

**LUDOVIKA – UNIVERSITY OF PUBLIC SERVICE**  
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**From West Africa to the Central Mediterranean Route.**  
**European Union and Member States' Responses to Handle the**  
**Migration Crisis**

Doctoral (PhD) dissertation

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**In the loving memory of Ancsi**



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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABBREVIATIONS	DEFINITIONS
AASM	Associated African States and Malagasy
ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States
AFISMA	African-led International Support Mission to Mali
AMU/UMA	Arab Maghreb Union Union du Maghreb Arabe
AQIM	Al-Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb
AU	African Union
BREXIT	The United Kingdom's exit from the European Union
CBSD	Capacity Building in support of Security and Development
CEAS	Common European Asylum System
CEN-SAD	Community of Sahel-Saharan States
CFA franc	Currency used in 14 West African countries
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CMA	Coalition des Mouvements de l'Azawad Coalition of Azawad Movements
COAFR	Africa Working Party
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CPA	Cotonou Partnership Agreement
CPCC	Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability

<b>ABBREVIATIONS</b>	<b>DEFINITIONS</b>
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
DCI	Instrument for Development Cooperation
DG DEVCO	Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development
DG HOME	Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs
EAC	East African Community
EAM	European Agenda on Migration
EAS	East African States
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EDF	European Development Fund
EEAS	European External Action Service
EEC	European Economic Community
EIB	European Investment Bank
EIDHR	European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
EIP	European External Investment Plan
EMP	Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
ENI	European Neighbourhood Instrument
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreements

<b>ABBREVIATIONS</b>	<b>DEFINITIONS</b>
EU	European Union
EUBAM	European Union Border Assistance Mission
EUCAP	European Union Capability-building Mission
EUGS	European Union Global Strategy
EUNAVFOR	European Union Naval Force
EUR	The currency of the European Union
EUROPOL	European Police Office
EUSR	EU Special Representative
EUTF	EU Trust Fund for Africa
EUTM	European Union Training Mission
FAMa	Forces Armées Maliennes Malian Armed Forces
FMP	Flow Monitoring Point
FPI	Department of Service for Foreign Policy Instruments
FRONTEX	European Border and Coast Guard Agency
GAM	Global Approach to Migration
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP	Gross domestic product
GNA	Government of National Accord
HR/VP	High Representative/ Vice President

<b>ABBREVIATIONS</b>	<b>DEFINITIONS</b>
IBM	Integrated Border Management
IDP	Internally displaced person
IcSP	Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace
IfG	Instrument for Greenland
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
INSC	Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation
INTERPOL	International Criminal Police Organization
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IPA	Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance II
JAES	Joint Africa–EU Strategy
JNIM	Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslimeen The Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims
LDC	Least Developed Countries
LIC	Low-income countries
LNA	Libyan National Army
MaMa	Mashreq/Maghreb Working Party
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MFF	Multiannual Financial Framework
MIC	Middle-income countries

<b>ABBREVIATIONS</b>	<b>DEFINITIONS</b>
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MME	Joint Africa–EU Partnership on Migration, Mobility, and Employment
MNLA	Mouvement national de libération de l'Azawad National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad
MPCC	Military Planning and Conduct Capability
MUJAO	Mouvement pour l'Unification et le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa
NDICI	Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe
NELM	New economics of labour migration
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NOC	National Oil Corporation (Libya)
NTC	National Transitional Council
OACPS	Organisation of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OCTs	Overseas countries and territories
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Development Assistance Committee
PanAf	Pan-African Programme
PESCO	Permanent Structured Cooperation
PI	Partnership Instrument

<b>ABBREVIATIONS</b>	<b>DEFINITIONS</b>
PNM	Politique nationale de la migration National Policy of Migration (Niger)
PONAM	Politique National de Migration National migration policy (Mali)
PPP	Purchasing power parity
REC	Regional Economic Communities
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAR	Search and rescue
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SOM	Senior Officials' Meetings
SSR	Security sector reform
STABEX	System of Stabilization of Export
SYSMIN	System of Stabilization of Export Earnings from Mining Products
TDCA	Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement
THB	Trafficking in human beings
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
USD	The currency of the United States of America
WHO	World Health Organisation
WMD	Weapons of mass destruction

## CHAPTER I.

### INTRODUCTION

The migration and refugee crisis in 2015 caused serious problems for the European Union (EU), which had to face significant internal and external challenges. The refugee system of the European Member States was not prepared to receive almost two million people arriving on different routes.<sup>1</sup> Until now there is no consensus in the EU on the reconsideration and transformation of the Dublin system. The implemented measures aimed at the transfer of refugees almost reached the desired objective (40,000 people from Greece and Italy until 20 July 2017, from which 33,846 people were transferred to other countries up to 7<sup>th</sup> March 2018, which marked the last report on the relocation scheme)<sup>2</sup>, but it resulted in even more fragmentation in the BREXIT torn EU. At the same time the reconsideration of the refugee regulation system was started, but the process proved to be too slow and too dividing to offer an effective solution to the situation.

The most important transit country of the route coming from West Africa, from Mali to Italy, is Libya. The long period of existing anarchy in the North African country creates a safe haven for the migrant smugglers, and also provides an easy passage to the migrants. The Africans using Libya as a transit country are not Libyan nationals but started the perilous journey to Europe from a Sub-Saharan country in the hope of a better life.<sup>3</sup>

The intra-continental migration trends in Africa are not leading only towards Europe, but they are more complicated. Among the internal routes we can find intra- and inter-regional routes, and routes to other continents. The scale of the intra-continental migration can be seen by the different armed conflicts, oppressive political regimes, ecological, demographical and economic problems, causing a tremendous burden to the African countries of which 33 is on the United Nations' (UN) list of least developed countries at the time of writing.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> SZUHAI, Ilona, TÁLAS, Péter: 'A 2015-ös európai migrációs és menekültválság okairól és hátteréről' [The reasons and background of the migration and refugee crisis of Europe in 2015], in TÁLAS, Péter (ed.), *Magyarország és a 2015-ös európai migrációs válság [Hungary and the European migration and refugee crisis in 2015]* Budapest, Dialóg Campus, 2017, p. 9.

<sup>2</sup> 2nd Emergency Relocation Scheme. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/api/stages/report/current/theme/towards-a-new-policy-on-migration/file/2nd-emergency-relocation-scheme> Downloaded: 04.11.2021.

<sup>3</sup> IOM World Migration Report 2020. [https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr\\_2020.pdf](https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr_2020.pdf) Downloaded: 01.06.2020.

<sup>4</sup> UN list of least developed countries. <https://unctad.org/topic/least-developed-countries/list> Downloaded: 01.05.2022.



The EU, building on its former Africa strategies, the existing contracts and the strategic partnership with the African Union (AU), tries to implement adequate responses to the migration crisis. Migration causes great problems on both continents and poses a big challenge for the countries of origin, the transit countries as well as the destination countries. The experiences of the 2015 migration crisis made the EU take steps. Handling the phenomenon is a complex challenge, which requires a comprehensive approach. These programs must be implemented not only in destination countries, but in countries of transit and origin as well to be successful in the long term. They must include topics like economy, politics and climate change. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and later, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) could serve as an example how to address the above mentioned topics with their basket and later pillar structure.<sup>5</sup>

The EU is not capable of launching a comprehensive set of programs by itself. It needs the cooperation, co-ownership and local ownership of the affected countries as well. This cooperation cannot only be forged by bilateral agreements, but with the support of different African regional organisations and with the strategic partnership of both the AU and, on the global level, the UN. The European Union has to exploit these opportunities if it wants to handle the migrant situation.<sup>6</sup>

Member States of the European Union can also influence how the EU, on the whole, manages irregular migration with their national policies. The programs launched by Member States are not necessarily as effective as the programs launched by the organisation. However, they can fit into the framework of the EU programs, and can help achieve the objectives of the EU, or they can go through a Europeanisation process.<sup>7</sup>

For the purpose of the research, Europe means the European Union, the term Africa includes all the countries on continental Africa and the islands. West Africa is understood as the Member States of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The Sahel is

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<sup>5</sup> N. RÓZSA, Erzsébet, MARSÁI, Viktor: From a Fragmented Cooperation to an Integrated Approach – The Emergence of the Maghreb and Sahel Region and its Consequences for the European Union. EuroMeSCo. 2022. Paper No. 53. <https://www.euromesco.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Paper-N%C2%BA53.pdf> Downloaded: 30.06.2022. p. 8.

<sup>6</sup> European Agenda on Migration. [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/communication\\_on\\_the\\_european\\_agenda\\_on\\_migration\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf) Downloaded: 02.04.2017.

<sup>7</sup> MOLNÁR, Anna: 'A menekült- és migrációs kérdés nemzeti és uniós szintű politikai aspektusai Olaszországban' [National and European political aspects of the refugee and migration crisis in Italy], in TÁLAS, Péter (ed.), Magyarország és a 2015-ös európai migrációs válság [Hungary and the European migration and refugee crisis in 2015] Budapest, Dialóg Campus, 2017, ps. 199-203. ; RADAELLI, Claudio M.: 'Europeanisation: Solution or problem?', European Integration online Papers, October 2004, <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/2004-016.pdf> Downloaded: 19.11.2020. p. 3.

understood as the G5 Sahel (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger) countries. The West African migration route is understood as the route from Mali through Niger to Libya.

## **RELEVANCE OF THE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH**

1. Decreasing irregular migration to a manageable size became one of the greatest challenges of the European Union in the past years.
2. Managing irregular migration requires the European Union to reconsider its existing policies, strategies and regulation systems in order to create a successful structure for the long term.
3. One of the continents of origin is Africa, where the massive intra-continental migration flows and refugee crisis, which have a wide variety of different factors to trigger migration, are causing immense problems for the countries.
4. The decrease of irregular migration is not just requiring action from the European Union. The EU has to cooperate with African countries and organizations in order to ease the migration pressure from the south.
5. Besides the common countermeasures taken by the European Union, Member States, like France, Germany and Italy, are also involved individually to solve the pressing migration issue. These Member State initiatives can go through a Europeanisation process.
6. On the migration route from Mali to Italy there were several European Union and Member States' countermeasures taken to decrease migration, of which French, German and Italian initiatives are in the focus.

## **OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH**

Based on the above-mentioned facts, the thesis analyses how EU policies affect irregular migration to Europe. The EU demonstrated over time that it is willing to engage in the management of irregular migration, both internally and externally. Irregular migration from the Middle East towards the EU became manageable with the EU–Turkey deal.<sup>8</sup> Thus, migration flows originating from the south remained to be an area to address. At the time of the start of the research, in 2016, the Central Mediterranean route was the most used migration route from

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<sup>8</sup> EU-Turkey statement, 18 March 2016. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18/eu-turkey-statement/> Downloaded: 11.06.2017.

Africa to the European Union. Therefore, it was the most visible, with the most data and research available.

Visibility must be taken in consideration when researching African countries as well, since data availability and statistics are scarce, or outdated. Three countries for a case study on the West African migration route were chosen, which leads up to the Central Mediterranean route, where an analysis on how the EU initiatives were turned into actions was conducted. The three countries in geographical order from the south to the north are Mali, Niger and Libya. All three of them are hosting EU missions on their territories, which provides the countries with visibility. To analyse countries within the same geographical region fits into the EU's intent of regionalization as well as with the integrated approach of crisis management introduced by the EU's Global Strategy of 2016.<sup>9</sup>

However, the EU is not the only actor in these countries. As formerly mentioned, EU Member States can also be influential on the European level. Thus, three Member States were selected, whose bilateral relations were examined with Mali, Niger and Libya. The Member States were selected by their Official Development Assistance (ODA) contributions and the number of troops engaged in Africa. Both of the indicators suggest that the selected countries are dedicated to be engaged in Africa.

As a result of the case selection process, Germany, France and Italy were chosen for the case studies. In terms of ODA contributions by amount in 2021 Germany was the second, France was the fifth and Italy was the seventh biggest contributor.<sup>10</sup> Regarding military contribution, France, Italy and Germany were the most significant players in Africa among EU Member States.

The thesis considers what triggers migration in West Africa. Besides these processes, steps taken by the European Union to handle mass irregular migration internally and within the selected countries were examined. Among the tools used by the EU as a part of the integrated approach, Common Security and Defence Policy missions and operations were analysed as well as European Border and Coast Guard Agency (FRONTEX) operations along the West African and Central Mediterranean migration routes.

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<sup>9</sup> MOLNÁR, Anna: Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy. [http://www.nemzetesbiztonsag.hu/cikkek/nb\\_2016\\_2\\_07\\_molnar\\_anna\\_-\\_kozos\\_jovokep\\_kozos\\_cselekves\\_erosobb\\_europa\\_kozos\\_kul\\_es\\_biztonsagpolitikai\\_strategia.pdf](http://www.nemzetesbiztonsag.hu/cikkek/nb_2016_2_07_molnar_anna_-_kozos_jovokep_kozos_cselekves_erosobb_europa_kozos_kul_es_biztonsagpolitikai_strategia.pdf) Downloaded: 29.09.2017.

<sup>10</sup> Preliminary ODA levels in 2021. <https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/ODA-2021-summary.pdf> Downloaded: 01.05.2022. p. 9.

## METHODOLOGY

For my research, case study method was utilised, which enables an in-depth analysis of the selected topic. Gary Thomas (2011) argues that the case study is not necessarily a research method, but a research design, and the method is what the researcher uses to analyse the selected case.<sup>11</sup> Charles Ragin (1992), however, handles case study as a method. Both agree that the case must be selected carefully, and the selection process must be presented clearly.<sup>12</sup> Applying the case study methodology has its limitations as well. According to Willis (2014) the most common concern is that case studies lack methodological rigour and researcher subjectivity.<sup>13</sup> This is echoed by George and Bennett (2005)<sup>14</sup>, who list the case selection bias as one of the shortcomings as well. This connects to another pitfall; it is argued that case study outcomes are hard to verify and commonly represent the researchers' prejudices.<sup>15</sup> Additionally, the selected case is not necessarily generalizable. Yin (2009) states that, however generalization cannot be applied to a population, it can be used to a theoretical proposition.<sup>16</sup> It is also argued that case study is mostly useful for generating hypotheses, thus they are only the first step of the research. Notwithstanding these limitations, Flyvbjerg (2006) argues that context-dependent knowledge and experience derives from the use of case study methodology. It is important because context-independent theory in social science was never successful he claims.<sup>17</sup>

Gerring and Seawright (2008) underlined that the case selection can both be the result of a pragmatic or a logistical process. They define the latter as the prominence of a case in the literature.<sup>18</sup> According to Andrew Abbott (1992), both a single and multicase narrative can be

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<sup>11</sup> THOMAS, Gary: 'A Typology for the Case Study in Social Science Following a Review of Definition, Discourse, and Structure.' in: *Qualitative Inquiry*, 2011. 17(6), 511–521. doi:10.1177/1077800411409884 p. 512.

<sup>12</sup> RAGIN, Charles: Introduction: Cases of "What is a case?". in: RAGIN, Charles and BECKER, Howard (eds.): *WHAT IS A CASE? Exploring the foundations of social inquiry*. New York, Cambridge University Press 1992. ps. 1-2.

<sup>13</sup> WILLIS, Ben: The Advantages and Limitations of Single Case Study Analysis. in: *E-International Relations*. 2014. <https://www.e-ir.info/pdf/50706> Downloaded: 30.06.2022. p. 4.

<sup>14</sup> GEORGE, Alexander and BENNETT, Andrew: *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 2005. ps. 31-32.

<sup>15</sup> FLYVBJERG, Bent: Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research. in: *Qualitative Inquiry*. 2006. Vol. 12. Issue 2. pp. 219-245. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1077800405284363> Downloaded: 30.06.2022. ps. 234-237.

<sup>16</sup> YIN, Robert K.: *Case Study Research Design and Methods*. E-book edition, Sage Publications, 2009. Kindle.

<sup>17</sup> FLYVBJERG, Bent: Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research. ps. 221-224.

<sup>18</sup> GERRING, John and SEAWRIGHT, Jason: 'Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options'. in: *Political Research Quarterly*, 61(2), 294–308. doi:10.1177/1065912907313077 ps. 294-295.

used.<sup>19</sup> This approach is contested by Lijphart (1971), who declares that the single case approach is preferable.<sup>20</sup>

All the above-mentioned authors agree that multiple types of case studies exist, depending on the aim of the research. Within the typology of the case studies, also multiple views exist. According to Thomas, this is the result of mixed criteria for classification. He considered the typology created by George and Bennett the most useful, since their research was based on wider known and utilised typology, defined in earlier works of Arend Lijphart and Harry Eckstein. According to these works, the typology is classified by theory-building research objectives.<sup>21</sup> George and Bennett (2005) listed five previously identified types of case studies and added a sixth. These types are the atheoretical/configurative idiographic, disciplined configurative, heuristic/outlier/deviant, theory testing, plausibility probes and building block studies.<sup>22</sup> Out of these six diverse types, I have selected theory testing, “*which assesses the validity and scope conditions of single or competing theories*”.<sup>23</sup>

For this, the definition of migration, securitization, Europeanisation, and regional security complex theory are introduced in chapter II. These definitions are important to understand in order to assess the European Union’s actions to tackle migration. Understanding how the African Union, and more closely researched African countries think about migration can bring the EU and the AU closer to harmonising their policies. Ultimately, this leads to a better understanding of each other and more successful cooperation on this particular field.

As the preferred method requires, first the case must be selected. In selecting the migration route, I followed partially the logistical process, which means that there are more available data on the selected case. In the context of irregular migration from Africa to the EU, the most used, thus, the most visible migration route was the Central Mediterranean at the time of writing. To assess, however, the key dependent variable of the research question, irregular migration, I decided to select African countries as well. This process also relied on mostly the logistic approach, which in this case was ensured by the EU missions present in African countries. This is also in line with the migration route approach utilised by the Rabat Process. Geographical proximity is also an important aspect to how one assesses threats, as the regional security

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<sup>19</sup> ABBOTT, Andrew: What do cases do? Some notes on activity in sociological analysis. in: RAGIN, Charles and BECKER, Howard (eds.): What is a Case? Exploring the foundations of social inquiry. New York, Cambridge University Press 1992. p. 62.

<sup>20</sup> LIJPHART, Arend: ‘Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method.’ in: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 65, No. 3. (Sep., 1971), pp. 682-693. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1955513> p. 691.

<sup>21</sup> THOMAS, 2011. p. 515

<sup>22</sup> GEORGE and BENNETT 2005. ps. 62-63.

<sup>23</sup> GEORGE and BENNETT 2005. p. 62.

complex theory states. West Africa and particularly the Sahel region within, is an ideal choice for this research for multiple reasons. First, this region was defined as a strategic interest of the EU, as it includes the neighbours of our neighbours.<sup>24</sup> This means that the Sahel region is considered important, because the countries are the southern neighbours of the ENP countries. Second, Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) missions and operations are also deployed along the West African and Central Mediterranean migration route, which means that the region's visibility is higher, thus more researchable. Third, the Sahel region in general is a very interesting incubator area for the EU's regional approach to security problems. Fourth, according to Trémolières (2009), West Africa has the most mobile population in the World with around 3 per cent of migrants within the region.<sup>25</sup> These factors made the region ideal for the case study.

West Africa also offers a multi-layered research interest. The ECOWAS, as an active regional organisation, and the African Union also provide regional and continental initiatives on migration. A third researchable layer is the national policies, of course. These are the ultimate elements of the research, defining how the EU policies could be translated in the analysed countries. Along these lines I selected Mali, Niger and Libya.

After examining the African perspective, it is necessary to investigate the EU's approach to Africa, and to migration. These actions provided the independent variable of the hypotheses of the research. The thesis investigates the policy development in two fields, as well as the practical steps taken. Among the practical steps, the CSDP missions and operations in the region will be addressed as the primary external steps of the EU.

EU Member States were also selected, which have the most influence within the EU or plausibly in the selected African countries as well. For this process a pragmatic approach was followed. An examination on which EU Member States contributed the highest amount of ODA and how many troops are deployed to Africa from the respective countries was conducted to specify the countries for the case study. Africa received USD 35 billion from the USD 117.6 billion allocated bilateral ODA flows, which shows the importance of the tool. The amount of the ODA signifies the economic power of the provider, which can be translated into influence within the EU as well. According to the reported ODA levels, Germany, France and Italy were

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<sup>24</sup> Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe, A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy. European External Action Service

[http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top\\_stories/pdf/eugs\\_review\\_web.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf) Downloaded: 25. 09.2017. ps. 34-36.

<sup>25</sup> ECOWAS Common Approach on Migration – African and European Perspectives. in: TRÉMOLIÈRES, Marie (ed.): Regional Challenges of West African Migration – African and European Perspectives. OECD publishing, 2009, [https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/regional-challenges-of-west-african-migration\\_9789264056015-en](https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/regional-challenges-of-west-african-migration_9789264056015-en) [DOI] Downloaded: 26.10.2019. p. 229.



the three biggest ODA contributors in 2021 from the EU. Germany contributed USD 32.23 billion, which was the second largest sum globally, while France contributed USD 15.45 billion and was placed fifth on the list. Italy contributed USD 6.02 billion, which was the seventh highest amount worldwide.<sup>26</sup> Regarding to military contribution, it was no surprise that France had about 9,909 troops deployed to Africa in 2022.<sup>27</sup> France takes part both in EU and UN missions on the continent, and also launched its own military operations, like Operation Barkhane in the G5 Sahel countries and Task Force Takuba in Mali. Over time, however, France lost its initial influence in Mali, and by early 2022, Bamako asked for the withdrawal of French troops from the country.<sup>28</sup>

Italy had 1,935 troops deployed to Africa in 2022.<sup>29</sup> But Italy is also important as the first EU destination country on the Central Mediterranean migration route. The country experiences mass migration directly. Italy, as France, has bilateral initiatives with Niger and Libya. The country also takes part in EU and UN missions. Italy is also an example for the successful Europeanisation of a national policy. The EU operation in the Mediterranean builds on a previous national operation, the Mare Nostrum. To Italy's request, the EU transformed it to a European endeavour. Germany had the smallest deployed troops among the three EU countries in Africa, with 858 personnel.<sup>30</sup> This is, however, compensated with the highest ODA contribution among the examined countries.

During the research international and Hungarian primary and secondary sources were studied, primarily the treaties of the European Union, its policies, strategies and the connected international agreements. Besides the primary literature, Hungarian and international secondary literature, books, essays, articles, and international organisations' databases that assist in understanding the migratory process were studied. I used the method of document analysis and

<sup>26</sup> Preliminary ODA levels in 2021. <https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/ODA-2021-summary.pdf> Downloaded: 01.05.2022. p. 9.

<sup>27</sup> Ministère des Armées: Opérations. <https://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/operations> Downloaded: 28.08.2022.

<sup>28</sup> HARRIS, Marielle, DOXSEE, Catrina and THOMPSON, Jared: The End of Operation Barkhane and the Future of Counterterrorism in Mali. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/end-operation-barkhane-and-future-counterterrorism-mali> Downloaded: 01.05.2022.

<sup>29</sup> MARTINELLI, Giovanni: Missioni all'estero: aumentano gli impegni per le Forze Armate italiane. <https://www.analisedifesa.it/2022/07/missioni-allestero-aumentano-gli-impegni-per-le-forze-armate-italiane/> Downloaded: 28.08.2022.

<sup>30</sup> Bundeswehr: Mali – MINUSMA. <https://www.bundeswehr.de/de/einsaetze-bundeswehr/mali-einsaetze/minusma-bundeswehr-un-einsatz-mali> Downloaded: 28.08.2022.; Bundeswehr: Die Bundeswehr im Südsudan – UNMISS. <https://www.bundeswehr.de/de/einsaetze-bundeswehr/die-bundeswehr-im-suedsudan> Downloaded: 28.08.2022.; Bundeswehr: Mali – EUTM Mali. <https://www.bundeswehr.de/de/einsaetze-bundeswehr/mali-einsaetze/eutm-bundeswehr-eu-einsatz-mali> Downloaded: 28.08.2022. and Bundeswehr: Westsahara – MINURSO. <https://www.bundeswehr.de/de/einsaetze-bundeswehr/die-bundeswehr-in-marokko> Downloaded: 28.08.2022.

content analysis to examine the policy development within the EU and the AU to build the case study.

To develop the case study, 15 semi-structured in-depth interviews were also conducted in person and online during the research between 2016 and 2022 with EU officials from DG HOME, active and former officials from EU missions and operations, like EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia, EUCAP Sahel Niger and EUCAP Sahel Mali. Among the interviewees there were two middle management level EU officials from the European Commission, a former head of mission, a deputy commander, a deputy head of mission, a chief of staff, a branch chief and two analysts of different CSDP missions and operations. The interviewees were selected using the snow-ball method. The interview questions were not standardised, because of the multifaceted and differing experience and field of expertise of the interviewees. The list of questions was personalised each time to gain the most possible information related to the present research and to fit the interviewees' scope of experience. The interviews were conducted anonymously with the individual consent of the interviewees.

*1. Table: The number of interviews conducted according to institutional affiliation (Edited by the author)*

Institutional affiliation of interviewees	EU officials	Staff of EU missions and operations	Member State official	Researchers
Number of interviews	2	7	3	3

The interviews were qualitative, mostly using open-ended questions to learn more about the EU's approach to migration policies from the addressed EU DGs. Regarding the staff of EU missions and operations, the open-ended questions aimed to tackle the success assessment of the respective mission or operation, its tasks, and the implementation of the regional and integrated approach. The Member State officials were asked about national policies towards the three case study countries, Mali, Niger and Libya. Meanwhile, the researchers were asked questions about the regional approach, EU policies towards Africa, and the developing security situation in the three case study countries.

## **THE HYPOTHESES OF THE RESEARCH**

To investigate the research question, how EU policies affect migration from West Africa to the Central Mediterranean, the hypotheses were built around two variables: Irregular migration as the dependent variable and the EU's actions as the independent variable.



To establish how the EU's actions affect migration, first, migration patterns of the selected area, West Africa have to be assessed. This establishes the baseline for the research, from which deviations can be measured in response to any implemented actions.

1. Most of the African migratory movements are internal within the continent, and the pattern will not change in the long term irrespective to the EU's policy changes.

The EU's approach towards conflicts and crises has changed with the introduction of the Global Strategy. The introduction of the integrated approach and regionalisation made possible harmonised EU actions in multiple areas at the same time. This also aims to prevent the spill-over of conflicts, and the process makes it possible to deal with multiple countries and regional and continental organisations at the same time.

2. The EU introduced its integrated approach to crisis management in its Global Strategy in 2016, when regionalisation also gained momentum. The regional approach can change the relationship between the European Union, the African countries and the regional organisations will gain more importance.

The essence of integrated approach is the parallel use of tools from different areas to address a crisis. The necessary and sufficient utilisation of these tools is influencing the EU's success in a region altogether.

3. Irregular migration can be successfully managed by the use of every tool of the integrated and comprehensive approach of the European Union.

The EU addresses migration internally with the introduction of mechanisms, policies and instruments. However, externalisation gained momentum when internal procedures fell short of the challenge of mass migration. This led to the externalisation of migration management. The EU, however, cannot necessarily be the one who intervenes in third countries. The organisation has to find willing governments, regional or continental organisations to successfully externalize migration management.

4. At the European Union level externalization of the management of the irregular migration started, solutions will be developed to handle migration outside of the borders of the European Union, with the inclusion of local actors.

## **EXAMINED TIME PERIOD**

The EU's predecessor, the European Economic Community, established bilateral ties with the former colonies of its member states in 1963. This marks the starting date of the research regarding the documents on EU–Africa bilateral relations. The bilateral relations are tackled up

until the post-Cotonou era. The Cotonou Agreement was signed in 2000 and it was expected to expire in 2020. The lack of agreement on the new framework of cooperation resulted in the extended application of the agreement until 30<sup>th</sup> November 2021. The negotiations on the new agreement were concluded on 15<sup>th</sup> April 2021, but the signature of the document still has not taken place until 24<sup>th</sup> February 2022, which marks the end of the research period.<sup>31</sup>

In 1999, the EU saw the entering into force of the Amsterdam Treaty. This treaty marks the starting point of the research concerning the EU internal migration policies and strategies. The Amsterdam Treaty was the first occasion when the EU demanded the construction of a common refugee regulation system. This was the starting signal of developing the currently used policies, processes and mechanisms. The development of the EU internal policies is tackled also until 24<sup>th</sup> February 2022.

Regarding the policy development of the African Union and its predecessor organisation, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the research starts at the date of the establishment of the organisation, in 1963, and ends on 24<sup>th</sup> February 2022.

The thesis consists of a case study on West African countries with ongoing conflicts, Libya, Niger and Mali. To avoid the overstretch of the research, in the case of Libya, 2011 and the events of the Arab Spring mark the start of the research, while with regard to Niger, the starting point of the research is the re-escalation of the Tuareg rebellion in 2007; while for Mali the starting point of the research is the outbreak of the Tuareg insurgency in 2012. The end of the research with respect to all three countries is marked by one event which can have an effect on the EU's approach towards West African countries. This is when on 20<sup>th</sup> February 2022 the Malian government requested French forces to withdraw from the territory of the country. This step provides an end to one chapter in European involvement in Mali. As to CSDP missions, they were examined from their establishment, which varies from 2013 of EUBAM Libya to 2020 of EUNAVFOR MED Operation Iriini) until 24<sup>th</sup> February 2022.

Besides the landmark events and documents, the effects of another event must be considered throughout the thesis. The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic disrupted both the migration trends, and the policy development. The EU's policy making slowed down significantly in the early stages of the pandemic. This seemed to change over time, but the policy making regarding migration yet appears to suffer from the neglect and disagreement in 2020. Meanwhile the

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<sup>31</sup> ACP-EU partnership. [https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/acp-eu-partnership\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/acp-eu-partnership_en) Downloaded: 01.05.2022. ; Post-Cotonou negotiations on new EU/Africa-Caribbean-Pacific Partnership Agreement concluded. [https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/news/post-cotonou-negotiations-new-euafrica-caribbean-pacific-partnership-agreement-concluded\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/news/post-cotonou-negotiations-new-euafrica-caribbean-pacific-partnership-agreement-concluded_en) Downloaded: 01.05.2022.

lingering pandemic is still affecting the daily life of people, and the possible new trends affected by the Russian aggression against Ukraine are yet to be discovered.

## LITERATURE REVIEW

The thesis consists of seven chapters. The second discusses the theoretical framework of the research, including securitization, Europeanisation, and migration theories. Securitization is important to discuss, since without the process, migration would not be a security question according to Huysmans.<sup>32</sup> Three schools of the process emerged through the times regarding securitization. The Copenhagen School argues that securitization is an act to introduce an existential threat, which requires immediate response. While Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde describe the process mostly as a security dominated act<sup>33</sup>, the Foucaultian school, represented by Bigo, claims that the process only happens to gain more political power. Bigo adds, that the process is not exceptional, it is for everyday political gains.<sup>34</sup> Hammerstad argues that there is a third line of securitization, which abandons the negative connotations, and applies to an inclusive security approach.<sup>35</sup> Securitization of a topic can be transferred onto different levels with the Europeanisation process. Bottom up, horizontal and top-down processes can be distinguished according to Graziano.<sup>36</sup> However, it is mostly discussed as a top-down process due to the EU's effects on the legal system of its Member States according to Faist and Ette<sup>37</sup>; Abdou<sup>38</sup>; and Vatta<sup>39</sup>. For the purpose of the research, however, the bottom-up process was used, which was discussed by Radaelli.<sup>40</sup> To understand why people decide to migrate,

<sup>32</sup> HUYSMANS, Jef: *The Politics of Insecurity, Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU*. Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, London, 2006. ISBN 9 78 0415 36125

<sup>33</sup> BUZAN, Barry, WÆVER, Ole, DE WILDE, Jaap: *Security A New Framework for Analysis*. Lyenne Rienner Publishers, London, 1998. ISBN 978 1 55587 784 2

<sup>34</sup> BIGO, Didier: *Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease*. *Alternatives* 2002. Issue 27. DOI: 10.1177/03043754020270S105 pp.63-92.

<https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/03043754020270S105> Downloaded: 08.02.2019.

<sup>35</sup> HAMMERSTAD, Anne: *The Securitization of Forced Migration*. in: FIDDIAN-QUASMIYEH, Elena, LOESCHER, Gil, LONG, Katy, SIGONA, Nando [eds.]: *The Oxford Handbook of Refugee & Forced Migration Studies*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016. ISBN 978 0 19 877850 9 ps. 265-275.

<sup>36</sup> GRAZIANO, Paolo R., VINK, Maarten P.: 'Europeanization: Concept, Theory, and Methods', in Simon Bulmer, Christian Lesquene (eds.), *The Member States of the European Union* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 47.

<sup>37</sup> FAIST, Thomas, and ETTE, Andreas: *The Europeanization of National Policies and Politics of Immigration : Between Autonomy and the European Union*. Palgrave Macmillan Basingstoke 2007. ps. 3-31.

<sup>38</sup> ABDOU, Leila Hadj: *The Europeanization of Immigration Policies*. in: AMELINA, Anna, HORVATH, Kenneth, and MEEUS, Bruno (eds.): *An Anthology of Migration and Social Transformation*, pp. 105-120. New York: Springer, 2016. 10.1007/978-3-319-23666-7 ps. 105-117.

<sup>39</sup> VATTA, Alessia: *The EU Migration Policy between Europeanization and Re-Nationalization*. in: BALDIN, Serena, and ZAGO, Moreno (eds.): *Europe of Migrations: Policies, Legal Issues and Experiences*. pp. 13-32 Trieste: EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste, 2017.

<sup>40</sup> RADAELLI, Claudio M.: 'Europeanisation: Solution or problem?', *European Integration online Papers*, October 2004, <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/2004-016.pdf> Downloaded: 19.11.2020. p. 3.

migration theories are also examined in the second chapter of the thesis. Migration theories are more widely discussed in international literature than in Hungarian. Massey et al. produced a summarizing work on the theories in 1998, which became the point of reference for theorists. It introduced new and contemporary theories as well as the regional migration systems.<sup>41</sup> Castles, de Haas and Miller followed the structure of the Massey et al. book in their work titled *The Age of Migration*. Castles, de Haas and Miller present migration theories in three different categories: functionalist, historical structural and network, transnationalism and migration systems theories. The first two were used in the Massey et al. publication as well, and in Hungarian academic literature: Hautzinger, Hegedűs and Klenner also use this categorization, which is followed in the thesis as well.

The third chapter introduces migration in West Africa. To build a holistic picture on the phenomenon, policies and strategies of the AU and the ECOWAS are analysed in the chapter, along with regional migration patterns from 2000 until the present. For this, primary literature, like AU and ECOWAS policies were used to establish the legal framework of migration in the region. Additionally, as the region is not rich in reliable statistical data on migration due to the lack of national institutions, or power of national authorities, the research builds on available International Organisation for Migration (IOM) reports. Secondary literature is also scarce in the topic. Adepoju introduced the idea that sub-Saharan migration is largely circular and mostly remains in Africa.<sup>42</sup> Búr and Tarrósy also discuss migration patterns in the continent. While the authors turned to the push and pull model to examine the phenomenon, their work is comprehensive. Urbán provides a continental overview of inter-continental African migration in the same volume.<sup>43</sup> The secondary literature was utilized to establish an understanding of the processes, rather than defining patterns. For that, IOM reports were utilized.

In the fourth chapter, EU–Africa bilateral relations and EU internal policy and strategic documents are introduced. For this, mostly primary literature was used, however, the works of Benkes<sup>44</sup> and Tóth<sup>45</sup> provided an academic framework for the deeper understanding of the

<sup>41</sup> MASSEY, Douglas S. et al.: *Worlds in Motion: Understanding International Migration at the End of the Millennium*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998. ISBN 0 19 829442 5

<sup>42</sup> ADEPOJU, Aderanti (2008): *Migration in sub-Saharan Africa*. in: *Current African Issues*, No. 37., The Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, 2008. ISSN 0280 2171

<sup>43</sup> TARRÓSY, István, GLIED, Viktor and KESERŰ, Dávid (eds.): *Új népvándorlás, Migráció a 21. században Afrika és Európa között*. [New exodus, migration in the 21st Century between Europe and Africa.] IDResearch Kft./Publikon Kiado, Pécs, 2011.

<sup>44</sup> BENKES, Mihály: *Helyzetkép Fekete-Afrikáról*. [A Situational Picture on Black Africa] A Magyar Történelemtanári Társulat Tanári Tagozatának kiadványa, Budapest, 2006.

<sup>45</sup> TÓTH, Norbert: *Historical duty or pragmatic interest? Notes on EU and AU security issues*. in: *African Security Review*, 2007. Vol. 16. Issue 3. pp. 111–116. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2007.9627436>  
Downloaded: 03.09.2022.

processes taking place in EU–Africa relations This chapter provides the information about the framework in which the EU’s practical steps, the missions and operations could be implemented. Thus, the EU actions are discussed in chapter five. For this, EU Council Decisions on the discussed missions and operations, EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia, its successor Iriini, EUBAM Libya, EUCAP Sahel Niger, EUTM Mali and EUCAP Sahel Mali were used. Biscop and Rehr<sup>46</sup> and Parkes<sup>47</sup> provided the main secondary literature on the EU’s decision to utilise CSDP missions and operations to address migration. Their arguments were built on the European Agenda on Migration of 2015 and the European Union’s Global Strategy of 2016. These documents made possible the employment of the CSDP to tackle migration. Molnár discussed the EUGS in detail for the better understanding of the EU’s goals in the future.<sup>48</sup> Her work provided a solid foundation to the analysis.

The case study of the selected West African countries is developed in chapter six. This chapter provides a comprehensive picture on how the EU actions are considered locally, and if they were necessary and sufficient. The result of the conducted interviews was mostly used in this chapter to provide an additional source for the case study. Besenyő, Miletics and Orbán provided a valuable insight regarding the policies of the selected EU Member States, France Germany and Italy.<sup>49</sup> To assess the approach of these EU Member States towards the selected African case study countries, Mali, Niger and Libya, national policies were also examined.

The findings and future possibilities are listed in the final, seventh chapter. Possible lines of further research are also indicated.

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<sup>46</sup> BISCOP, Sven, REHRL, Jochen (eds.): Migration – How CSDP can support. [https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/bmlvs\\_esdc\\_egmont\\_migration\\_final\\_online.pdf](https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/bmlvs_esdc_egmont_migration_final_online.pdf). Downloaded: 01.05.2018.

<sup>47</sup> PARKES, Roderick: Managing migration abroad. Why, where, what and how? [https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief\\_31\\_Migration.pdf](https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief_31_Migration.pdf) Downloaded: 30.09.2020.

<sup>48</sup> MOLNÁR, Anna: Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy. [http://www.nemzetesbiztonsag.hu/cikkek/nb\\_2016\\_2\\_07\\_molnar\\_anna\\_-\\_kozos\\_jovokep\\_kozos\\_cselekves\\_erosebb\\_europa\\_kozos\\_kul\\_es\\_biztonsagpolitikai\\_strategia.pdf](http://www.nemzetesbiztonsag.hu/cikkek/nb_2016_2_07_molnar_anna_-_kozos_jovokep_kozos_cselekves_erosebb_europa_kozos_kul_es_biztonsagpolitikai_strategia.pdf) Downloaded: 29.09.2017.

<sup>49</sup> BESENYŐ, János, MILETICS, Péter, ORBÁN, Balázs(eds.): Európa és a migráció. [Migration and Europe.]. Zrínyi Kiadó, Budapest, 2019. ISBN 978 963 327 794 2

## CHAPTER II.

### THEORETICAL FOUNDATION AND APPLICABLE MIGRATION THEORIES IN AFRICA

#### II.1 SECURITIZATION AND MIGRATION RELATED DEFINITIONS

As every scientific book (Massey et al.; Castles, De Haas and Miller; Fiddian-Quasmiyeh et al.; Huysmens; Skeldon; Besenyő, Miletics and Orbán; Hautzinger, Hegedüs and Klenner, Kosher) in the topic states, migration is a natural phenomenon. It has always existed, it happens now, and it will continue in the future as well. The difference is the scale, the affected regions, and the political attitude of the destination countries. Nevertheless, if it is a natural phenomenon, then how did it become one of the most important security questions for the European Union during the 2010s. The peak in the figures of immigration to the EU in 2015 made the political debate even more serious and divisive within Europe.

From a natural process, migration suddenly became a security issue in the EU and its Member States with a successful securitization process taking place.<sup>50</sup> The first part of this chapter discusses this theory, which was able to bring migration into the field of security and lost its former right to be treated as a natural and mostly neutral or even positive phenomenon. It is important to understand the theory itself, which reveals the deeper layers of judgement towards the question of migration.

The second part of the chapter will focus on the definitions of the core topic of this dissertation. To be able to understand this rather complex phenomenon of migration I had to set up a collection of related definitions, which are the most widely accepted among countries and international organisations.

After setting up this baseline of understanding I decided to deal with migration theories, which are important to understand in order to address the phenomenon successfully. Complex problems need complex solutions. To draw up the main theories I studied Hungarian and international literature related to migration theories. Hungarian literature does not draw a sharp line to differentiate between functionalist and historical-structural theories, which the

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<sup>50</sup> BESENYŐ, János, MILETICS, Péter and ORBÁN, Balázs (eds.): Európa és a migráció. [Migration and Europe.]. Zrínyi Kiadó, Budapest, 2019. ISBN 978 963 327 794 2 ; TZIAMPIRIS, Aristotle and ASDERAKI, Foteini (eds.): The New Eastern Mediterranean Transformed. Springer, Cham, 2021. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70554-1>

international works do. Hautzinger et al. even introduced new categories in their book „The Theory of Migration”, describing the models simply as economic and sociological theories. The Hungarian authors express better the core of the migration theories by using a simpler categorisation (economic and sociological), the publication itself strongly relies on the „Worlds in Motion” by Massey et al, from 1998, and, however, does not take in account the newer works on the topic. Therefore it must be assessed as a more simplistic introduction of the Massey book. Castles, de Haas and Miller also follow the theoretical framework of the Massey book in their „The Age of Migration”, published in 2014. This last work even introduces critical views of the different theories, thus, in my opinion, this one is the most valuable reference. By recognising the complex, interconnected character of migration, it is more likely that a better strategy can be developed to address it. To achieve this, I included an introduction to the migration theories in my research.

## II.1.2 DEFINITIONS

It is important to set up a collection of definitions regarding migration, since recent years showed that there is a wide range of misunderstanding when it comes to the differentiation of terms, for example, within the EU. The two relevant international organisations, the UN and the IOM are both referring to each other in connection with migration definitions, so the collection of terms originates from these two sources.

Since the dissertation is to research the migration process, a definition for migration must be set. For this, the commonly utilized IOM definition was used which is *“The movement of a person or a group of persons, either across an international border, or within a State. It is a population movement, encompassing any kind of movement of people, whatever its length, composition and causes; it includes migration of refugees, displaced persons, economic migrants, and persons moving for other purposes, including family reunification.”*<sup>51</sup> With this being set, a general term is needed to define a person who takes part in this process. The widest term in use is migrant. *“A migrant is any person who is moving or has moved across an international border or within a State away from his/her habitual place of residence, regardless of (1) the person’s legal status; (2) whether the movement is voluntary or involuntary; (3) what the causes for the movement are; or (4) what the length of the stay is.”*<sup>52</sup> This IOM definition includes all persons who are on the move, but further exactness is needed to describe the different status of migrants. There are people who do not migrate internationally, who fall under

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<sup>51</sup> Key Migration Terms. <http://www.iom.int/key-migration-terms> Downloaded: 06.11.2018.

<sup>52</sup> Key Migration Terms.



the definition of internally displaced persons (IDPs). *“IDPs are persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.”*<sup>53</sup>

One of the most challenging and contested term in this research topic is irregular migration. In both Hungarian and international literature, the terms irregular, illegal and undocumented migration are used to describe the same phenomenon. Even the EU uses them as synonyms. In 1992, the Treaty of the European Union used the expression unauthorised immigration,<sup>54</sup> which changed to illegal migration in the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007.<sup>55</sup> In the consecutive documents we can find a further change of the term. In the European Agenda on Migration, which was forged in 2015, the EU ceases to use the term illegal migration, and replaces it with the expression irregular migration.<sup>56</sup> In consecutive EU documents, irregular migration is used. The debate is ongoing regarding the usage of the terms illegal or irregular migrant. In EU documents the latter is preferred. Furthermore, from the legal point of view, the term illegal migrant cannot be used, since a person cannot be illegal, just an action.<sup>57</sup>

In the light of this, what is irregular migration? Since most of the literature uses the definition created by the IOM, the thesis also employs their explanation. Thus, irregular migration will be a *“movement that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving countries. There is no clear or universally accepted definition of irregular migration. From the perspective of destination countries, it is entry, stay or work in a country without the necessary authorization or documents required under immigration regulations. From the perspective of the sending country, the irregularity is for example seen in cases in which a person crosses an international boundary without a valid passport or travel document or does not fulfil the administrative requirements for leaving the country.”*<sup>58</sup>

<sup>53</sup> Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Francis M. Deng, submitted pursuant to Commission resolution 1997/39. Addendum: Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add. <http://www.un-documents.net/gpid.htm> Downloaded: 06.11.2018.

