

NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF PUBLIC SERVICE
Doctoral School of Military Science

THESIS BOOKLET

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**The impact of the Indochina war on the development of the Art of War, in
the light of the changes in the organization and warfighting methods of the
opposing forces**

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Introduction

Two factors motivated me when I applied to the Doctoral School of Military Sciences: first, I wanted to research a topic that was less researched and had not been previously covered in Hungarian, so I had a goal to "be the first" in something. I considered this important because I thought that the military historical researches basically concentrate only on a few topics, typically Hungarian or specifically Hungary-related ones, which inevitably leads to a narrowing of the topics that can be researched, so only micro-history remains an alternative for researchers. I definitely wanted to avoid this, and I wanted to focus on the development process of the modern art of war.

When choosing the topic, the second major motivating factor was my prior education and previous studies, which I definitely wanted to be connected to when writing my dissertation. I went back to before my professional military career, my focus was the Francophone culture and the learning of the French language. At the intersection of these two topics, there were several modern-day conflicts with which we traditionally research less in our country, even though they had a direct impact on the European balance of power and an indirect impact on the global one. These were typically colonial conflicts following the Second World War, of which I would highlight the first Indochina war (1945-1954) and the Algerian war (1954-1962), due to their impact.

Of the two conflicts, the Algerian is better known in our country, both in general history and in military science. Of course, this does not mean that the Algerian war is a well-researched topic at Hungary, but its events fit into the modern transformation of the relations in the Mediterranean region. Therefore, its researched status can only seem good in comparison with the Indochina war, according to my above-mentioned points of view!

In recent years, almost throughout my research, when my choice of topic was mentioned, typically the few stereotypes and inaccurate historical anecdotes came up from my partners, which only confirmed the correctness of my decision, that the topic needs to be researched, both in military science and in historical point of view.

At the same time, this relative obscurity also brought unexpected difficulties during my research, because there was no domestic expert or outstanding researcher on the subject, rather just sub-topics from the periphery of my research were connected to other people's fields of expertise. This led to the fact that I had to summarize an extremely fragmented material that was built up from many small pieces of information in order to be able to outline the general

historical overview and the background of the conflict I was researching (its impact on the development of the art of war) before I actually start developing my own work.

The Research Problem and my Objectives

In the course of my work, I tried to narrow down the topic sufficiently to be able to adhere to the thesis limits, so I had to refrain from a detailed elaboration of the entire military history of the Indochina War. This was a rather difficult decision, because there is currently no comprehensive military history work in Hungarian about the conflict and its history of events to which the changes in the art of war could be linked, so I think that the overview cannot be completely left out from my thesis.

I therefore thought that I would analyze the battlefield and the roots of the conflict, as well as the circumstances of the outbreak, only to the extent necessary to understand the context of the topic and provide the framework for the thesis. Also, since it has no precedent in the domestic historiography, I thought it would be appropriate to divide the war into phases and to present a background of their events. These can be called the framework or even the background of the historical research of the art of war itself, but by no means the goal. Instead of the chronological processing of the history of events, I tried to concentrate only on the major events, military operations and battles, which typically highlight the importance of a new procedure or organization, verify their correctness or even their incorrectness. I selected these "studies" during the examination of the entire event history of the war, with the aim of serving as an example of the changes that had the greatest impact on the history of the art of war.

During the further examination of the topic, it also became evident that the two opposing sides, i.e. the communist guerrillas, called the Viet Minh, and the French colonial forces and their allies developed to a completely different direction during the eight-year war, therefore a detailed analysis (taking into account the inevitability of the overview of the event history due to the above-mentioned reasons) would also exceed the limits of the dissertation.

Based on this, I had to refrain from presenting the sides equally, and based on my own system of criteria, I focused on examining the French side more deeply. The primary reason for this decision are the language difficulties, because the vast majority of the literature I have access to is written in French, while I do not speak the language of the Vietnamese side, and most of the bibliography published there is hardly available in Europe.

