists five strategies: Devoting the prime focus to activities at home; Strategy centered on the economy; Full utilization of benefits based on proper analysis; Minimizing threats based on proper analysis; Reducing vulnerability to threats; Building a reliable Defense capability and Building strong implementation capacity. The second part is about a detailed description of Ethiopia's relations with other countries, listed into seven regions: the Horn of Africa, other African countries, Middle East, Europe, USA, Asia, and international & non-governmental organizations.

Ethiopian Minister of Foreign Affairs from 2012-2016, Tedros Adhanom in his speech at the Africa Programme, Chatham House, elaborated the philosophy behind Ethiopia's foreign policy as follows:

Ethiopia's foreign policy has to serve these twin objectives: rapid economic development, which aims to provide all members of society with benefits, and democratization to ensure the complete participation of people in administering their own affairs. The government has, over the last years, therefore centered diplomatic activities on the promotion of trade, encouraging investment and tourism.

However, we realize that our development will be more sustainable if there are a shared vision and action for peace and development in the whole of our sub-region. Ethiopia, therefore, attaches utmost importance to its relations with its neighbors and believes that creating the economic conditions of regional integration is vital. It is accordingly taking concrete action to promote regional integration by linking the sub-region with massive infrastructure developments. In this regard, our road link with Djibouti and Sudan is creating an enabling environment for trade and people-to-people contact, and the standard-

²⁰⁸ Ministry of Information Press & Audiovisual Department. *The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy*. Addis Ababa. November 2002

gauge rail linking Ethiopia and Djibouti is expected to be operational next year. The Ethiopian side of the road linking Ethiopia and Kenya is already completed, and the Kenyan side is nearing its completion. The Lamu Port and Lamu South Sudan Ethiopia Transport Corridor project involving railway, road, and port infrastructure is currently underway...Ethiopia has already begun supplying Djibouti and Sudan with electric power and signed a deal with Kenya for two thousand megawatts more; that will be realized after the completion of the Ethiopian renaissance dam. That East African power pool can actually reach up to Rwanda.²⁰⁹

... we realize that the durability of the successes we have achieved as a country depends on the prevalence of peace and security in the whole of our sub-region. Ethiopia firmly believes that its peace and security are the peace and security of its neighbors and vice versa. This explains Ethiopia's commitment to peace and security, as demonstrated by our participation in the various peacekeeping operations within our sub-region in particular and our continent in general. In our sub-region, the deployment of Ethiopian troops in Darfur, Abyei, and Somalia has made a significant contribution to the maintenance of regional peace, security, and stability. Especially if you take Abyei: it is just Ethiopian troops keeping the peace of that disputed border between Sudan and South Sudan. During the last five years, we have increased our contribution to the UN peacekeeping operations fourfold. Currently, Ethiopia is the second-largest troop-contributing country to UN peacekeeping missions. If we add to this our involvement in African Union peacekeeping missions, we will find that Ethiopia is the largest contributor of peacekeeping troops in the world.²¹⁰

The key institutions of FDRE, which are the main drivers of foreign policy, are the Office of the Prime Minister, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, the Ethiopian National Defense Force, and the National Intelligence and Security Services. Others like the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, and the Inland Revenue and Customs Authority are also important institutions.²¹¹ However, in almost all governments, foreign policy is reserved to the executive branch, and effective powers are concentrated in a few men's hands.²¹²

As William Wallace described it:

²⁰⁹ Gebreyesus, Tedros A. "Ethiopia's Foreign Policy: Regional Integration and International Priorities." Programme, Chatham House. 23 October 2015. <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/events/20151023-ethiopia-foreign-policy-regional-integration-international-policies-qa.pdf>, Accessed on 24 November 2018.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

²¹¹ Maru, Mehari T. *A Regional Power in the Making: Ethiopian Diplomacy in the Horn of Africa*. Occasional Paper 261. South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA). June 2017.

²¹² Frankel, Joseph cited in William Wallace, *Foreign Policy and Political Process*. London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1971. 10.

It is characteristic of the foreign policy process that a greater degree of secrecy, of concern for confidentiality, and the need to avoid breaches of security, is observed by those involved. This in itself places a peculiar barrier in the way of the would-be student of foreign policy: that the practice of foreign policy is more shrouded in secrecy, that access to material is more difficult to obtain than in almost any other area of politics.²¹³

This is also true for Ethiopia, where a single party is ruling since 1991, and few individuals control state power. However, from few primary and secondary resources, it can be concluded that most of the crucial foreign policy decisions like the Ethio-Eritrean war from 1998-2001, Ethiopia's role in the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), climate change negotiations, the appointment of the chair of the UN-supported AU High-Level Implementation Panel (AU HIP), and the deployment in 2011 of the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) were depended on the personal leadership of the former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi.^{214 215 216}

Currently, Ethiopia has diplomatic missions in 47 countries. Focusing its regional policy issues by dividing into six; specifically, in Neighboring Countries, African Countries, Middle East Countries, Asian Countries, European Countries, and the United States of America. There are four Permanent Secretaries to African and Middle East Asian Countries; Europe-America-Asia and Multi-Lateral; Human Resource and Administrative; and Diaspora, Consular and Economic Diplomacy. MOFA is also organizationally divided into 29 Director Generals and Offices, led by a Minister and three States Ministers for Political Affairs, Business and Diaspora Affairs, and Human Resource and Administrative Affairs.

4.2.4 Ethiopia at UN

Ethiopia, alongside Bolivia, Kazakhstan, Sweden, and Italy & the Netherlands (both agreed to split a term, taking a year apiece), started its two-year term as a non-permanent member of the

²¹³ Wallace, William. *Foreign Policy and Political Process*. London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1971. 10.

²¹⁴ Maru, Mehari T. *A Regional Power in the Making: Ethiopian Diplomacy in the Horn of Africa*. Occasional Paper 261. South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA). June 2017.

²¹⁵ Maru, Mehari T. 'Ethiopia and AU', in Gelot L & M Eriksson (eds), *The African Union in Light of the Arab Revolts: An Appraisal of the Foreign Policy and Security Objectives of South Africa, Ethiopia and Algeria*, Nordic Africa Institute & Swedish Defense Research Agency Discussion Paper, 76, May 2013, <http://nai.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2%3A622198&dswid=5970>, Accessed in 6 January 2020.

²¹⁶ Interview with an official of the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 26 August 2019.

United Nations Security Council on 1st January 2017. It ended on 31st December 2018, and South Africa joined the Security Council to represent Africa alongside Cote D'Ivoire and Equatorial Guinea. In the past, Ethiopia got non-permanent seats in the Security Council two times before in 1967-68, and in 1989-90.

Ethiopia is a founding member of the United Nations and its predecessor – the League of Nations. Although it could not count on the League of Nations' support in its hour of need, Ethiopia never lost confidence in multilateralism. It remained a staunch supporter of the principle of collective security embodied in the United Nations Charter.

Ethiopia's commitment to UN peace endeavors has not been mere talk. It has been practical, concrete, and demonstrable. Its role in peacekeeping began in the early 1950s and continued during the civil war in Congo. Over the last twenty years, Ethiopia's contribution to UN peacekeeping has grown by leaps and bounds. The United Nations and the international community have publicly appreciated the discipline, professionalism, and dedication of Ethiopian peacekeepers in the effective and successful discharge of their responsibilities.

September 2017 was a month of Ethiopia's Presidency of the Security Council. One of Ethiopia's significant achievements in peace support operations in recent years is the adoption of Resolution 2378 (2017), adopted by the Security Council at its 8051st meeting, on 20 September 2017, on financing AU-led peace support operations. Other achievements were also, as Ethiopia being among the top five TCCs to United Nations Peacekeeping, Ethiopia is also a member of the UN Peace-building Commission (PBC).²¹⁷ The mandate renewal of UNISFA, maintaining UNISFA's support to the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM), and avoid significant cuts to the troop size would have enormous implications not only for the safety and security of Ethiopian peacekeepers. Also, the lifting of the sanctions imposed on Eritrea by adopting resolution 2444 (2018), which Ethiopia requested.

The draft resolution proposed by Ethiopia was unanimously adopted by the Council at the High-Level Open Debate and co-sponsored by more than sixty UN Member States. Resolution 2378 (2017), the partnership between the United Nations and the African Union for the financing of

²¹⁷ CDRC. 'Ethiopia's term as a non-permanent member at the Security Council'. *CDRC DIGEST*. Vol. 4 No. 2, February 2019

AU-led peace support operations, and the Security Council has decided to consider taking practical steps toward financing on a case-by-case basis.²¹⁸

Ethiopia's achievement can be summarized as follows:

In line with these aims and hopes, Ethiopia has tried to be a strong voice for Africa, reflecting the common position of Africa in various matters of peace and security that have arisen across the continent during this period, and with some success. In recognition of the valuable and useful role Ethiopia has been able to achieve, the AU Peace and Security Council, at its 814th meeting, held on 5 December 2018, said: "Council commended the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia for the important and exemplary role it played during its tenure, championing, promoting and defending the African common positions and concerns within the UN Security Council decision-making process."²¹⁹

4.3 The Ethiopian Military

The idea of modern military formation in Ethiopia begins with Emperor Tewodros II (ruled 1855-1868), who reunified the Ethiopian empire. During the Emperor's time, in the words of Philip Marsden, 'War, drove the ambition and passion of every Ethiopian highlander. War was a way of life, an end in itself.'²²⁰ However, Emperor Tewodros II planned to bring all regional forces under a single national command, the emperor. According to Bahru Zewde, 'to Tewodros, who owed his political power more to his military prowess than to his genealogy, the army's central role must have been even more vital. He set out to remold Ethiopia's military structure in three important respects: organization, discipline, and armament.'²²¹

Tewodros tried to the adaptation of western technology in order to modernize his army. He made a failed attempt to get artisans from England. He wrote a letter to the Queen of England as follows:

God's creature and slave, the son of David and Solomon, King of Kings Tewodros. May this letter reach the servant of the Queen of England: What I require from you ... is you should send me a cannon-maker, a gunsmith, an iron smelter, a sapper, and a gunner. By

²¹⁸ Ibid.

²¹⁹ Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *Two years as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council (Part 1)*. December 14, 2018. <https://mfaethiopiablog.wordpress.com/2018/12/14/two-years-as-a-non-permanent-member-of-the-un-security-council-part-1/>, Accessed on 27 January 2019.

²²⁰ Marsden, Philip. *The Barefoot Emperor: An Ethiopian Tragedy*. London: Harper Perennial. 2008. 5.

²²¹ Zewde, Bahru. *A History of Modern Ethiopia: 1855-1991*. 2nd Edition. Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Press. 2002. 32.

the power of God, let all these craftsmen come together with their equipment so that they may return after instructing me.²²²

Because the queen did not send artisans, Tewodros ordered the European Protestant missionaries to establish a foundry in Gafat, insisting on modern weapons production. The missionaries were able to mortars, including the largest one named ‘Sebastopol.’

Another important landmark in Ethiopian military history is the Italian invasion and the Battle of Adwa. It is after the death of Emperor Yohannes, Menelik of Shoa proclaimed himself as King of King and became Emperor Menelik II in 1889. In the same year, the Italians signed the Treaty of Wuchale with Ethiopia, recognizing Menelik II as emperor. However, Article 17 of the Italian version states that Italy would control Ethiopia’s external affairs (which aimed to make Ethiopia Italy’s protectorate), and the Amharic version said that Menelik could choose whether or not to ask the Italians to act on his behalf, but not required to do so.²²³ It was considered as a trick by the Italians, and Menelik II revoked the treaty in 1893. This was the beginning of hostility between the two states.

In 1895 the Italians defeated the ruler of Tigre, Northern Ethiopia, Ras Mangasha, and fortified Adigrat and Mekele. At the end of the same year, Emperor Menelik II mobilized his forces from all corners of the empire and marched to the north by issuing a proclamation and a declaration of war:

Assemble the army, beat the drum. God in his bounty has struck down my enemies and enlarged my empire and preserved me to this day. Enemies have come who would ruin our country and change our religion. They have passed beyond the sea that God gave us for our frontier. I, aware that herds were decimated and people were exhausted, did not wish to do anything [about it] until now. These enemies have advanced, burrowing into the country like moles. With God’s help, I will get rid of them. You who are strong give me your strength, and you who are weak, help me by prayer. If you refuse to follow me, look out! I shall not fail to punish you.²²⁴

²²² Rubenson cited in Henze, Paul B. *Layers of Time: A History of Ethiopia*. London: Hurst & Company. 2000. 138.

²²³ McLachlan, Sean. *Armies of the Adowa Campaign 1896: The Italian Disaster in Ethiopia*. New York: Osprey Publishing, 2011. 6.

²²⁴ Prouty, Chris. *Empress Taytu and Menilek II: Ethiopia, 1883-1910*. Trenton: Red Sea Press. 2016. 133-134.

Menelik II mobilized a force of around 100,000 troops, and the Italians were about 25,000. It was, and on midday 1st of March 1896, the decisive battle of Adwa was fought, and the Italian army defeated, and with it, the ‘Italian ambition was dead, and independent Ethiopia survived.’²²⁵

Because of Ethiopian independence and the history of freedom from colonialism, there is special collective behavior in its foreign policy and military orientation. The Adowa victory against the Italian colonial invasion is seen as ‘the epitome of African militancy, hardihood, and heroism.’²²⁶

In addition to the Ethiopian military victory against the colonial power, its red, yellow (gold), and green-colored flag symbolizes freedom and Pan-Africanism.²²⁷ It inspired the flags of other African nations. That is why most African states have the three colors in a different order. The red, yellow (gold), and green Ethiopian flag had been flown in Ethiopia for decades before the military victory; however, it is in the wake of the defeat of the Italians, Emperor Menelik II commissioned the first official flag in 1897, which became the first African nation-state flag.²²⁸

The first African state of being independent, Ghana, in 1957, took the flag color of Ethiopia and became the first country to use the Pan-African colors of red, yellow and green, and black star in the middle from Marcus Garvey’s ‘Back to Africa’ movement.²²⁹ Guinea, Cameroon, the Togolese Republic, Mali, and Senegal all had variations on the theme but acknowledged that these were pan-African colors for a continent united in rejecting rule from abroad and seeking a better future.²³⁰ At least eighteen sub-Saharan national flags are variations on the pan-African colors of red, yellow, green, and also black; likewise, many states are clearly influenced by them.²³¹

Even beyond the continent, the Ethiopian flag colors inspired the Jamaican-born Marcus Mosiah Garvey, a man who promoted racial separateness and was one of the founders of the Back to

²²⁵ Bahru Zewde. *A History of Modern Ethiopia 1955-1991*, 2nd Edition Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University press. 76-79.

²²⁶ Abraham, Kinfu. *Ethiopia from Empire to Federation*. Addis Ababa, EIIP Press. 2001. 143.

²²⁷ Devereux, Eva. *Flags of the World*. New York: Crescent Books. 1992. 35.

²²⁸ Marshall, Tim. *A Flag Worth Dying for: The Power and Politics of National Symbols*. New York. 2017. 191-193.

²²⁹ Crampton, William. *Pocket Guide to Flags*. New York. Salamander Books Ltd. 1992. 57.

²³⁰ Marshall, Tim. *A Flag Worth Dying for: The Power and Politics of National Symbols*. New York. 2017. 197.

²³¹ Ibid. 200.

Africa concept in New York.²³² In addition to this, since the 1930s, the Ethiopian flag colors became popular among the Rastafarian religious movement in Jamaica who looked to Ethiopia for political and spiritual guidance.²³³

Thus, Ethiopia's military victory against the colonial aggression created both institutional and individual behavior, which have also been reflected in all post-Adwa regimes in their recruitment of the army, indoctrination, and also peace support deployment with the motive of giving a hand for those who are fraught with menace.

4.3.1 The Beginning of Modern Military

Modernization of the Ethiopian army started in 1917 when the Imperial Bodyguard was formed as a regular standing force by Teferi Mekonne, who later became Emperor Haile Selassie I. In 1935, Ethiopia opened the first military officer's training academy at Holeta town 44 k.m from the capital Addis Ababa. After that, it was started using the modern army rank instead of the old traditional names for a top army officer. The following were the traditional rank naming with the modern equivalent of each: ራስ ቢትወደድ (Ras Bitewedid) – General, ራስ (Ras) – Lieutenant General, ደጃዝማች (Dejazimach) – Major General, ፊታውራሪ (Fitawirari) – Brigadier General, ቀኛዝማች (Kegnazimach) – Colonel, ግራዝማች (Girazimach) – Lieutenant Colonel.

Ethiopia's first 1931 Imperial constitution declares that the Emperor has power over all military issues and the army is loyal and obedient to the Emperor. A few of the articles from the constitutions declare as follows:

The Emperor shall decide the organization and regulation of all administrative departments. It is the Emperor's right to appoint and dismiss officers in the army as well as civil officials and to decide their respective functions and salaries. (Article 11) The right of declaring war and concluding peace is legally reserved to the Emperor. (Article 12) It is the Emperor's right to decide what armed forces shall be maintained, both in time of peace and in time of war. (Article 13) All members of the Ethiopian army owe absolute loyalty and obedience to the Emperor, in conformity with the provisions of the law. (Article 20)²³⁴

²³² Marshall, Tim. *A Flag Worth Dying for: The Power and Politics of National Symbols*. New York. 2017. 195-196.

²³³ DK Publishing. *Complete Flags of the World*. London: DK Publishing, 2008. 109.

²³⁴ Sigatu, Kaleab T. *Constitution in Ethiopia...* 54

In the 1955 revised constitution, the Emperor still has all the power over the military. The only difference from the previous constitution is Article 29 declares the waging of war; the parliament has to consent with the Emperor. The article reads as follows:

The Emperor reserves the right, with the advice and consent of Parliament, to declare war. He, further, reserves the right to decide what armed forces shall be maintained both in time of peace and in time of war. As Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, He has the right to organize and command the said Forces; to commission and to confer military rank upon the officers of the said Forces, and to promote, transfer, or dismiss any of the said officers. He has, further, the right to declare a state of siege, martial law, or a national emergency, and to take such measures as are necessary to meet a threat to the Defense or integrity of the Empire and to assure its Defense and integrity.²³⁵

The Ethiopian air force was started in 1929 after Emperor Haile Selassie decided to establish an Ethiopian air military.²³⁶ However, the Ethiopian did not have a modern army until 1941. Emperor Haile Selassie I, created a strong centralized professional regular army as part of his project to build a centralized monarchical state. The military's weakness was perceived to be a critical factor in Ethiopia's inability to prevent Italian occupation in 1935.²³⁷

4.3.2 The Military Government

The period of the *Derg*, which spanned from 1974 to 1991, brought about significant political crises and societal transformations for the Ethiopian state. However, between 1974 and 1991, the army grew from about 46,000 to nearly 500,000.²³⁸

Population	31,100,000	
Military Service	Conscription	
Estimated GNP 1979	\$3.bn	
Defense Expenditure	1980: \$385m	
Total Armed Forces	229,500*	

²³⁵ Ibid.

²³⁶ Cooper, Tom. *Wings Over Ogaden: The Ethiopian-Somali War 1978-79*. Durban: Pinetown Printers. 2014. 7.

²³⁷ Berhe, Mulugeta G. The Ethiopian post-transition Security Sector Reform Experience: Building a National Army from a Revolutionary Democratic Army. *African Security Review*, 26:2, 2017. 162.

²³⁸ Fantahun Ayele, *The Ethiopian Army: From Victory to Collapse, 1977-1991*. Evanston ILL.: Northwestern University Press, 2014. 27.

* Some 16,500 Cubans and about 300 Warsaw Pact technicians and advisers serve with the Ethiopian forces and operate aircraft and heavy equipment. Some South Yemeni troops may also serve.

	Army	225,000
	Navy	1,500 (Bases: Massawa and Assab)
	Air Force	3,000; 100+ Combat Aircrafts.
Reserves (All services)	20,000	
Para-Military Forces	169,000	
	Mobile Emergency Police Force	9,000
	People's Militia	150,000 (in 10 divisions with more, ATK guns)
	People's Protection bodies	10,000

Table 4.1 Ethiopian Military Capability in 1980-81.²³⁹

The 1987 PDRE Constitution says the following about the military:

The People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia shall defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity and safeguard the revolution. (Article 24. 1) The Defense of the country and the revolution is the historical responsibility of the entire working people. (Article 24.2)

The People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia shall maintain a strong Defense force. (Article 25.1) The Defense force of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia is an army of the working people that stands and struggles for the unity of the country, the supremacy of the working people, and for peace and socialism. (Article 25.2)

The People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia shall strengthen the country's defense capability. (Article 26.1) The People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia shall promote the working people's spirit of patriotism and revolutionary valor, and when necessary, mobilize the entire working people for the Defense of the country and the protection of the people and the revolution. (Article 26.2) The People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia shall foster the spirit of socialist patriotism of the youth and implement the National Military Service. (Article 26.3) The People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia shall organize civil defense to withstand natural and man-made calamities. (Article 26.4)

National military service is the right and duty of every Ethiopian. The ranks of the army were further swelled by conscripts through the unpopular mandatory national service program, which required all Ethiopians aged 18 to 30 years to undergo six months of training followed by two years of active service and assignment to reserve status until the age of 50. Article 53 (3)²⁴⁰

²³⁹ The International Institute for Strategic Studies. *The Military Balance: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defense Economics*. 1980-81. London: Arms and Amour Press. 1980. 52.

²⁴⁰ Berhe, Mulugeta G. The Ethiopian post-transition Security Sector Reform Experience: Building a National Army from a Revolutionary Democratic Army. *African Security Review*, 26:2, 2017. 165.

4.3.3 Post 1991 Ethiopian Military

The Tigrayan People Liberation Front - Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democracy Front (TPLF/EPRDF) Army overthrew the *Derg* regime in 1991. A new national army was restructured based on the 1995 FDRE's new constitution. The FDRE's Constitution Article 87 "Principles for National Defense" states as follows:

The composition of the national armed forces shall reflect the equitable representation of the Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples of Ethiopia. (1) The Minister of Defense shall be a civilian. (2) The armed forces shall protect the sovereignty of the country and carry out any responsibilities as may be assigned to them under any state of emergency declared in accordance with the Constitution. (3) The armed forces shall at all times obey and respect the Constitution. (4) The armed forces shall carry out their functions free of any partisanship to any political organization(s).²⁴¹

The Defense Forces Proclamation No. 1100/2019, Article 7.5 also asserts, 'Recruitment for military service as well as promotion for rank and position shall be merit-based, and it shall ensure the equitable representation of nation, nationalities, people, and women.' However, as in most multi-ethnic states, this remains the main challenge in the army. Most of the core of the new Ethiopian army and security apparatus remains heavily dominated (particularly at the top) by Tigrayan veterans of the liberation war.²⁴² However, after the reform and change of leadership in the ruling party EPRDF in April 2018, where the new leadership forced most of them to retire to balance the ethnic composition in the army. ENDF has 247 Generals, out of which 5 are full four-star Generals. Ethiopia has 84 Generals at the time of Haile Selassie I and 209 at the time of the Military government *Derg*.

The ENDF consists of Ground Force, Air Force, Naval Force, and Special Operations Force, including, as necessary, Space and Cyber Forces.²⁴³ Though Ethiopia has no sea out late after Eritrea's secession in 1991, under the new Defense Forces Proclamation No. 1100/2019 established Navy. Ethiopia's new Navy will be based in Djibouti, and Rear Admiral Kindu Gezu, who

²⁴¹ Proclamation No.1/1995 Proclamation of the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.

²⁴² Fisher, Jonathan. 'Post-liberation armies and peacekeeping: From guerrillas to securocrats?' Abstract. Presented at CFEE workshop: African Armies in Multilateral Peace Support Operations: Social and Professional Changes at Stake. Organized by CFEE & Institute for Peace and Security Studies, Addis Ababa University, Addis Ababa, 25-26 April 2016. <https://cfee.hypotheses.org/1554>, Accessed on 06 January, 2019.

²⁴³ Proclamation No.1100 /2019 A Proclamation of Defence Forces of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.

is leading the reestablishment process of the Ethiopian Naval Force, has been promoted to the rank of First Chief Commander of the Army. The Navy's headquarter is at the West Command of the ENDF in Bahir Dar, the lakeside regional capital of Amhara Region.²⁴⁴

In areas of military industry, Some of the existing Defense industry capability are: Hibret Machine Tools, which produces medium weapons for the ENDF and civilian output, includes hand tools, hospital beds, aluminum saddles, and household and office furniture; Gafat Armament Engineering Complex which produces a wide range of infantry equipment; Homicho Ammunition Engineering Complex which produces a wide range of ammunition ranging from light weapons to heavy mortars and artillery, and various metal products that are inputs to civil industries; Bishoftu Motorization Engineering Complex which repair and overhaul center for heavy armament, tanks, and military vehicles; Dejen Aviation Engineering Complex which is a center for overhauling and upgrading military aircraft and Nazareth Canvas and Garment Factory which produces and supplies military uniforms, canvas, leather and strap products to the Ethiopian National Defense Force. Since 2007 management of these assets rests in the Ministry of National Defense's Defense Industry Sector.²⁴⁵

Total Population	99,465,819 (2015)		
Geography	104,300 (sq. km)		
GDP	\$ 69.2 bn. (2016)		
Active Armed Forces	Military Expenditure	AirPower	Ground Force

²⁴⁴ Branapress. *Ethiopia: 1,000 army officers sent to Russia for training*. December 11, 2019. <https://www.branapress.com/2019/12/11/ethiopia-1000-army-officers-sent-to-russia-for-training/>, Accessed on 17 December 2019.

²⁴⁵ Griffard, Bernard F. and John F. Troxell. *Enhancing Professional Military Education in the Horn of Africa: The Ethiopian Defense Command & Staff College Initiative*. Issue Paper; U.S. Army War College Center for Strategic Leadership, Volume 13-09, August 2009.

Army 135,000	2015: US \$ 399 m	Aircraft: 26 combat capable	1 (Agazi Commando) Special Force Command
Air Force 3,000	(0.6 % of GDP)	Fighter: 11	1 (Northern) Corps (1 Mechanized division, 4 Infantry Division)
Reservists – None	2016: US \$ 451 m	Fighter/ground attack – 15	1 (Western) Corps (1 Mechanized division, 3 Infantry Division)
Paramilitary –None	(0.6 % of GDP)	Transport – 12	1 (Central) Corps (1 Mechanized division, 5 Infantry Division)
World Ranking (size): 35		Training – 16	1 (Eastern) Corps (1 Mechanized div, 5 Infantry Division)
		Helicopters	
		Attack: 18	
		Multirole: 7	
		Multirole / Transport: 12	

Table 4.2 Summary of Ethiopian Military Strength as of 2016 ²⁴⁶

The Council of Defense Commanders is one of the essential organs of ENDF, which includes the Chief of the General Staff (Chairperson), Deputy Chief of the General Staff (Member), Force Commanders (Member), Command Commanders (Member), Main Department Chiefs (Member) Inspector-General (Member).

The Ethiopian government also has a National Security Council established in 2001. Based on the objective to provide an additional guaranty against unforeseeable and potential threats and challenges to the country's national security.²⁴⁷ The Council shall have the following ex-officio members: (a) the Prime Minister - Chairperson (b) the Deputy Prime Minister - Deputy Chairperson (c) the Foreign Affairs Minister - Member (d) the Defense Minister - Member (e) the Head of the Security, Immigration and Refugee Affairs Authority (Currently named as National Intelligence and Security Service) - Member (f) the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces - Member (g) the Head of the Office of the Prime - Member and Secretary.

²⁴⁶ IISS. *The Military Balance 2017: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defense Economics*. London: Routledge, 2017. 512.

²⁴⁷ Federal Government of Ethiopia, Ethiopian National Security Council Establishment Proclamation No. 257/2001, 8th Year, No. 3, Addis Ababa, 12 October 2001, Article 4.

4.4 Summery and Partial Conclusion

Ethiopia is one of the oldest civilizations with a history of over three thousand years. The 1974 Ethiopian Revolution and the coming of *Derg*, the Armed Forces, the Police and Territorial Army Council ended thousand years' ancient Solomonic dynasty. In 1991 the Ethiopian state underwent significant rearrangement; the unitary state structure changed to a federal system, and in 1995 they adopted a new constitution. It established a democratic federal republic with a parliamentary and multi-party system.

The Ethiopian state has a long history of foreign relations with the outside world. Ethiopia's modern diplomatic history began at the reign of Emperor Theodoros II in the mid-19th century. His foremost intention was the need to obtain technical expertise, mainly military from the western European states. The most important goal and the core of foreign policies of the successive three Ethiopian governments under Menelik II, Haile Selassie I, and Colonel Mengistu HaileMariam was to preserve the geographical entity of Ethiopia, and all three fought against external and internal enemies to preserve it. Menelik II defeated the Italian invasion and kept Ethiopia independent. Under Emperor Haile Selassie I and *Derg*, another distinctive and fundamental future of Ethiopian foreign policy is its unwavering policy of supporting liberation struggles in Africa.

Post-1991 Ethiopian foreign policy has two objectives: rapid economic development, which aims to provide all members of society with benefits, and democratization to ensure the full participation of people in administering their own affairs. This development will be more sustainable if there are a shared vision and action for peace and development in the whole of our sub-region. Therefore, Ethiopia attaches utmost importance to its relations with its neighbors and believes that creating economic conditions. Ethiopia firmly believes that its peace and security are the peace and security of its neighbors and vice versa. This explains Ethiopia's commitment to peace and security as demonstrated by participation in the various peacekeeping operations within the Horn of Africa and the continent in general; this commitment made Ethiopia the most significant contributor of peacekeeping troops in the world.

With regard to the Ethiopian defence force, the idea of modern military formation in Ethiopia begins with Emperor Tewodros II. Tewodros II tried to an adaptation of western technology in order to modernize his army. The 1896 Adowa victory against the Italian colonial invasion is seen

as the embodiment of African militancy and heroism where Ethiopian unique collective behavior in its foreign policy and military orientation originated. Likewise, Its red, yellow (gold), and green colored flag symbolizes freedom and Pan-Africanism, which inspired the flags of other African nations.

The Ethiopian army's fundamental modernization started in 1917 as the Imperial Bodyguard was formed as a regular standing force by Teferi Mekonne, who later became Emperor Haile Selassie I. At the time of *Derg*, which spanned from 1974 to 1991, the army grew from about 46,000 to nearly 500,000. This is because of the civil war in northern Ethiopia. The Tigrayan People Liberation Front - Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democracy Front (TPLF/EPRDF) Army overthrew the *Derg* regime in 1991. A new national army was restructured based on the 1995 FDRE's new constitution.

CHAPTER 5 – REGIONAL SECURITY COMPLEX OF HORN OF AFRICA

“The defining role of any military force is the management of violence by violence.”

Major R.W.J. Wenek

This chapter covers introductions about the states of the Horn of Africa and the region's security complex. It deals in detail with the trends and of conflict in the region, the trends of peace support operations, and review the literature of Leenco Leta's concept of peacekeeping in the Horn of Africa.

5.1 States of the Horn of Africa

The ideas of regional security and security complexes are essential as every state can put its security in relation to at least one complex. Ethiopia's security is tied up with its regional complex of the Horn of Africa and vice versa, and how it undoubtedly takes this into consideration when considering its national security.

The Horn of Africa²⁴⁸ is located in the Northeastern part of the continent consisting of eight countries: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia,²⁴⁹ South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda. These

²⁴⁸ Prominent scholars on the region have four usage of the term 'Horn of Africa.' The first group use the term Horn of Africa only Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia and Djibouti. See Clapham, Christopher. *The Horn of Africa: State Formation and Decay*. London: Hurst & Company, 2017 and Habte-Selassie, Bereket. *Conflict and Intervention in the Horn of Africa*. London: Monthly Review Press, 1980.

The second group include Sudan, see De Waal, Alex. *The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa: Money, War and the Business of Power*. Cambridge: Polity Press. 2015 and Lata, Leenco. *The Horn of Africa as Common Homeland: The State and Self-Determination in the Era of Heightened Globalization*. Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2004. Lemke, Douglas. *Dimensions of hard power: Regional leadership and Material Capabilities*. In Flandes, Daniel (ed.) *Regional Leadership in the Global System: Ideas, Interests and Strategies of Regional Powers*. Farnham: Ashgate. 2010. 31-50.

The third group in addition to the above states they add Uganda and Kenya. See Williams, Paul D. *Horn of Africa: Webs of Conflict and Pathways to Peace*. Washington, DC: The Wilson Center, 2011 and Mesfn, Berouk "The Horn of Africa Security Complex" in Roba Sharamo and Berouk Mesfn (eds.), *Regional Security in the post-Cold War Horn of Africa*. Pretoria: ISS Monograph 178, April 2011, pp.1-29.

The fourth group go further by including Burundi, Rwanda or Tanzania by using the term 'Greater Horn of Africa'. See Mengisteab, Kidane and Redie Bereketab, (eds.) *Regional Integration, Identity and Citizenship in the Greater Horn of Africa*. Suffolk: James Currey, 2012 and Fisher, Jonathan *Mapping 'Regional Security' in the Greater Horn of Africa: Between National Interests and Regional Cooperation*. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, April 2014.

For this study the third usage of Horn of Africa, which includes all IGAD member states is used.

²⁴⁹ Somaliland is non-recognized a *de facto* independent state but internationally recognized as an autonomous region of Somalia.

nine states are also the member of the regional bloc, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which make the member states to be considered as the regional complex that reflects interlinked regional security complex.²⁵⁰ Except for Uganda, Ethiopia shares a border with all the member states.

The Horn of Africa region is a place of the origin of humanity. Fossil remains of *Chororapithecus Abyssinicus*, lived 12 to 7 million years ago, found in the Afar Depression of Ethiopia, and the most famous of the discovery in the same area is Lucy '*Dinkenesh*', the complete skeleton of an early hominid yet found and dating back some 3.2 million years.



Map 5.1 Political Map of Horn of Africa²⁵¹

²⁵⁰ Klosowicz, R. "The Role of Ethiopia in the regional security complex of the Horn of Africa." *Ethiopian Journal of Social Sciences and Language Studies*, Volume 2, Issue 2, 83-97, 84.

²⁵¹ Source: Sitesatlas. World Sites Atlas. <https://www.sitesatlas.com/>. Accessed on 2 February 2018.

The Aksumite Empire, in present-day Ethiopia and Eritrea, was the well-known empire in pre-colonial Africa. In the Middle Ages, Ifat Sultanate of present-day Djibouti, Adal Sultanate of present-day Somalia, the Zagwe dynasty of Ethiopia, the Mahdist in Sudan, the Buganda Kingdom in Uganda, and other sultanates and kingdoms existed in the region.

The European powers became more interested in the region to occupy after the Suez Canal opening in 1869. The French colonized a small portion of the land at the Red Sea coast, which they named French Somaliland that later become Djibouti in 1894. The British took over northern Somalia, which they named British Somaliland in 1887, the present-day autonomous region of Somaliland. Furthermore, in the south, the Imperial British East Africa Company in 1888, which later become Kenya, and since 1894 Uganda became a British protectorate and Anglo-Egyptian colony of Sudan established in 1899. Italy took possession of Eritrea in 1890 as well as southern Somalia, Italian Somaliland, in 1889. However, Ethiopia did not fall under the colonial yoke because they could defeat the Italian Empire in 1896 except Ethiopia's brief occupation (1936 – 1941).

During the Cold War, both the USSR and the United States were involved in the region because of its strategic location. For example, in the Ogaden war between Ethiopia and Somalia in 1977 – 78, USSR supported the Ethiopians and the United States to Somalia.²⁵² Moreover, most recently, the region has become one of the focuses of the global war on terror.

Today the region consists of two of the nine newest states globally, Eritrea and South Sudan.²⁵³ Moreover, Somaliland is striving to be one since 1991 by establishing the most stable state and conducting a peaceful government transition in the region by challenging the image of war and disaster that has been associated with the region.²⁵⁴

In Michael Sheehan's words, the Horn of Africa's security complex Africa is 'held together not by the positive influences of shared interest, but by shared rivalries. The dynamics of security

²⁵² Tareke, Gebru. *The Ethiopian Revolution: War in the Horn of Africa*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2009. 182.

²⁵³ Taylor, Adam. The 9 newest countries in the world. September 16, 2014. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/09/16/the-9-newest-countries-in-the-world/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.8359404d3f26, Accessed on 22 March 2018.

²⁵⁴ Bradbury, Mark. *Becoming Somaliland*. Oxford: James Carry. 2008. 1.

contained within these levels operate across a broad spectrum of sectors – military, political, economic, societal and environmental.’²⁵⁵ Andras Hetteyey and Viktor Marsai on Ethiopia and the Horn of African security complex said the following:

Ethiopia is the region’s leading political and military power; Ethiopia is involved in all three conflicts (Sudan and South Sudan, Somalia civil war, and Ethiopia - Eritrea). Addis Ababa commands enormous respect not only in Eastern Africa but on the entire continent. Except for Liberia – whose status remains unclear – Ethiopia, with its several thousand-year-old statehoods, was the only state on the entire continent that was able to withstand both Western and Eastern colonization attempts (save for a brief Italian occupation during World War II). What is more, the country’s prestige extends beyond Africa: Ethiopia is the main ally of the United States in the region. Despite its economic difficulties and extremely low living standards, the country’s leadership is able to maintain the strongest and most capable armies not only in the region but on the whole continent. Its armed force has extensive experience in both traditional and asymmetric warfare. Ethiopia uses its political and military power to contribute to the stability Eastern African proto-complex while it also serves as an insulator between the various regional conflicts – the two Sudan and Somalia.²⁵⁶

Scholars like Clapham²⁵⁷, Robert Stewart-Ingersoll, and Derrick Frazier²⁵⁸ consider the Horn of Africa as a regional security complex. Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier exclude Uganda from the Horn of Africa – Regional Security Complex. Edmond J. Keller sees the Horn of Africa as one sub-regional security complex.²⁵⁹ On the other hand, Buzan and also Hetteyey and Marsai the Eastern Africa as proto-complex.²⁶⁰

However, regarding ‘the question of whether the Horn of Africa forms, in Buzan’s terminology, a security complex’²⁶¹ based on the security dynamics talk about in this study, using Berouk

²⁵⁵ Sheehan, Michael. *International security: An Analytical Survey*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2005. 49–50.

²⁵⁶ Hetteyey, Andras and Viktor Marsai. ‘Africa and the Regional Security Complexes Theory’. In Hada, Bela et al. (eds.) *Regional Security Studies*. Budapest: NKE Szolgaltato Nonprofit Ltd, 2016. 235.

²⁵⁷ Clapham, Christopher. *The Horn of Africa: State formation and Decay*. Hurst & Company: London, 2017. 186.

²⁵⁸ Stewart-Ingersoll, Robert and Derrick Frazier. *Regional Powers and Security Orders: A Theoretical Framework*. 31.

²⁵⁹ Keller, E. J. “Rethinking African Regional Security” In In Lake, D. A. and Patrick Morgan, *Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World*. Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997. 298.

²⁶⁰ Hetteyey, Andras and Viktor Marsai. ‘Africa and the Regional Security Complexes Theory’. In Hada, Bela et al. (eds.) *Regional Security ...* 221.

²⁶¹ Mesfin, Berouk. The Horn of Africa Security Complex. In Sharamo, Roba and Berouk Mesfin. *Regional Security in the Post-Cold War Horn of Africa*. Institute for Security Studies (ISS). Monograph 178. April 2011. 23.

Mesfin's languages, 'the answer is a definite yes.'²⁶² The Horn of Africa displays many of the features of a Regional Security Complex. The countries in the region display high levels of security interdependence.

5.2 Brief Overview of Individual Horn of African States

5.2.1 Djibouti

The Republic of Djibouti is the smallest country both in terms of population and geographical size, located in a strategic corner of the Horn of Africa with an outlet to both the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Moreover, it has been Ethiopia's only access to the sea. The Somali and the Afar people are the two dominant ethnic groups in the country. The Afar also live in Ethiopia and Eritrea, while the Somalis live in Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya.

Djibouti was colonized by the French and named French Somaliland; later, its name was changed to 'The French Territory of the Afars and the Issas' in 1967, until its independence in 1977. French and Arabic are official languages of the state, and Islam is the official religion. It is also the headquarter of IGAD.

Since its independence, France deployed an unprecedented air-sea task force for the reason to 'ensure the territorial integrity of this newly independent state' because of fear of invasion by Ethiopia or Somalia. Both had expansionist designs on the budding country, became a determinant of Djibouti's Defense policy, and 40 years later, Djibouti remains under the French Defense umbrella.²⁶³ There are several foreign military bases in Djibouti, including hosting the United States's the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF– HOA) at Camp Lemonnier since 2002. Additionally, the EU, China, India, Saudi Arabia, Japan, Germany, Italy, and Spain base their troops in Djibouti.

²⁶² Ibid.

²⁶³ IISS. *The Military Balance: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defense Economics*. London: Routledge 2018.

5.2.2 Eritrea²⁶⁴

The State of Eritrea bordering Sudan and Ethiopia with a long coastline along the Red Sea. Eritrea is a multi-ethnic country where the majority are Tigrigna speaking, the Tigrinya and Tigre. The language is also widely spoken in northern Ethiopia. Eritrea became an independent sovereign state on 24 May 1993 after a long civil war with Ethiopia. According to the Guardian's Neal Ascherson, 'the African Vietnam'²⁶⁵ won a 30-year war of liberation against an Ethiopian army supported by the Americans and then by the Soviet Union.²⁶⁶ On the other hand, because of historical, resource-related, and religious animosities, several Arab countries in the Middle East, including Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, provided financial, diplomatic, and political supported Eritreans.²⁶⁷

After the independence, Eritrea was led by President Isaias Afwerki, with no political party allowed except the ruling People's Front for Democracy and Justice. Eritrea has no constitution or effective parliament and has held no election since its independence. Because of its conscript system and human rights violations, many Eritreans are choosing to leave the country, and Eritreans become the second-largest nationality after Syrians to seek refuge in Europe.²⁶⁸

In 1998 Eritrea and Ethiopia went into full-scale war. Moreover, both countries have remained in a state of war with Eritrea since the 1998 border conflict. Eritrea maintains a large standing army (mostly conscripted), with the primary focus of defending the border with Ethiopia.²⁶⁹ However,

²⁶⁴ Parts of this section is from the article published by the author Sigatu. K.T 'No Peace No War: The Ethiopian-Eritrean Conflict'. *AARMS*. Vol 18. No. 1, 2019. 79-91.

²⁶⁵ Gérard Prunier refers Eritrea as "the African equivalent of North Korea" for it is highly centralized, militarized and authoritarian system of government on the African continent. Lecture given at Association for Study of Middle East and Africa. 'Eritrea and its Discontents'. 2011. <https://vimeo.com/18716003>, Accessed on 25 November 2017.

Other as 'an African 'garrison state''. Tronvoll K & D Mekonnen, *The African Garrison State: Human Rights and Political Development in Eritrea*. Oxford: James Currey, 2014.

²⁶⁶ Ascherson, Neal. "When two tribes go to war, only the arms dealers win". 28 February 1999. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/feb/28/ethiopia.neal-ascherson>, Accessed on 25 November 2017.

²⁶⁷ Tareke, G. *Ethiopia: Power and Protest, Peasant Revolts in the Twentieth Century*. Lawrenceville: The Red Sea Press, 1996, 207–211.

²⁶⁸ UN News Center. "Thousands of civilians fleeing 'rule of fear' in Eritrea, say UN experts, warning of gross rights abuses". 24 June 2015. <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=51239#.Whte3UqnFPZ>, Accessed on 27 November 2017.

²⁶⁹ IISS. *The Military Balance 2017*. London: Routledge: 2017. 490-491.

significant numbers of conscripts choose to flee the country rather than serve. This makes Eritrea one of the world's fastest emptying nations, a country of about 4.5 million, governed by a secretive dictatorship accused of human rights violations that are playing an outsized role in the most significant global migration crisis since World War II.²⁷⁰ Eritrea is the second-largest nationality after Syrians to resort to seaborne smugglers to cross the Mediterranean to Europe.²⁷¹ About six percent of the population has fled the country.²⁷²

After the appointment of a new Prime Minister in Ethiopia, Abiy Ahmed, in April 2018, and his call for peace, the two countries signed a Joint Declaration on Peace and Friendship on July 9, 2018, in the Eritrean capital, Asmara, and an Agreement on Peace, Friendship and Comprehensive Cooperation on September 16, 2018, in Saudi Arabia. This begins a new chapter in the complicated relationship between the two states. It is also a considerable leap forward to build the peaceful Horn of Africa and break proxy war in the region. Similarly, the peaceful atmosphere between Eritrea and Djibouti; Eritrea and Somalia; and Eritrea and Sudan will facilitate to stabilize peace and security in the region.²⁷³ However, Eritrea suspended its membership in IGAD in 2007.

5.2.3 Kenya

The Republic of Kenya is the regional economic powerhouse and relatively with a stable and reliable democratic government in the region. Bordering Ethiopia, Uganda, Tanzania, and South Sudan and 536 km coastline along the Indian Ocean. The largest port in Mombasa also with other smaller ports. The second-largest commercial port is under construction in Lamu mainly to link South Sudan and Ethiopian Markets under the Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia-Transport

²⁷⁰ Stevis, Matina and Joe Parkinson. "African Dictatorship Fuels Migrant Crisis: Thousands flee isolated Eritrea to escape life of conscription and poverty". 2 February 2016. <https://www.wsj.com/articles/eritreans-flee-conscription-and-poverty-adding-to-the-migrant-crisis-in-europe-1445391364>, Accessed on 27 November 2017.

²⁷¹ UN News Center. "Thousands of civilians fleeing 'rule of fear' in Eritrea, say UN experts, warning of gross rights abuses". 24 June 2015. <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=51239#.Whte3UqnFPZ>, Accessed on 27 November 2017.

²⁷² BBC. "Eritrea profile – Timeline". 30 October 2017. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13349395>, Accessed on 27 November 2017.

²⁷³ IISS. *The Military Balance: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defense Economics*. London: Routledge 2018. 461.

(LAPSSET) corridor initiative, which includes oil pipelines, superhighways, and railway gauges to South Sudan and Ethiopia.

Kenya got its independence from British Colonialism in 1963. It adopted a new constitution in 2010 and was governed by a presidential system. It is a multi-ethnic state where no ethnic group constitutes more than twenty percent. The Borana Oromo people also live in southern Ethiopia and northern Kenya. The Somalis also live in northeastern Kenya.

The security threat from al-Shabaab remains a significant concern in Kenya. Kenya joined AMISOM in 2012, and only in 2014 and 2015 more than 200 civilians were killed by al-Shabaab fighters inside Kenya. Kenya hosts the East African Standby Force (EASF) headquarter.

5.2.4 Somalia

The Federal Republic of Somalia is the official name of the Somali Republic since 2012. The Somali Republic was formed in 1960 when the Trust Territory of Somaliland (the former Italian Somaliland) and the State of Somaliland (former British Somaliland) got their independence from Italy and the British rule respectively and unified. Later in 1969, Major General Mohamed Siad Barre established a Marxist–Leninist military government in a *coup d'état* and formed the Somali Democratic Republic; however, in 1991, civil war broke out, and the government collapsed. In the same year, the former State of Somaliland in the north unilaterally declared its independence as the Republic of Somaliland, reinstating its pre-unification borders. Currently, Somaliland able to conduct democratic elections and keep its relative security.

Geographically Somalia is bordered by Ethiopia, Djibouti (with Somaliland), and Kenya, where all Somalis live across the borders. Somalia has the longest coastline on the African mainland, a seacoast to the Gulf of Aden and to the Indian Ocean. Somalia is also one of the few African nations which are ethnically and religiously homogenous.

Siad Barre's regime fought two wars with Ethiopia and continued a troubled relationship with the rest of its neighbors up until the collapse. Since then, Somalia has been divided into various warlords. This statelessness has made Somalia a safe haven for violent extremist groups such as Al Ittihad Al Islamiya (AIAI) and later the Al Qaeda-associated group, al-Shabaab, which is the

primary terrorist threat and instability and an enigma, with far-reaching consequences for peace and stability in the Horn of Africa region.²⁷⁴

The current Federal Government of Somalia was established following the Somalia Transitional Federal Government in 2004 following a two-year peace process hosted in Kenya by IGAD. The IGAD Heads of State and Government, in their meeting on 31 January 2005 in Abuja, authorized the deployment of a Peace Support Mission in Somalia with a view to relocating the government to Mogadishu, providing security to the institutions of the TFG on the ground and sustaining the IGAD peace process.²⁷⁵ However, the radical group al-Shabaab is still controlling some parts of the country and making terrorist attacks one of the deadliest ever single attacks; in October 2018, a truck bomb killed over 320 people and wounded 300 more busy intersection in the capital, Mogadishu.²⁷⁶ On the other hand, Somaliland, the *de facto* independent state, was able to go out of the crisis after the civil war, establishing the Republic of Somaliland's government on 18 May 1991. Somaliland was able to conduct free and fair elections, and it is one of the only two countries with Kenya, which is Partly Free according to Freedom House report among the Horn of African states.²⁷⁷ Only Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Turkey have a consulate in Somaliland.