<sup>54</sup> Treaty on European Union. [https://europa.eu/european-union/sites/europa.eu/files/docs/body/treaty\\_on\\_european\\_union\\_en.pdf](https://europa.eu/european-union/sites/europa.eu/files/docs/body/treaty_on_european_union_en.pdf) Downloaded: 15.03.2019. Title VI. Article K.1 §3. (c)

<sup>55</sup> Treaty of Lisbon. (2007/C 306/01) [http://publications.europa.eu/resource/ellar/688a7a98-3110-4ffe-a6b3-8972d8445325.0007.01/DOC\\_19](http://publications.europa.eu/resource/ellar/688a7a98-3110-4ffe-a6b3-8972d8445325.0007.01/DOC_19) Downloaded: 15.03.2019. Chapter 2, Article 63a §1.

<sup>56</sup> European Agenda on Migration. [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/communication\\_on\\_the\\_european\\_agenda\\_on\\_migration\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf) Downloaded: 02.04.2017.

<sup>57</sup> According to the interview with an EU Committee official conducted by the author on 14.03.2019.

<sup>58</sup> Key Migration Terms



Now, coming to the legal status of different migrants, it is important to know the difference between asylum seekers and refugees. These two expressions are used commonly as synonyms, which they are not in fact. Therefore, *“asylum seekers are people who move across borders in search of protection, but who may not fulfil the strict criteria laid down by the 1951 Convention. Asylum seeker describes someone who has applied for protection as a refugee and is awaiting the determination of his or her status. Refugee is the term used to describe a person who has already been granted protection. Asylum seekers can become refugees if the local immigration or refugee authority deems them as fitting the international definition of refugee.”*<sup>59</sup> Before I move on to the next definition, it is important to note that asylum policies differ from country to country depending on the legislative regulations of the respective country. The last definition which needs to be introduced is for the term refugee. The 1951 Geneva Convention and the 1967 Protocol defines a refugee as someone who: *“Owing to well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”*<sup>60</sup>

In addition to these definitions the literature often categorises migrants into further subgroups. The three main ways to categorise them is to make a distinction between voluntary or forced migration, refugees and labour migrants, and regular and irregular migrants.<sup>61</sup> These categories are however very ambiguous and misleading, since they suggest there is a clear distinction between the groups, which is not the case.<sup>62</sup> The above-mentioned categories are divided further in this research because of the ambiguity of the categories and the permeability among the different groups. Additionally, the length constraints of the thesis do not allow the further discussion of these subcategories. The ambiguity is more apparent during the introduction of different migration theories in the second and third parts of this chapter.

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<sup>59</sup> Asylum Seeker. <http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/international-migration/glossary/asylum-seeker/> Downloaded: 06.11.2018.

<sup>60</sup> Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. <http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10> Downloaded: 06.11.2018.

<sup>61</sup> FIDDIAN-QUASMIYEH, Elena, LOESCHER, Gil, LONG, Katy, SIGONA, Nando [eds.]: The Oxford Handbook of Refugee & Forced Migration Studies. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016. ISBN 978 0 19 877850 9 ; KOSER, Khalid: International Migration A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016. ISBN 978 0 19 875377 3

<sup>62</sup> KOSER, Khalid: International Migration A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016. ISBN 978 0 19 875377 3 ps.14-17.

### II.1.1 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND<sup>63</sup>

For the purpose of the research the regional security complex theory must be studied. For this reason, the works of Buzan and Kelly were used. The essence of the theory lies in geographical proximity. This appears as the central variable in most of the theories studied, albeit with different definitions.<sup>64</sup> The theory is interpreted most commonly as claiming that political and military threats travel easily over shorter distances, rather than long ones.<sup>65</sup> Thus, most states worry more about neighbours than about distant countries. This can be attributed to the sharper security dilemmas opposing proximate actors, which have a shared history of interactions. It also suggests that regional security complexes tend to form security communities, and are threatened by local externalities.<sup>66</sup> Thus, migration could be regarded as an externality on the Southern and Eastern borders of the regional security complex of the EU. The EU is a model for security communities. These tend to be subjective structures, which can combine regional security complexes theory with securitisation.<sup>67</sup> The definition of a security community was born in 1957, when Deutsch noted that groups of people are integrated by a sense of community, common identity and tend to resolve social problems in a peaceful manner.<sup>68</sup> To be applicable to international relations, Buzan modified the theory to include *'[...] where states no longer expect, or prepare, to use force in their relations with each other.'*<sup>69</sup>

Prior to discussing securitisation, one more phenomenon must be introduced. Before any securitisation could take place at a regional level within the EU, the topic needs to be debated on the European stage. In this case, the debate on migration started mostly as a national debate, which rose to the EU level. To achieve this, the Europeanisation process needed to take place. Italy became a destination country in the 1990s when the Schengen system was built and the first legislative acts to regulate migration were introduced. From 2001 increasingly hostile

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<sup>63</sup> Based on VECSEY, Mariann: The Mediterranean Challenge. in: MOLNÁR Anna, FIOTT, Daniel, ASDERAKI, Foteini, PAILE-CALVO, Sylvain (eds.): Challenges of the Common Security and Defence Policy: ESDC 2<sup>nd</sup> Summer University Book. Publications office of the European Union, Luxembourg. 2022. pp. 138-149.

<sup>64</sup> KELLY, Robert E.: 'Security Theory in the 'New Regionalism''', International Studies Review, Summer 2007, [https://www.jstor.org/stable/4621805?read-now=1&seq=1#page\\_scan\\_tab\\_contents](https://www.jstor.org/stable/4621805?read-now=1&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents) Downloaded: 19.11.2020. p. 224.

<sup>65</sup> BUZAN, Barry: 'Regional Security Complex Theory in the Post-Cold War World', in F. Söderbaum et al. (eds.), *Theories of New Regionalism* London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p. 141.

<sup>66</sup> KELLY, Robert E.: 'Security Theory in the 'New Regionalism''', ps. 200-209.

<sup>67</sup> HÁDA, Béla, N. RÓZSA, Erzsébet, TÁLAS, Péter (eds.), *Regional Security Studies*, Budapest, NKE Szolgáltató Nonprofit Ltd., 2016, ps. 17-19.

<sup>68</sup> TUSICISNY, Andrej: 'Security Communities and Their Values: Taking Masses Seriously.' International Political Science Review / Revue Internationale De Science Politique, vol. 28, no. 4 (2007) [www.jstor.org/stable/20445105](http://www.jstor.org/stable/20445105) Downloaded: 19.11.2020. p. 426.

<sup>69</sup> BUZAN, Barry, 'Regional Security Complex Theory in the Post-Cold War World', p.142.

rhetoric was used in connection with migration.<sup>70</sup> But the situation started to escalate only in 2005, in parallel with the riots in France, when Italy also realised that it could not address the phenomenon of migration alone. However, Italy only asked for help from the EU in February 2011 - to handle the situation caused by a mass migration influx.<sup>71</sup>

The definition of Europeanisation which includes the bottom-up approach was constructed by Radaelli, in 2004. It reads as follows:

*'Europeanisation consists of processes of a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 'ways of doing things' and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) discourse, political structures and public policies.'*<sup>72</sup>

Europeanisation is mostly understood as a top-down process, but rather than being just a vertical procedure from above it does have bottom-up and horizontal directions too. That is because the EU is a regional security complex, which has interaction and reciprocity with its Member States. This means that domestic policies can influence each other and EU policies and vice versa.<sup>73</sup>

Securitization theory gained momentum after the end of the Cold War, when experts searched for new analytical methods to be able to explain the new world order, and the security agenda started to widen both horizontally and vertically. One of the new aspects of security became human security. It was argued extensively how it should be interpreted, narrow (freedom from fear) or broad (freedom from want), nevertheless it appeared in both the political agenda as well as in the academic debate. Disregard to the definition, the concept emphasises every individual's claim to security, and the obligation to provide security falls to the state in general.<sup>74</sup> National security in the end derives from human security; without the latter, the first

<sup>70</sup> MARRONE, Alessandro: The Conte Government: Radical Change or Pragmatic Continuity in Italian Foreign and Defence Policy? IAI Istituto Affari Internazionali. 2018. <https://www.iai.it/en/publicazioni/conte-government-radical-change-or-pragmatic-continuity-italian-foreign-and-defence>.

<sup>71</sup> MOLNÁR, Anna: 'Menekült- és migrációs kérdés Olaszországban' [The question of refugees and migrants in Italy] Nemzet és Biztonság [Nation and Security] no. 3. March 2015, [http://www.nemzetesbiztonsag.hu/cikkek/nb\\_2015\\_3\\_03\\_molnar\\_anna\\_-\\_menekult\\_es\\_migracios\\_kerdes\\_olaszorszagban.pdf](http://www.nemzetesbiztonsag.hu/cikkek/nb_2015_3_03_molnar_anna_-_menekult_es_migracios_kerdes_olaszorszagban.pdf) Downloaded: 19.11.2020. ps. 5-9.

<sup>72</sup> RADAELLI, Claudio M.: 'Europeanisation: Solution or problem?', European Integration online Papers, October 2004, <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/2004-016.pdf> Downloaded: 19.11.2020. p. 3.

<sup>73</sup> GRAZIANO, Paolo R., VINK, Maarten P.: 'Europeanization: Concept, Theory, and Methods', in Simon Bulmer, Christian Lesquene (eds.), The Member States of the European Union (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 47.

<sup>74</sup> WERTHES, Sascha and DEBIEL, Tobias: Horizontal and Vertical Extension of International Security: A Human Security Approach. in: BRAUCH, Hans Günter, et al. [eds.]: Facing Global Environmental Change. Hexagon Series on Human and Environmental Security and Peace. Vol 4. Berlin, Heidelberg, Springer 2009. pp. 1013-1021. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-68488-6\\_74](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-68488-6_74) Downloaded: 03.09.2022. p. 1018.

cannot be achieved. Human security and development are closely interlinked, too.<sup>75</sup> With globalisation, the presence of transnational threats, and the borderless state of world became more obvious. This brought human security to the agenda again. The new era of globalization brought such a level of interdependence, that, as Reveron and Mahoney-Norris argued, traditional war seems unlikely.<sup>76</sup> However, this concept was contradicted in early 2022, when Russia attacked Ukraine. This event does not change the core of the human security concept, it can even add to it. Challenges posed by transnational phenomena, like migration are still valid. The main concept is that the security perception is changing, and sub-national issues can grow to a regional and at global level are applicable also. Weak governances such as states in sub-Saharan Africa are especially prone to challenges posed by non-state actors, and local crises can broaden to regional instability.<sup>77</sup> But with the individual becoming the main referent object of security, the nature of security challenges changed, too. It breaks with the state centred threats, and prioritises human focused ones, like poverty, criminal activities and pandemic, for example. This already complex dimension of security is paired with the idea of regionalism in Africa, which can lead to the improvement of human security in a long term.<sup>78</sup> Borderlessness and the idea of regionalism bring back the concept of transnational issues. It is claimed to be one of the most important side effects of globalization either in a positive or a negative sense. To tackle the threats, international and transnational cooperation is needed, through which human security can be improved.<sup>79</sup>

Migration is a global transnational phenomenon. It has been established also as a security threat early on,<sup>80</sup> so, analysing migration phenomena through the lens of security is not a new practice. The inclusion of migration as a security issue also meant that the securitization of the topic has been introduced successfully.<sup>81</sup>

<sup>75</sup> BRAUCH, Hans Günter: Human Security Concepts in Policy and Science. in: BRAUCH, Hans Günter, et al. [eds.]: Facing Global Environmental Change. Hexagon Series on Human and Environmental Security and Peace. Vol 4. Berlin, Heidelberg, Springer 2009. pp. 959-989. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-68488-6\\_74](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-68488-6_74)  
Downloaded: 03.09.2022. p. 979.

<sup>76</sup> REVERON, Derek S. and MAHONEY-NORRIS, Kathleen A.: Human Security in a Borderless World. London, Routledge 2018. ps. 4-6.

<sup>77</sup> REVERON, Derek S. and MAHONEY-NORRIS, Kathleen A.: Human Security in a Borderless World. ps. 11-14.

<sup>78</sup> TARRÓSY, István: Demokratizálódás és regionalizáció a szubzaharai Afrikában. [Democratization and Regionalization in sub-Saharan Africa]. in: MARSÁI, Viktor [ed.]: Afrika a globalizált világban. [Africa in the Globalized World]. Dialóg Campus, Budapest, 2019. pp.127-145. ps. 137-139.

<sup>79</sup> REVERON, Derek S. and MAHONEY-NORRIS, Kathleen A.: Human Security in a Borderless World. p. 21.

<sup>80</sup> PANEBIANCO, Stefania: Human security at the Mediterranean borders: humanitarian discourse in the EU periphery. in: International Politics 2022. Vol. 59. pp. 428–448. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-021-00316-1>  
Downloaded: 03.09.2022. ps. 431-432.

<sup>81</sup> DANNREUTHER, Roland: Nemzetközi biztonság. [International Security] Antall József Tudásközpont, Budapest, 2016. ISBN 978 615 5559 20 4 ps. 59-67.

Three different versions of securitization theory emerged during the 1990s. The first one is the speech act approach, introduced by the Copenhagen School. The second is the sociological approach, based on Foucaultian views, and the third one is the inclusive security approach, inspired by the normative-theoretical approach.<sup>82</sup> The approach of the Copenhagen School is introduced in parallel with the Foucaultian theory, since they show a certain degree of similarity. Then the inclusive securitization approach will be discussed. At the end of the chapter, desecuritization is also touched upon, since it also became the part of the discourse in the 2000s.

There is no securitization theory without answering the question of what security is. Here the definition created by Barry Buzan is used, because the securitization theory of the Copenhagen School builds on this definition, too.

*“Security is taken to be about the pursuit of freedom from threat and the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity against forces of change which they see as hostile. The bottom line of security is survival, but it also reasonably includes a substantial range of concerns about the conditions of existence. Quite where this range of concerns ceases to merit the urgency of the 'security' label (which identifies threats as significant enough to warrant emergency action and exceptional measures, including the use of force) and becomes part of the everyday uncertainties of life is one of the difficulties of the concept.”<sup>83</sup>*

It is clear that the author himself admits the ambiguity of the definition, which opens opportunities for the process of securitization. According to the Copenhagen School, security is a move which takes politics beyond the existing rules and regulations and makes possible the implementation of special politics. Therefore, securitization can be assessed as the continuation of politicization.

Politicization means that a topic which is not naturally political in its character becomes the subject of political debate and needs to be dealt with. It also means that this topic has to be

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<sup>82</sup> HAMMERSTAD, Anne: The Securitization of Forced Migration. in: FIDDIAN-QUASMIYEH, Elena, LOESCHER, Gil, LONG, Katy, SIGONA, Nando [eds.]: The Oxford Handbook of Refugee & Forced Migration Studies. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016. ISBN 978 0 19 877850 9 ps. 265-275.

<sup>83</sup> BUZAN, Barry: New Patterns of Global Security in The Twenty-first Century. [http://home.sogang.ac.kr/sites/jaechun/courses/Lists/b7/Attachments/10/New%20Patterns%20of%20Global%20Security%20in%20the%20TwentyFirst%20Century\\_Buzan.pdf](http://home.sogang.ac.kr/sites/jaechun/courses/Lists/b7/Attachments/10/New%20Patterns%20of%20Global%20Security%20in%20the%20TwentyFirst%20Century_Buzan.pdf) Downloaded: 09.02.2019. ps. 4-5.

chosen carefully. It can be anything, from migration<sup>84</sup>, through energy security<sup>85</sup>, to the COVID-19 pandemic,<sup>86</sup> save things which cannot be changed, like the laws of nature, or issues which should not be put under political control, like free economy and the private sphere. Thus, securitization is a matter which presents an existential threat and requires an immediate response, which does not fall under the normal political procedures and needs priority decisions made by top leaders. The act of presenting a topic as an existential threat is the securitization move.<sup>87</sup>

However, there are other assessments on the process of securitization. According to Didier Bigo, who follows the Foucaultian views, securitization is not an exceptional process to address existential threats. He rather describes it as an everyday political process, often addressing common issues, in order to win political fights for power and popularity.<sup>88</sup> This approach is rather considering securitization as a modification of politicization.

The two processes show similarities. Both politicization and securitization have to be understood in an intersubjective process. This is especially true when examining securitization within the EU. With all Member States having different thresholds for defining threats, it is even more difficult. It means that one single actor, for example an EU Member State, can start a securitization process and the process can be successful in case it fits the perception of the other actors in the organisation about what a threat is.<sup>89</sup>

There are three distinctive units which are needed for the securitization process according to the Copenhagen School. The first is the referent object, which can be anything that has a legitimate claim to survive in the case of an existential threat. The second is the securitizing actors who claim the referent object as existentially threatened. These actors must be in a position of authority, however not necessarily official authority. The third unit is functional

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<sup>84</sup> TÁLAS, Péter: A terrorveszélyhelyzet-diskurzus margójára. [To the margins of the discourse on terrorist threat] in: *Nemzet és biztonság* [Nation and security] 2016. Issue 1. pp. 40-47. [http://www.nemzetesbiztonsag.hu/cikkek/nb\\_2016\\_1\\_06\\_talas\\_peter\\_-\\_a\\_terrorveszelyhelyzet-diskurzus\\_margojara.pdf](http://www.nemzetesbiztonsag.hu/cikkek/nb_2016_1_06_talas_peter_-_a_terrorveszelyhelyzet-diskurzus_margojara.pdf) Downloaded: 08.05.2022.

<sup>85</sup> TAKÁCS, Gergely: The role of energy security in the international relations theories. in: *Nemzetbiztonsági Szemle*. [National Security Review] 2018. Vol. 6. Issue 4. pp. 6-20. <https://folyoirat.ludovika.hu/index.php/nbsz/article/view/1483/802> Downloaded: 08.05.2022. ps. 10-13.

<sup>86</sup> Molnár, Anna, Takács, Lili, Jakusné Harnos, Éva: Securitization of the COVID-19 pandemic by metaphoric discourse during the state of emergency in Hungary. *International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy*. 2020. Vol. 40. Issue. 9-10. pp. 1167-1182. Downloaded: 08.05.2022.

<sup>87</sup> BUZAN, Barry, WÆVER, Ole, DE WILDE, Jaap: *Security A New Framework for Analysis*. Lyenne Rienner Publishers, London, 1998. ISBN 978 1 55587 784 2 ps. 23-29.

<sup>88</sup> BIGO, Didier: *Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease*. p. 65.

<sup>89</sup> BUZAN, Barry, WÆVER, Ole, DE WILDE, Jaap: *Security A New Framework for Analysis*. ps. 30-31.

actors, who are important actors in the respective sectors and can influence decisions made within.<sup>90</sup>

While the Copenhagen School tends to handle the governments as the voice of the state or nation itself, the Foucaultian School disagrees with the concept, mainly because it tends to strengthen the hostile feelings towards migration, which in this case appears as an outside threat which poses a risk to the whole nation or state.<sup>91</sup>

For successful securitization, not only the securitization move is needed. The move has to be accepted too. The degree of success of securitization is not decided by the securitizing actor, but by the audience. To be able to securitize an issue successfully, insecurity must be introduced to the audience. But insecurity is not natural itself, it must be written or talked about to exist. This process is done by the speech act.<sup>92</sup> A successful securitization move depends on the combination of two aspects: language and society. The speech act must contain the existential threat, the point of no return and a possible way out. In addition, it must include the special features of the respective sector, which in the case of migration would be the societal sector and the threat to identity. Finally, the speech act must contain the description of a specific threat, for example the increase in crime, leading to hostile sentiments.<sup>93</sup>

The idea of the Copenhagen Group is to analyse securitization as a process. However, some experts suggest studying the securitizing actors as the main beneficiaries of securitization.<sup>94</sup> This is the case especially with the securitization of migration. Huysmans, for example, expressed his concerns about studying migration through the lens of security.<sup>95</sup>

The assessment of migration as a security threat emerged in the early 1990s, when pessimistic reviews of the global demographic processes were published. The dramatic tone of these studies supported the estimation of migration as an existential threat. Less radical studies also politicized migration. The topic gained momentum, especially in Europe. Some analysts argue that migration became an issue in the EU because of the increasing popularity of radical right parties, and growing fears they encouraged. Some claim that migration is not a legitimate security question. The constructivist Copenhagen School states that the securitization of

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<sup>90</sup> BUZAN, Barry, WÆVER, Ole, DE WILDE, Jaap: Security A New Framework for Analysis. p. 36.

<sup>91</sup> BIGO, Didier: Biztonság és migráció: a félelemközpontú kormányzatiság kritikájának megalapozása. p. 35.

<sup>92</sup> HUYSMANS, Jef: The Politics of Insecurity, Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU. Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, London, 2006. ISBN 9 78 0415 36125 5 p. 7.

<sup>93</sup> BUZAN, Barry, WÆVER, Ole, DE WILDE, Jaap: Security A New Framework for Analysis. ps. 32-33.

<sup>94</sup> BIGO, Didier: Biztonság és migráció: a félelemközpontú kormányzatiság kritikájának megalapozása. ps. 42-43.

<sup>95</sup> HUYSMANS 2006. p. xi.



migration is an illiberal and retrograde exercise which misplaces migration from the suitable political field to the ambiguous field of security.<sup>96</sup>

Bigo claims that the securitization of migration serves the political interest of different groups and political parties. In connection with migration, he argues that the securitization process builds on doubts, and it is just a mere method of power politics. Its essence is to project every fear to an inconceivable enemy, migrants in this case, to create the 'we' and 'them' groups and in the end, it successfully criminalizes migration. According to Bigo's work, technological advancement could also influence the securitization of migration with the creation of EU databases from the use of information provided by satellites and the creation of an international network of law enforcement, like INTERPOL and EUROPOL.<sup>97</sup>

The third version of securitization, the inclusive securitization is - as its name suggests - not as pessimistic as the former two versions. Theorists who follow this school reject the 'we and them' approach and suggest that securitization can be a 'win-win' situation. The base of this approach is the Critical Security Theory, which aims to eliminate the state-centric and competitive understanding of security. Instead, handling migration as a human security issue, it suggests that securitization can take place in a proactive, inclusive, and collaborative way. This theory was popular during the 1990s and early 2000s, but it never became a well-researched academic effort, however remained mainly an activist endeavour.<sup>98</sup>

Besides securitization, desecuritization became part of the discourse in the early 2000s. Desecuritization means the 'unmaking' of security problems, questioning the effectiveness of handling a topic, in our case, migration, as a security issue. With desecuritization, even the approach can be widened since it does not tie people to addressing an issue exclusively from the security perspective. It also means that an issue can be addressed without being assessed as an existential threat. Furthermore, sometimes dealing with a problem from a security perspective can even be counterproductive. The main reason for desecuritization, however, is not this. Desecuritization is a strategy to move security questions to a political context. It means that problems like migration will be addressed as non-security questions, and security policy and security language will not have priority. With regard to migration it means that it will be addressed from a human rights approach. Desecuritization of migration means security will remain one of the policy approaches to treat the issue. Thus, desecuritization does not mean that

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<sup>96</sup> DANNREUTHER, Roland: Nemzetközi biztonság. [International Security] Antall József Tudásközpont, Budapest, 2016. ISBN 978 615 5559 20 4 ps. 215-216.

<sup>97</sup> BIGO, Didier: Biztonság és migráció: a félelemközpontú kormányzatiság kritikájának megalapozása. ps. 39-43.

<sup>98</sup> HAMMERSTAD, Anne: The Securitization of Forced Migration. p. 273.



migration will be neglected as a security issue, but it will be addressed from multiple disciplines.<sup>99</sup> With addressing migration from security, economic, social domains, a better understanding can be developed, and more effective policies and strategies can be forged.

Hein de Haas, in his work on migration and development, introduced the notion of a cyclical view on migration, changing from optimistic to pessimistic in different time periods. The last period he examined is from 2001 to the date of the publication of his findings in 2010. According to de Haas, after a long pessimistic view on migration, a period of optimism towards migration started in 2001.<sup>100</sup> Clearly, migration came into the spotlight again in 2015-2016, when the so-called migration and refugee crisis unfolded, and the European Agenda on Migration was created. With the ongoing crisis, the EU and its Member States reverted to a more pessimistic view on migration. According to de Haas and others, it was quite logical for renewed pessimism to start to unfold after the long era of optimism. The main question raised by King and Collyer is how we can stop this swinging from optimistic to pessimistic views.<sup>101</sup>

The assessment of migration as a security threat emerged in the early 1990s, when pessimistic views, including those by Sayad (1991), Habermas (1992) and Miles (1993), of the global demographic processes were published. The dramatic tone of these studies supported viewing migration as an existential threat. Less radical studies, such as those by Castels and Miller (1993) or Legomsky (1993), also politicised migration. The topic gained momentum, especially in Europe. Some analysts argue that migration became an issue in the EU because of the increasing popularity of radical right parties, and the growing fears they encouraged. Some claim that migration is not a legitimate security question. The establishment of the Schengen area and its inclusion to the Treaty of Amsterdam implicated that the external borders and, consequently, border management became important for the EU.<sup>102</sup> The constructivist Copenhagen School states that the securitisation of migration is an illiberal and retrograde exercise which mistakenly moves migration from the correct, political field to the ambiguous field of security.<sup>103</sup>

<sup>99</sup> HUYSMANS, Jef: *The Politics of Insecurity, Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU*. ps. 125-144.

<sup>100</sup> DE HAAS, Hein: *Migration and Development: A Theoretical Perspective*. *International Migration Review*, <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1747-7379.2009.00804.x> Downloaded: 30.09.2020.

<sup>101</sup> KING, Russell, COLLYER, Michael: *Migration and Development Framework and Its Links to Integration*. in GARCÉS-MASCAREÑAS, Blanca, PENNINX, Rinus (eds.), *Integration Processes and Policies in Europe*. London, Springer Open, 2016. <https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.12657/28047/1001947.pdf?sequence=1#page=170> Downloaded: 30.09.2020. p. 183.

<sup>102</sup> ATGER, Anaïs Faure. *The Abolition of Internal Border Checks in an Enlarged Schengen Area: Freedom of movement or a scattered web of security checks?*. CEPS, 2008. Vol. 8. <https://www.ceps.eu/wp-content/uploads/2009/08/1629.pdf> Downloaded: 08.05.2022. ps. 11-15.

<sup>103</sup> DANNREUTHER, Roland: *Nemzetközi biztonság*. [International Security], (Budapest, Antall József Tudásközpont, 2016), ps. 215-216.

Bigo claims that the securitisation of migration serves the political interests of various groups and political parties. He argues that the securitisation of migration builds on doubts and is simply a method used in power politics.<sup>104</sup>

## II.2 FUNCTIONALIST THEORIES

There are two paradigms into which migration theories are grouped. The first one is the group of functionalist theories. The primary subject of this school is not the individual. It sees the society as a system, a set of interdependent units. These units, however, function like organisms and have an inherent inclination towards equilibrium. Functionalist migration theories also treat migration as a positive phenomenon. According to these theories, migration serves the interest of the individuals and the society as well, helping to achieve greater equality within and between societies.<sup>105</sup> In these theories, development is embedded in migration partly through the remittances, the circular migration and therefore the brain gain.<sup>106</sup>

Although none of these individual theories can sum up the whole migration process, they should be analysed to be able to develop new concepts which might fit better to cover all the factors of contemporary migration.

### II.2.1 PUSH–PULL MODEL

The push and pull model is the most commonly used method to explain migration. It can be found both in Hungarian and international literature. However, this model is not a well-developed theory. The concept could gain popularity because it is easy to understand and gives the illusion of a clear answer to the question; why people migrate.<sup>107</sup> This model does not give an explanation to return migration and the parallel occurrence of immigration and emigration. One of the possible reasons for its popularity is that it visibly incorporates all major factors which have a role in the migration decision-making. The push and pull model can be misleading because it does not specify how these various factors combine together to motivate migration<sup>108</sup>, additionally, it does not take in consideration the external influences.<sup>109</sup> De Haas stated that the

<sup>104</sup> BIGO, Didier: *Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease*, ps. 68-70.

<sup>105</sup> CASTLES et al. 2014. p.27.

<sup>106</sup> DE HAAS, Hein (2010a): *Migration and Development: A Theoretical Perspective*.  
<https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4744987/> Downloaded: 23.10.2016.

<sup>107</sup> VAN HEAR, Nicholas, BAKEWELL, Oliver, and LONG, Katy: 'Push-pull plus: reconsidering the drivers of migration'. in: *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 2017. 44(6), 927–944.  
doi:10.1080/1369183x.2017.1384135 p. 928. Downloaded: 08.05.2022.

<sup>108</sup> CASTLES et al. 2014. ps.29-30.

<sup>109</sup> JÓNSSON, Gunvor: 'The environmental factor in migration dynamics – a review of African case studies'. International Migration Institute, Working Papers, No. 21. 2010.

push and pull model is deterministic, it does not take in consideration the policy environment of the sending country and only takes into account migration as the answer to a problem.<sup>110</sup> Skeldon also stated that the push and pull theory is simplistic and shallow.<sup>111</sup> Therefore, the push and pull model serves to develop a basic understanding of the process of the complex phenomena of migration.

The push and pull model includes environmental, economic and demographic factors which can lead to movements. Push factors are those, mostly negative effects, which encourage people to leave their countries of origin. Pull factors are those appealing circumstances which support migration decisions to different countries of destination. Pull factors can be translated as the availability of farmlands, better population density than in the country of origin, economic opportunities (for example, demand for workforce in the destination country), and a stable political system in the respective country, which preferably includes political freedoms. The push factors on the other hand can be desertification, soil erosion, lack of available farmland, overpopulation, lack of economic opportunities (for example, a high rate of unemployment), repressive political regimes, and the presence of armed conflicts in the country of origin, regardless of its type.<sup>112</sup>

The push and pull model is also too deterministic assuming that certain factors like demographic, environmental and economic are directly responsible for migration decisions. These factors, however, can never be interpreted alone. Overpopulation and environmental degradation, instead of resulting in migration, can lead to technological innovation. Also, we have to take into account that the lack of economic opportunities can lead to impoverishment on such a scale that it makes long-distance or international migration impossible.<sup>113</sup>

According to this it can be assessed that migration is connected to multiple, interrelated push and pull factors, and includes those social classes which can take the risk and the financial burden of a long journey. It means that those who finally decide to migrate will not be the poorest, but those who have the financial assets to pay for the journey. Besides all these factors,

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<https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/30067/1/Final%20The%20environmental%20factor%20in%20migration%20dynamics.pdf> Downloaded: 08.05.2022. p. 6.

<sup>110</sup> DE HAAS, Hein: 'The determinants of international migration'. International Migration Institute, Working Papers, No. 32. 2011. <https://www.migrationinstitute.org/publications/wp-32-11/@/@/download/file> Downloaded: 08.05.2022. ps. 4-7.

<sup>111</sup> SKELDON, Ronald: Population Mobility in Developing Countries: A Reinterpretation. Belhaven Press, London, 1990. ps. 125-126.

<sup>112</sup> BIEDERMANN, Zsuzsánna: Migráció Szubszaharai Afrikából Magyarországra és Európába. [Migration from Sub-Saharan Africa to Hungary and Europe]

[http://old.mta.hu/data/cikk/13/70/8/cikk\\_137008/\\_Biedermann.pdf](http://old.mta.hu/data/cikk/13/70/8/cikk_137008/_Biedermann.pdf) Downloaded: 06.11.2016.

<sup>113</sup> CASTLES et al. 2014. p.30.

the push and pull model left out a very important factor: the ability of individuals to make independent choices which are based on a limited but realistic knowledge.<sup>114</sup>

## II.2.2 NEOCLASSICAL THEORIES

The neoclassical theories (macro and micro) are also old and well-known theories of international migration. This approach started to gain momentum in the 1950s. In contrast to the multi-factoral approach of the push and pull model, neoclassical theories have a rather economic approach to international migration.<sup>115</sup> Most of the neoclassical theories assess the potential migrants as individual decision makers who base their choice of destinations on calculations for income maximization and optimization. Originally the theory was created to explain the rural-urban migration process, and later on it was also used to explain international migratory movements as well. Through time the theories improved from taking into account just the economic decision of an individual to include other factors, like financial and social costs of migration as well as investment in human capital.<sup>116</sup>

The main assumption of the neoclassical economics macro-theory is that the migratory movements are organised in a way to equalise economic opportunities. This means that workers from low-wage countries, which have a surplus in labour force, will move to high-wage, labour-scarce countries. As a result, the labour supply will decrease in originally capital-poor and low-wage countries, and eventually wages will start to grow, and labour scarcity will discontinue in high-wage, capital-rich countries, which will lead to a fall in wages in these countries. The process is expected to continue until an equilibrium is reached, which only reflects to the costs of the international movement. According to the macro-theory there is also a capital investment flow from capital-rich countries to capital-poor countries, which is accompanied by the movement of human capital. Although it includes the migration of highly skilled workers to capital-poor countries, the heterogeneity of labour force inflows must be recognised.<sup>117</sup>

This theory leads to the following assumptions: firstly, international labour migration is mainly fuelled by wage differences. When an equilibrium is reached in wages, economic migration will come to a halt. The flows of human capital respond to the return rate. This mainly affects highly skilled workers, whose salary will likely differ from the average patterns. Labour

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<sup>114</sup> CASTLES et al. 2014. p.31.

<sup>115</sup> HAUZINGER, Zoltán, HEGEDÜS, Judit, KLENNER, Zoltán: A migráció elmélete. [The theory of migration], Nemzeti Közszerkesztési Egyetem, Budapest, 2014. ISBN 978 615 5305 54 2 p. 25.

<sup>116</sup> CASTLES et al. 2014. ps. 29-30.

<sup>117</sup> HAUZINGER et al. 2014. ps. 25-26.

market mechanisms are the most important factors in international workforce migration, and governments can control migration flows by influencing labour markets.<sup>118</sup>

Now, neoclassical economics micro-theory builds also on the individual's logical income maximizing decision. This model, however, takes into account the costs and risks of migration, from the price of the journey and the need of learning a new language, to the possibilities of loosening ties with the family left at home.<sup>119</sup> In this theory we can already recognise that, besides the financial decision on migration, social factors also appear as an important part of decision-making.

A complementary approach widens more the perspective of the micro-theory. Sjaastad assessed migration as an investment in the human agent as well as an investment in the migration process itself. According to this theory, migration cannot be viewed in isolation as a purely economic phenomenon. Sjaastad argues that besides the obvious costs of migration, like earnings, there are other, non-money contributing factors, like opportunities and psychic. He claims that the use of the human capital concept is beneficial. Therefore, the return must be high both on the migration investment, the on-the job training and the cost of the pre-employment training. Consequently, Sjaastad argues that age is an important factor in migration as well, since it has an effect on the possible private returns of the process. The theory suggests that people would not necessarily seek for marked equilibria, but would take in consideration other personal related factors, such as the skill level and opportunities.<sup>120</sup> This model means that people invest in migration like the way they invest in education. So, when we see immigration statistics that show us a higher percentage of skilled migrants than the percentage of this social class within the local population, we have to remember the neoclassical micro-theory. However, we also have to note that this theory explains the movement of skilled workers only partially.<sup>121</sup>

This theory is also highly dependent on economic and financial factors. The micro theory still suggests that migratory decisions are mainly based on earning and employment rate differentials. However, it takes into account the individual characteristics as a new aspect. It means that the higher probability of employment in the destination country makes international migration more appealing. The micro-theory kept some assumptions of the macro-theory. For

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<sup>118</sup> MASSEY et al. 1998. p. 19.

<sup>119</sup> HAUTZINGER et al. 2014. p. 26.

<sup>120</sup> SJAASTAD, Larry A.: The Costs and Returns of Human Migration. in: *Journal of Political Economy*. 1962. Vol. 70. Issue 5. pp. 80-93 [https://www.jstor.org/stable/1829105?read-now=1&refreqid=excelsior%3Afe5ccd3cffeedcaa48614ed127e6ac1f&seq=12#page\\_scan\\_tab\\_contents](https://www.jstor.org/stable/1829105?read-now=1&refreqid=excelsior%3Afe5ccd3cffeedcaa48614ed127e6ac1f&seq=12#page_scan_tab_contents)

Downloaded: 30.06.2022. ps. 83-93.

<sup>121</sup> CASTLES et al. 2014. p. 30.

example, it states if the wages and employment rates do not differ between countries, international migration stops. Micro-theory also agrees with the primary importance of labour markets in influencing international migration. That means that other markets are not influencing migratory decisions. This model also assumes that governments can primarily control international migration via labour market policies.<sup>122</sup>

Neoclassical theories, despite their ability to explain certain migration patterns, must be treated critically. While the push and pull model used multiple factors to describe migration, save the human ability of decision making, neoclassical models exaggerated the individual decision-making capabilities of human beings. These theories, both macro and micro, assumed that people are rational actors, who use systematic comparison as a base of decision making. The neoclassical theories assume that people calculate with lifetime costs and benefits to make the decision on migration. People do take into account costs and benefits when deciding to leave or stay in their country of origin. This decision, however, is not always based on objective data, and a perfect knowledge of wage levels and employment opportunities in destination countries. Theories are also lopsided when it comes to determining why nationals from a poor country migrate, but other nationals from different poor countries do not. This can be explained by the former colonial ties. Migrants with such a background have comparative advantage to those from a different background. Private recruitment on nation states also plays a role in selective migration patterns, which cannot be realistically explained by neoclassical theories. Additionally, neoclassical theories do not take into account the imperfection of markets, the immigration policies of the destination countries, and that the borders cannot always be freely crossed. Adding up all these misconceptions results in a rather unrealistic environment. As an outcome, neoclassical migration theories are scarcely capable of explaining international migratory movements in a real-life situation.<sup>123</sup>

### II.3 HISTORICAL–STRUCTURAL THEORIES

The historical-structural approach gained momentum in the 1970s and 1980s as an alternative approach to the functionalist theories. While functionalist theories tend to treat migration as a voluntary movement, the new approach argues that the individuals do not have a free choice of their movements. This approach emerged during the time of the major labour

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<sup>122</sup> MASSEY et al. 1998. ps. 20-21.

<sup>123</sup> PORTES, Alejandro and BÖRÖCZ, József.: Contemporary Immigration: Theoretical Perspectives on its Determinants and Modes of Incorporation. in: *International Migration Review*. 1989. Vol. 23. Issue 3. pp. 606–630. <https://doi.org/10.1177/019791838902300311> Downloaded: 30.08.2022. ps. 606-609.

recruitment campaigns and emphasises the interconnectedness of the global political-economic system. Historical-structural theorists assumed that migration deepens the differences between wealthy and poor countries. It leads to increasing disequilibria in opposition to the neoclassical approach. In this theoretical framework migration steps up as one of the root causes of underdevelopment.<sup>124</sup> During the 1970s researchers observed that international migration is not just a temporary phenomenon, but it is linked to the countries' connectedness to global markets. Assumptions were made that saw migration as a natural consequence of the process of capitalist development.<sup>125</sup>

While neoclassical theories introduced the positive aspects of migration, like brain gain and return migration, which is mainly explained by the freedom of movement of persons, the historical-structural model is alarmingly pessimistic about the side effects of migration. This model highlights the brain drain or cherry-picking phenomenon as the side-effect of migration. It claims that brain drain has negative effects both in short and long-terms. The main argumentation is that poor countries lack capital and skills, and the brain drain phenomenon widens the gap between developing and developed countries.<sup>126</sup>

More theories influenced the evolution of the historical-structural theory throughout time. In the 1960s it was the dependency theory, which had its roots and became particularly popular in Latin America. This theory saw the underdevelopment of the Third World as a direct consequence of colonisation. It was assessed that even in the postcolonial era, the developed countries exploited not just the natural resources of developing countries, but the labour force as well. This included the lopsided trade agreements dictated by powerful developed economies. In the 1970s, another more complex, influential theory emerged. The world systems theory focused on how peripheral regions integrated into the world's economy which is controlled by developed core nations, and what changes resulted in local dynamics. It speeded up urbanisation processes with the deprivation of agricultural and rural workers. This process led to poverty and the growth of an informal economy.<sup>127</sup>

This introduction aimed to show that historical-structural theories are more complex than the functionalist theories with their almost exclusively economic approach. Although the

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<sup>124</sup> CASTLES, Stephen and KOSACK, Godula: Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe. Oxford University Press, London. 1973. ps. 425-428.

<sup>125</sup> MASSEY et al. 1998. ps. 35-37.

<sup>126</sup> HEKMATI, Mehri, and GLASER, William A: The brain drain and UNITAR's multinational research project on the subject. in: Social Science Information. 1973. Vol. 12. Issue 2. pp. 123-138.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/053901847301200207> Downloaded: 30.06.2022. ps. 124-125.

<sup>127</sup> WALLERSTEIN, Immanuel: The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis. [https://www.jstor.org/stable/178015?read-now=1&seq=15#page\\_scan\\_tab\\_contents](https://www.jstor.org/stable/178015?read-now=1&seq=15#page_scan_tab_contents) Downloaded: 24.11.2019. p. 401.



historical-structural model has a wider approach than the previous ones, these theories are not perfect either. These theories provide us a better understanding on the complex nature of migration, but they also need to be developed further.

### II.3.1 GLOBALIZATION THEORY

Globalization theory emerged in the 1990s, mainly from the dependency and world system theories. This theory requires a wider approach to migration and how societies interact between each other.<sup>128</sup> Globalization, like migration, is a complex phenomenon. “*Globalization is a process (or set of processes) that embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions, generating transcontinental or inter-regional flows and networks of activity, interaction, and power.*”<sup>129</sup> Since globalization is mainly a deepening worldwide interconnectedness, it means that migration is one of its aspects. Growing inequalities in developmental, demographic and economic fields paired with the increasingly available means of mass transportation and better long-distance communication assets result in an increasing desire to move.<sup>130</sup>

The increasing volume of different cross-border flows, like finance, trade, climate change, or even media products is also enhancing migration. These flows are organised around one structure, the transnational network. This network can be translated into different types of organisations, depending on the sector it represents, for example transnational corporations, or international non-governmental organisations (NGO). Globalization is also assessed as a process of worldwide social transformation, which results in fundamental changes in the way how society is organised and contributes to the emergence of the network society.<sup>131</sup> It has effects on traditional livelihoods as well, since globalization restructures the local economies. Of course, this is interconnected with the labour market and historical patterns. The phenomenon also questions the role of the nation-states and erodes the former models. However, national dimension is still important in understanding migration. Countries provide policies and legislation, which also have an impact on migration flows.<sup>132</sup>

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<sup>128</sup> CASTLES et al. 2014. p. 33.

<sup>129</sup> HELD, David, MCGREW, Anthony, GOLDBLATT, David, PERRATON, Jonathan: Globalization. [https://www.jstor.org/stable/27800244?seq=1#page\\_scan\\_tab\\_contents](https://www.jstor.org/stable/27800244?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents) Downloaded: 17.03.2019.

<sup>130</sup> KOSER, Khalid (2016): International Migration A Very Short Introduction. p.25.

<sup>131</sup> SIDDIQUE, M.A.B. (editor): International Migration into the 21st Century. Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, Cheltenham, 2001. ISBN 1 84064 531 8 p.181.

<sup>132</sup> CASTLES et al. 2014. ps. 34-35.



### II.3.2 SEGMENTED LABOUR MARKET THEORY

Michael Piore is the best-known theorist who supported the segmented or dual labour market theory.<sup>133</sup> He questions the mutually beneficial nature of migration, and claims that a culture of poverty can emerge within those who planned to engage in temporary labour migration. He argues that migration can be tracked back more to the pull factors, namely the demand of low skilled workforce, than the push factors. According to him, international migration is only sustainable because of the constant demand of developed countries for migrant labour force.<sup>134</sup>

Segmented labour market theory helps to understand how the labour markets of developed countries can have a demand both for skilled and unskilled labour force. First of all, I want to introduce the segments of labour market. The primary sector is capital-intensive. Here, a high-skilled labour force is needed who have education, vocational training and can work with expensive equipment. In this way, a labour force in this sector also works like capital. In the secondary sector it is the opposite. Employers here need unskilled workers for labour-intensive jobs. This sector is more unstable, and these workers are the most vulnerable to economic crises, since they are the first to lose their jobs. However, there is a possible third sector of labour market. This can only emerge when ethnic enclaves are formed, although ethnic enclaves are not necessarily the product of international migration. It means that a larger group of people with the same ethnic background is concentrated to an area. These enclave types of minorities can raise demand for “*specialised cultural products and ethnic services*”, like food, clothing and religious services, typical of the respective ethnic group. In this way, a third sector of a labour market is created.<sup>135</sup> The ethnic enclave theory is not included in the Hungarian literature, however, international literature discusses it as a possibility.

The demand for a labour-force in developed countries also has a demographic aspect. The decreasing local population results in a demand for a workforce in every sector. In addition, in developed countries youngsters stay in education longer than before. Addressing women in these countries is not a solution either, since they started to enter the formal labour market after World War II and already form an integral part of it.<sup>136</sup>

This theory states that international migration cannot result in a balanced wage system because of the structural inflation, which is coded into the system. It means that if an employer

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<sup>133</sup> PIORE, Michael: Labor Market Segmentation: To What Paradigm Does It Belong? in: The American Economic Review. 1983. Vol. 73. Issue 2. pp. 249-253. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1816850> Downloaded: 28.06.2022. ps. 249-253.

<sup>134</sup> PIORE, Michael: Birds of Passage: Migrant Labor and Industrial Societies. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 1979. ps. 26-49; 69-73; 81-85.

<sup>135</sup> MASSEY et al. 1998. ps. 30-31.