During the Indochina and Algerian conflicts, the professional soldiers of the French forces overlapped, so I saw it as appropriate to prioritize a more detailed examination of the colonial side. With this decision, the possibility of a later research towards Algeria was opened, while the second Indochina war, i.e. the US-Vietnam war, would have been the possible direction logically based on the research of the communist side. The above mentioned two conflicts are connected by a very important, Hungarian-related organization, which is none other than the French Foreign Legion.

Continuing along this line of thought, I believed that getting to know the military history of modern France the leading member of the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), also an ally of Hungary, could bring us numerous advantages.

Of course, the presentation of the military organization and procedures of the Viet Minh cannot be left out, however, the depth and purpose of the research is different from that of the colonial side. Guerrilla warfare and Maoist-type Southeast Asian revolutions have well-known Hungarian researchers, and in my opinion, the goals and activities of the Indochinese communists fit into the general trend, so I did not find it necessary to present them in detail. From this point of view, when I discuss the Viet Minh, I examine it more as a force opposing the French

At the beginning of the research, I set myself the achievement of three goals, two of which appeared as primary, i.e., direct scientific goals, which are related to military historical research and its methodology: these are valuable research results for military and historical science, which can clearly increase our knowledge in this area. in scientific fields. With regard to military science, my goal is to expand your general knowledge of the conflict and fill in the gaps in domestic military science research that relate to the development of the early Cold War military art, highlighting the general trends that still have an impact to this day. From the point of view of historiography, my aim was to draw attention to and evaluate the participation of the Hungarian foreign legionnaires in the war.

My secondary or indirect goal was to expand our knowledge of today's French forces at the organizational level, because I believe that knowledge of the contemporary military history of the Allied forces can facilitate more effective cooperation by understanding what influences led to the development of their organizational culture and traditions that exist today. I tried to achieve this goal by publishing the results of my research in the *Honvédségi Szemle*, the primary journal of the Hungarian Armed Forces.

In summary, in my thesis, I focus on the research of the colonial French and their allied forces, in addition to the opposing party, the Viet Minh, to the necessary extent. The basis and framework of the entire work is based on the history of the military events, from which I highlight a few battles or campaigns to depict the major changes having an impact on the development of the art of war. My primary goal is to examine how the history of the conflict fits into the series of asymmetric conflicts, what unique features it has, and what universal, still valid impact it has, especially with regard to the counterinsurgency operations carried out by the COIN side. With this methodology, I am trying to expand our knowledge of the two major disciplines, military and historical studies, while indirectly contribute to the more effective international relationship building of the Hungarian Armed Forces.

Hypotheses

At the beginning of my research, I assigned several hypotheses to my goals. My basic assumption is that the Indochina War has had an impact on the development of military art to this day, and therefore its research is absolutely necessary in terms of getting to know the early Cold War military history and military science. In my opinion, the dominance of the other major conflict in the region during the period, the Korean War (1950-1953), still obscures the actual impact of the Indochina War. My assumption is that it only got a lot of attention because of the direct involvement of the two young superpowers. Based on this, I think that the traditional point of view has more of a political background, because from the point of view of the development of the art of war, there were no events as significant as those happened on the Indochina Peninsula.

1. I assume that new procedures and/or organizations appeared in the Indochina war. Here, I consider it necessary to examine the riverine warfare or the activities of the parachute and commando units, as well as the unique logistical solutions.

2. I assume that the development that took place during the Indochina war was not only viable in the region, but their impact went beyond the Far East. First of all, I consider the examination of the elite formations of the French military, their commanders and their leadership to be of prime importance, because the majority of them took their experiences from Indochina to North Africa and achieved success by applying them there.

3. I assume that in today's military art there are procedures or organizations whose roots go back to Indochina. Most of the well-known 20th-century French counter-insurgency (COIN) theoreticians took part in colonial wars like the Indochina War. I also assume that the basics of combat airborne operations were also laid in Indochina, and the same principles are still valid today.

4. I assume that a significant number of Hungarians took part in the war, but their actual impact, activities, etc. are still not well-researched. I also assume that we can get a more accurate picture of the conditions of the French POW and the conditions in Hungary after 1945 if we examine the reasons why they joined the Legion. This would fill the gap between the currently ongoing researches.