5.2.5 South Sudan

The Republic of South Sudan is the newest state in the world after its independence from Sudan in 2011. It became one of the three landlocked states of the Horn of Africa with Ethiopia and Uganda. Geographically South Sudan borders with mostly troubled neighbors, Sudan, DR Congo, and CAR. Though it has abundant natural resources, it turned into a civil war in 2013, turning more than 2 million of its citizen into refugees.²⁷⁸ The war for independence started in 1972, the

²⁷⁴ CDRC. 'Somalia's challenges in the last two decades' *CDRC DIGEST*. Vol. 2 No. 2, January 2017.

²⁷⁵ Ibid.

²⁷⁶ Williams, Jennifer and Kainaz Amaria. "Al-Qaeda-linked militants kill more than 320 in Somalia truck bomb attack." October 17, 2017. <https://www.vox.com/world/2017/10/17/16485944/somalia-truck-bombings-mogadishu-terror-attack-shabaab>, Accessed on 24 March 2018.

²⁷⁷ Freedom House. "Freedom in the World 2017." <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2017>. Accessed on 23 March 2018.

²⁷⁸ UNHCR. "South Sudan Refugee Crisis." <https://www.unrefugees.org/emergencies/south-sudan/>, Accessed on March 24, 2018.

South Sudanese request for representation and autonomy, which lasted in 2005 with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the South Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and Sudan's government, which led to democratization and later to referendum for independence. South Sudan has the third-largest oil reserves in Sub-Saharan Africa.²⁷⁹ It is also a multi-ethnic state with more than sixty ethnic groups. The Dinka and the Nuer are the major once approximately 15% and 10%, respectively.

Soon after the independence, the Civil War broke out in 2013 when President Salva Kiir Mayardit blamed his deputy Riek Machar and ten others for attempting a coup d'état on him. Then, Vice President Machar denied he joined SPLM – in opposition (SPLM-IO), which led to fighting between SPLM and SPLM-IO that burst into a civil war. At the time of independence, the Security Council resolution 1996 (2011) established the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) to consolidate peace and security and help establish conditions for development in the Republic of South Sudan, with a view to strengthening the capacity of the Government of South Sudan to govern effectively and democratically and establish good relations with its neighbors.²⁸⁰ Later in 2013, UNMISS increased its troop and police strength of the mission due to the civil war, and in 2014, the Security Council reprioritized the mandate of UNMISS to protection of civilians, human rights monitoring, and support for the delivery of humanitarian assistance; also the IGAD's Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism in South Sudan (CTSAMM) deployed. In February 2020, Salva Kiir and Riek Machar formed a coalition government, which might lead to a wave of peace in the country.

5.2.6 Sudan

Sudan is the first sub-Saharan African nation to get its independence in 1956 from the British. In 1989, a military coup led by Brigadier General Omar Hassan al-Bashir, backed by the Islamist Hassan al-Turabi, removed a democratically elected government, which led to a conflict between the northern Islamic government and the Animists and Christians in the south. Moreover, the government offered support and residency Muslim liberation movements and Jihadists and

²⁷⁹ Oil Review Africa. *The future of oil production in South Sudan*. 03 October 2019 <https://www.oilreviewafrica.com/events/event-news/the-future-of-oil-production-in-south-sudan>, Accessed on 10 January 2020.

²⁸⁰ United Nations. UNMISS Background. <https://unmiss.unmissions.org/background>, Accessed on 10 January 2020.

even allowed Bin Laden to live in Khartoum, and facilitated the migration of large numbers of Mujahideen from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Egypt, Somalia, and Eritrea to support Sudan's war against the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) in South Sudan.²⁸¹

Sudan suffered two prolonged civil wars between the south and the north. The first civil war was from 1955 up to 1972 and another in 1983 until the North/South Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), signed in 2005, which settled in South Sudan's independence in 2011.

Sudan's military dictatorship led by Omar al-Bashir between 1989 and 2019 resulted in widespread human rights abuses, ethnic genocide in the Darfur region, resulting in Omar al-Bashir's indictment of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Court. He is the first sitting President to be wanted by the ICC and the first person to be charged by the ICC for the crime of genocide.²⁸² In late 2018, a popular uprising erupted in Sudan resulted in a coup d'état in April 2019 by a handful of military officials who were close to the president.

The conflicts in Darfur, South Kordofan, and the Blue Nile state are still affecting Sudan's stability. Moreover, Sudan and South Sudan are still in a frozen conflict on demarcating their borders, including the oil-rich Abyei region's fate.

5.2.7 Uganda

The Republic of Uganda got independence from British rule in 1962. However, soon after the independence, violent conflicts arise in the country. The brutal dictatorship of Idi Amin from 1971-1979, then after the Milton Obote regime from 1980 – 1985 marked by civil war and human rights abuses that claimed thousands of lives. The current president of Uganda, Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, came to power in January 1986. He is the longest-serving government leader in the Horn of Africa, brought relative stability even though there has been a prolonged civil war against the Lord's Resistance Army led by Joseph Kony.

Uganda is a landlocked country bordering three fragile neighbors. It hosts Africa's largest refugee population at over 1.2 million people, including 950,000 from South Sudan, 227,000 from the

²⁸¹ Salih, M.A. Mohamed "Transnational Islamist (Jihadist) Movements and Inter-State Conflicts in the Horn of Africa." Policy Notes 2011/2. The Nordic Africa Institute. <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/127933/FULLTEXT01-1.pdf>, Accessed on 20 April 2017.

²⁸² ICC. "Darfur, Sudan." <https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur>, Accessed on March 24, 2018.

Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and 45,000 from Burundi,²⁸³ which has been extreme security and economic challenge for the country. Besides troop deployment in AMISOM, Uganda contributes all 540 contingent troops to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UN-SOM) under the UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs.

5.3 The Horn of Africa Regional Security Complex

In the words of Christopher Clapham, ‘It will already be abundantly clear that the states of the Horn are deeply affected by their relationships with one another.’²⁸⁴ According to Barry Buzan and Ole Waever the interstate security dynamics in Africa are often simply spillovers of domestic dynamics, mainly refugee flows, expulsions of foreigners, and civil wars and intervention by neighbors in domestic turbulence.²⁸⁵ In the Horn of Africa proto-regional security complex (proto-RSC),²⁸⁶ the usual interaction is cross border interventions in which the government in each state supports insurgencies in the other: Somalia and Ethiopia, Eritrea and Ethiopia, Sudan and Uganda, Sudan and Eritrea, Sudan and Ethiopia.²⁸⁷ On the other hand, Robert Kłosowicz considered the IGAD the regional bloc as the regional complex that reflects an interlinked regional security complex.²⁸⁸

²⁸³ IISS. *The Military Balance: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defense Economics*. London: Routledge 2018. 440.

²⁸⁴ Clapham, Christopher. *The Horn of Africa: State formation and Decay*. Hurst & Company: London, 2017. p 176.

²⁸⁵ Buzan, Barry and Ole Waever. *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 229.

²⁸⁶ *Proto-complexes* is when there is sufficient manifest security interdependence to delineate a region and differentiate it from its neighbors, but when the regional dynamics are still too thin and weak to think of the region as a fully-fledged RSC. (Buzan, Barry and Ole Waever. *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 64.)

The researcher uses the term ‘Regional Security Complex’ because after Barry Buzan and Ole Waever published their study in 2003 there were security developments in their region which can label it as RSC than proto-RSC. Other scholars also used RSC (See also: Kłosowicz, R. The Role of Ethiopia in the regional security complex of the Horn of Africa” *Ethiopian Journal of Social Sciences and Language Studies*, Volume 2, Issue 2, 2015.)

²⁸⁷ Buzan, Barry and Ole Waever. *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 242.

²⁸⁸ Kłosowicz, R. The Role of Ethiopia in the regional security complex of the Horn of Africa” *Ethiopian Journal of Social Sciences and Language Studies*, Volume 2, Issue 2, 2015. 84.

In the Horn of Africa, there are few incidents of states going to a conventional war with each other. However, it is more at the sub-state level and more about spillovers from domestic instabilities, which is typical almost for all states in the region.²⁸⁹ Especially in the Somalian and the South Sudanese civil wars, the spillover effects became excruciating for the whole states in the region.

The following table describes ten various state indicators of eight states of the Horn of Africa.

Indexes	Djibouti	Eritrea	Ethiopia	Kenya	Somalia	South Sudan	Sudan	Uganda
Failed State Index (2018) ²⁹⁰ Rank out of 178 countries	42	19	15	17	2	1	7	24
Human Development Index (2014) ²⁹¹ Rank out of 188 Countries	171	181	174	147	-	179	165	165
Ibrahim Governance Index (Africa 2017) ²⁹² Rank out of 54 States	38	52	36	13	54	53	50	19
Corruption Perceptions Index (2017) ²⁹³ Rank out of 180 States	122	165	107	143	180	179	175	151
World Bank - Worldwide Governance Indicators (2016) ²⁹⁴ (percent Ranked from 0 (Lowest) to 100 (Highest))								

²⁸⁹ Buzan, Barry and Ole Waever. *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 248.

²⁹⁰ Fund for Peace. Fragile States Index 2018. <http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/>, Accessed on 20 March 2018.

²⁹¹ UNDP. Human Development Reports. <http://hdr.undp.org/en/2016-report>, Accessed on 20 March 2018.

²⁹² Mo Ibrahim Foundation. Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG). <http://iiag.online/>, Accessed on 20 March 2018.

²⁹³ Transparency International. Corruption Perceptions Index 2017. 21 February 2018. https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017, Accessed on 20 March 2018.

²⁹⁴ The World Bank Group. Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx?fileName=wgidataset.xlsx, Accessed on 20 March 2018.

Voice & Accountability ²⁹⁵	12.81	0.99	8.87	41.87	2.96	5.42	3.45	27.09
Political Stability & Absence of Violence/Terrorism	23.81	17.14	7.62	9.52	2.86	1.90	2.38	21.43
Government Effectiveness	16.83	3.37	28.38	41.35	0.48	0.00	7.21	32.21
Regulatory Quality ²⁹⁶	25.48	1.44	11.54	41.83	0.96	2.88	4.81	46.15
Rule of Law	17.31	5.77	37.02	32.69	0.00	2.88	9.13	45.67
Control of Corruption	30.29	11.54	39.90	16.83	0.48	1.92	1.44	12.98

Table 5.1 Different Indexes of the States of Horn of Africa.

Looking at ten various state indicators described in the table above: all Horn of Africa states are below the top 50 failed states globally. South Sudan and Somalia ranked first and second, respectively, the most fragile states globally, and Djibouti has a relatively better-performing state in the region. Regarding UNDP Human Development Index, all Horn of Africa states perform under the last 30 states out of 188 Countries, Sudan and Uganda performing relatively better than other states and Eritrea becoming the last. On the Ibrahim Governance Index in Africa, Kenya and Uganda perform better than the rest, and Somalia ranked 54 out of the 54 African states. Regarding Transparency International' Corruption, Ethiopia performs relatively better than the others though all are under 100 out of 180 states, Somalia and South Sudan ranked 180th and 179th, respectively. Based on World Bank - Worldwide Governance Indicators first on Voice & Accountability, which is perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens can select their government and freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. However, all Horn of Africa states are below 50% relatively Kenya is better, and Eritrea is the worst. Second, on Political Stability & Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Djibouti and Uganda are around 20%, and the rest is less than 10%. Third, on Government Effectiveness, Somalia and South Sudan are both

²⁹⁵ Reflects perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.

²⁹⁶ Reflects perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development.

below 1%, and Kenya is relatively better though all the states are performing below 50%. Forth, Regulatory Quality is perceptions of the government's ability to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development;. However, all Horn of Africa states are below 50%, relatively Uganda and Kenya are better than the rest. Fifth, Rule of Law all Horn of Africa states are below 50%, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Kenya ranked from first to third. Sixth, Control over Corruption; similarly, all Horn of Africa states are below 50%, but Ethiopia and Djibouti are better performing than the rest.

On the issues of peace and security, according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, since 1990, the Horn of African region has suffered from 32 state-based armed conflicts where a government is one of the belligerent parties. Moreover, 179 non-state armed conflicts fought between non-governmental groups; and 22 campaigns of one-sided violence where civilians are massacred.²⁹⁷

5.4 Trends of Conflict in the Horn of Africa

5.4.1 Intrastate Conflicts / Ethnic Conflict

Conflicts within the boundaries of a state are termed intra-state conflicts. Such conflicts are also referred to as civil wars. In the Horn of Africa, where almost all state borders in the region are non-natural and miss-drawn borders, which were imposed by the colonial powers and basically ignored ethnic, cultural, historical, and religious groups.²⁹⁸ As a result, it gave rise to intrastate conflicts instigated mainly from demands for autonomy of ethnic groups. This makes intrastate conflicts synonym with ethnic conflict.

A very tragic figures because of intrastate conflicts in the region - Sudan: 2,072,000 internally displaced, 724,791 refugees, and 52,000 asylum seekers; Ethiopia: 2,137,000 internally displaced, 93,234 refugees, and 133,283 asylum seekers; South Sudan: 1,830,000 internally displaced, and

²⁹⁷ Williams, Paul D. *Horn of Africa: Webs of conflict & Pathways to Peace*. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. 2011.

²⁹⁸ Mesfin, Berouk. "The Horn of Africa Security Complex." In Sharamo, Roba and Berouk Mesfin. *Regional Security in the Post-Cold War Horn of Africa*. Monograph 178. ISS. April 2011. 10.

2,321, 728 refugees; Somalia: 2,648,000 internally displaced, 810,216 refugees, and 55, 864 asylum seekers.²⁹⁹

In the Horn of Africa, though the causes of conflicts are complex here, one of the significant causes of conflict in the Horn of Africa studied by most scholars, ethnicity, which is related to the state formation in the region, is discussed.

Ethnic conflicts are conflicts in which the warring parties are defined by a combination of historical, linguistic, and cultural features.³⁰⁰ In most cases it is the marginalization of the poor has become a fertile ground for the elites to promote ethnic conflict, which benefits them to sustain their own control over power.³⁰¹ However, the root cause goes back to state formation in Africa, which was artificial where national boundaries were made by the European colonizers where the ethnic groups have no say and mainly dividing ethnic groups into two or more states.

There are more than three hundred seventy linguistic groups or can be ethnic groups in the Horn of Africa. Some scholars argue that because the states in the region have diverse ethnicities in the case of Somalia, clans, and religions having national cohesiveness or common political identity become hard.³⁰² Have their societies are divided along ethnic and religious lines also means ‘political loyalties often cut across state boundaries.’³⁰³ Secessionist wars in Ethiopia and Sudan and the irredentist war between Somalia and Ethiopia were fought for long years after the independence. Also, ethnic conflicts arise during the process of state formation when a fight erupts over which people should belong to which state.³⁰⁴

²⁹⁹ Williams, Wendy. “Shifting Borders: Africa’s Displacement Crisis and Its Security Implications.” Research Paper No. 8. Africa Center for Strategic Studies. [africacenter.org](https://africacenter.org/publication/shifting-borders-drivers/). October 2019. <https://africacenter.org/publication/shifting-borders-drivers/>, Accessed on 02 February 2020.

³⁰⁰ Schlee and Shongolo cited in Feyissa, Tigist Kebede. *Conflicts among Pastoralists in the Borana Area of Southern Ethiopia: The case of Borana and Garri*. Master’s Thesis in Peace and Conflict Transformation Faculty of Humanities, Social Sciences and Education University of Tromsø. Autumn, 2014.

³⁰¹ Department for International Development. *The causes of conflict in Africa: Consultation Document*. London. March 2001.

³⁰² Tekle, Amare. International Relations in the Horn of Africa (1991-96). *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 23, No. 70 December, 1996. 385.

³⁰³ Ibid.

³⁰⁴ Wimmer cited in Jinadu, L. Adele. Explaining and Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Towards a Cultural Theory of Democracy. *African Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 9, No. 1, June 2004. 11.

The Horn of Africa is a very multi-ethnic/multi-lingual state, making it vulnerable to conflict. Ethiopia is the most diverse state in the region. (See Table 5.2)

Country	Total Language Spoken	Extinct	Non-Indigenous	Institutional	Literacy	Principal Language
Djibouti	5	None	3	2	68	French and Arabic
Eritrea	15	None	9	5	69	Tigrigna, English, and Arabic
Ethiopia	90	2	3	43	49	Amharic
Kenya	68	1	7	13	82	English and Swahili
Somalia	13	None	3	3	38	Somali and Arabic
South Sudan	72	3	11	13	27	English
Sudan	77	2	5	15	72	English and Arabic
Uganda	43	None	None	27	73	English

Table 5.2 Languages Spoken in the Horn of African States³⁰⁵

Organization of African Union (OAU), in its First Ordinary Session in Cairo, in July 1964, recognizing the faultiness of national boundaries created by the colonialists in order to keep the stability and avoid border disputes among the new states, passed the following resolution:

Considering that border problems constitute a grave and permanent factor of dissension; Conscious of the existence of extra-African maneuvers aimed at dividing the African States; Considering further that the borders of African States, on the day of their independence, constitute a tangible reality; ...Solemnly declares that all Member States pledge themselves to respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence.³⁰⁶

However, the resolution did not save African nations from conflict because of ethnic groups divided by the colonial border. The table below indicates a good example of conflicts caused by divided ethnic groups among Horn of Africa states.

³⁰⁵ Source: Ethnologue.com. "Ethnologue: Languages of the World." <https://www.ethnologue.com>, Accessed on 20 April 2018.

³⁰⁶ OAU Secretariat. *Resolutions Adopted by the First Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government Held in Cairo, UAR, From 17 to 21 July 1964*. Addis Ababa. https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/9514-1964_ahg_res_1-24_i_e.pdf, Accessed on 12 March 2019.

Name of Ethnic Group	Countries of Habitation	Occurrences of Conflict
Afar	Djibouti*, Eritrea, and Ethiopia*	Yes
Somali	Somalia*, Djibouti*, Ethiopia*, and Kenya*	Yes
Luo	Kenya*, Uganda, Sudan*, Ethiopia, and Tanzania	Yes
Luhya	Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania	No
Beja, Rashaïda, Tigre	Eritrea and Sudan*	Yes
Tigrigna, Kunama, Shaho (Irob)	Eritrea* and Ethiopia*	Yes
Oromo	Ethiopia* and Kenya	Yes
Pokot and Teso	Kenya and Uganda	No
Kakwa, Sebei, Lugbwara, Madi, Anchoi, Kaliko, Pojullo	Uganda* and South Sudan*	Yes
Anuak, Nuer, Bertha, Donyiro, Tirma, Shita, Gumuz, Murle, Kichapo, Wetawit	Ethiopia* and Sudan*	Yes
Daasanach	Ethiopia, Kenya, and Sudan	No

Table 5.3 A selected list of Ethnic groups that are spread across different counties³⁰⁷ (*Countries where the conflicts have occurred.)

The absence of a nation-state and the forceful amalgamation of different ethnic groups has been a security challenge for African states. Jeffrey Herbst described it as follows:

The majority of [African] states have difficulty creating viable symbols to attract the loyalties of their citizens. Not surprisingly, therefore, there are today very few attempts in African countries to forge a national consensus on major issues, much less a national identity. For instance, most formulas to decrease inter-ethnic tension concentrate only on ameliorating the negative aspects of ethnic conflict by accommodating it through decentralized government structures and preferential policies.³⁰⁸

³⁰⁷ Mengisteab, Kidane. *Critical Factors in the Horn of Africa's Raging Conflicts*. Discussion Paper 67. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. 2011.

³⁰⁸ Herbst, Jeffrey. "War and the State in Africa". *International Security*. 14/4. Spring, 1990. 127 – 128.

In the Cold War, the post-colonial African borders were challenged, especially in the Horn of Africa and the Pandora box opened, and ethnic conflicts exploded throughout Africa. What Jeffrey Herbst argued in 1990 is still valid in the Horn of Africa region. The post-2013 conflict in South Sudan³⁰⁹ and the post-2015 Oromo uprising in Ethiopia still indicate there is ethnic tension.

Also, in the Horn of Africa, rooted in the legacy of colonialism, border wars were common the Ethiopia–Somalia war of 1977, the Ethiopia–Eritrea conflict of 1998, the Djibouti-Eritrea conflicts of 1995 and 2008, and the Sudan-South and Sudan border-related wars in 2012 are the major once.

5.4.2 Interstate Conflicts

Conflicts between governments or states are referred to as interstate conflicts. In the Horn of Africa, as stated in the previous section in paragraph one, the miss-drawn borders, which cut through ethnic, cultural, historical, and religious groups, sway states of the region to claim neighboring state territories, which lead to conflict. This manifested mainly in Ethiopian – Somalia, and Kenya – Somalia conflicts. The following table will plainly demonstrate the interstate conflicts in the region.

Year	Type of Interstate conflict	States Involved	Major Contentious issues or area	Other Issues
1964	Brief armed conflict	Ethiopia and Somalia	Control of Ethiopia's Somali-inhabited territory	-
The 1960s	Tensions	Kenya and Somalia	Control of Kenya's Northern Frontier District	-
1977-1978	Full-scale war	Ethiopia and Somalia	Control of Ethiopia's Somali-inhabited territory	US-Soviet competition
1994-1998	Tensions	Sudan and Eritrea	Islamist threat	Regional influence
1995-1998	Tensions	Sudan and Ethiopia	Sudanese link to the Mubarak assassination attempt	Support rebel movements
1995	Brief armed confrontation	Eritrea and Yemen	The territorial dispute over the strategic Hanish Islands	Control of mineral and fishing resources

³⁰⁹ Rolandsen, Oystein H. Another civil war in South Sudan: the failure of Guerrilla Government? *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 9/1. 2015.165.

1998-2000	Full-scale war	Eritrea and Ethiopia	Territorial dispute	Economic policies, regional hegemony
2006-2009	Ethiopian Intervention	Ethiopia and Somalia	Ethiopian military intervention to topple ICU	The global war on terrorism
2008-2010	Brief armed confrontation	Eritrea and Djibouti	Territorial dispute	Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict
2009	Tensions	Kenya and Uganda	The territorial dispute over Miginigo Island	-
2011	Brief armed confrontation	Sudan and South Sudan	The territorial dispute over the oil-rich border region of the Abyei Area	Support rebel movements
2011	Intervention	Kenya and Somalia	Kenyan military operation against Al-Shabaab	The global war on terrorism
2019	Tensions	Kenya and Somalia	Drilling rights along maritime territorial waters	-

Table 5.4 Interstate conflicts in the Horn of Africa³¹⁰

5.4.3 Religious Fundamentalism and Violence

The Horn of Africa is a religious fault line of Christianity, Islam, and traditional African beliefs. Sudan, Djibouti, and Somalia are predominantly Muslim, Eritrea and Ethiopia Christian but a considerable amount of Muslims, and South Sudan, Kenya, and Uganda with Muslim minorities. The region is also known breeding ground for violent religious extremism.³¹¹

The rise of al Shabaab in Somalia and its terrorist attacks in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, and Uganda and the spread of Islamic radicalism have become one of the region's central security challenges.³¹² However, also on the other side, originated in Uganda, the Lord's Resistance Army gained an international reputation for brutality for murdering, raping and kidnapping thousands of civilians as it waged an armed rebellion seeking to remove the government of Yoweri

³¹⁰ Source (with some modification) Mesfin, Berouk. The Horn of Africa Security Complex. In Sharamo, Roba and Berouk Mesfin. *Regional Security in the Post-Cold War Horn of Africa*. Institute for Security Studies (ISS). Monograph 178. April 2011. 8.

³¹¹ Mulugeta, Gebrehiwot Berhe. "Economic Integration as a Peacebuilding Strategy in the Horn of Africa with Particular Focus on Ethiopia and Its Four Neighbors". *Journal of African-centered Solutions in Peace and Security*. Vol.1 (1) August 2016. 63 – 90.

³¹² Hettyey, Andras and Viktor Marsai. In Bela Hada and et al. *Regional Security Studies*. Budapest, National University of Public Service, 2016. 234

Museveni, the Ugandan president and rule the country on the Biblical ten commandments.³¹³ Now it also operates in South Sudan, the Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Concerning the spread of violent Islamic extremism, geography also plays an important role. Most of these states are located near and have longstanding ties to the Arabian Peninsula, the source of many of today's Islamic militants. It is easy to move between the Persian Gulf states and this region by air and sea.³¹⁴ More captivately, Osama bin Laden lived and maintained a base of operations in Sudan for several years, beginning in 1991. Besides, since the 1990s, particularly following the 1998 al-Qaeda bombings of the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam which claimed 224 lives,³¹⁵ the Horn of Africa has been one of the main theatres of radical terrorism.

After 1991, because of the absence of a central government, Somalia became the hub of warlords and fundamentalists. Despite some positive results (notably the expulsion of al-Shabaab from Mogadishu and Kismayo by AMISOM), the overwhelmingly military measures have recurrently triggered terrorist backlashes – such as the July 2010 suicide bombings in Kampala or the 2013 attack at the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, for example. Also, al-Shabaab has been carrying out retaliatory attacks against AMISOM. Suicide attacks and roadside bombs showed an increasing sophistication and influence from the many hundreds of battle-experienced foreign jihadists from Afghanistan, Yemen, Pakistan, United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Kenya, & Saudi Arabia.³¹⁶

On the other hand, LRA, a heterodox Christian cult that operates in two Horn African countries in Uganda and South Sudan, but also operates in the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The group first operated as the United Holy Salvation Army before it was

³¹³ Aljazeera. "Profile: The Lord's Resistance Army." 6 May 2014. <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/10/2011101418364196576.html>, Accessed on 25 April 2017.

³¹⁴ Kilonzo, Boniface Kivinda. "Managing Terrorism in the Horn of Africa: A Case Study of Kenya." A Research Project in partial fulfillment for the award of a Master of Arts in International Conflict Management. University of Nairobi Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies. 2013.

³¹⁵ Berman, E. *Radical, Religious and Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism*. Cambridge: The MIT Press. 2009. 49.

³¹⁶ Dagne, Ted. *Somalia: Current Conditions for a Lasting Peace*. Congressional Research Service, 7-5700, Report for Congress. 4 February 2010, 2.

named the Uganda Christian Army/Movement and eventually the LRA.³¹⁷ On 13 October 2005, International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants of arrest for the leader of the group Joseph Kony and four other senior leaders for Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes committed in Uganda since July 2002.³¹⁸

5.4.4 Change in Living Space³¹⁹

Change in the living space or the environmental degradation or climate change that makes the region so vulnerable to conflict. IGAD described the regional ecosystem as the following, which is extremely vulnerable and clearly indicates a change in living space that can affect the security.

Only 5 percent of the original ecosystems/habitats remain intact in the region. This means that 95 percent of the original ecosystems have been either converted to other land use forms or have been degraded severely or moderately by different drivers. The main drivers of environmental and natural resources include climate change, frequent drought, high population growth, overgrazing, forest degradation, soil and land degradation, wildlife poaching and trafficking, desertification, etc. The impact of these drivers is the reduction of the capability of the different ecosystems to provide the necessary goods and services essential for the survival of living things in the region.³²⁰

In a region where most of the population lives in rural areas depending directly on land and nature, the study of rural security is vital. Most of the region's conflicts are fueled by the decline of agricultural or grazing land and water. Neighboring ethnic communities inside a state or across the state border clash over water use, grazing access, and cattle raiding.

Continues fight for land and water among the agricultural and pastoral communities were common, especially in arid and semi-arid areas. The Darfur conflict is a foremost example of such a

³¹⁷ Aljazeera. "Profile: The Lord's Resistance Army". 6 May 2014. <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/10/2011101418364196576.html>, Accessed on 25 April 2017.

³¹⁸ International Criminal Court. "Press Release: Warrant of Arrest unsealed against five LRA Commanders". 13 October 2005. [web.archive.org/web/20110616142249/http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/situations+and+cases/situations/situation+icc+0204/related+cases/icc+0204+0105/press+releases/warrant+of+arrest+unsealed+against+five+lra+commanders](http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/situations+and+cases/situations/situation+icc+0204/related+cases/icc+0204+0105/press+releases/warrant+of+arrest+unsealed+against+five+lra+commanders), Accessed on 2 May 2017.

³¹⁹ Partial of this section is taken from the work of the researcher Sigatu, Kaleab T. 'Rural Security-Lesson Learnt From Horn of Africa-Ethiopia: Conflicts Caused by Changed Living Space.' December 2018. Accepted for publication by project titled "Rural Security" under the commission of the National University of Public Service under the priority project KÖFOP-2.1.2-VEKOP-15- 2016-00001 titled „Public Service Development Establishing Good Governance" in the Ludovika Workshop led by Professor Dr. Tivadar Szilagyi. Budapest.

³²⁰ IGAD. "The IGAD Region". <https://igad.int/about-us/the-igad-region>, Accessed on 10 February 2018.

fight for a living space.³²¹ Currently, the resource pressure makes millions of people in the region are displaced and living in refugee and IDP camps. The shrinking of habitable living space is the fundamental security challenge in the Horn of Africa. Abdikadir Ahmed Abdi described the situation as follows:

Another contextual factor that has contributed to the conflicts and instability of the Horn of Africa is the highly increasing rate of environmental degradation the region faces. Much of the region is arid or semi-arid and has, over the last five or so decades, faced rapid environmental degradation, manifested in frequent droughts and chronic food and water shortages.³²²

Especially in the northern countries like Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan, topography and climate are contributing factors to conflict. The region's history includes massive population movements pushed by other groups and pulled by the search for better pasture and water sources. Pastoral migration is a common way of life in the region. The Horn contains the most extensive grouping of pastoralists globally: Sudan has the highest percentage globally; Somalia is third; Ethiopia is fifth; in Djibouti, one-third of the population is pastoralist.³²³

The typical mobile way of life is becoming a problem when grazing land shrinks because of an erratic climate. Thus, access to grazing land and water becomes one of the highest causes for tension between the pastoralists and between the pastoralist and agrarian societies of the Horn of Africa. S. Piers Simpkin describes the phenomenon as follows:

Pastoralist communities have, in their search for acceptable grazing land, often clashed with other pastoralists seeking the same resources. More recently, however, pastoralists are impinging increasingly on fertile land cultivated by sedentary groups near waterways. This development fuels tension and conflict with new groups who do not necessarily share the same goals or needs as the pastoralists. In the past, pastoral conflict usually involved pastoralists with common interests; the causes for conflict were thus well understood and could easily be resolved. New conflicts involving members of different livelihoods are more complicated, harder to resolve, and consequently tend to reoccur and escalate.³²⁴

³²¹ Flint, Julie and Alex De Waal. *Darfur: A New History of a Long War*. London: Zed Books. 2008. 63.

³²² Abdi, Abdikadir Ahmed. "The Impact of Conflicts in the Horn of Africa: A case study of Kenya." A Research Project Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the award of the Degree in Masters of Arts in International Studies, Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, University of Nairobi. 2015. 43.

³²³ OCHA Regional Officer for Central and East Africa. *Pastoralist Voices* Volume 1, Issue 8, October 2008. 1.

³²⁴ Simpkin, S. Piers. *Livestock Study in the Greater Horn of Africa*. Nairobi: ICRC, 2005. 8.

In addition to this, some studies suggest that it is the pastoralists in the Horn of Africa who are likely to be the first people wiped out by climate change.³²⁵ The fact that pastoralists live in a place with limited water and grazing land, loss of the existing resource will lead to a catastrophe. Taking into note that no difference between a civilian and armed man in pastoralist areas.

In Sudan, because of the armed conflict since 2003, according to Human Rights Watch, as of 2008, more than 200,000 people have died, and 2.5 million people have been forced from their homes in Darfur.³²⁶ Desertification led to food scarcity, water scarcity, and famine, in turn leading to civil war and ethnic cleansing. This is a shrinking of living space land fueled by population increase and political grievance. Musa Abdul-Jalil and Jon D. Unruh explain the Darfur conflict as follows:

Arab pastoralists of northern Darfur with longstanding grievances regarding their perceived lack of land and political participation (the two inseparable in Darfur) saw an opportunity to gain access to land and so were easily recruited into the Janjaweed. ... The primary war-related land tenure issue in the Darfur conflict, which has driven many other aspects of the war, including perceptions of 'genocide,' is how the Arab pastoralist militias (Janjaweed) have gone about operationalizing the prospect that they would be able to keep the lands they were able to 'liberate' during the course of the conflict. Instead of pursuing and engaging the rebel militias in order to obtain such lands, the Janjaweed and its constituencies went directly to the land itself and conducted scorched earth campaigns against the civilian agriculturalist population, emptying the countryside and seizing the land.³²⁷

Pastoralist conflicts in the region are not strictly limited to national boundaries, although most of these communities are divided by the states' political boundaries. The impact of conflicts caused by policy failures, exacerbated by climate change and natural resource degradation, transcends national boundaries.³²⁸

³²⁵ Christian Aid Cited in Meier, Partick et al. Environmental influences on pastoral conflict in the Horn of Africa. *Political Geography* 26 (2007) 716 - 735.

³²⁶ HRW. Crisis in Darfur: What Happened in Darfur? September 2008. <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/features/darfur/fiveyearson/qanda.html>, Accessed on 12 April 2008.

³²⁷ Abdul-Jalil, Musa & Jon D Unruh. "Land Rights under Stress in Darfur: A Volatile Dynamic of the Conflict". *War & Society*, (2013) 32:2, 156-181.

³²⁸ Berhe, Mulugeta Gebrehiwot. Economic Integration as a Peace building Strategy in the Horn of Africa with Particular Focus on Ethiopia and Its Four Neighbors. *Journal of African-Centered Solutions in Peace and Security*. Volume 1, Issue 1 August 2016. 63.

Today, the geographic belt separating desert from savannah in northern Africa has become a significant security concern. Terrorist groups like al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Boko Haram in north-eastern Nigeria and the Lake Chad area, and al-Shabaab in Somalia and Kenya are causing turmoil. Some scholars argue in addition to religious radicalism, the environmental conditions have also contributed to the instability.

Gunther Bachler describes the condition as follows:

Fertile land is the basic resource of the local food supply. When it is damaged or reduced, it propels the local population into competition and conflict, especially in countries with a large agricultural sector or subsistence economies. Africa is a sad example of the increasing importance of soil degradation in war. In the 1970s and '80s, armed conflicts mainly caused by the manifold effects of decolonization and in part overshadowed by the cold war were concentrated in Southern Africa and on the Horn. Today, another and different "war belt" stretches from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean. The single countries of this belt, Senegal, Mali, Chad, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia, all belong to the Sahel Zone, which has been particularly affected by overgrazing, drought, and soil erosion.³²⁹

Another security threat in the region is transnational cattle rustling and banditry caused by the militarization of pastoralist communities in the region resulted from access to modern weapons as a result of civil wars, and interstate wars or obtaining training from rebel movements are common causes of insecurity in the borders of Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, and Uganda.³³⁰ The following table shows how pastoralist groups are not limited to a single state but in two or more states, making the security issue regional other than limited to a single state.

Country	Pastoralist Groups	Estimated Countries of Movement	Number	percent of Population
Djibouti	Afar, Somali	Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia	100,000	16%
Eritrea	Tigre, Rashaida, Hidarib, Afar	Eritrea and Djibouti	1,000,000	11%
Ethiopia	Somali, Boran, Afar + 15 others	Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya	7,070,000	11%

³²⁹ Bachler, Gunther. The Anthropogenic Transformation of the Environment: A Source of War? Historical Background, Typology and Conclusions. Proceedings of the international conference on 'Environmental Crisis: Regional Conflict and Ways of Cooperation', Ascona, Switzerland, 2-7 October 1994.

³³⁰ Wasara, Samson S. Conflict and State Security in the Horn of Africa: Militarization of Civilian Groups. *African Journal of Political Science* (2002) Vol 7 No. 2

Kenya	Turkana, Pokot, Tugan, Massai, Gabbra, Sakuye, Rendille, Sam-bora, Dassanetch, Boran, Oromo, Somali	Kenya, Ethiopia, South Sudan, and Uganda	7,500,000	25%
Somalia	Somali	Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia	4,800,000	55%
Sudan	East: Beja, Beni Amer, Shuk-riyya, Rashaida	Eritrea and Sudan	4,700,000	15%
	West: Kababish, Zaghawa, Rize-igat, Messiriya, Fallata	Sudan and South Sudan		
	South: Dinka, Nuer, Mundari, Toppos + many others	Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan, and Uganda		
Uganda	Ateso, Nuer, Karamojong, Banyankore, Basongora	Kenya, South Sudan, and Uganda	1,030,000	5%

Table 5.5 Pastoralist groups in the Horn of African States³³¹

Finally, it is essential to mention the expected effect of conflict over the environment where ‘environmental degradation causes conflict which causes environmental degradation, creating a vicious cycle of environmental decline’ and cyclical conflict. In the Horn of Africa region, except Kenya and Djibouti, there were prolonged armed conflicts that created high cost on the environment, which left the lands, mostly the rural areas, which are the theatres of military operations, unlivable. Agricultural activity ceased because of land mines and cost lives even after the end of the armed conflict. Forests and wild animals have been affected, especially in guerrilla warfare. An excellent example of this is the human-made famine in war-torn South Sudan.³³² Similarly, another social crisis is the spread of sexually transmitted diseases like AIDS by the government and guerrilla fighters. These social pressures will create another social tension, which leads to conflict.

³³¹ Source: (Before the Separation of South Sudan from Sudan) Giessen, Eric van de. *Horn of Africa: Environmental Security Assessment*. Institute for Environmental Security. Hague. 2011. www.envirosecurity.org/espa/PDF/ESA_HOA.pdf, Accessed on 12 February 2018.

³³² UN News. Famine declared in region of South Sudan – UN. 20 February 2017. <https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/02/551812-famine-declared-region-south-sudan-un#.WLA6eBCaGO0>, Accessed on 12 February 2018.

Finally, it worth it to put the words of the renowned Ethiopian military historian Gebru Tareke which encapsulates crises of the Horn of Africa as follows:

A volatile region, the Horn is where demography, identity, and borders intersect and overlap in limited space. Among others, three intertwined factors explain the historical infelicity and pandemic of organized violence in the region. First, there is the continuing contest for state construction and the consolidation of state power, a process that began long before the dawn of European colonialism. The tensions and conflicts that rival nationalisms and counter-hegemonic movements generate are accentuated by scarce and diminishing resources in the face of exploding populations and rising social demands. Second, following independence, the state became both the source and site of conflict because, in the absence of a dominant class with a grip on the economy, the state acts as the chief custodian and allocator of national resources. This often spurred violent competition for political power since differential access to the state meant unequal access to wealth and privilege. Third, foreign actors both fueled and sustained the bloody conflicts.³³³

5.4.5 Supporting Neighboring State Rebels

The norm of ‘My enemy’s enemy is my friend’ has been the foremost foreign relations tradition in the Horn of Africa region. This form of relation ion resulted from tensions between states for a long. After the 1998 Ethio-Eritrean war, Eritrea starts supporting Ethiopian rebel groups, resulting in Ethiopia's reciprocal effect hosting Eritrean oppositions. The same is true between Ethiopia and Sudan, Sudan and South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda, Ethiopia and Somalia. The following table gives a clear example of how the region’s states support their neighbors’ rebel groups.

State	Selected rebel movements	Year of Origin	Motivation	Active regional backing
Djibouti	Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy	1991	Change of regime	Eritrea
Eritrea	Eritrean Islamic Jihad	1989	Chang of regime	Sudan
	Afar Red Sear Democratic Front	1989	Autonomy	Ethiopia
	Eritrean Democratic Alliance	2008	Chang of regime	Ethiopia
Ethiopia	Eritrean Liberation Front	1961	Secession	Sudan, Somalia, Egypt
	Eritrean People’s Liberation Front	1972	Secession	Sudan, Somalia, Egypt

³³³ Tareke, Gebru. *The Ethiopian Revolution: War in the Horn of Africa*. Addis Ababa: Eclipse Printing Press, 2016. 4 – 5.

	Tigray People's Liberation Front	1975	Autonomy and change of regime	Sudan
	Oromo Liberation Front	1976	Secession	Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea
	Western Somalia Liberation Front	1961, 1976	Secession	Somalia
	Ethiopian People's Patriotic Front	1998	Change of regime	Eritrea
	Ginbot 7: Movement for Justice, Freedom, and Democracy	2008	Change of regime	Eritrea
Kenya	Shifta War	1963	Secession	Somalia
Somalia	Somali Salvation Democratic Front	1979	Change of regime	Ethiopia
	Somali National Movement	1981	Secession	Ethiopia
	Al Ittihad Al Islamiya	1983	Islamization	Sudan, Eritrea
	United Somali Congress	1989	Change of regime	Ethiopia
	Al Shabab Al Mujahedeen	2006	Change of regime	Eritrea
South Sudan	Sudan People's Liberation Army-in-Opposition (SPLA-IO)	2014	Change of regime	Sudan
	South Sudan Liberation Army	2011	Change of regime	Sudan
Sudan	Beja Congress	1957	Autonomy	Eritrea
	Anyanya	1960	Secession	Ethiopia
	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army	1983	Secession	Ethiopia, Uganda, Eritrea
	National Democratic Alliance	1995	Change of regime	Eritrea, Ethiopia
	Justice and Equality Movement	2003	Darfur	Eritrea, South Sudan
	Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N)	2011	Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile	South Sudan
Uganda	Lord's Resistance Army	1987	Autonomy	Sudan

Table 5.6 Armed Groups in the Horn of Africa and states supporting the Armed Groups ³³⁴

Uganda provided substantial support to the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) during its armed struggle against Sudan, which reciprocated by giving support to the Lord's Resistance

³³⁴ Source (with some modification) Mesfin, Berouk. The Horn of Africa Security Complex. In Sharamo, Roba and Berouk Mesfin. *Regional Security in the Post-Cold War Horn of Africa*. Institute for Security Studies (ISS). Monograph 178. April 2011. 6-7.

Army (LRA). Abdullahi Yusuf's Somali Salvation Front was provided bases and military assistance by Ethiopia after his failed coup attempt to topple Siyad Barre's government after Somalia's defeat in the (1978) war with Ethiopia over the Ogaden region.³³⁵

Sudan has also accused South Sudan of supporting their former comrades-in-arms of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) in the ongoing conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, while South Sudan has accused the north of supporting the rebel Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), which has a long history of committing atrocities in the south. Besides, when South Sudan descended into full-scale civil war in 2013, Sudan began supplying weapons to the SPLM-in Opposition (SPLM-IO).

The Sudanese regime also periodically sees Eritrea as a threat. At various points in the past, Eritrea has supported the SPLA and the Darfur and Eastern Front rebels.³³⁶

5.5 Trends of Peace Support Operations and Political Missions in the Horn of Africa

There is also a high presence of UN and AU military support operations in the region. There is currently a presence of peace support missions in Darfur, Sudan; the Abyei Sudan-South Sudan border; Somalia; and South Sudan. In the past, there were missions in Somalia, in the Ethiopia-Eritrea border, in Uganda-Rwanda border, and Sudan. Also, there are thousands of foreign troops in Djibouti, which indicates the gravity of security challenges in the region. From the first UN mission in the region in 1992 until 2019, there were 19 multinational peace support operations by AU, EU, IGAD, and UN. Twelve of them are current, three in the past, and four others in the past and failed missions.

5.5.1 Current Peace Support Operations

As of September 2019, the UN has 14 peacekeeping operations across the world. Seven missions are in Africa, and out of it, three of them are in the Horn of Africa, in Darfur (hybrid with AU), in Abyei, and South Sudan. AU has six operations, out of which, three are in the Horn of Africa,

³³⁵ Barnes, Cedric & Harun Hassan. The Rise and Fall of Mogadishu's Islamic Courts. *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 1:2, 2007. 160.

³³⁶ IISS. *The Military Balance: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defense Economics*. London: Routledge 2018. 435.

in Somalia, in Darfur (hybrid with UN), and in countries affected by LRA, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, and Uganda. The regional organization Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has one ceasefire monitoring operation in South Sudan. In addition to these, the EU, the UN Department of Political Affairs, and the UN Department of Field Support also have peace support operations in Somalia (See Table 5.7).

Unlike traditional UN peacekeeping, most Troop Contributing Countries (TCC) in both UN and AU peace support operations in the Horn of Africa are from immediate neighboring states. Moreover, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda are among the top ten most significant contributors of uniformed personnel for multilateral peace support operations globally, Ethiopia being first, Uganda fifth, and Kenya tenth.

Some scholars argue that the UN ‘breaks with a long-standing principle of not allowing a country to engage in a peace support operation in a neighboring country.’³³⁷ The reason being most next-door neighboring countries are already involved in the conflict, or they might not be impartial. However, all current peacekeeping operations of UN and AU in the Horn of Africa are mostly comprised from next-neighboring countries and resulting in remarkable conflict management outcomes.

There are currently 12 multinational peace operations deployed in the Horn of Africa.

	Conduction Organization	Name of the Operation	Host State	Military/Civilian	Number of Troops
1	Ad hoc (a coalition of states)	Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord’s Resistance Army (RCI-LRA)	South Sudan, Uganda CAR, and DRC	Military	1031**
2	IGAD	Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism in South Sudan (CTSAMM)	South Sudan	Civilian	200
3	AU	African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)	Somalia	Military	22,126*

³³⁷ Fejerskov, Adam M. and et al. Regional Interests in African Peace Operations. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies. 2017. 12

* Williams, Paul D (2018). *Fighting for Peace in Somalia: A History and Analysis of the African Union Mission (AMISOM), 2007-2017*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

4	AU/UN Hybrid	African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNMID)	Darfur, Sudan	Military	8,341
5	EU	EU Training Mission (EUTM Somalia)	Somalia	Military	203
6	EU	European Union Naval Force Somalia (Operation Atalanta) (EU NAVFOR Somalia)	Somalia and Gulf of Eden	Military	600
7	EU	EU Regional Maritime Capacity Building for the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean (EUCAP Somalia)	Somalia (Including Somali-land)	Civilian	108
8	UN (DPA)	United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM)	Somalia	Military and Civilian	553
9	UN (DFS)	United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS)	Somalia	Military and Civilian	49
10	UN	United Nations Interim Security Force in Abyei (UNISFA)	Abyei (South Sudan/Sudan)	Military	4,586
11	UN	United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)	South Sudan	Military	16,682
12	UN (DPA)	Special Envoy Horn of Africa	Horn of Africa	Civilian	9

Table 5.7 Multinational peace support operations in the Horn of Africa as of December 2018 (* as of July 2017, ** from Williams, 2018:4)

5.5.1.1 - African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

AMISOM, created in January 2007 by AU's Peace and Security Council, is the longest and largest peace support mission run by AU.³³⁸ The mission's main strategic objectives are 'to enable the

³³⁸ Eight AU missions have deployed across Africa since the mid-2000s, the most comprehensive ones being in Somalia and the joint mission with the UN in Darfur, Sudan. In the past there were four mission namely; African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) 2003 -2004, African Union Mission in Sudan (AIMS) 2004 – 2007, Comoros (AMISEC, 2006), The African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic, mostly known for MISCA, the French acronym for Mission Internationale de Soutien à la Centrafrique sous Conduite Africaine and the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA). Currently beside African Union Mission to

gradual handover of its security responsibility to Somali security forces, reduce the threat posed by Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups, and assist Somali security forces in providing security for Somalia's political process and peacebuilding efforts.'³³⁹ (Detail explanation on AMISOM will be discussed in Section 6.2.3 Joining AMISOM, 2014).

5.5.1.2 - United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM)

UNSOM was established on 3 June 2013 in support of the establishment of the Federal Government of Somalia.³⁴⁰ Its mandates are to provide United Nations 'good offices' functions; supporting the Government's peace and reconciliation process by providing strategic policy advice on peacebuilding and state-building; assist international donor support, particularly security sector assistance and maritime security; and help to monitor violations of human rights.³⁴¹ Uganda contributed two experts on mission and 530 contingent troops, which is 96% of the whole personnel in the mission.

5.5.1.3 - United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS)

UNSOS was established on 09 November 2015, replacing the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA), which was established in 2009 as a logistical field support operation to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) led by the United Nations Department of Field Support (DFS).³⁴² UNSOS is responsible for support to AMISOM, UNSOM, the Somali National Army (SNA), and the Somali Police Force (SPF) on joint operations with AMISOM.³⁴³ Only Uganda contributed one expert on a mission for UNSOM from the Horn of Africa. The mission

Somalia (AMISOM), United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), the African Union-led Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army (AU-led RCI-LRA) and the African Union-led Regional Task Force are running.