<sup>136</sup> CASTLES et al. 2014. ps. 35-36.

pays more for a lower status job, he has to raise the salary of higher status workers as well. This step is needed to keep the workers in line with their social expectations. Thus, the employer has to have other techniques to attract a labour force to the bottom of the job hierarchy. Here motivational problems also exist, since this is the lowest status, and there are only few opportunities for upward movement. This problem is inescapable since the bottom cannot be eliminated with the mechanisation of these jobs, it would simply create a new bottom. So here employers need workers whose primary objective is to earn some money. Therefore, these bottom level jobs can attract international migrants. According to the theory, at the beginning of their migratory career international migrants view themselves as a part of the society in the country of origin, so their primary goal is not to achieve status or prestige, but to have an income. Later on, when the migrants' status becomes more permanent, a need for upward movement can emerge.<sup>137</sup>

This theory provides a different perspective to address migration. First of all, it rather blames the demand of developed countries for international migration, and states that equilibria in wages cannot be reached. This theory uses, however, a wider perspective to understanding migration, including economic and social perspectives, which in my opinion leads to a better understanding. But this theory is also flawed. It shows migration as a process which is driven exclusively by the demand of the labour force in developed countries. Historical-structural theories can also be blamed with narrow-mindedness, for handling political and economic structures as well as interests of capital as the causes of migration.

## II.4 THE NEW ECONOMICS OF LABOUR MIGRATION

This theory is on the border between functionalist and historical-structural theories. I listed it as an individual category because it does not show the characteristics of the historical-structural theories clearly. Massey et al. also placed the theory in their book out of the scope of the historical-structural theories, and Castles et al. also treats it separately.

The new economics of labour migration (NELM) theory emerged in the mid-1980s to offer a better explanation of the background of migration. The new theory arose to challenge the views promoted by the neoclassical theories. By the 1980s it became obvious, that neither neoclassical theories nor the historical-structural models can be used to explain international migration between developed countries, and theorists had to introduce new explanations. This theory breaks away from the tradition of the neoclassical models of assessing the decision on

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<sup>137</sup> MASSEY et al. 1998. ps. 29-30.

migration as an individual choice. The NELM takes into account that other individuals and other markets exist, besides the labour market can influence the decision-making process. This also means that the theory, as a new achievement, stops to be an exclusively economic theory. This new approach also notes that migration is not always a voluntary choice.<sup>138</sup>

According to Hautzinger et al. on the topic, this theory aims at the minimalization of risks, instead of the income maximization, which was prominent in the neoclassical theories. Migration is also seen as an opportunity to diversify family incomes, which means the migration decision, as earlier stated, became a family unit decision. This approach is needed in developing countries because the institutional system of risk management is not as efficient as in developed states.<sup>139</sup>

International literature explains the theory in more detail. It states that migration can be a decision based on the individuals' perceived relative deprivation. The level of deprivation can be examined in the context of a reference group with which the individual compares his or her situation. Migration can also be seen as an investment. The non-migrating family members can benefit from the migration of a family member through remittances.<sup>140</sup>

NELM also examines the stage of institutional risk management differences between developed and developing countries. The examination includes crop insurance markets, futures markets, unemployment insurance, retirement insurance, capital and credit markets. These assets, or the lack of them can have a significant influence on the migratory decision. The more these risk management institutions are developed and reachable in a certain country, the less likely that international migration will occur.<sup>141</sup>

This theory brought a couple of new elements into the discussion about migration. First of all, migration is not assessed as a decision of an individual anymore, but the decision of a household, or a family. Wage differential is not the primary reason for migration, therefore an equilibrium in wages will not necessarily result at the end of international migration. By widening the perspective of the influencing factors, the new economics theory revealed that international migration is a more complex phenomenon which requires a broader approach from the governmental level than just addressing labour market policies.<sup>142</sup> When the NELM theory

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<sup>138</sup> STARK, Oded, BLOOM, David E.: The New Economics of Labor Migration. [http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/docs/SummerSchool2013/readings/Kaczmarczyk\\_Reading%206.pdf](http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/docs/SummerSchool2013/readings/Kaczmarczyk_Reading%206.pdf)  
Downloaded: 09.03.2019.

<sup>139</sup> HAUTZINGER et al. 2014. ps. 28-29.

<sup>140</sup> STARK, Oded, BLOOM, David E.: The New Economics of Labor Migration.

<sup>141</sup> MASSEY et al. 1998. ps. 22-25.

<sup>142</sup> MASSEY et al. 1998. ps. 27-28.

emerged with its new ideas and hypothesis, it gave a new impetus to further research on migration.

## **II.5 NETWORK THEORIES**

Network theories are quite unambiguously focusing on the social ties and personal networks of migrants. These theories analyse the role of these social connections in the migration decision-making. I have already discussed the rise of network society within the globalisation theory, and now I will introduce its special implications on international migration. However, network theories primarily address the role of social connections in the migration decision-making process and these theories also take into consideration economics-related elements in various depths. This fact points to the direction which in my opinion is needed to understand migration: to assess it as a complex phenomenon; it needs an interdisciplinary, comprehensive approach.

Network theories continue with the earlier established assumptions which state that the migratory decision is not made by an individual, but a household, or a family unit. This assumption was used earlier in NELM. Therefore, it is clear that network theories rely on earlier results and experiences to develop migration theories further. Network theories gained momentum during the late 1980s and 1990s, which made them one of the newest theories on the field. They also provide the advantage to summarise earlier theories and build in conclusions to a new theoretical framework. For example, for the first time in the history of migration theories, it is stated that migration is self-sustainable.

As it was visible throughout the previous sections, migration theories became more and more complex. This last section discusses two theories in essence, migration network theory and cumulative causation. It is inevitable to reintroduce some formerly discussed ideas in connection with the network theories, since, as I formerly mentioned, they integrated elements from earlier theories. These duplications are therefore necessary to discuss network theories as a whole, and they show that network theories are the most complex frameworks with which we can address migration.

### **II.5.1 MIGRATION NETWORK THEORY**

The importance of social networks in shaping the migration process has been known for a long time. However, the topic gained more attention in the 1980s because of the migration patterns, and the changing theoretical framework throughout the decade. Previously the

formerly mentioned segmented labour market theory and the NELM offered a structural perspective on migration, but migration network theory focused the attention onto the existence of migration systems. The system approach offers a less static understanding of migration, and its advantage is that it takes into account stability and mobility in both origin and destination countries. Moreover, it analyses flows in the context of other flows, and within this context it acknowledges that flows of people are influenced by the flow of information, goods and services. In this theory, migration is considered a self-sustaining process which needs essentially the existing links, most prominently social networks, between origin and destination countries.<sup>143</sup> These networks link migrants to non-migrants and have an impact on the selection of potential migrants. The information which goes through these networks, and the resources which become available by them, influence the migration decision-making, and fuel long-term migration between countries.<sup>144</sup> This means that the migration network of an individual translates to a so-called social capital, which can be mobilised in certain depths (easier access to a job, accommodation, etc.) when the migration decision has been made.<sup>145</sup> It is also important to note that migration decisions can be supported by various flows of information. The stronger social connections, which consist of friends and family members, will be the primary source of information but weaker ties like acquaintances, can provide complementary information and links to other social clusters.<sup>146</sup> Therefore, a broader view can be obtained about the situation in the country of destination. It is evident that this theory also considers the family as the decision-making unit instead of the individual, as it was also established in the NELM theory. From this account, it is quite understandable why Boyd reflects on migration as a social product, and not as a decision by an individual.<sup>147</sup>

According to migration network theory, the already settled migrants serve as ‘bridgeheads’ which to some extent might have a positive effect on migration. Their presence reduces the risks of failure and costs. At first this concept was known as ‘chain migration’.<sup>148</sup> The presence of the first kinsmen in a geographical location leads to further migration to the same area, which

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<sup>143</sup> BOYD, Monica: Family and Personal Networks in International Migration: Recent Developments and New Agendas. in: *The International Migration Review*, vol. 23, no. 3, 1989, pp. 638–670. JSTOR, [www.jstor.org/stable/2546433](http://www.jstor.org/stable/2546433) Downloaded: 26.04.2020. ps. 639-641.

<sup>144</sup> HAUTZINGER et al. 2014. p. 30.

<sup>145</sup> DE HAAS, Hein (2010b): The Internal Dynamics of Migration Processes: A Theoretical Inquiry. in: *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 36:10, 2010, pp. 1587-1617, DOI: 10.1080/1369183X.2010.489361 <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/1369183X.2010.489361> Downloaded: 26.04.2020. ps. 1589-1590.

<sup>146</sup> BOYD. 1989. ps. 654-655.

<sup>147</sup> BOYD. 1989. p. 642.

<sup>148</sup> CASTLES et al. 2014. p. 40.

therefore produces a ‘chain reaction’ with more and more people of the same community migrating to the same place.<sup>149</sup>

To conclude, the migration network theory is a system theory, which breaks up with the formerly used rather static approaches, and examines migration as a network based, fluid, self-sustainable process, which is influenced by the flow of information, resources, and the ability to use the individual’s social capital. It is also important to acknowledge that this theory also continues with the NELM’s practice to view the migratory decision as a family decision, rather than the choice of an individual.<sup>150</sup>

## II.5.2 CUMULATIVE CAUSATION AND MIGRATION SYSTEMS THEORY

The cumulative causation theory gained momentum in 1990, but the concept was originally introduced in 1957 by Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal. Originally a development theory, it was to explain the growing inequality between rich and poor countries,<sup>151</sup> stating that poverty tends to create poverty.<sup>152</sup> Douglas Massey reintroduced the theory in 1990 with the very aim to synchronise the existing migration theories, and by combining them introduce a more applicable migration theory.<sup>153</sup>

Cumulative causation argues that migration changes the social and economic context, which influences the migration decision-making.<sup>154</sup> Massey also claims, like in the formerly discussed theories which were developed during the 1980s, that the decision is made by the family, or household unit, which is also influenced by local, national and international socioeconomic developments.<sup>155</sup> Cumulative causation and migration systems theory until this point seem very much the same as migration network theory. The difference is that while migration network theory focuses on the use of social capital in researching the migration flows, migration systems theory and cumulative causation merge the formerly separately researched social and economic domains.<sup>156</sup> Therefore, in cumulative causation theory, we can find elements of the formerly described migration network theory, NELM, as well as the neoclassical macroeconomics theory.

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<sup>149</sup> MASSEY et al. 1998. p. 130.

<sup>150</sup> HAUTZINGER et al. 2014. p. 29.

<sup>151</sup> DE HAAS 2010b ps. 1593-1594.

<sup>152</sup> MYRDAL, Gunnar: Rich lands and poor the road to world prosperity. New York, Harper, 1957. ps. 11-22.

<sup>153</sup> MASSEY, Douglas S.: Social Structure, Household Strategies, and the Cumulative Causation of Migration. Population Index, vol. 56, no. 1, 1990, pp. 3–26. JSTOR, [www.jstor.org/stable/3644186](http://www.jstor.org/stable/3644186). Downloaded: 28.04.2020. p. 4.

<sup>154</sup> MASSEY et al. 1998. p. 131.

<sup>155</sup> MASSEY 1990. p. 5.

<sup>156</sup> CASTLES et al. 2014. p. 43.

The theory of cumulative causation seeks to find those elements in the migration process which make subsequent migration more likely. However, in contrast to the previous theories, now multiple domains are expected to be taken into account, including anthropology, demography, history and geography.<sup>157</sup> Therefore cumulative causation can be achieved with the widening of the migration network, which reduces the risks and costs of migration for a household, also taking into consideration the relative deprivation of the decision-making household within the community.<sup>158</sup> In this case, relative deprivation is affected by the migrant remittances, which tend to increase inequalities in the counties of origin. These together create the circle of cumulative causation and make migration self-sustainable.<sup>159</sup>

The created migration cycle can have negative side effects. It can preserve underdevelopment in the country of origin and increase its dependence on the countries of destination. With these side effects, outward migration can increase dramatically.<sup>160</sup> With this process, when migration becomes more and more integrated into the values of a community and is also paired with success, a culture of migration can emerge.<sup>161</sup> This means that social values change in the given community, and migration becomes an expectation, or even a rite of passage to adulthood. In this case the migration network is so wide, and the information is so plentiful on appealing foreign locations and jobs, that it is considered as common knowledge. When a culture of migration emerges, it can include both young men and women from the community of origin and in the most extreme case, participating in international migration becomes a kind of ‘must’, and those who are not participating willingly can be marginalised.<sup>162</sup>

In conclusion, cumulative causation theory is a very advanced theory which encourages researchers to use an interdisciplinary approach towards migration. It uses the elements of network theories and economics-based theories as well. As with the migration network theory, cumulative causation also assesses migration as a self-sustainable process. Decision-making models include the regular, and formerly discussed variations, like reducing the risks of migration via the usage of social capital, or decision-making based on mere economics, like relative deprivation or income maximisation. However, cumulative causation also draws attention to such side effects of migration as increasing economic inequality and preservation

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<sup>157</sup> MASSEY 1990. p. 5.

<sup>158</sup> MASSEY 1990. ps. 8-9.

<sup>159</sup> CASTLES et al. 2014. p. 44.

<sup>160</sup> DE HAAS 2010b p. 1594.

<sup>161</sup> MASSEY et al. 1998. p. 132.

<sup>162</sup> MASSEY, Douglas S., et al.: Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal. *Population and Development Review*, vol. 19, no. 3, 1993, pp. 431–466. JSTOR, [www.jstor.org/stable/2938462](http://www.jstor.org/stable/2938462) Downloaded: 02.05.2020. ps. 452-453.

of underdevelopment in countries of origin, as well as the establishment of a culture of migration in the sending communities.

## II.6 CONCLUSIONS

Throughout this chapter, I sought to describe how migration became a security question with the help of the securitization process, I collected the most important definitions related to migration, and introduced the evolution of international migration, and the most important related theories.

Securitization of migration meant to place this process to a shelf of national and international concern. To approach it from a security perspective is highly dangerous, since migration is as old as humanity. Because of this its transformations went along with the transformations of humankind, therefore becoming more and more complex. Highlighting just one aspect of it is misleading and will not enable researchers and policy makers to address migration correctly. Migration cannot be left without certain regulations. Both migrants and the receiving societies need protection which can only be given with the desecuritization of migration. I quite agree with the concept that security can remain one of the aspects to tackle migration, however, a widening of the approach is very much needed, adding social, economic, environmental and other domains to it. Migration theories also improved when theorists realised that an interdisciplinary approach is essential to the deeper understanding of the migration process.

For further research, it was crucial to elaborate the definitions which are connected to migration, and which will often be used throughout the research. There is an existing debate on, and sometimes even ambiguity over the use of different expressions related to migration. Thus, I decided to use those definitions which are the most accepted internationally and/ or formulated by global international organisations. I considered this latter aspect especially important because I had to deal with migration from the perspective of two continents and two continental organisations.

Following the definitions, I continued with the introduction of different migration theories, which basically aim to give a theoretical framework to explain the above discussed movement patterns in a satisfactory manner. I went from the simplest to the most complex theory. What I realised during this introduction is that migration was mainly considered an economics-driven process through time, and thus most of the early theories are strongly reliant on that domain. These various theories assessed migration decision-making firstly as the decision of an individual, based on realistic knowledge. Later, these views were transformed and started to



take into account families and family strategies, but still stuck to theories related to economics, like equilibrium in wages, income maximization and relative deprivation. These early theories claimed that managing migration only depends on the regulation of the labour market. However, during the 1980s and 1990s theories emerged which started to include the social domain as a factor which influences migration flows. Naturally, there were some theories which broke up entirely with the formerly used economics heavy ideas. The static and structural theories have been replaced with network theories. Along the way, however, theorists kept important findings like the family or household unit is the decision-maker, or the decision is not necessarily voluntary. Then, in 1990, cumulative causation was reintroduced to the theoretical framework, which not only integrated the results from the economics-related theories but also kept the ideas of the network theories, like the one that migration is self-sustainable and relies on social capital, and the flow of information and goods. Among these theories I wanted to draw closer attention to two.

The first theory I discussed was the push and pull model, which became the most generally used migration theory. With its wide spectrum of push and pull factors, it has the illusion of offering a deep understanding of the background of the migratory decision. But mainly because of these separately applied factors it does not grab the essence of migration, which could be better described if we use these factors in an interlinked manner. Despite the push–pull model's deficiencies I agree with the usage of this theory as a first step to introduce the complexity of international migration to those for whom the topic is new.

The second theory which is important to highlight is the cumulative causation theory. It not only encourages researchers to synchronise knowledge on migration from other domains, it also emphasises the interconnectedness in the social domain. This basically means that cumulative causation not only considers the family or household unit as the decision maker, but it also acknowledges multiple levels which can influence this decision-making. Therefore, it does not just view migration as a complex interdisciplinary question, but also states that local, regional, national and international levels are actively affecting the flows.

With this being said, although I do not agree entirely with the concept that every migration decision can be placed under only one migration theory, cumulative causation is the best among them. It addresses migration as a complex phenomenon, which it is. In addition, I must highlight that EU policy makers should also take a closer look at this theory. The comprehensive and integrated approach introduced by the EU provides useful concepts to address migration, since the very meaning of these EU approaches precisely echoes the cumulative causation theory's approach to describe migration.

The EU has the concept how to address migration, just currently operationalising it in crisis management. The comprehensive and integrated approaches can be utilised to address migration, as it was suggested in the European Agenda on Migration. It can be debated which of the above-mentioned theories, the push and pull model or the cumulative causation theory should be used by the EU to tackle migration. A third route is also open, namely, to create a new, better fitting theory. In the following chapters I will examine the political and economic characteristics of the selected case study countries. I am seeking to create a new migration theory with the combination of the two by the end of the thesis.

To assess the correctness of the theories, migration patterns must be examined. In the next chapter, following the introduction of the political framework of migration, trends and patterns of West African migration are introduced.

## CHAPTER III.

### MIGRATION TRENDS IN WEST AFRICA

#### III.1 MIGRATION IN WEST AFRICA

This section introduces the regional migration patterns and the role of West Africa in international migration. Regional approach was used; this section is not devoted to focusing on specific countries. The first hypothesis suggests that most of the African migratory movements are made in the continent internally, and the pattern will not change in the long term. This section investigates the answers for this hypothesis with West African patterns in the focus.

The timeframe used to introduce migration patterns in West Africa starts from 2000, when the *Cairo Declaration* established the strategic partnership between the EU and the OAU and the subsequent *Cairo Action Plan* included the questions of migration, refugees and IDPs in the framework of cooperation.

Thinking along this line, this section is divided into three parts. The first part examines migration until 2006, when the first major approach change happened. With the introduction of the Rabat Process and the migration route approach a new era started in policy formation regarding migration. The second part investigates the time period between 2006 and 2015, and the third part analyses migration patterns from 2016, when the so-called European migration and refugee crisis peaked. The dividing date is again a migration related strategic document, the *Valletta Action Plan*, which was born in November 2015.

#### III.1.1 REGIONAL TRENDS BETWEEN 2000 AND 2006

In 2000 the estimated number of people who took part in international migration worldwide was 175 million, which was 2.9 per cent of the world population.<sup>163</sup> The share of sub-Saharan Africa in this figure was 16.3 million, or 9 per cent of global migrant stocks. Also, a particularly important factor in African migration is the number of IDPs and refugees, which was 3.6 million in 2000, still 22 per cent of the global figures. Forced migration was on a decreasing trend since the 1990s, however, non-refugee movements started to grow.<sup>164</sup> By 2005 the total number of

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<sup>163</sup> IOM World Migration Report 2005.

[https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr\\_2005\\_3.pdf?language=en](https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr_2005_3.pdf?language=en) Downloaded: 01.06.2020. p. 379.

<sup>164</sup> IOM World Migration Report 2005. p. 33.

international migrants in Africa rose to 17.5 million.<sup>165</sup> This time period is also curious, since data on trends and on migration patterns was scarce, and in the best-case scenario fragmented and incomplete. Migrant stocks and flows were not well documented, and there was no harmonised data collecting system in West Africa. Information related to refugees is more accurate and available than on migrants of other categories.<sup>166</sup> This was possible mainly because of the involvement of international organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in areas of forced migration.

In 2000, 42 per cent of the estimated total of 16 million African migrants were staying in West Africa.<sup>167</sup> In Europe only about 100,000 West Africans were registered in the period. The number of those who arrived unregistered remains an estimate. It is also important to note that most of the West Africans enter Europe legally, and their status changes with visa overstay. A yearly estimate of 25,000-35,000 irregular arrivals can be added to the migrant stock originating from sub-Saharan Africa, which was a small proportion of the 2.6 million total migrants to Europe in 2004. At the same time the Maghreb region received from 65,000 to 120,000 migrants yearly from sub-Saharan Africa. Of the migrant stock in the Maghreb, 62 to 80 per cent remained on the continent.<sup>168</sup>

Even with the highest mobility being intra-regional, brain drain was already a serious problem within Africa. In the policy documents and strategies one of the priorities was, as mentioned before, to decrease the rapid growth of the phenomenon. For this the African governments increasingly capitalised on the established practice of circular migration in the framework of regional cooperation, in order to keep the highly skilled migrants at least within the continent. One of the initiatives launched in 2002 and aimed at reaching the diaspora was the Digital Diaspora Network Africa. The objective of the initiative is to regain the highly skilled professionals (doctors, scientists, engineers, economists, IT specialists, etc.) who left Africa for developed countries.<sup>169</sup> To understand the scale of brain drain from Africa, it must be noted that between 1986 and 1990 - in just five years - from 50,000 to 60,000 high skilled professionals left the continent.<sup>170</sup> This figure grew firmly since African states gained their

<sup>165</sup> IOM World Migration Report 2010.

[https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr\\_2010\\_english.pdf?language=en](https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr_2010_english.pdf?language=en) Downloaded: 01.06.2020. p. 127.

<sup>166</sup> IOM World Migration Report 2000. p. 134.

<sup>167</sup> IOM World Migration Report 2005. p. 36.

<sup>168</sup> DE HAAS, Hein (2008): Irregular Migration from West Africa to the Maghreb and the European Union: An Overview of Recent Trends. [https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/mrs-32\\_en.pdf](https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/mrs-32_en.pdf) Downloaded: 02.06.2019. p. 9.

<sup>169</sup> TARRÓSY, István (2015): Afrikai migrációs folyamatok. <https://adoc.tips/afrikai-migracios-folyamatok.html> Downloaded: 23.11.2016. ps. 236-237.

<sup>170</sup> ADEPOJU (2001) p. 66.

independence. The loss is twofold, since the countries lost a substantial amount of their high skilled human resources, and with them the capital they invested in their education.<sup>171</sup>

With the developing Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and regional integration, the core country approach emerged. Core countries are those states whose economy is big enough to dominate a REC. In the West African migration complex two countries had sufficient economies to emerge as core countries, Côte d'Ivoire and Nigeria. Because of their significant economic power, they quickly became migration destination countries in the region. In West Africa the ECOWAS provided the locals with favourable conditions for intra-regional migration. The protocol on the free movement of persons, and the introduction of the travellers' cheque both encouraged ECOWAS nationals to migrate in increased numbers within the community. With these developments in the background, Côte d'Ivoire and Nigeria were considered the major countries of destination within West Africa until 2000.<sup>172</sup>

After three decades of prosperity, economy started to decline in both Côte d'Ivoire and Nigeria in early 2000. Combined with the rising level of unemployment among the youth, migrants started to be blamed for the negative trends in the economy.<sup>173</sup> Liberal immigration policies were changed, and the registration of foreigners started, special identity cards had been issued.<sup>174</sup> In 2002 a civil war broke out in Côte d'Ivoire, which produced an increased level of outward migration among Ivoirians as well. Upon losing both major destination countries at the beginning of the new millennium, West African migration still remained dominantly intra-regional, and intra-continental. One of the reasons for this is the separation of ethnic areas by political borders. People from these cross-border ethnic groups tend to migrate within ethnic territories, regardless of the fact they are crossing international borders. The same cultural background often provides a stronger social cohesion than national borders drawn along the interests of the former colonisers.<sup>175</sup>

The second reason to stay within the region was the instability in Central Africa. This led to two trends: either to stay within West Africa or move further away, as far as South Africa, or Europe. The security developments in Central Africa also strengthened circular migration within West Africa. This meant that migrants moved in various successive stages from town to

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<sup>171</sup> IOM World Migration Report 2005. p. 27.

<sup>172</sup> ADEPOJU, Aderanti (2001): Regional Integration, Continuity and Changing Patterns of Intra-Regional Migration in Sub-Saharan Africa. in. SIDDIQUE, M.A.B. (ed.) International Migration into the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. 2001. Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, Nothampton. ISBN 1 84064 531 8 pp. 50-74. ps. 56-61.

<sup>173</sup> IOM World Migration Report 2000. [https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr\\_2000\\_edited\\_0.pdf](https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr_2000_edited_0.pdf)  
Downloaded: 30.05.2020. ps. 141-142. ; ADEPOJU (2001). p. 62.

<sup>174</sup> ADEPOJU (2001). ps. 62-64.

<sup>175</sup> IOM World Migration Report 2005. p. 37.

town to follow job opportunities. They eventually returned to their countries of origin for shorter or longer time periods. The majority, around 80 per cent of circular migration, was carried out in neighbouring countries, while 10 per cent remained intra-regional and 10 per cent took place worldwide. This type of migratory movement signalled the end of the clear distinction of the country categorisations. The lines between countries of origin, transit and destination started to become blurred with the practice of multiple subsequent movements.<sup>176</sup>

The changes in the West African patterns affected the North African region as well. In the early 2000s Maghreb states increasingly became countries of destination. Even in inter-continental migration, those who could not continue the journey to Europe chose North Africa as the second-best option, which became the place of permanent residence.<sup>177</sup> Libya was one of the main receiving countries in the region, mainly because of Gaddafi's pan-African migration policy, which welcomed sub-Saharan workers in Libya. This created a favourable environment for sub-Saharan nationals to remain in the country. By 2000, migrant stocks of sub-Saharan origins grew significantly in North African states, and among those who continued their journey to Europe. By 2004, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia accepted the role Europe gave them, and they passed migration laws which punish irregular migrants severely. Joint border patrols and deportations started. Besides the more visible changes in the above mentioned three countries, human rights violations against sub-Saharan nationals became regular, and xenophobia rose throughout North Africa. In addition to these problems, North African states were also reluctant to accept the fact that they became destination countries. But regardless of these developments, sub-Saharan migration was less undesirable than the policies suggest since a work force was needed both in the Maghreb and Europe.<sup>178</sup> But North Africa and Europe were far from being the most popular destination for West Africans.

In 2006 the estimated number of sub-Saharan migrants in both Mauritania and Algeria was 100,000, in Libya 1 to 1.5 million, in Egypt it ranged between 2.2 to 4 million, with several tens of thousands in Tunisia and Morocco. This growth induced changes in European and North African migration policies. It is important to point out that until 2005 mostly North African

<sup>176</sup> CHARRIÈRE, Florianne, FRÉSIA, Marion: L'Afrique de l'Ouest comme espace migratoire et espace de protection. <https://www.unhcr.org/fr-fr/4b151cb61d.pdf> Downloaded: 02.06.2020. ps. 12-14.

<sup>177</sup> TARRÓSY, István (2010): Afrikai migránsok a fejlett világban és Magyarországon. [African Migrants in the Developed World and Hungary] [https://www.academia.edu/1956710/Afrikai\\_migr%C3%A1nsok\\_a\\_fejlett\\_vil%C3%A1gban\\_%C3%A9s\\_Magyarorsz%C3%A1gon\\_Migr%C3%A1ci%C3%B3s\\_trendek\\_integr%C3%A1ci%C3%B3\\_tapasztalatok](https://www.academia.edu/1956710/Afrikai_migr%C3%A1nsok_a_fejlett_vil%C3%A1gban_%C3%A9s_Magyarorsz%C3%A1gon_Migr%C3%A1ci%C3%B3s_trendek_integr%C3%A1ci%C3%B3_tapasztalatok) Downloaded: 23.10.2016. p. 109.

<sup>178</sup> DE HAAS, Hein (2006): Trans-Saharan Migration to North Africa and the EU: Historical Roots and Current Trends. <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/trans-saharan-migration-north-africa-and-eu-historical-roots-and-current-trends> Downloaded: 06.05.2017.

nationals crossed the Mediterranean to reach countries in Europe. As the European countries came to the realisation that a growing proportion of arrivals were coming from sub-Saharan states, they intensified their border controls. This even included the attempt to externalise the border controls by pressuring North African states to discontinue their liberal migration policies. In addition, some Southern European states like Spain and Italy signed a readmission agreement with a collection of African countries.<sup>179</sup>

The time period from 2000 to 2006 was interesting not only because of the growing numbers of West African nationals crossing to Europe. Policies regarding security, more precisely border security, were affected also by the devastating terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001. The attacks resulted in stricter national security policies in high income countries.<sup>180</sup> However, there is little empirical evidence which shows us that the 9/11 terrorist attacks had a direct effect on the attitudes towards migration.<sup>181</sup> Nevertheless, countries in the North definitely tightened their border controls following the events.<sup>182</sup> Stricter border controls meant that migratory movements became more clandestine, and people started to use more risky methods and routes. With the parallel developments in the Maghreb and the increasing criminalisation of irregular migration, the costs of border crossings went up in the shape of higher bribes. This forced migrants to find secondary routes through the Sahara Desert to reach North Africa. While mortality rate of the sea crossing in the Mediterranean was estimated at around one per cent, the crossing of the desert is believed to be even more perilous.<sup>183</sup> From these early years we do not have any data to support this idea, but during the upcoming years more reliable data became available about this part of the migratory movements.<sup>184</sup>

The use of risky methods to get to North Africa, or further to Europe resulted in the increase of human trafficking in the region,<sup>185</sup> which reached a significant level by 2008.<sup>186</sup> But the real wake-up call for both European and African countries happened in 2005, when thousands of

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<sup>179</sup> DE HAAS, Hein (2006): *Trans-Saharan Migration to North Africa and the EU: Historical Roots and Current Trends*.

<sup>180</sup> IOM World Migration Report 2005. p. 205.

<sup>181</sup> SCHÜLLER, Simone: *The Effects of 9/11 on Attitudes Toward Immigration and the Moderating Role of Education*. (2012) <http://ftp.iza.org/dp7052.pdf> Downloaded: 30.05.2020. ; HELBLING, Marc, MEIERRIEKS, Daniel: *Terrorism and Migration: An Overview*. in *British Journal of Political Science* (2022), 52, 977–996 doi:10.1017/S0007123420000587 ps. 991-992.

<sup>182</sup> ADEPOJU (2001) p. 65.

<sup>183</sup> DE HAAS, Hein (2006).

<sup>184</sup> BLACK, Julia: “No one talks about what it’s really like” – risks faced by migrants in the Sahara Desert.

<https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/ch12-no-one-talks-about-what-its-really-like.pdf> Downloaded: 01.05.2022. and EHLER, Christian Ehler, VON MARTIUS Lea: *Long March for Europe*. (Verlag Dr. Köster, Berlin, 2016.) ISBN 978 3 89574 910 0

<sup>185</sup> ADEPOJU (2001) p. 65.

<sup>186</sup> UNODC: *Global Report on Trafficking in Persons*.

[https://www.unodc.org/documents/Global\\_Report\\_on\\_TIP.pdf](https://www.unodc.org/documents/Global_Report_on_TIP.pdf) Downloaded: 07.06.2020. p. 63.

African migrants attempted to cross the heavily guarded 3-meter-high barbed wire fences around the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla.<sup>187</sup> During the desperate attempt at least 13 sub-Saharan African nationals died,<sup>188</sup> and according to media reports more than a hundred were injured.<sup>189</sup> These events at the Spanish-Moroccan border directly led to the adoption of the Rabat Process in 2006.<sup>190</sup> The heavy fortification of the Spanish borders and the tightening and the externalisation of European border control resulted in the label of ‘Fortress Europe’<sup>191</sup> in the early 2000s.

### III.1.2 REGIONAL TRENDS BETWEEN 2007 AND 2015

The period from 2007 to 2015 was the most important one with regard to migration patterns. Multiple international events affected migratory movements worldwide. The economic crisis in 2008, the Arab Spring and related conflicts from 2011, the Russian annexation of the Crimea, and the following changes in power politics from 2014, and the Ebola outbreak in West Africa in 2015 are just the main events. The period is concluded with the events that led to the adoption of the *Valletta Action Plan* as the next important milestone regarding African–European joint migration policies.

Similarly, as in the period until 2006, data on migration, specifically on irregular migration is lacking, not verifiable or accurate.<sup>192</sup> Information regarding the figures in Africa is particularly poor, which makes it difficult to estimate migration trends on the continent.<sup>193</sup> The adoption of the Rabat Process did not improve data collection in West Africa either.

In 2010 the global migration stock was estimated at around 214 million, which still represented around 3.1 per cent of the world’s population. Only a growth of 0.1 per cent occurred since 2005 in the overall figure. The question of IDPs remained a huge issue, with 26 million people in this situation. The problem was especially acute in East Africa, because of the continuous crisis in Somalia and the conflict in Darfur among others.<sup>194</sup> The share of sub-

<sup>187</sup> O’CONNELL, Kevin John: Fortress Europe: Ceuta and Melilla.

[http://www.monitor.upeace.org/archive.cfm?id\\_article=315](http://www.monitor.upeace.org/archive.cfm?id_article=315) Downloaded: 07.06.2020.

<sup>188</sup> DE HAAS, Hein (2006).

<sup>189</sup> Spain/Morocco: Migrants shot dead at the border fence, Spain deploys army.

<https://www.statewatch.org/news/2005/oct/01spain-morocco.htm> Downloaded: 07.06.2020.

<sup>190</sup> A Decade of Dialogue on Migration and Development. p. 7.

<sup>191</sup> JÜNEMANN, Annette, FROMM, Nicolas, and SCHERER, Nikolas: Fortress Europe? Challenges and Failures of Migration and Asylum Policies. Wiesbaden: Springer Vs. Italian Presidency of the EU. 2014. Il Semestre di Presidenza Italiana del Consiglio dell’UE. Sintesi dei Risultati. Italian Presidency of the EU [http://italia2014.eu/media/4605/risultati-semester-presidenza\\_it2014eu.pdf](http://italia2014.eu/media/4605/risultati-semester-presidenza_it2014eu.pdf) Downloaded: 19.08.2021.

<sup>192</sup> IOM World Migration Report 2010. p. 31.

<sup>193</sup> IOM World Migration Report 2010. p. 127.

<sup>194</sup> IOM World Migration Report 2010. ps. 115-119.



Saharan Africa in the migration stock was around 19 million in 2010,<sup>195</sup> which grew to 23.9 million by 2015. To understand these numbers in context, they must be assessed related to the total population of sub-Saharan Africa. As the population of the continent is dynamically growing, the increase in the number of migrants did not mean an increase in the proportions. It remained below 3 per cent with respect to the population of sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>196</sup> While West Africa maintained its high mobility rate, 93.6 per cent of international migrants originating from the region remained in West Africa in 2015, only moving to neighbouring countries. Data shows that inter-regional migration from West Africa to other regions did not happen on a large scale. 5.4 per cent of migrants chose Central Africa, while only 0.6 per cent South Africa, and an even lower proportion, 0.4 per cent East Africa as a region of destination.<sup>197</sup>

The first significant event during the investigated period which had effects on migration patterns was the global financial crisis. The crisis started in 2008, but different regions of the world experienced its effects at various times. The severity of the impact differed from country to country. In West Africa the level of integration into the global economy was low despite the various initiatives to boost the connectedness of the region. Therefore, the effects of the crisis were not that devastating. Ghana and Nigeria were considered the most exposed countries to the crisis, mainly because of their reformed bank sectors, and the floating exchange rate of national currencies. Countries which used the CFA franc were safe because of the fixed exchange rate to euro. To some extent the low level of integration to the global economy protected West Africa from the direct negative effects of the financial crisis.<sup>198</sup> The indirect effects of the crisis, however, reached West Africa as well. First of all, the worldwide crisis did not allow migrants to use alternative opportunities to shift to different destination countries.<sup>199</sup> It is an established finding that the brain drain phenomenon intensifies during the times of financial crises.<sup>200</sup> Also during the 2008 financial crisis, return migration grew in the short term, while irregular migration figures dropped. However, dropping numbers can be misleading,

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<sup>195</sup> IOM World Migration Report 2010. p. 127.

<sup>196</sup> FLAHAUX, Marie-Laurence: Demystifying African Migration: Trends, Destinations and Returns. in. CARBONE, Giovanni (ed.): Out of Africa Why People Migrate. pp. 31-50.

[https://www.ispionline.it/sites/default/files/pubblicazioni/out\\_of\\_africa\\_web.pdf](https://www.ispionline.it/sites/default/files/pubblicazioni/out_of_africa_web.pdf) Downloaded: 04.12.2017. p. 34.

<sup>197</sup> MBERU, Blessing U., SIDZE, Estelle M.: The Hidden Side of the Story: Intra-African Migration. in. CARBONE, Giovanni (ed.): Out of Africa Why People Migrate. pp. 73-94.

[https://www.ispionline.it/sites/default/files/pubblicazioni/out\\_of\\_africa\\_web.pdf](https://www.ispionline.it/sites/default/files/pubblicazioni/out_of_africa_web.pdf) Downloaded: 04.12.2017. ps. 77-78.

<sup>198</sup> SECK, Diery: The Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on West African States.

[http://www.crepol.org/images/my\\_pdf/The\\_Impact\\_of\\_the\\_Global\\_Financial\\_Crisis\\_on\\_West\\_African\\_States.pdf](http://www.crepol.org/images/my_pdf/The_Impact_of_the_Global_Financial_Crisis_on_West_African_States.pdf) Downloaded: 11.06.2020. ps. 6-8.

<sup>199</sup> KOSER, Khalid (2009): The Impact of Financial Crises on International Migration: Lessons Learned.

[https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/mrs37\\_en.pdf](https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/mrs37_en.pdf) Downloaded: 11.06.2020. p. 9.

<sup>200</sup> KOSER (2009). p.14.

since migrants tend to overstay their visas and working permits during times of recession for fear of not being able to re-enter the country. Therefore, the migrant stock of a country does not change but the legal status of people does. This is the direct result of the changing migration policies. During the recession, with the growing unemployment rates protectionism and xenophobia increased. In receiving countries migration policies became stricter and border security tighter.<sup>201</sup> These actions also helped to strengthen the image of building a ‘Fortress Europe’. While West Africa, mainly because of its low level of integration to the global economy remained relatively untouched by the global financial crisis, migration from the region was affected by it. Migrants in Europe either returned to their countries of origin or went through a legal status change. The recruitment of skilled workers went on too, continuing the long-standing tradition of excessive brain drain from Africa. According to the cyclic assessment of migration and development created by de Haas, from 2001 policy debates were optimistic about migration.<sup>202</sup> In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis policy debate on migration and development swung back to the pessimistic side and remained there until 2021.

Besides the financial crisis, another disaster struck Africa in 2011. The Arab Spring unfolded in Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries and changed the dynamics of intra-African migration. The Southern Mediterranean countries were established destination countries, mainly because they are relatively rich and safe compared to their sub-Saharan neighbours. Libya stood out as a major destination country, followed by Egypt, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. Altogether these countries had approximately 4.5 million migrants. This migrant stock consisted of 3 main groups, migrant workers being the largest group, followed by the group of refugees and lastly transit migrants.<sup>203</sup> Libya alone hosted an estimated 1.3-1.8 million migrants when the Arab Spring started. When the hostilities swept over the Maghreb, Libya was in the spotlight of the EU’s attention. Gaddafi used migration as one of his most effective weapons to make deals with European countries preceding the spiral the Arab Spring. Thus, after his regime fell, Europe anticipated a massive increase in the migration flows from Libya to Europe.<sup>204</sup> Expectations were only partially fulfilled since an estimated 1 million

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<sup>201</sup> CASTLES, Stephen, VEZZOLI, Simona: The global economic crisis and migration: temporary interruption or structural change? in *Paradigmes*. Volume 2009, Issue 2.

[https://www.migrationinstitute.org/files/news/castles-and-vezzoli\\_the-global-economic-crisis-and-migration.pdf](https://www.migrationinstitute.org/files/news/castles-and-vezzoli_the-global-economic-crisis-and-migration.pdf)  
Downloaded: 11.06.2020. ps. 69-70.

<sup>202</sup> DE HAAS, Hein (2010a): Migration and Development: A Theoretical Perspective.

<sup>203</sup> FARGUES, Philippe, FANDRICH, Christine: Migration after the Arab Spring.  
<https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/23504/MPC-RR-2012-09.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>  
Downloaded: 11.06.2020. ps. 2-4.

<sup>204</sup> ABDELFAH, Dina: Impact of Arab revolts on Migration. <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/45680242.pdf>  
Downloaded: 11.06.2020. ps. 13-14.

migrants left the country up until 2012.<sup>205</sup> However, the pattern was unexpected. 0.5 million of these people went to Egypt and Tunisia, which practiced an open border policy during the deepening Libyan crisis.<sup>206</sup> But Algeria, Chad, Niger and Sudan also became destination countries for those who left Libya.<sup>207</sup> From the one million who fled Libya, only an estimated 45,000 people went to Italy and Malta.<sup>208</sup> The migration flows from Africa to Europe resulting from the Arab Spring did not see major alterations and previous trends continued. The events only rerouted existing flows, making Libya and Tunisia the main countries of departure for irregular migrants.<sup>209</sup> The intra-African trends suffered more changes as a result of the uprisings in the North. First of all, the number one destination country, Libya sank into anarchy, thus stopped being an appealing destination. Second, because of the aforementioned reasons, migration flows increased dramatically within a short time period from Libya to the neighbouring countries and further. The national authorities were not in control of the borders, the outflows were unrestricted, anybody could leave the country. It is an important detail since Gaddafi hired sub-Saharan mercenaries to suppress protesters, who could capitalise on the turmoil and leave the country undetected.<sup>210</sup> After Gaddafi's regime fell, these fighters fled the country, some of them returning home with weapons, and newly gained experience in combat. Therefore, a collateral crisis started to take shape in Mali with the help of these returning fighters. In Mali the Tuareg struggle for an independent state began in 2012, mostly with the participation of armed ex-combatants from Libya.<sup>211</sup> The insurgency started in January and led to the displacement of 400,000 people by September, when the conflict was still far from being settled.<sup>212</sup> The instability in the Sahel region deepened further when radical Islamist groups appeared in the Malian conflict and started to spread in the whole region. The most affected areas were Northern Mali, and Northern Nigeria.

In the meantime, Libya experienced ups and downs in its stability, becoming a destination country in 2012<sup>213</sup>, and sinking into a new wave of civil war in 2014. The effect of the renewed

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<sup>205</sup> FARGUES, FANDRICH. p. i.

<sup>206</sup> KOSER, Khaid (2012): Migration, Displacement and the Arab Spring: Lessons to Learn.

<https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/migration-displacement-and-the-arab-spring-lessons-to-learn/> Downloaded: 11.06.2020.

<sup>207</sup> ABDELFAHATTAH. p. 4.

<sup>208</sup> KOSER (2012).

<sup>209</sup> FARGUES, FANDRICH. p. 4.

<sup>210</sup> ABDELFAHATTAH. p. 5.

<sup>211</sup> DIARRA, Oumar: Insecurity and Instability in the Sahel Region: The Case of Mali.

<https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a561296.pdf> Downloaded: 12.08.2013. p. 4.

<sup>212</sup> IRISH, John: U.N. members divided over response to Mali crisis.

<http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/27/us-un-assembly-mali-idUSBRE88Q02H20120927> Downloaded: 23.09.2013.

<sup>213</sup> FARGUES, FANDRICH. p. 13.

hostilities and the persistent anarchy led to the increase in the migration figures on the Central Mediterranean route. 170,000 migrants arrived in Europe through Libya in 2014.<sup>214</sup> The trend continued in 2015 as well, with some 154,000 migrants using the Central Mediterranean route to reach Europe. The growing insecurity in West Africa and the ungoverned space in Libya provided a favourable environment for migrants to reach Europe. But main trends did not change even during this period, since the majority of African migration still remained within the continent.<sup>215</sup> The anarchy in Libya, as in 2011, just rerouted the existing flows, and made it easier to come to a decision on migration for those who were already thinking about it.<sup>216</sup>

From December 2013 an Ebola outbreak also disturbed the migration patterns in West Africa. The disease was first detected in Guinea and rapidly reached its capital, Conakry. After reaching a city with high population density, the disease spread faster and crossed international borders. The three most affected countries were Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. However, other countries in West Africa like Mali, Nigeria, and Senegal also registered cases. Moreover, countries from the EU and even the US had confirmed cases.<sup>217</sup> During the 2013-2016 outbreak the World Health Organisation (WHO) did not advise any travel restrictions, but African countries implemented various preventive measures. Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal closed their borders with their most affected neighbours, while Cameroon closed its borders with Nigeria, and Kenya stopped flying to Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone.<sup>218</sup> These preventive measures could somewhat interrupt the existing migration models within and from the region. Data shows that migration in 2015 was significantly less than in 2016 from the affected region of West Africa to Europe.<sup>219</sup> One of the possible reasons for it could be the Ebola outbreak.