Research Methods

My research methodology was determined by the resources available to me. In general, it can be said that during my research I mainly used the tools of history and military science. MY sources were predominance of foreign language, mainly French, books, which include works of a historians as well as biographies and autobiographies. The first wave of evaluations of the experience took place at the end of the 1950s, which was prompted by the ongoing war in Algeria, but Indochina came to importance again in the late 1970s as a result of the American defeat.

During my work, I tried to use primary sources wherever possible, which consisted of two large groups: the traditional archival sources (HM HIM, ÁBTL, OSA Blinken), which were used mainly during the Hungarian Legion research part, and the limitedly available documents of the French archives (SHD Vincennes, SHAT, ECPAD, the Foreign Legion archives, and the Colonial Archive). Unfortunately, during the planning of my research (because due to the nature of the topic, expensive foreign travels would have been necessary), I planned this for the last period, which was made impossible by the COVID-19 situation, so I could only rely on the limitedly available digital materials. From 2020, the Hungarian archives provided digital documents for my research and it was extremely helpful.

The set of materials available on the Internet also appeared as a new source group, consisting mainly of the collection of personal legacies, photos, diaries and correspondence shared in thematic, closed groups in social media olatforms. In these virtual spaces, the target

audience consisted mainly of descendants of French soldiers, professional historians, and interested amateurs, and a large amount of material that was not available anywhere else was shared among the members. There is currently no accepted formal methodology for using these as sources so they literally do not exist for the official researcher.

I believe that those working in the field of sciences must respond to such new groups of sources and unusual platforms in social media, because documents might have been lost before they may be found! Nowadays, sharing a photo taken with a phone or a scanned letter only takes seconds, so a relatively large amount of digital data can be generated relatively quickly. It is worth noting that on these same platforms, you can initiate a conversation with the document sharers almost immediately, and it is even possible to conduct a mini-interview with him or her. This is also an unexploited opportunity that should have a place among modern research methodologies. The epidemic situation and the quarantine periods provided an excellent opportunity to try these methods when the traditional channels were closed.

Due to the physical distance, I did not conduct any research on the battlefields, but instead I used a large amount of digitized military topographic maps (typically materials produced by the US Army in the very early 1960s) to check the sources' statements. I checked those by using images and film material from the French military press archives (ECPAD).

The origins of the 20th century French Art of War and the context of the conflict

The development of modern French art of war prior to the Indochina War in the 19th century can be split into two: The colonial and the continental methods, experiences and theories. During this period, in the focus of the French empire-building was the armed forces. In the middle of the century, two theories appeared: the first focused on enemy insurgent forces and their destruction, favoring the use of the military, and the other focused on the local population.

This is the same period when mainstream European French military thinking deepened and focused on leadership, morale and psychological factors. Thus, in this period, their military theories essentially break away from the general topics related to the armed forces, laying down the foundation stone of the highly influential 20th century Gallic strategic thinking.

The First World War and then the Second World War both hit France hard, radically changing their warfighting concepts several times. The all-out offensive way was replaced by

the defensive doctrine at all levels, while the country actually withdrew from the mainstream of military thinking of the interbellum period. After the failure of this static, defensive approach in 1940, the French military was rebuilt under an American influence - especially in the case of the air force, which was reorganized in a completely new strategic role.

Meanwhile the change in attitude had not yet taken place in the colonies, the principles created on the basis of the 19th-century Algerian and turn-of-the-century Madagascar experiences were still valid there, even though the Second World War completely reshaped the image of the empire, highlighting the weaknesses of the French. However, the decision-makers in Paris who were working for the revival of "gloire" and "grandeur" were not willing to take note of this change, so when problems appeared in 1945, they reached out to the tool that had been the most effective in the past: it became the task of the military to pacification of rebel colonies.

The forces of the French Union were stuck in a series of colonial conflicts that were already considered rather anachronistic. At that time, this was more of an obstacle in the way to develop modern Cold War doctrines: the nuclear deterrence. While the 1990s were characterized by mutual disarmament programs and a general optimism, the number low-intensity conflicts began to rise. The French armed forces, had a historical dual role: fighting in colonial conflicts, but simultaneously preparing for a nuclear war, accumulated valuable experience in the early Cold War period, which became valuable again after 2001 - but this time not in France, but in the US.