³³⁹ United Nations (2017). *SC/12972 Security Council 8034th Meeting (Night): Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2372 (2017), Security Council Extends Mandate of African Union Mission in Somalia, Authorizes Troop Reduction*. 30 August 2017. <https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc12972.doc.htm>, Accessed on 28 January 2019.

³⁴⁰ Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs. "Mandate." <https://unsom.unmissions.org/mandate>, Accessed on 28 January 2019.

³⁴¹ Ibid.

³⁴² United Nations. b. "UNSOA Mandate." 2019. <https://unsoa.unmissions.org/unsoa-mandate>, Accessed on 08 February 2019.

³⁴³ United Nations. "Resolution 2245 (2015) Adopted by the Security Council at its 7551st meeting." 9 November 2015. https://unsos.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/resolution_2245_2015.pdf, Accessed on 08 February 2019.

has 49 personnel, and the UK contributed the whole 42 contingent troops, and Ghana, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sierra Leone all send one expert on the mission and Mauritania two.³⁴⁴

5.5.1.4 - European Union Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM Somalia)

European Union Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM Somalia) was launched on 7 April 2010. It initially conducted training in Uganda; then, the headquarters was relocated to Mogadishu on 16 March 2015.³⁴⁵ Besides the training, EUTM has an advisory role in building the Somali Ministry of Defense (MoD) capacity and Somali National Army (SNA) General Staff focusing on three essential pillars, training, mentoring, and advising.³⁴⁶

5.5.1.5 - European Union Naval Force Somalia (Operation Atalanta) (EU NAVFOR Somalia)

European Union Naval Force Somalia (Operation Atalanta) (EU NAVFOR Somalia) was started in December 2008 with the mandates of protecting vessels of the World Food Programme (WFP), African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and other vulnerable shipping, preventing piracy and armed robbery at sea, monitors fishing activities off the coast of Somalia and supports other EU missions and international organizations working to strengthen maritime security and capacity in the region.³⁴⁷ EU NAVFOR also established the Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa (MSCHOA), which provides 24-hour manned monitoring of vessels transiting through the Gulf of Aden.³⁴⁸

5.5.1.6 - EU Regional Maritime Capacity Building for the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean (EUCAP Somalia)

EU Regional Maritime Capacity Building for the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean (EUCAP Somalia) launched in July 2012. EUCAP is a civilian mission based in Mogadishu, aiming to support regional maritime capacity-building and enhance the maritime security across

³⁴⁴ United Nations. “Troop and Police Contributors.” December 2018. Retrieved from: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors>, Accessed on 08 February 2019.

³⁴⁵ EUTM Somalia. “Mission Background. 2019.” <https://www.eutm-somalia.eu/>, Accessed on 10 February 2019.

³⁴⁶ Ibid.

³⁴⁷ EUNAVFOR. “Mission.” <https://eunavfor.eu/mission/>, Accessed on 10 February 2019.

³⁴⁸ EUNAVFOR. “About MSCHOA”. <https://at-sea.mschoa.org/about-mschoa/>, Accessed on 10 February 2019.

the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean (WIO). As of the end of 2015, it solely focused on Somalia also including Somaliland.³⁴⁹

5.5.1.7 - African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNMID)

After civil war broke out between the Government of Sudan and militias and other armed rebels in Darfur in 2003, AU PSC authorized the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) deployment of an AU-mandated mission to monitor the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement in 2004. Later, AMIS was merged with the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) in December 2007 to become the joint AU–UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID).³⁵⁰ UNAMID’s mandate is to protect civilians, monitor, verify the implementation of agreements, assist the political process, and monitor and report on the situation along the borders with Chad and the Central African Republic. 14% out of the total personnel in the mission contributed from the states of Horn of Africa. Djibouti contributes 137 formed police unit; Ethiopia contributes a total of 984 personnel, 943 contingent troops, seven staff officers, five experts on mission, and 29 individual police; Kenya contribute a total of 87 personnel, 11 staff officers, one expert on a mission, and 75 contingent troops.³⁵¹

5.5.1.8 - United Nations Interim Security Force in Abyei (UNISFA)

Few weeks before South Sudan declared its independence on 9 July 2011, clashes between Sudan Armed Forces and Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLM) over disputed, oil-rich border region Abyei drove more than 100,000 people from their homes. On 27 June 2011, the Security Council authorized the deployment of a peacekeeping force to the Abyei Area, which both sides claimed. UNISFA’s establishment came after both reached an agreement in Addis Ababa to demilitarize Abyei and let Ethiopian troops monitor the area.³⁵² UNISFA has the principal mandate is monitoring the demilitarization from any forces other than UNISFA and the Abyei Police Service.

³⁴⁹ EUCAP-SOMALIA. “About us.” <https://www.eucap-som.eu/about-us/>, Accessed on 10 February 2019.

³⁵⁰ United Nations. “About UNAMID.” <https://unamid.unmissions.org/about-unamid-0>, Accessed on 08 February 2019.

³⁵¹ United Nations. “Troop and Police Contributors.” December 2018. <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors>, Accessed on 08 February 2019.

³⁵² Temporary Arrangements for the Administration and Security of the Abyei Area (2011). *Temporary Arrangements for the Administration and Security of the Abyei Area*. Addis Ababa, 20 June 2011. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_1449.pdf, Accessed on 08 February 2019.

Also, de-mining assistance and technical advice, facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid, strengthen the Abyei Police Service's capacity by providing support, and provide security for oil infrastructure in the Abyei Area.³⁵³

UNISFA is a unique type of peacekeeping operation since the beginning of UN peacekeeping in 1948³⁵⁴ because 100% of the contingent troops are from Ethiopia³⁵⁵. Holger Osterrieder and et al. describe the deployment as follows:

The deployment of troops for UNISFA took place 'significantly more quickly than is usually the case [with UN peacekeeping operations].' Only one month after its authorization, almost 500 troops had been deployed to the Abyei region. Operations started on 8 August 2011, while patrols began at the end of August 2011. The fact that UNISFA troops were drawn from one country, Ethiopia, helps to explain this prompt deployment. Indeed, the Ethiopian troops were ready to be deployed even before the UN Security Council authorized the mission. The land route from Ethiopia to Abyei was used to transfer troops within a week... The Ethiopian troops did not require the living standards normally necessary for UN missions. Temporary housing in tents was an efficient way to ensure the timely deployment of troops. Only a few months after its authorization, the UN Secretary-General declared that the mission was 'in a position to secure the Abyei area' and thus able to fulfill its mandate.³⁵⁶

Ethiopia is the only Horn of Africa state which contributes to this mission. It contributes a total of 4,453, 4,287 contingent troops, 78 experts on mission 78 staff officers, and ten police personnel, which is 97% of the total personnel and 24% of the police personnel.³⁵⁷

5.5.1.9 - United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)

On the same date, South Sudan becomes the newest country in the world, and the UNMIS operation was ended; the Security Council established UNMISS on 9 July 2011 with the mandate 'to

³⁵³ United Nations. *Resolution 1990 (2011) Adopted by the Security Council at its 6567th Meeting*. 27 June 2011. [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1990\(2011\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1990(2011)), Accessed on 08 February 2019.

³⁵⁴ Williams, Paul D and Thong Nguyen. *Neighborhood Dynamics in UN Peacekeeping Operations, 1990–2017*. New York: International Peace Institute. 2018, 10.

³⁵⁵ United Nations. "Troop and Police Contributors." December 2018. <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors>, Accessed on 08 February 2019.

³⁵⁶ Osterrieder, H. et al. 'United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA)'. In Koops, Joachim A. et al. (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2017, 821-822.

³⁵⁷ United Nations *Troop and Police Contributors*. December 2018. <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors>, Accessed on 08 February 2019.

help establish the conditions for development in the Republic of South Sudan, intending to strengthen the capacity of the Government of the Republic of South Sudan to govern effectively, democratically and establish good relations with its neighbors.³⁵⁸ However, with the rise of recent political and security crisis in December 2013, which resulted in an enormous humanitarian crisis, on 27 May 2014, the Security Council reprioritized the mandate to the protection of civilians, monitoring human rights, assisting the delivery of humanitarian and supporting the implementation of the cessation of Hostilities.³⁵⁹ As of November 2018, Ethiopia has 2,106 military and 26 police personnel, Kenya contributes 23 police personnel, which is 14% of the total UN military personnel in UNMISS.³⁶⁰

5.5.1.10 - Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism in South Sudan (CTSAMM)

IGAD established the CTSAMM following the signing of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS) in August 2015 by warring parties in South Sudan. It is responsible for monitoring and verifying the implementation of Permanent Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements (PCTSA) and the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities (ACoH), which is signed in December 2017. CTSAMVM led by Maj. Gen. Desta Abiche Ageno of Ethiopia and there are over 200 personnel from 17 different countries, the majority of whom are former military officers. It is headquartered in Juba with 16 Monitoring and Verification Teams (MVTs) in the most conflict-affected areas of South Sudan.³⁶¹ CTSAMM reports to the IGAD Council of Ministers and to the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC),

³⁵⁸ United Nations. *Resolution 1990 (2011) Adopted by the Security Council at its 6567th Meeting*. 27 June 2011 [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1990\(2011\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1990(2011)), Accessed on 08 February 2019.

³⁵⁹ United Nations. *Resolution 2155 (2014) Adopted by the Security Council at its 7182nd meeting*. 27 May 2014. [https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2155\(2014\)](https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2155(2014)), Accessed on 13 February 2019.

³⁶⁰ United Nations *Troop and Police Contributors*. December 2018. <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors>, Accessed on 08 February 2019.

³⁶¹ CTSAMM. *Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism: Composition & Functions*. 2019. <http://ctsamm.org/composition-functions/>, Accessed on 02 February 2019.

which includes the warring parties that signed the agreement, South Sudanese civil societies, members of IGAD, and international partners.³⁶²

5.5.1.11 - Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army (RCI-LRA)

African Union PSC designated the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) as a terrorist group and established Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the LRA (RCI-LRA) in November 2011. It has three organs, the Joint Coordination Mechanism (JCM), in Addis Ababa, chaired by the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, and comprises Ministers of Defense of the affected countries (Uganda, South Sudan, DRC, and CAR), the Regional Task Force (RTF), headquartered in Uganda, is the military component with a maximum of 5,000 troops to be contributed by the affected countries.³⁶³ As of July 2017, there was 1031 uniformed personnel from DR Congo, South Sudan, and the Central Africa Republic.³⁶⁴

5.5.1.12 - Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa³⁶⁵

UN has Political Missions and Good Offices Engagements, which are led by the United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs. Currently, the UN has 25 Political Missions and Good Offices Engagements; 12 in Africa, 2 in the Americas, 3 in Asia, 2 in Europe, and 6 in the Middle East. In the past, it completed 29 political missions in the world,³⁶⁶ one of which was in Somalia, The United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), which is completed in

³⁶² Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission. *JMEC Leadership*. 2018. <https://www.jmecsouthsudan.com/index.php/about-jmec/leadership>, Accessed on 02 February 2019.

³⁶³ African Union Peace and Security Department. *The African Union-Led Regional Task Force for the elimination of the LRA*. 23 November 2015. <http://www.peaceau.org/en/page/100-au-led-rci-lra-1>, Accessed on 02 February 2019.

³⁶⁴ African Union Commission and New Zealand Crown. *African Union Handbook*. Addis Ababa: African Union Commission and New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. 2018, 80. <https://au.int/en/documents/20180130/african-union-handbook-2018>, Accessed on 12 February 2019.

³⁶⁵ Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs. *'Special Envoy Horn of Africa.'* October 2018. <https://dppa.un.org/en/mission/special-envoy-horn-of-africa>, Accessed on 12 February 2019.

³⁶⁶ United Nations Department of Political Affairs. *'Past Political Missions.'* <https://www.un.org/undpa/en/past-political-missions>, Accessed on 12 February 2019.

2013.³⁶⁷ From the currently running mission, two of them are in the Horn of Africa. Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa and UNSOM.

5.5.2 Past Peace Support Operations

5.5.2.1 - United Nations Observation Mission in Uganda and Rwanda (UNOMUR)

The second UN mission in the region was UNOMUR, deployed on the Ugandan side of the border between Uganda and Rwanda on 22 June 1993. The Rwandan and Ugandan governments requested the deployment of military observers along the common border to prevent the military use of the area by the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF). RPF was fighting the government of Rwanda since 1990; the Security Council decided that the mission monitor border transit at the border of lethal weapons and ammunition across the border and any other material that could be of military use. There were 81 military observers in the mission, and no state from the Horn of Africa contributed to the mission, and UNOMUR was officially closed in September 1994.

5.5.2.2 - United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)

The fourth UN mission established by Security Council was UNMIS by resolution 1590 (2005) of 24 March 2005 to monitor and verify the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), signed on 9 January 2005 by the Government of Sudan and Sudan People's Liberation Movement. The mission was completed on 9 July 2011, after six years of mandated operations, on the same day South Sudan declared independence. A maximum of 10,519 military, police, and civilian components were deployed. Uganda and Kenya are the only Horn of Africa states that deployed military and civilian personnel, and Ethiopia contributes only police personnel (United Nations, 2018).

5.5.2.3 - Operation Allied Provider

NATO also made a support operation in the region named Operation Allied Provider from October to December 2008, escorting UN World Food Programme (WFP) vessels transiting through the Gulf of Aden and the coast of Somalia, giving protection against piracy at the request of the

³⁶⁷ Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs. "United Nations Political Office for Somalia." <https://un-pos.unmissions.org/>, Accessed on 12 February 2019.

then UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon.³⁶⁸ Similarly, before African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) succeeded by AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), NATO also provided air transport for some 37,000 AMIS personnel and trained over 250 AMIS officials.³⁶⁹

5.5.3 Failed Peacekeeping Operations in the Horn of Africa

5.5.3.1 - United Nations Operation in Somalia I, UNOSOM I (April 1992 - March 1993)

UNOSOM I was established to monitor the ceasefire in Mogadishu and escort deliveries of humanitarian supplies to distribution centers in the city. The mission's mandate and strength were later enlarged to enable it to protect humanitarian convoys and distribution centers throughout Somalia. It later worked with the Unified Task Force in the effort to establish a safe environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

5.5.3.2 - United Nations Operation in Somalia II, UNOSOM II (March 1993 - March 1995)

UNOSOM II was established in March 1993 to take appropriate action, including enforcement measures, to establish throughout Somalia a secure environment for humanitarian assistance. To that end, UNOSOM II was to complete, through disarmament and reconciliation, the task begun by the Unified Task Force for the restoration of peace, stability, law, and order. UNOSOM II was withdrawn in early March 1995.

5.5.3.3 - Unified Task Force (UNITAF)

The first UN peacekeeping mission was in Somalia. After President Siad Barre's downfall in January 1991, the power struggle and clan clashes in Somalia resulted in widespread death and destruction and severe humanitarian crises. On 24 April 1992, the Security Council establish UNOSOM I to monitor the ceasefire in Mogadishu. At first, only 50 unarmed uniformed United Nations military observers were deployed from Pakistan in September 1992; later, the number grows to protect the humanitarian distribution centers throughout Somalia. Due to the high-security risk and looting of aid supplies, UNITAF was established to ensure the delivery of relief

³⁶⁸ NATO. "Operations and Missions: Past and Present." 2018. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/top-ics_52060.htm, Accessed on 26 January 2019.

³⁶⁹ Ibid.

supplies with a more robust mandate by the leadership of the US, which was deployed in December 1992. The Security Council in March 1993 decided on a transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II, to undertake disarmament and restoration of peace and stability. However, in June 1993, 24 UNOSOM II soldiers from Pakistan were killed in an attack in Mogadishu, and 18 US soldiers of the Quick Reaction Force, which were not a part of the UN, deployed for the support lost their lives in operation in Mogadishu. Because of this US withdrew its force in 1994, followed by other states. UNOSOM II terminated in March 1995 due to reduced budget and troops and also lack of agreement to cease fire by warring groups in Somalia. Approximately 37,000 troops were deployed by UNITAF and 20,000 by UNOSOM; however, no states from the Horn of Africa.

5.5.3.4 - United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)³⁷⁰

United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) was established because of the Ethiopian-Eritrean war from 1998-2000 due to a border dispute. The UN Security Council established UNMEE on 31 June 2000 to monitor the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) and the cessation of hostilities. UNMEE was terminated on 30 July 2008 due to the Eritrean government's restriction on the activities of UNMEE in its territory, which makes the operation impossible to carry out. There were a total of 4,154 military, police, and civilian personnel was deployed, and Kenya was the only state of the region that contributed military personnel; as of March 2004, it contributed a total of 695 personnel.

The forces or observer missions had the task of implementing cease-fire or armistice agreements. It was expected that these activities would then allow diplomacy to lead to a final peace treaty. Cease-fires have not often lead to peace. War has stopped, but formal settlements between the parties have not followed it. Instead, the conflicts remain frozen without a final outcome.³⁷¹

Following talks in Algiers, a ceasefire came in to force on 31 June 2000, under which a United Nations peacekeeping force, when the Security Council, by its resolution 1312 (2000), decided to establish the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) consisting of up to 100

³⁷⁰ Parts of this section is from the article published by the author Sigatu. K.T 'No Peace No War: The Ethiopian-Eritrean Conflict'. *AARMS*. Vol 18. No. 1, 2019. 79-91

³⁷¹ Holsti, K.J. *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*. 7th Edition. Prentice-Hall International, Inc. New Jersey. 1995. 354.

military observers and the necessary civilian support staff.³⁷² UNMEE was deployed along a 25-kilometer wide strip between the two armies, which is agreed by the Algiers Agreement.³⁷³ Latter, UNMEE expanded to a total of 4,200 military personnel, including 220 military observers, three infantry battalions, and the necessary support units, to monitor the ceasefire and border delineation between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

However, on 30 July 2008, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1827, terminating the mandate of UNMEE. The Council decision came in response to crippling restrictions imposed by Eritrea on UNMEE, as well as the cutting off of fuel supplies – making it impossible for the operation to continue carrying out its mandated tasks, and putting at risk the safety and security of UN personnel.³⁷⁴

5.6 Leenco Leta's Concept of Peacekeeping in the Horn of Africa

Peace support operations or peacekeeping become the most important and regularly used conflict management mechanism in the post-Cold War Horn of Africa region. Leenco Leta, in his book, argues peacekeeping operations in the Horn of Africa³⁷⁵ are used as state-building mechanisms, not only for solving existing conflicts but also 'engaged in either state deconstruction or reconstruction.'³⁷⁶ From the first UN mission in the region in 1992 until 2020, there were 20 multinational peace support operations by AU, EU, IGAD, and UN, and 12 missions are still running.

For Leta, conflicts in the Horn of Africa are mainly caused by the history of state formation, which is peculiar to the region. European powers such as Britain, France, and Italy, also the regional powers Christian Abyssinia and Mahdist Sudan, were competing with each other to dominate the region and expand the territories under their control. The European powers divided their

³⁷² United Nations. "United Nations Mission Ethiopia and Eritrea". <https://unmee.unmissions.org/background>, Accessed on 2 November 2017.

³⁷³ Lyons, Terrence. "The Ethiopia-Eritrea Conflict and the Search for Peace in the Horn of Africa". *Review of African Political Economy*, 36.120, 2009. 168.

³⁷⁴ United Nations. "United Nations Mission Ethiopia and Eritrea". <https://unmee.unmissions.org/background>, Accessed on 2 November 2017.

³⁷⁵ The Horn of Africa for Leenco Leta encompasses only Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Somalia. (The study covers time before the independence of South Sudan)

³⁷⁶ Leta, Leenco. *Peacekeeping as State Building: Current Challenges for the Horn of Africa*. London: The Red Sea Press. 2012. 11-12.

region; meanwhile, two local powers were able to control present-day states of Ethiopia and Sudan; the other ‘victims of their conquests, on the other hand, continue to work to throw off the dominance imposed on them by force.’³⁷⁷ Thus, he suggests as follows:

It is this history of state formation that accounts for the simultaneous prevalence of expansionist and constructionist tendencies within the states of the Horn of Africa. And the ongoing peacekeeping operations in the region are, hence, attempting to resolve the conflicts deriving from imaginations of the state that accounts for these diametrically opposite tendencies.³⁷⁸

Taking the case of UNMIS, which is mandated to oversee the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA); UNMEE, which is mandated to oversee the implementation of the Algiers Peace Agreement (APA); UNAMID, mandated to oversee the implementation of Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA); and AMISOM mandated to support Transitional Federal Government (TFG), he argues all these peacekeeping operations are either state deconstruction or reconstruction as follows:

The mandate of UNMIS is overseeing the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which includes conducting a referendum in 2011 to determine whether South Sudan would separate and become an independent state or not. The referendum was conducted on January 9, 2011, in which South Sudanese overwhelmingly voted for separation. Consequently, UNMIS forthrightly oversaw the deconstruction of the extant Sudanese nation-state. Since the rebel groups in Darfur tend to emulate the South Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), UNAMID also could be drawn into overseeing whether Darfur also would separate or not. The mission of AMISOM forthright concerns the reconstruction of the collapsed Somali state. Even UNMEE, which at first sight looks like a conventional interposition force, was supposed to finalize the separation of Eritrea from Ethiopia by demarcating the border between them. UNMEE, too was, hence, involved in a delayed state deconstruction exercise.³⁷⁹

Besides the above premise of his study, he asserts that ‘conflict within the region’s state connects and resonates with those prevailing among them. Hence, restoring peace within each state requires a concurrent resolution of the conflict and tensions prevailing between it and its neighbors.’³⁸⁰

³⁷⁷ Leta, Leenco. *Peacekeeping as State Building: Current Challenges for the Horn of Africa*. London: The Red Sea Press. 2012. 6.

³⁷⁸ Ibid.

³⁷⁹ Ibid. 14-15.

³⁸⁰ Ibid. 7.

5.7 Summery and Partial Conclusion

This chapter covers the Horn of Africa's security dynamics, its regional security complex, trends of conflicts, assessing past and present peace support operations, and discussing Leenco Lata's peacekeeping concept in the region.

The Horn of Africa is located in the Northeastern part of the continent consisting of eight countries: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda. These nine states are also the regional bloc members, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), making the member states considered the regional complex that reflects interlinked regional security complex. Except for Uganda, Ethiopia shares a border with all the member states.

Today the region consists of two of the nine newest states in the world, Eritrea and South Sudan. Furthermore, Somaliland is striving to be one since 1991 by establishing the most stable state and conducting a peaceful government transition in the region by challenging the image of war and disaster that has been associated with the region.

In Michael Sheehan's words, the security complex in the Horn of Africa is held together not by the positive influences of shared interest but by shared rivalries. The dynamics of security within these levels operate across a broad spectrum of military, political, economic, societal, and environmental sectors.

The most common trends of conflict in the region are intrastate/ethnic conflicts, resulting from the existence of more than three hundred seventy linguistic groups or can be ethnic groups in the region. Interstate conflicts resulted from the miss-drown borders, which cut through ethnic, cultural, historical, and religious groups which sway states of the region to claim neighboring state territories. Religious fundamentalism and violence, resulting from the existence of failed states and proximity to the Middle Eastern states. Conflicts caused by a change in living space resulted from the environmental degradation and climate change that cause scarcity of pastoral lands and water, especially among pastoralist communities, and supporting neighboring state rebels, also has been a tradition of the regimes of the region.

The Horn of Africa region is known for the high presence of UN and AU military support operations. There is currently a presence of peace support missions in Darfur, Sudan; Abyei Sudan–South Sudan border where 100% of the contingent troops are from Ethiopia; Somalia; and South

Sudan. In the past, there were missions in Somalia, in the Ethiopia-Eritrea border, in the Uganda-Rwanda border, and in Sudan. From the first UN mission in the region in 1992 until 2019, there were 19 multinational peace support operations by AU, EU, IGAD, and UN.

Leenco Lata, in his book, argues peacekeeping operations in the Horn of Africa are used as state-building mechanisms, not only for solving existing conflicts but also 'engaged in either state deconstruction or reconstruction.' This is because of the history of state formation in the region and the ongoing peacekeeping operations in the region are, attempting to resolve the conflicts emanated from that.

CHAPTER 6 – TRENDS OF ETHIOPIAN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS AND ITS GENERATIONS

“The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing.”

Edmund Burke

“People who love freedom and who are trying to fight for their freedom should be respected and helped.” Emperor Haile Selassie I

This chapter looks at the four generations of Ethiopian peace support operations from the beginning of the Imperial Army’s first deployment to up to 2019. Secondly, it discusses the trends and capabilities of Ethiopian peace support operations, and then it briefly confers about reimbursement. Lastly, it discusses the survey results and analysis from members of ENDF on their outlook towards the Ethiopian peace support operation.

6.1 Generations of Peacekeeping Operations

The categorizations of peacekeeping operations are commonly used in the study of the historical development of peacekeeping as it is discussed in section 3.2 the work of Kenkel, K.M. ‘Five Generations of Peace Operations: from the “Thin Blue Line” to “Painting a Country Blue.”’ In other studies like Diehl et al.,³⁸¹ the categorization is mainly done to provide a framework for comparison across peacekeeping operations in different times and the functions of the missions or the level of complexity according to size, the scope of mandate, and the presence or absence of a civilian component in addition to a military component.³⁸² For this study, the method of classification for Ethiopian peacekeeping generation is based on the particular sending regime’s³⁸³ motive, the nature of the armed forces, and the focus area of deployment. Based on the three criteria mentioned, Ethiopian peacekeeping is divided into four generations of operations.

³⁸¹ Diehl, PF et al. “International Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution: A Taxonomic Analysis with Implications.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 42.1. 1998.

³⁸² Wilde, Ralph. Taxonomies of International Peacekeeping: An Alternative Narrative. *ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law*. 9.391. 2003.

³⁸³ Three types of Ethiopian governments were identified First, the Imperial regime of Emperor Haile Selassie I from 1930-1974, second, the Transitional Government of Ethiopia led by President Meles Zenawi from 1991-1995, and third, the government of Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia from 1996 up to now, (led by PM Meles Zenawi

The first generation is the Imperial Army's peacekeeping deployment from 1950-1967; the second generation was the peacekeeping deployment of EPRDF's Rebel Army from 1994-95; the third generation is ENDF engagement in 'African Solution for African Problems' from 2003-2010. The fourth and the last generation is since 2011, where ENDF become 'the peacekeeper army.'

6.1.1 First Generation - The Imperial Army: Conviction to Collective Security (1950 - 1967)

Ethiopia's first two missions were the US-led United Nations Command in Korea and in United Nations Operation in the Congo. The Ethiopian government was led by Emperor Haile Selassie I, mostly with a firm conviction towards UN and collective security. Historically, one of the main reasons Ethiopia contributed to UN peacekeeping troops was that the League of Nations failed to defend Ethiopia from the Italian aggression in 1936. Emperor Haile Sellassie I was very famous for his speech in 1936, appealing for the League of Nations. His speech was:

I, Haile Selassie I, Emperor of Ethiopia, am here today to claim that justice which is due to my people and the assistance promised to it eight months ago when fifty nations asserted that aggression had been committed in violation of international treaties.

There is no precedent for a Head of State himself speaking in this assembly. But there is also no precedent for a people being a victim of such injustice and being at present threatened by abandonment to its aggressor. Also, there has never before been an example of any Government proceeding to the systematic extermination of a nation by barbarous means, in violation of the most solemn promises made by the nations of the earth that there should not be used against innocent human beings the terrible poison of harmful gases. It is to defend a people struggling for its age-old independence that the head of the Ethiopian Empire has come to Geneva to fulfill this supreme duty, after having himself fought at the head of his armies.

... Is it necessary to remind the Assembly of the various stages of the Ethiopian drama? For 20 years past, either as Heir Apparent, Regent of the Empire, or as Emperor, I have never ceased to use all my efforts to bring my country the benefits of civilization, and in particular, to establish relations of good neighborliness with adjacent powers. In particular, I succeeded in concluding with Italy the Treaty of Friendship of 1928, which absolutely prohibited the resort, under any pretext whatsoever, to force of arms, substituting for force and pressure the conciliation and arbitration on which civilized nations have based international order.³⁸⁴

(1996-2012) PM HaileMariam Desalegn (2012-2018) and PM Abiy Ahmed (2018-). Ethiopia did not deploy peace-keeping troops at the time of the military government of Colonel Mengistu HaileMariam from 1974-1991.

³⁸⁴ Haile Selassie II. "Appeal to the League of Nations." June 1936. <https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/selas-sie.htm>, Accessed on 23 December 2018.

The Ethiopian government was motivated to participate in the collective security efforts of the UN because Ethiopia had been the victim of the League of Nations' ineffectiveness of its principles of collective security, and it did not want the same thing to happen to other states of the world under UN.³⁸⁵ Underlining this fact, one can use the words of Skordiles, who said: 'This nation [Ethiopia] lost her independence for five years, because of the lack of collective security.'³⁸⁶ The Emperor of Ethiopia, Haile Selassie I, in his speech at the League of Nations in 1936, clearly shows this:

On behalf of the Ethiopian people, a member of the League of Nations, I request the Assembly to take all measures proper to ensure respect for the Covenant. I renew my protest against the violations of treaties of which the Ethiopian people has been the victim. I declare in the face of the whole world that the Emperor, the Government and the people of Ethiopia will not bow before force; that they maintain their claims that they will use all means in their power to ensure the triumph of right and the respect of the Covenant. ... The great Powers who have promised the guarantee of collective security to small States on whom weighs the threat that they may one day suffer the fate of Ethiopia, I ask what measures do you intend to take?³⁸⁷

Despite this call, the League of Nations failed. This was one of the reasons why the Emperor sent Ethiopian troops to Korea in 1951 and to Congo in 1962.

6.1.1.1. The United Nations Command (UNC) in Korea

After Japan, which occupied Korea for a long, got defeated in World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to divide the peninsula at the thirty-eighth parallel as the boundary of their respective zones of occupation, which they took from Japan. The Soviets installed a communist government in the north, and the United States reinstate the former Provisional Government in exile in the south. However, in June 1950, North Korea launched a full-scale invasion against the southern the Republic of Korea to unify the whole of Korea under Communism.

Under Resolution 83 (1950), the Security Council 'determined that the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea constitutes a breach of the peace.' Furthermore, added, 'the authorities in North

³⁸⁵ Haile, A. A. "East African Crisis Response: Shaping Ethiopian Peace for Better Participation in Future Peace Operations". Tesis presented for Masters of Science in Defense Analysis. Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 2006. 35.

³⁸⁶ Skordiles cited in Haile. "East African Crisis Response...". 35

³⁸⁷ Haile Selassie. "Appeal to the League of Nations". Astro. June 1936. http://astro.temple.edu/~rimmerma/ap-peal_to_the_league_of_nations_.htm, Accessed on 22 January 2016.

Korea have neither ceased hostilities nor withdrawn their armed forces to the 38th parallel, and that urgent military measures are required to restore international peace and security.’ Finally, the resolution ‘recommends that the Member of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area.’³⁸⁸

On July 7, under Resolution 84, the Security Council ‘recommends that all Members providing military forces and other assistance pursuant to the aforesaid Security Council resolutions make such forces and other assistance available to a unified command under the United States of America; and authorizes the unified command at its discretion to use the United Nations flag in the course of operations against North Korean forces concurrently with the flags of the various nations participating.’³⁸⁹

The United Nations Command (UNC) provided the core military and strategic direction for the operation. The USA provided the UNC's high command and the vast majority of the logistics, air and naval power, artillery, and military infrastructure. Twenty-one member nations of the United Nations committed themselves to support South Korea, and sixteen UN nations supplied fighting units, and five sent military hospitals and field ambulances. Australia, Britain, Canada, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Colombia, Ethiopia, South Africa, New Zealand, Turkey, Greece, Thailand, Philippines, Luxembourg, and the United States sent fighting units. Norway, Sweden, Denmark, India, Italy contributed military hospitals and field ambulances to the cause.

Ethiopia provided a battalion made up of volunteers from Emperor Haile Selassie's Imperial Guard. At the time, it was the Imperial Guard, which was in a better passion and with not much duty in the country. At the time of departure from the capital Addis Ababa, the Minister of War *Ras Abebe Aregay*³⁹⁰ and the Commander of the Imperial Guard Brigadier General Mulugera Buli made an introductory speech, and then the Emperor and Commander in Chief Haile Selassie publicized the name of the Peacekeeping battalion as ‘*Qagnew Battalion*’ named after the horse

³⁸⁸ United Nations Security Council Resolution 83, Document No. S/1511, 27 June 1950.

³⁸⁹ United Nations Security Council Resolution 84, Document No. S/1588, 7 July 1950.

³⁹⁰ *Ras* is the old Ethiopian army rank equivalent to Lieutenant General. (*Ras Bitewedid* is General; *Dej'azimach* is Major General; *Fit'awirari* is Brigadier General; *Kegn'azimach* is Colonel and *Gir'azimach* is Lieutenant Colonel)

of the emperor's father, Prince Mekonin HaileMichael Gudisa. The Emperor also made the following speech at the farewell pared:

You will cherish this military symbol in every battle you wage. Since you have promised us a glorious and sacred battlefield, honored and sanctified by your heroic deeds, at the end of the war, we hope you will hand it over to us, your emperor, and your army commander...

... You all know the damage we have suffered in the years of the struggle and the sacrifices we have made, at a time when Ethiopia is in the throes of grief. When our people and we defend ourselves, we do not hesitate to push. Today, Ethiopia ranks among the states in the United Nations. It is something we should all be proud of...

... Therefore, looking back to what happened to us, we believe that people who love freedom and who are trying to fight for their freedom should be respected and helped. You still have a long way to go to respect and secure freedom. The spirit of our brave fathers who fought for Ethiopia's independence thousands of years ago will follow you. He will strengthen your arms on the battlefield. It strengthens your heart...

Ethiopia's deployment of peacekeeping troops to Korea has a meaning beyond helping others not to suffer as much as she did in the betrayal of the principle of common security by the League of Nations, which she relied on during her ordeal, and which she was subjected to inhumane treatment. Ethiopia wanted to show to the western world that it has turned a deaf ear to her cries in times of suffering; it is possible to stand firm and be equal to others even after they have fallen. Above all, it is to put her lasting identity and honor on the world community's conscience.³⁹¹

He also added to the departing soldiers as follows:

You are today on the point of leaving Ethiopia on a voyage halfway around the world in defense of the liberty and of the principles to which all members of the United Nations stand.... You are also representing and defending in far corners of the earth the most sacred principle of modern international policy, that principle of collective security with which Ethiopia's name is imperishably associated. Of all the nations of the world, the name of Ethiopia has been most closely associated with that principle.³⁹²

From the speech, it is clear the emperor is talking about Ethiopia's prestige and international recognition by participating in the UN mission.

³⁹¹ Techane, Gesit. *Yeqedmow Tor (The Former Army) 1927-1983. [Amharic]* Addis Ababa: Z. A Publishing. 2006 142 – 143.

³⁹² Atnafu cited in Abotaa, Arka. *Ethiopia's Foreign Policy under Emperor Haile Selassie I: An Appraisal*. Thesis Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of Addis Ababa University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for the Degree of Master of Arts International Relations. December 6, 2002 Addis Ababa. 53.

In addition to the central motive mentioned above, the Emperor decided to send his troops with the UN operation under the leadership of the United States was due to the regional security threats he had at the time looking an arms procurement or support from the United States, and it was an excellent opportunity to persuade the United States to dispense its negligence towards Ethiopia and value and welcome her arms request.³⁹³

William Stueck described the Ethiopian willingness for deployment as follows:

When in early August Ethiopia expressed its desire to contribute a British-trained battalion with English-speaking officers, the State Department was more receptive. But the overture from Ethiopia, whose government in the 1930s had been a victim of the failure of collective security, hardly represented a selfless gesture. The fates of neighboring Eritrea and Somaliland were now in the hands of the United Nations, and Ethiopia was an interested party, especially intent on acquiring the former and thus keen on enhancing its position in the international body. Another method of enhancing its bargaining power was to strengthen its army. Exchanges between Washington and Addis Ababa soon revealed that Ethiopia hoped to receive enough equipment from the United States to arm two or three divisions.³⁹⁴

On the other hand, the selfless conviction to collective security is gestured in response to the call of the Secretary General's request; the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a telegram permitting the financial contribution demanded. 'Fully aware of the incredible suffering resulting from the aggression, His Imperial Majesty has ordered the transfer to your use of one hundred thousand dollars in order to provide medical supplies for alleviating the sufferings of victims of aggression and to honor these heroic victims of aggression.'³⁹⁵

The first Qagnew Battalion reached Korea after 21 days of a sea voyage, traveling from Addis Ababa to Djibouti then from Port of Djibouti; they got on US military sheep to Korea. In their stay in Korea, the three Battalions preventing any breach of the defensive zone from being broken by the enemy conducted night and day patrols to curb the enemy's movements, spy on its contents, and obtain valuable information. Through this, the Battalions gained popularity, and many of the

³⁹³Techane, Gesit. *Yeqedmow Tor (The Former Army) 1927-1983. [Amharic]* Addis Ababa: Z. A Publishing. 2006 142.

³⁹⁴Stueck, William. *The Korean War: An International History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press:1995. 74.

³⁹⁵ Atnafu cited in Abotaa, Arka. *Ethiopia's Foreign Policy under Emperor Haile Selassie I: An Appraisal*. Thesis Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of Addis Ababa University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for the Degree of Master of Arts International Relations. December 6, 2002 Addis Ababa. 26.

leading officers were awarded the highest Ethiopian and American battlefield medals. After the ceasefire, the only country where none of its soldiers were captured to be returned during the exchange of prisoners of war was Ethiopia. The Imperial Guard took part in 253 battles, and only 120 were killed, and 536 were wounded.³⁹⁶

There were five rounds, and Colonel Kebede Kebre was the Commander in Chief for the first-round Ethiopian Army who went to Korea.

Ethiopian Participation in UN Command Korea (UNCK) 1951 - 1956				
Rotation	Contingents	Force Commander for Ethiopian Army	Number	Duration
1st	<i>Qagnew</i> Battalion	Lt. Col. Aman Amdom/ Lt. Colonel Teshome Erigetu	1,153	June 1951 – April 1952
2nd	<i>Qagnew</i> Battalion	Lt. Col. Asfaw Andarge	1,094	April 1952 - April 1953
3rd	<i>Qagnew</i> Battalion	Lt. Col. Woldeyuhannis Shita	1,271	April 1953 - April 1954
4 th	<i>Qagnew</i> Battalion	-	-	-
5 th	-	-	-	-
Total			6,037	

Table 6.1 Ethiopian 1st UN Peacekeeping Participation in Korea.³⁹⁷

The Korean Armistice Agreement is the truce signed on 27 July 1953 that brought a cessation of the Korean War hostilities. It was signed by the United Nations Command (UNC), North Ko-

³⁹⁶ Techane, Gesit. *Yeqedmow Tor (The Former Army) 1927-1983. [Amharic]* Addis Ababa: Z. A Publishing. 2006 168.

³⁹⁷ Negash, Yitibarek. *Be'alem Akef Yeselam Masikebere Zemecha Tesarifo Yalu Michu Hunetawochina Tikuret Yemishu Gudayoch: Etiyopiyan Bemimeleket 1994-2009. (Challenges in Prospects in International Peacekeeping Operations: 1994-2009)* [Amharic]. A Paper Submitted to the Fulfilment of BA in Military Science and Leadership. Ethiopian Defense and Command College. Addis Ababa July 2009. & Ethiopian Government Communication Affairs Office. *Etiyopiya ena Selam Masikebere. (Ethiopia and Peacekeeping).* [Amharic]. Addis Ababa: B.S.P.E. September 2012.

rea's Korean People's Army (KPA), and the Chinese People's Volunteer Army (PVA). It was designed to 'ensure a complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea until a final peaceful settlement is achieved.'³⁹⁸

In France, newspapers of the Right and Center lauded the UN effort in Korea. *Franciereur* described it as 'reaffirming a principle that of preventing armed aggression. What the League of Nations could not do for Ethiopia, the United Nations did for Korea.'³⁹⁹

6.1.1.2 ONUC, United Nations Operation in the Congo (Opération des Nations Unies au Congo)

The Republic of the Congo became independent on 30 June 1960. In the days that followed, chaos broke out in the country, and Belgium, former colonial master, sent its troops to the Congo without the Congolese Government's consent. ONUC originally mandated to provide the Congolese Government with the military and technical assistance it required following the collapse of many essential services and the military intervention by Belgian troops.⁴⁰⁰

After 75 years of tyranny, Congo got liberated, and Patrice Lumumba, the first democratically elected Prime Minister, won the parliamentary elections. The parliament elected Joseph Kasavubu as President. However, soon after the independence, the province of Katanga, led by Moïse Tshombe and South Kasai engaged in secessionist struggles with Belgian troops' support against the new leadership. On 12 July 1960, the Congolese Government asked for United Nations military assistance. Two days later, the Security Council called upon Belgium to withdraw its troops from the Congo and authorized military assistance as might be necessary until the national security forces are able to meet their tasks fully, through the technical assistance of the United Nations.⁴⁰¹

³⁹⁸ *The Korean War Armistice Agreement*. Panmunjom, Korea, July 27, 1953. https://www.usfk.mil/Portals/105/Documents/SOFA/G_Armistice_Agreement.pdf, Accessed on 21 September 2020.

³⁹⁹ Stueck, William. *The Korean War: An International History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press:1995. 345.

⁴⁰⁰ United Nations. "Republic of Congo – ONUC Background." 2001. <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mis-sion/past/onucB.htm>, Accessed on 13 January 2020.

⁴⁰¹ Ibid.

Ethiopia was one of the 35 nations which sent peacekeeping troops. The maximum number of mission personnel as of July 1961 was 19,828 all ranks, supported by international civilian and locally recruited staff.⁴⁰² Ethiopia Contributed a total of 10, 625 of which 6,911 contingents, 2,960 Junior Officers, and 754 Officers. (201 officers and non-commissioned officers lost their lives and 133 officers and non-commissioned officers wounded.)

The *Teqil*⁴⁰³ battalion for the deployment coordinated and organized by Lt. Colonel Siyum Gedi-Georgis and Emperor Haile Selassie made a farewell speech at the departing parade at the Imperial Ethiopian Air Force base in Debre Zeit as follows:

In line with the UN Security Council resolution, United Nations asked Our Imperial Government for military and air support. We sincerely respect and support the United Nations Charter's principles and the basic ideas of collective security; hence, we accepted the request. You who lined up in front of us today, Officers and Soldiers, because We decided that you would go for this great task.

Whenever you go to the country we have ordered you, by avoiding embarrassing and degrading work, We are confident that you will be a pride for your country and your emperor by performing your duties in a compassionate and kind manner as a policeman ...⁴⁰⁴

But later UN requested a Brigade; thus, three more Battalions were sent, and with the previous *Teqil* Battalion name *Tekil* Brigade.

In this mission, Ethiopia was given the position of commander in chief of UN forces. Lt. General Kebede Gebre was a force commander in the mission. He was also the commander of the three *Kagnew* Battalions deployed in Korea by then with the rank of Colonel. Brigadier General Eyasu Menigesha was the commander of the four *Teqil* Brigades deployed in Congo.

The request for the position of commander in chief of UN force in Congo comes from the UN. The army's performance in the Korean mission was rated as excellent by the UN, a fact that

⁴⁰² United Nations. "Republic of the Congo-ONUC: Facts and Figures." No date. <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/onucF.html>, Accessed on 06 July 2019.

⁴⁰³ Named after the horse of the Emperor Haile Selassie, *Teqil*.

⁴⁰⁴ Techane, Gesit. *The Former Army: 1935-1991 [Amharic] (Yeqedmow Tor: 1927-1983)*. Addis Ababa: Z. A Publishing. 2006 216.

motivated the UN Secretary-General to designate an Ethiopian force commander to the UN Mission in the Congo.⁴⁰⁵ U Thant, the then Acting Secretary-General, requested the Ethiopian government to send an officer for the position of Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Force in Congo; the Ethiopian, Lt. General Kebede Gebre, was selected by Emperor Haile Selassie I and served from April 1962 to July 1963. He was one of the five force commanders of ONUC.

The Emperor's acceptance letter for the request by U Thant he writes as follows:

At the request of Your Excellency, we have appointed Lt. General Kebede Gebre as Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Force in Congo. In this opportunity, when he comes to serve in his assigned place, we hope that United Nations' efforts for world peace will bear fruit.

As one of the countries striving for peace on earth, Ethiopia has never failed to provide the necessary assistance in accordance with the organization's decision.

Ever since the Congolese conflict broke out, to restore peace and with the hope that the divided people will be united, as Your Excellency knows, Ethiopia is playing its part and doing what it has to.⁴⁰⁶

Besides Lt. General Kebede Gebre, other Ethiopian officers like Major General Yacob GebreLeul were Deputy Force Commander

Rotation	Name	Force Commander	Contingents	Force Commander for Ethiopian Army	Duration
1 st	1 st <i>Teqil</i> Brigade	Col. Woldeyuhannis Shita	1 st Teqil Battalion	Lt. Col Siyum GedileGeorgis	
			2 nd Battalion	Lt. Col. Tadesse Yigezu (Imperial Bodyguard)	July 1960 - June 1961
			3 rd Battalion	Lt. Col. Kassa Wolde-Georgis (Imperial Bodyguard)	
			4 th Battalion	Lt. Col. Worku GebreMariam (Ground Force)	

⁴⁰⁵ Berhe, Mulugeta G. The Ethiopian post-transition Security Sector Reform Experience: Building a National Army from a Revolutionary Democratic Army. *African Security Review*, 26:2, 2017, 163.

⁴⁰⁶ Lema, Shibeshi. *The Zealous Soldier: Lt. General Kebede Gebre 1918 - 1974. (Koftanaw Wetader Letena General Kebede Gebre 1910 - 1967.)* [Amharic] Addis Ababa: Far East Trading PLC. 2015. 135.

2 nd	2 nd <i>Teqil</i> Brigade	Col. Teshome Yirigetu	25 th Battalion	Lt. Colonel Alemu Weldeyes (Ground Force)	June 1961 – June 1962
			8 th Battalion	Lt. Col. Tezera Gorfe (Ground Force)	
			26 th Battalion	Lt. Col. GebreMeskel Gundo (Emperial Body Guard)	
			35 th Battalion	Lt. Col. Gesses Reta (Ground Force)	
3 rd	3 rd <i>Teqil</i> Brigade	Col. Woriqu Metaferiya	4 th Battalion	Lt. Col. Tilahun Belihu	June 1962 - April 1963
			6 th Battalion	Lt. Col. Qedida Guri-mesa	
			27 th Battalion	Lt. Col. GebreWahid	
			28 th Battalion	Lt. Col Alemayehu Manyahile	
4 th	4 th <i>Teqil</i> Brigade	Col. Abebe Teferi	7 th Battalion	Lt. Col Tadesse WoldeKidan	April 1963 – June 1964
			21 st Battalion	Lt. Colonel Yiriga Yesuf	

Table 6.2 Ethiopian UN Deployment in Congo⁴⁰⁷

ONUC, starting from July 1960 to ensure the withdrawal of Belgian forces and assist the Government in maintaining law and order and preventing the occurrence of civil war, and securing the removal of all foreign military, paramilitary and advisory personnel, not under the United Nations Command, and all mercenaries. In 1963, after Katanga had been reintegrated into the

⁴⁰⁷ Negash, Yitibarek. *Be'alem Akef Yeselam Masikebere Zemecha Tesarifo Yalu Michu Hunetawochina Tikuret Yemishu Gudayoch: Etiyopiyan Bemimeleket 1994-2009. (Challenges in Prospects in International Peacekeeping Operations: 1994-2009)* [Amharic]. A Paper Submitted to the Fulfilment of BA in Military Science and Leadership. Ethiopian Defense and Command College. Addis Ababa July 2009.

Congo's national territory, the General Assembly authorized the stay of a reduced number of troops for a further six months. The Force was withdrawn entirely by 30 June 1964.⁴⁰⁸

In the time of the first generation of peacekeeping in Ethiopian history, the unswerving support for the principle of collective security is practically translated into action during the Korean and the Congo wars.⁴⁰⁹

According to Mulugeta Berehe:

Ethiopia's participation in these peace missions had historically-rooted motivations. The nation had itself been a victim of failed multilateralism when its appeal to the League of Nations in 1936 fell on deaf ears. Ethiopia's willingness to deploy its young army for international peacekeeping was therefore driven by its commitment to the founding idea of the UN – that collective security can only be promoted by collectively taking action to protect the weak from the strong.⁴¹⁰

6.1.2 Second Generation – The EPRDF's Rebel Army: Rebels Solidarity (1994 – 1995)

In 1991 EPRDF, a coalition of four parties led by TPLF, controlled government power removing the military government, which controlled power since 1974. EPRDF won the 17 years of guerilla fight with the government and formed a transitional government in 1991, which lasted upto 1995, dismantling the former national army, where EPRDF's rebel army become *de facto* national army.