The overall increased migration flow to Libya resulted in a higher number in the loss of life at sea. A boat with approximately 850 people on board sank near the Italian island Lampedusa

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<sup>214</sup> MARSAL, Viktor: A migrációs diskurzus margójára III. – A libiai válság az európai migráció tükrében. [To the margin of the migration discourse III. – The Libyan crisis in regards to European migration] in: Nemzet és Biztonság 2017. Issue 1. pp. 110–134. [http://www.nemzetesbiztonsag.hu/cikkek/nb\\_2017\\_1\\_11\\_marsai\\_viktor\\_-\\_a\\_migracios\\_diskurzus\\_margojara\\_ii-a\\_libiai\\_valsg\\_az\\_europai\\_migracio\\_tukreben.pdf](http://www.nemzetesbiztonsag.hu/cikkek/nb_2017_1_11_marsai_viktor_-_a_migracios_diskurzus_margojara_ii-a_libiai_valsg_az_europai_migracio_tukreben.pdf) Downloaded: 11.05.2018. p. 114.

<sup>215</sup> The Mediterranean and migration: Postcards from a 'crisis'. [https://www.ecfr.eu/specials/mapping\\_migration](https://www.ecfr.eu/specials/mapping_migration) Downloaded: 11.06.2020.

<sup>216</sup> Mixed Migration Trends in Libya Changing Dynamics and Protection Challenges. [https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/lby\\_mixed\\_migration\\_unhcr\\_altai\\_july2017.pdf](https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/lby_mixed_migration_unhcr_altai_july2017.pdf) Downloaded: 11.06.2020. p. 54.

<sup>217</sup> 2014-2016 Ebola Outbreak in West Africa. <https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/history/2014-2016-outbreak/index.html> Downloaded: 11.06.2020.

<sup>218</sup> Ebola Virus Disease 2013-2014 Outbreak in West Africa: An Analysis of the Epidemic Spread and Response. <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4380098/> Downloaded: 11.06.2020.

<sup>219</sup> VECSEY, Mariann (2019b): Changes in the Migration Trends from West Africa to Europe. in: Hungarian Defence Review, Vol. 147, No. 1-2, 2019. pp. 99-116. <https://kiadvany.magyarhonvedseg.hu/index.php/honvszemle/article/view/30/28> Downloaded: 16.12.2019. p. 112.

in April 2015, resulting in the deadliest crossing attempt on the Mediterranean.<sup>220</sup> This incident served as a wakeup call for the EU. In May *A European Agenda on Migration* was born, to respond to the unfolding migration crisis in a comprehensive manner.<sup>221</sup> To complement the solely European document, the EU and the AU adopted the Valletta Action Plan in November launching 16 initiatives with the aim of better migration management. The implementation of the Action Plan was to be monitored by the Rabat and Khartoum Processes as well as the *Joint Africa–EU Strategy* (JAES).<sup>222</sup>

### III.1.3 REGIONAL TRENDS FROM 2016

Until 2016 data on migration patterns in West Africa was lacking. This changed in that year when the IOM established Flow Monitoring Points (FMP) in the region for the better understanding of population movements. Notwithstanding the positive developments in available data, this period also has some significant events which influenced migration flows. Besides the mostly security related issues, demographical trends caused the most significant changes in migration. In 2016, migratory figures in the Central Mediterranean route peaked with more than 181,000 people arriving in Europe using it.<sup>223</sup> Since then a downward trend has been going on, which is partly the consequence of the political instability and the constant armed conflict in Libya. Despite the volatile situation in the country, in 2019 the estimated number of international migrant stock in Libya remained within the same range as it was in 2016, believed to be around 818,000.<sup>224</sup>

By 2019 the total migrant stock globally reached 272 million, which still made up of only 3.5 per cent of the population.<sup>225</sup> Although it seems a very small percentage of the global population, it is almost 100 million people, more than in 2000, and proportions grew from 2.9 to 3.5 per cent of the total population in the past 19 years. The global trend therefore shows a slow but steady increase in the internationally mobile people. Africa's share from the figure

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<sup>220</sup> BOND, Kate, SPINDLER, William: UNHCR welcomes EU Mediterranean plans, but says more needs to be done. <https://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2015/4/553623109/unhcr-welcomes-eu-mediterranean-plans-says-needs.html> Downloaded: 11.06.2020.

<sup>221</sup> European Commission: A European Agenda on Migration. COM(2015) 240 final. [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/communication\\_on\\_the\\_european\\_agenda\\_on\\_migration\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf) Downloaded: 02.04.2017. p. 2.

<sup>222</sup> Valletta Action Plan. [https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21839/action\\_plan\\_en.pdf](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21839/action_plan_en.pdf) Downloaded: 02.04.2017. p. 1.

<sup>223</sup> The Mediterranean and migration: Postcards from a 'crisis'.

<sup>224</sup> Migration Data Portal: Migration data in Northern Africa. <https://migrationdataportal.org/regional-data-overview/northern-africa> Downloaded: 11.06.2020.

<sup>225</sup> IOM World Migration Report 2020. [https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr\\_2020.pdf](https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr_2020.pdf) Downloaded: 01.06.2020. p. 2.

was over 21 million intra-continental and 19 million inter-continental migrants. This was around 2 per cent of the continent's total population, which went through a significant growth during the past two decades (Africa's total population reached 1.31 billion in 2019 with a 30 per cent growth since 2000).<sup>226</sup> Africans who live in another African country still outnumbered those who lived on a different continent, although the number of inter-continental migrants grew to almost 19 million. The main regions for inter-continental migration from Africa were Europe (10.6 million), Asia (4.6 million) and Northern America (3.2 million).<sup>227</sup> Migration within the continent also increased, with significant migration corridors. Out of the top 10 corridors in 2019, three were established between West African countries: from Burkina Faso to Côte d'Ivoire, from Côte d'Ivoire to Burkina Faso (as an excellent example of circular migration) and from Mali to Côte d'Ivoire.<sup>228</sup>

As a consequence of adopting the *Valletta Action Plan*, the amount of data on West African migration has grown since 2016. The Action Plan introduced the financial framework, the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF), which made possible the installation of Flow Monitoring Points (FMPs) in Africa with a specific focus on North Africa, the Sahel, the Lake Chad Region and the Horn of Africa.<sup>229</sup> This meant that by 2018, 35 FMPs were operating in West and Central Africa. Data collected by the FMPs shows that 95 per cent of those individuals who provided information stayed within the region or in the same country. The main destination countries of the movements were Niger, Mali, Senegal and Nigeria. Data collected between January 2017 and September 2018 shows that almost 0.5 million individuals claimed to be a Nigerien national, and some 560,000 foreign nationals identified the country as their destination. Within this scope, a little bit more than 122,000 people migrated in Niger internally. For Nigeriens the most popular destination country was Nigeria, with 252,000 migrants naming it as their destination. Another excellent example for circular migration is that the most popular destination for Nigerians is Niger. 287,000 migrants from the total 297,000 registered Nigerian migrants chose Niger to be their destination country. During this period half of Senegal's registered 288,000 migrants remained in the country, while for the others Guinea and Mali were the destination. With almost 222,000 registered migrants, Burkina Faso was also among the biggest countries of origin. The country is, however, the first one in the list with an insignificant amount of internal migration. Besides the already mentioned migration corridor to Côte d'Ivoire

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<sup>226</sup> IOM World Migration Report 2020. ps. 24-26.

<sup>227</sup> IOM World Migration Report 2020. p. 54.


<sup>228</sup> IOM World Migration Report 2020. p. 58.

<sup>229</sup> EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa. About. [https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/content/about\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/content/about_en)  
Downloaded: 11.06.2020.



(104,000 people), there was also a significant movement towards Niger (84,000) and to a lesser extent to Mali (28,000). The last country added is Mali, with its 214,000 registered migrants. Mali is the most interesting when it comes to the examination of destinations. Mainly because of its central location within the region, Malians named a wider variety of destination countries than other nationals. The main countries they named in the order of popularity from most to least, are Guinea, Senegal, Mali, Algeria, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Gambia, Niger, Benin and Nigeria. The total migrant stock in West and Central Africa was estimated around 7.5 million in 2019, with 2.2 million living in Côte d'Ivoire and at least 1.2 million in Nigeria.<sup>230</sup> Unfortunately, data collection is still not perfect, since these figures only represent those people who happened to encounter one of the FMPs and were willing to provide data. However, it is still important information to assess the dynamics of intraregional movements.

*1. Map: West African migration patterns based on IOM data collected on FMPs between January 2017 and September 2018. (Edited by the author)*



Inter-regional migration must also be assessed since it was disrupted by multiple events in the examined time period. First Libya, as the major country of destination in North Africa, sank

<sup>230</sup> Migration Flows in West and Central Africa, Overview 2017-2018. <https://migration.iom.int/data-stories/migration-flows-west-central-africa> Downloaded: 11.06.2020.

back again in turmoil. Despite international efforts, Libyan parties, the Government of National Accord (GNA) and General Khalifa Haftar, continued to fight for national power, but the Islamic State also appeared in the equation and had to be dealt with.<sup>231</sup> By that time, the number of international migrants still residing in the country was estimated between 700,000 and 1 million by the IOM.<sup>232</sup>

**EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia** also had an effect on migration in the Central Mediterranean. The operation was launched in June 2015 and the main objective was to disrupt the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks.<sup>233</sup> Since the operation had maritime assets patrolling in the Mediterranean (Italian territorial waters and high seas), it provided migrants from the South with a new opportunity. Regardless of the mandate and objectives of the mission, the participating ships were also obliged to fulfil the international maritime law. In this case it is particularly important, since one of the obligations is to provide assistance to those people who are in distress at sea.<sup>234</sup> In practice this led to the phenomenon that EUNAVFOR MED vessels together with NGOs were saving migrants' lives in the Mediterranean. To some extent this process also had an impact on the migration decision, since crossing the Mediterranean could be assessed as less dangerous with the rescue ships in place.

Notwithstanding, Italy, the frontline country on the Central Mediterranean route demanded more support from the EU to handle the incoming flows. Disembarkation became a problem for vessels in the Mediterranean with migrants on board. Rules started to become stricter in 2017 and peaked in March 2019 when the EUNAVFOR MED had to withdraw its naval assets, resulting again in a more dangerous environment for crossing the sea. The operation was renamed to **EUNAVFOR MED Operation Iriini** on 31<sup>st</sup> March 2020, and naval assets are sailing again in the Mediterranean. The changes with respect to this operation show that the EU became more and more divided on the question of migration. As a side-effect, the figures reached historical lows by 2020. The declining trend started in 2017, with some 118,000 crossing, and continued in the following years, with only 23,485 in 2018<sup>235</sup> and a mere 14,876 people crossing in 2019.<sup>236</sup> In 2020 the figures started to rise again, with 36,415 registered

<sup>231</sup> MARSAL, Viktor (2017). ps. 118-119.

<sup>232</sup> IOM Libya Brief. <https://www.iom.int/countries/libya> Downloaded: 11.06.2020.

<sup>233</sup> EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia Factsheet. <https://www.operationsophia.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Factsheet-about-Mission-EUNAVFOR-MED-Operation-SOPHIA-1.pdf> Downloaded: 11.06.2020. p. 1.

<sup>234</sup> Regulation 33 - Distress Situations: Obligations and procedures. <http://solasv.mcga.gov.uk/regulations/regulation33.htm> Downloaded: 28.06.2020.


<sup>235</sup> Migratory Routes, Central Mediterranean Route. <https://frontex.europa.eu/along-eu-borders/migratory-routes/central-mediterranean-route/> Downloaded: 11.06.2020.

<sup>236</sup> Arrivals of refugees and migrants to Europe in 2019. <https://erccportal.jrc.ec.europa.eu/getdailymp/docId/3192> Downloaded: 02.02.2020.



crossings throughout the year.<sup>237</sup> The trend continued in 2021 with 67,477 individuals using the Central route.<sup>238</sup>

2. Map: European Union, DG ECHO: Arrivals of refugees and migrants to Europe in 2021. [https://ercportal.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ERCMapsThumbs/20220216\\_DM\\_Europe\\_migration.png](https://ercportal.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ERCMapsThumbs/20220216_DM_Europe_migration.png) Downloaded: 08.05.2022.



In 2020 another restricting element occurred. The COVID-19 global pandemic officially reached Africa on 14 February 2020 and the first case was recorded in Egypt. The next infected person was reported from Nigeria and since then the number of registered cases grew dramatically.<sup>239</sup> The number of confirmed COVID-19 cases in Africa reached 382,354 up to the end of June, out of which 73,381 cases were registered in the ECOWAS countries.<sup>240</sup> The appearance of the virus in Africa triggered different actions to prevent the rapid spread of the infection. This included travel restrictions (cancelling direct flights to and from China, ceasing visa activity, and issuing national travel documents), the closure of schools, prohibiting visits

<sup>237</sup> Arrivals of refugees and migrants to Europe in 2020.

<https://ercportal.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ECHOProducts/Maps#/maps/3582> Downloaded: 04.11. 2021.

<sup>238</sup> Migratory Map. [https://ercportal.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ERCMapsThumbs/20220216\\_DM\\_Europe\\_migration.png](https://ercportal.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ERCMapsThumbs/20220216_DM_Europe_migration.png) Downloaded: 08.05. 2022.

<sup>239</sup> TARRÓSY, István (2020): Africa in the Grip of the COVID-19 Pandemic. in KKI Elemzések, E-2020/47. [http://real.mtak.hu/108664/1/47\\_KKI-elemzes\\_Africa\\_Tarrosy\\_20200508.pdf](http://real.mtak.hu/108664/1/47_KKI-elemzes_Africa_Tarrosy_20200508.pdf) Downloaded: 28.06.2020. p. 4.

<sup>240</sup> Coronavirus in Africa Tracker: How many covid-19 cases & where? <https://africanarguments.org/2020/06/29/coronavirus-in-africa-tracker-how-many-cases-and-where-latest/> Downloaded: 30.06.2020.

to mosques and churches for mass prayers. Algeria closed its borders, and Morocco and Libya introduced a curfew.<sup>241</sup> With these restrictions, it is quite logical that figures were dropping.

### **III.2 MIGRATION POLICIES AND STRATEGIES OF THE AFRICAN ORGANISATIONS**

This chapter introduces the migration policy framework relevant to West Africa, because it provides the legal environment in which irregular migration happens. Hence, I will close this chapter by analysing the migration trends in West Africa. For this I mainly used IOM reports, since these provide the most detailed information.

To be able to propose effective answers to a problem, the comprehensive knowledge of that specific topic is needed. This chapter therefore is dedicated to the better understanding of migration in West Africa, and the policies and strategies of the primary institutional partners of the EU on the continent and the region.

First, the strategies and policies of the African Union and its predecessor organisation will be discussed. This is needed because the EU widely cooperates with the AU in different policy areas including migration. Studying the African approach to the phenomenon was especially relevant, since it extensively influences the attitude towards EU initiatives to handle migration.<sup>242</sup>

After discussing the AU policies, the chapter continues with ECOWAS policies. This organisation is a subordinate organisation of the AU, which means that its ideas are supposed to be harmonised with the overarching policy framework of the continental organisation. But the ECOWAS also has its own ideas about managing migration in the region. Thus, the introduction of the ECOWAS is also needed to have a clear view on the policies and strategies which affect migration in West Africa.

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<sup>241</sup> BESENYŐ, János, KÁRMÁN Marianna: COVID-19 Pandemic on the African Continent, *Safety and Security Sciences Review* 2020. Vol. 2. Issue 2. pp. 39-56. <https://biztonsagtudomanyi.szemle.uni-obuda.hu/index.php/home/article/view/64/59> Downloaded: 28.06.2020. ps. 43-48

<sup>242</sup> Interview with Guy-Michel Bolouvi. Niger – A Crossroads of African Migration Networks in: TREMOLIÉRES, Marie (ed.): *Regional Challenges of West African Migration African and European Perspectives* [https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/regional-challenges-of-west-african-migration\\_9789264056015-en#page1](https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/regional-challenges-of-west-african-migration_9789264056015-en#page1) DOI:<https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264056015-en> Downloaded: 26.10.2019.

### III.2.1 AFRICAN UNION POLICIES<sup>243</sup>

The predecessor of the AU and the first continental organisation in Africa, was established in 1963 under the name of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Its membership consisted of the then independent African states and grew in parallel with the de-colonisation of the continent. The OAU was constructed as an organisation of sovereign states, without the ambition of being a supranational organisation. While the OAU was keen to follow the policy of non-interference in internal affairs,<sup>244</sup> its main aim was to achieve the de-colonisation of the entire African continent.<sup>245</sup> The OAU Charter therefore does not deal with the topics of migration and the situation of refugees.

In 1965, however, the organisation accepted a declaration in Accra which discusses indirectly the question of refugees. The *Declaration on the Problem of Subversion* includes the statement of dealing with political refugees according to the principles of international law. Though the document is mostly dealing with subversive activities originating from out of Africa against a Member State or from Member State to Member State, it also emphasises the possibility of the return of political refugees to the countries of origin, which must happen on a voluntary basis. The last, 8<sup>th</sup> paragraph of the declaration includes an interesting detail: it encourages the guarantee of the safety of political refugees from non-independent African territories, and it bids to support these refugees in their struggle for independence.<sup>246</sup> The declaration was made against subversion, when it is against an OAU Member State, but it treats liberation movements differently. The declaration, however, does not deal with migration in an extensive manner.

When the Portuguese Colonial War was underway between 1961 and 1974 in Angola, Bissau Guinea and Mozambique,<sup>247</sup> it probably influenced forced migration flows to such a scale towards neighbouring countries, that the need increased to formulate an African refugee agreement. The *Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa* of 1969 includes the principles of the 1951 Geneva Convention and the 1967 Protocol, and

<sup>243</sup> Based on the research of VECSEY, Mariann: Afrika migrációs politikájának alakulása I. Fókuszban: Nyugat-Afrika. [Migration Policy Development in Africa I. In the Focus: West Africa] in. Honvédségi Szemle, Volume 148. Issue 4. 2020. ISSN 2060-1506. pp. 92-107.

<sup>244</sup> BÚR, Gábor: Ötven éve alakult meg az Afrikai Egységszervezet (Organization of African Unity: est. fifty years ago) [http://www.afrikatanulmanyok.hu/application/essay/1060\\_1.pdf](http://www.afrikatanulmanyok.hu/application/essay/1060_1.pdf) Downloaded: 06.05. 2020. p. 2.

<sup>245</sup> OAU Charter. [https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7759-file-oau\\_charter\\_1963.pdf](https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7759-file-oau_charter_1963.pdf) Downloaded: 07.12.2019. p. 3.

<sup>246</sup> Declaration on the Problem of Subversion. <https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/ahg-res-27-ii-en.pdf> Downloaded: 07.12.2019.

<sup>247</sup> CANN, John P.: Counterinsurgency in Africa: The Portuguese Way of War 1961-1974. Helion and Company, Soilhull, 2012. p. 22.

establishes them as the fundamental, universal instruments to address refugee related questions. The African convention on refugees also integrated the definitions created by these earlier documents. However, besides following the path appointed by international law, this African convention also has an interesting remark about subversion. It is stated in the preamble of the document that a distinction must be made between those who flee to seek normal life in another country, and those who just leave their country of origin to lead subversion activities from outside.<sup>248</sup> Since further elaboration did not occur in the document about how to make the distinction between the two categories, this phrase gives opportunity to abuse ethnic groups or political opposition. Besides this dangerous ambiguity, however, the convention in general encourages to solve the African problems in the spirit of the Charter of the OAU. This indicates that the African countries continued to think in a unified continental framework about addressing transnational phenomena. In addition to this, the convention also looks beyond the continental scope. It seeks help from existing international bodies, mainly by emphasising the close and continuous collaboration with the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

Thus, the OAU convention from 1969 was a modern document of the period, which is in line with international law and continued to seek uniformity within the African continent. Before the transformation of the organisation to become the African Union, there is only one additional document to examine in connection to migration. In 1991, when the African Economic Community was created with the signature of the Abuja Treaty, the partaking countries also committed themselves to creating the *Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Right of Establishment*. Then, the guarantee of the free movement of persons was considered as a fundamental element of regional integration. Both the selection of the name as the African Economic Community, and the protocol on the free movement of persons show strong resemblance with the European integration process and such initiatives as the Schengen process. This latter had a significant influence on African initiatives.<sup>249</sup> The European impact can be the result of the fact that the European Community was Africa's biggest donor, and was willing to finance projects and political initiatives, which coincided with the

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<sup>248</sup> Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa.

[https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36400-treaty-0005 -](https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36400-treaty-0005_-_oau_convention_governing_the_specific_aspects_of_refugee_problems_in_africa_e.pdf)

[\\_oau\\_convention\\_governing\\_the\\_specific\\_aspects\\_of\\_refugee\\_problems\\_in\\_africa\\_e.pdf](https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36400-treaty-0005_-_oau_convention_governing_the_specific_aspects_of_refugee_problems_in_africa_e.pdf) Downloaded: 05.06.2019, ps. 1-2.

<sup>249</sup> The African Union was modelled after the European Union by its founding fathers. BABARINDE, Olufemi: The EU as a Model for the African Union: The Limits of Imitation. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series, Vol. 7, No. 2, April 2007. <http://aei.pitt.edu/8185/1/BabarindeEUasModellong07edi.pdf> Downloaded: 15.03.2020, p. 8.

European visions. However, this possibility highly likely took its toll on the local implementation aspect, as well as on the level of local ownership.<sup>250</sup>

The recommendations for the *Strategic Framework for Migration Policies* were proposed in 1995 by the Heads of States and Governments in the Seminar on Intra-African Migration, held in Cairo. These were accepted on the 19th Ordinary Session of the OAU Labour Commission in 1996. These recommendations include the regional approach of addressing questions related to migration; a need for consultation with every relevant partner regarding the handling of intra-African migration (including origin, transit and destination countries); an increased need to establish a database in which data can be collected on Member State level regarding information and statistics of labour migration; and a promise, that the OAU is willing to cooperate closely with RECs to enhance and achieve deeper economic integration.<sup>251</sup>

The transformation of the OAU took place with strong European influence in 2000. Upon accepting the new Constitutive Act in Togo, which came into force in May 2001, the African Union emerged.<sup>252</sup> Following the transformation, migration - as a question which needs further coordination - can be found in the Constitutive Act. Article 13 established that “*nationality, residency and immigration matters*”, among other topics, are coordinated by the Executive Council, as it is a common interest of the Member States. Furthermore, Article 14 creates the Committee on Trade, Customs and Immigration Matters.<sup>253</sup> Thus, the AU, right from the moment of its formation addressed the question of migration. This is also clear because the creation of the Strategic Framework for Migration Policies started in 2001, making use of the recommendations of 1996. The *Strategic Framework for Migration Policies* was adopted in 2006. It encouraged the Member States, among other things to:

- *“improve inter-sectoral coordination by establishing a central body to manage migration, using the Strategic Framework for Migration Policies as a guideline;*
- *introduce due process measures, including legal frameworks, to fight illegal migration and to punish those guilty of smuggling or trafficking;*
- *establish appropriate mechanisms to enable national focal points to exchange information regularly in order to develop a common vision;*

<sup>250</sup> KLAVERT, Henrike: African Union frameworks for migration: current issues and questions for the future. ECDPM, No. 108, June 2011. <https://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/DP-108-African-Union-Frameworks-Migration-Issues-Questions-Future-2011.pdf> Downloaded: 06.12.2019. ps. 1-2.

<sup>251</sup> The Migration Policy Framework for Africa.

[http://www.fasngo.org/assets/files/resources/EXCL276\\_IX\\_Strategic\\_Framework\\_for\\_Policy\\_Migration.pdf](http://www.fasngo.org/assets/files/resources/EXCL276_IX_Strategic_Framework_for_Policy_Migration.pdf) Downloaded: 07.12.2019. p. 5.

<sup>252</sup> BABARINDE 2007 p. 6.

<sup>253</sup> Constitutive Act of the African Union. [https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34873-file-constitutiveact\\_en.pdf](https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34873-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf) Downloaded: 07.12.2019. ps. 11-12.

- *encourage diaspora input in trade and investment, for the development of countries of origin; and*
- *coordinate research on migration and development to provide current and reliable information on migration.*<sup>254</sup>

Although the policy framework was created because of the increasing migration pressure according to the preamble of the document, and therefore it is definitely filling a hiatus, its implementation remains a question. Basically, the document is a collection of recommendations, which provide guidance for the RECs and Member States, but it is not legally binding in nature. The AU, most importantly, expects the development of national regulations from the Member States through this policy framework. It also wishes to rely on the regional organisations and integration initiatives in formulating the continental policy on migration, as was recommended in 1996 by the OAU Labour Commission. It is remarkable that border management, irregular migration, the matter of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) are all listed among the nine priority areas to be regulated.<sup>255</sup>

After the Africa–EU Conference on Migration and Development in Libya, the creation of an *African common position on migration and development* also took place in 2006. It is important to note that the first and probably the most important of the 11 priority areas is the assessment of migration as an instrument for development. Besides this the document drew a fundamentally positive image about migration, emphasising the advantages of labour migration and the effects of remittances in developing countries. There was only one aspect of migration which quite understandably was regarded as negative, the phenomenon of ‘brain drain’. This was listed in second place, which signifies its importance in the African thinking.<sup>256</sup>

The next important milestone in the line of African migration policies is the creation of the *Kampala Convention* in 2009. This is a unique, ground-breaking document which deals with IDPs. This is the first ever legally binding document created on this topic. The convention discusses the details of the protection and assistance of IDPs in Africa in a comprehensive manner. It does not just list state responsibilities toward IDPs, like respect for human rights, and fulfilling obligations under international law. It also highlights that state actors have to ensure the accountability of non-state actors, like multinational companies or security contractors. This is an important obligation, because non-state actors can have an effect on local

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<sup>254</sup> ADEPOJU, Aderanti (2008): Migration in sub-Saharan Africa. In Current African Issues, No. 37., The Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, 2008. ISSN 0280 2171 p. 9.

<sup>255</sup> The Migration Policy Framework for Africa, ps. 15-27.

<sup>256</sup> KLAVERT 2011. p. 5.



livelihoods to such an extent that it can lead to migration. Also, the Kampala Convention introduces a revolutionary idea in treating IDPs: its aim is to promote self-reliance and sustainable livelihoods.<sup>257</sup> In 2016 the original Ugandan protection policy became the element of a global framework, the UN forged *New York Declaration* and the *Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework*.<sup>258</sup> The Kampala Convention also established a monitoring process to follow the implementation of the objectives in the partaking countries.<sup>259</sup> The convention was needed because the AU realised that intra-African migration was increasing significantly, and uncontrolled migration has tremendous risks. Besides this, Member States also realised that guaranteeing the free movement of persons is an important element of African integration and regional cooperation.<sup>260</sup>

The free movement of persons and the creation of a protocol about it was a long-planned project by the OAU and later by the AU. Finally, in 2018, the *Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Right of Establishment* was created as it was pledged in the Abuja Treaty in 1991.<sup>261</sup> The reason for the slowness in creating this protocol was mainly because of the large number of countries involved in the policy making. In case of the AU, policy making has to be based on the consensus of 54 countries, double the EU membership. The protocol was made to promote continental integration and the idea of Pan-Africanism.<sup>262</sup> The Protocol established one visa free area on the entire African continent, where it is possible for international travellers to have one valid travel document which is accepted by the authorities of all Member States.<sup>263</sup> With this move, it is even more obvious that the AU chose the EU as a role model.

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<sup>257</sup> African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention.) [https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36846-treaty-0039\\_-\\_kampala\\_convention\\_african\\_union\\_convention\\_for\\_the\\_protection\\_and\\_assistance\\_of\\_internally\\_displaced\\_persons\\_in\\_africa\\_e.pdf](https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36846-treaty-0039_-_kampala_convention_african_union_convention_for_the_protection_and_assistance_of_internally_displaced_persons_in_africa_e.pdf) Downloaded: 08.02.2020. ps. 4-5.

<sup>258</sup> Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework, Uganda. [http://www.globalcrrf.org/crrf\\_country/uga/](http://www.globalcrrf.org/crrf_country/uga/) Downloaded: 07.08.2018.

<sup>259</sup> African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention.) p. 15.

<sup>260</sup> The Migration Policy Framework for Africa, p. 4.

<sup>261</sup> Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to Free Movement of Persons. Right of Residence and Right of Establishment. [https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36403-treaty-protocol\\_on\\_free\\_movement\\_of\\_persons\\_in\\_africa\\_e.pdf](https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36403-treaty-protocol_on_free_movement_of_persons_in_africa_e.pdf) Downloaded: 26.09.2019. p. 3.

<sup>262</sup> "Pan-Africanism may be described as a politico-cultural phenomenon which in its early stages regarded Africa, Africans and persons of African extraction as a unit. It has consistently aimed at the regeneration and uplift of Africa and the promotion of a feeling of unity among Africans in general. It also glories in the African past and inculcates pride in African culture. ESEDEBE, Peter Olisanwuche: Origins and Meaning of Pan-Africanism. in *Présence Africaine*, Vol. 73. pp. 109–127. 1970. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24348769> Downloaded: 01.05.2022. p. 127.

<sup>263</sup> Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to Free Movement of Persons. Right of Residence and Right of Establishment. p. 3.

### III.2.2 EU–AFRICA JOINT POLICIES

This subchapter is dedicated to introducing EU-Africa joint policies, which were formulated with the inclusion of the two parties. EU policies and strategies regarding Africa are discussed in the next chapter.

Besides the independent AU policies, a growing number of EU–Africa joint documents were born preceding the migration influx in 2015. The first of these was the *Cairo Declaration*, which established the strategic partnership between the EU and the OAU. The *Cairo Action Plan* was a complementary document to the Declaration in 2000.<sup>264</sup> The action plan includes multiple topics. Migration, refugees and IDPs are covered under title IV Human Rights, Democratic Principles and Institutions, Good Governance and the Rule of Law. In this section the parties agree to:

- *“Support, as appropriate, African countries in ensuring free intra-African mobility of labour and migration in the spirit of the Abuja Treaty.*
- *Collaborate in addressing the root causes of migration and asylum-seeking in source, transit and recipient countries.*
- *Collaborate further in the issue of the reciprocal integration of migrants, migrant rights and re-admission agreements between the European and African countries.*
- *Recognise the need for measures to combat racism and xenophobia and to secure the respect of the dignity and protection of the migrants’ rights, to which they are entitled, under applicable international law, notably the right to fair treatment based on the principle of non-discrimination.*
- *Fully implement all relevant conventions [regarding to refugees and internally displaced persons].*
- *Co-operate closely for the eradication of the root causes of refugees and displaced persons.*
- *Continue to provide assistance to refugees and displaced persons and to participate in their voluntary return and in their reintegration in conformity with international law and relevant UN conventions.*

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<sup>264</sup> ABEBE, Tsion Tadesse: Migration policy frameworks in Africa. Institute for Security Studies, 2017, 13. <https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/ar2.pdf> Downloaded: 11.11.2019. p.13.



- *Support efforts by international and national bodies and actors in order to ensure the safeguarding of the civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps and settlements.*<sup>265</sup>

The main lines of the strategic partnership were established by this declaration in 2000, followed by consecutive summits.

One of the results of the new cooperation framework is the *Ouagadougou Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings, Especially Women and Children*. It was drafted in 2002, on the second ministerial troika meeting of the EU–AU format.<sup>266</sup> The Action Plan emphasises the prevention of human trafficking, highlighting education and raising awareness as a key measure. But it also discusses the steps to be taken by states to protect victims, in particular avoiding their criminalisation. In accordance with this, the Action Plan provides guidelines on the legislative framework to precisely define all human trafficking activities in national law, and therefore make them punishable.<sup>267</sup> The document was adopted in 2006.<sup>268</sup>

In addition to the Ouagadougou Action Plan, two more important joint documents were accepted in 2006. The first is the *The Euro–African Dialogue on Migration and Development* (Rabat Process). The Rabat Process is a non-binding cooperation framework which was initiated by four countries: France, Morocco, Senegal and Spain. The need to establish a migration management cooperation emerged from the realisation that handling the increased migration in the West Mediterranean route, through the Straits of Gibraltar and the Canary Islands is not only the responsibility of Morocco and Spain. Therefore, the Rabat Process links countries from Europe and Northern, West and Central Africa and provides a platform to discuss questions on migration and development, with responses to irregular migration in focus.<sup>269</sup>, <sup>270</sup> The cooperation framework has three levels of meetings which represent the political, technical and operational dimensions of the Rabat Process. The highest level of the dialogue is the Euro-African Ministerial Conference, which adopts the multi-annual cooperation programme. The Senior Officials' Meetings (SOM) are generally held prior to the

<sup>265</sup> Cairo Declaration and Cairo Plan of Action. <https://unctad.org/en/Docs/tb24d2.en.pdf> Downloaded: 09.05.2020. ps. 26-27.

<sup>266</sup> Trafficking in Human Beings, Especially Women and Children, in Africa. <https://www.unicef-irc.org/publications/pdf/trafficking-gb2ed-2005.pdf> Downloaded: 09.05.2020. p. 28.

<sup>267</sup> Ouagadougou Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings, Especially Women and Children. [https://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/sites/antitrafficking/files/ouagadougou\\_action\\_plan\\_to\\_combat\\_trafficking\\_en\\_1.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/sites/antitrafficking/files/ouagadougou_action_plan_to_combat_trafficking_en_1.pdf) Downloaded: 09.05.2020. ps. 3-5.

<sup>268</sup> KLAVERT 2011. p. 8.

<sup>269</sup> Rabat Process. <https://www.icmpd.org/our-work/migration-dialogues/rabat-process/> Downloaded: 09.05.2020.

<sup>270</sup> Euro-African Dialogue on Migration and Development (Rabat Process). <https://www.iom.int/euro-african-dialogue-migration-and-development-rabat-process> Downloaded: 09.05.2020.


Ministerial Conference, since this level discusses the strategic priorities in detail. However, SOM can be organised to address an important topic. Finally, there are Thematic Meetings, which discuss specific topics of the multi-annual strategic framework.<sup>271</sup>

The Rabat Process implemented a new, unconventional approach. The approach is original because it links countries of destination, transit and origin together along the West African migration route. It is clear why it is called the “migration route” approach. It does not just regionalise the cooperation on migration, but also breaks with the earlier practice of clear categorisation of countries. This means that countries along specific routes are handled together, as a migration complex, regardless of their role in the migration process. The reasoning behind this is that the migration process became so complex that there is no clear distinction between countries of destination, transit and origin anymore. The migration route approach makes it possible to coordinate migration management along one specific route, which has a greater impact on the migration flows than individual country responses.<sup>272</sup>

The Rabat Process has five guiding principles which are working dialogue, a flexible and balanced approach, a coherent dialogue, committed partners and shared responsibility. These

principles mean that the dialogue is action oriented, intended in order to keep balance among the pillars, the framework is to guarantee the consistency of national and international policies, and states have to ensure the active participation of every partner in the implementation of the actions.<sup>273</sup> The strategic priorities (thematic pillars) of

*1. Figure: The four thematic pillars of the Rabat Process. (Edited by the author)*



of the Rabat Process evolved throughout the years since its establishment. First of all, they follow an EU inspired global approach on migration. This global approach is represented by the above-

<sup>271</sup> The Rabat Process. <https://www.rabat-process.org/en/about/rabat-process/333-rabat-process> Downloaded: 09.05.2020.

<sup>272</sup> A Decade of Dialogue on Migration and Development. [https://www.rabat-process.org/images/RabatProcess/Documents/10-years-Rabat-Process-anniversary-publication-2015\\_web.pdf](https://www.rabat-process.org/images/RabatProcess/Documents/10-years-Rabat-Process-anniversary-publication-2015_web.pdf) Downloaded: 09.05.2020. p.19.

<sup>273</sup> Rabat Process. <https://www.icmpd.org/our-work/migration-dialogues/rabat-process/>

mentioned thematic pillars. The first pillar which was established is migration and development. However, irregular migration and border management were considered as the most important pillars in the Rabat Process. In 2008 the topic of legal migration was also added to the cooperation framework. The *Rome Programme* in 2014, added a fourth pillar to the Rabat Process, which was on international protection.<sup>274</sup> The current structure of the dialogue was formed in 2018, with the adoption of the *Marrakesh Action Plan*. Now, the stakeholders are engaged in five domains:

- “*Development benefits of migration / Root causes of irregular migration & forced displacement;*
- *Legal migration and mobility;*
- *Protection and asylum;*
- *Irregular migration, migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings (THB);*
- *Return, readmission and reintegration.*”<sup>275</sup>

These five domains stem from the thematic pillars, and together they represent a comprehensive approach towards migration. But the Rabat Process is only a regional framework organised along the West African migration route. Thus, the EU pushed for a continental cooperation, which came to life also in 2006. The *Joint Africa–EU Declaration on Migration and Development (Tripoli Process)* was adopted in the framework of Africa–EU Strategic Partnership. The Tripoli Process was discussed at a ministerial meeting preceding the 2<sup>nd</sup> summit in Lisbon. However, it was forged within Africa–EU Strategic Partnership and it also pledged to implement the Rabat Process. Thus, the process cannot be considered as an entirely new framework, especially because it also adopted the migration route approach. The Tripoli Process recognised that the root causes of migration are manifold, thus it must be addressed in an integrated, comprehensive and holistic manner. It is also acknowledged that the majority of migration stays within Africa, and well managed migration can fuel development on the otherwise underdeveloped continent. The main problem to address was identified as the high rate of unemployment and lack of economic opportunities for the youth. An earlier raised problem also showed up in the document, which is the need to put a halt on developed countries’ selective migration approaches, which leads to the brain drain or cherry-picking phenomenon. Unfortunately, there is a phrase in the document, which can serve as a loophole to the continuation of selective practices. It recommends the discussion of simplified procedures for

<sup>274</sup> A Decade of Dialogue on Migration and Development. p.17.

<sup>275</sup> The Rabat Process, Committed Partners, Concrete Actions. [https://www.rabat-process.org/images/documents/EN-Rabat-Process\\_-Brochure\\_2018-web.pdf](https://www.rabat-process.org/images/documents/EN-Rabat-Process_-Brochure_2018-web.pdf) Downloaded: 09.05.2020. p. 6.

specific categories of people to make the migration process smoother. The Tripoli Process also aims to use the RECs as the primary partners for cooperation to reduce poverty and enhance development.<sup>276</sup>

At the 2<sup>nd</sup> EU–Africa Summit in Lisbon in 2007, the Tripoli Process was taken even further with the adoption of the *Joint Africa–EU Partnership on Migration, Mobility, and Employment* (MME).<sup>277</sup> The added value of the MME is that it brought the dialogue on migration and development to a continental level<sup>278</sup> and introduced an altered conceptual approach to handling migration. The MME distanced itself from using an exclusively security perspective and introduced a broader context in which migration and development must be understood.<sup>279</sup> The MME is the key element of the *Joint Africa–EU Strategy*, which was also adopted at the EU–Africa Summit in 2007.<sup>280</sup>

The three main objectives of the MME are to implement the Tripoli Process, the earlier discussed *Ouagadougou Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings, Especially Women and Children* and the 2004 *Ouagadougou Declaration and Action Plan on Employment and Poverty Alleviation in Africa*.<sup>281</sup> Despite the very willing rhetoric and the ambitious framework, in its first three years of operation the implementation of the MME was not a success. Until 2010 political dialogue dominated the partnership. This shows the difficulties of synchronising the colliding interests of Africa and Europe on migration related topics.<sup>282</sup> The second Action Plan, while it fine-tuned the MME, kept the balanced and comprehensive policy concept to address migration mobility and employment. The three main objectives remained the same, and a couple of specific actions and initiatives were added. However, the implementation remained on a low level.<sup>283</sup> From 2014 the JAES, and the MME within, was

<sup>276</sup> Joint Africa-EU Declaration on Migration and Development. [https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/32899-file-4\\_the\\_joint\\_africa\\_eu\\_declaration\\_on-migration\\_and\\_development\\_2006.pdf](https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/32899-file-4_the_joint_africa_eu_declaration_on-migration_and_development_2006.pdf) Downloaded: 14.05.2020. ps. 2-9.

<sup>277</sup> Africa-EU Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment (MME). <https://www.iom.int/africa-eu-partnership-migration-mobility-and-employment-mme> Downloaded: 14.05.2020.

<sup>278</sup> Africa. <https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/international-affairs/africa> Downloaded: 09.05.2020.

<sup>279</sup> MANGALA, Jack: Africa-EU Partnership on Migration, Mobility, and Employment. in. MANGALA, Jack (ed.): *Africa and the European Union A Strategic Partnership*. 2013. New York, Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 978-1-349-44395-6. DOI 10.1057/9781137269478. ps. 195-196.

<sup>280</sup> MME - The Africa-EU Partnership on Migration, Mobility & Employment. [http://migration.commission.ge/index.php?article\\_id=254&clang=1](http://migration.commission.ge/index.php?article_id=254&clang=1) Downloaded: 14.05.2020.

<sup>281</sup> JAES Action Plan 2011–2013 Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment. <https://europafira.files.wordpress.com/2010/12/partnership-on-migration-mobility-and-employment.pdf> Downloaded: 14.05.2020. p. 1.

<sup>282</sup> KLAVERT. 2011. ps. 16-17.

<sup>283</sup> MANGALA. ps. 212-214.

governed by Roadmaps, which are essentially laying out the priority areas which must be addressed.<sup>284</sup>

In 2014 the EU–Africa cooperation on migration was supplemented with the *EU–Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative* (Khartoum Process). After the Rabat Process covering North, West and Central Africa, the Khartoum Process brought the Eastern Sahel region and the Horn of Africa into a dialogue with the EU. The initiative, which brings together 40 African and European countries,<sup>285</sup> also uses the migration route approach. The thematic scope of the Khartoum Process is to prevent migrant smuggling and human trafficking along the migration route from the Horn of Africa to Europe.<sup>286</sup> After the Valletta Summit of 2015 on migration, the Khartoum Process, together with the Rabat Process, are responsible for monitoring the Valletta Action Plan. With this task, both processes had to include the five priority areas set out by the Action Plan. These are:

- *“address the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement,*
- *enhance cooperation on legal migration and mobility,*
- *reinforce the protection of migrants and asylum seekers,*
- *prevent and fight irregular migration, migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings,*
- *work more closely to improve cooperation on return, readmission and reintegration.”*<sup>287</sup>

The Khartoum and Rabat Processes, together with the MME, are also integral parts of the EU’s Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, which I address in Chapter III.

### III.2.3 ECOWAS POLICIES<sup>288</sup>

The OAU envisioned a faster pace of development in Africa through regional integration. Thus, the organisation, and later on its successor, the AU, promoted the establishment of regional communities throughout the continent. Despite the general support from the AU, only

<sup>284</sup> PIROZZI, Nicoletta, SARTORI, Nicoló, VENTURI, Bernardo: The Joint Africa-EU Strategy. [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/603849/EXPO\\_STU\(2017\)603849\\_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/603849/EXPO_STU(2017)603849_EN.pdf) Downloaded: 09.05.2020. p. 11.

<sup>285</sup> EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative (Khartoum Process). <https://gfmf.org/pfp/ppd/5682> Downloaded: 14.05.2020.

<sup>286</sup> IOM: EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative (Khartoum Process). <https://www.iom.int/eu-horn-africa-migration-route-initiative-khartoum-process> Downloaded: 14.05.2020.

<sup>287</sup> Valletta Summit on migration, 11-12 November 2015. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2015/11/11-12/> Downloaded: 02.04.2017.


<sup>288</sup> Based on the research of VECSEY, Mariann: Afrika migrációs politikájának alakulása I. Fókuszban: Nyugat-Afrika. [Migration Policy Development in Africa I. In the Focus: West Africa] in: Honvédségi Szemle, Volume 148. Issue 4. 2020. ISSN 2060-1506. pp. 92-107.



eight RECs are recognised by it.<sup>289</sup>

The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU/UMA), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Community of Sahel–Saharan States (CEN–SAD), the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the ECOWAS, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Southern African

Figure 2: Regional Economic Communities (RECs) recognised by the African Union (Edited by the author)



Development Community (SADC).<sup>290</sup> The AU intends to secure long-term development with the support of the RECs and considers them as the fundamental instrument of development. Figure 2. maps out the recognised RECs in Africa and their Member States. Regional organisations which are not recognised by the AU are not presented. It is visible from the figure that besides the high number of regional organisations, there is a significant overlapping in their membership. This practice does not provide a favourable environment to deepening the integration of the particular RECs. Some of the countries are members of as many as three organisations recognised by the AU, which provides a complicated setting to economic development and the intended integration to the global economy in the long-term.<sup>291</sup> But the regional integration does not serve the sole purpose of economic advancement. RECs can also build holistic security and political stability together, which not only contributes to development, but to human security as well.<sup>292</sup>

The West African region is one of the least affected areas regarding overlapping memberships if we only consider RECs recognised by the AU. The region houses CEN-SAD and the ECOWAS, the latter being in the focus of this subchapter. The organisation was

<sup>289</sup> TARRÓSY, István: Térségi biztonsági kérdések és megoldások az afrikai kontinensen: Az Afrikai Unió és a regionális gazdasági közösségek (RECs) biztonsági architektúrája. [Regional security questions and solutions on the African continent: The security architecture of the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs)]. in: Afrikai Tanulmányok. 2018. Vol. 12. Issue 1-3. pp. 5-30. [http://real.mtak.hu/100729/1/01\\_tarosy.pdf](http://real.mtak.hu/100729/1/01_tarosy.pdf) Downloaded: 02.06.2019. p. 23.