The quasi-dual development of military art was previously left Hungary unnoticed due to the Soviet conventional approach's influence. It is therefore necessary to further analyze the first great decolonization war of the French, in order to get a more comprehensive answer to the role of conflict in the development of the art of war, which can also contribute to the revision of our traditional Cold War Great Power Competition centric way of thinking, especially in the light of counterinsurgency operations.

The Pre-Conflict History and the Characteristics of the battlefield

This chapter reveals how the colonial French Indochina came to existence, as a result of a conquest spanning through several decades. At the time of its creation, the French had to deal with both the British, who were expanding towards Malaya and Burma, and the Chinese, who considered the region to be part of their traditional sphere of interest. It was a twist of fate

that after the Second World War that the soldiers of the same two countries awaited the returning French Officials, Commander-in-Chief General Philip Leclerc and Admiral Thierry d'Argenlieu, the briefly appointed Governor-General.

China (the People's Republic of China from 1949) never gave up its Indochinese ambitions, for which it found partners in the form of the Viet Minh and Ho Chi Minh. The involvement of the communist China led to the appearance of the United States in the region, and from 1950 the country's role became more and more important. The US was interested in containing the communist ideology, so they stood behind the French, even though they had previously rejected the idea to save the old colonial empires. The importance and impact of the conflict grew beyond France, but this was not recognized in Paris at that time. France could not end the Indochina war alone, and due to the burdens of reconstruction and the challenges of the European security situation, the protracted conflict became more and more burdensome, and was also increasingly rejected by the people.

The French, with centuries of experience, reached out to the tool that had traditionally been the most successful in pacifying rebellious colonies: they sent the Colonial Army to the Far East. However, the face of Indochina changed, and the Japanese occupation played a huge role in it: the emergence of an Asian power discredited the previously invincible Europeans. The division of colonial society was also brought to the surface by the presence of the Imperial Japanese forces: nationalists, religious sects and the communist Viet Minh (re)appeared. When the French returned, they encountered a chaotic situation: in addition to numerous smaller resistance groups, they had to negotiate with an opponent with a well-developed guerrilla movement willing and able to fight for the country's independence.

The leadership in Paris did not develop an effective strategy, it did not support the soldiers with the country's economic, diplomatic and other instruments. In this situation, the traditional colonial warfighting methods described at the beginning of the thesis failed, because the previously successful over-use of force was not enough to deal with complex social conditions in addition to the difficult physical terrain. The French simply did not recognize the importance of the population-centric COIN.

This was a situation in which the overwhelming technical/firepower superiority of a modern army prepared and equipped to fight on the battlefields of the Second World War could not prevail. In order to understand what kind of organization this French Far East Expeditionary Corps was, it is necessary to examine its structure, leadership and the performance of its elements, highlighting the reasons for the success or failure. The experiences of the analysis

can provide the answers to the question of what types of formations and procedures are needed for effective COIN operations.

The Opposing Forces and the assessment of the French forces

In the Indochina War, the forces of both sides changed a lot. In the case of the Viet Minh, regularization was the leading element of this process. The driving force behind it was the import of the Chinese three-stage revolutionary warfare theory and the creation of a three-level force which was made possible by the supplies from China. The Viet Minh was the first to realize how huge the role of psychological warfare (propaganda) and Intelligence could be in a COIN conflict.

After 1947, the French were forced to respond to the challenge of the evolution of the enemy. During this time several dual force structures were created: one would have fought NATO's mechanized and nuclear war, while the other was increasingly adapted to the specifics of the Far East battlefield. Nuclear warfare became the mainstream of the continental military thinking, while the traditional colonial element was increasingly marginalized. Despite all of this, after Indochina France's soldiers immediately went to the Algerian War where they benefited enormously from the COIN experiences in Indochina.

From the 1960s, the break between colonial and continental warfare was obvious, the former was no longer in the forefront due to the disintegration of the French Union. It is not surprising that some of the innovations from Indochina (and Algeria) were only reinvented much later in the American military after 2001 (in Afghanistan and in Iraq).