In Rwanda, fighting between the Armed Forces of the mainly Hutu-led government and the Tutsi-led RPF first broke out in October 1990 across the border between Rwanda and its northern neighbor, Uganda. During this time, the Ethiopian transitional government, led by Meles Zenawi, was supporting the liberation struggle of the RPF/Army.⁴¹¹ During this time, the UN established two missions, UNOMUR and UNAMIR, where Ethiopia participated in the second one, even though it has not established a constitutional-based national army.

⁴⁰⁸ United Nations. *Republic of Congo – UNUC Background*. 2001. <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mis-sion/past/onucB.htm>, Accessed on 13 January 2020.

⁴⁰⁹ Abotaa, Arka. *Ethiopia's Foreign Policy under Emperor Haile Selassie I: An Appraisal*. Thesis Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of Addis Ababa University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for the Degree of Master of Arts International Relations. December 6, 2002 Addis Ababa.

⁴¹⁰ Berhe, Mulugeta G. The Ethiopian post-transition Security Sector Reform Experience: Building a National Army from a Revolutionary Democratic Army. *African Security Review*, 26:2, 2017, 163.

⁴¹¹ Musoni, Edwin "Zenawi was a gallant leader - Kagame." 22 August 2012 <https://www.newtimes.co.rw/sec-tion/read/56467>, Accessed on 22 September 2020.

6.1.2.1. UNAMIR, United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda

UNOMUR was deployed on the Ugandan side of the border between Uganda and Rwanda in 1993 to observe along the common border of Uganda and Rwanda to prevent the military use of the area by RPF. There were 81 military observers in the mission, and it was officially closed in September 1994.⁴¹²

Following the Arusha peace talks' conclusion, in August 1993, between the government of Rwanda and RPF, the Secretary-General recommended that the Security Council establish another peacekeeping operation, UNAMIR, which was established on 5 October by the Security Council resolution 872 (1993).

On 6 April 1994, an aircraft carrying President Juvénal Habyarimana of Rwanda and President Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi crashed at Kigali airport, killing all those on board. The crash was followed by horror that engulfed Rwanda. Genocide claimed the lives of members of the Tutsi minority and moderate Hutus.

On 4 May, the Secretary-General warned that the United Nations might later be accused of passivity if it did not act quickly. On 13 May 1994, the Secretary-General recommended a new mandate for UNAMIR, including 5,500 troops. UNAMIR would support and provide safe conditions for displaced persons and other groups, help with humanitarian organizations' assistance, and monitor border-crossing points and the two parties' deployment.⁴¹³ While its rules of engagement including to take action in self-Defense against those who threatened protected sites and populations and the means of delivery and distribution of humanitarian relief.⁴¹⁴

On 8 March 1996, as UNAMIR's mandate was ending, with the RPF Government's agreement, to the protection of the personnel and premises of the International Tribunal, which was established to prosecute persons responsible for genocide and other violations of international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda.

⁴¹² United Nations. "Uganda-Rwanda – UNOMUR: Background." <https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unomurbackgr.html>, Accessed on 04 February 2019

⁴¹³ United Nations. "Rwanda – UNAMIR Background." peacekeeping.un.org. <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/unamirFT.htm>, Accessed on 15 January 2017.

⁴¹⁴ Ibid.

Rounds	Contingents	Commander	Workforce	Duration
1 st	<i>Guna</i> Batalion	Col. Tadele GebreSilassie	836	August 1994 – April 1995
2 nd	<i>Wigagen</i> Battalion	Col. Alemishet Degife	858	April 1995 – July 1995
		Total	1,694	

Table 6.3 Ethiopian Participation in UNAMIR 1994-1995

The main reason for deployment is that by the early 1990s, the spirit of liberation had not yet cooled, and the new EPRDF government leaders were young and revolutionary; what happened in Rwanda was very poignant for them. In addition to this, the Transitional Government president, the later prime minister, Meles Zenawi, had a profound concern in peacekeeping;⁴¹⁵ he personally visited the Ethiopian peacekeepers in Rwanda during their deployment.

Some mentioned it was ambitious for a new government that just came out of a long civil war to respond to the UN call for the peacekeeping and humanitarian operation in Rwanda following the genocide.⁴¹⁶ However, Roméo Dallaire, Force Commander of UNAMIR, reported that ‘despite their lack of equipment, the Ethiopian contingent were incredibly resourceful on being able to do their job effectively with minimum equipment and had no reluctance to help local farmers harvest their fields.’⁴¹⁷

Moreover, on the 4th of July 2009, on the Rwandan Liberation Day, President Paul Kagame of Rwanda presented Meles Zenawi with “Uruti” (National Liberation Medal) and “Umurinzi” (Campaign against Genocide Medal). The first medal was given to recognize Meles’s contribution

⁴¹⁵ Prime Minister Melez Zenawi has an important role in ENDF’s peacekeeping deployment until his death in September 2012. Almost all deployments were made based on his assessment and decision. (Interview with Anonymous Ethiopia MOFA official in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 3 August 2019)

⁴¹⁶ HaileMariam, Z. “Africa: Ethiopia’s Contribution Toward Peacekeeping Mission”. *allafrica.com*. 8 January 2016. <http://allafrica.com/stories/201601081051.html>, Accessed on 10 January 2017.

⁴¹⁷ Djinnit, Dalil. “Ethiopia’s Contribution to Global and African Peacekeeping Operations.” April 7, 2016. <https://ippjournal.wordpress.com/2016/04/07/ethiopias-contribution-to-global-and-african-peacekeeping-operations-2/>, Accessed on 20 January 2017.

in toppling down the former regime and bringing peace and socio-economic development to Ethiopia. The second recognized Ethiopia's contribution in deploying peacekeepers to help Rwanda.⁴¹⁸

The Ethiopian Army being chosen by the UN to operate in the region has created two sentiments in Rwanda. On the one hand, the Ethiopian peacekeepers, who knew that the ethnic Tutsis have East African origin, may support the Tutsi. On the other hand, they may take an act of revenge on the Hutus. This view poses a challenge for the first round of the Ethiopian peacekeeping force; however, the view comes-up not true.⁴¹⁹

The army was able to open a new history of peace and partisanship, completing all their missions. Though the long-standing UN Peacekeeping principle advocate, a peacekeeper should not respond in fire even if he shot at, instead of retreat. Regardless of the Ethiopian army respecting this principle, it also firmly believes in the principle of 'retreating while there is a clear attack against civilians is not a virtue.'⁴²⁰

As a result, the army has won the love of the people by protecting the lives of innocent civilians, as well as working with the Rwandan army to ensure the country's security. The Ethiopian troops have a conviction of defending civilians later lead to the 'Kigali Principles on the Protection of Civilians', a non-binding set of eighteen pledges for the effective and thorough implementation of civilians' protection in UN peacekeeping.⁴²¹

⁴¹⁸ Rwanda News Agency. "After Ethiopia, Eritrea will also be honored for Rwanda Liberation". 04 July 2010. <http://rnanews.com/politics/3724-afer-ethiopia-eritrea-will-also-be-honored-for-rwanda-liberation>, Accessed on 20 January 2017.

⁴¹⁹ Ethiopian Government Communication Affairs Office. *Ethiopia and Peacekeeping*. [Amharic]. (*Etiyopiya ena Selam Masikebere*.) Addis Ababa: B.S.P.E. September 2012. 16.

⁴²⁰ Ibid. 17

⁴²¹ The principles on the Protection of Civilians emanated from the High-level International Conference on the Protection of Civilians held in Rwanda on 28-29 May 2015. The Republic of Rwanda, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United States of America initiated the Principles, bringing together the first nine signatories: Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Italy, Netherlands, Rwanda, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Uganda, and Uruguay.

Global Center for Responsibility to Protect. "The Kigali Principles on the Protection of Civilians." 29 May 2015 <http://s156658.gridserver.com/resources/985>, Accessed on 25 September 2019.)

In 2004 when Rwanda deployed its first peacekeepers in Sudan's troubled Darfur region, Rwandan President Paul Kagame affirmed that Rwandan troops would use force to defend civilians. The Sudan Tribune transcribed it as follows:

'Our forces will not stand by and watch innocent civilians being hacked to death like the case was here in 1994,' Kagame said, referring to United Nations troops who did not intervene as a genocide unfolded in Rwanda in 1994 because they didn't have a mandate to stop the slaughter of at least 500,000 minority Tutsis and political moderates from the Hutu majority.

'If it was established that the civilians are in danger, then our forces would certainly intervene and use force to protect civilians...I have no doubt that they certainly will intervene forcefully to protect civilians,' Kagame said. 'In my view, it does not make sense to give security to peace observers while the local population is left to die.'

'If the local population is continued to be killed, and we are prevented from intervening, then (we) will withdraw our troops from this mission,' Kagame said. 'The size of the forces asked for in my view is too small. One hundred and fifty people cannot go to bring peace to a country many times bigger than Rwanda.'⁴²²

This idea of giving peacekeepers a formal mandate to use force to stop attacks on civilians, commenced by the Rwandan government, later become successful. More than 96% of all UN peacekeepers are currently deployed to missions with Protection of Civilians mandates (POC), where Ethiopia contributes the most personnel (7,499) to UN peacekeeping missions with POC mandates. Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Bangladesh are the top three contributors of uniformed personnel to UN peacekeeping operations with the protection of civilians mandates as of April 2019.⁴²³

6.1.3 Third Generation – ENDF Engagement in 'African Solution for African Problems' (2003 - 2010)

In 1997, Salim Ahmed Salim, then Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), said:

⁴²² Sudan Tribune. "Rwandan president: Troops will use force if necessary in Darfur." 14 August 2004, <https://www.sudantribune.com/Rwandan-president-Troops-will-use,4722>, Accessed on 19 December 2019.

⁴²³ Center for Civilians in Conflict. "Trends in the Protection of Civilians through UN Peacekeeping Operations. #POC20 Series." May 29, 2019. <https://civiliansinconflict.org/blog/international-peacekeepers-day/>, Accessed on 02 January 2020.

The OAU Member States can no longer afford to stand aloof and expect the International Community to care more for our problems than we do, or indeed to find solutions to those problems which in many instances have been of our own making. The simple truth that we must confront today is that the world does not owe us a living, and we must remain at the forefront of efforts to act and act speedily to prevent conflicts from getting out of control.⁴²⁴

African Heads of States decided to establish a mechanism to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts in Africa at the 1993 Summit in Cairo, but just one year later, the Rwandan tragedy showed the weakness of OAU's conflict prevention and management.⁴²⁵ UN also acknowledged its failure in its 1999 report.⁴²⁶ After OAU changed to AU in 2002, it established the Peace and Security Council (PSC), a standing body of the AU with core functions to conduct early warning and preventive diplomacy, facilitate peace-making, and establish peace-support operations. Moreover, in certain circumstances, recommend intervention in the Member States to promote peace, security, and stability.⁴²⁷ After the establishment of PSC, AU started peacekeeping missions in Africa. In 2003, the first mission wholly initiated, planned, and executed by AU members, the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB), was deployed to Burundi.⁴²⁸ In 2004, the UN Security Council decided to establish UN Peace Operations in Burundi (ONUB), and AMIB troops were incorporated into the ONUB.⁴²⁹

⁴²⁴ Address by Salim Ahmed Salim, then Secretary-General of the OAU, at the Second Meeting of the Chiefs of Defense Staff of Member States of the OAU Central Organ, Harare, October 25, 1997. Cited in Malan, M. "Africa: Building Institutions on the Run". In Daniel, D. C. et al. (eds), *Peace Operations: Trends, Progress, and Prospects*. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2008. 90.

⁴²⁵ Murithi, T. "The African Union's Evolving Role in Peace Operations: the African Union Mission in Burundi, the African Union Mission in Sudan and the African Union Mission in Somalia". *African Security Review* 17/1. 2008. 72.

⁴²⁶ United Nations. "Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda". New York, UN. 1999. <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B%E2%80%A6/POC%20S19991257.pdf>, Accessed on 30 January 2017.

⁴²⁷ African Union Commission "Peace and Security Council (PSC)". 2017. <https://au.int/web/en/organs/psc>, Accessed on 23 January 2017.

⁴²⁸ Murithi, T. "The African Union's Evolving Role in Peace Operations: the African Union Mission in Burundi, the African Union Mission in Sudan and the African Union Mission in Somalia". *African Security Review* 17/1. 2008. 75.

⁴²⁹ Murithi, T. "The African Union's Evolving Role in Peace Operations: the African Union Mission in Burundi, the African Union Mission in Sudan and the African Union Mission in Somalia". *African Security Review* 17/1. 2008. 76.

The same year in September 2003, the UN established UNMIL in Liberia. Likewise, after the Darfur crisis in Sudan, AU set up a peacekeeping operation in 2004, the African Union Mission in Sudan. By 2007 the AU/UN Hybrid operation in Darfur was established by the Security Council and incorporated AMIS personnel.⁴³⁰ Furthermore, AMISOM⁴³¹ was created by the African Union's Peace and Security Council on 19 January 2007 with the approval of the United Nations. These trends of assuming the responsibility of securing peace and ensuring stability on the African continent by African states is the idea of African solutions for African problems, which is taken earnestly by Ethiopia, especially in the East African region.

6.1.3.1. The African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) and United Nations Peace Operations in Burundi (ONUB)

AMIB was mandated in 2003 by the OAU Central Organ of the Mechanism for conflict prevention, management, and resolution, which operated pending the creation of the AU PSC. The mission was to support and help the implementation of the efforts undertaken by Burundians to restore lasting peace and bring national reconciliation as provided under the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi⁴³² signed at Arusha in August 2000.⁴³³ From June 2004, AMIB was succeeded by UN mission ONUB. ONUB successfully completed its mandate on 31 December 2006 and was succeeded by the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB). Ethiopia sent a total of 2,747 contingents and five military observers. Brigadier General Gebre Ayele was the Deputy Force Commander of ONUB.

⁴³⁰ United Nations Security Council. "Security Council Authorizes deployment of United Nations African Union 'Hybrid' peace operation in Bid to resolve Darfur Conflict". Press Release, SC/9089, 31 July 2007. <http://www.un.org/press/en/2007/sc9089.doc.htm>, Accessed on 22 January 2017.

⁴³¹ Though AMISOM is considered as a third generation Ethiopian peacekeeping deployment, it will be covered under Ethiopian Hegemonic peacekeeping in section 6.1.

⁴³² The agreement was facilitated by former Presidents Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Nelson Mandela of South Africa and it ended 12 years of civil war dating back to Burundi's independence in 1960. The conflict was between Hutu rebels and the successive Tutsi-dominated regimes. The agreement was signed between the warring parties for power sharing formula to establish a more representative government and military.

⁴³³ United Nations. "Burundi – ONUB – Background". 2006. <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onub/background.html>, Accessed on 21 January 2017.

Rounds	Contingents	Commander	Manpower	Duration
1st	<i>Wigagen</i> Battalion	Col. Meley Amare	864	August 2003 – August 2004
2nd	109th Battalion	Col. Gebre GebreMariam	850	August 2004 – June 2005
3rd	33rd Battalion	Col. Negash Hiluf	841	June 2005 – March 2006
4th	1st Company	Col. Yiridaw GebreAnaniya	192	March 2006 – 2007
		Total	2,747	

Table 6.4 Ethiopian Participation in ONUB 2003-2007

6.1.3.2. United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)

UNMIL was established in September 2003 to support the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and the peace process, the humanitarian and human rights activities, as well as assist in national security reform, including national police training and formation of a new, restructured military force.⁴³⁴

A civil war broke out in Liberia in late 1989 between government forces and fighters of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), led by a former government official, Charles Taylor. In 1993 the Security Council established the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL). Later, in August 1997, Charles Taylor formed a new Government and announced a reconciliation and national unity policy. UNOMIL's principal objective was achieved, and its mission ceased. However, the Government and opposition party leaders failed to resolve their differences, and abuses of human rights continued, which contributed to the intensification of the civil war again.

In September 2003, the UN established UNMIL with 15,000 United Nations military personnel, including up to 250 military observers, 160 staff officers, and 1,115 UN police officers, aimed to

⁴³⁴ United Nations. "Support for the implementation of the Peace Process". 2016. <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmil/index.shtml>, Accessed on 21 January 2017.

assist in the maintenance of law and order throughout Liberia.⁴³⁵ Ethiopia has contributed with a total of 17,453 contingents and 17 military observers since December 2003, which meant eight brigades in nine shifts and one battalion.⁴³⁶

Rounds	Contingents	Sector Commander	Manpower	Duration
1st	87th Brigade	Brd. General Kemal Gelichu	1,784	December 2003 – September 2004
2nd	137th Brigade	Brd. General Tsegaye Tesema	2,548	October 2004 – June 2005
3rd	124th Brigade	Brd. General Seyoum Hefes	2,544	June 2005 – May 2006
4th	27th Brigade	Brd. General Berhanu Julia	2,511	May 2006 – October 2006
5th	23rd Brigade	Brd. General Alhadi Mohamed	1,798	October 2006 – June 2007
6th	20th Brigade	Brd. General Mulugeta Berihe	1,798	June 2007 – December 2007
7th	29th Brigade	Brd. General Temesgen Abebe	1,779	Decemebr 2007 – June 2008
8th	30th Brigade	Brd. General Abraha Arefe	1,779	June 2008 – January 2009
9th	20th Battalion	L. Col. Kiros WeldeSilasie	872	January 2009 -
		Total	17,453	

Table 6.5 Ethiopian Participation in UNMIL

⁴³⁵ United Nations. “UNAMIL – Background”. 2016. <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmil/background.shtml>, Accessed on 22 January 2017.

⁴³⁶ FDRE Peace Support Training Center Graduation booklet. Addis Ababa: Brana Publishing Co., 2015. 14.

6.1.3.3. African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)

A civil war erupted in Darfur in 2003 between the Government of Sudan, its allied militias, and other armed rebel groups. In 2006, the African Union deployed a peacekeeping mission to Sudan, which was replaced in 2008 by the African Union/UN Hybrid operation in Darfur, referred to by its acronym UNAMID, the second-largest UN Peacekeeping operation in the world.

Though the protection of civilians is its core mandate, it also makes humanitarian assistance and monitors and reports on the situation along the borders with Chad and the Central African Republic.⁴³⁷

Ethiopia began its mission in UNAMID in February 2008 by sending 11 troops and one military observer, and an entire battalion since 2009. Since 2017 it was one of the top three countries of the largest contributor to the mission. As of September 2019, Ethiopia contributed six experts on Mission, 821 contingent troops, 19 police, and five staff Officers; and a total of 18,901 personnel were deployed between 2009 and 2019.


Year	Division	Military			Civil			Others ⁴³⁸			Total
		Male	Fem.	Total	Male	Fem.	Total	Male	Fem.	Total	
2009	1 st Battalion	822	6	828	8	6	14	3	-	3	845
2010	2 nd Battalion	766	4	770	8	14	22	11	2	13	805
	3 rd Battalion	758	8	766	18	15	33	3	1	4	803
	4 th Battalion	764	10	774	17	15	32	2	10	12	818
2011	5 th Battalion	772	3	775	8	17	25	-	-	-	800
	6 th Battalion	778	1	775	4	17	21	-	-	-	796
2012	7 th Battalion	736	28	764	15	20	35	1	-	1	800
	8 th Battalion	768	8	776	-	11	11	6	6	12	799
2013	9 th Battalion	788	11	799	16	27	43	22	-	22	864
	10 th Battalion	747	23	770	5	2	7	13	7	20	797

⁴³⁷ United Nations. "Protecting civilians, facilitating humanitarian aid and helping political process in Darfur". 2016. <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unamid/index.shtml>, Accessed on 22 January 2017.

⁴³⁸ Others means Police Personnel and other Military and Civil Personnel of ENDF who are not under the payroll of EDRE-PSTC.

	11 th Battalion	699	9	708	-	-	-	15	15	30	738
2014	1 st Round QRF	173	-	173	1	1	2	1	1	2	177
	12 Battalion 12 th Round	688	35	723	1	18	19	38	9	47	789
	13 Battalion 13 th Round	689	9	698	11	4	15	11	78	87	800
	4 th Round Water drilling (26)	90	5	95	3	5	8	8	21	29	132
	14 th Battalion 14 th Round	685	16	701	-	15	15	61	23	84	800
2015	15 th Battalion 15 th Round	668	4	672	1	7	8	68	12	70	750
	16 th Battalion 16 th Round	597	9	606	-	1	1	149	45	193	800
	17 th Battalion 17 th Round	624	21	645	1	17	18	118	16	134	797
	5 th Battalion Water drilling (26)	76	7	83	6	3	9	14	-	14	106
2016 - 2017	18 th Battalion 18 th Round	712	8	720	5	9	14	41	21	62	796
	6 th Round Water drilling (26)	81	2	83	-	-	-	38	3	41	124
2017 - 2018	19 th Battalion 19 th Round	688	26	714	-	-	-	54	30	84	798
2017 - 2018	20 th Battalion 20 th Round	665	22	687	3	12	15	74	23	97	799
2017 - 2018	21 st Battalion 21 st Round	616	10	626	2	2	4	125	42	167	797
2018 - 2019	22 nd Battalion 22 nd Round	730	10	740	-	1	1	13	21	34	775
	23 rd Battalion 23 rd Round	722	12	734	13	4	17	37	14	51	800
	Total			17,208			389			1,304	18,901

Table 6.6 Ethiopian Participation in UNAMID until 2019



Map 6.1 Map Showing the Deployment in UNAMID⁴³⁹

6.1.3.4. United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI)

Ethiopia also has participated in missions in Côte d'Ivoire since 2006. The Security Council established UNOCI in April 2004 with a mandate to facilitate the implementation of the peace agreement signed by the Ivorian parties in January 2003.⁴⁴⁰ However, following the 2010 presidential election and political crisis, UNOCI has remained on the ground to protect civilians; provide good offices or mediation; support the Ivorian Government in disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants. As well as partaking in the security sector reform to monitor and promote human rights. Ethiopia's two military observers served in Côte d'Ivoire until December 2016.

⁴³⁹ OCHA. "UNAMID Deployment Map, September 2019." <https://reliefweb.int/map/sudan/unamid-deployment-map-september-2019>, Accessed on 07 January 2020.

⁴⁴⁰ United Nations. "Protecting civilians and supporting the Government in DDR and security sector reform". 2016. <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unoci/index.shtml>, Accessed on 22 January 2017.

6.1.3.5. United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT)

The Security Council authorize the deployment of a UN civilian and police operation, MINURCAT, on 25 September 2007, with a European Union military force (EUFOR), in order to contribute to the protection of civilians; promote human rights and the rule of law, and promote regional peace.⁴⁴¹ This is because more than 240,000 Sudanese refugees have fled to eastern Chad from the conflict in Darfur since 2003, joined by approximately 45,000 refugees from the Central African Republic (CAR). With the around 180,000 Chadians displaced by the civil war in the east of the country, which resulted in tensions among the region's communities.⁴⁴²

In January 2009, the Security Council authorized the deployment of a military component where Ethiopia deployed are nine males, four female Staff Officers, and two civilians total of 15 personnel. MINURCAT's mission completed in December 2010,

6.1.4 Fourth Generation – The Peacekeeper Army (Since 2011)

The two most significant developments in this post-2011 are founding the Ethiopian International Peacekeeping Training Center (EIPKTC), currently named (FRDE-PSTC) under the Ministry of Defense, Peacekeeping Main Department; and the exceptional deployment of ENDF to Abiye under UNISFA. Moreover, since 2011 Ethiopia has participated in six missions. In the Caribbean, MINUSTAH, in Mali MINUSMA and Continued missions Liberia UNMIL, two ongoing missions in South Sudan and Sudan, UNMISS and UNAMID respectively, and in Yemen, which is an essential geopolitical state for Ethiopia and the Horn.

Type of Deployment	Police	UN Military Experts on Mission (UNMEM)	Troops	Staff Officers	Total
Number	66	99	7,294	112	7,571

Table 6.7 Ethiopian Contributors to UN Peacekeeping Operations as of January 2019

⁴⁴¹ United Nations. "MINURCAT Background." <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/minurcat/background.shtml>, Accessed on 12 December 2019.

⁴⁴² Ibid.

Mission	Type of Deployment	Number
MINUSMA	Staff Officer	1
UNAMID	Contingent	864
	Expert on Mission	4
	Individual Police	27
	Staff Officer	5
UNISFA	Contingent	3,905
	Expert on Mission	55
	Individual Police	10
	Staff Officer	55
UNMISS	Contingent	1,976
	Expert on Mission	14
	Individual Police	24
	Staff Officer	23
UNMHA	Expert on Mission	1
	Total	7,571

Table 6.8 Ethiopian Contributors to UN Peacekeeping Operations under Department of Peace Operations and to Political Missions under the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA) as of January 2019

Though Ethiopia has a long experience of deployment in peacekeeping, there was a gap and need for specific knowledge and training and strengthening the capacity of middle and senior-level military, police, and civilian officers to effectively deliver complete their AU and UN peacekeeping mandates. The EIPKTC objectives are: to enhanced institutional capacity for applied research, conflict analysis, training design that address regional Peace Support Operations (PSO) needs as well as peace and security policy development at the regional level; to improved regional, multi-national, and multi-dimensional PSO capability of civilian personnel to address the evolving peace and security situations; to the increased capacity of regional

police deployed in PSO in Eastern Africa or wider Africa; to enhanced regional standby capacity of civilian experts for peacekeeping missions and peacebuilding elements of the East African Security Forces.⁴⁴³ The center offers 28 courses on a range of topics including protection of civilians, conflict management, civil-military coordination and mediation. Since its inception, it has trained more than 6,000 people, and about 32% of whom from other African countries.

The center was established with the support of UNDP with finance received from the Government of Japan. Besides organizing international peace support forums, the center regularly provides training on peace and security for military officers around and beyond the Horn of Africa states.⁴⁴⁴ The Ethiopian troop deployment in AMISOM is also considered as the Fourth Generation Peacekeeping; however, it will be discussed in the next subtopic, ‘Hegemonic-Peacekeeping: Ethiopia in Somalia’.

FRDE-PSTC has also Contingent Training School in Hurso in the Somali Regional state about 400 kilometers east of the capital Addis Ababa. The training school offers pre-deployment classroom and field training for three months, including special courses such as logistics or combat medicine; and mission-specific courses for the unique circumstances of Somalia, South Sudan or Darfur.⁴⁴⁵

According to Christopher Clapham’s assessment of the peacekeeping operations in the Horn of Africa and the role of Ethiopia, he argues as follows:

One key element in the new politics of regional conflict management has been supporting peacekeeping forces, both in Somalia and Sudan. In Somalia, such forces have proved extremely problematic and as likely to promote conflict as to resolve it. In the two Sudan, they have been rather more beneficial, though without being able to create the bases for any lasting settlement to the conflict in South Sudan. Ethiopia’s principal contribution has

⁴⁴³ UNDP Ethiopia. “Ethiopian International Peace Keeping Training Centre.” https://www.et.undp.org/content/ethiopia/en/home/operations/projects/democratic_governance/project_EIPKTCentre.html, Accessed on 23 January 2020.

⁴⁴⁴ Interview with the Commandant of the EIPKTC, Brigadier General Habtamu Tilahun, Addis Ababa, 09 August, 2017.

⁴⁴⁵ Interview with Colonel Alemayehu Abera Deputy Commandant and Head of Training at Hurso Peacekeeping Training School, Hurso, Somali Regional State, Ethiopia, 01 October 2019.

been to provide the vast majority of peacekeepers patrolling the Abyei frontier zone between Sudan and South Sudan, where its disciplined and efficient armed forces appear to have done a very competent job.⁴⁴⁶

6.1.4.1. UNISFA, United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei

It took the United Nations Security Council just five minutes to unanimously agree to send 4,200 Ethiopian troops to Abyei as a peacekeeping force.⁴⁴⁷ UNISFA's establishment came in June 2011, after the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) reached an agreement in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to demilitarize Abyei. Both sides claimed the region and let Ethiopian troops monitor the area under the 'Temporary Arrangements for the Administration and Security of the Abyei Area.'⁴⁴⁸ Under that deal, brokered by former South African President Thabo Mbeki, the two sides agreed on the need for a third party to monitor the flashpoint border between the North and South. UNISFA's mandate is monitoring the border between the two countries and facilitating humanitarian aid delivery; moreover, it is authorized to use force in protecting civilians and humanitarian workers in Abyei. Security Council Resolution 1990 states "authorizing the use of force to protect civilians and humanitarian workers in Abyei." UNISFA is exceptional for the reason that, unlike most peacekeeping missions in the world, it is almost entirely composed of Ethiopian peace troops.

As of January 2020, 35 countries sent their military and police personnel a total of 3,772 to the mission. Ethiopia contributed a total of 3,642 personnel, Experts 79, Police 5, Staff 69, and Contingent 3,489, which is 96.5 % of the peacekeepers in the mission. The 35 other states contributed only 130 military and police personnel.⁴⁴⁹ Besides, the fact that both parties requested the Ethiopian force at the Addis Ababa Agreement on Abyei expressed the trust which Ethiopia enjoys in both Khartoum and Juba. The highest-ranking female officer in the UN Peacekeeping was Briga-

⁴⁴⁶ Clapham, Christopher. *The Horn of Africa: State formation and Decay*. Hurst & Company: London, 2017. p. 182.

⁴⁴⁷ McConnell, Tristan. "UN clears Ethiopia for Abyei deployment." 28 June 2011. <https://www.pri.org/stories/2011-06-28/un-clears-ethiopia-abyei-deployment>, Accessed on 10 January 2019.

⁴⁴⁸ United Nations. "UNISFA – Background". 2016. <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unisfa/background.shtml>, Accessed on 22 January 2017.

⁴⁴⁹ United Nations. "Troop and Police Contribution." https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/3_country_and_mission_16.pdf, Accessed on 20 March 2020.

dier General Zewdu Kiros Gebrekidan, an Ethiopian who was appointed as Deputy Force Commander of UNISFA in the mid of 2016. Both Head of Mission and Force Commander and Deputy Force Commander are Ethiopians. As of September 2019, 3871 Contingent troops, 80 Experts on Mission, 5 Police, and 80 Staff Officers; a total of 4,036.⁴⁵⁰

No.	Name	Time	Note
1	Lieutenant-General Tadesse Werede Tesfay	July 2011 – January 2013	-
2	Major-General Yohannes Gebremeskel Tesfamariam	March 2013 – June 2014	Former FDRE’s Commissioner for the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE). Also Force Commander at UNMISS in June 2014 - June 2016)
3	Lieutenant-General Birhanu Jula Gelalcha	November 2014 – January 2016	In 2005, he was a Sector Commander in the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). Currently General and Deputy Chief of Staff & military operations division head of (ENDF)
4	Major-General Hassen Ebrahim Mussa,	January 2016 – January 2017	Sector Commander North in the African Union-UN Mission in Darfur, UNAMID
5	Major-General Tesfay Gidey Hailemichael	February 2017 – April 2018	-
6	Major General Gebre Adhana Woldezzgu	April 2018 –April 2019	-
7	Major General Mehari Zewde Gebremariam	February 2019 – July 2020	-
8	Maj Gen. Kefyalew Amde Tessema	June 2020 – Present	In 2015, he served as an African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) Sector Commander in Somalia.

Table 6.9 UNISFA’s Force Commanders since the beginning of the Mission


UNISFA is run by a Head of Mission and a Force Commander. In the operation's initial years, these positions were held by the same person, but since 2014 they have been split between two people.

No.	Head of Mission Name	Time	Note
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⁴⁵⁰ United Nations. “Contributions by country and mission.” September 2019. https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/4_mission_and_country.pdf. Accessed on 12 January 2020.

1	Lieutenant-General Tadesse Werede Tesfay	July 2011 – January 2013	
2	Lieutenant-General Yohannes Gebremeskel Tesfamariam	March 2013 – June 2014	
3	Major-General Halefom Ejigu Moges	2014 – 2015	Acting Head of Mission
4	Haile Tilahun Gebremariam (Brigadier-General Retired)	January 2015 – 2020	
6	Maj Gen. Kefyalew Amde Tessema	2020 – Present	Acting Head of Mission

Table 6.10 UNISFA's Head of Mission since the beginning of the Mission



Map 6.2 Map Showing the Deployment in UNISFA⁴⁵¹

⁴⁵¹ OCHA. "UNISFA, May 2019." 17 May 2019 <https://reliefweb.int/map/south-sudan/unisfa-may-2019>, Accessed on 20 December 2019.

Year	Division	Military			Civilian			Others ⁴⁵²			Total
		Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	
2011	1 st Battalion	827	5	832	8	19	27	6	8	14	873
2012	2 nd Battalion	813	8	821	8	15	23	12	6	18	862
	3 rd Battalion	808	14	822	4	17	21	15	4	19	862
	4 th Battalion	786	10	796	4	12	16	23	11	34	846
	5 th Battalion	764	13	777	5	12	17	57	11	68	862
	6 th Battalion	803	9	812	1	18	19	23	9	32	863
	Armored 1 st Round	130	2	132	-	6	6	-		-	138
	Artillery 1 st Round	136	-	136	-	3	3	-	1	1	140
	Staff Officer & Signal	88	2	90	4	5	9	37	16	53	152
	Light Engineer	79	4	83	3	2	5	-	2	2	90
	De-Mining	51	1	52	-	-	-	4	4	8	60
	Level II Hospital	37	13	50	4	9	13	-	-	-	63
	QRF	173	-	173	-	1	1	-	1	1	175
	Utility Helicopter	75	3	78	3	4	7	-	1	1	86
	Multi Role Logistics	207	9	216	11	10	21	9	4	13	250
	2 nd Round Light Engineer	111	1	112	3	4	7	-	-	-	119
	2 nd Round Armored	66	-	66	-	-	-	1	1	2	68
	2 nd Round Artillery	66	-	66	-	-	-	-	-	-	66
2013	2 nd Round Staff Officer and Signal	138	11	149	5	6	11	2	7	9	169
	2 nd Round Level II Hospital	35	13	48	5	8	13	-	-	-	61
	2 nd Round Multi Role Logistics	207	5	212	3	5	8	18	1	19	239

⁴⁵² Others means Police Personnel and other Military and Civil Personnel of ENDF who are not under the payroll of EDRE-PSTC.

	2 nd Round QRF	168	1	169	1	1	2	1	1	2	173
	2 nd Round Utility Helicopter	73	1	74	-	-	-	7	5	12	86
	3 rd Round Multi Role Logistics	177	13	190	11	14	25	28	2	30	245
	3 rd Round Staff Officer and Sig-nal	52	3	55	-	7	7	9	1	10	72
	3 rd Round Level II Hospital	32	13	45	4	9	13	2	1	3	61
	3 rd Round Armored	136	-	136	-	2	2	-	2	2	140
	3 rd Round Artillery	128	-	128	-	3	3	-	3	3	134
	3 rd Round Light Engineer	105	7	112	2	2	4	-	5	5	121
2014	7 th Battalion 3 rd Round	775	5	780	-	9	9	34	25	59	848
	3 rd Round QRF	166	1	167	1	1	2	6	1	7	176
	8 th Battalion 3 rd Round	749	10	759	-	2	2	33	28	61	822
	9 th Battalion 3 rd Round	821	27	848	6	7	13	28	4	32	893
2015	3 rd Round Utility Helicopter	70	5	75	5	2	7	2	0	2	84
	Border Security (402) 1 st Round	100	3	103	-	5	5	-	-	-	108
	Border Security (402) 2 nd Round	10	483	493	6	16	22	16	27	43	558
	10 th Battalion 4 th Round	689	12	701	-	3	3	69	11	80	784
	4 th Round Armored	103	1	104	-	1	1	5	-	5	110
	4 th Round Multi Role Logistics	49	7	56	12	14	26	40	-	40	122
	4 th Round Artillery	123	-	123	-	-	-	7	-	7	130
	4 th Round Level 2 Hospital	23	16	39	9	10	19	-	-	-	58
	4 th Round Light Engineer	143	3	146	2	-	2	22	-	22	170
	4 th Round Quick Reaction Force (QRF)	146	1	147	-	2	2	13	-	13	162

	4 th Round Utility Helicopter	67	2	67	8	6	14	-	1	1	82
	Staff and Signal 4 th Round	140	9	149	1	4	5	18	4	22	176
	11 th Battalion 4 th Round	749	15	764	10	4	14	46	21	67	845
	12 th Battalion 4 th Round	654	4	658	-	3	3	181	20	201	862
2016	5 th Round Artillery	136	1	137	-	-	-	1	2	3	140
	5 th Round Armored	129	-	129	-	-	-	2	5	7	136
	5 th Round Light Engineer	113	3	116	-	-	-	2	2	4	120
	5 th Round Multi Role Logistics	132	15	147	12	11	23	54	6	60	230
	Staff Officers & Signal 5 th Round	54	9	63	-	-	-	3	4	7	70
2017	13 th Battalion 5 th Round	764	5	769	1	6	7	52	19	71	847
	14 th Battalion 5 th Round	753	20	773	4	14	18	72	11	83	874
	QRF 5 th Round	134	1	135	2	4	6	33	-	33	174
	Level II Hospital 5 th Round	29	18	47	5	7	12	2	1	3	62
	15 th Battalion 5 th Round	854	14	868	1	6	7	64	22	86	961
	16 th Battalion 5 th Round	707	30	737	1	4	5	81	29	110	852
	Border Security (402) 3 rd Round	479	14	493	2	14	16	36	15	51	560
	17 th Battalion 6 th Round	596	16	613	-	4	4	224	42	266	883
2017 - 2018	18 th Battalion 6 th Round	687	5	692	2	6	8	134	33	167	867
	6 th Round Artillery	127	2	129	-	-	-	6	4	10	139
	6 th Round Armored	120	2	122	-	-	-	9	2	11	133
	6 th Round Multi Role Logistics	163	16	179	9	10	19	36	10	46	244
	6 th Round Light Engineer	93	4	97	-	2	2	20	1	21	120

	QRF 6 th Round	93	-	93	-	-	-	76	6	82	175
2017/18 -2019	6 th Round Utility Helicopter	75	1	76	4	6	10				86
	Level II Hospital 6 th Round	30	14	44	1	6	7	4	5	9	60
	Staff & Signal 6 th Round	145	11	156	1	3	4	6	12	17	177
	Border Security (402) 3 rd Round	487	22	509	1	5	6	18	24	42	557
	7 th Round Artillery	134	-	134	2	1	3	-	3	3	140
	7 th Round Armored	131	3	134				-	4		138
	7 th Light Engineer	104	5	109	3	1	4	5	2	7	120
	7 th Round Multi Role Logistics	164	18	182	7	5	12	29	16	45	239
	19 Battalion 6 th Round	304	5	309	-	1	1	7	5	12	322
	Total			21,110			590			2,226	23,930

Table 6.11 Military and Civilian Personnel who were deployed and Finished their Deployment in UNISFA up to 2019

Since the deployment of UNISFA, the condition in Abyei remained calm, and no major violent clashes had happened. This showed that a UN mission could quickly establish security in its mandated area if it has sufficient strength and leadership. Unlike other missions in the region, in UNISFA's case, the task is made easier as the force is entirely Ethiopian with a single line of command.⁴⁵³ Using the words of Chris Johnson to conclude as follows:

The involvement of Ethiopian troops in UNISFA is unprecedented; a neighboring power invited by both Sudan and South Sudan to provide an interposition force to keep the peace between them. This is seen as evidence of Ethiopia's good relations with both states and its neutral position in the conflict, and Ethiopia takes pride in this regional role. UNISFA is viewed as a success story and has shown Ethiopia that it is not only possible but 'a good thing' to contribute troops to a peace operation in a neighboring country.⁴⁵⁴

6.1.4.2 UNMISS, United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan

South Sudan became the newest country in the world on 9 July 2011 after a six-year peace process, which began with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005 between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), which ended more than 20 years of war. The United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) supported the implementation of the CPA.

The Security Council established UNMISS to consolidate peace and security and to help to establish conditions for development in the new country. However, in December 2013, violence broke out in South Sudan's capital, Juba, and quickly spread to other locations in the country, resulting in a deep nation-wide political and security crisis. Following the crisis that broke out in May 2014, the Security Council decided to reinforce UNMISS and reprioritized its mandate towards protecting civilians, human rights monitoring, and support for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the implementation of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement.

Ethiopia has contributed fifteen police officers since December 2008, which was the first Police deployment for Ethiopia for UNMIS, and when UNMIS was deployed in South Sudan, it also began sending its police officers. By February 2017, it sent 23 police officers, 11 military experts, and 1,277 contingent troops, becoming the second-largest contributor, only behind India.

⁴⁵³ Johnson, C. Peacemaking and Peacekeeping: Reflections from Abyei. *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.19, No.5, November 2012. 640–654.


⁴⁵⁴ Ibid.

As of September 2019, 2,091 Contingent Troops, 17 Experts on Mission, 20 Police, and 30 Staff Officers; a total of 2,158.

Year	Division	Military			Civil			Others ⁴⁵⁵			Total
		Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	
2006	1st Battalion 1 st Round	507	5	512	5	7	12	37	29	66	590
	2st Battalion 1 st Round	593	6	599	3	12	15	1	8	9	623
2008 - 2009	3rd Battalion 2 nd Round	538	1	539	4	12	16	22	6	28	583
	4th Battalion 2 nd Round	514	14	528	6	4	10	67	21	88	626
2008 - 2009	5 th Battalion 3 rd Round	494	29	523	1	11	12	44	24	68	603
	6 th Battalion 3 rd Round	545	10	555	4	5	9	47	29	76	640
2010 - 2011	7th Battalion 4 th Round										
	8th Battalion 4 th Round	566	5	571	3	6	9	9	14	23	604
	9 th Battalion 5 th Round	579	19	598	1	1	2	11	24	35	635
	Total			4425			85			393	4,904

Table 6.12 Military and Civilian Personnel who were deployed and Finished their Deployment in UN-MISS

⁴⁵⁵ Others means Police Personnel and other Military and Civil Personnel of ENDF who are not under the payroll of EDRE-PSTC.



Map 6.3 Map Showing the Deployment in UNMISS⁴⁵⁶

6.1.4.3 MINUSMA, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

The Security Council established MINUSMA in April 2013 to support political processes and assist the re-establishment of state authority, the rebuilding of the security sector, and the promotion and protection of human rights in Mali.⁴⁵⁷ As of January 2020, Ethiopia has only one Staff Officer in MINUSMA. This is basically the luck of military and police personnel with the skill of the French language.

6.1.4.4 MINUSTAH, United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

MINUSTAH was established in June 2004 after an armed conflict that forced President Aristide to exile. Its original mandate was to support the Transitional Government in ensuring a

⁴⁵⁶ OCHA. "South Sudan: UNMISS, September 2019." September 2019. <https://reliefweb.int/map/south-sudan/south-sudan-unmiss-september-2019>, Accessed on 20 December 2019.

⁴⁵⁷ United Nations. "Supporting political process and helping stabilize Mali". 2016. <http://www.un.org/en/peace-keeping/missions/minusma/index.shtml>, Accessed on 22 January 2017

secure and stable environment, to assist in monitoring, restructuring, and reforming the Haitian National Police and demobilization and reintegration programs. However, the devastating earthquake of January 2010 forced MINUSTAH to increase its commitment. Ethiopia has been deploying police officers since 2015, and currently, there are eight of them serving in MINUSTAH.

6.1.4.5 UNMHA, United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement

Ethiopia has only one Expert on a Mission since June 2019; out of 30 nations, most of them send a single expert or police to the mission of a total of 37 personnel. Only Police and Experts are present in the mission.⁴⁵⁸ Under the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, following the Stockholm Agreement, reached in Sweden on 13 December 2018, between the Government of Yemen and the Houthis, the Security Council in its resolution 2451 (2018), authorized the establishment and deployment of an advance team to monitor and support the immediate implementation of the ceasefire and redeployment of forces from the city of Hudaydah and the ports of Hudaydah, Saleef, and Ras Isa.⁴⁵⁹ On 16 January 2019, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution S/2019/2452, authorizing the establishment of a new Special Political Mission, the United Nations Mission, to support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA).⁴⁶⁰

6.2 Hegemonic Peacekeeping: Ethiopia in Somalia and its Unilateral Interventions

Ethiopia is undoubtedly the hegemonic state in the Horn of Africa, especially concerning its role in Somalia.⁴⁶¹ Ethiopian first unilateral action in Somalia was in 1995 to remove the Islamic insurgent, Al-Ittihad Al-Islamiya (AIAI). In 1998 Ethiopia launched a second military intervention at the time of the Ethio-Eritrean war, following Eritrea's effort—in collaboration with a Baidoa-based Somali warlord Hussein Aideed and involving the OLF and the ONLF to open a second front against it.⁴⁶² Ethiopia's third intervention was in 2006, against the threat from the Islamic

⁴⁵⁸ United Nations. *Troop and Police Contribution*. https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/3_country_and_mission_16.pdf, Accessed on 20 March 2020.

⁴⁵⁹ UNDPPA. "UNMHA, Hudaydah Agreement." 16 January 2019. <https://dppa.un.org/en/mission/unmha-hudaydah-agreement>, Accessed on 11 November 2019.

⁴⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁶¹ Malito, D. *The Persistence of State Disintegration in Somalia Between Regional and Global Intervention*. Doctoral Thesis. Università degli studi di Milano, 18 March 2013.

⁴⁶² Beyene, Abdeta D. and Seyoum Mesfin. The Practicalities of Living with Failed States. *The American Academy of Arts & Sciences*. 147 (1) Winter 2018. 129.

Courts Union (ICU) and supporting the Somali Transitional Federal Government. Lastly, Ethiopia joined AMISOM in 2014, simultaneously deploying troops outside the AMISOM command to support its troops under AMISOM.

Nevertheless, Ethiopian intervention in Somalia has been contentious. Napoleon A. Bamfo described it as ‘Ethiopia’s invasion of Somalia in late 2006 may go down in history as one of the most daring if not imprudent strategic decisions any African government has made on its neighbor.’⁴⁶³ The online media in Sudan covered it as ‘A US diplomatic cable published by the Wikileaks whistle-blowing organization has exposed that Ethiopia and the US government had secret agreement to invade Somalia.’⁴⁶⁴ The Somali-based Horn Observer stated, ‘Ethiopia has a long and ugly history of perennially intervening in Somalia to weaken the political independence of the country and to pursue narrow political objectives’; commenting about Ethiopian Non-AMISOM troops in Somalia.⁴⁶⁵ However, on the other hand, the then-sited Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, in an interview with an Aljazeera news channel, said, ‘did not invade Somalia. We were invited by the duly constituted government of Somalia, the internationally recognized government of Somalia, to assist them in averting the threat of terrorism.’⁴⁶⁶

Some also argued Ethiopian interventions are based on the ‘the inherent right to self-defense, a terrorist threat, intervention by invitation, and the protection of the right to self-determination of the Ethiopian Somalis.’⁴⁶⁷ Terry Mays also stated on the Somali intervention condition: ‘Western states were not eager to return to Somalia. If a peacekeeping mission were required to

⁴⁶³ Bamfo, Napoleon A. Ethiopia’s invasion of Somalia in 2006: Motives and lessons learned. *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations* Vol. 4/2, 055-065. February 2010.

⁴⁶⁴ Sudan Tribune. “Wikileaks: US behind Ethiopia invasion in Somalia.” Sudantribune.com, 6 December 2010. <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article37189>, Accessed 15 July 2020.

⁴⁶⁵ Horn Observer. *FNPF Statement on the presence of Non-AMISOM troops in Somalia*. 16 June 2020. <https://hornobserver.com/articles/456/FNP-Statement-on-the-presence-of-Non-AMISOM-troops-in-Somalia>, Accessed 5 July 2019.

⁴⁶⁶ Al Jazeera English. “Talk to Jazeera - Meles Zenawi - 18 March 2007 - Part 1.” May 2007. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EZh3ppcedBc>, Accessed 20 November 2019.