<sup>290</sup> Regional Economic Communities (RECs). <https://au.int/en/organs/recs> Downloaded: 30.06.2022.


<sup>291</sup> TARRÓSY, István: Térségi biztonsági kérdések és megoldások az afrikai kontinensen: Az Afrikai Unió és a regionális gazdasági közösségek (RECs) biztonsági architektúrája. p. 23.

<sup>292</sup> TARRÓSY, István: Demokratizálódás és regionalizáció a szubszaharai Afrikában p. 139.

established after decades-long integration efforts in 1975, with the Treaty of Lagos. The organisation has 15 Member States.<sup>293</sup>

The ECOWAS, as one of the most active regional organisations in Africa, also created some documents related to migration. However, the number and scope of these documents are more limited than those adopted by the AU. It is important to note that the ECOWAS countries are bound to implement every document which was accepted by the AU. Thus, the ECOWAS should be responsible for the regional harmonisation and fine tuning of initiatives in West Africa.

3. Map: The Member States of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). (Edited by the author)



The first ECOWAS document related to migration was adopted in 1979. The creation of the *Protocol Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment* was based on the Treaty of ECOWAS. With this step the organisation became one of the first in Africa which created a protocol about the free movement of persons. The idea was to implement it in three phases. The first phase introduced a visa free area within the ECOWAS. This means that the citizens of the 15 ECOWAS<sup>294</sup> Member States can stay up to 90 days without a visa in the territory of another Member State. The only requirement is to have a valid travel document. The second phase was to introduce the right of residence, and the third the right of establishment. Until 1990 four supplementary documents were accepted to fine-tune the protocol: a code of conduct for the implementation, a supplementary protocol on the second phase, an amendment to the original document and, finally, a supplementary protocol on the third phase.<sup>295</sup> To be able to better fulfil the requirements of the first phase, the ECOWAS

<sup>293</sup> ECOWAS: Basic information. [https://ecowas.int/?page\\_id=40](https://ecowas.int/?page_id=40) Downloaded: 30.06.2022.

<sup>294</sup> The Member States of the Ecowas: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. Member States. <https://www.ecowas.int/member-states/> Downloaded: 27.05.2020.

<sup>295</sup> ABEBE. ps. 8–9.

passport was introduced in 2000.<sup>296</sup> As of 30<sup>th</sup> June 2022, the second phase of the protocol has been implemented.<sup>297</sup>

With the adoption of the *Protocol Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment* the ECOWAS set an example to other regional organisations and contributed to the development of migration policies. But the West African organisation also improved the border procedures in addition to the changes on the policy level. On the technical level, it provided training to immigration officials and introduced new devices in the border control procedure. Moreover, the ECOWAS set out an ambitious plan to replace the national passports with a common ECOWAS document. The common passport undoubtedly would smooth the mobility of persons within the region. Unfortunately, the implementation was not as fast as was expected in the beginning. By March 2019, 10 out of the 15 countries replaced their national passports with the ECOWAS papers.<sup>298</sup>

The next important step was the adoption of the *ECOWAS Common Approach on Migration* in 2008. The document is definitely pro-migration, which is not a surprise. When the common approach was forged, West Africa had the highest mobility rate among all the regions in the world. This meant that 3% of its population took part in the international migration process. It means that countries in the region have large diaspora communities, which are an important element of the economy as workers and in the form of remittances. With this level of involvement in the phenomenon, it is hardly unexpected that migration is seen as a driver of development in West Africa. The high mobility rate suggests that it is in the best interest of the ECOWAS that migration happens via legal channels. Therefore, the common approach gives special attention to human smuggling and human trafficking activities. The ECOWAS applied a victim centred approach because of the recognition of the vulnerability of those individuals and groups who are affected by the above-mentioned criminal activities.<sup>299</sup> This realisation and

<sup>296</sup> Free Movement in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

<https://www.gfmd.org/pfp/ppd/1901#:~:text=The%20ECOWAS%20passport%20was%20introduced,region%2C%20the%20Eco%2DVisa>. Downloaded: 30.08.2022.

<sup>297</sup> According to the website of the Nigeria Immigration Service.

<https://portal.immigration.gov.ng/pages/visaguidelines> Downloaded: 30.06.2022.

<sup>298</sup> LANSFORD, Tom (ed.): Political Handbook of the World 2018-2019. Sage–CQ Press, London, 2019,

[https://books.google.hu/books?id=oSJoDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA1843&lpg=PA1843&dq=CEDEAO+paspeport+im+plementation+2020&source=bl&ots=VQMQLvSz9r&sig=ACfU3U0LH6dgRyOgz-dreeCaRD\\_DN\\_ZX9g&hl=hu&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiN0vav-t3oAhWKiqQKHetCDToQ6AEwDnoECAsQMw#v=onepage&q=CEDEAO%20paspeport%20implementation%202020&f=false](https://books.google.hu/books?id=oSJoDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA1843&lpg=PA1843&dq=CEDEAO+paspeport+im+plementation+2020&source=bl&ots=VQMQLvSz9r&sig=ACfU3U0LH6dgRyOgz-dreeCaRD_DN_ZX9g&hl=hu&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiN0vav-t3oAhWKiqQKHetCDToQ6AEwDnoECAsQMw#v=onepage&q=CEDEAO%20paspeport%20implementation%202020&f=false) Downloaded: 10.04.2020. p. 1843.

<sup>299</sup> ECOWAS Common Approach on Migration (Annex A). in: TRÉMOLIÈRES, Marie (ed.): Regional Challenges of West African Migration – African and European Perspectives. OECD publishing, 2009, [https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/regional-challenges-of-west-african-migration\\_9789264056015-en](https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/regional-challenges-of-west-african-migration_9789264056015-en) [DOI] Downloaded: 26.10.2019. ps. 229–232.



the historical memories are very important in a region which is the most affected by human trafficking activities within Africa.<sup>300</sup>

Though legal migration is preferred in the region, it must be noted that the incomplete introduction of the ECOWAS passport, the disproportionately difficult obtainment of national travel documents and the general corruption at border crossing points make legal migration complicated for the individual. The cross-border ethnic groups, the strong historical and cultural ties and the porous borders in the region on the other hand, make the job of the officials difficult. Identifying an individual's nationality based on ethnicity is not effective in a region so heterogeneous and interlinked.<sup>301</sup> This means that ethnicity is not necessarily helping in the identification, because the same ethnic group can live in multiple bordering countries. Thus, recognising a person's ethnic group can still lead to the assumption that he or she can be the national of three different countries.

The *ECOWAS Common Approach on Migration* partly addresses these above-mentioned issues with various actions to promote legal migration and fight irregular migration. Most significantly, the document lists among its actions a need for setting up an information and monitoring system on migration in order to gain a better understanding on migration movements within the ECOWAS. Also, recognising the vulnerability of those who decide to take the journey to a different country or even continent, the establishment of information centres were suggested.<sup>302</sup>

Since 2008 the ECOWAS has not adopted additional documents regarding migration. The West African organisation, however, joined the Rabat Process and takes part in continental commitments.

### III.3 CONCLUSIONS

Literature on independent African migration policies is scarce. Action plans and policies, like the JAES, which were formed jointly with the EU are more visible, mostly because of the EU's effort. It is clear that the AU was to some extent interested in developing its own policies

<sup>300</sup> UNODC Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2018.

[https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/GLOTiP\\_2018\\_BOOK\\_web\\_small%20%281%29.pdf](https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/GLOTiP_2018_BOOK_web_small%20%281%29.pdf)  
Downloaded: 30.05.2020. ps. 80-85.

<sup>301</sup> ADEPOJU, Aderanti (2009): Migration Management in West Africa within the context of ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons and the Common Approach on Migration: Challenges and Prospects. In: Marie Trémolières (ed.): Regional Challenges of West African Migration African and European Perspectives. OECD publishing, 2009. [https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/regional-challenges-of-west-african-migration\\_9789264056015-en#page20](https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/regional-challenges-of-west-african-migration_9789264056015-en#page20) [DOI] Downloaded: 26.10.2019. p. 20.

<sup>302</sup> ECOWAS Common Approach on Migration. <https://www.unhcr.org/49e47c8f11.pdf> Downloaded: 30.05.2020. ps. 7-8.

and even the ECOWAS made an effort in 2008 with the *Common Approach on Migration*. But the main reason behind the slow implementation and the lack of visibility is that Africa, and in particular West Africa, does not consider migration as a number one priority to tackle. The EU prioritises the issue and the African partners are happily cooperating in creating policies, given the fact that the implementation is a completely different question.

Two AU documents, the *Strategic Framework for Migration Policies* (2006) and the *African Common Position on Migration and Development* (2006) are mere guidelines. They do not have implementation mechanisms, and Member States can ignore them. The only legally binding document is the Kampala Convention, since the question of IDPs and refugees is really pressing in some regions in Africa.<sup>303</sup> The state of play is nearly the same in the ECOWAS. The three phases of the implementation of creating a freedom of movement area are still not finished, stagnating now in phase two. The introduction of the common ECOWAS travel document is slow. The *Common Approach on Migration* was criticised in 2014, 6 years after its adoption, for going against the African value of hospitality. The civil society claimed that the development of national borders in West Africa would decrease the existing solidarity and increase xenophobia.<sup>304</sup>

In 2009, Ouedraogo criticised that the local population does not know and/or understand migration related politics, because they are written in French or English, not in the locally spoken languages. Thus, these policies are not necessarily addressing the most prominent issues related to migration, but those which have attracted the most public attention. Therefore, these policies are not enough to effectively tackle the phenomenon, since migration is not a public concern in West Africa.<sup>305</sup> This statement is still valid. The EU and other partners must understand that African countries are interested in combatting irregular migration, because they are keen to combat human trafficking, and to some extent, human smuggling. But migration otherwise is considered a natural phenomenon, which raises little to no public concern or attention. This is quite understandable if we consider the high rate of population mobility in West Africa, which has not changed over time, or other more pressing issues in the region.

Despite the fact that data was scarce about intra-African migration for a long time, it was clear that West African migration stays within the region. This finding resonates well with my

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<sup>303</sup> KLAVERT. 2011. p. 9.

<sup>304</sup> PAR, Tiphaine G.: La CEDEAO et ses politiques migratoires. <http://mitrajectoires.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/La-CEDEAO-et-ses-politiques.pdf> Downloaded: 30.05.2020. p. 3.

<sup>305</sup> OUEDRAOGO, Dieudonné: Migration and Population in West Africa: Political Issues and Perspectives. in: TRÉMOLIÈRES, Marie (ed.): Regional Challenges of West African Migration African and European Perspectives. OECD publishing, 2009. [https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/regional-challenges-of-west-african-migration\\_9789264056015-en#page135](https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/regional-challenges-of-west-african-migration_9789264056015-en#page135) [DOI] Downloaded: 26.10.2019. p. 135.

first hypothesis, that the majority of African migratory movements are internal within the continent, and the pattern will not change in the long term irrespective to policy changes.

With the FMPs implemented since 2016, a clearer picture can be drawn up. Data collected by the FMPs showed that Niger is by far the most popular destination country, and that a lot of migrants in West Africa do not just stay in the region but stay within their home countries as well. The IOM also identified established migration corridors in West Africa, of which the most significant is the circular route between Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire.<sup>306</sup> This also offers a good example of the most practiced form of migration in the region. Circular migration is the most common pattern.

Migration flows are by nature sensitive to security related events, like armed conflicts. The ECOWAS region experienced multiple crises from 2000 to 2020, which affected the migration patterns. The civil war in Côte d'Ivoire in 1999, the Tuareg insurgency and inter-ethnic clashes in Mali from 2012 to date and the growing presence of extremist groups in the region are all responsible for increasing migratory figures. Growing and prospering economies can also attract migrants, and are therefore also responsible for increasing flows. But the two serious pandemics which hit the region, both the Ebola outbreak from 2013 to 2016 and the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 reduced the migration flows.

By analysing the migration trends within and from West Africa in connection with a timeframe set by different migration related documents, I must point out one important phenomenon. Despite all the EU's efforts to make its answers to external and internal challenges proactive, this objective seems unreachable. The first two examined time periods, lasting until 2006 and until 2015, respectively, both ended with a tragedy which triggered the EU's reaction, resulting in the creation of the Rabat Process and the Valletta Action Plan. The EU, mainly because it is a big organisation with large membership, is not capable of thinking outside of the box, which is needed for proactivity, because consensus is required for every decision. This makes the organisation slow, and therefore mostly only capable of following the events. The implemented policies also show that migration dynamics are not necessarily understood within the EU. Most of the joint EU - Africa policies are aiming at decreasing migration to Europe. This general aim shows that the EU is either unaware of the migration patterns or does not consider them in the political thinking. In this light, the migration policies forged by the EU and Africa do not have any direct effect on the migration patterns on the

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<sup>306</sup> IOM World Migration Report 2020. p. 58.

continent. Security related events have had the most impact on the intra-continental routes, together with enforceable national policies.

In the next chapter the EU policies and strategies are investigated in order to understand what the main aim of the EU in Africa towards migration is, and how it fits into the picture drawn up by the African policies.

## CHAPTER IV.

# ANALYSIS OF THE POLICIES AND STRATEGIES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION WITH AFRICA AND MIGRATION IN THE FOCUS

### IV.1 EU–AFRICA RELATIONS<sup>307</sup>

Europe and Africa have a long common history, and not just because of geographic proximity; both the Roman Empire and the colonial system connected the two continents. The relationship continued after the collapse of the colonial empires, despite the reluctance of the former colonies at the beginning of the process. Cooperation between Europe and Africa started with the process of de-colonization, as many European countries sought continued influence over their former domains. The first European communities, like the European Economic Community (EEC), pursued similar aims, and cooperation with African countries continues with the EU.

This chapter aims to introduce the EU–Africa relations from the establishment of the EU–ACP partnership in 1963. It examines the Yaoundé, Lomé and Cotonou Agreements. These have been the three main documents of the partnership so far. The chapter also discusses the different EU strategies regarding Africa, like the Sahel strategy or the Horn of Africa strategy. The strategies of the EU regarding Africa continue to evolve, of course, and analysing the process makes it easier to identify both achievements and challenges in EU-Africa relations. It is also discussed how these strategies fit in the Global Strategy of the European Union. Besides these, the chapter outlines the institutional and financial background of the partnership.

#### IV.1.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

De-colonization was important to start the European–African relations. The EEC, which was created during the de-colonisation of the African countries, established contractual relations only with independent states. As nearly all the African countries had been in colonial status, the process could start after these territories gained their independence.


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<sup>307</sup> Based on: VECSEY, Mariann: EU–Africa Relations. in: GÁLIK, Zoltán, MOLNÁR, Anna [eds.]: Regional and bilateral relations of the EU. Dialóg Campus, Budapest, 2019. ISBN 978 615 5945 52 6 pp. 65-94.

African countries became independent in several waves. The de-colonisation process of the African countries is presented in Table 2. Eight of the currently existing 54 fully recognised

Map 4: Countries of Africa. (Edited by the author)

states



gained their independence before 1960; another 33 countries established independent governments over the next decade. Until 1980 every European colony became independent. Namibia and Eritrea became sovereign states in the 1990s. The formulation of the current borders of African states, depicted on Map 4., was ended in 2011, when South Sudan declared its secession from Sudan.<sup>308</sup>

<sup>308</sup> Chronologie des indépendances africaines. <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20091231-chronologie-independances-africaines> Downloaded: 23.09.2017.

Table 2: Colonial Powers, Colonies and their date of independence<sup>309</sup> (Edited by the author)

Colonial Power	Colony	Date of Independence
American Colonization Society	Liberia	26 July 1847
Italy	Libya <sup>310</sup> (Cyrenaica and Tripolitania)	1 March 1949
United Kingdom	South Africa <sup>311</sup> (Union of South Africa)	31 May 1910
	Egypt (Protectorate)	28 February 1922
	Ghana	6 March 1957
	Nigeria	1 October 1960
	Sierra Leone	27 April 1961
	Tanzania <sup>312</sup> (Tanganyika)	9 December 1961
	Uganda	9 October 1962
	Tanzania (Sultanate of Zanzibar)	10 December 1963
	Kenya	12 December 1963
	Malawi	6 July 1964
	Zambia	24 October 1964
	The Gambia	18 February 1965
	Botswana	30 September 1966
	Lesotho	4 October 1966
	Mauritius	12 March 1968
Swaziland	6 September 1968	
Republic of Seychelles	29 June 1976	

<sup>309</sup> Eritrea and South Sudan are not included in the table, because Eritrea gained its independence from Ethiopia in 1993 (Eritrea. <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/eritrea/> Downloaded: 08.05.2022.), and South Sudan held a successful referendum in 2011 in favour of secession from Sudan. (South Sudan. <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/south-sudan/> Downloaded: 08.05.2022.)

<sup>310</sup> The eastern part of Libya, the Cyrenaica region, became independent in 1949, while Fezzan (under French rule) remained a colony. The current state of Libya was formed by UN General Assembly Resolution 289, which urged the unification of the three separate regions not later than 1 January 1952. The three regions became one sovereign state on 24 December 1951. (BARBOUR, Neville et al.: Libya. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Libya> Downloaded: 25.09.2017.)

<sup>311</sup> The modern state of South Africa came to existence on 31 May 1961, when it became a republic. Until 21 March 1990, South Africa administered the territory of the current Namibia, which was occupied by South Africa during World War I. (South Africa. <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/south-africa/> Downloaded: 08.05.2022.)

<sup>312</sup> Modern Tanzania was formed on 24 April 1964, with the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar. (BRYCESON, Deborah Fahy et al.: Tanzania. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Tanzania> Downloaded: 25.09.2017.)

Colonial Power	Colony	Date of Independence
	Zimbabwe <sup>313</sup>	18 April 1980
United Kingdom and Egypt	Sudan	1 January 1956
United Kingdom and Italy	Somalia	1 July 1960
France and the United Kingdom	Libya	24 December 1951
	Cameroon	1 January 1960
France	Tunisia (Protectorate)	20 March 1956
	Guinea	2 October 1958
	Togo	27 April 1960
	Madagascar (Malagasy)	26 June 1960
	Benin (Republic of Dahomey)	1 August 1960
	Niger	3 August 1960
	Burkina Faso (Upper Volta)	5 August 1960
	Côte d'Ivoire	7 August 1960
	Chad	11 August 1960
	Central African Republic	13 August 1960
	Congo, Republic of	15 August 1960
	Gabon	17 August 1960
	Senegal	20 August 1960
	Mali	22 September 1960
	Mauritania	28 November 1960
	Algeria	3 July 1962
	Union of the Comoros	6 July 1975
Djibouti	27 June 1977	
France and Spain	Morocco	2 March 1956
Spain	Western Sahara <sup>314</sup>	1975
	Equatorial Guinea	12 October 1968

<sup>313</sup> Rhodesia's first attempt at independence was the Unilateral Declaration of Independence on 11 November 1965. (INGHAM, Kenneth, SANGER, Clyde William, BRADLEY, Kenneth: *Zimbabwe*. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Zimbabwe> Downloaded: 25.09.2017.)

<sup>314</sup> The independence of Western Sahara is still disputed, the territory is still not recognised as an independent state by the majority of states. BESENYŐ, János: A nyugat-szaharai válság. [Crisis in Western Sahara] IDResearch Kft./Publikon Kiado, Pécs, 2012. [http://real.mtak.hu/83775/1/besenyoy\\_vfinal.pdf](http://real.mtak.hu/83775/1/besenyoy_vfinal.pdf) Downloaded: 23.08.2022. ps. 77-128.



Colonial Power	Colony	Date of Independence
Belgium	Congo, the Democratic Republic of (Zaire)	30 June 1960
	Burundi	1 July 1962
	Rwanda	1 July 1962
Portugal	Guinea-Bissau	20 September 1974
	Mozambique	25 June 1975
	Cape Verde	5 July 1975
	São Tomé et Príncipe	12 July 1975
	Angola	11 November 1975

The EEC's areas of interest depended largely upon the members. Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands all had colonial connections to Africa; only Luxembourg had no direct interests.<sup>315</sup> The first economic agreement, the Yaoundé Convention of 1963, was made with the Associated African States and Malagasy (AASM), an organisation founded in September 1961, just after Belgium and France decided to give their African territories independence. The founding states of AASM (Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Niger, Senegal and Upper Volta) comprise Francophone Africa and, as a block, welcomed close relations with the former colonisers. The Francophone countries which gained their independence later, joined the AASM, too.<sup>316</sup>

The *Yaoundé Convention*, which included Burundi, Mali, Mauritania, the Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Somalia, and Togo in addition to the EEC and AASM, was signed on 20 July 1963. It dealt with trade, ensured privileges to both the EEC and the African countries. It also abolished quantitative restrictions on import goods originating in EEC and African states. The convention also listed the free of customs duty products (coffee, tea, cocoa, pineapple and spices). These products were allowed into the EEC countries free of charge. The agreement also granted financial aid from the European Development Fund (EDF) to the African countries in need with detailed amounts and country shares, and specific areas for investment. The Convention appeared unbalanced at first, despite the well described aid for the African

<sup>315</sup> GABEL, Matthew J.: European Community. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/European-Community-European-economic-association> Downloaded: 25. 09. 2017.

<sup>316</sup> TALL, A. B. : L'Organisation commune africaine, malgache et mauricienne. Journal of African Law, Vol. 16, No. 3. 304-309. [https://www.jstor.org/stable/745240?seq=2#page\\_scan\\_tab\\_contents](https://www.jstor.org/stable/745240?seq=2#page_scan_tab_contents) Downloaded: 25.09.2017.

countries. It granted unlimited export quotas both to the European and African states but gave duty-free status only for a few exotic products. It also stated that the agreement has no impact on earlier created international contracts. Furthermore, the *Yaoundé Convention* includes that any future agreements made with third countries, which set more favourable conditions will be extended to the convention, too. It does not grant the same charges for products of African origin in the EEC countries as member states apply among themselves, however. The *Yaoundé Convention* also stipulated that after a five-year period from its entry into force, there could be a review and possible extension with a further period.<sup>317</sup> The same contracting parties accordingly signed a second economic agreement on 29 July 1969. The new agreement expanded financial aid opportunities for the African countries, but otherwise confirmed and continued the former agreement for another five years. The *Yaoundé II. Convention* also had a five-year long timeframe, which expired 31<sup>st</sup> January 1975.<sup>318</sup>

The accession of the United Kingdom to the EEC in 1973 required a review of economic agreements, as the country sought continued influence over its former colonies.<sup>319</sup> The EEC was open to including former British colonies in the *Yaoundé Convention*; however, Ghana and Nigeria not only refused to join but also criticized the Francophone countries for participating. Not every former British colony had the same attitude towards the EEC. In 1968 the EEC signed the *Arusha Agreement* with the former British colonies of East Africa, the East African States (EAS). The agreement with the EAS (Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda), was renewed in 1969 and ran until 31 January 1975. It essentially duplicated the *Yaoundé Convention* of 1969. It made a stronger attempt to protect the interests of both the EEC and the African countries.

The first *Lomé Convention* was signed on 28 February 1975 between the nine members of the EEC and 46 African, Caribbean and Pacific states, the later African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP). The EAS played an active role in the formation of this new international organisation, under the Georgetown Agreement of 6 June 1975. At the time of its formation,

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<sup>317</sup> Convention of Association between the European Economic Community and the African and Malagasy States associated with that Community and Annexed Documents. (1963) in: *International Legal Materials* Vol. 2, No. 5 (September 1963), pp. 971-1008, Cambridge University Press <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20689684> Downloaded: 08.05.2022.

<sup>318</sup> Convention of Association between the European Economic Community and the African and Malagasy States associated with that Community and Annexed Documents (1969). in: *International Legal Materials* Vol. 9, No. 3 (MAY 1970), pp. 484-506, [Cambridge University Press](https://www.jstor.org/stable/20690626) <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20690626> Downloaded: 25.09.2017.

<sup>319</sup> GABEL, Matthew J.: European Community.

the ACP consisted of 46 countries comprising most of the former European colonial territories.<sup>320, 321</sup>

The *Lomé Convention* broke with Yaoundé practices and established partnership principles and shared objectives. It also combined aid, trade and political aspects, which resulted in trade and financial benefits to the partaking countries. The Lomé Convention was also financed by the EDF. The guiding values of the convention included equality between partners and respect for sovereignty. It established non-reciprocal preferences for most exports from ACP countries to the EEC. It also recognised the mutual interests and interdependence between EEC and ACP. The Convention also stated that every state has the right to determine its own policies. It also wanted to guarantee the security of the established relations. The first *Lomé Convention* introduced a system to stabilize the earnings of the ACP countries from exports (STABEX), to compensate for the shortfall in their export incomes. The most important detail of the Convention was the so-called ‘sugar protocol’ under which EEC countries agreed to import a fixed quantity of sugar from ACP countries annually at a fixed price. The *Lomé I. Convention* had a timeframe of five years. In 1979, the two parties signed a second five-year agreement, the *Lomé II*, that essentially extended the first. It introduced only one new instrument, the System of Stabilization of Export Earnings from Mining Products (SYSMIN), which provided help to the mining industry in ACP countries which are strongly dependent on it. This period was financed by the fifth EDF. A third Lomé agreement (1984) significantly altered the main goals of the convention from industrial development to focus on self-sufficiency for ACP states, and especially food security. The five-year-long period of the *Lomé III. Convention* was funded by the sixth EDF.<sup>322</sup>

The fourth Lomé convention covered ten years including two five-year funding packages, namely the seventh and the eight EDFs. Signed in 1989, the Lomé IV called for a mid-term review, which took place during 1994 and 1995. At that time the agreement was signed between the EU and ACP. The agreement emphasized common values like the promotion of human rights (especially gender equality), democracy, the environment, and good governance. For the first time though, it held out the prospect of withholding funds from countries that did not fulfil

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<sup>320</sup> TAGUABA, Lugon: The Arusha Agreement: Origins, Meaning and Future of Association with the E.E.C. [https://journals.co.za/doi/pdf/10.10520/AJA00020117\\_237](https://journals.co.za/doi/pdf/10.10520/AJA00020117_237) Downloaded: 26.09.2017.

<sup>321</sup> The Georgetown Agreement. [http://www.acp.int/sites/acpsec.waw.be/files/Georgetown%20Agreement%20%201975\\_0.pdf](http://www.acp.int/sites/acpsec.waw.be/files/Georgetown%20Agreement%20%201975_0.pdf) Downloaded: 26.09.2017.

<sup>322</sup> European Economic Community - African, Caribbean, and Pacific Countries: Documents from Lomé Meeting. in: International Legal Materials Vol. 14, No. 3 (MAY 1975), pp. 595-640 (46 pages) <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20691431> Downloaded: 08.05.2022.

certain criteria: respect for human rights, democratic principles, and the rule of law. Other important goals included the diversification of ACP economies, the decentralization of cooperation through the promotion of the private sector and increasing regional cooperation. This was the first time when the EDF did not increase in real terms.<sup>323</sup>

When the *Lomé Conventions* came to an end in 2000, they resulted in only partial achievements, like the ‘sugar protocol’ or placing the partnership on a foundation based on law. Beyond this the *Lomé Conventions* met no success. The ACP countries’ share in the European markets declined from having 60 per cent for ten products in 1974 to just 3 percent in 1998. The economic growth of the sub-Saharan Africa, moreover, remained relatively low compared to other ACP countries. The partners concluded, however, that they simply needed more time to adapt to the new geostrategic situation. Talks regarding a new agreement started in 1998.<sup>324</sup>

When Portugal joined the EEC in 1986,<sup>325</sup> its former colonies became part of the ACP, which was thus comprised of 79 states - 48 in sub-Saharan Africa, 16 in the Caribbean, and 15 in the Pacific. All members save Cuba were signatories to the *Cotonou Partnership Agreement* (CPA).<sup>326</sup> The CPA was signed on 23 June 2000 between the EU and the complete ACP. It was the continuation of the Lomé partnership principles and shared objectives. This pact rested on the fundamental principles of equality, ownership of development strategies, and the participation of both governments and non-state actors. The agreement aimed to increase the accountability of the aid receiving countries and harmonise the donor activity. The CPA introduced differentiation, prioritising aid programmes to countries on the lowest level of development, and regionalisation, which aimed to promote regional integration.<sup>327</sup> It ran for 20 years, with an obligatory review and new financial protocol every five years.<sup>328</sup> It included cooperative activities to increase social and human development, to increase economic development in the ACP countries, and to promote and expand trade in the framework of regional cooperation and integration. The CPA envisioned strengthening regional trade via Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA), but the formation of these partnerships took too

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<sup>323</sup> European Economic Community - African, Caribbean, and Pacific Countries: Documents from Lomé Meeting.

<sup>324</sup> European Economic Community - African, Caribbean, and Pacific Countries: Documents from Lomé Meeting.

<sup>325</sup> GABEL, Matthew J.: European Community.

<sup>326</sup> The ACP Group. <https://www.acp.int/content/secretariat-organisation-african-caribbean-and-pacific-states-oacps> Downloaded: 08.05.2022.

<sup>327</sup> The Cotonou Agreement. [https://www.eods.eu/library/EU\\_Cotonou%20Agreement\\_2000\\_EN.pdf](https://www.eods.eu/library/EU_Cotonou%20Agreement_2000_EN.pdf) Downloaded: 27.09.2017.


<sup>328</sup> Cotonou Agreement, Summary. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/cotonou-agreement.html> Downloaded: 08.05.2022.

long. The partnership integrated Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)<sup>329</sup> were replaced in 2016 with Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)<sup>330</sup>. The CPA rested on three pillars: development cooperation, political cooperation, and economic and trade cooperation. The third pillar included development aid. Its new element was the “rewarded performance policy”, which means allocations were no longer automatic but depended upon effective use of funds released to date.<sup>331</sup>

The first review of the Cotonou Agreement took place in Luxembourg on 25 June 2005. After deciding on the financial protocol for the next five-year period, the parties introduced an improved agenda in support of the MDGs and outlined management procedures to make implementation more flexible and effective. The revision introduced a more formal and systematic dialogue on human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law. It also included a donor harmonisation initiative, and the ‘everything but arms’ trade policy. The revision incorporated a framework on development cooperation, the European Consensus on Development. It also deepened the political dialogue, particularly regarding security issues. The ACP and EU agreed, for instance, on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).<sup>332</sup>

The second review of the Cotonou Agreement came in 2010. It emphasized regional integration in the ACP and

Figure 3: Timeline of EU-OACPS contractual relations. (Edited by the author)



<sup>329</sup> The Millennium Development Goals were set in 2000 with a 15-year timeframe by the United Nations (UN). These were the following: eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, achieve universal primary education, promote gender equality and empower women, reduce child mortality, improve maternal health, combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, ensure environmental sustainability, global partnership for development. (Millennium Development Goals. <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/> Downloaded: 27.09.2017.)

<sup>330</sup> On 25 September 2015, the UN adopted a new set of goals to reach to end poverty, to protect the planet and to ensure prosperity for all in the timeframe 15 years. These were: no poverty, zero hunger, good health and well-being, quality education, gender equality, clean water and sanitation, affordable and clean energy, decent work and economic growth, industry, innovation and infrastructure, reduced inequalities, sustainable cities and communities, responsible consumption and production, climate action, life below water, life on land, peace, justice and strong institutions, partnerships for the goals. (Sustainable Development Goals. <http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/> Downloaded: 27.09.2017.)

<sup>331</sup> Cotonou Agreement, Summary.

<sup>332</sup> Partnership Agreement ACP-EC. [http://www.acp.int/sites/acpsec.waw.be/files/cotonou\\_2006\\_en.pdf](http://www.acp.int/sites/acpsec.waw.be/files/cotonou_2006_en.pdf) Downloaded: 08.05.2022.

ACP–EU cooperation and highlighted the interdependence between security and development, focusing on conflict prevention and peace building. The EU and ACP agreed on a joint approach to both sustainable development and poverty reduction, but only recognised the challenge of the climate change. The revision also introduced a trade development package and simplified the donor coordination.<sup>333</sup> Despite the review, the effectiveness of the CPA had not changed, and its significance started to decrease.

The third review of the CPA was completed in 2016. It built on the UN’s Sustainable Development Agenda 2030 and was in line with the EU’s Global Strategy. It set out six EU priorities:

- *“Promote peaceful and democratic societies, good governance, the rule of law and human rights for all;*
- *Spur inclusive sustainable growth and decent jobs for all;*
- *Turn mobility and migration into opportunities and address challenges together;*
- *Promote human development and dignity;*
- *Protect the environment and fight climate change;*
- *Join forces in the global arena on areas of common interests.*”<sup>334</sup> (JOIN (2016) 52 final, 7)

These priorities were tailored to the different ACP regions, taking into account the heterogeneity of the organisation. The renewed CPA aimed at a more targeted and flexible partnership. This meant a reduced number of instruments and an increase in the budget.<sup>335</sup>

The CPA was initially due to expire in February 2020. Negotiations about the new cooperation framework started in 2018. The new partnership was not agreed until the scheduled deadline, so the CPA was extended until 30 November 2021, except if the new agreement enters into force before this set date. The new agreement was still not signed on 24 February 2022.<sup>336</sup>

#### **IV.1.2 DEVELOPMENT IN EU–AFRICA RELATIONS**

The EU’s strategic partnership with Africa started in 2000, via the first EU–Africa Summit in Cairo that launched a comprehensive framework for political dialogue. It dealt with regional integration in Africa, the integration of Africa into world economy. The summit agreed on

<sup>333</sup> ACP – The Cotonou Agreement.

[http://www.acp.int/sites/acpsec.waw.be/files/accord\\_cotonou\\_revise\\_2010\\_en.pdf](http://www.acp.int/sites/acpsec.waw.be/files/accord_cotonou_revise_2010_en.pdf) Downloaded: 08.05.2022.

<sup>334</sup> European Commission: Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council 22.11.2016. JOIN(2016) 52 final on A renewed partnership with the countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A52016JC0052> Downloaded: 08.05.2022.

<sup>335</sup> JOIN(2016) 52 final

<sup>336</sup> Post-Cotonou: Negotiators reach a political deal on a new EU/Africa-Caribbean-Pacific Partnership Agreement. [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip\\_20\\_2291](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_2291) Downloaded: 10.11.2021.



common values, such as human rights, democratic principles and institutions, good governance and rule of law. It also discussed the main security related tasks of conflict prevention and peace-building and issues like poverty eradication and food security. Both the Europeans and Africans agreed on the principles, but the priorities of the continents remained different as well as their views on the value of the partnership. Europeans prioritized peace and security issues, the Africans trade and economic aspects. Despite the disagreement on the priorities, the partnership continued and deepened. This difference is still a cause of frustration in the relationship.

The real boost in the partnership between the EU and Africa came in 2001 with the establishment of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and the 2002 transformation of the OAU to the AU. These institutions made sure that the AU was committed to respect common values. They also provided clarity regarding African countries' needs and desires, which made it easier to coordinate with donors. The importance of this was in the higher level of local ownership, which resulted in more effective programs.<sup>337</sup>

This paved the way to the EU Strategy for Africa (2005). The three principles of this strategy are equality, partnership, and ownership. The equality principle is based on mutual recognition, respect for institutions and the definition of mutual interest. The partnership includes the development of political cooperation. Ownership in this case means the ownership of strategies and development policies. The goal of this strategy is to help Africa meet the MDGs. The strategy makes the differentiation of African countries possible, taking into consideration their very diverse economic, social and environmental circumstances. It also recognises the challenges of sustainable development. The EU also created a protocol for engaging the most effective level of government (national, regional, or continental) in any given case. The 10<sup>th</sup> EDF provides the financial framework for the programmes and actions established by the EU Strategy for Africa.<sup>338</sup>

The EU's Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which came out also in 2005, clearly relates to the EU's Strategy for Africa. It recognizes that EU cooperation with third-world countries is vital in the prevention of terrorism and identifies North Africa as an area of particular interest. The

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<sup>337</sup> The EU-Africa Partnership in Historical Perspective. [https://europafrika.files.wordpress.com/2007/05/historical\\_perspective.pdf](https://europafrika.files.wordpress.com/2007/05/historical_perspective.pdf) Downloaded: 29.09.2017.

<sup>338</sup> EU Strategy for Africa. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=LEGISSUM:r12540&from=EN> Downloaded: 29.09.2017.

four pillars of the counter-terrorism strategy mirror those of the global strategy: promoting good governance and democracy, resolving conflicts, and working to sustain peace.<sup>339</sup>

To support the objectives of both strategies, to reach the MDGs and promote good governance and democracy and resolve conflicts, in 2006 the EU introduced The European Consensus on Development. This document, despite its global commitment, is also connected to Africa. It defines Least Developed Countries (LDCs), low-income countries (LICs) and even some middle-income countries (MICs) in certain programs as the only countries which are allowed to get development aid.<sup>340</sup> According to the UN report, by February 2021, 33 of the 46 LDCs were from the African continent.<sup>341</sup>

Table 3: Comparison of the African States (data collected from worldbank.org) (Edited by the author)

Country	Area	Population (million people) (2021)	GDP (per capita, current prices / in U.S. dollars, 2021)	PPP (per capita GDP / in Current international dollar, 2021)
Algeria	2,381,741 km <sup>2</sup>	44.6	3,765.0	12,037.5
Angola	1,246,700 km <sup>2</sup>	33.9	2,137.9	6,581.0
Benin	112,622 km <sup>2</sup>	12.4	1,428.4	3,789.3
Botswana	581,730 km <sup>2</sup>	2.3	7,347.6	17,603.7
Burkina Faso	274,200 km <sup>2</sup>	21.4	918.2	2,461.9
Burundi	27,830 km <sup>2</sup>	12.2	236.8	793.2
Cabo Verde	4,033 km <sup>2</sup>	0.5	3,445.8	7,028.0
Cameroon	475,440 km <sup>2</sup>	27.2	1,661.7	4,064.5
Central African Republic	622,984 km <sup>2</sup>	4.9	511.5	1,020.5
Chad	1,284,000 km <sup>2</sup>	16.9	696.4	1,590.6
Comoros	2,235 km <sup>2</sup>	0.8	1,494.7	3,284.4
Congo, Democratic Republic of the	2,344,858 km <sup>2</sup>	92.3	584.1	1,218.8

<sup>339</sup> The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy.

<https://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2014469%202005%20REV%204> Downloaded: 05.09.2015.

<sup>340</sup> European Parliament – Council – Commission: Joint statement by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on 24.02.2006. 2006/C 46/01 on European Union Development Policy: ‘The European Consensus’ [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:42006X0224\(01\)&from=EN](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:42006X0224(01)&from=EN) Downloaded: 22.03.2017.

<sup>341</sup> List of Least Developed Countries. [https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/wp-content/uploads/sites/45/publication/ldc\\_list.pdf](https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/wp-content/uploads/sites/45/publication/ldc_list.pdf) Downloaded: 04.11.2021.



<b>Country</b>	<b>Area</b>	<b>Population (million people) (2021)</b>	<b>GDP (per capita, current prices / in U.S. dollars, 2021)</b>	<b>PPP (per capita GDP / in Current international dollar, 2021)</b>
<b>Congo, Republic of the</b>	342,000 km <sup>2</sup>	5.6	2,213.9	3,616.9
<b>Côte d'Ivoire</b>	322,463 km <sup>2</sup>	27.0	2,578.8	5,939.8
<b>Djibouti</b>	23,200 km <sup>2</sup>	1.0	3,363.7	5,925.8
<b>Egypt</b>	1,001,450 km <sup>2</sup>	104.2	3,876.4	13,316.2
<b>Equatorial Guinea</b>	28,051 km <sup>2</sup>	1.4	8,462.3	18,127.2
<b>Eritrea</b>	117,600 km <sup>2</sup>	3.2*	642.5*	1,625.5*
<b>Eswatini</b>	17,364 km <sup>2</sup>	1.1	4,214.9	9,815.8
<b>Ethiopia</b>	1,104,300 km <sup>2</sup>	117.8	944.0	2,599.7
<b>Gabon</b>	267,667 km <sup>2</sup>	2.2	8,017.0	15,597.5
<b>Gambia</b>	11,300 km <sup>2</sup>	2.4	835.6	2,433.9
<b>Ghana</b>	238,533 km <sup>2</sup>	31.7	2,445.3	6,178.3
<b>Guinea</b>	245,857 km <sup>2</sup>	13.4	1,174.4	2,878.6
<b>Guinea Bissau</b>	36,125 km <sup>2</sup>	2.0	813.0	2,057.1
<b>Kenya</b>	580,367 km <sup>2</sup>	54.9	2,006.8	5,023.5
<b>Lesotho</b>	30,355 km <sup>2</sup>	2.1	1,166.5	2,682.2
<b>Liberia</b>	111,369 km <sup>2</sup>	5.1	673.1	1,552.8
<b>Libya</b>	1,759,540 km <sup>2</sup>	6.9	6,018.4	23,356.6
<b>Madagascar</b>	587,041 km <sup>2</sup>	28.4	514.9	1,635.4
<b>Malawi</b>	118,484 km <sup>2</sup>	19.6	642.7	1,658.3
<b>Mali</b>	1,240,192 km <sup>2</sup>	20.8	917.9	2,447.3
<b>Mauritania</b>	1,030,700 km <sup>2</sup>	4.7	1,723.0	5,591.8
<b>Mauritius</b>	2,040 km <sup>2</sup>	1.2	8,812.1	22,240.1
<b>Morocco</b>	446,550 km <sup>2</sup>	37.3	3,496.8	8,143.5
<b>Mozambique</b>	799,380 km <sup>2</sup>	32.1	500.4	1,342.3
<b>Namibia</b>	824,292 km <sup>2</sup>	2.5	4,729.3	9,805.2
<b>Niger</b>	1,267,000 km <sup>2</sup>	25.1	594.9	1,309.8
<b>Nigeria</b>	923,768 km <sup>2</sup>	211.4	2,085.0	5,459.2
<b>Rwanda</b>	26,338 km <sup>2</sup>	13.2	833.8	2,494.1

Country	Area	Population (million people) (2021)	GDP (per capita, current prices / in U.S. dollars, 2021)	PPP (per capita GDP / in Current international dollar, 2021)
<b>São Tomé and Príncipe</b>	964 km <sup>2</sup>	0.2	2,449.3	4,445.9
<b>Senegal</b>	196,722 km <sup>2</sup>	17.1	1,606.5	3,768.7
<b>Seychelles</b>	455 km <sup>2</sup>	0.09	13,306.7	29,837.5
<b>Sierra Leone</b>	71,740 km <sup>2</sup>	8.1	515.9	1,816.2
<b>Somalia</b>	637,657 km <sup>2</sup>	16.3	445.8	1,302.5
<b>South Africa</b>	1,219,090 km <sup>2</sup>	60.0	6,994.2	14,420.2
<b>South Sudan</b>	644,329 km <sup>2</sup>	11.3	1,119.7**	1,234.7**
<b>Sudan</b>	1,861,484 km <sup>2</sup>	44.9	764.3	4,217.2
<b>Tanzania</b>	947,300 km <sup>2</sup>	61.4	1,135.5	2,932.6
<b>Togo</b>	56,785 km <sup>2</sup>	8.4	992.3	2,380.2
<b>Tunisia</b>	163,610 km <sup>2</sup>	11.9	3,924.3	11,594.7
<b>Uganda</b>	241,038 km <sup>2</sup>	47.1	858.1	2,397.8
<b>Zambia</b>	752,618 km <sup>2</sup>	18.8	1,120.6	3,623.9
<b>Zimbabwe</b>	390,757 km <sup>2</sup>	15.0	1,737.2	2,444.5
* Data collected in 2011.				
** Data collected in 2015.				

The first part of the European consensus defines its vision on development, outlining the common objectives, values, and principles, in line with previous EU documents. It describes a mechanism for more effective aid, and a desire for improving coherence in development policy. The document recognises development as a global challenge. The second part describes the new Development Policy in cohesion with the introduction, and how it will operate at the European Community level. It identifies priorities and sets out guidelines for the planning and implementation procedures of Community instruments and cooperation strategies. The main element of the document emphasizes the importance of coherence for development policy. It defines the European Consensus on Development as a fundamental document for every policy which affects developing countries.<sup>342</sup>

In 2006 the EU thus created a source document for subsequent strategies. The first Africa-related document created under this umbrella was the EU–South Africa Strategic Partnership

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<sup>342</sup> 2006/C 46/01 policy

of 2006, which set out the framework for long-term political cooperation between the EU and the Republic of South Africa, at the national government level. It both continued and broadened the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) reached between the two parties five years after the abolition of the apartheid system, and the first free elections in the country in 1994.<sup>343</sup> The strategic partnership with the Republic of South Africa aims to establish a more coherent political cooperation regarding regional, continental and global issues.<sup>344</sup>

After the implementation of this more trade oriented strategic partnership, the JAES was created by the EU jointly with the AU, in 2007. The document builds on the EU Strategy for Africa, using the African Union Constitutive Act and Strategic Framework of 2004-2007. It is the first time when an EU strategy is supported by both a European and an African document as well, which makes the partnership even more fruitful than just a unilateral concept. Besides this the strategy does not only mention the historical connections and the geographical closeness as a cause of creating a new partnership, but it also reflects on the need of a new EU-Africa strategy due to the changes in the European organisation, which nearly doubled in size, and deepened the integration among its members. It also takes into account the integration process of the African continent, with the formation of the AU and launching of NEPAD. The idea of the JAES is to elevate cooperation to a strategic level, create a long-term framework for EU-Africa relations with short-term action plans to reach set goals, and to enhance political dialogue at all levels. The agreed principles of the strategy are the unity of Africa, the interdependence between the continent and the EU, and it also emphasises the usually mentioned values of such documents as ownership and joint responsibility, respect for human rights, democratic principles, the rule of law, and the right to development. It also defines the governing principles of the partnership, out of which the most important are: mutual accountability, solidarity, equality, justice, common and human security, and gender equality. The strategy lists four main objectives, which are the following:

- To reinforce and elevate EU–Africa political partnership to focus on common concerns, and challenges, like peace and security, development, clean environment and migration.