Regardless of this, the French soldiers gained very important experience in multi-national warfare but they realized very late that the conflict was not an enemy-centered COIN one, and that conventional operations were not able lead to success. Several theoreticians (including Beaufre, who served Indochina at the beginning of the war and later became an important French strategist) indicated at the beginning of the conflict that this would not be enough, but neither the political nor the military leadership were ready to admit this.

A unique comprehensive example for COIN approach can be the case of GAMOs, and the non-conventional elements: the GCMA's and commando formations, and their use resembled to the modern day special forces, In CEFEO's leadership the dominance of traditional military force application, binary thinking along the lines of attack and defense maintained its primacy throughout (even when it was led by a former intelligence officer General Navarre).

Due to the extremely complicated French command system, even the planning of the smallest operation, several command levels and staffs had to be involved, which greatly limited their success even before they began. This situation was only further aggravated by the physical characteristics of the battlefield, as well as the mixed composition and often unprofessional behavior of the French military leadership.

The French military applied a great number of innovations at the tactical level with great efficiency during the war (for example, the improvement of airborne and riverine operations, the methods of direct air support, and the concept of special forces cooperating with local tribes), and they created very flexible organizational structures (Mobile Groups). However it turned out to be very rigid at the operational, and at the strategic level, and also the guidance of the political leadership was noticeably lacking. Therefore, the military and operational planning/leadership examples found in Indochina can be part of military history as warning examples.

The Course of the War

Many battles and campaigns would be suitable to be mentioned here, however, only the most influential ones of each period have been selected. This is the case of Operation LEA, which is outstanding in terms of its size among the many small operations of the first period, and it almost ended the conflict. This operations shows all the military strengths of the French forces: the combined army and joint warfighting skills based on technical superiority initially provided the CEFEO a significant advantage and it also highlighted the importance of reconnaissance in Indochina. However, the tactical results were dismissed by logistical difficulties, and when Viet Minh forces reverted back to their preferred guerilla way of war, the French operation collapsed.

The second period saw a significant change, and the battles along Cao Bang and RC 4 became the turning point of the war. The opening of the lines of communication to the Chinese border made it possible for the Viet Minh regular forces to begin a rapid development. After Cao Bang, the war entered a new phase, the superiority of the French in conventional operations quickly disappeared, and the Communist forces gained momentum. Only the energetic intervention of the new commander-in-chief, General de Lattre, could prevent a disaster in the Tonkin region. At that time, securing the key areas became the French's main effort, and an increasing proportion of the colonial forces were tied up in static defensive tasks. This meant that the initiative increasingly went to the Viet Min.

In the last period, at the battle of Dien Bien Phu all the development in military theory, organizational transformation and all the innovations of the entire war appeared, from the paratroopers to the GCMA groups, despite the fact that battles original French concept was not more innovative than the battle of Verdun half a century earlier. The goal was the same as in 1916: bleed the enemy dry by using fortifications that gave the defense advantage and combine it with superior firepower.

Conclusions

The Indochina War has its roots deep in the French colonial past. This already determined how the forces returned to the Far East began to operate and with what they tried to deal with the situation. French colonial military thought developed parallel to European theories, but it broke away from it after the First World War, because the evolution of the continental military theory was incredibly accelerated by the development of military technology (tanks, aircraft, and then weapons of mass destruction). This parallel development led to a break not only in military theory, but also in practice, and caused certain elements of the armed forces to distance from each other. Units within units were formed, and the first signs of this already appeared in Indochina.

The growing communist threat, which really gained importance after the end of the Chinese Civil War presented a varied challenge to the French and the forces of the associated states. In the south, the members of the Viet Minh were much more dogmatic Maoists, while in the north, military professionalism appeared in the armed forces, so the attacks did not only serve a great political goal, but also took military objectives into account. This difference even in the 1960s it had an effect on the relationship between the Viet Cong and North Vietnam. After the siege of Na San in 1952, General Giap became much more cautious and did not favor large, general offensives which caused huge losses (such as the Tet Offensive in 1968).