⁴⁶⁷ Dawit, G. cited in Yihdego, Zeray W. Ethiopia's Military Action against the Union of Islamic Courts and Others in Somalia: Some Legal Implications. *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, Vol. 56, No. 3 July, 2007. 668.

support a new national government, it would have to be one mandated and fielded by African countries.’⁴⁶⁸

Generally, Ethiopia’s extended intervention in Somalia in the name of intervention can be considered as ‘hegemonic peacekeeping.’ Carolyn M. Shaw and Julius O. Ihonvber called the Nigerian participation in the regional peacekeeping force, ECOMOG, in Liberia as ‘hegemonic participation in peacekeeping.’⁴⁶⁹ Similarly, Adekeye Adebajo asserted Nigeria’s case from 1990-1998 and the United States in 1993 in their interventionists in Liberia and Somalia, respectively, as hegemonic peacekeeping. Adebajo defined hegemonic peacekeeping as follows:

Hegemonic peacekeeping’ is a situation in which a powerful state with strong global or regional interests is able to deploy a preponderance of troops in a bid to manage a conflict and is able to convince other states to accept its leadership of the mission. By shouldering a greater military and financial burden, a ‘hegemonic’ peacekeeper is able to exert disproportionate influence over military and political decisions regarding the mission.⁴⁷⁰

Since the beginning of AMISOM, peacekeepers from the region were relied on Ethiopian soldiers to provide the bulk of the security functions required to keep the Transitional Federal Government safe in its compounds and counter-attacks from Somali factions.⁴⁷¹ This shows Ethiopia’s hegemonic military burden and leadership. This is because ‘Ethiopian troops know the land, they are

⁴⁶⁸ Mays, Terry. The African Union’s African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM): Why did it Successfully Deploy following the failure of the IGAD Peace Support Mission to Somalia (IGASOM)? A Thesis Presented in Partial Completion of the Requirements of the Certificate-of-Training in United Nations Peace Support Operations. Peace Operation Training Institute. 2009

⁴⁶⁹ Shaw, Carolyn M. and Julius O. Ihonvber Hegemonic Participation in Peacekeeping Operations: The Case of Nigeria and ECOMOG. *International Journal on World Peace*, Vol. 13, No. 2 June 1996. 31-66

⁴⁷⁰ Adebajo, Adekeye. In Search of Warlords: Hegemonic Peacekeeping in Liberia and Somalia, *International Peacekeeping*, 10:4, 2003. 63-64. Adebajo also gave the example of Nigerian-led missions in Chad (1979-82) and Sierra Leone (1997-2000), and American-led missions in Haiti (1994), and Bosnia (post-1995), the Australian-led mission in East Timor (1999) and the South African-led mission in Burundi (2002).

⁴⁷¹ Mays, Terry. The African Union’s African Mission in Somalia... 2009

used to the temperatures, they are the only ones who have previous experience fighting both guerilla and conventional warfare.⁴⁷² In addition to that, Ethiopia was able to pursue its regional interests multilaterally, mainly through a dominant role in IGAD.⁴⁷³

Adekeye Adebajo also argues a ‘major criterion for a mission to be defined as hegemonic peacekeeping is multilateral as opposed to unilateral intervention. As a sheriff, the lead state must be able to rally a posse of allies to undertake the intervention.’⁴⁷⁴ Hence, though Ethiopia took the first intervention action unilaterally, there was the support of the United States,⁴⁷⁵ African Union,⁴⁷⁶ and Ethiopian troops were fighting al-Shabaab with Kenyan, Ugandan, and Burundian troops under AMSISOM even before it joined AMISOM.⁴⁷⁷ Also, it is Ethiopian unilateral intervention in 2006 transformed into a multilateral intervention in 2009. Thus, Ethiopian intervention in Somalia qualifies as hegemonic peacekeeping under Adekeye Adebajo's definition. The following are four Ethiopian interventions in Somalia.

6.2.1 The 1995 Intervention against Al-Ittihad Al-Islamiya (AIAI)

Al-Ittihad al-Islamiya (AIAI) was one of Somalia's largest militant Islamic organization rose to power in the early 1990s through established in early 1980s. AIAI began its alliance with Al-Qaida in 1993 and was getting substantial funds from Osama bin Laden.⁴⁷⁸ It was also involved

⁴⁷² France24.com. Ethiopian troop withdrawal from Somalia exposes peacekeeping problems. 15 December 2016. <https://www.france24.com/en/20161215-ethiopian-troops-withdraw-highlighting-peacekeeping-internationally-funded-peacekeeping>, Accessed on 23 December 2019.

⁴⁷³ Maru, Mehari T. *Ethiopia's Regional Diplomacies: A Dominant Interpretation of the Horn of Africa*. South African Foreign Policy and African Drivers Programme. South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), Policy Briefing 112. October 2014.

⁴⁷⁴ Adebajo, Adekeye. In Search of Warlords: Hegemonic Peacekeeping in Liberia and Somalia, *International Peacekeeping*, 10:4, 2003. 64.

⁴⁷⁵ Whitlock, Craig. *U.S. drone base in Ethiopia is operational*. 27 October, 2011 https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-drone-base-in-ethiopia-is-operational/2011/10/27/gIQAzNk-wMM_story.html, Accessed on 12 June 2020.

⁴⁷⁶ Al Jazeera English. *Talk to Jazeera - Meles Zenawi - 18 March 2007 - Part 1*. May 2007. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EZh3ppcedBc>, Accessed 20 November 2019.

⁴⁷⁷ Kenyan Defense Forces. *War for Peace: Kenya's Military in the African Mission in Somalia, 2012-2020*. Nairobi: Kenyan Ministry of Defense. 2020. 56-57

⁴⁷⁸ United Nations Security Council. “Al-Ittihad al-Islamiya (AIAI).” https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/entity/al-itihaad-al-islamiya/aiai, Accessed 20 November 2019.

with Al-Qaida's bombing of the United States Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998.⁴⁷⁹ Ideologically, it was a pan-Somali and pan-Islamic agenda, aiming to establish an Islamic state in the Horn of Africa, forcing the Ethiopian Somali State or Ogaden's secession.⁴⁸⁰ AIAI also made several terrorist attacks against Ethiopia allied with the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), then a separatist group.⁴⁸¹ The Ethiopian army mounted an attack on AIAI inside Somalia, killing most of its leaders and destroying its military and political infrastructures, which led to the organization's formal disintegration in 1997.⁴⁸²

6.2.2 The 2004 Intervention against Islamic Courts Union (ICU)⁴⁸³

In early 2000, a group of court leaders from Mogadishu formed the *Sharia* Implementation Council (SIC) or Joint Islamic Courts Council to unify and coordinate the various courts. It started to issue a *fatwa* (religious judgments) like the celebration of New Year as an offense that is punishable by death. They started shutting down cinemas as an 'alternative means of governance to Somalia through sharia law... away from factional politics based around clan loyalty.'⁴⁸⁴ On the other hand, in 2006, the ICU restored security in Mogadishu and south-central Somalia, where they had effective control; however, it was not accepted internationally due to close links with al-Qaida.⁴⁸⁵

⁴⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁰ Metaferia, Getachew. *Ethiopia and the United States: History, Diplomacy, and Analysis*. New York: Algora publishing, 2009, 93.

⁴⁸¹ Woldeselase, Woldemicael. *Terrorism in Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa: Threat, Impact and Response*. Addis Ababa: Rehoboth Printers, 2010, 132-135.

⁴⁸² Kenyan Defense Forces. *War for Peace: Kenya's Military in the African Mission in Somalia, 2012-2020*. Nairobi: Kenyan Ministry of Defense. 2020. 39

⁴⁸³ Parts of this section is from the authors article Sigatu, Kaleab T. 'Asymmetric Warfare against the Islamic Militant Group al-Shabaab in Somalia—The Ethiopian Experience'. In Ámos Peter Kiss. *Asymmetric Warfare: Conflict of the Past, the Present, and the Future*. Conference Proceeding. Hungarian Defense Forces General Staff Scientific Research Centre. Budapest, 9–10 November 2016. 235 – 247. <http://hvktkh.hm.gov.hu/kiadvanyok/dokumentumok/asymmetricwar.pdf>, Accessed 20 November 2019.

⁴⁸⁴ Barnes, Cedric & Harun Hassan. The Rise and Fall of Mogadishu's Islamic Courts. *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 1:2, 2007. 160.

⁴⁸⁵ Seifert, Matthias. "The Ethiopian Intervention in Somalia: Theoretical Perspectives". In Bruchhaus, Eva-Maria and Monika M. Sommer. *Hot Spot Horn of Africa Revisited: Approaches to Make Sense of Conflict*. London: Transaction Publishers, 2008, 29.

At the same time, in 2004, IGAD set up the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to restore peace and order in Somalia.⁴⁸⁶ The TFG was formed in November 2004 in Kenya with the adoption of Transitional Federal Parliament, Transitional Federal Charter, and Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed's election as President of Somalia and head of the TFG and the new parliament first met inside Somalia in 2006. Also, the UN Security Council Resolution 1725 unanimously passed that characterized the TFG as 'the only route to achieving peace and stability in Somalia.'⁴⁸⁷ However, ICU became the major challenge for the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) which is only confined to the town of Baidoa.

Islamic Courts Union then started a war against TFG. Suicide bombers attacked the weak Transitional Federal government; also, it runs terror training camps, courted foreign fighters, and released videos through al Qaeda's propaganda arm.⁴⁸⁸ Sheikh Ahmed Sharif, the ICU leader, called for the creation of a 'greater Somalia' in the horn of Africa, saying 'we will leave no stone unturned to integrate our Somali brothers in Kenya and Ethiopia and restore their freedom to live with their ancestors in Somalia.'⁴⁸⁹

In the meantime, Abdullahi Yusuf, on his first foreign visit to Ethiopia, asked 20,000 Ethiopian forces to strengthen his government, which was based in Baidoa.⁴⁹⁰ The ICU, which has already declared itself as Ethiopia's enemy by their irredentist policy, makes the Ethiopian government ardently accept the invitation and launch a large-scale offensive attack. The Ethiopian Parliament also authorized the Government to take all legal and necessary measures against the ICU. Also, AU supported Ethiopian intervention; the deputy chairman of the AU Commission, Patrick Mazimhaka, said Ethiopia 'given us ample warning that it feels threatened by the Union of Islamic

⁴⁸⁶ Sabala, Kizito. "Regional and extra-regional inputs in promoting (in) security in Somalia". In Sharamo, Roba and Berouk Mesfin (eds), *Regional Security in the post-Cold War Horn of Africa*. Addis Ababa: Central Printing Press, 2011, 100.

⁴⁸⁷ UN Security Council. "Security Council Approves African Protection, Training Mission in Somalia, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1175 (2006)." 6 December 2006. <http://www.un.org/press/en/2006/sc8887.doc.htm>, Accessed 28 November 2016

⁴⁸⁸ Roggio, Bill. "Former Islamic Courts Leader elected president of Somalia." January 31, 2009. http://www.long-warjournal.org/archives/2009/01/former_islamic_court.php, Accessed on 28 November 2016.

⁴⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁰ BBC. "Somalia: Who supports who?" 28 December 2006. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/5092586.stm>, Accessed on 28 November 2016.

Courts' and also the international community has the responsibility of supporting the TFG.⁴⁹¹ On December 28, 2006, Ethiopian and TFG forces captured the capital of Somalia, Mogadishu. The Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi said, 'Our patience was considered as a weakness, and we were forced to go to war, and the alternative left to us is to speedily bring the war to a successful and victorious end in the shortest time possible.'⁴⁹²

Cedric Barnes and Harun Hassan describe the situation as follows:

On 20 December, a day after Sheikh Indha'adde's ultimatum for Ethiopian troops to leave, expired clashes began between the two sides near Baidoa. It was the Islamic Courts front-line in the central regions (near the town of Bandiiradley 60 kilometers south of Galkayo) that crumbled first, leaving a significant gap in the Courts' overextended defensive capacity. The asymmetry in numbers and capability between the combined Ethiopian and Transitional Government forces and the loosely integrated Islamic Courts' forces became clear, and one town after another fell. On 28 December, Ethiopian and government forces marched into Mogadishu unopposed. In the face of the Alliance, the Islamic Courts' military and administrative presence seemed to collapse.⁴⁹³

On December 28, 2006, Meles Zenawi told a news conference in Addis Ababa as follows:

But while we are there, we will help them try and stabilize Mogadishu. We will not let Mogadishu bury. We will help the transitional government to do whatever it can to make sure that Mogadishu is stabilized quickly.

At most, it will be few weeks, hopefully just a matter of days before we leave, but at most, it will be a matter of (a) few weeks.

Because we plan to pursue the remnants of the Eritrean troops, international Jihadists, and the hardcore elements of the Islamic Courts who are fleeing towards Kismayo and other port areas, I will continue to pursue them. That is our primary agenda.

The forces of the transitional government and Ethiopia are in the outskirts of Mogadishu now. We are discussing what we need to do to make sure that Mogadishu does not descend into chaos.

The United States has not contributed a single bullet, a single soldier, or a piece of single military equipment to this operation. Lastly, we have with the United States longstanding

⁴⁹¹ Xinhua. "AU: Ethiopia has right to intervene militarily in Somali." December 27, 2006 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-12/27/content_5536553.htm, Accessed on 28 November 2016.

⁴⁹² Plaut, Martin. "Ethiopian army faces Somali test." 25 December 2006. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/af-rica/6208759.stm>, Accessed on 28 November 2016.

⁴⁹³ Barnes, Cedric & Harun Hassan. The Rise and Fall of Mogadishu's Islamic Courts. *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 1:2, 2007. 160.

arrangements to share intelligence on terrorist activities in the neighborhood. That sharing of intelligence has not been stopped during the conflict.⁴⁹⁴

Following the Control of Mogadishu by the TFG, on February 20, 2007, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1744, reiterating its support for the Transitional Federal Government and welcomed Ethiopia's decision to withdraw its troops from Somalia. Furthermore, it approved the African Union's plan to establish the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to avoid the security vacuum and create the conditions for a complete withdrawal of ENDF and the lifting of emergency security measures currently in place.⁴⁹⁵

Though AMISOM started its peacekeeping deployment in 2007, it was in January 2009; the Ethiopian troops started to pull out from Somalia. Colonel Gabre Yohannes Abate, the Ethiopian troop commander in Somalia, said, 'though the journey is challenging, we are happy to start the journey back to our homeland after successfully discharging the mission bestowed by the government and the people of Ethiopia.'⁴⁹⁶

6.2.3 Joining AMISOM, 2014

The Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahidin (Movement of Warrior Youth), commonly known as al-Shabaab, a radical militant group, was an offshoot of ICU that took over most of southern Somalia after the Ethiopian troops withdraw in 2009. The defeat of the ICU in 2006 served as the immediate context for al-Shabaab's evolution into an insurgent group.⁴⁹⁷ US State Department, in February 2008, through its Public Notice No. 6137, officially put al-Shabaab on the black terror list.⁴⁹⁸ In September 2009, al-Shabaab pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda for the first time in a video distributed on jihadi blogs.⁴⁹⁹ Al-Shabaab was also able to control more territory than any other

⁴⁹⁴ AP Archive. "Prime Minister says Ethiopian troops on outskirts of Somali capital." <http://www.aparchive.com/metadata/youtube/9d9afd55c8a9709011701f8ad8775840>, Accessed on 24 March 2019.

⁴⁹⁵ UN Security Council. "The Situation in Somalia: Resolution 1744 (2007)." 21 February 2007. <http://www.ref-world.org/docid/4600f97e2.html>, Accessed on 28 November 2016.

⁴⁹⁶ Kitnan, Rajesh Babu. "Ethiopian Troops Receive Warm Farewell as They Leave Mogadishu." 16 January 2009. <http://www.ssig.gov.my/blog/2009/01/16/ethiopian-troops-receive-warm-farewell-as-they-leave-mogadishu/>, Accessed on 28 November 2016.

⁴⁹⁷ Shay, Shaul. "Somalia in Transition since 2006." London: Transaction Publishers, 2014. 97.

⁴⁹⁸ US Department of State. *Designation of al-Shabaab as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist*. February 26, 2008. <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/102448.htm>, Accessed on 1 December 2016.

⁴⁹⁹ Shay, Shaul. *Somalia in Transition since 2006*. London: Transaction Publishers, 2014. 103.

entity in Somalia, “talibanized” devout yet secular and tolerant Muslim society gradually imposing draconian and oppressive laws on the people, banning music, the playing of video games, and watching sports or movies.⁵⁰⁰

It was al-Shabaab that becomes a substantial challenge after ICU to the TFG and the newly AU peacekeeping force, AMISOM. AMISOM was the replacement of IGAD’s failed attempt to deploy a peace operation. IGAD planned the IGAD Peace Support Mission in Somalia (IGASOM) in 2005; however, because of the disagreement between the three international organizations involved in the operation UN, AU, and IGAD, lack of funding, and failure to lift the UN arms embargo on Somalia made it impossible to materialize the operation.⁵⁰¹ The Security Council authorizes AMISOM under resolution 1744 (2007) on 20th February 2007, which will be operated by AU.

AMISOM’s first deployment was about 1,600 Ugandan soldiers who were limited to a few strategic locations in Mogadishu in March 2007. By January 2014, it had become the AU’s largest-ever multinational force, consisting of over 22,000 uniformed personnel.⁵⁰² On the 1st of January 2014, the ENDF provided 4,395 uniformed personnel.⁵⁰³ At the ceremony, when ENDF joins AMISOM Ethiopian Ambassador to Somalia, Wondimu Asamnew said the following:

We have been on the side of the Somali people for the last 24 years, and we will continue to be on the side of our brothers until full comprehensive peace is achieved in Somalia. ... Ethiopia believes that unless Somalia is in peace, Ethiopia cannot be in peace. Our life [and] our destiny is intertwined, and I am hopeful that we will jointly uproot Al-Shabaab in a very short period of time and bring Somalia into a new chapter of peace and prosperity.⁵⁰⁴

⁵⁰⁰ Shay, Shaul. *Somalia in Transition since 2006*. London: Transaction Publishers, 2014. 129.

⁵⁰¹ Mays, Terry. The African Union’s African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM): Why did it Successfully Deploy following the failure of the IGAD Peace Support Mission to Somalia (IGASOM)? A Thesis Presented in Partial Completion of the Requirements of the Certificate-of-Training in United Nations Peace Support Operations. Peace Operation Training Institute. 2009. 5-13.

⁵⁰² Williams, Paul D. *Special Report: How Many Fatalities Has the African Union Mission in Somalia Suffered?* September 10, 2015. <https://theglobalobservatory.org/2015/09/amisom-african-union-somalia-peacekeeping/>, Accessed on 1 December 2016.

⁵⁰³ AMSOM. “Ethiopia-ENDF.” <http://amisom-au.org/ethiopia-endf/>, Accessed on 21 September 2016.

⁵⁰⁴ AMISOM Somalia. *Ethiopian Ambassador to Somalia Reacts to Ethiopian Troops Joining AMISOM*. January 23, 2014. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vxXraqoVbSw&t=4s>, Accessed on 23 June 2019.

On the same day, EU Envoy to Somalia, Ambassador Michele d'Urso remarked to Ethiopian Troops joining AMISOM as 'a game-changer.'⁵⁰⁵ It was also a departure from its previous unilateral military approaches to neutralize and contain threats emerging from Somalia.⁵⁰⁶

AMISOM, with a multidimensional Peace Support Operation, is mandated to reduce the threat and conduct offensive operations against al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups. Also, to provide security to enable the political process at all levels as well as stabilization efforts, reconciliation, and peacebuilding in Somalia, enabling the gradual handing over security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces. The contingents are responsible for building the Somali security forces' capacities and providing appropriate protection to the Somali authorities to help them carry out government and security functions for critical infrastructure.⁵⁰⁷ However, it resulted as 'the deadliest peace operation in modern history.'⁵⁰⁸


AMISOM troop contributors are Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Burundi, while Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Zambia, Kenya, and Uganda contributed police personnel. See Map 6.4 the sector deployment of AMISOM contributor countries. Till 2019 there were 15,418 contingents rotated in AMISOM; please look at Table 6.13, and until August 2020, there were 13 Ethiopian Force Commanders, and Ethiopian top AMISOM officers were Maj. Gen. Mohamedesha Zeyinu, Deputy commander for Operations and Plans in 2016 and acting force in the same year; Lt. Gen. Tigabu Yilma Wondimhunegn was force commander from 2019 – 2020; Maj. Gen. Abreha Tesfay, Deputy Force Commander for Operations and Plans in 2016; and Brig. Gen. Kittila Bulti Tadesse served as AMISOM Chief of Staff in 2018.

⁵⁰⁵ AMISOM Somalia. *European Envoy to Somalia Reacts to Ethiopian Troops Joining AMISOM*. January 23, 2014. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rh1Cp0X86hw>, Accessed on 23 June 2019.

⁵⁰⁶ Mulugeta, Kidist. 'Ethiopia in AMISOM'. Abstract. Presented at CFEE workshop: African Armies in Multilateral Peace Support Operations: Social and Professional Changes at Stake. Organized by CFEE & Institute for Peace and Security Studies, Addis Ababa University, Addis Ababa, 25-26 April 2016. <https://cfee.hypotheses.org/1554>, Accessed on 06 January, 2019.

⁵⁰⁷ AMISOM. "AMISOM Mandate." <http://amisom-au.org/amisom-mandate/>, Accessed on 1 December 2016.

⁵⁰⁸ Williams, Paul D. *Fighting for Peace in Somalia: A History and Analysis of the African Union Mission (AMISOM), 2007-2017*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. 1.



Map 6.4 AMISOM Sector⁵⁰⁹ Deployment as of January 2015

⁵⁰⁹ ENDF is also deployed in Sector 4 with Djibutian Armed Forces.

Year	Division	Military			Civilian			Others ⁵¹⁰			Total
		M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	
2014 - 2015	Sector 03 1 st Round	1637	10	1647	6	11	17	28	42	70	1734
	Sector 04 1 st Round	1406	3	1406	-	-	-	40	20	60	1466
	Sector 03 1 st Round, Multi Role Logistics	69	-	69	-	-	-	-	-	-	69
2015 - 2016	Sector 03 2 nd Round	2264	14	2278	9	19	28	58	65	123	2429
	Sector 04 2 nd Round	1234	8	1242	7	4	11	7	34	41	1294
	Sector 03 2 nd Round Light Engineering	66	-	66	-	-	-	3	-	3	69
	Sector 03 2 nd Round Multi Role Logistics	16	-	16	-	-	-	19	-	19	35
	Sector 04 2 nd Round Multi Role Logistics	95	-	95	-	-	-	6	-	6	101
	Kisumayu ⁵¹¹ 1 st Round	564	1	565	2	1	3	13	16	29	597
2016 - 2017	Sector 03 3 rd Round	2175	77	2252	6	12	18	80	62	142	2412
	Sector 04 3 rd Round	1177	52	1229	2	7	9	53	37	90	1328

⁵¹⁰ Others means Police Personnel and other Military and Civil Personnel of ENDF who are not under the payroll of EDRE-PSTC.

⁵¹¹ Kisumayu is considered as Sector 6.

2017/18 - 2019	Sector 04 4 th Round	1127	44	1171	1	8	9	99	42	141	1321
2017 - 2018	Sector 03 4 th Round	90	6	96	-	1	1	1	1	2	99
	Kisumayu 2 nd Round	539	27	566	-	2	2	16	16	32	600
20108 - 2019	Kisumayu 3 rd Round	514	34	548	-	-	-	3	19	22	570
	Total			13,246			98			768	15,418

Table 6.13 Ethiopian Peacekeeping Deployment thought AMISOM 2014-2019

6.2.4 Unilateral Intervention in Somalia

Since ENDF set foot in Somalia in 2006 to support the TFG, it never left Somalia entirely. The former Ethiopian Foreign Affairs Minister Seyoum Mesfin and his former colleague at the ministry Dr. Abdeta Dribssa argue the necessity of Ethiopia presence in Somalia, especially in places near the Ethiopia border, as follows:

In fact, the government of Somalia is unable to credibly guarantee to Ethiopia that these territories will not be used to threaten Ethiopia, so Ethiopia often is blamed for interference. This criticism highlights the paradox in which Ethiopia has to infringe on Somalia's sovereignty in territories that Mogadishu is unable to control in order to ensure the fulfillment of basic obligations required of a sovereign state. Conventional tools of international relations, such as pressuring a national government to fulfill the obligations of its sovereignty, do not work when a state lacks a government with the capacity or political will to exercise even minimal control over its territory and armed forces.⁵¹²

Their argument is based on the TFG later the Somalia Federal Government (SFG) has no power to control its entire territory, so that Ethiopia needs to keep its sovereignty inside Somalia. In this regard, Seyoum Mesfin and Abdeta Dribssa bring the concept of a 'buffer zone.' Their argument about the need for an Ethiopian buffer zone in Somalia is as follows:

Buffer zones play their paradoxical role while states with stronger domestic capabilities that develop their own broader dimensions of effective internal and external sovereignty, such as Ethiopia, step in to manage the effects of this extreme asymmetry of domestic control. The stronger state then violates the sovereignty of the weaker to provide the basis for the semblance of an orderly state system in the region. This hegemony can appear as domination, but to its architects, it is also the only viable alternative to manage the destabilizing regional effects of state failure and collapse. This is particularly important for states like Ethiopia, which shares a long border with Somalia, a failed state that generates violent illicit activities, cross-border insurgencies, refugee flows, and other disruptions that threaten efforts in Ethiopia to transform its domestic political economy. Disorder in the borderlands is a historical problem for state-builders, but the difference now is that stronger states no longer have the option (or are no longer inclined) to solve this problem through conquest. Instead, they have to maintain order in weak states.⁵¹³

⁵¹² Beyene, Abdeta D. and Seyoum Mesfin. The Practicalities of Living with Failed States. *The American Academy of Arts & Sciences*. 147 (1) Winter 2018. 129.

⁵¹³ Ibid.

Furthermore, it is argued that ‘Ethiopia’s unilateral intervention and success were ultimately welcomed, triggering endorsement for the deployment of the AMISOM.’⁵¹⁴ Moreover, another argument for Ethiopian unilateral force presence in Somalia after the establishment of AMISOM is that the Ethiopian force in AMISOM covers 62% of Somalia’s total AMISOM mission area.⁵¹⁵ Moreover, it is problematic that such a small number of Ethiopian troops under AMISOM cover the extensive mission areas, Sectors 3, 4, and 6.⁵¹⁶ Thus, there is a need for the vast areas to be covered by ENDF troops deployed with the agreement with the SFG.⁵¹⁷ Specially sector 3 (Baidoa) and sector 4 (Beledweyne), the area bordering Ethiopia, it is relatively easy for ENDF to cross the border to Somalia. That is why Ethiopia deployed an additional about 10,000 – 15,000 troops outside the command of AMISOM.⁵¹⁸ Ethiopian former ambassador to Somalia Wendimaginegn Asaminew affirmed that all ENDF forces in Somalia are not part of AMISOM, and in fact, the burden of defeating al-Shabaab in its strongholds has been left primarily to the Ethiopian forces. Ethiopia’s non-AMISOM forces are deployed on bilateral understandings with the SFG.⁵¹⁹

6.3 Trends and Capabilities of Ethiopian Peace Support Operations

As discussed in the previous sections, Ethiopia has been among the pioneer peacekeeping contributor in the world. Though the internal political dynamics, especially during the military government and the civil war from 1974-1991 and the Ethio-Eritrean war from 1998-2000, has a significant effect on its army on the capability and readiness for foreign deployment, it was able to maintain its international reputation in the peacekeeping.

⁵¹⁴ Centre for Dialogue, Research and Cooperation (CDRC). ‘Somalia’s challenges in the last two decades’ *CDRC DIGEST*. Vol. 2 No. 2, January 2017

⁵¹⁵ FDRE-PSTC. *FDRE Peace Support Training Center Graduation Bulletin*. Brana Publishing: Addis Ababa. 2015. 20.

⁵¹⁶ Interview with ENDF Officer who were deployed in AMISOM, 29 October 2019, FRDE-PSTC, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

⁵¹⁷ Ibid.

⁵¹⁸ Vidiya, Patrick. *Ethio-Kenya Ties, Taming al Shabaab: Lessons from Ethiopia*. 09 December 2019 <https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/big-read/2019-12-09-taming-al-shabaab-lessons-from-ethiopia/>, Accessed on February 2020.

⁵¹⁹ Asaminew, Wondimu. *Beyond the Common Knowledge: Ethiopian Political Hopes and Challenges*. (Ke’adebay Bashager: Ye’Itiyopia Poletica Tesfana Sigatoch.) [Amharic] Mekele 2020. 105

Since the 1950's about more than 130,000 Ethiopian peacekeepers were deployed to peacekeeping operations worldwide and mainly in Africa through AU and the UN missions. This by itself has a tremendous influence on the psychology and the military tradition of men and women in uniform. Since 2010, there is a rotation of about 12,000 uniformed personnel every year under UN and AU flag.

Ethiopia is also a leading contributor of female peacekeepers since 2015; in January 2020, Ethiopia deployed 593 female peacekeepers, followed by Rwanda. Brigadier General Zewdu Kiros Gebrekidan was the first Ethiopian woman to assume the highest position in peacekeeping as Deputy Force Commander of UNISFA from 2016-2017.

Currently, Ethiopia's deployment capability is multi-task units in various missions. These include: Tactical helicopter units, Utility helicopter units, Motorized battalions, Mechanized battalions, Artillery batteries, Tank coys, Quick Reaction Forces, Level II hospital, well drilling units, Signal units, Multirole logistics unit, Light field engineering unit, and Demining unit have been deployed.

Ethiopia currently contributes the most personnel (7,499) to UN peacekeeping missions with Protection of Civilian (POC) mandates. Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Bangladesh are the top three contributors of uniformed personnel to UN peacekeeping operations with the protection of civilians mandates as of April 2019,⁵²⁰ which is based on the Kigali Principles.

The history of Ethiopian involvement in peacekeeping operations shows that Ethiopian interest extends well beyond the regional and the African continent. However, the current peacekeeping trends focused primarily on immediate neighbors.

Since the establishment of the UN, all Ethiopian governments deployed peacekeeping troops except the Provisional Military Administration Council, later the government of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia from 1974-1991. Though the government has a positive outlook towards the UN, it has never sent peacekeepers. This is because since it captured state power in

⁵²⁰ Center for Civilians in Conflict. *Trends in the Protection of Civilians through UN Peacekeeping Operations. #POC20 Series*. May 29, 2019. <https://civiliansinconflict.org/blog/international-peacekeepers-day/>, Accessed on 02 January 2020.

1974, the Ethiopian army was engaged in a fierce war with Mohamed Siad Barre's Somalia between July 1977 and March 1978 over the disputed Ethiopian region of Ogaden and a civil war with Eritrean and Tigrian anti-government rebels from September 1974 to June 1991. These made it impossible for the Ethiopian army, in addition to the Cold War politics being on the side of the Soviet Block.

	Years of Deployment	Mission	Participation
1	1951-1953	Korea	6,037
2	1959-1962	ONUC, Congo	10,625
3	1993-1995	UNAMIR, Rwanda	1,694
4	2003-2007	ONUB, Burundi	2,747
5	2003-2010	UNMIL, Liberia,	17,453
6	2007-2019*	UNAMID, Darfur, Sudan	18,901
7	2011-2019*	UNISFA, Abyei	23,930
8	2014-2019*	UNMISS, South Sudan	4,904
9	2014-2019*	AMISOM, Somalia	30,418
		Total	116,709

Table 6.14 Summary of Major Ethiopian Peace Support Operation Deployment (UNOCI in Côte d'Ivoire; MINUSMA in Mali; MINUSTAH in Haiti; MINURCAT in Central African Republic and Chad; and UN-MHA in Yemen are missions where only few Ethiopian personnel deployed are not included in the table.)
 (* The data is only up to the beginning of 2019; because the missions are ongoing the actual numbers will be more)

6.3.1 Contingent

Ethiopia started contributing to UN peacekeeping missions only its contingent troops. Still, a significant number of Ethiopian UN contribution is contingent. For example, in February 2019, 96.2% of the total peacekeepers are contingents. Currently, ENDF uses Hurso Contingent Training School to train its contingents before they left to mission areas. One of the main reasons Ethiopians mainly send its contingents is almost all missions Ethiopia participates in are peace enforcements

with Protection of Civilians mandates (POC), and require more troops on the ground to keep the peace of the mission area.⁵²¹




Figure 6.1 Ethiopian Troop Contribution to UN Peacekeeping Operations since 1994⁵²²

It was in 1994 Ethiopia send its troops for peacekeeping mission to Rwanda. After the mission ended in 1995 until 2003 Ethiopia did not participate in peacekeeping mission because of the Ethio-Eritrean war from 1998-2000. Primarily because of the UNISFA mission opining in Abyei the Ethiopian contingent contribution increasing drastically from 2011 were 100% of the contingent troops are from Ethiopia

6.3.2 Military Experts on Mission (UNMEM)

UNMEM includes senior officers such as Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels that can work as UN Military Liaison Officers and UN Military Observers. Ethiopia started sending its Military Experts from the mission in Liberia, and its highest contribution of Military Experts is in 2011 after the

⁵²¹ Interview with Colonel Alemayehu Abera, Deputy Commandant and Head of Traning at Hurso Peacekeeping Training School, 01 October 2019. Hurso, Somali Regional State.

⁵²² The number of troops varies from month to month in the year for this reason the graph includes the highest number of contribution in the year.

opening of the mission in Abyei. Because of the high demand for UNMEM, Ethiopia established a training center for military observers in Addis Ababa in 2013.⁵²³




Figure 6.2 Ethiopian UN Military Experts on Mission (UNMEM) Contribution to UN Peacekeeping Operations since 1994⁵²⁴

6.3.3 Staff Officer

Staff officers are those who perform specialized functions at the Force Headquarters or integrated military, civilian, or police structure. The post is also required to have at least completed their national basic military staff course. The main limitation for Ethiopian staff officers is English language skills, which is the reason for Ethiopian less contribution of Staff Officers for UN missions.⁵²⁵

⁵²³ Interview with Colonel Tamrat Andarge, Head of Training Division at EIPSTI, 11 November 2019, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

⁵²⁴ The number of military expert varies from month to month in the year for this reason the graph includes the highest number of contribution in the year.

⁵²⁵ Interview with Colonel Milkesa Regasa, Commandant, Hurso Peacekeeping Training School, 01 October 2019, Hurso, Somali Regional State, Ethiopia.



Figure 6.3 Staff Officers⁵²⁶

Ethiopia also deploy Staff Officers to AMISOM, who are based at the Head quarter. However due to the nature of the mission which is peace enforcement or clear war with Al Shaabab, there are no Military Observers.

In addition to the language constraints Ethiopia Staff Officers, according to a study conducted by Teame G. Gebreegziabher, on Ethiopia Staff Officers and Military Observers, it shows not only most of Ethiopian officers were poor in English language during presentations but also inadequate knowledge about their mission tasks generally because some army members working in remote areas and front lines have limited access to for learning and self-developments resulted in language shortages, unable to operate computers and less driving skills also when they join pre-deployment training for they lag behind.⁵²⁷ This contributed highly for limited deployment of both Ethiopia Staff Officers and UNMEM.

⁵²⁶ UN data for Staff officers found only after 2017.

⁵²⁷ Gebreegziabher, Teame G. "Challenges and Opportunities for Ethiopian Staff Officer's /Military Observer's Performance in United Nations Peacekeeping Mission." A Thesis Submitted in Partial fulfilment for the degree of Masters in Public Management and Policy. Addis Ababa University, 2018.

UN/AU Post	Deployment Country	Military			Civil			Others ⁵²⁸			Total
		M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	
Military Observer	Liberia	110	10	120	-	-	-	42	1	43	163
Staff Officer	Liberia	47	2	49				15	-	15	64
Military Observer	Cot d'Ivoire	19	-	19	-	-	-	-	1	1	20
Staff Officer	Cot d'ivor	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Military Observer	Burundi	11	-	11	-	-	-	8	-	8	19
Staff Officer	Burundi	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Military Observer	Chad	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Staff Officer	Chad	9	4	13	-	-	-	2	-	2	15
Military Observer	Darfur	95	6	101	-	-	-	2	-	2	103
Staff Officer	Darfur	138+	5	143	-	-	-	9	-	9	152
Military Observer	Abiye	341	50	391	-	1	1	14	3	17	409
Staff Officer	Abiye	274	9	283	-	-	-	10	-	10	293
Staff Officer	Somalia	18	-	18	-	-	-	-	-	-	18
Military Observer	Somalia	15	1	16							16
Staff Officer	South Sudan	35	1	36	-	-		-	-	-	36
Military Observer	South Sudan	11	15	26	-	-	-	-	-	-	26
Staff Officer	Mali	-	1	1							1
Total		1,123	104	1,227	-	1	1	102	5	107	1,335

Table 6.15 Staff Officers and Military Observers who finished their deployment in 2019.

6.3.4 Police and Formed Police Unit (FPU)

One of the duties of FDRE's Federal Police commission is 'prepare a peacekeeping police force which can properly accomplish international peacekeeping call of the country.'⁵²⁹ Ethiopia started sending individual police in February 2008 for the first time to Liberia. Though it was minimal,

⁵²⁸ Others means Police Personnel and other Military and Civil Personnel of ENDF who are not under the payroll of EDRE-PSTC. Source FDRE, PSTC.

⁵²⁹ Proclamation No. 720/2011. Ethiopian Federal Police Commission Establishment Proclamation. 18th Year No.2 Addis Ababa. 28th November, 2011.

Ethiopia has been sending individual police peacekeepers. It was in 2018 that an independent department for peacekeeping had been established under the Federal Police Commission.⁵³⁰ Recently, the Center for Peacekeeping Training and Support, under the auspices of the Ethiopian Police University College, start to provide pre-deployment training, and for the first time, 180 police officers who have received Formed Police Unit training are ready to engage in peacekeeping missions.⁵³¹ This will enable Ethiopia to contribute FPUs to UN and AU missions.




Figure 6.4 Ethiopian Police Contribution to UN Peacekeeping Operations since 1994⁵³²

As of 2017 the top 10 UN troop contributor in the world Ethiopia, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Rwanda, Nepal, Burkina Faso, Indonesia, Senegal, and Ghana. India and Pakistan with over a million of total military personnel, they contributes mainly in MONUSCO, DRC over three thousand personnel each. Ethiopia's contribution is though limited to the Horn of Africa it is the largest in the world. All of the top 10 contributors contribute to diverse missions than Ethiopia, which is limited to its next-door neighbor missions.

⁵³⁰ Interview with Commander Tegegne Agajiet Deferesha, Federal Police Commission. Addis Ababa, 3 October 2020.

⁵³¹ Walta. "Ethiopia is to Deploy Uniformed Police Unit to International Peacekeeping." 17 August, 2020 <http://www.waltainfo.com/news/detail/57775?locale=am>, Accessed on 20 August 2020.

⁵³² The number of police varies from month to month in the year for this reason the graph includes the highest number of contribution in the year.




Figure 6.6 As of February 2017, the World's top ten UN peacekeeping troop, police, and military expert contributors.

As of February 2017, the top 10 African UN troop-contributing countries are Ethiopia, Rwanda, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Ghana, Egypt, Tanzania, Nigeria, Morocco and South Africa. Egypt ranked the first in military strength in Africa, South Africa third, Nigeria fourth, Morocco fifth and Ethiopia sixth. Except Algeria, which has the second strongest military in Africa, the rest of them are among the top 10 UN peacekeeping contributors.




Figure 6.5 As of February 2017, Africa's top ten UN peacekeeping troop, police, and military expert contributors.

As of January 2020, Ethiopia is still the top contributor for UN peacekeeping mission by only deploying only to four UN Missions. Ghana is the top diverse contributor by deploying to 15 missions where Nepal is the second by deploying to 13 missions around the world.

Country	Staff	Expert	Police	Contingent	FPU	Total Personnel Deployed	In Sub-saharan Africa	Outside Sub-saharan Africa
Ethiopia	104	103	46	6,386	0	6,639	4	1
Bangladesh	109	31	44	5,625	600	6,413	6	3
Rwanda	75	34	59	3,852	913	6,292	5	0
Nepal	133	42	66	4,863	496	5,658	7	6
India	79	39	23	5,098	0	5,404	4	5
Pakistan	102	49	0	4,050	104	3,441	7	2
Egypt	70	32	54	2,180	650	3,113	6	1
Ghana	80	39	88	2,304	262	2,774	10	5
Kenya	48	20	13	75	0	156	6	2

Table 6.16 As of January 2020 Some of Leading Troop Contributors in Africa and the World⁵³³

6.3.5 Command and Control

The Ethiopian International Peacekeeping Training Centre (EIPKTC) was established under MOD Peacekeeping Coordination Center in Addis Ababa in July 2013, with the goal of becoming a regional and international center of excellence in peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and conflict resolution. The EIPKTC, being set up by the Ethiopian Federal Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of

⁵³³ United Nations. *Troop and Police Contribution* https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/1_summary_of_contributions_20.pdf, Accessed on 20 March 2020.

Economic Development and Economic Affairs, and the UN Development Programme was funded by the Japanese government.⁵³⁴

When there is a need for peacekeepers, AU or UN presents invitation and force requirements to the Ethiopian government, and it is the Office of the Prime Minister which has been handling such requests from AU/UN until now. Then the Office of the Prime Minister passes the invitation to the Office of the Chief of the General Staff, which will be passed to the MOD Peacekeeping Coordination Center (TCC). The TCC will receive the actual demand military personnel from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operation or AU Peace Support Operation Department through the Permanent Representative of Ethiopia to the United Nations or Ethiopian Permanent Representative to the African Union. Lastly, the final Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) prepared by the TCC will be presented to all stakeholders. This is done through the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). When preparing a negotiation plan and program, the EIPKTC must ensure that it clearly indicates Ethiopia's needs and goals in terms of its mission. The military will do this attaches working at the office of the Permanent Representative at AU or UN.⁵³⁵

⁵³⁴ Interview with Brigadier General Habtamu Tilahun, Commandant of EIPKTC, 11 November 2019, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

⁵³⁵ Interview with Colonel Elias Seyoum, Head of Peace and Security Research Division at EIPSTI, 10 June 2019. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia




Figure 6.7 FDRE PSTC Organizational Structure

The members of the Foreign, Defense, and Security Affairs Standing Committee parliament standing committee are responsible after the deployment of the troops on their wellbeing and other related administrative issues. Also, the standing committee members visited the troops in the mission area.⁵³⁶

⁵³⁶ Interview with Tesfaye Dhaba Waqjira, FDRE's House of Peoples' Representative, Foreign, Defense and Security Affairs Standing Committee Chairman. 03 August, 2019, Bishoftu (Debre Zeit), Ethiopia.




Figure 6.8 Tentative Government Structure of Peacekeeping Deployment Command and Control

6.3.6 The Issue of Reimbursement

The FDRE Ministry of Defense has ‘International Peacekeeping Operation Performance Guide’, which is divided into six chapters, including Invitation and Force requirement from AU or UN; Deployment and Operation; and Reimbursement and other regulation in ENDF PKOs.⁵³⁷

The reimbursement issue covered all payments for personnel, materials, services, transportation, aviation, and compensations (See UN Reimbursement framework for Contingent Owned Equipment (COE)⁵³⁸). The payment for contingent military personnel deployed in mission is termed in the guide as ‘Subsidy for Returnee Peacekeepers.’ And paid according to pay scale of AU, for

⁵³⁷ General Staff of the Armed Forces. *FDRE Ministry of Defense: International Peacekeeping Operation Performance Guide*. January 2016. Addis Ababa.

⁵³⁸ United Nations. “Deployment and Reimbursement.” <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/deployment-and-reimbursement>, Accessed on 21 January 2020.

AMISOM (\$822 per soldier, per month)⁵³⁹ or for UN missions (US\$1,428⁵⁴⁰ per soldier per month as of 1 July 2019, police and civilian personnel paid from each peacekeeping operation budget) and the rank of the peacekeeper at home (the temporary rank used in mission area will not be used for payment) and based on the payment manual of MOD. For civilians deployed in a mission, their payment is also based on their professions before deployment standardized with equivalent military rank.

Out of the total reimbursement from AU or UN, the payment given to men and women in uniform is 40% for Senior Officers and 35% for Junior Officers and Senior Non-commissioned Officers and 30% Non-commissioned Officers and Private. However, since 2012 the payment modality is changed, as is seen in the following table.

	Military Rank	Payment %
1	Major – Colonel	50%
2	Sergeant – First Sergeant	44%
3	Staff Sergeant Major – Chief Warrant Officer	47%
4	Private – Corporal	40%

Table 6.17 ENDF Reimbursement Policy since 2012

Ministry of Defense will handle the money for other internal matters, mainly the money transfer to the Defense Forces' Foundation, which builds houses for the members of ENDF and other developments in the military.⁵⁴¹

Military personnel deployed as a contingent while their salaries continue to be played for them or for their family member, their food allowance will stop. On the other hand, military personnel are

⁵³⁹ Williams, Paul D. "Paying for AMISOM: Are Politics and Bureaucracy Undermining the AU's Largest Peace Operation?" January 11, 2017. <https://theglobalobservatory.org/2017/01/amisom-african-union-peacekeeping-finance/>, Accessed on 06 February 2018.

⁵⁴⁰ A rate of reimbursement of \$1,332 per person per month came into effect on 1 July 2014 and continued until 30 June 2016. The rate increased to \$1,365 per person per month from 1 July 2016, and increased to \$1,410 from 1 July 2017 and \$1,428 per soldier per month as of 1 July 2019.

⁵⁴¹ Interview with Interview with Colonel Elias Seyoum, Head of Peace and Security Research Division at EIPSTI, 10 June 2019. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

deployed as a military observer, staff officer, sector commander, force commander, liaison officer, and officers and professionals paid directly by AU or UN, both their salaries and food allowances halt until return.

The issue of reimbursement in Ethiopian peacekeeping operations history has its own challenges. The first strain took place in 1974 when all four battalions which were deployed in ONUC complained about not getting the appropriate reimbursement for their deployment.⁵⁴² The second one arises in 2005 by the battalion led by Br. General Kemal Gelichu which were deployed in Liberia. The battalion blocked the highway to the North of the capital Addis Ababa, at Fiche town, because of the payment reduction.

Generally, there is no uniform policy between states on the payment of UN reimbursement for the deployed troops. For example, the South African Army will stop the troops' salary deployed to peacekeeping because they will get full payment of UN reimbursement. The Kenyan Defense Force will give both the regular salary and 100% of the UN reimbursement, previously retaining \$200 for administrative costs.⁵⁴³ In 2018, the governments of Burundi and Uganda retain \$200 of the \$1,028 monthly allowance and Djibouti's government keeps \$328.

6.5 Summery and Partial Conclusion

This chapter covers the first part of the analysis of the study. The generations of Ethiopian peacekeeping, trends, the hegemonic peacekeeping of Ethiopia in Somalia, and capabilities of Ethiopian peace support operations, including a brief discussion on reimbursement. Below are the main points covered by the chapter.

Since the 1950's about more than 120,000 Ethiopian peacekeepers have been deployed to peacekeeping operations worldwide and mainly in Africa; this by itself has a tremendous influence on the psychology and military tradition of men and women in uniform. Since 2010, about 12,000 uniformed personnel rotation every year and der UN and AU flag.

⁵⁴² Techane, Gesit. *The Former Army:1935-1991 [Amharic] (Yeqedmow Tor: 1927-1983)*. Ababa: Z. A Publishing. 2006 351 - 355

⁵⁴³ Interview with Colonel Robert K. Kitur, Defense Attaché in Embassy of the Republic of Kenya, Ethiopia, 30 May, 2019, Embassy of the Republic of Kenya, Addis Ababa

For this study, the method of classification for Ethiopian peacekeeping generation is based on the particular sending three Ethiopian regimes's the Imperial regime from 1930-1974, second, the Transitional Government of Ethiopia from 1991-1995, and the government of Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia from 1996 up to now. The motive, the nature of the armed forces, and the focus area of deployment. Based on the three criteria mentioned, Ethiopian peacekeeping is divided into four generations of operations. The following table summarizes the generation of Ethiopian peacekeeping.

Generation	Key features
1st Generation, The Imperial Army: Conviction to Collective Security	The Imperial Army was deployed to peacekeeping mission because of Emperor Haile Selassie I's conviction towards UN and collective security. (1950 - 1967) Ethiopia's first two missions participated in during this time were the US-led United Nations Command in Korea and in United Nations Operation in the Congo.
2nd Generation, Rebels Solidarity	The EPRDF's rebel army, three years after defeating the government and control power, wanted to support similar rebel group RPF also with conviction to halt the civilian massacre in Rwanda. (1994 – 1995).
3rd Generation, ENDF Engagement in 'African Solution for African Problems'	After the formation of the national army, the government, driven by the principle 'African Solution for African Problems,' engaged in peacekeeping missions in Burundi, Liberia, Sudan, Côte d'Ivoire, and the Central African Republic. (2003 - 2010)
4th Generation, The Peacekeeper Army	Since 2011, it can be affirmed that the Ethiopian army has become a peacekeeper army with long experience and the establishment of peacekeeping training facilities and the formation of the main peacekeeping department at the MOD shows the coming of a new period when ENDF transformed to the peacekeeper army.