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<sup>343</sup> BÚR, Gábor: Dél-afrikai Köztársaság. [The Republic of South Africa]. in. MARSÁI, Viktor; NAGYNÉ, Rózsa Erzsébet (eds.) Magyarország és Afrika 2018-2025. [Hungary and Africa 2018-2025]. 2020. Ludovika Egyetemi Kiadó, Budapest, 2020 ISBN 978 963 531 213 9 pp. 183-194. p. 186.

<sup>344</sup> Towards an EU-South Africa Strategic Partnership <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52006DC0347&from=EN> Downloaded: 30.09.2017.

- To strengthen and promote safe and secure environment, democratic values, development, and integration processes in Africa, and to support African countries to reach the MDGs by 2015.
- To promote and sustain an effective multilateral system, with strong and legitimate institutions and international institutions and address global challenges and common concerns.
- To broaden and promote the partnership, including non-governmental actors as well, allowing them to play an active role in the first two objectives.

To meet these objectives, the strategy had to implement new approaches. It outlined ways to ensure bilateral relations aligned with the joint strategy and ways to integrate lessons learned. Recognising the contributions of non-government actors became a central feature. The strategic framework targeted four inter-related areas: peace and security, governance and human rights, trade and regional integration, and key development issues. Regarding peace and security, the strategy does not only focus on solving the problems on the African and the European continents, by drawing up the need for a holistic approach, but it also emphasises the importance of addressing global concerns in each of these areas. Recognising peace and security as the most important problem, the main focus of the strategy falls on the promotion of democratic governance and human rights. To achieve the set goals, the strategy encourages a comprehensive and intensive dialogue on governance between the EU and Africa.

Under trade and regional integration, the aim was to reach a state of affairs where donor support is no longer needed in Africa. To support this idea, the development of the local markets and regional integration were the key elements. In order to be less dependent, three more key objectives were determined: private sector development, strengthening physical infrastructure networks and services related to them, and trade integration. The main effort was to assist Africa reach the MDGs by 2015. The strategy also outlined its institutional architecture and implementation, identified the actors, created action plans for different areas, and designed follow-up mechanisms.<sup>345</sup>

The strategic principles and general values remained the same through time, although the most important difference is the use of an AU document as a basis of the JAES. The document still focused on the MDGs, as all of the EU's Africa-related strategies and agreements created after 2000 had. It provides a comprehensive framework for the EU–Africa Partnership created in 2007 to reinforce the political relations between Africa and the EU and encourage joint

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<sup>345</sup> A Joint Africa – EU Strategy. [http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/files/documents/eas2007\\_joint\\_strategy\\_en.pdf](http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/files/documents/eas2007_joint_strategy_en.pdf) Downloaded: 05.09.2015.

efforts to address global challenges like climate change, the protection of the environment as well as peace and security. The joint action resulted in greater impact on the global stage. It aimed to broaden Africa–EU cooperation including areas like governance, human rights, trade and regional integration, migration, mobility and employment. The partnership also sought to encourage civil society and participation of the private sector.<sup>346</sup>

In 2011, the European Union followed up by creating the *Agenda for Change*. It embraced the same principles and values as its predecessors, and likewise aimed at successful development policy and practices for the European organisation to be able to fit within the comprehensive international development agenda until and beyond 2015. The second main objective of the agenda is to support partner countries in faster progress to reach the MDGs. It introduced a more effective aid contribution process and proposed coordinated EU action to avoid fragmentation and increase efficiency by creating a joint programming document. It is not only to be created by the member states, but it should also be synchronised with the strategies of the partner countries. It also proposes improved coherence among EU policies to evaluate their impact. All of these improvements aim at better aid contribution, and the goal is to make sure that the most vulnerable and fragile countries get the necessary assistance.<sup>347</sup>

In 2011, the EU accepted two strategies regarding Africa. The first one was created before the *Agenda for Change*. The EU's *Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel* appeared in 2011. It did not include the achievements of the Agenda but addressed concerns regarding the 'Arab Spring.' The strategy dealt with North Africa, but the main focus fell on the countries in the Sahel region. The strategy covered Mauritania, Mali, Niger and, in a wider perspective, Burkina Faso, Chad, and farther countries which are affected by the same challenges, like Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Nigeria. It declared that security and development could not be separated in the Sahel and called for a coordinated, holistic approach to tackle the problems of the region. The constantly deteriorating situation in the Sahel region caught the attention of the EU, mainly because of its geographical closeness and the direct impacts on European citizens. The strategy defined the problems in the Sahel as the following: extreme poverty, climate change, food crisis, and rapidly growing population, fragile governance, corruption, internal

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<sup>346</sup> What is the Partnership? <http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/en/about-us/what-partnership> Downloaded: 15.10.2017.

<sup>347</sup> European Commission: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 13.10.2011. COM (2011) 637 on Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for Change. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0637:FIN:EN:PDF> Downloaded: 22.03.2017.

tensions, violent extremism and radicalisation, illicit trafficking and terrorism. The strategy emphasized, however, that al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) was the biggest threat.

The long list of problems is interdependent, and the EU was determined to find the root causes of the problems to be able to help more effectively in the region. The Sahel Strategy identified four levels of challenges. The first was governance, development and conflict resolution, which includes internal, governance and development-related issues. The second was coordination on regional level, as threat perceptions were different in each country and there was a lack of intra-regional communication. The third level was security and rule of law, particularly the insufficient law enforcement and judicial sector of the countries in the region. The fourth was fight against and prevention of violent extremism and radicalisation. The mutual interest of the strategy was to reduce insecurity and improve development in the Sahel. It also aims to prevent AQIM attacks and to strengthen and protect lawful trade in the region and in the EU, to reduce illicit trafficking. The strategy formulated objectives in line with these challenges and set out both long-term (5-10 year) and short-term (3-year) aims to be achieved. The Sahel Strategy built on existing initiatives which are connected to the region, at multiple levels, including ECOWAS, the Joint EU–Africa Strategy, and existing EU engagements. The lines of action in the strategy were to contribute to development, to encourage political dialogue in the region. Furthermore, it aimed to strengthen security in the Sahel via increasing social resilience. The strategy also defines its financial resource as the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF.<sup>348</sup>

Following the Sahel Strategy, the EU created *The Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa* in November 2011 to integrate the achievements of the Agenda for Change. The motives of the EU to create a strategy for the Horn of Africa were based on its historical relations with, and geo-strategic interests in the Horn, and the turbulent political changes which had taken place in the last 50 years in the region. These were the secession of South Sudan from Sudan in 2011, and the decades long Somalian crisis. The EU resolved to use the same methods as in the Sahel Strategy to address challenges in the region, notably to exploit existing local, regional and international partnerships, particularly the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD).<sup>349</sup> The challenges parallel to those of the Sahel; however, IGAD, which involved comprises of the countries in the Horn region, is much less effective than ECOWAS, which proved to be a useful partner of the Sahel Strategy. The challenges identified in the Strategic

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<sup>348</sup> Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel.

[https://ec.europa.eu/sites/eas/files/strategy\\_for\\_security\\_and\\_development\\_in\\_the\\_sahel\\_en\\_0.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/sites/eas/files/strategy_for_security_and_development_in_the_sahel_en_0.pdf)

Downloaded: 05.09.2015.

<sup>349</sup> The member countries of the organisation are: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Uganda

Framework parallel with those of the Sahel were: corruption, food insecurity, climate change, terrorism, migration and illicit trafficking. As before, the EU wanted to address the whole region to solve the problems, since there is a large scale of interdependence in the Horn of Africa. The main objectives were similar: promote peace and stability, advocate security and prosperity, form accountable governments, and attain the MDGs. To achieve these the EU will make its current engagements in the Horn of Africa more effective, by using the instruments in a more consistent, coherent and complementary manner. These engagements were the formerly mentioned Cotonou Partnership Agreement, other bilateral trade relations between IGAD countries and the EU, the political dialogue set by multiple EU strategies, policies and agreements, a humanitarian response, mainly focusing on internally displaced people (IDP), the EU's crisis response and management system, which is conducted through the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), which even includes counter-piracy operations and counter-terrorism operations, the EU cooperation on climate change, migration and the support of African regional integration. The document also suggested a regular review of the strategy, with the first one to be held one year after the implementation of the Strategic Framework.<sup>350</sup>

The fourth EU–Africa Summit took place in Brussels in 2014. It witnessed the creation of *Roadmap 2014-2017* and the *Pan-African Programme* (PanAf), funded under the EU's Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI). The Roadmap augmented the Joint Africa–EU Strategy, with a timeframe of 2014-2017. It was focusing on five key priorities and areas for essential joint actions at inter-regional, continental and global level in which Africa and the EU have mutual interests. These key priorities were:

1. *“Peace and Security,*
2. *Democracy, Good Governance and Human Rights,*
3. *Human development,*
4. *Sustainable and inclusive development and growth and continental integration,*
5. *Global and emerging issues.”*<sup>351</sup>

The fifth priority addressed issues such as climate change, and non-proliferation and the reform of the international governing system.<sup>352</sup>

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<sup>350</sup> Council of the European Union: Council conclusions on the Horn of Africa.

[http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/126052.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/126052.pdf) Downloaded: 20.03.2017.

<sup>351</sup> Roadmap 2014-2017. [http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/files/documents/2014\\_04\\_01\\_4th\\_eu-africa\\_summit\\_roadmap\\_en.pdf](http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/files/documents/2014_04_01_4th_eu-africa_summit_roadmap_en.pdf) Downloaded: 15.10.2017.

<sup>352</sup> Roadmap 2014-2017.

PanAf built on the Lisbon Treaty and was connected to the Agenda for Change. It was a complementary element of current EU policies and instruments, adding a continental or trans-regional approach where needed. The programme also addressed the external dimensions of the EU policies. The PanAf put into practice the Policy Coherence for Development, which constructs synergies between EU policies and development cooperation. It was implemented by widening the range of the EU cooperation and involving all concerned services for whole planning and implementation processes. The PanAf was one of the supporting instruments of the Joint Africa–EU Strategy and was the first EU instrument that treated Africa as a whole.<sup>353</sup>

Faced with new, unprecedented global challenges and the need to re-invent itself after the shock of BREXIT, the EU developed a new global strategy in 2016. The number one priority of the new European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) is security. It emphasises building the defence capabilities of the EU, creating a security community, with strategic independence. To reach this objective, it sets out five areas: security and defence, counterterrorism, cybersecurity, energy security, and strategic communication. The secondary goal is to invest in state and social resilience to create stable states, which are resistant to crisis. It defines the most important characteristics of these states as democratic societies with trusted institutions and sustainable development. The third priority of the strategy is to create an integrated approach, which elevates the comprehensive approach to a broad, multi-dimensional, unified perspective of policies and conflicts, involving actors from every governmental level. The fourth priority supports the Cooperative Regional Orders, which aims to promote various forms of regional integration. The fifth is the vocation of the EU to the transformation of the 21<sup>st</sup> century global governance. The strategy also scheduled a yearly review.<sup>354</sup>

The priorities of the EUGS appear in multiple EU documents regarding Africa and migration. These documents discuss all five areas, from which the 2011 Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel arose from the EU's determination to fight terrorism in the region, while the strategic communication and partnership dates back to 2000 and the first EU–Africa Summit. The introduction of social resilience as part of the EUGS created the foundation for the earlier announced so called 'more for more' policy. This policy appeared in the Cotonou

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<sup>353</sup> Pan-African Programme 2014-2020. [https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/system/files/brochure-pan-african-programme\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/system/files/brochure-pan-african-programme_en.pdf) Downloaded: 08.05.2022.

<sup>354</sup> MOLNÁR, Anna: Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy. [http://www.nemzetesbiztonsag.hu/cikkek/nb\\_2016\\_2\\_07\\_molnar\\_anna\\_-\\_kozok\\_jovokep\\_kozos\\_cselekves\\_erosebb\\_europa\\_kozos\\_kul\\_es\\_biztonsagpolitikai\\_strategia.pdf](http://www.nemzetesbiztonsag.hu/cikkek/nb_2016_2_07_molnar_anna_-_kozok_jovokep_kozos_cselekves_erosebb_europa_kozos_kul_es_biztonsagpolitikai_strategia.pdf) Downloaded: 29.09.2017.



Agreement, which was signed in 2000. It does not only support democratic states in Africa, but all states where the aid will bring positive results.

The EU has changed a lot on its approach to the policies, refined the definitions, but the essence remained the same: the democratic values and the main principles. The different policies and strategies just clarified the definitions. The rewarded performance was translated to the political dimension, instead of the economic dimension. The integrated approach is not entirely new to EU–Africa relations, having been introduced in 2014 with PanAf. It provided a wider perspective to the existing strategies.

The most recent EU document related to Africa is the EU's *Integrated Strategy in the Sahel* of 2021. The geographical scope of the new strategy is slightly bigger than that of the previous one. In addition to Mauritania, Mali and Niger, Burkina Faso and Chad, the entirety of the G5 Sahel countries were added, which fits into the EU's articulated regional approach. The document was doubled in length compared to the Sahel Strategy of 2011. Its main focus is organised around one topic: security, and takes into consideration the fragile power structure of the countries, migration, COVID, and CSDP missions and operations.<sup>355</sup> The lengthy document is, however, a step backward from the previous strategic text concerning the region. It says less than its predecessor and has less concrete ideas how to address different vulnerabilities and weaknesses in the region. Besides the clear message on the willingness of European engagement in the region, there is no clear structure of the document. It is prominent, too, that this time the EU tries to address all aspects of security, but clearly fragments during the process. Compared to the strategy of 2011, the new document on the Sahel seems to be lost in the too many tasks. Fight against terrorism, which was a prominent element in 2011, was barely mentioned in 2021. Migration and cross-border crime gained more importance. This can also be translated as the continuation of the securitization of migration, since the strategy explicitly addresses security related topics.

The next stage of EU – Africa cooperation was the renewal of the expiring CPA. As mentioned in the preceding historical background section, the negotiations about the new framework of cooperation with the ACP countries started in 2018. During the course of negotiations, at the 9<sup>th</sup> Summit of the ACP Heads of State and Government, the ACP revised the Georgetown Agreement.<sup>356</sup> The new agreement transformed the ACP group of countries

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<sup>355</sup> The European Union's Integrated Strategy in the Sahel - Council Conclusions. <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7723-2021-INIT/en/pdf> Downloaded: 12.01.2022.

<sup>356</sup> The Georgetown Agreement brochure. [http://www.acp.int/sites/acpsec.waw.be/files/user\\_files/user\\_15/%20ACP-Brochure%20Revised%20Georgetown%20Agreement-UK%20def.pdf](http://www.acp.int/sites/acpsec.waw.be/files/user_files/user_15/%20ACP-Brochure%20Revised%20Georgetown%20Agreement-UK%20def.pdf) Downloaded: 10.11.2021.

into an international organisation and strengthened the cooperation among the partaking states. The name was changed to be the Organisation of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (OACPS). The refinement of the agreement was also encouraged by geopolitical reasons, as the members of the agreement expressed their wish to become a major multilateral actor.<sup>357</sup> This wish is quite legitimate if we take into consideration the number of countries (79 of them) who participate in the OACPS. With their sheer geographical area and population, this group can be an important platform for expressing and achieving the ACP countries' economic aims.

The negotiations on the new framework of cooperation with the freshly renamed OACPS were concluded on 15 April 2021. The most remarkable change compared to the previous agreements is that each of the three respective regions of the cooperation got a tailored regional protocol. The foundation of the agreement is the same for all three regions:

- i. Human Rights, Democracy, and Governance in People-Centred and Rights-Based Societies,
- ii. Peace and security,
- iii. Human and social development,
- iv. Environmental sustainability and climate change,
- v. Inclusive sustainable economic growth and development, and
- vi. Migration and mobility.<sup>358</sup>

The three regional protocols are fitted to the regional characteristics. For example, the Africa Protocol includes migration and mobility, the Caribbean Protocol includes climate change, just like the Pacific Protocol, but the latter also includes an oceans, seas and fisheries title too.<sup>359</sup> The agreed text must be ratified by the OACPS. In parallel with that, the EU must accept it, too. The European Commission already adopted a proposal for a Council Decision, but before the Council decides on it, the European Parliament must also give its consent. The Slovenian presidency of the EU was pushing for the signature of the new agreement before the end of 2021. As it did not take place, now the task forms part of portfolio of the French presidency.<sup>360</sup>

<sup>357</sup> ACP Summit Endorses Revised Georgetown Agreement. <http://acp.int/content/acp-summit-endorses-revised-georgetown-agreement> Downloaded: 10.11.2021.

<sup>358</sup> Post-Cotonou negotiations on new EU/Africa-Caribbean-Pacific Partnership Agreement concluded. [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP\\_21\\_1552](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_21_1552) Downloaded: 09.11.2021.

<sup>359</sup> Negotiated Agreement text initialled by the EU and OACPS chief negotiators on 15th April 2021. [https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/system/files/negotiated-agreement-text-initialled-by-eu-oacps-chief-negotiators-20210415\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/system/files/negotiated-agreement-text-initialled-by-eu-oacps-chief-negotiators-20210415_en.pdf) Downloaded: 09.11.2021.

<sup>360</sup> Signature and conclusion of the new agreement between the EU and the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP-EU post-Cotonou). [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-development-deve/file-signature-of-the-new-eu-acp-agreement-\(%E2%80%98-post-cotonou-%E2%80%98\)](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-development-deve/file-signature-of-the-new-eu-acp-agreement-(%E2%80%98-post-cotonou-%E2%80%98)) Downloaded: 10.11.2021.

### IV.1.3 INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND

The different strategies require institutional foundations. There are EU Special Representatives (EUSR) in the different crisis areas, they represent the EU in these troubled regions where they promote EU policies and interests. The main tasks of the EUSRs are to support the work of the High Representative/ Vice President (HR/VP) with respect to the mentioned regions and countries. They play an important role in developing and strengthening the CSDP and to make the EU a more effective, capable and coherent actor worldwide. There are two EUSRs in Africa, one for the Horn of Africa and one for the Sahel. Both EUSRs' mandates are based on the strategies and policy objectives of the respected regions. They also have to contribute actively to the regional and international endeavour to reach lasting peace, security and development. The EUSR for the Horn of Africa was appointed in 2012, with the corresponding task of developing the effectiveness of the EU's multidimensional engagement in the area. The EUSR for the Sahel was appointed in 2015 and has to coordinate the comprehensive approach addressing the crisis in the Sahel according to the EU's related strategy. Besides the two EUSRs, who are directly linked to Africa, there is a third EUSR for Human Rights, first appointed in 2012, with a thematic task: to work with the European External Action Service and promote the EU's human rights policy across the world, including Africa.<sup>361</sup>

The EU is represented at the ambassadorial level by delegations. The EU is represented by these diplomatic bodies all over the world, and its presence is very significant in Africa. It has a multilateral delegation to the African Union and, via bilateral or regional delegations, it is represented in 53 countries on the continent. The tasks of these delegations are to represent the EU and its citizens, to serve the EU's interests through presenting, explaining, and implementing EU policies, maintain political dialogue, oversee EU aid programs, and conduct negotiations in accordance with their given mandate.<sup>362</sup> The most important among these delegations is the EU Delegation to the AU, which started in 2008 in order to have a permanent connection with the AU. The delegation works with the 55 AU member states, the AU Commission and other AU bodies. These are the AU Peace and Security Council, EU countries, and other governmental and international partners of the AU. The delegation has to deal with different countries and thematic areas. Political dialogue on mutually concerning issues, and a

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<sup>361</sup> EU Special Representatives. [https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-special-representatives\\_en](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-special-representatives_en) Downloaded: 08.05.2022.

<sup>362</sup> EU Delegations and Offices around the World. [https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-world-0\\_en#44326](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-world-0_en#44326) Downloaded: 15.10.2017.

long-term cooperation and institution building is among these thematic areas. The delegation follows the framework set by the Joint Africa–EU Strategy and the consecutive EU–Africa Summits’ achievements and additional EU documents related to Africa.<sup>363</sup>

The Council of the EU has several preparatory bodies, including the Africa Working Party (COAFR), the African, Caribbean and Pacific Working Party (ACP), and the Mashreq/Maghreb Working Party (MaMa).<sup>364</sup> The Africa Working Party is responsible for the management of EU external policy towards sub-Saharan Africa, which is defined by various documents focusing on establishing a far-reaching partnership, which includes 46 countries, the AU, and other regional organisations.<sup>365</sup> The ACP Working Party is responsible for the EU–ACP cooperation set by the Cotonou Agreement. It was the most complex and deepest partnership between the EU and developing countries, which provides a framework for cooperation both in development, trade and political dimensions.<sup>366</sup> The countries which fall under the Mashreq/Maghreb Working Party are the states included in the ENP.

There are also multiple committees responsible for the African issues. The Committee on Foreign Affairs, supported by a subcommittee on security and defence, is responsible for the promotion, implementation and monitoring of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the CSDP. The committee is also responsible for promoting, implementing, and monitoring the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace, the Partnership Instrument (PI) and issues concerning democracy, the rule of law, and the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), which is covered by a subcommittee on human rights. All of these instruments are connected to Africa, by providing aid, or establishing partnership, and in the framework of the CSDP multiple EU missions and operations are present on the continent. The Committee on Development is responsible for areas which have links to Africa, too. This committee is responsible for the promotion, implementation and monitoring of the development and cooperation policy of the EU, especially for maintaining political dialogue and cooperation with developing countries and monitoring aid. This committee is also responsible for the DCI, which covers the Pan-African Programme and the European Development Fund. This latter provides the finances for most of the distributed aid in Africa. Finally, it is responsible for the entire ACP–EU Partnership Agreement. The Committee on International Trade monitors trade

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<sup>363</sup> About the EU Delegation to the African Union. [https://www.ecas.europa.eu/delegations/african-union-au\\_en](https://www.ecas.europa.eu/delegations/african-union-au_en) Downloaded: 15.10.2017.

<sup>364</sup> EU–Africa relations. <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-africa/> Downloaded: 15.10.2017.

<sup>365</sup> Africa Working Party (COAFR). <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/preparatory-bodies/africa-working-party/> Downloaded: 15.10.2017.

<sup>366</sup> African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Working Party. <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/preparatory-bodies/african-caribbean-pacific-working-party/> Downloaded: 15.10.2017.

activity and agreements between the EU and third countries, including Africa. The Committee on Budgets has no direct connection to Africa but, along with the Committee on Budgetary Control, manages the EDFs that fund the EU's programs in Africa.<sup>367</sup>

Besides the Committees, some of the European Commission's Departments and services have connections to Africa as well. The Directorate-General (DG) for International Cooperation and Development (DEVCO), which deals with the development of the cooperation policies of the EU. It has two geographical directorates that focus on Africa: Directorate D, responsible for EU-Africa Relations, East and Southern Africa and Directorate E, covering West and Central Africa. They supervise assistance from EU Delegations in addition to controlling some programmes directly, such as the EU–African Peace Facility, and bilateral cooperation with Ethiopia or Nigeria.<sup>368</sup> DG Migration and Home Affairs (HOME) also contributes to the cooperation with Africa via bilateral, regional and continental dialogues on migration and mobility. This translates to programs like the *Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment* and the Rabat and Khartoum Processes.<sup>369</sup> The Department of Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) works with the European External Action Service and is responsible for operational expenditures in the critical area of EU external action. The FPI reports directly to the HR/VP and has five units. The first is responsible for the budget, finance, relations with other institutions. The second covers the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), while the third unit is in charge of Common Foreign and Security Policy operations. The fourth is responsible for the PI, and the fifth unit is accountable for EU Foreign Policy Regulatory Instruments, and Election Observation. Nearly all of these areas connect to EU initiatives regarding Africa, or to operating EU missions and operations on the continent.<sup>370</sup>

The formal dialogues between the two continents are conducted on various levels, whose institutional architecture was mainly set by the Joint Africa–EU Strategy. According to this, the EU–Africa Summits are the most important strategic-level forums for regular dialogue between the two parties. They occur every three years since the implementation of the Joint Strategy. This level is responsible for providing political guidance for the further work, and this body approves the Action Plans. The 1st EU–Africa Summit (Cairo, 2000) elucidated a

<sup>367</sup> Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament.

<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getLastRules.do?language=en&reference=ANN-05> Downloaded: 15.10.2017.

<sup>368</sup> Organisational structure of DG DEVCO. [https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/organisation-chart-dg-devco\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/organisation-chart-dg-devco_en.pdf) Downloaded: 08.05.2022.

<sup>369</sup> Migration and Home Affairs: Africa. [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/international-affairs/africa\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/international-affairs/africa_en) Downloaded: 06.11.2021.

<sup>370</sup> Funding instruments. [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/funding/funding-instruments-programming/funding-instruments\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/funding/funding-instruments-programming/funding-instruments_en) Downloaded: 25.10.2017.

comprehensive framework for the EU–Africa strategic partnership. The second (Lisbon, 2007) saw the formulation of the Joint EU–Africa Strategy; the third (Tripoli, 2010) widened the scope of the Joint Strategy, to make it a more people-centred partnership, and it adopted the Second Action Plan and the Tripoli Declaration, which focused on achieving the MDGs.<sup>371</sup> The fourth summit, held in 2014 in Brussels, discussed the future of relations and the reinforcement of the existing partnership. The Summit adopted both Roadmap 2014–2017 and PanAf.<sup>372</sup> The fifth was in Abidjan in November 2017, a decade after the adoption of the Joint Strategy. The event was expected to be a defining year of the EU–Africa relations. Seven topics headed the agenda: investing in youth, peace and security, governance (including democracy), human rights, migration and mobility, investment and trade, skills development, and job creation.<sup>373</sup> The sixth summit was between 17–18 February 2022 in Brussels. At the ministerial level preparatory meeting of the summit, six topics were discussed: (1) the response to and recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic, (2) resilience building, (3) investing in the digital and green transitions, (4) peace, security and global governance, (5) migration and mobility, (6) education, science, technology and skills development.<sup>374</sup> These topics were mostly covered at the summit as well. After the summit the Joint Vision for 2030 was released, which pledged for the renewal of the partnership. In this framework, recovery from COVID-19 gained the first place, while among other priorities migration and mobility and commitment to multilateralism were also listed.<sup>375</sup>

EU-Africa summits are prepared at the ministerial level. In line with this there is a bi-annual ministerial-level or “troika” meeting designed to balance representation of both unions. *“On the EU side, the Troika consists of the current and incoming EU Presidency, the European Commission and the EU Council Secretariat, while on the African side the Troika consists of the current and outgoing Presidencies of the AU and the AU Commission, expanded to include chef de file countries at the expert and senior official levels.”*<sup>376</sup> This meeting has the task to review and monitor the implementation of the Joint EU – Africa Strategy and the Action Plans.

<sup>371</sup> 3rd Africa-EU Summit (2010). <http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/en/3rd-africa-eu-summit> Downloaded: 16.10.2017.

<sup>372</sup> EU – Africa summit, Brussels, 02-03/04/2014. <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2014/04/02-03/> Downloaded: 16.10.2017.

<sup>373</sup> 5th African Union – EU Summit, 29-30/11/2017. <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2017/11/29-30/> Downloaded: 16.10.2017.

<sup>374</sup> African Union - European Union ministerial meeting, 26 October 2021.

<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-ministerial-meetings/2021/10/26/> Downloaded: 04.11.2021.

<sup>375</sup> 6th European Union - African Union Summit: A Joint Vision for 2030.

[https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/54412/final\\_declaration-en.pdf](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/54412/final_declaration-en.pdf) Downloaded: 13.05.2022.

<sup>376</sup> A Joint Africa – EU Strategy. p. 21.



The third level of the institutional system is the annual commission-to-commission level meeting, which is to strengthen the cooperation between the two bodies and advance the agenda of the strategic partnership.<sup>377</sup>

#### IV.1.4 FINANCIAL BACKGROUND

The basis of the aid provided by the EU and its member states is regulated by treaties via the guiding principles of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC), which defines the countries and territories eligible to receive ODA. The EU and its member states became the biggest aid provider in the world recently, with more than 50 per cent of globally distributed official aid. The EU is also committed to increasing the recent contribution.<sup>378</sup> The renewed Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for 2014–2020 had nine development instruments; four are thematic (EIDHR, Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), PI and the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC)) and five are geographical (DCI, Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance II (IPA), European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), Instrument for Greenland (IfG) and the EDF).<sup>379</sup>

Out of these nine development instruments six provided funding to African countries and regional organisations, three of which are geographical instruments (DCI, ENI and EDF), and three thematic instruments (EIDHR, IcSP and INSC). Since these are the most important instruments with respect to Africa, only these six will be introduced here.

The EIDHR was a thematic funding instrument for EU external action, which was aiming to support projects in the area of human rights in non-EU countries. This instrument was unique in the EU's toolbox as it complemented other EU external assistance instruments. It could be used flexibly, which allowed the EU to use it according to local conditions, and at either the government or non-governmental level. The budget of the EIDHR for 2014–2020 was 1.3 billion EUR.<sup>380</sup>

The IcSP was the main EU instrument financing security initiatives and peace-building activities. This instrument was to provide short-term and long-term support as well, where the short-term assistance was meant for countries with unfolding crises, and the long-term was to

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<sup>377</sup> A Joint Africa – EU Strategy.

<sup>378</sup> MOLNÁR, Anna: Az Európai Unió külkapcsolati rendszere. [The Foreign Relations of the European Union], Dialóg Campus Kiadó, Budapest, 2018. ISBN 978 615 5877 06 3 ps. 96-101.

<sup>379</sup> Funding instruments.

<sup>380</sup> European Instrument for Democracy & Human Rights (EIDHR). <https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/node/103464>  
Downloaded: 25.10.2017.

tackle global and trans-border threats. The IcSP also complemented the EU's geographical instruments. It had a 2.3 billion EUR budget for the 2014–2020 period.<sup>381</sup>

The INSC promotes high standards of nuclear safety, including radiation protection, and applies efficient and effective safeguards for nuclear material in non-EU countries. The instrument entered its second phase in 2014, working with African countries to address consequences of uranium mining in North Africa, and particularly in Egypt and Morocco. The INSC had a budget of 200 million EUR for 2014–2020.<sup>382</sup>

The DCI was formulated in line with the Lisbon Treaty and the Agenda for Change. Its main objective was poverty reduction, but it contributed to other EU programs, like sustainable development in multiple areas, for example in economic, social and environmental fields, but it also provided assistance to promote democracy, the rule of law, good governance, and human rights. This instrument could be used in countries not entitled to IPA funds. The DCI consisted of three elements. The first is geographic programmes, which supported cooperation with developing countries, which included the South African region. The second was thematic programmes, which covered all developing countries that fell under the ENI or the EDF. These thematic programmes were complementary and coherent with the geographical programmes. The third was the Pan-African Programme, which supported activities from the trans-regional to the global level. The DCI's total budget of 19.6 billion EUR for 2014–2020 breaks down as follows: 11.8 billion EUR for geographic programmes; 7 billion EUR for thematic programmes; and 845 million EUR for PanAf.<sup>383</sup>

The ENI supported the ENP, meaning for Africa, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia. The instrument had a 15.4 billion EUR budget for 2014–2020.<sup>384</sup>

The EDF was the most important and largest EU aid package; it provides the financing for the CPA. The EDF, however, was outside the EU budget, financed by direct contributions from the EU member states. The 1<sup>st</sup> EDF came in 1957, with the Treaty of Rome. The treaty established a technical and financial development fund primarily for the African countries, which later transformed to support the ACP and the overseas countries and territories (OCTs). The 10<sup>th</sup> EDF finished at the end of 2013. Some minor modification was introduced with the

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<sup>381</sup> The Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP). <https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/node/7350> Downloaded: 25.10.2017.

<sup>382</sup> Building Nuclear Safety Together. [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/information-brochure-insc-building-nuclear-safety-20140115\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/information-brochure-insc-building-nuclear-safety-20140115_en.pdf) Downloaded: 26.10.2017.

<sup>383</sup> Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI). <https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/node/7432> Downloaded: 26.10.2017.

<sup>384</sup> European Neighbourhood Policy. [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/neighbourhood/overview\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/neighbourhood/overview_en) Downloaded: 26.10.2017.



11<sup>th</sup> EDF, including aligning the EU member states' contribution rules to the MFF to the EU budget. The other was an effort to create more flexibility for faster reaction to unexpected events both on national and regional level. The EDF funded activities related to economic development, social and human development, and regional cooperation and integration.

The last, 11<sup>th</sup> EDF budget was 30.5 billion EUR for 2014–2020.<sup>385</sup> In 2015 the budget support program of the EU, including all instruments, allocated 1.59 billion EUR, 20% of the official development assistance disbursed by DEVCO and DG Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations. 47% of this financial support went to sub-Saharan Africa, as the largest recipient.<sup>386</sup> Table 4. shows the total EU commitments to Africa for 2015 in million EUR, by instrument.

Table 4: EU commitments to Africa, 2015 (EUR million)<sup>387</sup> (Edited by the author)

2015	ENI	DCI GEO	DCI THEMA	DCI	EIDHR	IcSP	INSC	CFSP	IPA	HUMA	EDF	OTHER	Total
<b>Africa total</b>	484	129	123	–	1	103	2	33	–	587	4344	13	5820
<b>Africa regional</b>	3	101	100	–	–	–	–	–	–	136	1446	2	1788

To synchronise these instruments and pool the aid, the Africa Investment Facility (AfIF) was established in 2015. The purpose is to support sustainable growth in Africa and improve coordination with donors. It provides support through investment grants, technical assistance, risk capital, and other risk-sharing instruments. The resources of the AfIF came from the EDF and DCI.<sup>388</sup>

The new MFF for 2021–2027 rationalised the instruments. This means that the number of external action instruments decreased dramatically, with only two of them remaining. The first, and less important from Africa's point of view is the European Instrument for Nuclear Safety with a budget of 300 million EUR for the 2021–2027 period.<sup>389</sup> The second remaining or rather newly created instrument is the Neighbourhood Development and International Cooperation

<sup>385</sup> European Development Fund (EDF). <https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/node/1079> Downloaded: 25.10.2017.

<sup>386</sup> 2016 Annual Report, DEVCO. <https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/europeaid-ar2016-en-ld.pdf> Downloaded: 25.10.2017.

<sup>387</sup> 2016 Annual Report, DEVCO.

<sup>388</sup> Africa Investment Facility. [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/africa-investment-facility\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/africa-investment-facility_en) Downloaded: 27.10.2017.

<sup>389</sup> Financing EU external action in the new MFF, 2021–2027. [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/644173/EPRS\\_BRI\(2019\)644173\\_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/644173/EPRS_BRI(2019)644173_EN.pdf) Downloaded: 06.11.2021. p.6.

Instrument, known also as the Global Europe Instrument. This one instrument practically incorporated almost all of the previous foreign policy instruments in itself, even adding the EDF, therefore including it into the EU's official budget. This does not mean, however, that there will be no differentiation within this increased budget.

- 60.38 billion EUR was planned for geographic programmes, with the following allocation to different areas: at least 19.32 billion EUR for the ENP countries, at least 29.18 billion EUR for ACP Africa region, 8.48 billion EUR for Asia and the Pacific, 3.39 billion EUR for the Americas and the Caribbean.
- 6.36 billion EUR for thematic programmes, including Human Rights and Democracy.
- 3.18 billion EUR for rapid response actions.
- In addition to this, a pool of unallocated funds will be ready for use, with a sum of 9.53 billion EUR.

Thus, the Global Europe Instrument has the total amount of 89.2 billion EUR for the 2021–2027 period.<sup>390</sup>


The EUTF is the EU's tool for flexible response in emergency situations. The EUTF for Africa was established at the 2015 Valletta Summit on migration and made available 1.8 billion EUR immediately. Since then, the resources increased to more than 3.2 billion EUR, thanks to the member states' contributions and European Commission instruments, like the EDF. The EUTF for Africa is an implementing tool, which allows a rapid, flexible and effective response from the EU side in emergency situations. This tool uses various resources, from the EU to other donors. The main objectives of the EUTF for Africa are to address the root causes of migration and the crisis around Lake Chad in a comprehensive manner. The EUTF for Africa

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<sup>390</sup> EU external action budget: European Commission welcomes the final adoption of the EU's new long-term external action budget for 2021-2027. [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip\\_21\\_2885](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_2885)  
Downloaded: 06.11.2021.

participates in different projects in the Sahel and Lake Chad regions (Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal), in the Horn of Africa (Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda), and in North Africa (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia). The EUTF for Africa, which is based on the EUGS and the EU's development policy, addresses forced migration and its root causes, like security challenges,

4. Map: EUTF regions. (Edited by the author)



social issues, economic pressure and environmental stress.<sup>391</sup> The total budget allocation in 2020 was 4.9 billion EUR; of the total, 2.1 billion EUR will go to the Sahel region and Lake Chad, 1.8 billion EUR to the Horn of Africa, and 900 million EUR to North Africa.<sup>392</sup>

Besides the above-mentioned instruments, the EU also provides loans to sub-Saharan and South African countries through the European Investment Bank (EIB). It provides project loans, intermediated loans, venture capital facility, microfinance and equity and fund investments. In 2020 the EIB financed 47 projects in sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, the Overseas Countries and Territories and South Africa with 2.1 billion EUR. Since 2003, West Africa and the Sahel received a total of 4.6 billion EUR to 110 projects, which is far more than the second number, 82 projects and 3 billion EUR to Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean.<sup>393</sup> 71 per cent of EIB assistance goes to less developed countries and fragile states.<sup>394</sup>

Different aid provided by the EU through various agencies and programmes, like the EUTF can raise the question of their effectiveness, since African countries' per capita incomes have

<sup>391</sup> 2016 Annual report EUTF.

[https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/eutf\\_2016\\_annual\\_report\\_final\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/eutf_2016_annual_report_final_en.pdf) Downloaded: 26.10.2017.

<sup>392</sup> EUTF for Africa. [https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/sites/default/files/factsheet\\_eutf-for-africa\\_january\\_2021\\_0.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/sites/default/files/factsheet_eutf-for-africa_january_2021_0.pdf) Downloaded: 04.11.2021.

<sup>393</sup> 2020 Annual Report on EIB Activity in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, and the Overseas Countries and Territories. [https://www01.eib.org/attachments/publications/acp\\_annual\\_report\\_2020\\_en.pdf](https://www01.eib.org/attachments/publications/acp_annual_report_2020_en.pdf) Downloaded: 04.11.2021. p. 67.

<sup>394</sup> 2020 Annual Report on EIB Activity in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, and the Overseas Countries and Territories. p. 6.

not changed much in real terms over time. It is argued also, that most aid is funding vanity projects instead of addressing recipient development priorities and providing a predictable tailored solution to the countries in need. It can be assessed that one of these selfish vanity projects of the EU is migration management. Within the framework of EUTF this thematic area seems to be the most important, which raises the question of effectiveness in the articulated goal to address the root causes of migration.<sup>395</sup>

The blame is, however, not just on the donor countries, since aid in less democratic structures can lead to further corruption. Furthermore, aid can discourage development, and contribute to the brain drain phenomenon on a local level. These accusations are traceable in the EU – OACPS relations as well. Trade concessions in the Lomé conventions turned out to be a mere formality, since the ACP countries were not eligible for preferences in their only meaningful sector, agriculture. During the 1980s and 1990s, the shift of EU preferences from the former colonies to the post-Soviet region resulted in decreasing funds to the ACP. With the CPA, problems remained, the new framework did not benefit all contracting states uniformly, thus it led to even more heterogeneity. The post-Cotonou era brought a more severe consequence to the relations. The dedicated instrument of the partnership, the EDF was budgetised and merged with multiple other EU financial instruments. This also signifies the EU's further step back from Africa. The EDF had been perceived as a dedicated fund, and with the budgetisation of the instrument it can be redirected to other regions and purposes.<sup>396</sup> In 2021, with the introduction of the new MFF exactly this happened, the Global Europe instrument was introduced, precisely to be able to divert funds more easily. These steps are widening the gap between the EU and the OACPS.

## IV.2 EU STRATEGIES ON MIGRATION<sup>397</sup>

In 2015 an unprecedented number of migrants reached the borders of the European Union. This unexpected mass migration influx meant a significant burden to the transit countries lying

<sup>395</sup> SZENT-IVÁNYI, Balázs: Practising what they preach? Development NGOs and the EU's Emergency Trust Fund for Africa. in: *Third World Quarterly*. 2021. Vol. 42. Issue 11. pp. 2552-2571.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2021.1964358> Downloaded: 03.09.2022. ps. 2557-2258.

<sup>396</sup> SZENT-IVÁNYI, Balázs: The EU's International Development Policy. in: GÁLIK, Zoltán, MOLNÁR, Anna [eds.]: *Regional and bilateral relations of the EU*. Dialóg Campus, Budapest, 2019. ISBN 978 615 5945 52 6 pp. 255-278. ps. 258-269.

<sup>397</sup> Based on: VECSEY, Mariann: A migrációs politika evolúciója az Európai Unióban. [The evolution of migration policy in the European Union] in: MOLNÁR, Anna, KOMLÓSI, Orsolya [eds.]: *Az Európai Unió mediterrán térséggel összefüggő kapcsolata, Párbeszéd és konfliktusok*. [The European Union's Relations with the Mediterranean, Dialogue and Conflicts.] Dialóg Campus, Budapest, 2019. ISBN 978 615 5920 17 2 pp. 145-162.

either on the Balkans or the Central Mediterranean migration route. The figures reached as high as 1.3 million in 2016 and did not grow significantly further only because of the so-called EU-Turkey deal.<sup>398</sup>

The European Union, unprepared to receive the masses who crossed its borders in the timeframe of mere months, engaged itself in creating makeshift solutions for the problem. This led to the birth of such initiatives as the quota system, or the renewed thinking about the formulation of a common European Army.

Migration was no longer regarded as a natural phenomenon, and different Member States communicated differently about migration, successfully politicising and in the end securitising it. The securitisation Europeanised over time, and in 2016 the irregularly arriving migrants were generally regarded as a security threat. Migration was seen as a threat to the fundamental acquis of the EU integration, as border controls were reintroduced within the Schengen area.<sup>399</sup> This seemingly common security threat did not mobilise the Member States fully, and there was no common understanding about the possible solutions among them. The Member States' varying share from the crisis led to different proposals, and consensus on them was rare. With the competing interests, new dividing lines appeared in the BREXIT-weakened European integration.

The aim of this subchapter is to introduce the European policy initiatives how to tackle the so-called migration and refugee crisis. The section focuses on the Dublin Regulation, which is the core document of events in 2015–16. It is important to know how the EU tackled migration from the early stages of the integration, which can reveal that the possible changes of the migration policies and common measures on asylum had an effect on the patterns of international migration to the EU. Thus, the examination of the contractual and legal framework on migration is tackled in three main parts, one being the period before the so-called migration and refugee crisis, the second from 2014, through the years of the crisis until the proposal in 2019 on the New Pact on Migration and Asylum.

#### **IV.2.1 CONTRACTUAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK UNTIL 2014**

The first period to tackle is how the EU's policy on migration evolved from the 1990s until the beginning of recent so-called migration and refugee crisis in 2014. For this, the treaties are

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<sup>398</sup> Eurostat: *Migration and migrant population statistics*. [http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Migration\\_and\\_migrant\\_population\\_statistics](http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics). Downloaded: 04.06.2017.

<sup>399</sup> GUILD, Elspeth, BROUWER, Evelien, GROENENDIJK, Kees and CARRERA, Sergio: What is happening to the Schengen borders? [https://www.ceps.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/No%2086%20Schengenland\\_0.pdf](https://www.ceps.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/No%2086%20Schengenland_0.pdf) Downloaded: 10.11.2021. p.8.

important sources to identify if the EU and its predecessor organisations considered the third country nationals as potential immigrants to the territory of the European integration. Therefore, the first treaty to investigate is the Treaty of Rome, which established the European Economic Community. The treaty, signed in 1957, was not yet to address the question of migration in a common manner. The few mentions of migration in the treaty mostly refer to the free movement of people.<sup>400</sup>

With a huge leap in time the next important year in the formulation of a common migration policy is the first Dublin Regulation which was signed in 1990. Thus, the foundation of the common European asylum procedure was laid down even before the Treaty of Maastricht was signed. Unfortunately, the regulation entered into force only in 1997. It outlined the basis for the succeeding documents. It listed in Article 1 the related definitions, only seven of them that first time, starting with such as applicant for asylum, which reads as the following: “*an alien who has made an application for asylum in respect of which a final decision has not yet been taken*”. Besides this, residence permit, different visa types were also defined.<sup>401</sup>

Article 2 states that the EU will take action in accordance with international law with no geographical restrictions. Article 3 of the regulation determines the principles on the asylum procedure. These include the most important ones, such as one Member State examines an application at a time, every Member State is eligible to examine applications, or cease any case if the applicant leaves the EU for 3 or more months. Articles 4 to 9 then discuss the hierarchy of which Member States are responsible to examine an asylum application. These are the following in the order of priority:

1. Where the applicant for asylum has a member of his family who has a recognised refugee status;
2. Where the applicant for asylum is in possession of a valid residence permit or visa, or a residence permit expired less than two years previously, or a visa expired less than six months previously;
3. Where it can be proved that the applicant for asylum irregularly crossed the border from a third state;
4. The Member State who is responsible for controlling the entry of an alien into the territory of the EU;

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<sup>400</sup> Treaty of Rome. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/FR/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:11957E/TXT&from=EN> Downloaded: 15.11.2021. p. 52.