The first French concept of counter-revolutionary warfare appeared in Indochina, and reached its final form in Algeria, so it (although it was a completely independent conflict) can be considered a natural continuation of the former – at least from the point of view of the history of military art. The connection between the two conflicts was the professional personnel of the French armed forces who carried their burden and frustration of Indochina to the Mediterranean. That is why, when researching the COIN elements of the French decolonization wars, it is wise

to treat the two conflicts, the two "dirty wars" together, despite all their differences: one is an example of the birth of the theories, and the other is an example of their application.

In the French army, many innovations appeared in the Far East, like the flexible organizational principle of the GMs, or the intensive use of parachute formations, which was based on new basics (a mixture of the British SAS and the German Fallschirmjäger), and it represents one, if not the most important step for today's heliborne operations. The direct, decentralized leadership of the young French officers, which was exercised in the parachute units, proved to be much more effective than the rigid continental methods. The commandos used in the North African war were based on the paratrooper experiences (only technology developed and the helicopter became widespread), and the concept of the American airmobile/air assault infantry also originates from this.

In the same way, the combination of commando formations and riverine forces (dinassaut) and amphibious combat groups represented a completely new concept. From a logistical point of view, the renewal of the reborn of the centuries-old concept of a large fortress capable of logistically supporting the operational area, the base aéroterrestre, represented a major evolution in sustainment.

From a COIN point of view, the Indochina war is a war of missed opportunities. It was a multi-layered, multi-dimensional, complex conflict, because the guerilla war in the south, which was also fueled by religious elements, was very different than the maneuvers of divisions or artillery duels happened in the north. It was both a classic struggle for independence and a modern ideological struggle, a closed, colonial struggle and one of the first important battlefield of the Cold War.

From this point of view, it is visible why the most important innovation was the creation of the French COIN elements. It was the time when modern psychological warfare was born, and the integrated political-economic-military concept (GAMO) of reintegrating contested territories also appeared. In this war, the task of the commandos/GCMA (also forerunners of modern day special forces) was the training of local resistance groups, and the organization of friendly irregular forces against the communist guerrillas.

The leading COIN theorists (Trinquier, Nemo, Hogard, who fought in the Far East, and Galula) were able to draw the appropriate conclusions from the conflict and were able to write down their theories. It is not surprising why their knowledge became important again after 2001, when the age of "Forever War" and low-intensity conflicts came.

New Scientific Findings

1. I proved that in the Indochina war many new methods - like the flexible organizational principles of GMs, the intensive use of paratroopers, the merging of commando units and riverine forces (dinassaut) and their addition to amphibious combat groups, the renewal of the century-old concept of a central fortress system capable of supplying the operational area, and the creation of COIN elements (GCMA, GAMO) - appeared during the evolution of the French armed forces.
2. I proved that the population/enemy centric COIN, the organizational principles of the commando units and the tasks can and should be comparable to today's special forces or elite light infantry units.
3. I showed that in the Indochina war, the emergence of an "army within the army", the elite unit's brotherhood like cohesion and strong esprit de corps appeared on the French side is similar as of today's special forces.
4. I highlighted the extent of the Hungarian participation in the French Foreign Legion and the losses they suffered during the eight years of the war, as well as the main reasons why they joined the Legion (POW status, political or economic emigration, "push and pull factors"). I also presented what kind of procedures the legionnaires faced when they were repatriated to Hungary during the 1950s.

Practical Applicability of the Research and Scientific Findings

The results of the research can be used in graduate/postgraduate education (especially at the National University of Public Service's Faculty of Military Science and Officer Training) and for the further understanding the decolonization and the early Cold War military history.

I recommend a comprehensive study of modern French military theory, which would contribute to a better understanding of one of our important European and NATO ally. Based on my research, it appears that French military thinking is quite abstract to the point of being philosophical, but still has much more strategic depth than today's similar Anglo-Saxon works.. Currently, there is no domestic research that summarizes the work of the most important French

military theorists of the last two centuries from the period of the Napoleonic wars to the present day.