Table 6.18 Summary of the Taxonomy of Ethiopian Generation of Peacekeeping

Based on the historical analysis of Ethiopian generations of peace operations, from Korea to AMISOM. The chapter has proven that Ethiopian peacekeeping participation is getting more focused on Ethiopia's regional security. The first generation missions were far from Ethiopian national security, where the fourth generation mission deployments are almost 100% in its immediate national security areas of its next-door neighbors. These trends show that Ethiopia was a real international actor, where its interest extends well beyond the regional and the African continent; however, the current peacekeeping trends focused primarily on immediate neighbors. In addition to this, the current Ethiopian contribution, 7,499 personnel to UN peacekeeping missions, is with Protection of Civilian (POC) mandates which are based on the Kigali Principles.

Hegemonic peacekeeping' is a situation in which a powerful state with vital global or regional interests is able to deploy a preponderance of troops in a bid to manage a conflict and is able to convince other states to accept its leadership of the mission. Based on this definition, Ethiopia is undoubtedly the hegemonic state in the Horn of Africa, especially concerning its role in Somalia. This can be proven by the Ethiopian first unilateral action in Somalia was in 1995 to remove the Islamic insurgent, Al-Ittihad Al-Islamiya (AIAI); then in 1998, Ethiopia launched a second military intervention at the time of the Ethio-Eritrean war, following Eritrea's effort—in collaboration with a Baidoa-based Somali warlord Hussein Aideed. The third intervention was in 2006, against the threat from the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and supporting the Somali Transitional Federal Government. Lastly, Ethiopia joined AMISOM in 2014, simultaneously deploying troops outside the AMISOM command to support its troops under AMISOM.

CHAPTER 7 – SURVEY RESULTS AND ANALYSIS OF MEMBERS OF ENDF OUTLOOK ON ETHIOPIAN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

“If you wish to experience peace, provide peace for another.” Dalai Lama

“Peace is not something you wish for, it's something you make.” Robert Fulghum


7.1 Introduction

A survey was done for a total of 420 men and women in uniform who responded to the quantitative survey. The results for each question are included below, including a brief analysis for each question. From Survey 1 up to survey 14 are for a total of 420 ENDF members. Survey question 15 is for only 122 soldiers who were deployed to mission areas of second and third-time deployments. Survey questions 17 up to 24 for 200 contingents, five Staff Officers, and five Military Observers returnees from mission areas.

7.2 Survey Results


7.2.1 Survey Results of Total 420 ENDF Peacekeepers

Survey 1 – Military Rank




From the survey's total participants, 50.7% are Non-commissioned Officers, 27.4% are Junior Officers, and 21.9% are Senior Officers.

Survey 2 – Sex



From the survey's total participants, 88.3% are male, and 11.7% are female. This is due to low involvement of women in ENDF. Though the Ministry of Defence does not release any data about the female members of ENDF, the national defense forces guidelines allow up to ten percent (10%) of female representation.⁵⁴⁴ This is also reflected in the peacekeeping deployment.


Survey 3 – Age



From the survey's total participants, 19.52% are from age 18-29; 51.9% from 30-40, 25.95% from 40-50; and 2.61% above 50 years old.


⁵⁴⁴ Gebremichael, Seble Menberu. "Women in Peacekeeping Missions in Africa: The Case of the Ethiopian Army deployed in Abyei (Sudan / South Sudan border)". 23 January 2019. https://lamenparle.hypotheses.org/978#_ftn2. Accessed on 20 December 2019.

Survey 4 – Marital Status




From the survey's total participants, 67.38% are married, 31.19% are single and 1.42% are divorced.

Survey 5 – Educational Level




From the survey's total participants, 1.19% have a Master's degree, 14.04% finished their bachelor degree, 24.76% got a diploma, 49.28% finished high school, 9.04% finished their primary education, and 1.66% has no formal education but read and write.

Survey 6 – Service Year




From the survey's total participants, 47.14% served more than 15 years, 30.23% 10-15 years, 18.57% 5-10 years, and 4.04% served less than five years before deployment the peacekeeping mission.

Survey 7 – Mission Area (Returned or About to Deploy)




From the survey's total participants, 33.57% were deployed in Darfur, 29.28% in Abyei, 20.23% in South Sudan, 15% in Somalia, 3.56% in Liberia, and 0.47% in Burundi.

Survey 8 – Number of Deployment




From the survey's total participants, 70.95% of officers were deployed for the first time, 27.14% were deployed two times, and 1.9% were deployed three times to a peacekeeping mission.

Survey 9 – Personal Motivation for Deployment




From the survey's total participants, more than half of the officers (66%) claim their motivation for peacekeeping deployment is to help peoples of neighboring countries in conflict; 24% said because it is one of their military duty, and 10% motivated by more payment of peacekeeping deployment.

Survey 10 – Why do you think the Ethiopian Government Sends its troops to Peace Support Operations?




From the survey's total participants, the two most common answers to why Ethiopia deploy peace-keeping troops are: because the mission will indirectly protect Ethiopia from terrorists in neighboring states and prevent conflicts from spillover to Ethiopia, 47% and help people conflict areas 33%. 15% of said it is because UN obligation and 5% said it is because the Ethiopia government wanted to get more money.

Survey 11 – How is your knowledge about the climate, topography, social and cultural issues, and the conflicting parties at the mission area you about to be deployed?




From the survey's total participants, most of the officers who are deployed to mission areas have some kind of knowledge about climate, topography, social and cultural issues, and the conflicting parties at the mission area, 19% are extremely, 41% are very aware, 32% are moderately aware. Only 7% of them are slightly aware and 1% are not aware at all.

Survey 12 – Before your deployment, how are the experience and knowledge sharing with peace-keepers who returned from the mission?




From the survey's total participants, it can be deduced that most of the officers will get some kind of informal or formal experience sharing from the officers returned from the same mission they were about to be deployed, 14% share very high experience and knowledge, 29% high, and 38% share medium experience and knowledge. On the other hand 17% have low share experience and knowledge and 2% very low.

Survey 13 – How is your interest in participating in mission areas outside the Horn of Africa regions like the Democratic Republic of Congo and Mali?



From the survey's total participants, it can be deduced that the majority of officers are interested in being deployed in peacekeeping missions outside the Horn of Africa region, 36% has very high interest, 22% high interest, and 26% Medium; 10% has low interest and 6% very low.


Survey 14 – Do you believe the selection or recruitment of peacekeepers in regards to their physical fitness, health, and overall criteria is done with the UN standard?



From the survey's total participants, the majority of the officers, 70% support the selection norms; however, 30% do not agree with it.

7.2.2 Survey Results of 122 troops who were deployed for the second and third times.

Survey 15 – Places of deployment of 122 troops who were deployed for the second and third times.




From the survey's total 420 participants, 29.04 % were deployed for the second and third time.

Out of which, 55.73% were deployed to Darfur, and 29.5% were deployed to Liberia for the second or third time, the others were deployed in Abyei, Somalia, South Sudan, Rwanda, and Burundi.


7.2.3 Survey Results of 200 Returnees from Mission, Five Returnees Staff Officers, and Five Returnees Military Observers

Survey 16 - Are you are willing to go on a peacekeeping mission again?




From the survey of a total of 210 returnees from peacekeeping missions, the most significant number of officers, 89% are willing to go to peacekeeping missions again. Only 11% are not willing to go to peacekeeping mission over again.

Survey 17 – What are the main problems in Mission Area?




From the survey of a total of 210 returnees from peacekeeping missions, one of the most significant challenges is language, which is 55%. Other challenges are the weather condition 24%, rebel groups in the mission area 15%, and challenges in the local community constituted 6%.

Survey 18 –The similarities between the pre-deployment training with the actual mission realities and its contribution to the troops to accomplish their mission successfully.




From the survey of a total of 210 returnees from peacekeeping missions, for the majority of them (73% very high and high) the pre-deployment training is similar to the actual mission reality, and it contributed to their mission's success. For 21% it contributed in medium level, for 4% low and for 3% very low.

Survey 19 – How do you evaluate ENDF peacekeepers' members in the overall execution of their tasks in missions?




From the survey of a total of 210 returnees from peacekeeping missions, the majority believe ENDF officers are better at executing the mission duties, 53% very high and 26%. 15% of the respondents are answered medium, 3% low, and 4% very low.

Survey 20 – How are the Relations with troops from other counties in Mission Areas?



From the survey of a total of 210 returnees from peacekeeping missions, the majority believe there is better relations with other countries' troops despite the language barrier, 58% very high and 25% high. 14% of the respondents respond medium, 3% low and 1% very low regarding their relations with troops from other states.


Survey 21 – Do you think you got experience from your peacekeeping deployment that can be useful in your local missions⁵⁴⁵?



⁵⁴⁵ Local missions are mostly in case of riots, civil unrest and ethnic clashes, when any unrest becomes beyond the capability of the police ENDF is requested to assist the regional police or regional special forces. Also according to the Constitution Article 87 in case of state of emergency.


From the survey of a total of 210 returnees from peacekeeping missions, the majority (74%) believes it is important and very important for the local duties. For 18% moderately important, for 5% slightly important, and for 4% not important at all.

Survey 22 – How are the ENDF peacekeepers’ relations with the communities or the warring parties in mission areas?




From the survey of a total of 210 returnees from peacekeeping missions, it can be deduced that ENDF peacekeepers have a good relationship with the communities or the warring parties in mission areas, 38% excellent relations, 33% good, 24% fair. It is only for 3% poor and 4% very poor relations.

Survey 23 – How was your overall mission experience?



From the survey of a total of 210 returnees from peacekeeping missions, 51% are satisfied more than their expectations, 32% found their peacekeeping mission precisely as they expected it, and for the 17%, it was below their expectation.

Survey 24 – If you have to go on a mission for the second time, where do you want to be deployed?



From the survey of a total of 210 returnees from peacekeeping missions, the first choice to go back again is to Abyei, 33%; the second choice is South Sudan, 27%; the third choice is Darfur 17%, of the ENDF officers. 11% of the officers are willing to be deployed anywhere and the rest of them are willing to be deployed in Mali, DRC and outside Africa. It can be deduced that from the mission areas Ethiopia is deploying its troops, Abyei is the most preferred mission among Ethiopian officers, and Somalia is the list preferred. In Abyei it is easier for Ethiopians to feel at home because all contingents are Ethiopians. On the other hand, AMISOM in Somalia is a warfighting mission that has high risk; besides, because it is an African Union mission, it has less reimbursement than the United Nations mission in Abyei.

7.3 Summery and Partial Conclusion

This chapter covers the second part of the analysis of the study. Twenty four (24) survey results were discovered and described in the chapter, on the members of ENDF outlook on Ethiopian peacekeeping deployment.

A total of 420 men and women in uniform responded to the 24 questions of a quantitative survey. From the survey's total participants, 50.7% are Non-commissioned Officers, 27.4% are Junior Officers, and 21.9% are Senior Officers; 88.3% are male, and 11.7% are female. This is due to the low involvement of women in ENDF. Though the Ministry of Defence does not release any data about the female members of ENDF, the national defense forces guidelines allow up to ten percent (10%) of female representation. This is also reflected in the peacekeeping deployment. The age group of the respondents is 19.52% from age 18-29; 51.9% from 30-40, 25.95% from 40-50; and 2.61% above 50 years old; the marital status, 67.38% are married, 31.19% are single, and 1.42% are divorced.

Regarding their academic status, 1.19% have a Master's degree, 14.04% finished their first degree, 24.76% got a diploma, 49.28% finished high school, 9.04% finished their primary education, and 1.66% has no formal education but read and write. The participants' service years are 47.14% served more than 15 years, 30.23% 10-15 years, 18.57% 5-10 years, and 4.04% served less than five years before deployment the peacekeeping mission.

From the survey's total participants, 33.57% were deployed in Darfur, 29.28% in Abyei, 20.23% in South Sudan, 15% in Somalia, 3.56% in Liberia, and 0.47% in Burundi; and 70.95% of officers were deployed for the first time, 27.14% were deployed two times, and 1.9% were deployed three times to a peacekeeping mission.

More than half of the officers (66%) claim their motivation for peacekeeping deployment is to help peoples of neighboring countries in conflict; 24% said because it is one of their military duty, and 10% motivated by more payment of peacekeeping deployment. The two most common answers to why Ethiopia deploy peacekeeping troops are: because the mission will indirectly protect Ethiopia from terrorists in neighboring states and prevent conflicts from spillover to Ethiopia, 47% and help people conflict areas 33%. 15% said it is because of UN obligation, and 5% said it is because the Ethiopian government wanted to get more money.

Regarding the pre-deployment knowledge of mission area: most of the officers who are deployed to mission areas have some kind of knowledge about climate, topography, social and cultural issues, and the conflicting parties at the mission area, 19% are extremely, 41% are very aware, 32% are moderately aware. Only 7% of them are slightly aware, and 1% are not aware at all. It can be deduced that most of the officers will get some kind of informal or formal experience sharing from

the officers returned from the same mission they were about to be deployed, 14% share very high experience and knowledge, 29% high, and 38% share medium experience and knowledge. On the other hand, 17% have low share experience and knowledge and 2% very low.

The majority of officers are interested in being deployed in peacekeeping missions outside the Horn of Africa region. 36% has very high interest, 22% high interest, and 26% Medium; 10% has low interest and 6% very low. Concerning the selection process of peacekeepers by MoD, from the survey's total participants, the majority of the officers, 70% support the selection norms; however, 30% do not agree with it.

From the survey's total 420 participants, 29.04 % were deployed for the second and third time. Out of these, 55.73% were deployed to Darfur, and 29.5% were deployed to Liberia for the second or third time; the others were deployed in Abyei, Somalia, South Sudan, Rwanda, and Burundi.

From 210 returnees from peacekeeping missions, the most significant number of officers, 89% are willing to go to peacekeeping missions again. Only 11% are not willing to go to a peacekeeping mission over again. Also, from the same number of returnees, one of the most significant challenges is language, which is 55%. Other challenges are the weather condition 24%, rebel groups in the mission area 15%, and challenges in the local community constituted 6%.

From the survey of a total of 210 returnees from peacekeeping missions, for the majority of them (73% very high and high), the pre-deployment training is similar to the actual mission reality, and it contributed to their mission's success. For 21%, it contributed at medium level, for 4% low and for 3% very low. From the same number of respondents, the majority believe there is better relations with other countries' troops despite the language barrier, 58% very high and 25% high. 14% of the respondents respond medium, 3% low, and 1% very low regarding their relations with troops from other states.

Similarly, from the survey of a total of 210 returnees from peacekeeping missions, the majority (74%) believe it is important and very important for the local duties. For 18% moderately important, for 5% slightly important, and for 4% not important at all. In addition to this, it can be deduced ENDF peacekeepers have a good relationship with the communities or the warring parties in mission areas; 38% respond excellent in their relations, 33% good, 24% fair. It is only for 3% poor and 4% very poor relations from the total of 210 returnees from peacekeeping missions. From

the same number of returnees, 51% are satisfied more than their expectations, 32% found their peacekeeping mission precisely as they expected it, and for the 17%, it was below their expectation.

From the survey of a total of 210 returnees from peacekeeping missions, the first choice to go back again is to Abyei, 33%; the second choice is South Sudan, 27%; the third choice is Darfur 17%, of the ENDF officers. 11% of the officers are willing to be deployed anywhere, and the rest of them are willing to be deployed in Mali, DRC, and outside Africa. It can be deduced that from the mission areas Ethiopia is deploying its troops, Abyei is the most preferred mission among Ethiopian officers, and Somalia is the list preferred.

CHAPTER 8 – THE NEXUS OF NATIONAL SECURITY, FOREIGN POLICY, MILITARY POWER, AND PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS DEPLOYMENT OF ETHIOPIA

“Peacekeeping works in some situations, but it very often needs other ingredients. Peacekeeping is not the aspirin of international security.”

Jean-Marie Guehenno

“When States decide to use force to deal with broader threats to international peace and security, there is no substitute for the unique legitimacy provided by the United Nations.”

Kofi Annan

This chapter will discuss five primary analyses of this study. First, it discusses four main Ethiopian geopolitical interests and security risks. Second, it discusses Ethiopia's next-door peace support operations, one of its foreign policy and national security strategies. Third, it forwards six rationales of Ethiopian participation in peacekeeping missions. The fourth one analyzes Ethiopian hegemony in the Horn of Africa region.

8.1 Ethiopian Geopolitical Interest and Security Risks

This study identified four levels of Ethiopian geopolitical interest and security risk responsiveness vis-à-vis peace support operation deployment. Ethiopia's first and immediate geopolitical interest and security risks are its neighboring countries or the IGAD region. Secondly, African Countries, which is AU and Ethiopia's Pan-Africa commitment; Thirdly, the Red Sea Region, which is a vital trade route and the nearest access to the sea for Ethiopia; and fourth, the Global focus, which is a commitment to collective international security and national prestige. These four Ethiopian geopolitical interest and security risk responsiveness vis-à-vis its peace support operation deployment are described in Figure 8.1.

8.1.1 Neighboring Countries/ the IGAD Region: Immediate National Security

Ethiopia's three vulnerabilities that emanate from its immediate neighbors are: first and foremost, spillover effect both conflict and refugee from failed states of Somalia, South Sudan, and Eritrea; second, the geographical factor, Ethiopia's lack of sea access or being a landlocked state makes it

dependent on using the ports of its neighbors. Third, the concentration of great powers military base in its most important trade route and port, Djibouti. The conflict spillover effect from failed States, mainly from South Sudan, Eritrea, and Somalia, is Ethiopia's principal foreign policy concern.




Figure 8.1 Ethiopian Geopolitical Interest and Security Risk Responsiveness vis-à-vis Peace Support Operation Deployment.

The four dashed oval rings represent Ethiopia's four geopolitical interests: neighboring countries, African countries, the Red Sea region, and the global arena. The yellow rectangles where the four geopolitical fields are written represent troops' size to be deployed in a given peacekeeping mission in that particular field.

8.1.1.1 Failed State Neighbors

The main problem with failed states is they 'fundamentally lack the capacity to fulfill obligations of sovereignty, such as monitoring and governing their territories to prevent different actors there from launching unauthorized attacks on neighbors or more generally spreading disorder across

their borders.⁵⁴⁶ For example, in Somalia, starting from the overthrow of the Siad Barre regime, Islamist insurgency attacks have extended in neighboring states to Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda. (Ethiopian experience with these Islamist groups was discussed in Section 6.2). Also, in the case of South Sudan, kidnapping and cattle are common in the bordering Gambella regional state of Ethiopia; besides the refugee influx, the South Sudanese government, which is in civil war since 2013, was not in a position to do anything.

According to Mehari T. Maru, described as following how the Ethiopian government emphasizes in its neighboring states regional organization IGAD:

Although active in all these multilateral platforms, in practice, Ethiopia is more heavily involved in IGAD than the others, and it is the challenges and opportunities peculiar to the IGAD region that have an immediate impact on the internal and regional challenges [Ethiopia] faces. Thus, IGAD increasingly dominates government thinking. Ethiopia's political leaders, diplomats, experts, and armed forces have played a critical part in all major IGAD activities.⁵⁴⁷

Thus, Ethiopia's approach to the Horn of Africa regional security has been primarily influenced by minimizing its vulnerabilities and immediate national security threats that its national role in peacekeeping emanates from, and this role has become the defining paradigm for its foreign policy engagement.

8.1.1.2 Landlockedness

With the Eritrean secession in 1991 and with the 1998-2000 Ethio-Eritrean war and border stalemate,⁵⁴⁸ Ethiopia lost its Red Sea ports of Massawa and Assab. This left Ethiopia landlocked, and thus, it needs positive relations with its most essential neighbors with a port, namely Djibouti, Somaliland or Somalia, Kenya, and Sudan; and also have a stable government, to use their ports.

⁵⁴⁶ Beyene, Abdeta D. and Seyoum Mesfin. The Practicalities of Living with Failed States. *The American Academy of Arts & Sciences*. 147/1. Winter 2018.

⁵⁴⁷ Maru, Mehari T. *A Regional Power in the Making: Ethiopian Diplomacy in the Horn of Africa*. Occasional Paper 261. South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA). June 2017.

⁵⁴⁸ After the appointment of a new Prime Minister in Ethiopia, Abiy Ahmed (Ph.D.) in April 2018, and his call for peace, the two countries signed a Joint Declaration on Peace and Friendship in July 9th, 2018 in Eritrean capital, Asmara and an Agreement on Peace, Friendship and Comprehensive Cooperation in September 16th, 2018 in Saudi Arabia. This will be a beginning of a new chapter in the complicated relationship between the two states. (Sigatu, Kaleab T. No Peace No War: Ethiopian-Eritrean Conflict. *Academic and Applied Research in Military and Public Management Science (AARMS)*. 18/1, 2019. 91

Brendon J. Cannon explains the vulnerability of a land lock state and how the security of the neighboring transit state matters, as follows:

Also, the fact that trade from a landlocked country must pass through a sovereign transit country in order to access international shipping markets creates a serious political vulnerability on the former. If a landlocked country and its transit neighbor are in conflict, either military or diplomatic, the transit neighbor can block borders, implement regulatory changes that impede trade, or simply increase tariffs. Even when there is no direct conflict, landlocked countries are extremely vulnerable to the political vagaries of their transit neighbors.⁵⁴⁹

In this regard, besides paying attention to the region's security, Ethiopia goes beyond buying the share of the Berbera port in Somaliland to reduce its dependency on Djibouti's port.

8.1.1.3 Foreign Military Bases in the Horn of Africa

The Horn of Africa has become one of the most militarized regions in the World. Currently, there are fifteen states with operational military bases, one under construction and two with possible existing military facilities, in Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, and Somaliland. In addition to that, there is a high military naval presence in the nearby waters of the Red Sea, Gulf of Eden, and Bab al-Mandab.


⁵⁴⁹ Cannon, Brendon J. Ethiopia, Berbera Port and the Shifting Balance of Power in the Horn of Africa. *Rising Powers Quarterly*. Volume 2, Issue 4, 2017. 10.

No.	Horn of Africa States	The Foreign States with a Military Base in the Horn Region
1	Djibouti	US, France, China, Saudi Arabia, Japan, Germany, Spain, and Italy
2	Eritrea	Iran, Israel, and Russia
3	Ethiopia	-
4	Kenya	UK and US
5	Somaliland	UAE
6	Somalia	Turkey, the US, and the UK
7	Sudan	Turkey and Russia
8	South Sudan	<i>US presence</i>
9	Uganda	<i>US presence</i>

Table 8.1 Foreign Military Bases in the Horn of Africa

The militarization of Ethiopian neighbors is another vital security threat for Ethiopia. The presence of Gulf powers can lead to the expansion of fundamentalism in the region; similarly, there is the danger of exporting Iran vs. the Saudi Arabian camp rivalry to the region as it occurred in Yemen and exporting Qatar vs. Saudi Arabian camp contention. These are threats to Ethiopia's foreign policy interest in the region. Moreover, regarding acquiring dependable port access, the expansion of foreign military bases presents a colossal challenge. Generally, this will defy Ethiopia's hegemony and dominant role in the Horn of Africa.

These three vulnerabilities of Ethiopia: being surrounded by failed neighboring states, its landlockedness, and the presence of many foreign military bases in the region will determine Ethiopia's foreign policy area of interest and action radius of military deployment or force projection as it is described in Figure 8.1.



Map 8.1 Foreign Military presence in the Horn of Africa Region⁵⁵⁰ (CTF = Combined Task Force; EUNAVFOR = European Union Naval Force; EUTM-S = European Union Training Mission in Somalia.)

8.1.2 African Countries: AU and Pan-African Commitment

Ethiopia as a founding member of OAU and later AU and the seat for the Organization. One of the few standard policies of all the past three regimes in the nation's modern political history is a commitment to AU and Pan-Africanism (See Section 4.2.1). The late Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, in his speech at the OAU meeting in Lome, Togo, in 1998, said the following:

⁵⁵⁰ Source: Melvin, N. J. 'The new external security politics of the Horn of Africa region'. *SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security*. No. 2019/2, Apr. 2019.

In respect of government rules in Ethiopia, Ethiopia has always been committed to African independence and liberation. Who trained Mandela? Emperor Haile Selassie, the reactionary, trained Mandela, the revolutionary. Mandela was trained in Ethiopia. Who supported Mugabe in his fight against Rhodesia? Mengistu! Internally Mengistu was a butcher. But on the issue of Africa, Mengistu was as sold as Haile Selassie was. Ethiopia's commitment to Africa has not varied with governments. You could have Emperor Haile Selassie, you could have Mengistu, and you could have a different government; it didn't matter. Every Ethiopian knows how it feels to be alone. We were alone at the table of Europeans during the League of Nations, and we know what happens to us there. Now we are not alone; we have fifty-three African countries. And therefore, every Ethiopian could not but understand the meaning of African unity.⁵⁵¹

Taking this into account, when the notion of 'African solutions to African problems' initiative which trace its root to the discourse of Salim Ahmed Salim, Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1997, who addressed the Chiefs of Defense Staff of Member States of the OAU as follows:

The OAU Member States can no longer afford to stand aloof and expect the International Community to care more for our problems than we do, or indeed to find solutions to those problems which, in many instances, have been of our own making. The simple truth that we must confront today is that the world does not owe us a living, and we must remain at the forefront of efforts to act and act speedily to prevent conflicts from getting out of control.⁵⁵²

Later, AU, in 2002, established the Peace and Security Council (PSC). Though OAU established a mechanism to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts in Africa at the 1993 Summit in Cairo, it showed the weakness of OAU's conflict prevention and management after the 1994 Rwandan tragedy.⁵⁵³ On the other hand, the PSC is a standing organ of the AU with core functions to conduct early warning and preventive diplomacy, facilitate peace-making, establish peace-support operations and, in certain circumstances, recommend intervention in the Member States to promote peace security, and stability.⁵⁵⁴

⁵⁵¹ HahuDaily Ethiopia. *Meles Zenawi in Togo Lome about AU Headquarter*. youtube.com. 29 Jan 2016. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DL4ogpyzVa8>, Accessed on 24 February 2020.

⁵⁵² Address by Salim Ahmed Salim, then Secretary-General of the OAU, at the Second Meeting of the Chiefs of Defense Staff of Member States of the OAU Central Organ, Harare, October 25, 1997. Cited in Malan, Mark. "Africa: Building Institutions on the Run". In Daniel, Donald C. et al. *Peace Operations: Trends, Progress, and Prospects*. Georgetown University Press: Washington, D.C, 2008. 90.

⁵⁵³ Murithi, Tim. "The African Union's ... 72.

⁵⁵⁴ The African Union Commission. "Peace and Security Council (PSC)". AU. 2017. <https://au.int/web/en/organs/psc>, Accessed on 23 January 2017.

With the PSC mechanism, AU started peacekeeping missions in Africa. The first mission wholly initiated, planned, and executed by AU members in 2003 was deployed to Burundi was African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB).⁵⁵⁵ In 2004, the UN Security Council decided to establish UN Peace Operations in Burundi (ONUB), and AMIB troops were incorporated into the ONUB.⁵⁵⁶ Likewise, after the Darfur crisis in Sudan, AU set up a peacekeeping operation in 2004, African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). By 2007 AU/UN Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) was established by the Security Council and incorporated AMIS personnel.⁵⁵⁷ Furthermore, AMISOM was created by the African Union's Peace and Security Council on 19th January 2007 with the approval of the United Nations. These trends of assuming the responsibility of securing peace and ensuring stability on the African continent by African states is the idea of African solutions for African problems, which is taken earnestly by Ethiopia where it contributed peacekeepers for all mentioned operations.

8.1.3 The Red Sea Region

The Red Sea is a significant waterway for international trade, which lies between the Arabian Peninsula of western Asia and northeast of Africa, the Horn of Africa. Currently, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Yemen have costs of the Red Sea. Before the independence of Eritrea, 1006 km of the Red Sea coast, lies entirely in Ethiopia. In the south, there is the Bab-el-Mandeb strait, which connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, located between Yemen, Djibouti, and Eritrea, and further in the south, the Gulf of Aden situated between Somalia and Yemen.

Throughout history, the Red Sea has been the primary entry point to the Horn of Africa, to the Portuguese, the Ottoman, the colonial powers of French, Britain, and Italy, and after the WWII Soviet Union and the United States and recently the Gulf nations and China. These powers also have been trying to put the Red Sea region under their sphere of influence. Thus, this region is vital both for the states of the region and for the foreign powers. The ports of the Sudan, Eritrea,

⁵⁵⁵Murithi, Tim. "The African Union's ...75.

⁵⁵⁶Ibid. 76

⁵⁵⁷Security Council. "Security Council Authorised deployment of United Nations African Union 'Hybrid' peace operations in Bid to resolve Darfur Conflict". Press Release. SC/9089 31 July 2007. <http://www.un.org/press/en/2007/sc9089.doc.htm>, Accessed on 22 January 2017.

Djibouti, and Somalia, as discussed in Section 7.1.1 foreign powers for security and economic reasons.

Roberto Aliboni describes the importance of the Red Sea as follows:

A mere glance at a map of the Middle East gives an indication of the paramount strategic importance of the Red Sea. Lying as it does between two continents, Africa and Asia, between the Middle East and the Far East, as well as between Europe and Asia, the Red Sea is at the heart of an area that has seen the birth of civilizations and religions and which constitutes a link between two worlds and two civilizations. The geopolitical position of the Red Sea is of special importance: bordering the eastern coast of Africa and the western coast of the Arabian peninsula, it is a vital route for the transportation of oil through Bab el-Mandeb in the south to the Suez Canal in the north.⁵⁵⁸



⁵⁵⁸ Aliboni, Roberto. *The Red Sea Region: Local Actors and the Superpowers*. Sydney: Croom Helm. 1985. ix.

Map 8.2 Red Sea, Bab-el-Mandeb, the Gulf of Aden, and the Horn of Africa⁵⁵⁹

One of the most strategic countries in the Red Sea region is Yemen. Yemen is geographically and historically very proximate to the Horn of Africa. It is separated by the Red Sea and its closest point to the Horn, which is with Eritrea, is less than 100 km.⁵⁶⁰ Besides this, Yemen has political relations with the states of the region; for example, Yemen was involved in a two-day war with Eritrea over the Hanish Islands; it has played the role of mediation between Eritrea and Sudan in 1994 and the warring Somali factions; on the other hand, Yemen was assisted by Eritrean President Afwerki when tensions increased following the unification of North and South Yemen.⁵⁶¹

Most importantly, in 2002, Yemen, Ethiopia and Sudan initiated trilateral cooperation, the Sana'a Forum for Cooperation, which later (Somalia and Djibouti joined in 2004 and 2010, respectively. The Forum is as focused on trade and regional security. The Forum 'aims to protect the coasts of the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea through the maintenance of peace, security, and stability in the region.'⁵⁶²

Thus, some scholars even argue 'Yemen is more a part of the Horn than often acknowledged and policy-makers.'⁵⁶³ Mulugeta G. Berhe also suggests 'Yemen, Libya, and Egypt are no less involved in the issues and processes of the region and certainly have an impact on power balances and developments.'⁵⁶⁴ Even in the Cold War history of the region, according to General Mohamed Nur Galal, a former deputy Defense minister of Somalia, 'in early 1977, Fidel Castro brought together the leaders of Somalia, Ethiopia, and Southern Yemen at the meeting in Aden in March 1977, and suggested to create Greater Socialist Federal State in the region, an Ethiopian-

⁵⁵⁹ Source: Einstein, Norman. *Map showing the location of the Gulf of Aden, located between Yemen and Somalia. Nearby bodies of water include the Indian Ocean, Red Sea, Arabian Sea, and the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait.* https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Gulf_of_Aden_map.png, 29 January 2009. Accessed on 01 July 2020.

⁵⁶⁰ Abdellaoui, Jamila El 'Yemen: Part of the Problem, Part of the Solution'. 28 April 2010. <https://reliefweb.int/report/eritrea/yemen-part-problem-part-solution>, Accessed 12 February 2019.

⁵⁶¹ Ibid.

⁵⁶² Sudan Tribune. 'Ethiopia's Prime Minister says Sanaa Forum is open to all'. 31 December 2008. <https://sudantribune.com/spip.php?article29729>, Accessed on 20 January 2019.

⁵⁶³ Abdellaoui, Jamila El 'Yemen: Part of the Problem, Part of the Solution'. 28 April 2010. <https://reliefweb.int/report/eritrea/yemen-part-problem-part-solution>, Accessed 12 February 2019.

⁵⁶⁴ Berhe, Mulugeta G. Regional Peace and Security Co-Operation Under the Intergovernmental Authority on Development: Development and Challenges. *Eastern Africa Social Science Research Review*, Volume 30, Number 1, January 2014. 108.

Somali-Yemeni Socialist Federation. The merger would create a strategic alliance that would control the Red Sea, Suez Canal, the Arabian Gulf, and the Indian Ocean.⁵⁶⁵ Though Castro's suggestion did not work, the security of the region is tied with Yemen. Yemen has been in civil war since 2014. The war in Yemen has also been a significant security challenge for the Horn of Africa. Michael Horton describes how firearms from Yemen fueling Conflicts in the Horn of Africa as follows:

Arms trafficking via the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea has a long history. However, the wars in Yemen and the vast number of arms and materiel provided by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have ushered in a golden age for regional arms traffickers. The flow of weapons and material from Yemen to the Horn of Africa has increased over the last three years... At the Bab al-Mandeb strait, only 20 miles of water separate Yemen and Djibouti. Skiffs equipped with powerful outboard engines can cross from Yemen to Eritrea and Djibouti in hours in favorable weather. Larger vessels sailing from Yemen take only days to reach the extensive and thinly populated coasts of Puntland and Somalia. It is these desolate and largely uncontrolled coastlines that make the region ideal for arms traffickers and the illicit networks they operate within.⁵⁶⁶

Moreover, states of the region have been involved in the conflict. For example, Eritrea agreed to provide land, airspace and allegedly sent 400 soldiers to Yemen's war.⁵⁶⁷ Sudanese troops also have been deployed since 2015 against the Houthi movement, though it reduced the number of troops it has in Yemen from a peak of 15,000 to 5,000 in 2019.⁵⁶⁸

Concerning Ethiopian interest in the Red Sea, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Ethiopian Defense Force, General Berhanu Julla, said in 2019, 'We must show our influence around the sea. Different countries are coming from far and creating influences on the sea. We are a great nation with over 100 million people. There is no any reason Ethiopia remains landlocked.'⁵⁶⁹ Similarly, Tekeda Alemu, former state minister of foreign affairs and permanent representative of Ethiopia to the

⁵⁶⁵ Maruf, Harun. 'Fidel Castro Left Mark on Somalia, Horn of Africa'. 26 November 2016. <https://www.voanews.com/africa/fidel-castro-left-mark-somalia-horn-africa>, Accessed on 02 March 2019.

⁵⁶⁶ Horton, Michael. 'Arms from Yemen will Fuel Conflict in the Horn of Africa'. <https://jamestown.org/program/arms-from-yemen-will-fuel-conflict-in-the-horn-of-africa/>, Accessed on 20 March 2020.

⁵⁶⁷ Berhane, Samson. Scramble for the Horn. *Ethiopian Business Review*. Vol. 7. No. 67. October 16 – November 15 2018. 15.

⁵⁶⁸ Abdelaziz, Khalid. *Sudan says it has reduced troops in Yemen to 5,000*. 8 December 2019. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sudan-politics-idUSKBN1YCOH4>, Accessed on 20 January 2020.

⁵⁶⁹ Buta, Idris. Abiy Ahmed's Ethiopia: Bandwagon or Hegemony? January 31, 2019. <https://thenewturkey.org/abiy-ahmeds-ethiopia-bandwagon-or-hegemony>, Accessed on 20 November 2019.

United Nations from January 2011 until September 2018, stressed Ethiopia's attentiveness to the Red Sea region as follows:

The Red Sea region will continue to be a challenge for the countries of the Horn of Africa, and though we are not a Red Sea littoral country, for Ethiopia as well. There is no doubt that matters have changed in the region, and the Red Sea is becoming a magnet, pulling toward the Horn of Africa's diverse interests making the geopolitical situation there dicey. This is a worrying development that Ethiopia cannot afford to observe with disinterest.⁵⁷⁰

Also, the revised FRDE Foreign Policy draft white paper says the following on the importance of the Red Sea region:

Due to its geographic proximity, cultural, religious, and historical connections, this region has an impact on Ethiopia's peace, political and social affairs. Moreover, the region is where resource-rich and oil-producing countries that can immensely contribute to economic integration, investment, and the expansion of trade and investment. With regards to peace and security and foreign affairs, the ongoing conflicts in the Middle Eastern countries have posed a great challenge to the region Ethiopia is situated in. Considering both the influence the Middle East countries have and their respective policies towards the Red sea area, Ethiopia should confirm that its strong relationship with the Middle Eastern countries is conducted in a manner that ensures its lasting interest. Ensuring its benefits on the Red sea is a matter of survival for Ethiopia. Since Ethiopia pursues a direct interest in the Red sea, it will play its role in coordination with the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and the Horn of Africa region countries.⁵⁷¹

Because of internal political instability in Ethiopia since 2016, Ethiopia's role in the region and its role in the civil war in Yemen appears to be ignored. However, Ethiopia managed to send a staff officer to Hodeidah Agreement (UNMHA), which is a political mission overseeing Yemen's peace agreement.

8.1.4 Global: Commitment to International Collective Security and National Prestige

Ethiopia, since joined the League of Nations as the first African nation based on two pillars of its national interest: collective security and national prestige, as discussed in Section 4.2.1. Similarly, Peacekeeping has become an indispensable part of Ethiopia's foreign and military policy for the last twenty-six years. Its growing involvement in peacekeeping operations in the region makes the

⁵⁷⁰ Alemu, Tekeda. 'The conundrum of present Ethiopian foreign policy—in search of a roadmap for Ethiopia's Foreign and National Security Policy and Strategy'. *CDRC DIGEST*. Vol. 4 No. 1, January 2019.

⁵⁷¹ *The Revised FRDE Foreign Relations Draft Policy Document*. Addis Ababa. May 2019

government look for its hegemonic position in African and global politics and enhance its national image.

Besides the old peacekeeping missions in Korea and Congo since the mid-1990s, Ethiopia contributed to one remote operation, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), which was established in 2004. However, Ethiopia sent its officers after 2010 when the UN increased the overall force levels to support Haiti's immediate recovery, reconstruction, and stability efforts because of the earthquake, which resulted in more than 220,000 deaths and 96 UN peacekeepers.

Ethiopia became the temporary member of the UN Security Council for the third time – after twenty-six years of absence – without opposition in June 2016. In the campaign to the UNSC seat, the then Ethiopian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tedros Adhanom, stated during the African Union's 26th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government that Ethiopia's desire to be a member of the Security Council emanates from 'a strong and real belief that our solid record of continued contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security puts us in a well-placed position to shoulder the responsibility.'⁵⁷² He also mentioned historically, 'Ethiopia has always responded to UN calls for collective action on international peace and security. Since the inception of the UN, Ethiopia has deployed over 100,000 military and police personnel through UN peacekeeping missions worldwide.'⁵⁷³

8.2 Ethiopian Next-door Peace Support Operation as a Foreign Policy and National Security Strategy

Troop contribution from the next-door neighbor is one of the concerns scholars give attention to. Paul D. Williams and Thong Nguyen argue about next-door neighbors T/PCCs as follows:

... the decision calculus of next-door neighbors, as a distinct category of potential T/PCCs, would be influenced more heavily by security, political, and potentially normative considerations than that of more distant states. In Africa, where the majority of UN peacekeepers have been deployed since 1990, this is captured by the popular adage about the imperative of helping to put out a fire in your neighbor's house. This embodies a security imperative to prevent the fire from spreading and burning your own house, a political imperative to

⁵⁷² Mesle, A. "Africa: Ethiopia's UNSC Seat - Reinvigorating UN's Role in Addressing Global Challenges" *Al-lafica*. 8 July 2016. <http://allafrica.com/stories/201607111176.html>, Accessed on 22 March, 2017.

⁵⁷³ *Ibid*.

maintain good relations with your neighbors, and a moral imperative to help a neighbor and fellow Africans in trouble.⁵⁷⁴

On the other hand, in 1998, Jocelyn Coulon argues as it is more of for economic gain as follows:

The financial and military benefits of participation in peacekeeping missions have led many countries of the Third World and the former East bloc to offer their services to the UN on a massive scale. ... The civilian and military planners of the peacekeeping operations in New York and in the various missions throughout the world are not exactly delighted with the eagerness of these countries to offer their services to the UN. But no official wants to say this openly, and the UN must accept the soldiers provided. Moreover, UN rule calls for an equitable geographic distribution of member countries when missions are formed. (An exception to this rule is the Cyprus mission, where, at the request of the local government, 'troops of color' were excluded.) (Karl Th. Birgisson, 'United Nations Peacekeeping Forces in Cyprus,' in Durch, ed., *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*, 227.) The planners' misgivings have nothing to do with the skin color of the soldiers but rather with their training and discipline, the equipment with which they are supplied, and their professionalism.⁵⁷⁵

Also, in 1958, UN's second secretary-general, Dag Hammarskjöld, considering the geopolitics in the context of the Cold War, forwarded his concern of avoiding neighboring states to deploy their military in neighboring host state as follows:

In order to limit the scope of a possible difference of opinion, the United Nations in recent operations has followed two principles: not to include units from any of the permanent members of the Security Council; and not to include units from any country which, because of its geographical position or for other reasons, might be considered as possibly having a special interest in the situation which has called for the operation.⁵⁷⁶

However, because of familiarity of the next-door neighbor to the conflict, the cultural similarity, and geographical proximity, which has the advantage of lower cost and short time of responding when conflict broke out (as Ethiopia in the case of UNISFA), it seems UN 'breaks with a long-

⁵⁷⁴ Williams, Paul D. and Thong Nguyen, "Neighborhood Dynamics in UN Peacekeeping Operations, 1990–2017," New York: International Peace Institute, April 2018. <https://www.ipinst.org/2018/04/neighborhood-dynamics-in-un-peacekeeping-operations>, Accessed on 28 January 2019.

⁵⁷⁵ Coulon, Jocelyn. *Soldiers of Diplomacy: The United Nations, Peacekeeping, and the New World Order*. (English Translation by Phyllis Aronoff and Howard Scott) Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998. 39.

⁵⁷⁶ Quoted in Williams, Paul D. and Thong Nguyen, "Neighborhood Dynamics in UN Peacekeeping Operations, 1990–2017," New York: International Peace Institute, April 2018. <https://www.ipinst.org/2018/04/neighborhood-dynamics-in-un-peacekeeping-operations>, Accessed on 28 January 2019.

standing principle of not allowing a country to engage in a peace support operation in a neighboring country.⁵⁷⁷ As well, it has become clear that ‘no regional support or interest in intervening many operations would fail, because conflicts usually, if not always, have a regional dimension and are embedded historically in cross-border dynamics.’⁵⁷⁸

In the case of Ethiopia, its geopolitical location in the Horn of Africa makes it vulnerable because of civil wars, failed states, and the risk of spillover conflicts and refugees. Thus, in order to protect its national interest, Ethiopia needs to keep the peace of its neighbors for its own interest.

The current Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali, emphasizing the importance of focusing on foreign relations with the next-door neighbors, said as follows:

Establishing and enhancing a relation, which is based on cooperation, with our neighboring countries will be the prime focus of our foreign relations. With regard to neighboring countries, we should follow the old [Ethiopian] sayings, “A cactus that grows next to a conkerberry wipes all its days,” or “A ficus tree planted next to a water spring flourishes all the time.” A country with neighbors who failed to ensure their peace and lack internal stability cannot ensure lasting and reliable peace and stability. It is known that the interrelation between Ethiopian people, amongst themselves, and their relation with people in the region dates back to the formation of the modern nation-state. A well-defined and integrated outline should be put in place so that our foreign relations would reinforce these routes of communication, and our diplomacy would scale up existing economic and social interactions.

Our relation with our neighbors should get the prime focus of the relations we have with others. We should exert more efforts on our relations with our neighbors, particularly in the areas of peace and security, where a number of gaps and pending issues were witnessed.

Our relation with our neighbors should be strengthened in two directions. The first one is that we can scale up our relation by strengthening IGAD and making them pay attention to IGAD. In addition, Ethiopia should work on creating comprehensive bilateral diplomatic relations with the neighboring countries.

...the problem our relation with our neighbors frequently faces is a negative attitude that emanates from the siege mentality. Both the siege mentality and being suspicious against our neighbors do have a psychological contribution to defending our sovereignty. However, suppose we set our relation beyond conspiracy and hearsay. In that case, we will be

⁵⁷⁷ Fejerskov, Adam M. et al. “African Peace Operations and the Power of Regional Interests,” Danish Institute for International Studies, November 2017. Available at www.diis.dk/en/research/african-peace-operations-and-the-power-of-regional-interests, Accessed on 29 January 2019.

⁵⁷⁸ Ibid.

able to not only create the foundation that will enable us to grow together but also add up our resources that we spend suspecting each other and resolve our problems easily.

It is essential to do away with a relationship based on insecurity and create a partnership centered on economic cooperation, harmony, and unification. It is also vital to ensure regional peace by putting an end to squabbles on “sheltering,” “training,” and “arming” each other’s armed opposition forces. In addition to enhancing our role in the region, we should also consider the Arab countries as neighbors and lasting partners, not as our historic enemies. Our foreign relations should be conducted by maintaining not-alignment between contradictory forces and interests and by strengthening friendship.⁵⁷⁹

The revised FRDE Foreign Relations Daft Policy Document.

The Horn of Africa region incorporates countries of the region that are geographically adjacent to each other that are interlinked by history, culture, language, and above all, geographic and people to people relations.

The state of these countries is interlinked with Ethiopia greatly. Through its age-old history, Ethiopia has long-standing relations with most of its neighbors.

Despite the geographic differences, the Horn of Africa countries enjoy a high degree of similarities in the economic sector and practice. Not only most of the economy is dependent on agriculture and mining, but it is also of the lowest productivity. Though the countries are endowed with huge development potential, their peoples are lingering in poverty. On the contrary, it is possible to collectively develop by using and exploiting – their national resources that may facilitate their development. Their young population is the main resource and capital of the countries of the region. Ethiopia believes that its relations with the Horn of Africa countries are commendable and stronger. Therefore, Ethiopia’s foreign affairs policy attaches special attention to neighboring countries.⁵⁸⁰

Ethiopia’s peacekeeping operations in its next-door neighbors can also be analyzed based on Berouk Mesfin’s ‘classical problem-solving techniques: define the problem, propose solutions, test the solutions and implement the best one’⁵⁸¹ adopted to the Ethiopian next-door peace support operations. The Ethiopian process of national security planning and practical activity towards its three neighboring states has been mainly deploying its peacekeeping troops, as elaborated in the table below.

⁵⁷⁹ Ali, Abiy A. *Medemer*. Addis Ababa: Tsehai Publishers. 2019. 257-260

⁵⁸⁰ *The Revised FRDE Foreign Relations Daft Policy Document*. Addis Ababa. May 2019

⁵⁸¹ Mesfin, Berouk. *The Role of Military Power in Ethiopia’s National Security (1974-1991)*. A Thesis submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of Addis Ababa University. In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in International Relations. Addis Ababa, June 2002.

Functions of National Security	Somalia	Sudan	South Sudan
Defining the vital national interest that has to be safeguarded	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Export of Agricultural goods - Ethnic Somali's live both in Somalia and in Ethiopia 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Oil Import - Import and Export of Agricultural goods 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Oil Import - Minimizing migration - Illicit arms trade
Identifying threats for the National Interest	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Islamists and Irredentists coming to power in Mogadishu 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Civil War in Sudan - Alliance with Egypt against Ethiopia's GER Dam over the Nile 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Civil War
Selecting strategic actions with the available elements of national power can be mobilized by the state.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Supporting the Federal government with sending its troops to fight Al-Shabaab (Unilateral intervention) - Deploying its troops with AMISOM 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - PM involved (2019-2020) - Deploying its troops to UNAMID in Darfur - Deploying its troops to UNISFA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Abyei - Deploying its troops to UNMISS and CTSAMM - Involve in IGAD mediation

Table 8.2 The Three Ethiopian National Security Functions towards the three countries Ethiopian peace-keeping troops deployed.

8.3 Rationales of Ethiopian Peace Support Operations

The issue of providing peacekeepers has been an central topic on the UN table for a long. In 2009 the UN revealed that:

The necessary military capabilities are increasingly scarce in the face of rising global demand. New peacekeeping tasks require high numbers of police and civilian specialists, experts that are in limited supply both at home and abroad.... And there is no sign that the need for peacekeeping will diminish.⁵⁸²

Also, earlier, in 2001, the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon admitted, 'securing the required resources and troops [for UN peacekeeping] has consumed much of my energy. I have been begging leaders to make resources available to us.'⁵⁸³

⁵⁸² UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, *A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping* (New York: United Nations, July 2009), p. ii.

⁵⁸³ Ban Ki-moon cited in Bellamy, Alex J. and Paul D. Williams. Broadening the Base of United Nations Troop- and Police-Contributing Countries. *Providing for Peacekeeping*. No. 1. International Peace Institute. August 2012.