<sup>401</sup> Convention determining the State responsible for examining applications for asylum lodged in one of the Member States of the European Communities ( 97/C 254/01 ). [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:41997A0819\(01\)&from=EN](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:41997A0819(01)&from=EN) Downloaded: 28.10.2021. p. 3.

5. When other criteria are not met in the first Member State where the application for asylum was lodged;
6. For humanitarian reasons, strictly if the applicant for asylum desires, any Member State, by the request of another Member State.<sup>402</sup>

Within these criteria, there are exemptions, and more detailed descriptions.

Besides establishing the mechanism how to identify which Member State is responsible for examining an asylum application, the regulation also laid out that the Member States shall share and exchange information. According to the regulation, general information on trends and countries of origin can be exchanged, and further communication is encouraged in order to identify the Member State responsible for examining an application as well as, if needed, personal and travel document information and other information of the applicant to clarify his identity.<sup>403</sup> The first Dublin Regulation was 12 pages altogether. It clearly built up the mechanism for 'business as usual', and not for the dramatically increased figures of 2015.

The next treaty to investigate after examining the Treaty of Rome is the Treaty of Maastricht, which established the European Union. In 1992, when the Member States signed the treaty, they thought about third country nationals wanting to enter the EU. Article K.1 identified common asylum procedure, common immigration policy and the rules governing the crossing of external borders by third country nationals as an EU interest. Within this scope, the conditions of entry, movements and residence were to be addressed by a common migration policy, with the addition of combatting unauthorised immigration, residence, and work by third country nationals. The treaty also recognized the importance of cooperation in various areas, such as the fields of justice, customs and police cooperation. Article K.2 further elaborates that the agreed common policies must be in compliance with the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4 November 1950 and the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951. In addition to the mandatory compliance with the international conventions, the common policies to be forged must take into account the Member States' policies about protection to persons persecuted on political grounds.<sup>404</sup>

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<sup>402</sup> Convention determining the State responsible for examining applications for asylum lodged in one of the Member States of the European Communities ( 97/C 254/01 ). ps. 4-5.

<sup>403</sup> Convention determining the State responsible for examining applications for asylum lodged in one of the Member States of the European Communities ( 97/C 254/01 ). ps. 6-7.

<sup>404</sup> Treaty of Maastricht <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:11992M/TXT&from=HU> Downloaded: 10.06.2017. p. 61.



The Treaty of Maastricht identified the need for a common migration policy and encouraged cooperation among Member States in different areas. Yet, the treaty did not define a timeframe to create the said policy. In 1997, the Amsterdam Treaty addressed this hiatus and specified a five-year-long threshold from its entry into force to adopt multiple measures, which aimed to establish a more coherent European response to migration. As in the Treaty of Maastricht, Article 73K addressed migration related questions. The same international agreements and protocols were listed as the basis of the EU's actions, and the article remained mostly unchanged. The most important difference was that the treaty required the EU to adopt measures in the following areas: to prevent and combat crime related to border crossing, measures in the fields of asylum, immigration, and safeguarding the rights of third country nationals, measures in the judicial and administrative fields and police cooperation.<sup>405</sup>

The Treaty of Amsterdam gave tangible tasks and a timeframe to the organisation, and the EU started the formulation of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) accurately in 1999, just as the treaty entered into force. The CEAS aimed to harmonise national procedures, measures and the minimum standards for asylum. The system also included the Dublin Regulation as one of its pillars.<sup>406</sup> The further harmonisation of the asylum system was introduced within the five-year Tampere Programme, in 1999. The programme intended to build coherence not just among the different national, but also between the internal and external policies. One of its priorities was to develop partnership with migration transit and origin countries.<sup>407</sup> Naturally, the creation of an entirely new common policy and procedures was not a speedy process. Its next stage was the Treaty of Nice, which again set out a five-year long timeframe to formulate the mechanisms for determining which Member State is responsible for considering an asylum application by a third-country national, and the previously mentioned minimum standards for asylum.<sup>408</sup> In this second multiannual program on developing the common migration policy, security gained more focus. The unprecedented terrorist attacks on

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<sup>405</sup>Treaty of Amsterdam 97/C 340/01. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:11997D/TXT&from=HU> Downloaded: 10.06.2021. p. 28.

<sup>406</sup> Common European Asylum System. [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/policies/migration-and-asylum/common-european-asylum-system\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/policies/migration-and-asylum/common-european-asylum-system_en) Downloaded: 21.11.2021.

<sup>407</sup> Tampere European Council 15 and 16 October 1999 Presidency Conclusions. [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam\\_en.htm#a](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_en.htm#a) 21.11.2021.

<sup>408</sup> The Common European Asylum System - third reform. [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/PERI/2017/580866/IPOL\\_PERI\(2017\)580866\\_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/PERI/2017/580866/IPOL_PERI(2017)580866_EN.pdf) Downloaded: 21.11.2021. p. 3.



11 September 2001 led to an increased attention to third countries which have chosen not to cooperate to combat illegal migration.<sup>409</sup>

In 2003, Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 in its Chapter III., further detailed the earlier established hierarchy of criteria on determining which Member State is responsible for examining an application for asylum. The regulation kept the general order of criteria, complementing it with articles on unaccompanied minors, added paragraphs to the article on already residing family members, articles on visa and residence permit, including measures if fraud was committed, an article on application for asylum lodged in an international transit zone and an article on the multiple family members parallel applications. For these reasons the definitions section of the regulation got longer than in the original Dublin Regulation. It also introduced new terminology, for example, changing the earlier used “alien” to “third-country national”. Due to the wider scope of criteria that the regulation established, it needed to define such terms as “unaccompanied minor” and “family”. As a new idea, taking charge and taking back measures were introduced in the regulation. It obliged Member States to take charge or take back any applicant whose application for asylum according to criteria falls on them, or it was requested by another Member State. The regulation further elaborated the information exchange and communication cooperation among Member States with respect to applicants for asylum and to general trends.<sup>410</sup> According to the Dublin Regulation and the Council Regulation of 2003, the Member State responsible for examining an application for asylum will be mostly the one where the applicant first lodged his/her application and entered the territory of the EU, save a few exemptions.

In 2004, in the framework of the Tampere Programme, the EU accepted Council Directive 2004/83/EC on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third-country nationals and stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted. The directive was in accordance with the development of the CEAS. Its objective was to ensure the effectiveness of the system, to regulate the recognition of the refugee status and harmonise its main contents.<sup>411</sup>

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<sup>409</sup> TARDIS, Matthieu: European Union Partnerships with African Countries on Migration. [https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/tardis\\_eu\\_partnerships\\_african\\_countries\\_migration\\_2018.pdf](https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/tardis_eu_partnerships_african_countries_migration_2018.pdf) Downloaded: 21.11.2021. p.10.

<sup>410</sup> Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32003R0343&from=hu> Downloaded: 22.11.2021. ps. 2-8.

<sup>411</sup> Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32004L0083&from=EN> Downloaded: 21.11.2021.

In 2005, when the next multiannual programme was accepted in the Hague, among the ten listed priorities, anti-terrorist measures took the prominent second place, signifying that migration and security are going hand in hand. Besides this, in 2005 a plan on legal migration was demanded. In addition, border security information and data sharing among Member States and a strengthened visa system was to be formulated.<sup>412</sup> In the same year another outstanding document was accepted on migration, the Global Approach to Migration (GAM). The document was important to launch actions in Africa and the Mediterranean to develop relations with these regions.<sup>413</sup> Just one year after the GAM was introduced, the earlier discussed Rabat and Tripoli Processes took shape to address international migration in the said region.

The last piece of the contractual framework is the Treaty of Lisbon. Title II, Article 63 of the treaty stresses again the importance to develop a common policy on asylum, subsidiary protection and temporary protection for third nationals. The plan to offer an appropriate status for third country nationals within the EU must be in accordance with international law.<sup>414</sup> The formulation of the common policy must comprise:

*“A uniform status of asylum;*

*A uniform status of subsidiary protection;*

*A common system of temporary protection;*

*Common procedures for the granting and withdrawing of uniform asylum or subsidiary protection status;*

*Criteria and mechanisms for determining which Member State is responsible for considering an application;*

*Standards concerning reception conditions;*

*Partnership and cooperation with non-EU countries.”*<sup>415</sup>

Another important detail to be mentioned is that paragraph 3 of the same article laid down the foundations for the later on well needed provisional measures, in case one or more Member States were confronted with an emergency situation.<sup>416</sup>

<sup>412</sup> Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament of 10 May 2005 – The Hague Programme: ten priorities for the next five years. The Partnership for European renewal in the field of Freedom, Security and Justice [COM(2005) 184 final – Official Journal C 236 of 24.9.2005]. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/HU/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM:116002> Downloaded: 21.11.2021.

<sup>413</sup> Global approach to migration: Priority actions focusing on Africa and the Mediterranean. 15582/05 ASIM 64 RELEX 747 <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15744-2005-INIT/en/pdf> Downloaded: 23.11.2021, p.2.

<sup>414</sup> Treaty of Lisbon 2007/C 306/01. [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:8d1c14fc-6be7-4d4e-8416-f28cfc7b3b60.0006.01/DOC\\_3&format=PDF](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:8d1c14fc-6be7-4d4e-8416-f28cfc7b3b60.0006.01/DOC_3&format=PDF) Downloaded: 21.11.2021. ps. 60-61.

<sup>415</sup> Asylum Policy. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/151/asylum-policy> Downloaded: 21.11.2021.

<sup>416</sup> Treaty of Lisbon 2007/C 306/01. p.61.

The demands of the treaties translated to different programmes in practice. In 2008, before the second phase of creating the CEAS, the Council of the European Union accepted the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum. In the pact the Council outlined five recommendations, which were to be translated into actions. These five recommendations were the following:

1. *“to organise legal immigration to take account of the priorities, needs and reception capacities determined by each Member State, and to encourage integration;*
2. *to control illegal immigration by ensuring that illegal immigrants return to their countries of origin or country of transit;*
3. *to make border controls more effective;*
4. *to construct a Europe of asylum;*
5. *to create a comprehensive partnership with the countries of origin and of transit in order to encourage the synergy between migration and development.”*<sup>417</sup>

The most important thought on promoting legal migration within the document is to focus on labour-migration, to make the EU more attractive to highly qualified workers, but in the meantime encourage circular migration to avoid brain drain.

The second priority is interesting even on its own because it consequently uses the term illegal. As mentioned earlier in I.1.2 Definitions, the terms illegal migrant, illegal migration were used in EU documents up until 2015. In that period therefore it was still acceptable to use the term, as it was also used in the Treaty of Lisbon, despite their pejorative connotation.<sup>418</sup>

To address the third priority, to make border controls more effective, the EU turned to one of its existing organisations, FRONTEX. The first major leap in the funding of the agency was in 2008, quite likely as the consequence of the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum.<sup>419</sup>

Under priority four the calling for the construction of a single European asylum procedure must be highlighted.<sup>420</sup> This indicated the second review of the Dublin Regulation in 2013.

The fifth priority establishes the need for closer cooperation among countries of origin, transit and destination. Within this framework the EU strengthens its commitment to the Rabat and Tripoli Processes, which were launched in 2006.<sup>421</sup>

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<sup>417</sup> European Pact on Immigration and Asylum 13440/08 ASIM 72.

<https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-13440-2008-INIT/en/pdf> Downloaded: 10.06.2017. p. 4.

<sup>418</sup> European Pact on Immigration and Asylum 13440/08 ASIM 72. ps. 5-7.

<sup>419</sup> Frontex and managing the EU's borders: Frequently Asked Questions.

[https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO\\_10\\_45](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_10_45) Downloaded: 23.11.2021.

<sup>420</sup> European Pact on Immigration and Asylum 13440/08 ASIM 72. ps. 11-12.

<sup>421</sup> European Pact on Immigration and Asylum 13440/08 ASIM 72. p. 13.

In 2009 the second phase of the CEAS started with a proposal for the review of the 2004 directive of the minimum standards for the qualification as refugees. The earlier accepted directive was too ambiguous to achieve the harmonisation of laws among Member States and effective decision making. The new document was to establish a common understanding on refugee status and on other types of international protection.<sup>422</sup> The amended, revised directive was accepted only in 2011, which is a good example of the slowness of the process.

The new multiannual program was signed in 2009 for the period of 2010–2014 in Stockholm. The framework aimed at the harmonisation of Member State laws in different areas, migration among them. The programme articulated the EU's commitment to the formulation of the CEAS until 2012 as a top priority. Additionally, it underlined the importance of maximising the positive effects of migration on development, while minimising its negative effects. Within this scope, cooperation with countries of origin and transit was defined as a compulsory action, and the integration of third-country nationals was identified as an equally important topic. Besides this, the programme also addresses the question of the growing number of unaccompanied minors, illegal migration and the refugee status. In the latter, solidarity among Member States was in the focus.<sup>423</sup>

The entire Title V. Chapter 2 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union was dedicated to Policies on border checks, asylum and immigration. Well before the Arab Spring the treaty already recommended the formulation of a common system of temporary protection for displaced persons in the event of a massive inflow.<sup>424</sup>

Despite the effort made through the years since the Treaty of Maastricht, the CEAS could not be launched in 2012. More directives and regulations which were integral parts of the CEAS were adopted only in 2013. By then it became clear that the Arab Spring was a precursor to the increasing number of migrants from the south. These legislative acts were the Eurodac Regulation, the Reception Conditions Directive, the Asylum Procedures Directive and the Dublin III Regulation.<sup>425</sup>

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<sup>422</sup> Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection and the content of the protection granted {SEC(2009) 1374}. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52009PC0551&from=hu> Downloaded: 23.11.2021.

<sup>423</sup> The Stockholm Programme — an open and secure Europe serving and protecting citizens (2010/C 115/01). <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:115:0001:0038:en:PDF> Downloaded: 10.06.2017. ps. 27-33.

<sup>424</sup> Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=HU> Downloaded: 10.06.2017. ps.76-77.

<sup>425</sup> Asylum Policy. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/151/asylum-policy> Downloaded: 20.11.2021.

The Dublin III Regulation was accepted at the dawn of the so-called migration and refugee crisis. As previously mentioned, the Dublin Regulation started as a simple, 12- page-long document. By 2013, the convention grew significantly in its content. With its 29 pages it more than doubled since the first document was formulated. Not just the definitions section grew significantly with new content, but the number of related legislations (Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection), supporting documents (Tampere, Hague and Stockholm Programmes) and agencies (European Asylum Support Office) did, too. With the ever-widening scope, the second review had to contain these new elements to satisfy the EU's intention to harmonise Member State and EU laws in this policy area. The hierarchy of criteria became so complex that the articles got their own titles, like "Minors", "Family members who are beneficiaries of international protection", "Issue of residence documents or visas". It is clear that the issues identified in the Stockholm Programme were addressed in the review. The rights of minors and the unity of the family gained momentum visibly in the hierarchy of criteria with two individual titles. Nonetheless, the general hierarchy remained unchanged. The Dublin III Regulation laid out the procedures for taking charge and taking back. Additionally, the information sharing among Member States remained key for three main objectives:

1. *determining the Member State responsible;*
2. *examining the application for international protection;*
3. *implementing any obligation arising under this Regulation.*<sup>426</sup>

Notwithstanding these much-needed improvements in the regulation, one important element was still lacking. The document did not provide provisions in case of an emergency, for increased numbers of applications for asylum. Solidarity was also mentioned only nine times in the text, but the regulation itself did not create procedures to bring solidarity into practice. It rather appointed the newly established European Asylum Support Office to provide such measures.<sup>427</sup>

To enhance solidarity among Member States, the European Parliament and the European Council accepted the regulation which established the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund

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<sup>426</sup> Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast). <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013R0604&from=EN>  
Downloaded: 10.06.2017.

<sup>427</sup> Regulation (EU) No 604/2013. p. 2.

in 2014. Its objective was to support the development of the CEAS. The regulation allocated EUR 2.7 billion for the national programmes of Member States. The fund provided a flexible framework for the Member States, from which all of them could benefit in accordance with their specific needs.<sup>428</sup>

The framework of cooperation from the beginning of the European integration to 2014 went through significant changes. However, the objective laid out in the Treaty of Maastricht to formulate a common migration and asylum policy has not been achieved yet. The number of EU acquis grew, as well as the number of regulated areas. The securitisation of migration already happened. The Europe of asylum concept started to build up regulations and measures which were already more favourable for highly qualified workforce. The mass migration influx which reached the borders of the EU brought changes into thinking about international migration and the EU's acquis went through a significant review to adapt to the new situation. The next section is to introduce the evolution.

#### **IV.2.2 CONTRACTUAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK BETWEEN 2014–2019**

On 1 November 2014 the incoming European Commission led by Jean-Claude Juncker identified migration as one of its 10 priority areas. The Juncker Commission was determined to continue the implementation of the CEAS. The eighth priority of the Commission was not less than the formulation of a new migration policy. Within this pledge, four main actions were identified: the implementation of the common asylum policy, a new policy on legal migration (starting with the review of the Blue Card directive), the release of a Communication on internal security strategy and taking operational measures to fight terrorism and counter radicalisation.<sup>429</sup> To achieve this aim, a ten-point plan was presented on 20 April 2015. In May the European Commission presented the European Agenda on Migration. The rapidity of the process until the introduction of the first documents was the clear sign of consensus among the Member States.<sup>430</sup> The European Agenda on Migration (EAM) proved to be the most important document of the period reaching to 2019, when the succeeding Commission took office. One

<sup>428</sup> Regulation (EU) No 516/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 establishing the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, amending Council Decision 2008/381/EC and repealing Decisions No 573/2007/EC and No 575/2007/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Decision 2007/435/EC. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014R0516&from=hu> Downloaded: 10.06.2017.

<sup>429</sup> GOTEV, Georgi: Juncker defines 10 priorities for EU, seeks inter-institutional support. <https://www.euractiv.com/section/social-europe-jobs/news/juncker-defines-10-priorities-for-eu-seeks-inter-institutional-support/> Downloaded: 18.12.2021.

<sup>430</sup> DEBYSER, Ariane: The ten priorities of the Juncker Commission: State of play a year on. [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/565912/EPRS\\_BRI\(2015\)565912\\_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/565912/EPRS_BRI(2015)565912_EN.pdf) Downloaded: 18.12.2021. p.8.



of its achievements was that the previously mixed use of terms regarding migration was unified. Succeeding documents related to migration followed the terminology of the EAM, using the term irregular migration. This meant a break with the established practice of the Treaty of Lisbon.

The EAM firmly acknowledged that migration is a natural and complex phenomenon. It also declared that focusing on diverse types of flows is a practice to be discontinued. The aim of the EU, according to the EAM, was to continue to be a safe haven for those who are fleeing persecution and at the same time to attract talent and entrepreneurship. To follow up the presented ten-point plan, the EAM presented actions and directives. These were mostly based on already existing instruments and aimed at their better utilisation. Such was the budget enhancement of FRONTEX operations (Triton and Poseidon) in the Mediterranean and the strengthening of the border management component in existing missions under the CSDP in Mali and Niger. The launch of a multi-purpose centre in Niger was also one of the EU's immediate action proposals in the EAM. The document argued that the root causes of irregular migration must be addressed. It proposed humanitarian aid, the distribution of information, a more effective return policy and the reinforcement and amendment of the FRONTEX legal basis to tackle irregular migration. The document also suggested the revision of the existing programs and procedures regarding legal migration and underlined the importance of integration. The EAM aimed to build a sustainable system to handle migration and claimed that a common migration policy would be the primary foundation for such a system.<sup>431</sup>

To follow up the EAM, the Commission also presented an implementation plan for the first measures. This included relocation, resettlement, an action plan against migrant smuggling, fine tuning the Eurodac Regulation and the revision of the Blue Card Directive.<sup>432</sup>

Meanwhile migration to the EU peaked in 2015 with almost 885,000 irregular arrivals on the Eastern Mediterranean route, and a consistent number of arrivals ranging between 153,000 and 185,000 since the second half of 2013 in the Central Mediterranean route.<sup>433</sup> These two figures and the uneven share of the Member States from the crisis made it clear that more solidarity and more action was needed within the EU to handle the significantly increased number of arrivals and corresponding applications for asylum. The Dublin Regulation as it was, proved to be inadequate to tackle the massive amount of applications. National systems were

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<sup>431</sup> A European Agenda on Migration. Brussels, 13.5.2015 COM(2015) 240 final. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52015DC0240&from=EN> Downloaded: 18.12.2021. ps. 1-10.

<sup>432</sup> DEBYSER, Ariane: The ten priorities of the Juncker Commission: State of play a year on.p.8.

<sup>433</sup> Infographic - Irregular arrivals to the EU (2008-2021). <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/irregular-arrivals-since-2008/> Downloaded: 18.12.2021.

overwhelmed. To show more solidarity to the Member States located along the migration routes, the EU accepted two Council Decisions in September 2015 to establish provisional measures. The two beneficiary countries of these measures were Italy and Greece. The documents created a temporary relocation mechanism first for 40,000 then for 120,000 migrants in need of international protection. The proposed timeframe to fulfil the provisions was two years. The first provision indicated that the Member States should execute the relocation in a voluntary manner. The second provision, however, defined the number of migrants to be relocated per Member State for clarity and to enhance solidarity.<sup>434</sup> On establishing the temporary measures, Finland abstained from the vote, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia voted against the temporary provisions.<sup>435</sup> To follow up the two-year-long time period designated to conclude the relocations, the European Commission released regular reports. The fifteenth and last of the reports was presented on 6 September 2017. The results of the mechanism were mixed. Hungary and Poland remained the only Member States that have not relocated anyone under the temporary provision. The Czech Republic stopped relocating after May 2016. The positive examples were Latvia and Malta who fulfilled their commitments.<sup>436</sup>

2015 proved to be an active year in the realm of formulating new migration related documents and action plans. One of the most important ones related to Africa was the Joint Valletta Action Plan of November 2015. The Action Plan introduced 16 initiatives in five key areas, based on previously successful programs in Africa regarding migration. Such were the Khartoum and Rabat Processes and the Cotonou Partnership Agreement. The five key areas were the development benefits of migration, legal migration, protection and asylum, prevention and fight against irregular migration, return readmission and reintegration. The initiatives were to be monitored under the Joint EU–Africa Strategy.<sup>437</sup>

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<sup>434</sup> Council Decision (EU) 2015/1523 of 14 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and of Greece. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32015D1523&from=HU> Downloaded: 10.06.2017. ; COUNCIL DECISION (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32015D1601&from=HU> Downloaded: 10.06.2017.

<sup>435</sup> Migrant crisis: EU ministers approve disputed quota plan. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34329825> Downloaded: 28.08.2017.

<sup>436</sup> Fifteenth report on relocation and resettlement Brussels, 6.9.2017 COM(2017) 465 final. [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:9ca86f51-93d9-11e7-b92d-01aa75ed71a1.0001.02/DOC\\_1&format=PDF](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:9ca86f51-93d9-11e7-b92d-01aa75ed71a1.0001.02/DOC_1&format=PDF) Downloaded: 20.02.2021. ps. 3-4.

<sup>437</sup> Valletta Action Plan. [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2015/11/ACTION\\_PLAN\\_EN\\_pdf/](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2015/11/ACTION_PLAN_EN_pdf/) Downloaded: 02.04.2017



The number of irregular arrivals remained elevated in 2016: exceeding 180,000 people on both the Central Mediterranean and the Eastern routes.<sup>438</sup> The EU took care of the Eastern route with the help of Turkey. The EU–Turkey Statement of 18 March 2016 ensured the rapid return of irregularly arriving migrants to Turkey. In place of the returnees, Syrians were pledged to be resettled in the EU. Moreover, Turkey got a 3 billion EUR worth of support from the EU for its refugee system.<sup>439</sup>

In regard to the CEAS, the Commission had other plans. In a press release of April 2016, the European Commission presented the options for the revision of the CEAS. It stated that the system in force disproportionately burdens the Member States. This also led to different national approaches, which opened space for the circumvention of the rules. To remedy the situation, the Commission considered it important to form a common rules system. Five key areas were defined to structurally improve the CEAS:

1. *“Establishing a sustainable and fair system for determining the Member State responsible for asylum seekers*
2. *Achieving greater convergence and reducing asylum shopping*
3. *Preventing secondary movements within the EU*
4. *A new mandate for the EU’s asylum agency*
5. *Reinforcing the Eurodac system”*<sup>440</sup>

In May the Commission presented the first package of proposals towards the reform of the CEAS. This included the reform of the Dublin system, the reinforcement of the Eurodac system and the establishment of the European Union Agency for Asylum.<sup>441</sup>

A second package of proposals came out in July. It proposed to replace the Asylum Procedures Directive and the Qualification Directive with a Regulation and the reform of the Reception Conditions Directive.<sup>442</sup>

The internal proposals towards the reform of the CEAS were welcomed in the EU Global Strategy of 2016. The EUGS also stated that migration management had to be addressed in

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<sup>438</sup> Infographic - Irregular arrivals to the EU (2008-2021).

<sup>439</sup> EU-Turkey statement, 18 March 2016. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18/eu-turkey-statement/> Downloaded: 11.06.2017.

<sup>440</sup> Commission presents options for reforming the Common European Asylum System and developing safe and legal pathways to Europe. [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP\\_16\\_1246](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_16_1246) Downloaded: 11.06.2017.

<sup>441</sup> Towards a sustainable and fair Common European Asylum System. [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP\\_16\\_1620](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_16_1620) Downloaded: 11.06.2017.

<sup>442</sup> Completing the reform of the Common European Asylum System: towards an efficient, fair and humane asylum policy. [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP\\_16\\_2433](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_16_2433) Downloaded: 11.06.2017.

cooperation with external partners of the EU.<sup>443</sup> In line with this pledge, in 2017 the Malta Declaration, addressing the Central Mediterranean route, was adopted. The Declaration strengthened the EU's will on cooperation with other international organisations. Moreover, it committed the EU to stabilising Libya. The EU is also determined to deepen the relations with the Sub-Saharan neighbours of the country.<sup>444</sup>

The first of the reform proposals, the Entry exit system was adopted in 2017. Yet in 2018 most of the reform proposals presented in 2016 were still pending, The Dublin Regulation, the European Union Agency for Asylum and the reinforcement of the Eurodac among them.<sup>445</sup>

From the 42 proposals submitted by the Juncker Commission, 24 were adopted and 7 were proceeding slowly or were blocked entirely until April 2019. The wanted and so much needed reform of the CEAS was a little bit more than halfway through when the new European Commission took over in 2019.<sup>446</sup>

#### **IV.2.3 CONTRACTUAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK FROM 2019**

By 2019 a fatigue regarding the migration topic was gaining momentum. The number of irregular arrivals dropped significantly. A mere 120,000 people arrived altogether, counting all three main migratory routes of the Mediterranean to Europe.<sup>447</sup> Also, the different approaches from different Member States caused a deadlock on the reform of the CEAS. The lack of success with the relocation mechanism<sup>448</sup> showed that despite the efforts, solidarity did not grow within the EU. Given the protracted BREXIT procedure and other emerging issues like climate change, a need for a European strategic autonomy and the declining democracies within the EU itself, migration did not make it to the priority list as an individual priority of the von der Leyen Commission.<sup>449</sup> But migration remained on the agenda, with the new Commission stressing the shared aspects of the phenomenon. To give a new impetus to the reform of the CEAS, the New

<sup>443</sup> Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe.

[https://ceas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eugs\\_review\\_web\\_0.pdf](https://ceas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eugs_review_web_0.pdf) Downloaded: 11.06.2017.

<sup>444</sup> European Commission: Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council 25.01.2017. JOIN (2017) 4 final on Migration on the Central Mediterranean route Managing flows, saving lives. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=JOIN%3A2017%3A4%3AFIN> Downloaded: 10.10.2017.

<sup>445</sup> BASSOT, Étienne, HILLER, Wolfgang: The Juncker Commission's ten priorities State of play in early 2018. <https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/cb5248c4-0639-11e8-b8f5-01aa75ed71a1/language-en> Downloaded: 19.12.2021. p.27.

<sup>446</sup> BASSOT, Étienne, HILLER, Wolfgang: The Juncker Commission's ten priorities An end-of-term assessment. [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2019/637943/EPRS\\_IDA\(2019\)637943\\_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2019/637943/EPRS_IDA(2019)637943_EN.pdf) Downloaded: 19.12.2021. p.26.

<sup>447</sup> Infographic - Irregular arrivals to the EU (2008-2021).

<sup>448</sup> BASSOT, Étienne, HILLER, Wolfgang: The Juncker Commission's ten priorities An end-of-term assessment. p.25.

<sup>449</sup> The European Commission's priorities. [https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024_en) Downloaded: 19.12.2021.

Pact on Migration and Asylum was launched in 2020, under the fifth priority of ‘Promoting the European way of life’. The new reform package included mainly the same elements as the 2016 one. Strengthening the external borders and modernising the common asylum system were the main bullet points of the new pact.<sup>450</sup>

The new proposal to create a truly common asylum system was introduced in September 2020. The communication from the Commission clearly stated that the reform package builds on the reform started in 2016. Hence the similarities between the proposals. What strikes out is the firstly mentioned key action, which is the “*robust and fair management of external borders, including identity, health and security checks*”. It does not just mean that FRONTEX and its development is in the focus.<sup>451</sup> The main message of this prioritisation points out that migration is still viewed as a security threat to the integrity of the EU, and the earlier introduced pessimistic view regarding migration did not change. With the beefing up of FRONTEX, the EU’s image of building a ‘Fortress Europe’ has also been reinforced.

Besides the strengthening of the external borders, the new pact identified the following issues to be addressed via the reform. The simplification of the asylum procedure, recognising the positive effects of migration, and steps to promote the latter. The EU continued to oppose brain drain, highlighting its negative effects. The new pact went on to advocate that the root causes of migration must be addressed, and for this, cooperation with third countries is needed. Last, but not least, people in vulnerable situations must be protected from human traffickers and smugglers.<sup>452</sup> Within this scope, the implementation roadmap of the new pact outlined 41 proposals towards the reform of the CEAS. These are, of course, not all legislative proposals, they include the appointment of personnel, enforcement and implementation of previously adopted legislations, and the creation of strategies. The roadmap also indicates the different stops in the legislative procedure.<sup>453</sup> The new pact on migration admittedly considers solidarity

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<sup>450</sup> BASSOT, Étienne: The von der Leyen Commission's priorities for 2019-2024. [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2020/646148/EPRS\\_BRI\(2020\)646148\\_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2020/646148/EPRS_BRI(2020)646148_EN.pdf) Downloaded: 21.12.2021. ps. 7-8.

<sup>451</sup> Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on a New Pact on Migration and Asylum, COM(2020) 609 final. [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:85ff8b4f-ff13-11ea-b44f-01aa75ed71a1.0002.02/DOC\\_3&format=PDF](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:85ff8b4f-ff13-11ea-b44f-01aa75ed71a1.0002.02/DOC_3&format=PDF) Downloaded: 28.10.2021. ps.1-2.

<sup>452</sup> Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on a New Pact on Migration and Asylum, COM(2020) 609 final. ps. 1-28.


<sup>453</sup> Annexes to the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on a New Pact on Migration and Asylum, COM(2020) 609 final. [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:85ff8b4f-ff13-11ea-b44f-01aa75ed71a1.0002.02/DOC\\_4&format=PDF](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:85ff8b4f-ff13-11ea-b44f-01aa75ed71a1.0002.02/DOC_4&format=PDF) Downloaded: 28.10.2021.

and responsibility as its guiding principles, which must be in balance. The text showed that solidarity matters. In fact, it was mentioned 22 times in the communication.

Of the 41 proposals nine refer to legislative changes, five to legal instruments, three to recommendations and one to a guidance document. These are the following: The five legal instruments are formed by the proposal of a new screening regulation; an amended proposal revising the Asylum Procedures Regulation, known as Dublin Regulation; an amended proposal revising the Eurodac Regulation; a new asylum and migration management regulation, and a new crisis and force majeure regulation. The three recommendations include a new migration preparedness and crisis blueprint, a new recommendation on resettlement and complementary pathways, and a new recommendation on search and rescue operations by private vessels. This latter is also supported by a guidance to Member States that rescue on the sea cannot be criminalised. The new guidance introduced within the pact is on the Facilitators Directive.<sup>454</sup>

Within the ‘Promoting the European way of life’ priority, 27 proposals had been submitted by December 2021. Of these proposals, 17 is proceeding normally, 4 slowly, 1 is blocked and 5 were adopted so far. Those five listed under

2. Figure Legislative delivery on the New Pact on Migration and Asylum (Edited by the author)



are proposals submitted in the scope of the previous reform package, such as the ERASMUS+ regulation and the Blue Card directive to promote legal migration and to attract talent and entrepreneurs. One, the establishment of the Asylum and Migration Fund is a financial instrument, embedded in the 2021–2027 MFF. One is related to institutional reform, mainly strengthening the European Asylum Support Office, and re-naming it to European Union

<sup>454</sup> European Parliamentary Research Service: The European Commission’s New Pact on Migration and Asylum. Study. [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2021/694210/EPRS\\_STU\(2021\)694210\\_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2021/694210/EPRS_STU(2021)694210_EN.pdf) Downloaded: 21.12.2021. p.1.

Agency for Asylum. The last one is reforming the Visa Information System, which is a technical instrument for the EU Member States Consular services to help avoiding visa shopping. It is very important to highlight that one of the proposals submitted was inherited as blocked, and its situation remained unchanged. This particular proposal is the revision of the Dublin Regulation.<sup>455</sup>

Until the end of 2021 the landscape regarding the reform of the CEAS has not changed significantly. The topic was forced into the background by multiple issues some of which needed more immediate response, for example, the COVID-19 pandemic. Attention to migratory issues also decreased due to the fact that the number of irregular arrivals had been reduced by 90 per cent since 2015.<sup>456</sup> Despite the articulated importance of solidarity stressed through the process so far, the little advance can also be the by-product of unchanged national policies on migration.

### IV.3 CONCLUSIONS

The chapter overviewed two seemingly distant topics, EU–Africa relations and EU migration policy development. But these two topics are more interlinked than it seems at first sight. The proximity and common history of the two continents predestines that relations remain close between them. Both Europe and Africa have continental organisations: the EU and the AU. These organisations are not the ends, but the means of cooperation.

Relations between Africa and Europe started at the dawn of the European integration, with the first preferential trade agreements between the EEC and former colonies. After decades of development, this partnership bloomed and evolved. In 2021 the main framework of 20 years, the Cotonou Partnership Agreement expired, and a new agreement was outlined. It was time indeed to change the old structure, since it had been widely criticised from the beginning. The CPA was accused to be too lengthy and lacking a clear concept. Since it was building on the preceding agreements, its institutions remained relatively unchanged over time.<sup>457</sup> Taking into consideration that the Yaoundé Convention was established in 1963, this is a serious delay. Both the number of signatory countries and the international environment has changed drastically since then.

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<sup>455</sup> legislative train schedule, Promoting the European way of life. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-promoting-our-european-way-of-life> Downloaded: 22.12.2021.

<sup>456</sup> EU migration policy. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-migration-policy/> Downloaded: 18.12.2021.

<sup>457</sup> TÜRKE, András István (2015): Az Európai Unió első afrikai misszióinak és hadműveleteinek geopolitikája. Publikon Kiadó, Pécs. ISBN 978 615 5457 61 6 p.17.

The CPA was asymmetric, since any violation of the fundamental elements set out in Article 96 could only be sanctioned from the EU side; the CPA does not permit the ACP to institute sanctions, since it would mean the suspension of the EDF. Article 97 described the sanctions on the violation of ‘good governance’. From the EU side, these sanctions can be invoked, but from the ACP side implementing sanctions on these two articles in case of any EU violation on the essential elements of the CPA would mean the suspension of the financial aid to the countries. The sanctions regarding both Articles were also implemented by the EU with the use of double standards in favour of the former colonies. Another aspect rendering the trade pillar unbalanced was the trade averages. While the share of the ACP countries in the EU’s exports and imports was about 5 percent, the European share of the ACP trade averages is around 20 percent; ECOWAS has the greatest share, while the exchange with the Pacific and the Caribbean is insignificant.<sup>458</sup>

Despite the significant changes in the structure of the post-Cotonou agreement, criticism was already expressed well before the ratification of the text. The first question asked even before the end of the negotiations was if an agreement of this type is still needed. Its scope is too big, engaging with all 79 countries of the OACPS, and the addressed countries are too different. The original agreements were important for the European Community, because of having former colonial powers among its Member States. Now the situation is quite different. With the BREXIT, the Commonwealth lost its anchor country within the EU. The newly admitted Central-East European countries as well as those who did not have huge empires in previous centuries do not see the agreement with the ACP countries as a necessity. These countries rather assess it as an outdated inheritance, which can be get rid of. Also, the most influential region of the OACPS, Africa would prefer an Africa approach. This means that the continent must be addressed as a whole, through the AU, as we see it within the EU–Africa Summits.<sup>459</sup> A more recent criticism is by the chief negotiator from the OACPS, Robert Dussey (foreign minister of Togo), who expressed that a common understanding was missing from the OACPS’ part. Therefore, they could not express and represent their aims during the negotiations as efficiently as the determined and decided EU could. Africa is still not united, and this shows in the text of the agreement as well.<sup>460</sup> This undecidedness manifests in the general objectives about

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<sup>458</sup> NEGRE, Mario et al.: Towards renewal or oblivion? <http://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/DP-9-Post-2020-Cooperation-EU-Africa-Caribbean-Pacific.pdf> Downloaded: 23.10.2017.

<sup>459</sup> PETRANGELI, Federico: Does the EU-ACP Agreement Still Make Sense for Africa? <https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/does-eu-ACP-agreement-still-make-sense-africa-24859> Downloaded: 10.11.2021.

<sup>460</sup> Cotonou 2.0: A bad trade deal for Africa? <https://www.dw.com/en/cotonou-20-a-bad-trade-deal-for-africa/a-57503372> Downloaded: 10.11.2021.



migration, for example, which echo solely the EU's views on the topic and completely ignore the possibly different African or other regional takes on the title. While the whole section on migration and mobility also lacks a coherent approach towards the phenomenon, and it does not only miss the needs of the OACPS partners, but also the EU's aims to promote legal migration.<sup>461</sup>

Based on the priority lists of EU–Africa Summits, it is evident that the two continents both want to engage in the same topics. Peace and security, economic growth, migration and mobility are the most common buzzwords. But do the EU and its African partners understand the same things under these topics? Do they have the same priorities within the list? The answer is unfortunately no. As the recently negotiated post-Cotonou agreement and its numerous criticisms show, for the EU migration is more important than anything else. That is why it is crucial to be aware of its internal implications as well. Truly beneficial common policies can only emerge if the parties understand each other. The applied regionalisation, which became prominent from the evolution of the CPA and the EU's recent Sahel strategy, might bring closer ties with African regional organisations like the ECOWAS. As hypothesis two suggested, the regional approach can change the relationship between the European Union and the African countries, and regional organisations can gain more importance in this nexus. Yet it seems that cooperation with regional organisations has not gained momentum so far. This can be attributed to their inactivity on the field of migration since ECOWAS released its latest document on this topic in 2008.

Migration became more prominent within the European integration in the 1990s. The enlargement of the integration and the formulation of the EU initiated changes in that niche as well. So the establishment of the Common European Asylum System began. But this policy field resides in the shared competences area, which means both the EU and its Member States can pass laws.<sup>462</sup> This can make EU level legislative procedures slow and cumbersome. This manifests in the reform of the Dublin Regulation. The EUGS lined out the reform of the CEAS and emphasised the importance of engagement with third countries to tackle migration. We partly saw these initiatives to materialise in the reform process which started in 2016 and in various declarations regarding the external nexus of migration. Partly, because the process was already in motion when the EUGS was presented. As the so-called migration and refugee crisis

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<sup>461</sup> CONCORD's Analysis of the Post-Cotonou Agreement.

[https://concordeurope.org/?smd\\_process\\_download=1&download\\_id=21069](https://concordeurope.org/?smd_process_download=1&download_id=21069) Downloaded: 10.11.2021. ps. 1., 17-18.

<sup>462</sup> Areas of EU action. [https://ec.europa.eu/info/about-european-commission/what-european-commission-does/law/areas-eu-action\\_en#member](https://ec.europa.eu/info/about-european-commission/what-european-commission-does/law/areas-eu-action_en#member) Downloaded: 23.12.2021.

reached, peaked and then decreased in Europe, a permanent solution could not be formulated. In 2016 the lack of solidarity was blamed for the failure. In the meantime, the external borders of the EU were strengthened, and FRONTEX gained both importance and funds. In 2019, when the incumbent Commission took over the reform of the CEAS, it got a new impetus. The von der Leyen Commission pushed further the reform of FRONTEX and introduced the New Pact on Migration and Asylum. The new pact in practice is the continuation of the failed reform of 2016. It has conflicting goals, and despite championing solidarity, it could not make a change so far. The reform of the Dublin Regulation remains blocked, while the Blue Card Directive and the ERASMUS+ regulations got accepted. These latter aim to attract talent and entrepreneurs into the EU. These two very initiatives have the potential to cause brain drain, which the EU wished to reduce with the introduction of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum. Meanwhile the practical steps the EU took just strengthened the picture of a 'Fortress Europe' to third country nationals, even after the height of the so-called migration and refugee crisis. At the same time solidarity remains a distant goal, with Member States so divided.

After investigating EU policies and strategies regarding migration, it can be stated that EU migration policies can affect African migration towards Europe. Policies indicate that certain social groups, the more educated, are welcome to the EU, while others are not. This would not mean an exodus towards the EU, but as earlier stated, could lead to brain drain, and visa overstay from those individuals who would not expect their readmission to EU territory after the expiration of their documents. This, too, supports the idea of my first hypothesis, which states that EU policies will not change African migration patterns in the long term.

To investigate if the EU's comprehensive and integrated approach can handle migration successfully, in addition to the examination of political steps in this section, the practical steps taken by the EU are discussed in the next chapter.



## CHAPTER V.

# THE PRACTICAL STEPS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION TO DECREASE IRREGULAR MIGRATION SINCE 2015

### V.1 MARITIME OPERATIONS

For a long time, the Central Mediterranean migration route from Libya to Italy has been the most used migration route from Africa to Europe. The first part of this section introduces the general trends in the Central Mediterranean route, assessing its importance in the Europe–Africa inter-continental migration. The main nationalities who use this route will be defined, as well as the major events which had an impact on the migratory figures. The following two sections discuss the maritime operations launched in the Mediterranean, as they were believed to be a major pull factor to migrants, and therefore actions which had an impact on migration.

In 2016, a lot of changes occurred in how the EU approached migration. The ongoing so-called migration and refugee crisis demanded practical steps from the EU. The previous chapter introduced the policies and strategies, including the two reform initiatives of the Common European Asylum System, which shaped the practical steps taken. This chapter examines the actions in the security area which followed the plans.

Debate on the use of the CSDP as a tool to tackle migration rose together with the first CEAS reform process, when another EU agency, FRONTEX was strengthened significantly. It has been found that CSDP missions and operations were already used either implicitly or explicitly to manage migration flows. Also, further recommendation was made by Biscop and Rehrl to enhance the role of CSDP in areas like border surveillance, processing of irregular migrants, law enforcement activities and security sector reform.<sup>463</sup> These recommendations indicate further questions on how the EU should continue to use its security toolbox. These listed tasks mainly belong to the area of FRONTEX. Since the above-mentioned tasks should generally belong to the tasks of civilian CSDP missions, this would mean an overlapping responsibility. Besides this, there is also an overlapping pool of experts who can be deployed to the missions. Parkes explored more questions on how migration should be managed abroad. He found that

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<sup>463</sup> BISCOP, Sven, REHRL, Jochen (eds.): Migration – How CSDP can support. [https://ceas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/bmlvs\\_esdc\\_egmont\\_migration\\_final\\_online.pdf](https://ceas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/bmlvs_esdc_egmont_migration_final_online.pdf). Downloaded: 01.05.2018. ps. 11-12.

FRONTEX traditionally operates closer to the EU's borders, while CSDP is deployed to more distant areas. These differences are, however, changing now. FRONTEX sends liaison officers to distant third countries, while CSDP is discussed to be a tool used even within the EU itself. Yet, according to Parkes, the traditional allocation of the CSDP and FRONTEX is to be maintained because of the specific characteristics of the two organisations.<sup>464</sup>

The landscape of missions and operations has changed significantly since the beginning of the so-called migration and refugee crisis. These changes were the most prominent in the field of maritime operations. The following subchapters are to introduce maritime operations on the Central Mediterranean migration route, launched by both CSDP and FRONTEX. The mandates of the operations are examined, too, to provide an understanding of how these operations have changed over time.