I believe that, despite all their differences, the conflicts in Indochina and Algeria must be treated as a continuation. I recommend a further examination of the anti-revolutionary warfare thinkers of the period (Trinquier, Galula, Hogard, Nemo and others), in comparison with each other or with their colonial predecessors. At the moment, only the works of some of them are known, but this is not enough to get a comprehensive understanding of the French COIN.

I consider important to examine the activities of some of the unique units and French military leaders of the period, for the sake of a broader perspective. France was in constant war between 1939 and 1962, and the important dynamics between society and the military, as well as between the political leadership and the armed forces and certain elements within the armed forces could be better understood.

In my opinion, this limited, tactical level application of airborne forces can also fit the Hungarian Defense Forces methods, and the experiences of the French are a rich in good case studies. In the same way, the conflicts of the Indochina peninsula, rich in rivers, can serve many examples for all brown water activities, from landing to demining.

Finally, I recommend expanding the research about the Foreign Legion between 1945 and 1956, because many personal stories, including successes and tragedies, are still in the dark. For this a more in-depth analysis of the Hungarian prisoners of war in French captivity is needed, and also, a research of the largest volunteer groups (for example, the gendarmes or the Levente youth). Based on the result of these researches, it would be possible to get a more accurate overall picture about the background and motivation of the legionnaires.

List of Publications

Zoltán Harangi-Tóth: The applicability of intel analyst methods in military history research. In *Honvédségi Szemle*, 4/2017. No. 110–119.

Zoltán Harangi-Tóth: The last operations of the French 100th Mechanized Group (GM100) in Indochina. In *Honvédségi Szemle*, 3/2018. No. 104–116.

Zoltán Harangi-Tóth: Hungarians Fighting for France in Indochina. In *AARMS*, 3/2018. No. 63–70.

Zoltán Harangi-Tóth: French paratroopers in the first half of the Indochina war. In *Honvédségi Szemle*, 3/2019. No. 140–149.

Zoltán Harangi-Tóth: Ghost of Indochina in the Mediterranean. In *Mediterranean World Journal of Social Sciences*, 45-46. No. 2019, pp. 222–230.

Zoltán Harangi-Tóth: Operation LEA. In *Hadtudomány*, 3/2019. No. 59–70.

Zoltán Harangi-Tóth: About the research of the Indochina War. In *Hadtudomány*, 2020/4. No. 123–134.

Zoltán Harangi-Tóth: The history of operational planning and the French operational art in the Indochina War. In *Honvédségi Szemle*, 2021/1. No. 89–100.

Zoltán Harangi-Tóth: The research and educational characteristics of the military art of the period after World War II. In Ildikó Szelei (ed.): *A hadtudomány aktuális kérdései II*. Ludovika, Budapest, 2022. 203–215.

Biography of the Doctoral Candidate

Major (OF-3) Zoltán Harangi-Tóth (born in Szeged, 13 January 1984), got his Mechanized Infantry Military Leadership degree in 2006 at the Miklós Zrínyi Defense University's Lajos Kossuth Faculty of Military Sciences, and in 2016 he obtained MSc in Military Leadership at the National University of Public Service's Faculty of Military Science and Officer Training. Between 2006 and 2018 he served at the 5th Bocskai István Infantry Brigade at Hódmezővásárhely. He participated in several deployments in Afghanistan and in numerous international and domestic exercises, as well as foreign training/education.

From 2006, he learned history at the Faculty of Arts of the University of Pécs, then at the University of Szeged, and finally got his History BA degree here in 2014, and also a MA in Contemporary History in 2016. In the same year, he began his studies at the Doctoral School of Military Science at the National University of Public Service, in the History of Military Art research area, where his supervisors were Brigadier General Prof. Tamás Csikány, DSc and Colonel Csaba Horváth, PhD. The title of his dissertation: *The impact of the Indochina war on the development of the Art of War, in the light of the organizational and warfighting changes of the opposing forces.*

Since 2018, he serves at the Faculty of Military Science and Officer Training of the National University of Public Service, where he is an assistant lecturer at the Department of Military History, Philosophy and Cultural History, as well as a member of numerous professional military history associations and societies dealing with modern education methodology.

He is the husband of a talented fashion designer, and the proud father of an 8-year-old hockey player boy.

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