On the other hand, states have their own agenda and interest to contribute to UN missions. Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams pointed out five reasons why states contribute to UN peacekeeping: political, economic, security, institutional, and normative reasons. Politically, peacekeeping contribution enhances the nation's national status on security issues, or it can strengthen a country's bid for an elected seat in the UN Security Council.⁵⁸⁴ Economically, national governments may use UN compensation payments to support their national budget, and individuals who participated in the mission can benefit from UN monthly payment of soldiers.⁵⁸⁵ The security benefit would be because usually 'peace operations being more likely to receive contributions from states in the immediate neighborhood or region than those further afield.' Neighboring states are likely to contribute to containing armed conflicts that might affect them.⁵⁸⁶ The institutional reason is that the mission provides invaluable overseas experience for the country's armed forces.⁵⁸⁷ Lastly, the normative reason is that UN peacekeeping promotes the greater good for all and serves as proof of 'good international citizenship.'⁵⁸⁸ Generally, it can be said that 'UN peacekeeping support became automatic and unquestioned because it involved few costs in blood and treasure and produced power, prestige, peace, and pride on the cheap.'⁵⁸⁹

Regarding Ethiopia, though there are plenty of reasons why Ethiopia send its troops to UN and AU peace operation below four main rationales are identified.

8.3.1 National Security

Participation in peacekeeping operations in the Ethiopian context can be considered as a vehicle for its national security strategy. Ethiopia is found in a region distinguished for civil wars and state failures. Most of the problems are transnational because social and economic problems in one

⁵⁸⁴ Bellamy, Alex J. and Paul D. Williams. *Broadening the Base of United Nations Troop- and Police-Contributing Countries. Providing for Peacekeeping NO.1*. New York: International Peace Institute, August 2012.

⁵⁸⁵ Bellamy, Alex J. and Paul D. Williams. *Broadening the Base of United Nations Troop- and Police-Contributing Countries. Providing for Peacekeeping NO.1*. New York: International Peace Institute, August 2012.

⁵⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁷ Findlay, Trevor cited in Bellamy, Alex J. and Paul D. Williams. *Broadening the Base of United Nations Troop- and Police-Contributing Countries. Providing for Peacekeeping NO.1*. New York: International Peace Institute, August 2012. 5.

⁵⁸⁸ Bellamy and Williams. *Broadening the Base of United Nations Troop- and Police-Contributing Countries*. 5.

⁵⁸⁹ Jakobsen, Peter Viggo. "Denmark and UN Peacekeeping: Glorious past, dim future." *International Peacekeeping*. Vol. 23, No. 5, 741-761, 2016. 747-748.

country have intended and unintended spillover effects on neighboring countries.⁵⁹⁰ The fact that, out of six states with which Ethiopia shares borders, with the exception of Kenya and Djibouti, either Ethiopia was in conflict (Eritrea and Somalia) or there were interstate armed conflicts. In Somalia, Sudan, and South Sudan UN deployed troops because of intrastate conflicts and interstate in case of Abyei. This makes Ethiopia without any other option to send its troops to UN peacekeeping operations to the troubled neighboring states in order to its own security.

The post-1991 collapse of the government in Somalia, which resulted in the civil war and the rise of radical Islamists in the country, has been a significant security threat in the region. The Sudanese civil war, which resulted in the breakaway of South Sudan, still has not brought peace because the division between South Sudan's leadership led to a new civil war in the country. In addition to this, Sudan and South Sudan still have not finished the demarcation of their borders because of the oil-rich Abyei region claimed by both states.

Thus, Ethiopia responded to all four aforementioned calamities through AU and UN peacekeeping missions. Security threats thanks to spill-over effects come from communities living on both sides of the borders, namely pastoral communities, human traffickers, and in the form of illegal movement of migrants, illicit trade, and organized crime such as drug trafficking. They represent major security threats along the whole Ethiopian border region.⁵⁹¹

In addition, scholars found evidence that rebellions are contagious; in other words, a rebellion significantly increases the risk of internal upheaval in a neighboring country.⁵⁹² An ongoing conflict in neighboring states may decrease the price of arms and increase their availability, making it relatively accessible to rebel groups to mobilize insurgencies.⁵⁹³ This is most likely along 'poorly defined borders of Ethiopia'.⁵⁹⁴ Since 2017, there has been an attempt by armed groups to attack

⁵⁹⁰Berhe, Mulugeta G. "Economic Integration as a Peacebuilding Strategy in the Horn of Africa with Particular Focus on Ethiopia and Its Four Neighbors". *Journal of African-centered Solutions in Peace and Security* Vol.1 (1) August 2016. 63.

⁵⁹¹ Ibid. 75.

⁵⁹² Collier and Hoeffler cited in Sesay, Fatmata L. "Conflict in Neighboring (Developing) Countries: Direct and Indirect Effects on Economic Growth". *Tiger Working Paper Series* No. 68. Warsaw, November 2004. www.tiger.edu.pl/publikacje/TWPN068.pdf, Accessed on 10 February 2017.

⁵⁹³ Ibid.

⁵⁹⁴ Mulugeta, GebrehiwotBerhe. "Economic Integration as a Peacebuilding Strategy in the Horn of Africa".75.

the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam – set to become the biggest hydropower dam in Africa – located only 15 km from the Sudanese border. The Sudanese government handed over some of the rebels who fled after the Ethiopian security forces killed 13 of them.⁵⁹⁵

In the case of South Sudan's conflict, Ethiopia was mainly concerned about the dynamics around its western Gambella regional state. The sudden influx of Nuer refugees into Gambella changes demographic balance with Anuak and creates tension between the two ethnic groups. Moreover, when more than 1,000 gunmen from South Sudan have killed 28 people and kidnapped 43 children in the Gambella region of Ethiopia, bordering South Sudan at the beginning of March 2017, the South Sudanese government which is in civil war since 2013, was not in a position to do anything. For the second time, the occurrence of such incidents, where more than 200 people died and about 160 children were kidnapped,⁵⁹⁶ demonstrates that violence in South Sudan could spill over into neighbors.⁵⁹⁷

With the availability of small arms, cattle rustling and child abductions have become more frequent and fatal. Over the years, insurgent groups among the Murle have increasingly killed more civilians, rustled more cattle, and abducted more children, primarily from communities that are not well protected, such as the Anyuua and Jikany-Nuer of Ethiopia. These make sending peacekeeping troops to neighboring states to help to create a strong and functioning government not a matter of altruism but a matter of national security.

8.3.2 Political Influence

The political influence can be image building, national prestige, and diplomatic leverage. The current Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed is about Ethiopian international role, and peacekeeping deployment forwarded his notion as follows:

⁵⁹⁵ Gaffey, Conor. "Ethiopia and Eritrea trade accusations over grand dam 'attack'." *Newsweek*. 3 February 2017 <http://europe.newsweek.com/ethiopia-dam-nile-eritrea-562895?rm=eu>, Accessed on 23 January 2017.

⁵⁹⁶ Aljazeera. "Ethiopia attack: 200 people dead, 100 children missing". 18 April 2016. <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/04/ethiopia-attack-200-people-dead-100-children-missing-160418045025770.html>, Accessed on 23 January 2017.

⁵⁹⁷ Aljazeera. "Ethiopia reports deadly raid by gunmen from South Sudan". 15 March 2017. <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/03/ethiopia-reports-deadly-raid-gunmen-south-sudan-170315130515870.html>, Accessed on 23 January 2017.

The role it is playing for the peace and security of the Horn of Africa region and the African continent is a manifestation of Ethiopia's determination to this cause. The peacekeeping work we carried out in Somalia, Sudan, Rwanda, and Burundi is enormous. Our Defense force is a highly disciplined army that efficiently discharges its peacekeeping missions. The role Ethiopia is playing in mediating countries is also considerable. Countries that are either pursuing their interests in the Horn of Africa or observing the ongoing political developments in the region can clearly witness the role Ethiopia is playing in the region. Thus, Ethiopia's outstanding role in keeping peace in the Horn of Africa is one of the reasons why Ethiopia is enjoying an ever-increasing influence in the region.⁵⁹⁸

Bellamy and Williams, in their argument for the political rationale of states' involvement in UN peacekeeping, states are mostly interested in 'contributing to certain easier, 'safer' UN missions.⁵⁹⁹ However, in the case of Ethiopia, though its participation highly contributed to regional order, almost all the missions ENDF has been undertaking are far from 'safe.'

8.3.3 Economic Gain

There are two means of economic gain for Ethiopia. The first one is a direct economic gain of UN reimbursement for troop-contributing member states for providing equipment, personnel, and support services to military or police contingents;⁶⁰⁰ and indirect economic gain because of a peaceful region that attracts foreign investment and harness regional trade and development.

One of the incentives which the governments provide for foreign investment besides low-tariffs and cheap labor is security. Li Yifan, China's ambassador to Ethiopia, said, 'Ethiopia's government and its military have managed to keep peace and stability in this country ... that is the basis of any meaningful economic activity. Without that, I do not think the investors will come over here.'⁶⁰¹ Security in the region is also essential. In order to sustain this growth, in the words of Haile A. Amdemichael:

Peace in Ethiopia alone was not considered to be enough for the development of the country. Over time it has become increasingly obvious that it's not only the stability of the

⁵⁹⁸ Ali, Abiy Ahmed. *Medemer*. Addis Ababa: Tsehay Publishers. 2019. 252.

⁵⁹⁹ Bellamy, Alex J. and Paul D. Williams. Broadening the Base of United Nations Troop- and Police-Contributing Countries. *Providing for Peacekeeping*. No. 1. International Peace Institute. August 2012.

⁶⁰⁰ United Nations. *How we are Funded*. <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/how-we-are-funded>, Accessed on 26 December 2019.

⁶⁰¹ Davison, William. "In the Fastest-Growing African Economy, Government is the Fuel". Bloomberg. 5 February 2016. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-05/in-the-fastest-growing-african-economy-government-is-the-fuel>, Accessed on 23 January 2017.

neighboring states but also regional security disturbances directly that affect the process of development in Ethiopia.⁶⁰²

However, Ethiopia's trade with its neighbors is small; it is not insignificant; for example, in 2018, Ethiopian export was 30.15% to Djibouti, 26.99% to Somalia, and 14.45% to Sudan; and its import was 13.76% from Sudan and 11.94% from Kenya. In 2016 24.04% to Sudan, 21.85% to Djibouti, and 16.55% to Kenya; and its import in 2016 was 24.11% from Sudan and 7.22% from Kenya.⁶⁰³ Thus, negative spillover to neighboring nations is likely to occur from disruptions to trade, heightened risk perceptions by would-be investors in the region, severance of input supply lines, collateral damage from nearby battles, and resources spent to assist refugees.⁶⁰⁴ Ethiopia sheltered 742,700 refugees in mid-2016, which made it the biggest host country after Turkey, Pakistan, and Lebanon.⁶⁰⁵

The effects of civil wars are not only felt in the countries where they are fought but also in neighboring countries and beyond.⁶⁰⁶ Conflict in one country does not only reduce the economic growth of its neighbors but also significantly affects other growth-enhancing variables.⁶⁰⁷ Unless Ethiopia tries to help neighboring countries to achieve peace, the spillover effects of conflict will hinder its ongoing economic growth. It seems at this point and time, unless there is peace in all countries in the region that there is no way for economic integration and a prosperous future. This makes Ethiopia's focus on peacekeeping the right thing to do.

⁶⁰² Amdemichael, Haile A. "East African Crisis Response: Shaping Ethiopian Peace for Better Participation in Future Peace Operations." Thesis Presented for Masters of Science in Defense Analysis. Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 2006. 45-46.

⁶⁰³ Workman, Daniel. Ethiopia's Top Trading Partner. <http://www.worldstopexports.com/ethiopias-top-trading-partners/>. Accessed on 12 December 2018.

⁶⁰⁴ Murdoch and Sandler cited in Sesay, Fatmata Lovetta. "Conflict in Neighbouring (Developing) Countries: Direct and Indirect Effects on Economic Growth". *Tiger Working Paper Series* No. 68. Warsaw, November 2004. www.tiger.edu.pl/publikacje/TWPNo68.pdf, Accessed on 10 February 2017.

⁶⁰⁵ UNHCR "Poorer countries host most of the forcibly displaced, report shows." 27 February 2017. <http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2017/2/58b001ab4/poorer-countries-host-forcibly-displaced-report.html>, Accessed on 22 March 22, 2017.

⁶⁰⁶ Sesay, Fatmata Lovetta. "Conflict in Neighbouring (Developing) Countries: Direct and Indirect Effects on Economic Growth". *Tiger Working Paper Series* No. 68. Warsaw, November 2004. www.tiger.edu.pl/publikacje/TWPNo68.pdf, Accessed on 10 February 2017.

⁶⁰⁷ Ibid. Anonymous 10 June 2019 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

On the other hand, peacekeeping deployment provides economic gains for the soldiers who participate in missions. In ENDF, being deployed for a peacekeeping mission become an important carrier goal for a soldier and an officer.⁶⁰⁸ The UN monthly US \$ 1,428 per soldier as of 1 July 2019, even with its government deduction (as discussed in Section 6.4), is incomparable to a salary. (See the following table for the salary of ENDF)

Rank	Net Salary (ETB)/per Month	USD
Private	2000 Birr	51 \$
Lance-Corporal	2,679 ''	69 ''
Corporal	2,826 ''	72 ''
Sergeant	3,254 ''	83 ''
Master Sergeant	3,254 ''	83 ''
First Sergeant	3,624 ''	93 ''
Staff Sergeant Major	3,831 ''	98 ''
Junior Warrant Officer	4,309 ''	110 ''
Second-Lieutenant	3,341 ''	85 ''
Lieutenant	3,354 ''	86 ''
Capitan	3,851 ''	99 ''
Major	4,411 ''	113 ''
Lieutenant-Colonel	4,925 ''	126 ''
Colonel	5,800 ''	148 ''
Brigadier-General	6,948 ''	177 ''
Major-General	7,691 ''	196 ''
Lieutenant-General	7,979 ''	204 ''

Table 8.3 Salary Scale of ENDF ⁶⁰⁹

⁶⁰⁸ Interview with Anonymous Military Officer 11 June 2019, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

⁶⁰⁹ Source: Temesgen Desalegn. Yerabew Serawit. *Fitih Megazin*. Vol. 1. No. 28. May 2019. 5.

8.3.4 Historical Legacy and Conviction to Collective Security

As it is discussed in Section 6.1.1, Ethiopia deployed its troops to the US-led peacekeeping mission in Korea based on two main intentions. The first one is because of the historical legacy of the League of Nations failed to defend Ethiopia from the Italian aggression in 1936, Though, Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations states “The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League.” Ethiopia demanded that the League to punish Italy for invading its borders; that the punishment halt Italy’s conquest of the country. However, the league unsuccessful to do so. Recalling Emperor Haile Selassie I speech of June 1936 at the League of Nations, he expressed both Ethiopian commitment and trust to the collective security and also its frustration on the contemporary international system as follows:

... Apart from the Kingdom of the Lord, there is not on this earth any nation that is superior to any other. Should it happen that a strong Government finds it may with impunity destroy a weak people, then the hour strikes for that weak people to appeal to the League of Nations to give its judgment in all freedom? God and history will remember your judgment.

I ask the fifty-two nations, who have given the Ethiopian people a promise to help them in their resistance to the aggressor, what are they willing to do for Ethiopia? And the great Powers who have promised the guarantee of collective security to small States on whom weighs the threat that they may one day suffer the fate of Ethiopia, I ask what measures do you intend to take?

Representatives of the World I have come to Geneva to discharge in your midst the most painful of the duties of the head of a State. What reply shall I have to take back to my people?"⁶¹⁰

This historical incident has been an important landmark in Ethiopian history and a significant motivation in the Ethiopian army deployment in Korea and Congo at the time of the Emperor. Reminding the 1936 episode, the current Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed wrote the following:

The fact that Ethiopia, despite voicing its concern about Italy’s invasion during Emperor Haile Selassie’s regime, did not succeed in securing the attention of the international community, was an incident that had given us a lesson that our belief on the possibility of designing a foreign policy based on trust on international organizations would not take us far. However, this incident did not force us to fully give up hope on the idea of multilater-

⁶¹⁰ Haile Selassie I. “Speech by the His Majesty Haile Selassie I, Emperor of Ethiopia, at the Assembly of the League of Nations, at the Session of June–July 1936.” dl.wdl.org. <https://dl.wdl.org/11602/service/11602.pdf>, Accessed on 20 June 2019.

alism and abandon the direction of cooperation. Ethiopia is a country that survived by promoting a relation based on fairness and cooperation and by resisting a relation that is established on the force.⁶¹¹

This shows, despite the historical experience, Ethiopian leaders are still optimistic about international organizations and collective security. Moreover, the newly drafted Ethiopian Foreign Policy further goes by including a section on ‘Ethiopian Peace Support Operations’ as follows:

Ethiopia believes that states’ common peace and security will be ensured when nations work together. Until now, Ethiopia effectively conveyed its international duties and expectations in peacekeeping operations in Korea, Congo, Liberia, Somalia, Burundi, South Sudan, Sudan, and Abyei. Ethiopia does not interfere in other countries’ internal affairs and will work efficiently and impartially in its peacekeeping missions if called upon. The peacekeeping force will be able to carry out its mission efficiently, be praised for its ethics and commitment, and will continue to be a bulwark for our country.⁶¹²

The inclusion of peacekeeping in its foreign policy white paper shows how Ethiopia took its global peacekeeping role very utterly.

In relation to this, the same historical parallelism can be mention to Rwanda. Paul Kagame, President of Rwanda, on his remark at the International Conference on the Protection of Civilians and on the endorsement of the ‘Kigali Principle,’ stated ‘the international community’s decision to walk away from a genocide in progress in 1994 was not only a disgrace but a disaster that had to be reckoned with.’⁶¹³ This tragic historical incident in Rwanda made the Rwandan government sheer conviction to peacekeeping. In turn, led to the emergence of the ‘Kigali Principle,’ sponsored by the Rwanda government, which includes the principles of ‘to be prepared to use force to protect civilians’ and ‘not to hesitate to take action to protect civilians.’ Rwanda also becomes one of the top peacekeeping contributors, and it was the first county to send peacekeepers to Darfur, seeing ‘similarity to 1994 and felt a moral obligation to act.’⁶¹⁴

Furthermore, the early Ethiopian victory over the Italian colonial army in 1896, gave a unique historical legacy of Ethiopia, as the only independent African state with its own government and

⁶¹¹ Ali, Abiy A. *Medemer*. 252

⁶¹² *Revised FDRE’s Foreign Policy: Draft*. Addis Ababa. May 2019. 14.

⁶¹³ Civilianprotection.rw. “Report of the High-Level International Conference on the Protection of Civilians. Kigali, Rwanda.” Civilianprotection.rw. 28-29 May 2015. http://civilianprotection.rw/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/REPORT_PoC_conference_Long-version.pdf. Accessed on 08 February 2019.

⁶¹⁴ Firsing, Scott. “Thinking through the role of Africa’s militaries in peacekeeping: the cases of Nigeria, Ethiopia and Rwanda.” *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 21/1. 2014. 50.

state structure. This resulted a special collective behavior in its foreign policy and military orientation. Also the freedom inspired other African states and black people around the world. The Ethiopian peacekeeping operations can be considered as an extension of credence in fighting for those are beleaguered. Emperor Haile Selassie I, affirmed ‘people who love freedom and who are trying to fight for their freedom should be respected and helped.’⁶¹⁵ This statement is still a core value in all Ethiopian regimes' foreign policy and military conviction.

8.4 Ethiopia as a Regional Hegemon and Regional Power in the Horn of Africa.

In the generous words of Idris Buta, Ethiopian can be described as:

Never succumbed to foreign aggression and shines as a beacon of independence in Africa and beyond. In the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia commands a clear hegemonic power status with over 80% of the population and 58.5% of the land of the region, the strongest armed forces in Sub Saharan Africa and one of the fastest-growing economies in the world. With a respected role as a security provider and a peacemaker in the IGAD region.⁶¹⁶

Furthermore, evaluating Ethiopia based on Daniel Flesmes, four regional power criteria's;⁶¹⁷ First in terms of formulation of the claim to leadership: Ethiopia, especially under the late Meles Zenawi's premiership, played a leadership role in the Horn of Africa region and to the whole African continent. Meles has become Africa's most outspoken leader on climate change and represented Africa at G8 and G20 summits.⁶¹⁸ He represented the continent in the consecutive climate change conferences held in Copenhagen, Cancun, and Durban.⁶¹⁹ The President of the Pan-African Parliament, Bethel Amadi, said, ‘Meles was able to enhance a clear vision on how Africa should plan for the next millennium in terms of infrastructure and human capital development, peace and

⁶¹⁵ Techane, Gesit. *The Former Army:1935-1991 [Amharic] (Yeqedmow Tor: 1927-1983)*. Addis Ababa: Z. A Publishing. 2006 142 – 143.

⁶¹⁶ Buta, Idris. Abiy Ahmed's Ethiopia: Bandwagon or Hegemony? January 31, 2019. <https://thenewturkey.org/abiy-ahmeds-ethiopia-bandwagon-or-hegemony>, Accessed on 20 November 2019.

⁶¹⁷ Flesmes, Daniel. *Conceptualizing Regional Power in International Relations: Lessons from the South African Case*. Working Paper No. 53, German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg. 2007.

⁶¹⁸ Malone, Barry. *Ethiopia PM: world not serious on climate change*. 12 November 2009. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-africa-meles/ethiopia-pm-world-not-serious-on-climate-change-idUSTRE5AB3FT20091112>, Accessed on 17 January 2020.

⁶¹⁹ African Business Magazine. *Meles Zenawi, Africa's intellectual giant*. 16 August 2013. <https://africanbusiness-magazine.com/uncategorised/meles-zenawi-africa-s-intellectual-giant/>, Accessed on 17 January 2020.

security, agriculture and food security, environmental protection, and in terms of our relations with the international communities. His contribution was immense.’⁶²⁰

Moreover, Meles pushed African states to reject the neoliberal policy and to adopt a democratic developmental state. This was based on Meles Zenawi’s unpublished Master’s dissertation, *African Development: Dead Ends and New Beginnings*.⁶²¹ He was also ‘in the forefront of those who took the initiative to establish and implement the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD).’⁶²²

The regional leadership charisma also reflected with the current Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for 2019 ‘for his efforts to achieve peace and international cooperation, and in particular for his decisive initiative to resolve the border conflict with neighboring Eritrea.’⁶²³ He also has bold views of uniting the Horn of African states.⁶²⁴ He was attempting a regional integration for security and common position in international relations through two tripartite summits with Somali and Eritrean leaders with Joint Declaration Agreement on Comprehensive Cooperation signed in September 2019 at Asmara. Also hosted another trilateral summit with leaders of Sudan and Djibouti in Ethiopia in the same year.⁶²⁵

⁶²⁰ Ibid.

⁶²¹ De Waal. Alex, The Theory and Practice of Meles Zenawi. Review Article. *African Affairs*, 112/446, 148–155

⁶²² Meleszenawi.com. Remembering Meles Zenawi, the Prime Minister of Ethiopia (1955 - 2012) November 3, 2012. <http://www.meleszenawi.com/nepad-to-maintain-meles-zenawis-philosophies-within-the-partnership/>, Accessed on 17 January 2020.

⁶²³ The Nobel Prize. *The Nobel Peace Prize for 2019*. 11 October 2019. <https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2019/press-release/>, Accessed on 17 January 2020.

⁶²⁴ Daily #Ethiopia News. *BREAKING Abiy Ahmed's Speech on Somalia & Ethiopia Unity | Africa Unity | United Africa*. 17 Jun 2018. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FBorE2SfMLA>. Accessed on 17 January 2020.

⁶²⁵ Buta, Idris. Abiy Ahmed's Ethiopia: Bandwagon or Hegemony? January 31, 2019. <https://thenewturkey.org/abiy-ahmeds-ethiopia-bandwagon-or-hegemony>, Accessed on 20 November 2019.

Moreover, his mediations between ‘Eritrea and Djibouti, Eritrea and Somalia, Somalia and Kenya, and pushed the various factions in South Sudan to give peace a chance’⁶²⁶ similarly mediated Sudan’s military rulers and civilian opposition after Omar al-Bashir removed from power in 2019.⁶²⁷ Besides, as is discussed in Section 4.2.3.1, Ethiopia has been played an important leadership role at the UN Security Council in peace and security of the African continent in relation to AU and peacekeeping.

Christopher Clapham reasons Ethiopian leadership role and hegemonic character as follows:

For so long as a single state at the heart of the region has a population vastly greater than that of its other states combined, together with an effective government and economy likewise far more important than those of its neighbors, a powerful military, and alliance both in the continent and beyond it, that state is necessarily the critical element on which the structure of regional relations depends. ... Historically, in a comparative perspective, the presence of a large and powerful state at the center of a region has been every bit as likely to prove a destabilizing element as a stabilizing one. Such states, like the United States in the Americas, imperial and Soviet Russia in central Europe and Asia, or China in East Asia, readily acquire a hegemonic or even imperialist attitude towards their neighbors that arouses intense resentment. Ethiopia provides a classic case of such attitudes indeed.⁶²⁸

Secondly, in terms of possession of the necessary power resources: Ethiopia has more than 112 million people (2019), the second-most populous nation in Africa after Nigeria, and the fastest growing economy in the region.⁶²⁹ Ethiopia also has a strategic location in the Horn of Africa region, and it has a strong military with fighting battle-hardened. With the experience of conventional and guerrilla warfare, including long experience in peace support missions in the region.

Thirdly, in the employment of foreign policy instruments, besides the major role of its military, which is the hypothesis of the study, economically, because of Ethiopia’s enormous potential of

⁶²⁶ Halakhe, Abdullahi B. Abiy’s Efforts to Unify Ethiopia could Lead to its Disintegration. 7 December 2020. <https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2020/12/7/abiys-efforts-to-unify-ethiopia-could-lead-to-its-disintegration>, Accessed on 17 January 2020.

⁶²⁷ Abdelaziz, Khalid. *Ethiopia attempts to mediate Sudan crisis after bloodshed*. June 7, 2019. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sudan-politics/ethiopia-pm-abiy-in-sudan-to-meet-with-chief-of-military-council-idUSKCN1T80OS>, Accessed on 17 January 2020.

⁶²⁸ Clapham, Christopher. *The Horn of Africa: State formation and Decay*. Hurst & Company: London, 2017. 179 - 180.

⁶²⁹ The World Bank. *The World Bank in Ethiopia*. October 13, 2020. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ethiopia/overview>, Accessed on 17 January 2020.

hydroelectric power, it exports electricity to Djibouti and Sudan. There is a plan to begin power export to Kenya and its southern neighbors, Tanzania and Rwanda.⁶³⁰ In addition, an agreement has been signed to further connect to Yemen through Djibouti's underwater sea cable.⁶³¹ Also, a plan to export hydroelectric power further to Egypt and negotiation started with Somaliland and South Sudan.

Forth, acceptance of the third state's leadership role can be manifested clearly in Ethiopia's role in IGAD and its intervention in Somalia. Ethiopia intervened in Somalia in 2006 against the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) in support of the Transitional Federal Government, which was approved by IGAD. On the other hand, Eritrea started supporting UIC. Because of this pretext, Ethiopian proposed sanction on Eritrea was implemented and supported by IGAD states and approved by AU and UN until 2018.⁶³² It is also Ethiopia which pushed for the Security Council to lift the sanctions.⁶³³ Though Kenya is economically an important power in the region, because of Ethiopia's military and diplomatic role in Somalia and against Eritrea, Ethiopia has been playing a prominent role.⁶³⁴ James Jeffrey quotes one US diplomat in 2018 as follows:

Ethiopia plays an important role in the regional stability as the largest contributor to UN peacekeeping missions globally and host to one of the world's largest refugee populations. With a growing population of over 100 million, Ethiopia also represents tremendous untapped economic potential. The reform process launched by Prime Minister Abiy opens the door for further progress and collaboration in all of these areas, not least because democracy and good governance are powerful factors in building political stability and economic prosperity. Far from drifting away from Ethiopia, the US is moving closer as we see a clear alignment in our priorities.⁶³⁵

⁶³⁰ Maasho, Aaron. *Ethiopia plans power exports to neighbors*. June 29, 2011. <https://www.reuters.com/article/ozatp-ethiopia-electricity-20110629-idAFJOE75S0GR20110629>, Accessed on 17 January 2020.

⁶³¹ Ibid.

⁶³² United Nations News. *Eritrea sanctions lifted amid growing rapprochement with Ethiopia: Security Council*. 14 November 2018. <https://www.un.org/africarenewal/news/eritrea-sanctions-lifted-amid-growing-rapprochement-ethiopia-security-council>, Accessed on 17 January 2020.

⁶³³ Ibid.

⁶³⁴ Gebrewold, Belachew. *Legitimate Regional Powers? A Failed Test for Ethiopia, Nigeria, and South Africa*. *African Security*. 7:1–23, 2014. 17.

⁶³⁵ Jeffrey, James. *US-Ethiopia relationship changing amid Horn of Africa power struggle*. November 08, 2018 <https://www.pri.org/stories/2018-11-08/us-ethiopia-relationship-changing-amid-horn-africa-power-struggle>, Accessed on 17 January 2020.

Ethiopia's role in the Horn of Africa can be very similar to how Daniel Flesmes describe regional power. Flesmes describes the role of regional power as follows:

Regional powers are expected to play the role of regional peacemakers and policies as well as taking on the role of moral authority. They have the responsibility for keeping their backyard neat and orderly, sometimes with a measure of support by great powers. Furthermore, regional powers seem to be expected to support and promote acceptable rules and norms in terms of which regional politics and relations are conducted.⁶³⁶

Herbst,⁶³⁷ Rudincova,⁶³⁸ Gebrewold,⁶³⁹ and Clapham,⁶⁴⁰ argue that Ethiopia is clearly a regional power, a hegemon, and a dominant country in the Horn of Africa. First, it has a population of more than 110 million, the largest in the region, and second in Africa; secondly, it has the strongest and well-experienced military in the region; thirdly, it has the fastest growing economy in the region. Moreover, it has abundant natural resources and hydroelectric power that can stretch beyond the Horn of Africa. Also, historically it has a dominant role in the continent since the time of Emperor Haile Selassie I. The Emperor, in a speech from his throne, at the opening Houses of Parliament, on the 2nd November 1964, said: 'We consider this signal honor (the location of the OAU. headquarters in Addis Ababa) both a recognition of Ethiopia's glorious history as a proud and free nation, as well as a challenge to the continuation of her present role of dignified leadership in the new history of the continent.'⁶⁴¹

Jeffrey Herbst claims South Africa, Nigeria, Ethiopia, and DRC are Sub-African regional hegemons:

Indeed, it is striking that Africa's largest countries, with the exception of South Africa, are more likely to be discussed as destinations for peacekeepers than benign hegemons leading

⁶³⁶ Flesmes, Daniel. *Conceptualizing Regional Power in International Relations: Lessons from the South African Case*. Working Paper No. 53, German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg. 2007.

⁶³⁷ Herbst, Jeffrey. African Peacekeepers and State Failure. In Robert I. Rotberg (ed.), *Peacekeeping and Peace-enforcement in Africa: Methods of Conflict Prevention*. Cambridge and Washington DC: World Peace Foundation and Brookings Institution Press, 2000. 26.

⁶³⁸ Rudincova, Kateřina. "Ethiopian Foreign Policy in the Horn of Africa: Informal Relations with Somaliland and their Possible Future Development." *Politeja* No. 42, *African Studies*, 2016.

⁶³⁹ Gebrewold, Belachew. Legitimate Regional Powers? A Failed Test for Ethiopia, Nigeria, and South Africa. *African Security*, 7:1–23, 2014. 17.

⁶⁴⁰ Clapham, C. "Peace in the Horn of Africa." In Richmond, O. P. (ed). *The Palgrave Handbook of Disciplinary and Regional Approaches to Peace*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2016. 327.

⁶⁴¹ Prys, Miriam. Hegemony, Domination, Detachment: Differences in Regional Powerhood. *International Studies Review*. Vol. 12, No. 4, December 2010. 491.

to disinterested interventions. DRC has been the destination for a variety of interveners for several years now, and both Nigeria and Ethiopia, given the centrifugal pressures they are experiencing, are routinely discussed as possible failed states. Indeed, far from size being correlated with power as has traditionally been the case in the international relations literature, it appears that a significant size, within the African context, is a relatively good predictor of poor state performance. It is telling that of the African countries participating in the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), only Ethiopia is among the largest African countries that would normally be thought of as natural interveners.⁶⁴²

Comparing the population and the military capability of the region, as shown in Table 8.4, Ethiopia has the largest population which is constituting 40% of the total population of the region. It also has the second-largest GDP and the third-largest military expenditure. Though the Ethiopian government officially does not reveal the total number of its army, according to different sources, Ethiopia has the second-largest military in the region after Eritrea and the strongest military in the region. Also, Ethiopia has the largest foreign deployment in peacekeeping in the region.

⁶⁴² Herbst, Jeffrey. African Peacekeepers and State Failure. In Robert I. Rotberg (ed.), *Peacekeeping and Peace-enforcement in Africa: Methods of Conflict Prevention*. Cambridge and Washington DC: World Peace Foundation and Brookings Institution Press, 2000. 26.

Country	Popltn	GDP	Def bdt	Military Capability							
				Active	Army	Navy	Air Force	Gendarmerie	Para-military	Reserve	Peacekeeping Deployment
Djibouti	884,017	3.17bn	n.k	10,450	8,000	200	250	2,000	2,650		AMISOM 1,872; MINURSO 2 obs
Eritrea	5,970,646	2.11bn	n.k	201,750	200,000	1,400	350	-	-	120,000	-
Ethiopia ⁶⁴³	108,386,391	91.2bn	518m	139,000	135,000	1000	3000	-	-	70,000	AMISOM 4,323; UNMISS 2,122; UNAMID 1,684; UNISFA 4,368;
Kenya	48,397,527	98.6bn	1.23bn	24,100	20,000	1,600	2,500	-	5,000	-	MINUSCA 7; MONUSCO 7; UNIFIL 1 MINUSMA 8; AMISOM 4,046; UNMISS 11; UNAMID 89;
Somalia ⁶⁴⁴	11,259,029	4.96bn	n.k	19,800	19,800	-	-	-	-	-	-
South Sudan	10,204,581	3.68bn	70.1m	185,000	185,000	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sudan	43,120,843	30.9bn	n.k	104,300	100,000	1,300	3,000	-	20,000	85,000	Yemen: <i>Operation Restoring Hope</i> 950
Uganda	42,169,690	30.7bn	547m	45,000	45,000	-	-	-	1,400	10,000	AMISOM 6,022; UNSOM 530; UNMISS 2

Table 8.4 Military Capability of Horn of Africa states and Peace Operations Deployments.⁶⁴⁵

⁶⁴³ The Data of Ethiopian Navy and Reserve force is from Anonymous ENDF Sinour Officer, 11 June 2019, Addis Ababa.

⁶⁴⁴ Two territories where the Somalian government has no effective control, Somaliland has 12,500 Army, 600 Coast Guard, and Puntland has 3,000 Army, 1,000 Maritime Police Force. (ISS. *The Military Balance 2019: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defense Economics*. London: Routledge, 2018.)

⁶⁴⁵ Source: ISS. *The Military Balance 2019: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defense Economics*. London: Routledge, 2018.

Jason Mosley said, ‘Ethiopia remains the center of gravity in the Horn of Africa, and increasingly an influential player in the evolving Red Sea regional security—and, eventually, economic—landscape.’⁶⁴⁶ Tekeda Alemu further goes, saying, ‘Ethiopia could become a formidable force for peace, security, and stability in the Horn of Africa, and in Africa in general.’⁶⁴⁷ In the same fashion, Dustin Dehéz’s claim about the Ethiopian hegemonial character as follows:

Interestingly, where more traditional hegemons, such as the United Kingdom, India, or the United States, differ from current regional hegemons in Sub-Sahara Africa most, is that the rise of hegemons was historically accompanied by a consolidation of their internal political dynamics. Industrialization, nationalism, the growth of national redistributive policies all went hand in hand with the state's capability to project power beyond its borders and the expansion of its hegemonic potential. I argue that large African states, such as Ethiopia, have been able to act as regional hegemons, despite their dysfunctional redistributive state system and the inherent lack of domestic consolidation in both the political and economic realm and in terms of ethnic composition.⁶⁴⁸

Though Ethiopia has the above mentioned hegemonic characters and advantage Dustin Dehéz, point out two important weakness of Ethiopia as follows:

Ethiopia's lack of internal consolidation and its inability to formulate a coherent and comprehensive framework for an ethnically inclusive state is a huge constraint for its hegemonic aspirations. This inability has left the state vulnerable in a regional environment, where it has been common practice for decades to exploit ethnic divisions to counterbalance the power of neighboring countries.⁶⁴⁹ [Also]... its Christian Orthodox legacy makes it impossible to claim a hegemonic position among its Arab neighbors, and its Southern neighbors rather turn to the South or to Central Africa than following Ethiopian leadership.⁶⁵⁰

Finally, it worth it to conclude with the words of Christopher Clapham, which he asserts as follows:

The key to stability in the Horn rests, as always, with Ethiopia. In a region with such massive internal power disparities, hegemonic stability is the only kind on offer, and this requires a minimum that Ethiopia remains reasonably stable internally and that it is capable

⁶⁴⁶ Mosley, Jason. Ethiopia’s Transition: Implications for the Horn of Africa and Red Sea Region. *SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security*. No. 2020/5, March 2020

⁶⁴⁷ Alemu, Tekeda. ‘The conundrum of present Ethiopian foreign policy—in search of a roadmap for Ethiopia’s Foreign and National Security Policy and Strategy’. *CDRC DIGEST*. Vol. 4 No. 1, January 2019.

⁶⁴⁸ Dehéz, Dustin. *Ethiopia – A Hegemon in the Horn of Africa Region*. BISA Annual Conference, Exeter, December 2008. <http://www.open.ac.uk/socialsciences/bisa-africa/confpapers/Dehez-exeter-08.pdf>, Accessed on 23 February 2020.

⁶⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁰ Ibid.

of articulating a wider regional project that promises mutual benefits rather than the prospect of mere domination to its neighbors.⁶⁵¹

8.5 Summery and Partial Conclusion

This chapter deals with four key matters of the study. First, the Ethiopian geopolitical interest and security risks vis-à-vis peace support operation magnitude of deployment; second, the analysis of Ethiopia's next-door peace support operations; third, the rationales of Ethiopian peacekeeping deployment; and fourth, the argument for Ethiopian hegemony in the region.

Ethiopia has four geopolitical interests and security risks that it has to deal with. The first geopolitical interest and security risk is its neighborhood, the Horn of Africa or the IGAD region, which is its immediate national security concern. Because of three main reasons, Ethiopia should give priority to this region. One is because of the existence of failed states in this region, second because of Ethiopia's landlockedness and its dependence on its neighbors, because of this it has a high economic and geographical vulnerability, and third because of the presence of numerous foreign military bases in the region.

The second Ethiopian geopolitical interest is the African continent because of its Pan-African commitment, which has been its historical legacy. Third, the Red Sea region is a significant waterway for international trade, especially for oil, which is a strategic resource and which is identified by many nations as a national (fundamental) interest; and the nearest water body for Ethiopia that has paramount economic and security value for its economic and national security. Lastly, its global concern emanated from its commitment to collective international security and national prestige.

Scholars argue, being a peacekeeper in next-door neighbors can be influenced more heavily by security, political, and potentially normative considerations than that of more distant states. Ethiopian main peacekeeping focus on its next-door neighbors beside the advantage of the familiarity of the next-door neighbor conflict and cultural similarity and geographical proximity which has the advantage of lower cost and short time of responding when conflict broke out; on the other hand, Ethiopia's, geopolitical location in the Horn of Africa makes it vulnerable because of civil wars, failed states and the risk of spillover conflicts and refugees from the region. Thus, in order to protect its national interest, Ethiopia needs to keep the peace of its neighbors for its own interest.

⁶⁵¹ Clapham, Christopher. *The Horn of Africa: State formation and Decay*. Hurst & Company: London, 2017. 186.

As a country with neighbors who failed to ensure peace and lack internal stability, it cannot ensure lasting and reliable peace and stability. Participation in peacekeeping operations in the Ethiopian context can be considered as a vehicle for its national security strategy. As well, Ethiopia used its peacekeeping deployment as political influence in the region and economic gain for its troops.

Ethiopia's peacekeeping operations in its next-door neighbors can also be analyzed adopted to the Ethiopian next-door peace support operations. As described in Table 8.2, based on Berouk Mesfin's classical problem-solving techniques: define the problem, propose solutions, test the solutions and implement the best one; The Ethiopian process of national security planning and practical activity towards its three neighboring states (Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan) has been mainly deploying its peacekeeping troops. First by defining the vital national interest that has to be safeguarded and then identifying threats for the national interest in that country and selecting strategic actions with the available elements of national power can be mobilized by the state, which is primarily deploying its peacekeeping troops.

The general rationales of Ethiopian peacekeeping are four. First, national security, which is related to reasons for deploying troops in next-door neighbours, for Ethiopia the ongoing conflict in neighboring states of Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan may led to vulnerabilities like arms smuggling, human trafficking, illegal movement of migrants, illicit trade, and organized crime such as drug trafficking. Secondly Ethiopian will gain political influence by building its image and national prestige, as an international responsible state and it can be also used as diplomatic leverage. Third, economic gain, first direct payment from UN reimbursement for equipment, personnel, and support services to military or police contingents; and indirect economic gain because of a peaceful region that attracts foreign investment and harness regional trade and development that can be achieved by stabilizing the region trough peacekeeping.

Lastly the historical legacy and conviction to collective security, this derives from first the failure of the League of Nations to defend Ethiopia from the Italian aggression in 1936, while both Italy and Ethiopia was a member states and Article 10 stated 'The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League.' Another historical legacy is the early Ethiopian victory over the Italian colonial army in 1896, gave Ethiopia a special collective behavior in its foreign policy and military orientation. Also the freedom inspired other African states and black people

around the world. The Ethiopian peacekeeping operations can be considered as an extension of credence in fighting for those are beleaguered. Emperor Haile Selassie I, stated ‘people who love freedom and who are trying to fight for their freedom should be respected and helped.’ This statement is still a core value in all Ethiopian regimes' foreign policy and military conviction.

Ethiopia commands a clear hegemonic power status in the Horn of Africa; this is due to its being the most populous state in the region, strongest armed forces with the fastest-growing economies. In addition to this, Ethiopia manifests the four characteristics of regional hegemon: first, it claims its responsibility in areas of security and the region and continental level on issues of Pan-Africa and climate change in its modern political history; secondly, it has the necessary, demographic, economic, and military power resource to influence its region, third it has been employing an essential foreign policy instrument, its military power through vast peace support operation in the region, lastly more or less Ethiopia has an acceptance of its leadership role by the states of the region and beyond.

CHAPTER 9 – CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The long-awaited world peace did not arrive ... One of the most important tasks of states and associations is to guarantee security and sovereignty and to ensure the conditions for development. The force still has a place in the advocacy toolbox. A force that is able to respond quickly and flexibly to changes in the security environment and changing circumstances in its equipment, organization, and procedures.

Colonel Dr. Boldizsar Gabor

“It is collective security: it is the very existence of the League of Nations. It is the confidence that each state is to place in international treaties. It is the value of promises made to small States that their integrity and their independence shall be respected and ensured.”

Emperor Haile Sellassie I of Ethiopia (1936)

“War can only be abolished through war, and in order to get rid of the gun, it is necessary to take up the gun.” Mao Zedong

9.1 Conclusion

- * Foreign policy and military power are the two most important functions of a state to pursue its national interest outside its national territory. Peacekeeping is where a state’s foreign policy and its military capability adjoin. This means any state’s interest or decision to deploy its military or police personnel to a UN or any other regional organization's mission is based on its foreign policy and national interest in addition to its capacity military power.
- * Ethiopian foreign policy, mainly since the formation of its modern government structure, has been oriented towards supportive of the notion of international organizations, collective security, and peacekeeping operation and supporting those who are in tyranny. This is manifested throughout its history of being the first African nation to be the founding member of the League of Nations and also one of the founding members of the United Nations. It was also the only African nation to send its troops to South Korea when it faced invasion from the North in 1950. Ethiopia was also supporting anti-colonial and anti-Apartheid liberation movements in other African states and in South Africa. These military and foreign policy traditions continued until today.

- * The Horn of Africa region, which is composed of nine states that are members of the regional bloc, IGAD, can be considered as the regional complex that reflects an inter-linked regional security complex. The most common security dynamics in the region are: spillovers of domestic conflicts, mainly refugee flows, expulsions of foreigners, and civil wars and intervention by neighbors in domestic turbulence. Also, the region is known for the high presence of UN and AU military support operations. There is currently a presence of peace support missions in Darfur, Sudan; Abyei Sudan–South Sudan border. In the past, there were missions in Somalia, in the Ethiopia-Eritrea border, in the Uganda-Rwanda border, and in Sudan. From the first UN mission in the region in 1992 until 2019, there were 19 multinational peace support operations by AU, EU, IGAD, and UN.
- * Besides all these peace support missions in the region, the Horn of Africa has become one of the world's most militarized regions. Currently, there are fifteen states with operational military bases, one under construction and two with possible existing military facilities, in Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, and Somaliland. Besides, there is a high military naval presence in the nearby waters of the Red Sea, Gulf of Eden, and Bab al-Mandab.
- * The study classified Ethiopian peacekeeping generation is based on the particular sending regime's (Three types of Ethiopian governments were identified First, the Imperial regime of Emperor Haile Selassie I from 1930-1974, second, the Transitional Government of Ethiopia led by President Meles Zenawi from 1991-1995, and third, the government of Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia from 1996 up to now, (led by PM Meles Zenawi (1996-2012) PM HaileMariam Desalegn (2012-2018) and PM Abiy Ahmed (2018-). Ethiopia did not deploy peacekeeping troops at the time of the military government of Colonel Mengistu HaileMariam from 1974-1991.) motive, the nature of the armed forces, and the focus area of deployment. Based on these three criteria, Ethiopian peacekeeping is divided into four generations of operations.
- * The first generation of peacekeeping is the Imperial Army (1950 - 1967) which is based on the conviction to the collective security of Emperor Haile Selassie I. The second generation is the EPRDF's Rebel Army sent to Rwanda by the Transitional Government of Ethiopia. This is characterized as Rebels Solidarity (1994 – 1995) because both the governments of

Ethiopia and Rwanda at the time were rebel armies. The third generation of peacekeeping is after the formation of the national army, ENDF Engagement in 'African Solution for African Problems' (2003 - 2010), where Ethiopia gave focus for peacekeeping deployment in Africa. The fourth-generation peacekeeping is when the Ethiopia army become the Peacekeeper Army (Since 2011) after the MoD of Ethiopia institutionalize peacekeeping as one of its departments and establish a peace support training center.

- * Participation in peacekeeping operations in the Ethiopian context can be considered as a vehicle for its national security strategy. Besides, that Ethiopia used its peacekeeping deployment as political influence in the region and economic gain for its troops. In addition to this, the historical tradition and conviction to collective security is among Ethiopia's rationales where it took peacekeeping as its "national mandate" to protect civilians. Moreover, Ethiopia commands a clear hegemonic power status in the Horn of Africa; this is due to its being the most populous state in the region, strongest armed forces with the fastest-growing economies.
- * Because of Ethiopian independence and the history of freedom from colonialism, there is special collective behavior in its foreign policy and military orientation. The Adowa victory against the Italian colonial invasion is seen as the embodiment of African militancy and heroism. In addition to the Ethiopian military victory against the colonial power. Its red, yellow (gold), and green colored flag symbolizes freedom and Pan-Africanism. It inspired the flags of other African nations and other Black movements in the Americas.
- * A total of 420 men and women in uniform responded to the 24 questions of a quantitative survey of their outlook on Ethiopian peacekeeping deployment. From the survey's total participants, 50.7% are Non-commissioned Officers, 27.4% are Junior Officers, and 21.9% are Senior Officers; 88.3% are male, and 11.7% are female. This is due to the low involvement of women in ENDF. Though the Ministry of Defence does not release any data about the female members of ENDF, the national defence forces guidelines allow up to ten percent (10%) of female representation. This is also reflected in the peacekeeping deployment. The age group of the respondents is 19.52% from age 18-29; 51.9% from 30-40, 25.95% from 40-50; and 2.61% above 50 years old; the marital status, 67.38% are married, 31.19% are single, and 1.42% are divorced.

- * Regarding their academic status, 1.19% have a Master's degree, 14.04% finished their first degree, 24.76% got a diploma, 49.28% finished high school, 9.04% finished their primary education, and 1.66% has no formal education but read and write. The participants' service years are 47.14% served more than 15 years, 30.23% 10-15 years, 18.57% 5-10 years, and 4.04% served less than five years before deployment the peacekeeping mission.
- * From the survey's total participants, 33.57% were deployed in Darfur, 29.28% in Abyei, 20.23% in South Sudan, 15% in Somalia, 3.56% in Liberia, and 0.47% in Burundi; and 70.95% of officers were deployed for the first time, 27.14% were deployed two times, and 1.9% were deployed three times to a peacekeeping mission.
- * More than half of the officers (66%) claim their motivation for peacekeeping deployment is to help peoples of neighboring countries in conflict; 24% said because it is one of their military duty, and 10% motivated by more payment of peacekeeping deployment. The two most common answers to why Ethiopia deploy peacekeeping troops are: because the mission will indirectly protect Ethiopia from terrorists in neighboring states and prevent conflicts from spillover to Ethiopia, 47% and help people conflict areas 33%. 15% said it is because of UN obligation, and 5% said it is because the Ethiopian government wanted to get more money.
- * Regarding the pre-deployment knowledge of mission area: most of the officers who are deployed to mission areas have some kind of knowledge about climate, topography, social and cultural issues, and the conflicting parties at the mission area, 19% are extremely, 41% are very aware, 32% are moderately aware. Only 7% of them are slightly aware, and 1% are not aware at all. It can be deduced that most of the officers will get some kind of informal or formal experience sharing from the officers returned from the same mission they were about to be deployed, 14% share very high experience and knowledge, 29% high, and 38% share medium experience and knowledge. On the other hand, 17% have low share experience and knowledge and 2% very low.
- * The majority of officers are interested in being deployed in peacekeeping missions outside the Horn of Africa region. 36% has very high interest, 22% high interest, and 26% Medium; 10% has low interest and 6% very low. Concerning the selection process of peacekeepers by MoD,

from the survey's total participants, the majority of the officers, 70% support the selection norms; however, 30% do not agree with it.

- * From the survey's total 420 participants, 29.04 % were deployed for the second and third time. Out of these, 55.73% were deployed to Darfur, and 29.5% were deployed to Liberia for the second or third time; the others were deployed in Abyei, Somalia, South Sudan, Rwanda, and Burundi.
- * From 210 returnees from peacekeeping missions, the most significant number of officers, 89% are willing to go to peacekeeping missions again. Only 11% are not willing to go to a peacekeeping mission over again. Also, from the same number of returnees, one of the most significant challenges is language, which is 55%. Other challenges are the weather condition 24%, rebel groups in the mission area 15%, and challenges in the local community constituted 6%.
- * From the survey of a total of 210 returnees from peacekeeping missions, for the majority of them (73% very high and high), the pre-deployment training is similar to the actual mission reality, and it contributed to their mission's success. For 21%, it contributed at medium level, for 4% low and for 3% very low. From the same number of respondents, the majority believe there is better relations with other countries' troops despite the language barrier, 58% very high and 25% high. 14% of the respondents respond medium, 3% low, and 1% very low regarding their relations with troops from other states.
- * Similarly, from the survey of a total of 210 returnees from peacekeeping missions, the majority (74%) believe it is important and very important for the local duties. For 18% moderately important, for 5% slightly important, and for 4% not important at all. In addition to this, it can be deduced ENDF peacekeepers have a good relationship with the communities or the warring parties in mission areas; 38% respond excellent in their relations, 33% good, 24% fair. It is only for 3% poor and 4% very poor relations from the total of 210 returnees from peacekeeping missions. From the same number of returnees, 51% are satisfied more than their expectations, 32% found their peacekeeping mission precisely as they expected it, and for the 17%, it was below their expectation.
- * From the survey of a total of 210 returnees from peacekeeping missions, the first choice to go back again is to Abyei, 33%; the second choice is South Sudan, 27%; the third choice is Darfur

17%, of the ENDF officers. 11% of the officers are willing to be deployed anywhere, and the rest of them are willing to be deployed in Mali, DRC, and outside Africa. It can be deduced that from the mission areas Ethiopia is deploying its troops, Abyei is the most preferred mission among Ethiopian officers, and Somalia is the list preferred. In Abyei it is easier for Ethiopians to feel at home because all contingents are Ethiopians. On the other hand, AMISOM in Somalia is a warfighting mission that has high risk; besides, because it is an African Union mission, it has less reimbursement than the United Nations mission in Abyei

- * Ethiopia is deploying thousands its troops in all current AU and UN peacekeeping missions: UNAMID in Sudan, Darfur, UNMISS, in South Sudan UNISFA), in Abyei, and AMISOM in Somalia. Since 2015 – 2019, Ethiopia has been the top overall troop contributor to UN peacekeeping missions. Adding its AU peacekeeping and its unilateral involvement in Somalia, it is the second country in the world next to the US with foreign deployed troops. UNISFA is a unique type of peacekeeping operation since the beginning of UN peacekeeping in 1948 because 100% of the contingent troops are from Ethiopia
- * The history of Ethiopian involvement in peacekeeping operations shows that Ethiopian interest extends well beyond the regional and the African continent. However, the current peacekeeping trends focused primarily on immediate neighbors.
- * Ethiopia currently contributes the most personnel to UN peacekeeping missions with Protection of Civilian (POC) mandates. Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Bangladesh are the top three contributors of uniformed personnel to UN peacekeeping operations with the protection of civilians mandates as of April 2019, which is based on the Kigali Principles.
- * A foreign policy consists of two elements: national objectives to be achieved and the means for achieving them, while military power is the key machinery of government against internal and external security threats. The Military apparatus is also vital in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy and in the functioning of the state in the international system. The same is true for Ethiopian foreign policy and military power in the Ethiopian peace support operation in the Horn of Africa until 2019.
- * Scholars argue, being a peacekeeper in next-door neighbors can be influenced more heavily by security, political, and potentially normative considerations than that of more distant states.

Ethiopian main peacekeeping focus on its next-door neighbors beside the advantage of the familiarity of the next-door neighbor conflict and cultural similarity and geographical proximity which has the advantage of lower cost and short time of responding when conflict broke out; Ethiopia's, its geopolitical location in the Horn of Africa makes it vulnerable because of civil wars, failed states and the risk of spillover conflicts and refugees. Thus, in order to protect its national interest, Ethiopia needs to keep the peace of its neighbors for its own interest.

- * The study identified four levels of Ethiopian geopolitical interest and security risk responsiveness vis-à-vis peace support operation deployment. The first and immediate geopolitical interest and security risk for Ethiopia are its neighboring countries or the IGAD region; Secondly, African Countries, which is AU and Ethiopia's Pan-Africa commitment; Thirdly, the Red Sea Region, which a vital trade route and the nearest access to the sea for Ethiopia; and forth, the Global focus, which is a commitment to collective international security and national prestige.
- * The study finds out that Ethiopia's approach to the Horn of Africa regional security has been primarily influenced by minimizing its vulnerabilities and its immediate national security threats where its national role in peacekeeping emanates from, and this role has become the defining paradigm for its foreign policy engagement.
- * Ethiopia is a key player in the Horn of Africa and, despite the recent internal conflict, its peace support operations have been crucial for maintaining stability in the region. Its role is aided by its military's strength and active participation in regional peace and security operations; its capacity and willingness to combat terrorism; a Pan-Africanist legacy; and its effective utilization of multilateral platforms; it will keep its regional hegemony and visibility.
- * Many peace operations in the Horn of Africa show how complex the composition of the human terrain is (language, ethnicity, religion) and how complex the roots of conflicts are (history, traditions, beliefs and beliefs, behavior, individual and group consciousness and memory, development, wars, occupation, colonisation, interests, values). These many conflicts require a lot of effort and Ethiopia is at the forefront of this. Ethiopia acts for security on an individual, regional and global level based on its historical (independence), value (the only country that was not a colony), interest (living space, security, stability, development), size (largest in the region).

9.2 New Scientific Results

1. The post-1991 Ethiopian government has been using its military power capability or show of force and force presence through peacekeeping operations. One of the major feature of Ethiopian peacekeeping is its disposition to deploy its troops to Protection of civilians (POC) missions and focusing on peacekeeping deployment in its next-door neighbours
2. The study identifies four-generation peace operations, thus providing an opportunity to define a clear framework in the study of Ethiopia's peacekeeping history and its rationales. The first generation of peacekeeping is the Imperial Army (1950 – 1967) deployment in two missions: in the US-led United Nations Command in Korea and in United Nations Operation in the Congo, the second generation is the EPRDF's Rebel Army sent to Rwanda by the Transitional Government of Ethiopia, characterized as Rebels Solidarity (1994 – 1995), the third generation of peacekeeping is after the formation of the national army, ENDF engagement in 'African Solution for African Problems' (2003 – 2010), the fourth-generation peacekeeping is when the Ethiopia army become the Peacekeeper Army Since 2011.
3. The study has created the concept of peace operation strategy analysed based on the four levels of Ethiopian geopolitical interest and security risk responsiveness vis-à-vis peace support operation deployment. The first and immediate geopolitical interest and national security risks are its neighbouring countries or the IGAD region; Secondly, African Countries, which is AU and Ethiopia's Pan-Africa commitment, thirdly, the Red Sea Region, which a vital trade root and the nearest access to the sea for Ethiopia, and is a significant waterway for international trade and including with the most crucial state in the area, Yemen. Forth, the Global focus, which is a commitment to collective international security and national prestige.
4. The Horn of Africa forms, a security complex in Buzan's terminology. The Horn of Africa displays many of the features of a Regional Security Complex based on its security dynamics and high levels of security interdependence. Security dynamics in the region are spillovers of domestic dynamics, refugee flows due to the common conflicts trends in the region: intrastate conflicts/ethnic conflict, interstate conflicts, religious fundamentalism and violence, change in living space, supporting neighboring state rebels or neighbors in domestic turbulence which affect all states of the Horn of Africa.

5. Three Ethiopian National Security Functions towards the three next-door states Ethiopian peacekeeping troops deployed summarized in the following table.

Functions of National Security	Somalia	Sudan	South Sudan
Defining the vital national interest that has to be safeguarded	- Export of Agricultural goods - Ethnic Somali's live both in Somalia and in Ethiopia	- Oil Import - Import and Export of Agricultural goods	- Oil Import - Minimizing migration - Illicit arms trade
Identifying threats for the National Interest	- Islamists and Irredentists coming to power in Mogadishu	- Civil War in Sudan - Alliance with Egypt against Ethiopia's GER Dam over the Nile	- Civil War
Selecting strategic actions with the available elements of national power can be mobilized by the state.	- Supporting the Federal government with sending its troops to fight Al-Shabaab (Unilateral intervention) - Deploying its troops with AMISOM	- PM involved (2019-2020) - Deploying its troops to UNAMID in Darfur - Deploying its troops to UNISFA	- Abyei - Deploying its troops to UNMISS and CTSAMM - Involve in IGAD mediation

Table 8.2 The Three Ethiopian National Security Functions towards the three countries Ethiopian peacekeeping troops deployed.

9.3 Supplement for the New Scientific Results

1. The post-1991 Ethiopian government has been using its military power capability or show of force and force presence through peacekeeping operations at its foreign policy instrument to deal with its security challenges in the neighbouring Horn of African states. In addition to this has three unique features of peacekeeping. First, **ETHIOPIA'S DISPOSITION TO DEPLOY ITS TROOPS TO PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS (POC) MISSIONS** where the principles of peacekeeping: consent of the parties, impartiality and non-use of force, except in self-defence and defence of the mandate can never be an excuse for failure to **PROTECT CIVILIANS, WHICH IS RELATED TO THE KIGALI PRINCIPLES**. Second, Ethiopia's focus of peacekeeping deployment in its next-door neighbours. Next-door peacekeeping is indispensable and important for the success of missions because not only the deployed troops familiarity of the next-door neighbour conflict and cultural similarity and geographical proximity, but also, most importantly, a conflict in the next-door neighbour is linked with the national security of states in the same regional security complex, where the fate of the states involved is interwoven. Third Ethiopia's history of the only non-colonized and free state in Africa which gave Ethiopia a exceptional intention in its foreign

policy and military orientation. Ethiopia's concept of Peace Support Operation is considered as a 'national extra mandate.' This is a moral issue not only at the state level but also at the individual level in the army. This emanates from the historical legacy of the League of Nations that failed to defend Ethiopia from the Italian aggression in 1936. Thus, the guarantee of collective security to small States and beleaguered people may not suffer Ethiopia's fate is the commitment not only at the government level but also individual troops. Moreover, the victory of Adwa against the Italian colonial invasion and the Ethiopian independence and freedom from colonialism gave a moral and security commitment and the military profession.

2. **THE STUDY IDENTIFIES FOUR-GENERATION OF ETHIOPIAN PEACE OPERATIONS**, thus providing an opportunity to define a clear framework in the study of Ethiopia's peacekeeping history and its rationales. The taxonomy is based on the particular sending regime's motive, the nature of the armed forces, and the focus area of deployment. The first generation of peacekeeping is the Imperial Army (1950 – 1967) which is based on the conviction to the collective security of Emperor Haile Selassie I. The missions were the 1950 The United Nations Command (UNC) in Korea and the 1960 the United Nations Operation in the Congo. The second generation is the EPRDF's Rebel Army sent to Rwanda by the Transitional Government of Ethiopia. This is characterized as Rebels Solidarity (1994 – 1995), Ethiopian troop deployment in Rwanda, which both the governments of Ethiopia and Rwanda at the time were rebel armies. The third generation of peacekeeping is after the formation of the national army, ENDF engagement in 'African Solution for African Problems' (2003 – 2010), where Ethiopia gave focus for peacekeeping deployment in Africa. The fourth-generation peacekeeping is when the Ethiopia army become the Peacekeeper Army (Since 2011) after the MoD of Ethiopia institutionalize peacekeeping as one of its departments and establish a peace support training centre.
3. The study has created the concept of peace operation strategy analysed based on the four levels of Ethiopian geopolitical interest and security risk responsiveness vis-à-vis peace support operation deployment.

- a) **ETHIOPIA'S FIRST AND IMMEDIATE GEOPOLITICAL INTEREST AND NATIONAL SECURITY RISKS ARE ITS NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES OR THE IGAD REGION.** Where Ethiopia's three vulnerabilities emanate from: first and foremost, spillover effect both conflict and refugee from failed states of Somalia, South Sudan, and Eritrea; second, the geographical factor, Ethiopia's lack of sea access or being a landlocked state makes it

dependent on using the ports of its neighbors. Third, the concentration of great powers military base in its most important trade route and port, Djibouti, and the region has become one of the most militarized regions in the world. There are fifteen states with operational military bases, one under construction and two with possible existing military facilities, in Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, and Somaliland, including Djibouti. In addition to that, there is a high military naval presence in the nearby waters of the Red Sea, Gulf of Eden, and Bab al-Mandab.

- b) Secondly, **AFRICAN COUNTRIES, WHICH IS AU AND ETHIOPIA'S PAN-AFRICA COMMITMENT, AS ETHIOPIA IS A FOUNDING MEMBER OF OAU AND LATER AU AND THE SEAT FOR THE ORGANIZATION. ALSO, ETHIOPIA HAS AN UNSWERVING COMMITMENT TO THE NOTION OF 'AFRICAN SOLUTIONS TO AFRICAN PROBLEMS' INITIATIVE.**
- c) Thirdly, **THE RED SEA REGION, WHICH A VITAL TRADE ROUTE AND THE NEAREST ACCESS TO THE SEA FOR ETHIOPIA, AND IS A SIGNIFICANT WATERWAY FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE.** Because of this, Ethiopia needs an influence around the sea, including with the most crucial state in the area, Yemen.
- d) Fourth, **THE GLOBAL FOCUS, WHICH IS A COMMITMENT TO COLLECTIVE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND NATIONAL PRESTIGE.** As it has always been responded to UN calls for collective action on international peace and security. Since the inception of the UN, Ethiopia has deployed over 100,000 military and police personnel through UN peacekeeping missions worldwide. Thus, Ethiopia's military deployment and troops' size to be deployed shall be based on the four geopolitical interests and security risk levels.

4. **THE HORN OF AFRICA FORMS, A SECURITY COMPLEX IN BUZAN'S TERMINOLOGY. THE HORN OF AFRICA DISPLAYS MANY OF THE FEATURES OF A REGIONAL SECURITY COMPLEX BASED ON ITS SECURITY DYNAMICS.** The countries in the region display high levels of security interdependence. For example, 18 ethnic groups, namely Afar, Somali, Luo, Tigrinya, Kunama, Shaho (Irob), Oromo, Anuak, Nuer, Bertha, Donyiro, Tirma, Shita, Gumuz, Murle, Kichapo, Wetawit, and Daasanach live both in Ethiopia and all its neighboring states except Uganda. Thus it is abundantly clear that the states of the Horn are deeply affected by their

relationships with one another and spillovers of civil wars, domestic dynamics, mainly refugee flows, and intervention by neighbors in domestic turbulence is most common in the region. Because Ethiopia's security is tied up with its neighbors, this significantly manifested in its foreign policy and military deployment, resulting in its peace support operations focused on its next-door neighboring states, Abyei, Darfur, Somalia, and South Sudan. Such peace support operations in Ethiopia's troubled neighbors will minimize its vulnerabilities and immediate national security threats.

5. Besides the Ethiopian National Security Functions towards the three next-door states, **THE ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA WERE ESTABLISHED BY THE ETHIOPIAN HEGEMONIC REGIONAL POWER AND USED AS A POLITICAL AND FOREIGN POLICY INFLUENCE IN THE REGION. ETHIOPIA COMMANDS A CLEAR HEGEMONIC POWER STATUS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA; THIS IS DUE TO ITS BEING THE MOST POPULOUS STATE IN THE REGION, STRONGEST ARMED FORCES WITH THE FASTEST-GROWING ECONOMIES.** In addition to this, Ethiopia manifests the four characteristics of regional hegemon: first, it claims its responsibility in areas of security and the region and continental level on issues of Pan-Africa and climate change in its modern political history; secondly, it has the necessary, demographic, economic, and military power resource to influence its region, third it has been employing an essential foreign policy instrument, its military power through vast peace support operation in the region, lastly more or less Ethiopia has an acceptance of its leadership role by the states of the region and beyond.

9.4 Recommendations

- * Though Ethiopia has a long and wide peacekeeping experience deploying thousands of military and police personnel deployed throughout its history, there is no white paper or strategic policy on peace support operation acquired from its experience – which can be useful for regional and international organizations for their peace support operation. Thus, it is recommended the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs work on this. Developing such a strategy will support the diplomats and military officers in their operational and tactical levels towards achieving the needed goal

- * Based on the analysis of this study, Ethiopian geopolitical interest, and security risk responsiveness vis-à-vis peace support operation deployment, Ethiopia should involve more and focus on the security issues in Yemen which is more a part of the Horn than often acknowledged and policy-makers. It has a strong historical, cultural and strategical relations with the states of the region. Also Ethiopia should increase its involvement and influence on the Red Sea according to its own fundamental security requirement.
- * It is unlikely Ethiopia will abandon its long-held foreign policy and military tradition of peacekeeping; It is also the recommendation of this study that Ethiopia remains in its involvement in the peacekeeping operations. And to keep its influence, it will need to increase its capability and, especially, its leadership role in the UN peacekeeping operations and offer effective designs about peacekeeping and peace enforcement and peacebuilding in its region and beyond.
- * Ethiopia needs to develop its military, police, and civilian capability for supplying UN peace support operation demands. For example, the UN listed its nine critical shortages: in Mobility - strategic airlift, utility and tactical helicopters, infantry with high mobility vehicles; Enablers - engineers, logistics and transportation units; Information-Gathering - observation/surveillance, including high resolution; night operations capability; data management and analysis; Formed Police Units - specialized in public order management, including crowd control; Specialized Police - including trainers, organizational reform experts, and investigators; Civilian Specialists - including in security sector reform, judicial and prisons management; Strategic planners - military, police, and civilian; Female Military, Police and Senior Civilian Personnel; and Francophone Staff Officers and Police - for four French language missions.⁶⁵²
- * Compared with Ethiopia, the latecomer, Rwanda has a strong record of active engagement with peace operations strategy, doctrine, and practice; for example, it contributes 'the Kigali protocol,' and the study recommends that Ethiopia follow the same trend beyond mere contribution of personnel.
- * The study on the Horn of Africa security complex, and Ethiopia's peace support operation in the region which is related to the root causes of conflict, complex human terrain, and protection of national interest and values can give a lesson to Hungarian Defence Forces and NATO.

⁶⁵² UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, *A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping*. New York: United Nations, July 2009. 27.

These are: When conflict arise in a given state it is important to work together with the relevant regional states to enhance peacekeeping capabilities to get the advantage of both military capability and familiarity of the complexities of conflicts that have a regional insinuation.

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APPENDIXES

APPENDIX 1. SIPRI'S MULTILATERAL PEACE OPERATIONS THAT WERE ACTIVE AS OF MAY 2019 ⁶⁵³

No.	UN United Nations	No.	EU European Union		No.	OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe	No.	AU African Union
1	MINUJUSTH UN Mission for Justice Support in Haiti, 2017 M-0 P-1005 C-157	1	EUAM Iraq EU Advisory Mission in Support of Security Sector Reform in Iraq, 2017 M-0 P-8 C-21		1	OMIK <i>OSCE Mission in Kosovo, 1999</i> M-0 P-0 C-84	1	AMISOM AU Mission in Somalia, 2007 M-20161 P-662 C-66
2	MINURSO UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, 1991 M-224 P-1 C-75	2	EUAM Ukraine EU Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine, 2014		2	OSCE Centre in Ashgabat* <i>OSCE Centre in Ashgabat, 1999</i> M-0 P-0 C-5	2	AU Observer Mission in Burundi 2015 M-8 P-0 C-37

⁶⁵³ Source: SIPRI. *SIPRI Map of Multilateral Peace Operations, 2019*. <https://www.sipri.org/publications/2019/sipri-map-multilateral-peace-operations-2019>, Accessed on 20 July 2019.

M-Military | P-police | C-International Civilian; All figures are estimates of the actual number international personnel deployed as of 31 Dec. 2018, unless otherwise noted. The figures do not include national civilian staff; * Not a multilateral peace operation according to the definition applied by SIPRI; ** Figures are as of 31 Dec. 2017; *** The JF-G5S is headquartered in Mali and operates in three distinct geographical sectors along and across the borders of Mali and Mauritania (West); Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger (Central); and Chad and Niger

			M-0 P-44 C-98					
3	MINUSCA UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, 2014 M-11628 P-2049 C-607	3	EUBAM Libya EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya, 2013 M-0 P-7 C-35		3	OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995 M-0 P-0 C-33	3	MISAC AU Mission for the Central African Republic and Central Africa, 2014 M-0 P-0 C-9**
4	MINUSMA UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, 2013 M-12811 P-1761 C-743	4	EUBAM Rafah EU Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point, 2005 M-0 P-1 C-8		4	OSCE Mission to Moldova 1993 M-0 P-0 C-10	4	MISAHHEL AU Mission for Mali and the Sahel, 2013 M-0 P-0 C-11**
5	MONUSCO UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC, 2010 M-15851 P-1362 C-833	5	EUCAP Sahel Mali EU CSDP Mission in Mali, 2015 M-0 P-40 C-71		5	OSCE Mission to Montenegro* 2006 M-0 P-0 C-7	No.	NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
6	UNDOF UN Disengagement Observer Force, 1974 M-939 P-0 C-49	6	EUCAP Sahel Niger EU CSDP Mission in Niger, 2012 M-0 P-35 C-80		6	OSCE Mission to Serbia 2001 M-0 P-0 C-21	1	KFOR NATO Kosovo Force, 1999 M-3642 P-0 C-0
7	UNFICYP UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, 1964 M-804 P-68 C-37	7	EUCAP Somalia* EU Maritime Security Capacity Building Mission in Somalia, 2012 M-0 P-86 C-4		7	OSCE Mission to Skopje 1992 M-0 P-0 C-35	2	NMI NATO Mission Iraq, 2018 M-580 P-0 C-0 (as authorized)

8	UNIFIL UN Interim Force in Lebanon, 1978 M-10317 P-0 C-239	8	EUFOR ALTHEA EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2004 M-560 P-0 C-17		8	OSCE Observer Mission at the Russian Checkpoints Gukovo and Donetsk 2014 M-0 P-0 C-21	3	RSM Resolute Support Mission, 2015 M-16910 P-0 C-0
9	UNISFA UN Interim Security Force for Abyei, 2011 M-4545 P-41 C-136	9	EULEX Kosovo EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, 2008 M-0 P-166 C-124		9	OSCE PRCiO OSCE Personal Representative of the Chairperson-in-Office for the Conflict Dealt with by the Minsk Conference, 1995 M-0 P-0 C-6	No.	ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
10	UNMIK UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, 1999 M-8 P-10 C-93	10	EUMM Georgia EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia, 2008 M-0 P-0 C-201		10	OSCE Presence in Albania 1997 M-0 P-0 C-19	1	ECOMIB ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau, 2012 M-396 P-146 C-0
11	UNMISS UN Mission in South Sudan, 2011 M-14904 P-1778 C-895	11	EUNAVFOR MED/ Operation Sophia* EU Naval Force Mediterranean/Operation Sophia, 2015 M-246 P-0 C-2		11	OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek* OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek M-0 P-0 C-10	2	ECOMIG ECOWAS Mission in The Gambia, 2017 M-875 P-125 C-0
12	UNMOGIP UN Military Observer	12	EUNAVFOR Somalia/ Operation Atalanta*		12	OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe* OSCE Programme Office	No.	LCBC Lake Chad Basin Commission

	Group in India and Pakistan, 1951 M-44 P-0 C-23		EU Naval Force Somalia/Operation Atalanta, 2008 M-251 P-0 C-0			in Dushanbe M-0 P-0 C-22		
13	UNTSO UN Truce Supervision Organization, 1948 M-142 P-0 C-77	13	EUPOL COPPS EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories, 2005 M-0 P-20 C-39		13	OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan* 1998 M-0 P-0 C-6	1	MNJTF* Multinational Joint Task Force, 2015 M-10752 P-0 C-20**
No.	UN/AU United Nations/African Union	14	EUTM Mali EU Training Mission Mali, 2013 M-640 P-0 C-52		14	OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine* 1999 M-0 P-0 C-4	No.	G5 Sahel Group of Five for the Sahel
1	UNAMID AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur, 2007 M-6045 P-2296 C-630	15	EUTM RCA EU Training Mission in the Central African Republic, 2016 M-166 P-0 C-1		15	OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan* 2000 M-0 P-0 C-3	1	JF-G5S* Joint Force of the G5 Sahel, 2017 5000 (as authorized)***
No.	United Nations Special Political Missions	16	EUTM Somalia EU Training Mission Somalia, 2010 M-128 P-0 C-10		16	OSCE SMM OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, 2014 M-0 P-0 C-893	No.	IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on Development
1	UNAMA UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, 2002 M-1 P-0 C-280	No.	Ad hoc Ad hoc coalitions of states				1	CTSAMVM Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification

								Mechanism, 2015 M-0 P-0 C-114
2	UNAMI UN Assistance Mission in Iraq, 2003 M-241 P-0 C-306	1	IMT International Monitoring Team, 2004 M-19 P-3 C-6				No.	OAS Organization of American States
3	UNIOGBIS UN Integrated Pea- cebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau, 2010 M-1 P-12 C-62	2	JCC/JPKF Joint Control Commis- sion/Joint Peacekeeping Forces, 1992 M-1120 P-0 C-0				1	MAPP/OEA OAS Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia, 2004 M-0 P-0 C-28
4	UNMHA UN Mission to Support the Hodeidah Agreement, 2019 M-2 P-5 C-. .	3	MFO Multinational Force and Observers, 1982 M-1117 P-0 C-111					
		4	NNSC Neutral Nations Supervi- sory Commission, 1953 M-10 P-0 C-0					
		5	OHR Office of the High Rep- resentative, 1995 M-0 P-0 C-12					

APPENDIX 2. PRE-DEPLOYMENT QUESTIONNAIRE FOR A MEMBERS OF ENDF CONTINGENT FORCE

For Contingents who are on Standby for Mission

My name is Kaleab Tadesse Sigatu, and I am currently doing my Ph.D. dissertation research on the Ethiopian National Defense Forces' role in peacekeeping in the Horn of Africa; in Abyei, Darfur, Somalia, and South Sudan. The main purpose of this questioner is to study the experience of ENDF contingents who are on standby for a mission at Hurso Peacekeeping Training School.

For the better achievement of the study, I would kindly ask you to answer the following questions. To keep the anonymity of the person who fills this questioner, there is no need to write a name. The purpose of this questioner will be only for academic purposes; thus, please feel free to answer what you believe a correct answer. Thank you for your time.

Part 1 – General Information – Please write your rank and mark the ‘X’ sign on the given space for accurate information about yourself.

1. Rank _____
2. Sex
 - i. Male _____
 - ii. Female _____
3. Age
 - i. 18 – 29 _____
 - ii. 30 – 40 _____
 - iii. 40 – 50 _____
 - iv. More than 50 _____
4. Marital Status
 - i. Married _____
 - ii. Single _____
 - iii. Divorced _____
5. Educational Level
 - i. No Formal Education _____
 - ii. Primery Education _____
 - iii. Secondary 'High School _____
 - iv. Diploma _____
 - v. Degree _____
 - vi. Masters _____

6. Service time at ENDF

- i. Less than 5 Years _____
- iii. 10 to 15 Years _____
- ii. 5 to 10 Years _____
- iv. More 15 Years _____

7. In which place are you going to be deployed?

- i. Abyei, UNISFA _____
- iii. Somalia, AMISOM _____
- ii. Darfur, UNAMID _____
- iv. South Sudan, UNAMISS _____

8. For how many times are you deployed to a peacekeeping mission?

- i. For the 1st time _____
- iii. For the 3rd time _____
- ii. For the 2nd time _____

9. Did you go on a peacekeeping mission before? If so, where and when?

- i. Place _____ Time _____
- ii. Place _____ Time _____
- iii. Place _____ Time _____

Part 2 – Questions concerning peacekeeping missions: Please mark the ‘X’ sign on the given space for accurate information about yourself.

10. Why did you want to part of the ENDF peacekeeping mission? *(It is possible to mark more than one answer)*

- i. To help people in neighboring states in conflict
- ii. Because it is my military duty
- iii. Because there is high reimbursement
- iv. If there is other reason _____

11. Does ENDF have a policy and strategy for Peacekeeping Missions?

- i. Yes _____
- iii. I don't know _____
- ii. No _____

12. Why do you think the Ethiopian government sends its troops to a peacekeeping mission? (Circle on your answers) (*It is possible to mark more than one answer*)

- i. To make its troops get supplementary reimbursement
- ii. To help peoples in conflict, ridden states
- iii. To protect Ethiopia indirectly from Terrorists and spillover conflicts
- iv. It is the duty of the Ethiopian government as a member of the UN and International Community

Part 3 – Mark the ‘X’ sign on the given space at your accurate judgment.

No.	Question	Very High	High	Medium	Low	Very Low
13	Do you believe you got all the necessary training for peacekeeping mission deployment?					
14	Do you believe you got all the necessary logistics to undertake your peacekeeping mission?					
15	How is the selection process of troops which will be deployed for a mission in regard to health, physical fitness, and other issues in quality and planning?					
16	How is your information and awareness about the climate, topography, society, and conflicting parties in the mission area you will be deployed?					

17	How is the experience sharing with the contingents who were deployed in a mission before?					
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Part 4 – Please provide your opinion on the question below.

18. What will be your duty at the mission you are going? _____

19. What kind of challenges did you face at the time of pre-deployment training? _____

20. What are the issues that have to be improved in pre-deployment and at the mission area that have to be improved? _____

APPENDIX 3. POST-DEPLOYMENT QUESTIONNAIRE FOR A MEMBERS OF ENDF CONTINGENT FORCE

For Contingents who are returned from deployment.

My name is Kaleab Tadesse Sigatu, and I am currently doing my Ph.D. dissertation research on the Ethiopian National Defense Forces' role in peacekeeping in the Horn of Africa; in Abyei, Darfur, Somalia, and South Sudan. The main purpose of this questioner is to study the experience of ENDF contingents who are on standby for a mission at Hurso Peacekeeping Training School.

For the better achievement of the study, I would kindly ask you to answer the following questions. To keep the anonymity of the person who fills this questioner, there is no need to write a name. The purpose of this questioner will be only for academic purposes; thus, please feel free to answer what you believe a correct answer. Thank you for your time.

Part 1 – General Information – Please write your rank and mark the ‘X’ sign on the given space for accurate information about yourself.

1. Rank _____
2. Sex
 - i. Male _____
 - ii. Female _____
3. Age
 - i. 18 – 29 _____
 - ii. 30 – 40 _____
 - iii. 40 – 50 _____
 - iv. More than 50 _____
4. Marital Status
 - i. Married _____
 - ii. Single _____
 - iii. Divorced _____
5. Educational Status
 - i. No formal Education _____
 - ii. Primeray Education _____
 - iii. Secondary Education _____
 - iv. Diploma _____
 - v. Degree _____
 - vi. Masters _____
6. Service year in the ENDF

i. Less than 5 Years ____

iii. 10 – 15 Years ____

ii. 5 – 10 Years ____

iv. More than 15 Years ____

7. For how many times you were deployed to peacekeeping mission?

i. 1st time ____

iii. 3rd time ____

ii. 2nd time ____

8. Did you participate in a peacekeeping mission before? If so, where and when?

i. Place _____ Time _____

ii. Place _____ Time _____

iii. Place _____ Time _____

Part 2 – Questions concerning peacekeeping missions: Please mark the ‘X’ sign on the given space for accurate information about yourself.

9. From which mission area did you get back?

i. Abyei, UNISFA ____

iii. Somalia, AMISOM ____

ii. Darfur, UNAMID ____

iv. South Sudan, UNAMISS ____

10. Are you willing to be deployed for a peacekeeping mission again?

i. Yes, I am ____

ii. No, I am Not ____

11. If you are willing to be deployed in PKO again, in which mission are you willing to go?

i. Abyei, UNISFA _____

v. If there is any other place,
you are interested in being
deployed for UN peace-
keeping _____

ii. Darfur, UNAMID _____

iii. Somalia, AMISOM ____

iv. South Sudan, UNAMISS _

12. How was your evaluation of your PKO deployment?

i. Less than I expected ____

iii. It was more than I ex-
pected it ____

ii. As I expected it ____

13. What was your main reason for interest to be deployed in peacekeeping mission? (*Possible to answer more than one*)

- i. To help people in neighboring states in conflict
- ii. Because it is my military duty
- iii. Because there is high reimbursement
- iv. If there is other reason _____

14. What are the problems you faced in the mission area?

- i. Language _____
- ii. The weather Condition _____
- iii. Armed Oppositions in the mission area _____
- iv. The Mission area population _____
- v. Other _____

15. What do you think the Ethiopian government is willing to send members of ENDF to PKO around the world?

- i. To make its troops get supplementary reimbursement
- ii. To help peoples in conflict, ridden states
- iii. To protect Ethiopia indirectly from Terrorists and spillover conflicts
- iv. It is the duty of the Ethiopian government as a member of the UN and International Community

Part 3 - Mark the 'X' sign on the given space at your accurate judgment.

No.	Question	Very High	High	Medium	Low	Very Low
16	Was the peacekeeping training similar to the actual deployment scenarios and helped the troops accomplished their duties properly?					
17	Were individual preparations all met that are needed to fulfill the peacekeeping mission?					

18	During our peacekeeping operations, all operations were carried out in accordance with the United Nations manual?					
19	How willing would you be if you are deployed in places far from the Horn of Africa, like in Congo and Mali?					
20	How much more interested are you in participating in domestic missions than in foreign United Nations and African Union PKOs?					
21	How important is the training you received before you went on a mission to your peacekeeping mission?					
22	How well do you think each member of the FDRE has accomplished its peacekeeping mission?					
23	How was the level of cooperation with peacekeepers from other countries?					
24	Do you believe that your participation in the peacekeeping mission has gained valuable experience and lessons for your various domestic missions?					
25	How was the logistics supply of the ENDF to the peacekeeping force in logistics, medicine, communication, shelter, and food?					
26	What was the army's relationship with the local community and (or in Darfur and South Sudan with the warring parties) during the peacekeeping operation?					
27	How is the selection process of troops which will be deployed for a mission in regard to health, physical fitness, and other issues in quality and planning?					

Part 4 – Please provide your opinion on the question below.

28. What was your duty at the time of deployment? _____
29. What are the issues that need to be improved in the overall ENDF's peacekeeping operation? _____

30. Do you believe that your involvement in peacekeeping missions has given you valuable experience for your various domestic missions? If so, what are they? _____

31. What are the strength and weakness of ENDF contingent at the time of deployment in your opinion? Strength _____ Weakness _____

APPENDIX 4. POST-DEPLOYMENT QUESTIONNAIRE FOR A MEMBERS OF ENDF STAFF OFFICERS AND MILITARY OBSERVES

For Staff Officers and Experts returned from deployment

My name is Kaleab Tadesse Sigatu, and I am currently doing my Ph.D. dissertation research on Ethiopian National Defense Forces' role in peacekeeping in the Horn of Africa; in Abyei, Darfur, Somalia, and South Sudan. The main purpose of this questioner is to study the experience of ENDF officers who were deployed at Staff and Experts in AU and UN PKOs.

For the better achievement of the study, I would kindly ask you to answer the following questions. To keep the anonymity of the person who fills this questioner, there is no need to write a name. The purpose of this questioner will be only for academic purposes; thus, please feel free to answer what you believe a correct answer. Thank you for your time.

Part 1 – General Information – Please write your rank and mark the ‘X’ sign on the given space for accurate information about yourself.

1. Military Rank at the time of Deployment _____

2. Sex

i. Male _____

ii. Female _____

iii.

3. Age

i. 18 – 29 _____

iv. 50 – 60 _____

ii. 30 – 40 _____

v. Above 60 _____

iii. 40 – 50 _____

4. Marital Status

i. Married _____

iii. Divorced _____

ii. Single _____

5. Educational Status

i. No formal Education ____

ii. Primeray Education ____

iii. Secondary Education ____

v. Degree ____

iv. Diploma ____

vi. Masters ____

6. Service year in the ENDF


i. Less than 5 Years ____

iii. 10 – 15 Years ____

ii. 5 – 10 Years ____

iv. More than 15 Years ____

Part 2 – Mark ‘X’ sign on the given space at the Places you were deployed.

Country of Deployment	Type of Deployment		
	Staff Officer	Expert	Other
Rwanda			
Burundi			
Liberia			
Haiti			
Cote d'Ivoire			
Chad			
South Sudan			
Darfur, Sudan			
Abiye			
AMISOM, Somalia			
Mali			
Other 			

7. Why did you want to part of the ENDF peacekeeping mission? *(It is possible to mark more than one answer)*

i. To help people in neighboring states in conflict

ii. Because it is my military duty

iii. Because there is high reimbursement

iv. If there is other reason _____

8. Why do you think the Ethiopian government sends its troops to a peacekeeping mission? (Circle on your answers) (*It is possible to mark more than one answer*)

i. To make its troops get supplementary reimbursement

ii. To help peoples in conflict-ridden states

iii. To protect Ethiopia indirectly from Terrorists and spillover conflicts

iv. It is the duty of the Ethiopian government as a member of the UN and International Community

Part 3 – Please Write Your Answers to the Questions below.

9. How do you view the deployment of more Ethiopian Experts and Staff Officers in mission like in Congo and Mali in addition to missions in the Horn of Africa? _____

10. What were your main duty at the peacekeeping mission? _____

11. Explain the pre-deployment trainings for Staff and Experts. What are the helpful sides and the challenges you faced at the training? _____

12. What are the challenges you faced in mission areas? _____

APPENDIX 5. LIST OF KEY INFORMANTS

No.	Name	Position	Date	Place
FDRE's The Hours of Peoples Representative Parliament				
1	Tesfaye Dhaba Waqjira	Foreign, Defense and Security Affairs Standing Committee Chairman ⁶⁵⁴	03 August 2019	Bishoftu (Debre Zeit), Ethiopia
African Diplomats				
2	Colonel Robert K. Kitur	Defense Attaché in Embassy of the Republic of Kenya, Ethiopia	30 May 2019	Embassy of the Republic of Kenya, Addis Ababa
3	Major General Sam Kiwanuka	Defense Attaché in Embassy of the Republic of Uganda, Ethiopia	07 June 2019	Embassy of the Republic of Uganda, Addis Ababa
4	El Ghassim Wane	* Former Director African Union Commission Peace and Security Department * Former Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operation United Nations * Former African Union Chief of Staff		Bishoftu (Debre Zeit), Ethiopia
Ethiopian Diplomats at FDRE's MOFA				
5	Dawit Yiriga	* Former FDRE's Political Coordinator of the Permanent Mission to the African Union in Addis Ababa		Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

⁶⁵⁴ 'Foreign Relation and Peace Affairs' is the new name of the Standing Committee.

		<p>* Former Minister Counsellor at Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York.</p> <p>* Currently Director-General for International Organization in MOFA</p>		
6	Henok Seyum	Junior Diplomat in MOFA		Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
7	Helina Dinku	Ethiopian Diplomat in FDRE' Embassy in Rome		Rome, Italy
8	Anonymous	Peacekeeping Department	05 August 2020	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
FDRE's Federal Police Commission				
9	Commander Tegegne Agajiet Deferesha	Head of Peacekeeping Department	03 October 2020	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
10	Anonymous	Sergeant, Federal Police Commission (Retired)	24 February 2020	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
11	Anonymous	Sergeant, Federal Police Commission (Retired)	25 February 2020	Burayu, Ethiopia
ENDF Peacekeeping Coordination Center (PCC) International Peace Support Training Institute (EIPSTI)				
12	Anonymous	-	11 June 2019.	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
13	Colonel Elias Seyoum	Head of Peace and Security Research Division at EIPSTI	10 June 2019.	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
14	Brigadier General Habtamu Tilahun	Commander of EIPSTI	11 November 2019.	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

15	Colonel Tamrat Andarge	Head of Training Division at EIPSTI	11 November 2019.	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
16	Colonel Milkesa Regasa	Commandant, Hurso Peacekeeping Training School	01 October 2019.	Hurso, Somali Regional State, Ethiopia
17	Colonel Alemayehu Abera	Deputy Commandant and Head of Training at Hurso Peacekeeping Training School	01 October 2019.	Hurso, Somali Regional State, Ethiopia

APPENDIX 6. LIST OF PUBLICATIONS BY THE RESEARCHER

Book Chapter

1. **‘Ethiopian Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations since 1991’** In Janos Besenyo and Viktor Marsai. (Eds.) *The Dynamics of Conflicts in Africa in the Early 21st Century*. Budapest, 2018. 201-224. <https://akfi-dl.uni-nke.hu/pdf/webPDFDynamicsofConflictsinAfrica.pdf>

Articles

2. **‘No Peace No War: Ethiopian-Eritrean Conflict.’** *Academic and Applied Research in Military and Public Management Science (AARMS)*. Volume 18, Issue 1, 2019. 79 – 91. <https://folyoiratok.uni-nke.hu/document/nkeszolgaltato-uni-nke-hu/AARMS201901.pdf>
3. **‘Asymmetric Warfare against the Islamic Militant Group Al-Shabaab in Somalia–The Ethiopian Experience.’** In Almos Peter Kiss (Ed.) *Asymmetric Warfare: Conflict of the Past, the Present, and the Future*. Conference Proceeding. Hungarian Defence Forces General Staff Scientific Research Centre, in cooperation with the National University of Public Service. Budapest, 9-10 November 2016. 235 – 247. <http://hvktkh.hm.gov.hu/kiadvanyok/dokumentumok/asymmetric-war.pdf>
4. **‘Conflict over the Nile: The GERD Project and its Implication in the security of the Horn of Africa.’** 2019. Budapest. Accepted for publication by project “Africa in the globalized world” Ludovika Research Group, supported by the National University of Public Service under the priority project KÖFOP-2.1.2-VEKOP-15-2016-00001 entitled „Public Service Development Establishing Good Governance” Led by Dr. Viktor Marsai.
5. **‘The Role of regional actors in the South Sudan Conflict.’** Accepted for publication by project “Africa in the globalized world” Ludovika Research Group, supported by the National University of Public Service under the priority project KÖFOP-2.1.2- VEKOP-15-2016-00001 entitled „Public Service Development Establishing Good Governance” Led by Dr. Viktor Marsai.
6. **‘UNISFA: Conflict over Abyei and the Exclusive Ethiopian Peacekeeping Mission.’** 2019. Budapest. Accepted for publication by the project titled “Rural Security” under the commission of the National University of Public Service under the priority project KÖFOP-2.1.2- VEKOP-15-2016-00001 titled „Public Service Development Establishing Good Governance” in the Ludovika Workshop led by Professor Dr. Tivadar Szilagyi

7. **‘Conflict among Border Communities the Case between Ethiopia and Kenya and Ethiopia and South Sudan.’** 2019. Budapest. Accepted for publication by the project titled “Rural Security” under the commission of the National University of Public Service under the priority project KÖFOP-2.1.2-VEKOP- 15- 2016-00001 titled „Public Service Development Establishing Good Governance” in the Ludovika Workshop led by Professor Dr. Tivadar Szilagyi

Monograph

8. **‘Rural Security-Lesson Learnt Form Horn of Africa–Ethiopia: Conflicts Caused by Changed Living Space.’** December 2018. Budapest. Accepted for publication by the project titled “Rural Security” under the commission of the National University of Public Service under the priority project KÖFOP-2.1.2-VEKOP-15- 2016-00001 titled „Public Service Development Establishing Good Governance” in the Ludovika Workshop led by Professor Dr. Tivadar Szilagyi.

Book

9. **‘Constitution in Ethiopia form Kibire Negest to EPRDF’** ሕገ መንግስት በኢትዮጵያ፡ ከፍትሐ ነገስት እስከ ኢፌዴሪ [Bilingual Book - Amharic and English] Mega Publishing & Distribution Pvt. Ltd. Co., Addis Ababa, 2019.

APPENDIX 7. LIST OF SCIENTIFIC LECTURES BY THE RESEARCHER

1. **„Asymmetric Warfare with the Islamic Militant Group Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The Ethiopian Experience”** In “International Conference by The Science Department of the Hungarian Defence Force General Staff, in cooperation with NUPS.” Stefania Palace, Budapest, 9-10 November 2016
2. **„The Role of Ethiopia in the Regional Security Complex of the Horn of Africa”** In „The Dynamics of African Conflicts in the Early 21st Century – Two Steps Further, one Step Back?” Ludovika Campus, Budapest, October 5, 2017
3. **„Regional Influences and Somali Security: Ethiopia’s Role in Somalia”** In „Secured without Security? The political economy of peace enforcement of the Federal Government of Somalia Achievements and constraints between regional influences and domestic struggles.” Rome, Italy, September 26th, 2017
4. **„Military Power as Foreign Policy Instrument: Ethiopian Peacekeeping Role in the Horn of Africa”** In „20th International Conference of Ethiopian Studies (ICES20), ‘Regional and Global Ethiopia: Interconnections and Identities’” Mekele University, Mekele, Ethiopia 1-5 October 2018
5. **„Constitutions in Ethiopian History: Reflection on Important Historical Landmarks”** In „20th International Conference of Ethiopian Studies (ICES20), ‘Regional and Global Ethiopia: Interconnections and Identities’” Mekele University, Mekele, Ethiopia 1-5 October 2018
6. **„Conflict over the Nile – The Involvement of China and the United States”** In “The Jagielloonian Conference on Security in Asia, Africa, and Europe: The Impact of Rivalry between China, Russia, and United States on Security Dynamics in Asia, Maghreb, and Europe. Krakov, Poland, 22–23 November 2018
7. **„Peacekeeping the Horn: AU and UN Peacekeeping Missions in the Horn of Africa.”** In „War Studies University: International Expert Seminar on the Horn of Africa” Warsaw, Poland, 4th December 2018
8. **„Terrorism in the Horn of Africa: threats and Ethiopian responses”** International Conference Organized by www.migraciokutato.hu „Terrorism 3.0 — Current Security Challenges and Prospects.” Budapest, Hungary, 5-6 December 2019

9. **„Building a National Army in Multi-Ethnic States: The Case of Ethiopia.”** In “VIVA AFRICA 2019, 11th International Conference on African Studies. „Multiple Entanglements in African Politics” November 28–29, 2019 / Olomouc / Czech Republic.
10. **„Ethiopia in Transition: The Case of the Security Sector.”** In “30 Years of Freedom - Farewell to Communism in Hungary Local and Global Lessons,”. Organized by the Embassy of Hungary to Ethiopia, the Ethiopian Civil Service University (Addis Ababa, ETH), the National University of Public Service (Budapest, HU), and the University of Pecs (Pecs, HU). 25 October 2019