### V.1.1 THE CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN ROUTE<sup>465</sup>

As one of the biggest migration transit and receiving countries, internal political changes in Italy are expected to influence the migration flows of the Central Mediterranean route. New approaches on the European side are likely to influence changes in migration patterns in Africa as well. Then it is not only the changes in the destination and transit countries which may have an impact on migration patterns. The protracted instability in the Sahel region, escalating conflicts, natural disasters and the lack of economic prospect influences migration too.

As a result of the migration influx in 2015, in 2017 Italy started to implement limitations to NGOs and requested a closer cooperation with the police.<sup>466</sup> In 2018 the far-right League and the anti-establishment Five Star Movement (Movimento 5 Stelle - M5S) parties formed the new government.<sup>467</sup> One of their main policy changes occurred in the field of migration. The new approach insisted on the closure of the Italian ports to migrants.<sup>468</sup> The decision of Italy was followed by Malta, and both countries closed their ports to vessels carrying saved migrants on board. This practice also changed the attitude of cargo ships, which started to neglect their duty

<sup>464</sup> PARKES, Roderick: Managing migration abroad. Why, where, what and how?

[https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief\\_31\\_Migration.pdf](https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief_31_Migration.pdf) Downloaded: 30.09.2020.

<sup>465</sup> Based on: VECSEY, Mariann: Changes in the migration trends from West Africa to Europe. In: Hungarian Defence Review, Special Issue 2019. Vol. 147, Nr 1-2.

<https://kiadvany.magyarhonvedseg.hu/index.php/honvszemle/article/view/30/28> pp. 99-116.

<sup>466</sup> ZALAN, Eszter „NGOs divided by Italy's new rescue code” <https://euobserver.com/migration/138656> Downloaded: 19.09.2019.

<sup>467</sup> KIRCHGAESSNER, S. “Italy's president invites populist coalition to form government”. *The Guardian*, 23 May 2018. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/23/italys-president-invites-populist-coalition-to-form-government> Downloaded: 04.05.2019.

<sup>468</sup> MOLNÁR, A. “Olaszország biztonsági kihívásai és stratégiai irányai” [Italian Security Challenges and Strategic Directions]. *Felderítő Szemle* 17/3. 2018. 91-111. <http://knbsz.gov.hu/hu/letoltes/fsz/2018-3.pdf> Downloaded: 04.05.2019.

to save people in distress because of the fear of economic loss.<sup>469</sup> On 24<sup>th</sup> September 2018, in Italy, the Council of Ministers approved a decree which restricted access to asylum, protection, and increased the possibility of detention.<sup>470</sup> It also extended the time limit for keeping migrants in detention centres. A list of various crimes, from thefts to violence to public officials, was identified, for which asylum seekers could be expelled from Italy. In parallel with this, the legislation strengthened the police by increasing funds.<sup>471</sup> Meanwhile Malta, with no EU agreement on search and rescue cooperation, followed the migration policy which has the widest support throughout the EU, namely the fortification and externalisation of Europe's border control.<sup>472</sup>

The biggest North African transit country, Libya, experienced years of long fight for national power. As a result of growing insecurity and jeopardy during the travel, migratory routes tend to change to directions which are assessed to be cheaper or safer. In 2017 the Italian government managed to secure a deal with Libyan tribal leaders to seal the borders, which also affected migration routes.<sup>473</sup> The deal, agreed with the help of Italian Interior Minister Minniti, proved to be successful in reducing migration flows. By September 2017, the figures decreased dramatically on the Central Mediterranean route.<sup>474</sup> According to Map 6, the decline in the migratory figures started in mid-June 2017, continued throughout 2018, and the decrease remained steadily until 2020, as it is clear from Map 7. From 2020 a sharp increase is visible, which was sustained in 2021, however not reaching the number of arrivals observed in 2017.

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<sup>469</sup> SCHMEER, Laura: Migration in the Mediterranean: between Myth and Reality. <https://eyes-on-europe.eu/migration-mediterranean/> Downloaded: 19.09.2019.

<sup>470</sup> SUNDERLAND, J.: New Low for Italian Migration Policies. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/09/26/new-low-italian-migration-policies> Downloaded: 04.05.2019.

<sup>471</sup> MATAMOROS, C. A: Italy's new security decree clamps down on immigration. <https://www.euronews.com/2018/11/29/italy-s-new-security-decree-clamps-down-on-immigration> Downloaded: 04.05.2019.


<sup>472</sup> Cherry-picking Europe: Migration and economic management in Malta. European Council on Foreign Relations. [https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary\\_cherry\\_picking\\_europe\\_migration\\_and\\_economic\\_management\\_in\\_malta](https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_cherry_picking_europe_migration_and_economic_management_in_malta) Downloaded: 12.05.2019.

<sup>473</sup> Italy brokers deal with Libyan tribes to curb migrant influx. <https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/italy-brokers-deal-with-libyan-tribes-to-curb-migrant-influx/> Downloaded: 12.05.2019.


<sup>474</sup> Wintour, P. "Italian minister defends methods that led to 87% drop in migrants from Libya." *The Guardian*, 7 September 2017. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/07/italian-minister-migrants-libya-marco-minniti>, Downloaded: 12.05.2019.

Additionally, a continuous increase in the arrivals occurred in the West Mediterranean route to Spain from 2018.

Map 6: European Union, DG ECHO: Influx of refugees and migrants to Europe.  
<https://ercportal.jrc.ec.europa.eu/getdailymap/docId/2707> Downloaded: 04.05.2019.



5. Map: European Union, DG ECHO: Arrivals of refugees and migrants to Europe in 2021.  
[https://ercportal.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ERCMapsThumbs/20211217\\_DM\\_Europe\\_migration.png](https://ercportal.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ERCMapsThumbs/20211217_DM_Europe_migration.png) Downloaded: 10.01.2022.



To assess this change in the figures, the method of an earlier research conducted by Brenner

*Table 5: Detected arrivals on the Central-Mediterranean route by nationality (Data collected from FRONTEX). (Edited by the author)*

Nationality/Year	Total 2015	Total 2016	Total 2017	Total 2018	Total 2019	Total 2020	Total 2021
Eritrea	38791	20721	7055	3529	479	909	2614
Nigeria	21914	37554	18163	1262	431	492	850
Somalia	12430	7259	2863	452	417	1020	928
Sudan	8916	9406	6221	2037	1764	1769	2126
Gambia	8245	11929	5808	276	106	184	474
Syria	7448	1197	2350	121	66	220	2408
Mali	5756	10008	7119	915	383	642	1393
Bangladesh	5028	8131	9009	583	750	4447	7848
Côte d'Ivoire	3756	12399	9509	1191	1304	2065	3989
Guinea	2716	13550	9714	840	404	878	2540
Egypt	2609	4226	988	276	267	1124	8506
Pakistan	1982	2772	3030	1513	1213	1398	1752
Tunisia	880	1207	6415	5182	2690	12985	15675
Algeria	343	1240	2020	1216	1039	1465	1681
Iran	119	255	439	161	311	888	3879

and Forin on the shift of the migration patterns was used. According to this research, the arrivals of those nationalities must be analysed, who used the Central Mediterranean route most commonly.<sup>475</sup>

Data collected by FRONTEX on ‘illegal border-crossings statistics’ was used to show information on the number of arrivals by nationality, relying on records from 2015 until the end of 2021.<sup>476</sup> Data on detected border-crossing shows that regarding the Central Mediterranean route, the main counties of origin changed over time (Table 5.) on a larger scale than in the Western Mediterranean<sup>477</sup> route (Table 6.). In 2015, Eritrea, Gambia, Nigeria, Somalia and Sudan were the top 5 source countries of the Central Mediterranean route. The presence of Syrians was still remarkable on the route, still over 7,000 nationals used the Central Mediterranean route. Until 2021, eight more countries appeared on the list of major countries

Nationality/Year	Total 2015	Total 2016	Total 2017	Total 2018	Total 2019	Total 2020	Total 2021
Côte d'Ivoire	743	1040	3334	4043	114	229	33
Guinea	2311	2358	3320	12257	205	202	133
Gambia	280	927	2669	2429	40	25	3
Cameroon	870	936	881	1015	10	26	28
Mali	111	125	625	10758	264	150	336
Senegal	39	20	315	2019	120	264	19
Sudan	44	30	16	11	9	21	208
Unspecified sub-Saharan nationals	0	0	0	69	14346	13250	15077

*Table 6: Detected arrivals on the Western Mediterranean route by nationality (Data collected from FRONTEX) (Edited by the author)*

<sup>475</sup> BRENNER, Y., FORIN, R. and FROUWS, B.: The ‘Shift’ to the Western Mediterranean Migration Route: Myth or Reality? <http://www.mixedmigration.org/articles/shift-to-the-western-mediterranean-migration-route/> Downloaded: 04.05.2019.

<sup>476</sup> Frontex: Detections of illegal border-crossings statistics download: updated monthly [https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Migratory\\_routes/2022/Monthly\\_detections\\_of\\_IBC\\_2022\\_08\\_05.xlsx](https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Migratory_routes/2022/Monthly_detections_of_IBC_2022_08_05.xlsx) Downloaded: 01.09.2022.

<sup>477</sup> The Western Mediterranean migration route is understood as the Western Mediterranean land and sea crossings, as well as the Western African route land and sea crossings reported by FRONTEX.




of origin on this route. In 2021, the top nationalities who used the Central Mediterranean route were mainly from the MENA region, namely Tunisia, Egypt, and Iran. An unlikely candidate appeared among the countries of origin, Bangladesh.

Besides the changes in the main nationalities, data shows a sharp increase in the use of this route, from 23,485 in 2018 and 14,003 people in 2019 to 67,724 in 2021.<sup>478</sup>

The main senders regarding the Western Mediterranean route changed less over time. Here North African and West African countries dominated among the top 5 countries of origin from 2015 to 2021. It is also notable that unspecified sub-Saharan nationals dominated data regarding the last three years, which makes the assessment more difficult. In 2019, more than half of the migrants, while in 2020 and in 2021 around one-third of the total detected crossings fell into this category. On this route it is visible that in 2018 the figures rose sharply to 57,568 detected arrivals from 7,878 in 2015, then decreased again to 26,687 in 2019. Since 2019 the number of detected arrivals increased, reaching 40,817 in 2021. The detected arrivals on both routes are shown in Figure 5.

This data shows that from 2018 to 2020, the West Mediterranean migration route was the

Figure 5: Detected irregular border-crossings on the Central and Western Mediterranean migration routes between 2015 and 2021. (Data collected from FRONTEX) (Edited by the author)



most used one, replacing the Central Mediterranean. However, in 2021 data shows that the trend changed again, and the Central Mediterranean route gained back its attractiveness to migrants. Analysis of the Central Mediterranean shows that one-third of the top nationalities are originated from West African countries, while half of those using the Western route are

<sup>478</sup> Frontex: Detections of illegal border-crossings statistics download: updated monthly [https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Migratory\\_routes/2022/Monthly\\_detections\\_of\\_IBC\\_2022\\_08\\_05.xlsx](https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Migratory_routes/2022/Monthly_detections_of_IBC_2022_08_05.xlsx)  
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migrants from regions other than West Africa. The most prominent regions of origin are the Middle East and North Africa.

Those nationals who were present on both the Central and Western routes over time were people from Algeria, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Guinea, Mali and Sudan. The scope of the overlapping top nationals also shows the diversity of the regions of origin, although West African countries are predominant. Data shown in Figure 6. suggests a change in the migration pattern in 2018. From 2015 a growing number of sub-Saharan nationals used the Western Mediterranean route, peaking in 2018, when an overwhelming number of sub-Saharans used this route to reach the EU, but numbers dropped sharply in 2019. The number of detected arrivals increased from 2019 until 2021 in the Central Mediterranean from most of the sub-Saharan countries of origin, excluding Gambia, which experienced a more moderate growth in the figures.

To investigate if this pattern is replicated regarding other West African countries, a table of the ECOWAS countries was created to examine the number of detected arrivals from 2015 to 2021. As some of the countries from the ECOWAS were already presented in Figure 6 (Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Guinea and Mali), and some nationals were not significantly present in both or one of the examined migration routes (Nigeria and Senegal was predominantly represented on the Central Mediterranean route, while Cape Verde had an extremely low number of nationals detected on both routes), remaining countries were collected into Figure 7 to examine. This includes Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Niger, Sierra Leone and Togo. As data shows, the earlier detected migration pattern reappears in Burkina Faso, Sierra-Leone and to a smaller extent in Liberia and Guinea-Bissau.

Figure 6: Detected arrivals by main nationalities (Data collected from FRONTEX) (Edited by the author)







Figure 7: Detected arrivals from ECOWAS states 2015-2021. (Data collected from FRONTEX) (Edited by the author)



Data shows the increased popularity of the Western Mediterranean route among most of the ECOWAS nationals (2015–2018). In 2019 the number of crossings in the Mediterranean decreased sharply, highly likely linked to the political changes in the EU regarding migration. The increasing numbers on the Western Mediterranean route suggest a similar decision-making process, which possibly took into consideration the growing xenophobia in Italy as well as the instability in Libya when choosing the route to the EU. Data presented by Table 5 also indicates that from 2018 the number of nationals arriving to the EU is more increasingly from the MENA region, notably from Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt and Iran as well as from South Asia: Pakistan.

Based on the scale of the difference in the figures, it is visible that the Western Mediterranean route replaced the Central route from 2018 until 2020 as the most used migration route. Thus, it can be stated that for three years, the main migration route from West Africa to the EU became the Western Mediterranean. In addition to this change a sharp decrease in both routes disrupted the emerging trend, and from 2019 the region of origin of the main nationals shifted from West Africa to the MENA region. To assess what caused these changes, another research is needed on the available migrant stock of those nationalities in the main African transit countries.

Based on the results of the research, it can be stated that the changes in the migration pattern are not necessarily visible if the research focuses only on the nationals of the biggest sending countries. By including multiple countries from West Africa in the data analysis, the changes in the pattern can be detected. Whereas migrants from some countries like Nigeria and Senegal chose predominantly the Central Mediterranean route, most of the West African nationals preferred to use the Western Mediterranean route up until 2020. The general figures show a significant decrease of the migration flow to the EU in 2019, which started to increase but not yet reached the number of detected arrivals of 2017 on the Central Mediterranean route, while it already surpassed it on the Western Mediterranean.

The decreasing number of crossings on the Central Mediterranean route was possibly the result of the agreement between Italy and the Southern Libyan tribes to control sub-Saharan African migration flows. Additionally, Italian political changes made the Southern European country less appealing to migrants from Africa. In 2018, Italy also restricted its asylum policy, which possibly had a further discouraging effect on migrants. Besides this, suspending the activities of naval assets of **EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia** made the journey particularly dangerous. General Haftar's

offensive against Tripoli, which proved to be a protracted process, displaced Libya from its previous position of the biggest transit country of the North African region.

It is also important to note that in spite of the relatively large number of migrants who reach the EU, it is now visible, based on data presented in Chapter III., that most of the African migrants remain on the African continent. Additionally, there is a growing tendency among young Africans to choose Asia over Europe when deciding about the destination. An increasing number of people choose China, whose Africa policy is far more welcoming than the EU's.<sup>479</sup> By 2019 an estimated 500,000 Africans lived in China.<sup>480</sup>

The use of information technology which helped to organise the events of the Arab Spring in 2011 now supports those sub-Saharan Africans who are planning to leave their countries of origin. Therefore, the news on unfavourable policy changes developing anti-immigrant attitude is getting to those who want to reach the EU. It might be also discouraging that the EU has still not finished the revision of the Dublin Regulation and most of the legislation passed only made it more difficult to enter and to stay. Potential migrants can also gather information on the rapidly changing security situation in transit countries. Thanks to the internet, all this earlier mentioned information can reach the people on the move relatively fast to discourage them from starting a perilous journey to the European Union, which is ever more difficult to reach, through countries which offer a rather hostile environment.

The change of the migration patterns is the result of complex, interconnected events. Policy changes in one country cannot realistically influence the directions of entire migration routes, but a series of events along a formerly popular migration route can have a multiplier effect. By 2018 several changes had taken place on the Central-Mediterranean route, including both policy and security changes, which was apparently enough to encourage migrants from sub-Saharan African countries to choose different routes than their predecessors. Political development until 2021 and the additional COVID-19 pandemic might have suppressed the number of arrivals in 2020 and 2021, but figures have steadily been growing both on the Central and


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<sup>479</sup> TARRÓSY, István: Who and How Many of Them from the South Are Knocking on Our Doors? <http://real.mtak.hu/100740/1/16512-10988.pdf> Downloaded: 11.01.2019.

<sup>480</sup> CISSÉ, Daouda: As Migration and Trade Increase between China and Africa, Traders at Both Ends Often Face Precarity. Migration Policy Institute. <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/migration-trade-china-africa-traders-face-precarity> Downloaded: 08.05.2022.

Western Mediterranean routes, even if the predominant nationalities are from the MENA region.

*Map 8: Migration routes in West Africa and the Mediterranean. (Edited by the author)*



## V.1.2 EUNAVFOR MED OPERATIONS SOPHIA AND IRINI<sup>481</sup>

Conflicts and crisis in the Mediterranean were a hot topic within the EU in the past decade. International media followed the events of the Arab Spring, the migration flows and lastly, the launching of EU naval operations reached the attention of the international community. This subchapter investigates the CSDP operation(s) on the Mediterranean. Definitions and theories introduced in Chapter I are used to explain the occurred changes.

The events on the Mediterranean are linked to the broader approach to the context of migration development. According to de Haas, who introduced the notion of a cyclical view on migration, in 2001 an optimistic period started following a long

<sup>481</sup> Based on: VECSEY, Mariann: The Mediterranean Challenge. in: MOLNÁR, Anna, FIOTT, Daniel, ASDERAKI, Foteini, PAILE-CALVO, Sylvain (eds.): Challenges of the Common Security and Defence Policy: ESDC 2<sup>nd</sup> Summer University Book. Publications office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2022. pp. 138-149.

pessimistic cycle.<sup>482</sup> Clearly, migration came into the spotlight again in 2015–2016, when the so-called migration and refugee crisis unfolded, and the EAM was created. With the ongoing crisis, the EU and its Member States reverted to a more pessimistic view on migration. According to de Haas it was quite logical for renewed pessimism to start to unfold after the long era of optimism. The growing pessimism, along with other, complementary phenomena led to changes in the Mediterranean.

The regional security complex theory supports the tendency towards pessimism. The essence of the theory is geographical proximity, since political and military threats tend to travel more easily over shorter distances.<sup>483</sup> Thus, migration could be regarded as an imminent threat on the Southern and Eastern borders of the regional security complex of the EU. Despite the notion of perceived uniformity of thinking within a regional security complex,<sup>484</sup> the EU has proven to be a more heterogeneous environment. The Member States of the EU still have different geopolitical interests and strategic histories. It is a difficult task to launch a CSDP operation to each and every Member States' satisfaction, especially if it is related to a topic so divisive as migration. The EU as a regional security complex intends to address migration and the question of Libya at its southern borders, as a local externality.<sup>485</sup> This suggests the existence of a common strategic culture within the regional security complex. However, the EU lacks such a thing and this fact prevents it from providing effective answers to external threats. Different national interests are also the loudest in the closest geographical proximities,<sup>486</sup> since the EU remains an organisation of sovereign Member States with national interests, which are the strongest when at a close distance.

The debate on migration in the Mediterranean started mostly as a national debate, which rose to the EU level via the Europeanisation process. What happened is that Italy became a destination country in the 1990s and the first legislative acts to regulate

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<sup>482</sup> DE HAAS, Hein: Migration and Development: A Theoretical Perspective. *International Migration Review*, <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1747-7379.2009.00804.x> Downloaded: 30.09.2020.

<sup>483</sup> KELLY Robert E.: Security Theory in the 'New Regionalism'. *International Studies Review*, Summer 2007, [https://www.jstor.org/stable/4621805?read-now=1&seq=1#page\\_scan\\_tab\\_contents](https://www.jstor.org/stable/4621805?read-now=1&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents) Downloaded: 30.09.2020. p. 224. ; BUZAN, Barry: Regional Security Complex Theory in the Post-Cold War World. in SÖDERBAUM, F. et al. (eds.): *Theories of New Regionalism*. London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. p. 141. ; KELLY Robert E.: Security Theory in the 'New Regionalism'. ps. 200-209.

<sup>484</sup> KELLY Robert E.: Security Theory in the 'New Regionalism' p. 224.

<sup>485</sup> HÁDA, Béla, RÓZSA, Erzsébet N., TÁLAS, Péter (eds.), *Regional Security Studies*, (Budapest, NKE Szolgáltató Nonprofit Ltd., 2016), ps. 17-19.

<sup>486</sup> KELLY Robert E.: Security Theory in the 'New Regionalism'. p. 224.

migration were introduced at that period. From 2001, increasingly hostile rhetoric was used in the country in connection with migration. The situation started to escalate only in 2005, in parallel with the riots in France, when Italy also realised that it could not address the phenomenon of migration alone. However, Italy only asked for help from the EU in February 2011 to handle the situation caused by a mass migration influx. The Southern European country tried to promote the need for Member State solidarity and to improve the effectiveness of EU tools.<sup>487</sup>

As the first attempts to Europeanise migration were not successful, Italy launched **Mare Nostrum** in October 2013. The tasks of the operation were to safeguard human lives at sea and to bring human traffickers and smugglers to justice. The area of operation focused on the Strait of Sicily.<sup>488</sup> The first important answer from the EU came in the shape of a FRONTEX operation, which will be discussed in the next section.<sup>489</sup> Operation Triton was a smaller scale operation, which was not designed to replace Mare Nostrum completely, but after its launch, Italy withdrew its forces and continued lobbying for a CSDP mission in the area.<sup>490</sup> In order to launch a CSDP mission or operation to address migration or connected activities, these topics had to be elevated to the level of a security challenge. According to Huysmans, the analysis of migration from the security perspective has been with us since the early 1990s.<sup>491</sup> Thus, the securitisation of migration had already taken place. This made the launching of a CSDP operation in the Mediterranean possible, making the move acceptable to the wider audience.

Italy finally succeeded with its lobby for a CSDP operation in 2015. Via a remarkably fast process, which took just under three months, the EU launched **EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia**, which was an adequate replacement for **Mare Nostrum**.<sup>492</sup> The **EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia** was the result of a persistent Europeanisation process originating from Italy.

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<sup>487</sup> MOLNÁR, Anna: Menekült- és migrációs kérdés Olaszországban [The question of refugees and migrants in Italy] *Nemzet és Biztonság* [Nation and Security] no. 3. March 2015, [http://www.nemzetesbiztonsag.hu/cikkek/nb\\_2015\\_3\\_03\\_molnar\\_anna\\_-\\_menekult\\_es\\_migracios\\_kerdes\\_olaszorszagban.pdf](http://www.nemzetesbiztonsag.hu/cikkek/nb_2015_3_03_molnar_anna_-_menekult_es_migracios_kerdes_olaszorszagban.pdf) Downloaded: 30.09.2020. ps. 5-10.

<sup>488</sup> Mare Nostrum Operation. <https://www.marina.difesa.it/EN/operations/Pagine/MareNostrum.aspx> Downloaded: 30.09.2020.

<sup>489</sup> Joint Operation Triton (Italy). <https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/focus/joint-operation-triton-italy--ekKaes> Downloaded: 30.09.2020.

<sup>490</sup> MOLNÁR, Anna: Menekült- és migrációs kérdés Olaszországban [The question of refugees and migrants in Italy] p. 13.

<sup>491</sup> HUYSMANS, Jef: *The Politics of Insecurity, Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU*. p. xi.

<sup>492</sup> MOLNÁR, Anna: Az EUNAVFOR MED Sophia művelet. [The EUNAVFOR Med Operation Sophia], in MOLNÁR, Anna, KOMLÓSI, Orsolya (eds.), *Az Európai Unió mediterrán térséggel*

According to the preamble of the Council Decision on creating EUNAVFOR MED, Italy certainly achieved its primary goal. The operation is a testament to the EU's commitment to strengthening internal responsibility and solidarity among its Member States. The document also states that the EU is committed to preventing illegal migration. The mission of the operation was never that direct, however. The task of the operation was the *disruption of the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks in the Southern Central Mediterranean* and to contribute to the training of the Libyan Navy and Coast Guard.<sup>493</sup>

By 2018 the fear expressed earlier that the CSDP operation in the Mediterranean was simply a transport service for the migrants, gained momentum.<sup>494</sup> On this note, changes started to mount from 1<sup>st</sup> February 2018, first affecting the FRONTEX operation and disembarkation in Italy. It was thought that a modification on disembarkation would not affect the number of arrivals, since most of the rescues were coordinated by Italy, but it definitely sent a political message.<sup>495</sup>

In 2018 the newly elected Italian government took drastic steps to gain the attention of the EU. Both Italy and Malta effectively closed their ports to NGO boats in 2018,<sup>496</sup> to protest against the lack of solidarity from other Member States.<sup>497</sup> 2018 provided another great opportunity for Italy to express its dissatisfaction. In December, **EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia**'s mandate was to be extended. Italy sought changes to the disembarkation rules and the situation even threatened with the complete shutdown of the operation. Finally, the case was solved in March 2019, with an interesting solution: **EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia** was not to use its naval assets until an agreement was reached on disembarkation rules, namely to make

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*összefüggő kapcsolata Párbeszéd és konfliktusok [The European Unions relations with the Mediterranean Dialogue and conflicts]* (Budapest, Dialóg Campus Kiadó, 2019), p. 101.

<sup>493</sup> Council decision on a European Union military operation in the Southern Central Mediterranean' (EUNAVFOR MED)' Council Decision 2015/778, May 18, 2015, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32015D0778> Downloaded: 30.09.2020.

<sup>494</sup> PARKES, Roderick: Managing migration abroad. Why, where, what and how? p. 3.

<sup>495</sup> SCHERER, Steve: In new EU sea mission, ships not obliged to bring migrants to Italy. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-italy-idUSKBN1FL62M> Downloaded: 30.09.2020.

<sup>496</sup> PETRONI, Nadia: Italy and Malta are not the villains of Europe's migration crisis. <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2019/08/28/italy-and-malta-are-not-the-villains-of-europes-migration-crisis/> Downloaded: 30.09.2020.

<sup>497</sup> TONDO, Lorenzo, MCVEIGH, Karen: No NGO rescue boats currently in central Mediterranean, agencies warn. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/12/migrant-rescue-ships-mediterranean> Downloaded: 30.09.2020.



it possible to use ports out of Italy as well. This left a naval mission with only its air assets deployable and strengthened support for the Libyan Coast Guard.<sup>498</sup>

It was clear that Operation Sophia was approaching its end following these developments. On 1<sup>st</sup> April 2020, a complete replacement of the operation was agreed upon and **EUNAVFOR MED Operation Irini** took its place. The new operation quite logically did not inherit its predecessor's mandate and objective. Operation Irini focuses mainly on the implementation of the UN arms embargo on Libya. Two of the supplementary tasks were inherited from Operation Sophia: *assisting with the development of capacities and the training of the Libyan Coast Guard and Navy and contributing to the disruption of the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks*. A third task added was the prevention of illicit export of petroleum from Libya.<sup>499</sup>

It is clear from the objectives that the operation is still expected to contribute to the disruption of the human smuggling business model, but it is only a complementary solution to the diverse problems. The surveillance of the smuggling networks can only be conducted by aerial assets, and naval vessels are to be kept out of the traditional migration routes. The new operation also has a reduced area of responsibility, which is confined to the eastern section of the Libyan coast.<sup>500</sup> The limitation can be clearly deduced from the primary objective of the mandate, which is enforcing the UN arms embargo. In 2020 the Libyan National Army (LNA), led by General Khalifa Haftar was under control. These are indeed significant changes in the *modus operandi* of the operation. The reduced operational area and the more restrictive mandate combined with a lower budget suggest that the previous disembarkation issue had not been entirely solved. The new operation is important, but a less bold and daring endeavour by the EU to address the long-standing issues in the Mediterranean.

### V.1.3 FRONTEX OPERATIONS

The existence of FRONTEX operations in the Mediterranean is not a new phenomenon. It was stated among the tasks of the agency upon its establishment in

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<sup>498</sup> VECSEY, Mariann: Changes in the Migration Trends from West Africa to Europe. Hungarian Defence Review, Special Issue, vol. 147, no. 1–2 (2019), p. 103.

<sup>499</sup> Council Decision on a European Union military operation in the Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED IRINI)' Council Decision 2020/472, 31 March 2020, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32020D0472&from=EN>

<sup>500</sup> RIZZI, Alberto: Beyond Sophia: EU launches Operation Irini to counter arms trafficking in Libya. <https://finabel.org/beyond-sophia-eu-launches-operation-irini-to-counter-arms-trafficking-in-libya/>

2004 that it must “assist Member States in circumstances requiring increased technical and operational assistance at the external borders by coordinating and organising joint operations, taking into account that some situations may involve humanitarian emergencies and rescue at sea in accordance with Union and international law”.<sup>501</sup> Besides this, other tasks were also listed among the agency’s responsibilities, related to the management of the EU’s external borders. Since significantly more FRONTEX operations were launched in the Mediterranean than CSDP operations, in this section I will restrict my scope to introduce only those which are still active along the Central Mediterranean route.

When Italy launched its Mare Nostrum search and rescue (SAR) focused humanitarian operation in the Mediterranean in 2013 due to the increasing migration flows, in order to tackle the emerged humanitarian emergency<sup>502</sup>, two FRONTEX operations were already active in the region. **Operations Hermes and Enea** had begun in 2011 to the request of Italy to support border surveillance, SAR capability, migrants’ nationality identification and intelligence gathering on people-trafficking networks.<sup>503</sup> The formerly mentioned emerging issues, such as the rising number of migrants’ crossing the Mediterranean demanded a more comprehensive answer from the EU in the area. The incoming Italian EU presidency in July 2014 pushed for more solidarity, and the replacement of the **Mare Nostrum** as the Italian operation was initially viewed as an emergency, short-term operation. The initial idea was to merge the existing two FRONTEX operations into one, under the name of FRONTEX Plus.<sup>504</sup> The new operation was, however, not planned to be a substitute for the **Mare Nostrum**. Firstly, its area of operation excluded international waters, secondly its mission was limited to patrolling and inspection.<sup>505</sup> The FRONTEX Plus later was re-

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<sup>501</sup> Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard and amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32016R1624&from=EN> Downloaded: 08.01.2022. p.14.

<sup>502</sup> Italian Ministry of Defence: Mare Nostrum Operation.

<https://www.marina.difesa.it/EN/operations/Pagine/MareNostrum.aspx> Downloaded: 08.05.2022.

<sup>503</sup> Hermes 2011 running. <https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news/news-release/hermes-2011-running-T7bJgL> Downloaded: 08.01.2022.

<sup>504</sup> VINCENTI, Daniela: Italy pushes ‘Frontex Plus’ to tackle migration crisis.

<https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/italy-pushes-frontex-plus-to-tackle-migration-crisis/> Downloaded: 08.01.2022.

<sup>505</sup> Parliamentary questions Frontex Plus Question for written answer E-008039-14 to the Commission. [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2014-008039\\_EN.html](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2014-008039_EN.html) Downloaded: 08.01.2022.

named to Operation Triton, but the shortcomings remained the same. The main reason for this was the emerging criticism first towards **Mare Nostrum**, and later to other EU search and rescue activities along the Central Mediterranean route. It was thought that the humanitarian activity contributed to the pull factor and hence the increasing number of arrivals on the Central Mediterranean migration route.<sup>506</sup> This approach represents well the swing to a pessimistic cycle of the view on migration. As Benedicto argues, FRONTEX operations in the Mediterranean can also be dubbed as a practical step in the securitisation process of migration within the European Union.<sup>507</sup> The tasks of Operation Triton were clearly signalling the rightfulness of this approach, since the SAR activity was confined to solely Italian and Maltese national waters, and the main task of the operation was the control and surveillance of the external borders.<sup>508</sup> Of course, according to international law, the naval assets engaged in the operation were obliged to rescue those in distress at sea, but the overall contribution of the operation to saving lives were lesser than Mare Nostrum's, since the area of operation was smaller.<sup>509</sup> **Operation Triton** started in 2014, just before the Juncker Commission took over, and before the Council decided on launching the EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia in the Mediterranean which was, as discussed in the previous section, a better suited replacement for **Mare Nostrum**, yet still lacking the humanitarian aspect, which was the Italian operation's main profile.

The mounting issues on the migration policy area and the emerging crises in EU Member States urged the EU to start the reform of the CEAS and the FRONTEX. Undecidedness on the revision of the Dublin Regulation determined the path forward. With beefing up and renaming FRONTEX in 2016, the EU put the securitisation of migration in practice. The EAM clearly set FRONTEX and CSDP missions and operations on the task to tackle the root causes of migration. The question, however,

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<sup>506</sup>KOLLER, Emily: Mare Nostrum vs. Triton. <https://munkschool.utoronto.ca/ceres/files/2017/10/Paper-Emily-Koller.pdf> Downloaded: 08.01.2022. p. 6.

<sup>507</sup> BENEDICTO, Ainhoa Ruiz: Guarding the Fortress. Centre Delàs d'Estudis per la Pau, Barcelona, 2019. [https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/informe40\\_eng\\_ok.pdf](https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/informe40_eng_ok.pdf) Downloaded: 08.01.2022. ps. 6-7.

<sup>508</sup> VACAS FERNÁNDEZ, Félix: The European operations in the Mediterranean Sea to deal with migration as a symptom: from the Italian operation Mare Nostrum to Frontex operations Triton and Poseidon, EUNAVFOR-MED and NATO's assistance in the Aegean Sea. [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/312567162\\_THE\\_EUROPEAN\\_OPERATIONS\\_IN\\_THE\\_MEDITERRANEAN\\_SEA\\_TO\\_DEAL\\_WITH\\_MIGRATION\\_AS\\_A\\_SYMPTOM\\_FROM\\_THE\\_ITALIAN\\_OPERATION\\_MARE\\_NOSTRUM\\_TO\\_FRONTEX\\_OPERATIONS\\_TRITON\\_AND\\_POSEIDON\\_EUNAVFOR-MED\\_AND\\_NATO'S\\_ASSISTAN](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/312567162_THE_EUROPEAN_OPERATIONS_IN_THE_MEDITERRANEAN_SEA_TO_DEAL_WITH_MIGRATION_AS_A_SYMPTOM_FROM_THE_ITALIAN_OPERATION_MARE_NOSTRUM_TO_FRONTEX_OPERATIONS_TRITON_AND_POSEIDON_EUNAVFOR-MED_AND_NATO'S_ASSISTAN) Downloaded: 06.01.2022. p.100.

<sup>509</sup> KOLLER, Emily: Mare Nostrum vs. Triton. p. 10.

remained how these two different tools can be used to tackle this transnational phenomenon.

As Carrera and Cortinovic stated, a visible disengagement started in the SAR operations from 2018.<sup>510</sup> This was both due to the failure of the complete revision of the CEAS, since the bureaucratic load was not eased on the Member States, and again related to geographical proximity. In 2018 the Italian elections changed the tide on the Italian approach to migration. While in 2013 a humanitarian approach was followed, in 2018 even the CSDP operation's existence was in danger, and in parallel the FRONTEX operation Triton was also transformed. Operation Themis followed Triton, with an admittedly enhanced focus on external border management and law enforcement.<sup>511</sup> Thus, the FRONTEX side-lined SAR operations in the Mediterranean, in a more restricted area of operation than the original in 2013. It happened in parallel with the debates on **EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia**, which operated six months without the use of its naval assets.

Besides the disengagement from SAR operations, the disembarkation became an issue, too. In previous FRONTEX operations, the vessels were obliged to take the rescued people to Italian ports. With **Operation Themis**, the modus operandi changed, and, as with the rebranded CSDP operation Irini, disembarkation is negotiated on a case-by-case basis.<sup>512</sup>

FRONTEX operations in the Mediterranean never intended to replace the more ambitious Italian Mare Nostrum operation. Because of the agency's profile, the operations' main tasks were to support the Italian Coast Guard and enhance the external border management. Besides the primary tasks, the number of SAR operations deviated according to EU and national policies. The area of operation remained solely on national and European waters, excluding high seas. The FRONTEX operations can be an excellent supplementary operation to the CSDP operations in the Mediterranean and vice versa since both tools have different profiles. These profiles can complement each other if the tasks are drawn carefully.

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<sup>510</sup> CARRERA, Sergio, CORTINOVIS, Roberto: Search and rescue, disembarkation, and relocation arrangements in the Mediterranean. Justicing maritime border surveillance operations. In: CARRERA, Sergio, STEFAN, Marco: Fundamental Rights Challenges in Border Controls and Expulsion of Irregular Immigrants in the European Union Complaint Mechanisms and Access to Justice. Routledge, New York, 2020. ISBN: 978-0-429-20327-5 ps. 150-151.

<sup>511</sup> Operation Themis. <https://frontex.europa.eu/we-support/main-operations/operation-themis-italy/>  
Downloaded: 06.01.2022.

<sup>512</sup> SCHERER, Steve: In new EU sea mission, ships not obliged to bring migrants to Italy.

## V.2 CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND STATE BUILDING

The previous section discussed CSDP and FRONTEX maritime operations along the Central-Mediterranean route. To complete the list of CSDP tools used by the EU to tackle migration, it is important to assess the missions deployed in Africa. From 2016 the EU increasingly started to subordinate every possible tool to this aim and CSDP missions in Africa were no exception. This subchapter is to investigate how the mandates of the missions in West Africa changed over time to support the EU's migration policy and address migration in the respective countries of origin.

The importance of the West African region is visible. The region was identified in the EUGS as a part of the regional cooperative order. It is also included in the strategy as an area of interest, where state and societal resilience must be promoted.<sup>513</sup> The newly accepted Integrated Strategy in the Sahel of 2020 leaves no doubt that the EU is dedicated to be engaged in the region.<sup>514</sup> Well before the EU's new Sahel strategy, West Africa was acknowledged as one of the main incubators of the EU's new approaches, such as the comprehensive and the later introduced integrated approaches. In addition to this, the previous chapters showed that the region is indeed worthy of attention since - as previously stated - it is one of the most mobile regions of the World with its mobility rate around 3 per cent.<sup>515</sup> With the case selection process introduced, countries hosting CSDP missions got more international visibility. During the peaking years of the so-called migration and refugee crisis, countries and regions of origin with operating CSDP missions gained even more attention. This subchapter investigates CSDP missions in Africa. The missions are introduced from north to south, to trace the EU's steps on the Central Mediterranean migration route from Libya to Mali.

### V.2.2 CSDP MISSIONS TO TACKLE MIGRATION<sup>516</sup>

The European Union established the **European Union Border Assistance Mission**

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<sup>513</sup> Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe, A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy. European External Action Service [http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top\\_stories/pdf/eugs\\_review\\_web.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf) Downloaded: 25. 09.2017. ps. 9 and 34.

<sup>514</sup> The European Union's Integrated Strategy in the Sahel. <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7723-2021-INIT/en/pdf> Downloaded: 12.01.2022.

<sup>515</sup> ECOWAS Common Approach on Migration (Annex A). in: TRÉMOLIÈRES, Marie (ed.): Regional Challenges of West African Migration – African and European Perspectives. OECD publishing, 2009, [https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/regional-challenges-of-west-african-migration\\_9789264056015-en](https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/regional-challenges-of-west-african-migration_9789264056015-en) [DOI] Downloaded: 26.10.2019. p. 229.

<sup>516</sup> Based on: MOLNÁR, Anna, VECSEY, Mariann: EU's Missions and Operations from the Central Mediterranean to West Africa in the context of the migration crisis. in: International Journal of Euro-

**in Libya** (EUBAM Libya) on 22 May 2013. Although the first mandate of the mission did not include the comprehensive approach as a framework of migration management, the given tasks were related to that scope, with the further stabilization of the country. The short-term objectives of EUBAM Libya were to help the capacity development of Libyan authorities to improve border security. Its long-term objective was to establish Integrated Border Management (IBM).<sup>517</sup> The long-standing turmoil and instability in Libya created an environment in which the mission was not able to establish systemic relations with the local partners. Without close connections and real local ownership, it was not able to fulfil its tasks given in the mandate.<sup>518</sup> In 2014, when the security situation deteriorated further in Libya, EUBAM had to move its headquarters to Tunisia.<sup>519</sup> Despite operating from the territory of a neighbouring country, the mandate of the mission was extended in 2016 upon the invitation of the Government of National Accord. Regardless of the special situation of the EUBAM, the mission's tasks did not change. One more task was even added to support the government, namely a comprehensive civilian security sector reform.<sup>520</sup>

By the end of 2017, the security situation allowed EUBAM to, at least partially, return to Tripoli.<sup>521</sup> The mandate of the mission was also altered favourably since EUBAM focused on the sole task to support Libya's security sector reform in the fields

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Mediterranean Studies. 2022. Vol. 15. Issue 1. pp. 55-82. <https://emuni.si/ISSN/2232-6022/15.55-82.pdf> Downloaded: 30.06.2022.

<sup>517</sup> Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities in EU Conflict Prevention. 2017. The Libya Review Revision 2.0. Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities in EU Conflict Prevention May 01. [http://www.ieceu-project.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/IECEU\\_D3.4\\_Libya\\_review.pdf](http://www.ieceu-project.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/IECEU_D3.4_Libya_review.pdf) Downloaded: 13.02.2022. ; Council Decision 2013/233/CFSP of 22 May 2013, on the European Union Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission in Libya. *European Council* May 24. [https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/celex\\_32013d0233\\_en\\_txt.pdf](https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/celex_32013d0233_en_txt.pdf) Downloaded: 13.02.2022.

<sup>518</sup> CHRISTENSEN, G., RUOHOMÄKI, J. and RODT, A. 2018. "The European Union Border Assistance Mission in Libya-successes, shortcomings and lessons identified." Royal Danish Defence College. January 2018. Brief. [https://www.academia.edu/36040150/The\\_European\\_Union\\_Border\\_Assistance\\_Mission\\_in\\_Libya\\_-\\_successes\\_shortcomings\\_and\\_lessons\\_identified](https://www.academia.edu/36040150/The_European_Union_Border_Assistance_Mission_in_Libya_-_successes_shortcomings_and_lessons_identified) Downloaded: 13.02.2022.

<sup>519</sup> Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities in EU Conflict Prevention. 2017. The Libya Review Revision 2.0. Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities in EU Conflict Prevention May 01.

<sup>520</sup> Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/207 of 15 February 2016 amending Decision 2013/233/CFSP on the European Union Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya). *European Council* February 16. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32016D0207> Downloaded: 13.02.2022. ; MOLNÁR, Anna, TAKÁCS Lili: The European Union's Response to Mass Migration Through Mediterranean: A Shift from Humanitarian Foreign Policy Actor Towards a Pragmatist Foreign Policy Actor? in: TZIAMPIRIS, Aristotle, ASDERAKI, Foteini (eds.): *The New Eastern Mediterranean Transformed*. Springer, Cham, 2021. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70554-1> pp. 199-217. p. 204.

<sup>521</sup> EU Integrated Border Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya) Factsheet. *European External Action Service* Downloaded: 07.06.2019. [https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/20190319\\_eubam\\_libya\\_factsheet\\_march\\_2019\\_en.pdf](https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/20190319_eubam_libya_factsheet_march_2019_en.pdf) Downloaded: 13.02.2022.



of border management, law enforcement and the criminal justice system instead of overarching strategic objectives.<sup>522</sup> A stronger cooperation with the UN and other EU missions and operations on the ground was also strengthened by the mandate. Due to the increasing migratory figures in May-July in 2017 (having 23,000 new arrivals in May and 23,500 in June),<sup>523</sup> it became obvious that it was necessary to mention coordination in the mandate. This fact reflected well one of the objectives of the EU Global Strategy in 2016, which emphasised the need for closer cooperation between CSDP missions and operations.<sup>524</sup> In 2016 the EUNAVFOR Med Operation Sophia remained a direct partner to work with Libyan authorities. The EU's role of training the Libyan coast guard and border management in Southern Libya impacted other missions situated on the West African migration route. Therefore, the EU formed these missions and operations in a way to support each other's activities and to contribute to the work of the regional security organizations as well.<sup>525</sup>

The mandate of EUBAM Libya was changed in 2017 according to a template, which was used before to define the activities of EUCAP Sahel Niger and EUCAP Sahel Mali. The element of handling migration became more visible in this mandate, due to the mounting migration pressure on the EU.<sup>526</sup> The document has a reference to the Malta Declaration as its fundamental text. The Malta Declaration mentioned the comprehensive approach to address "illegal flows into the EU".<sup>527</sup>

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<sup>522</sup> Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/1342 of 17 July 2017 amending and extending Decision 2013/233/CFSP on the European Union Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya). European Council July 18. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32017D1342&from=EN> Downloaded: 13.02.2022.

<sup>523</sup> Migratory Map. FRONTEX September 04. [https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Migratory\\_routes/Detections\\_of\\_IBC\\_2019\\_09\\_04.xlsx](https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Migratory_routes/Detections_of_IBC_2019_09_04.xlsx) Downloaded: 13.02.2022.

<sup>524</sup> Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe, A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy.

<sup>525</sup> Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/50 of 11 January 2017 amending Decision 2014/219/CFSP on the European Union CSDP Mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali). European Council January 12. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32017D0050&qid=1560279856809&from=EN> Downloaded: 13.02.2022.

<sup>526</sup> LOSCHI, C., RAINERI, L. and STRAZZARI, F. 2018. "The implementation of EU Crisis Response in Libya: Bridging theory and practice." EUNPACK Project Working Paper. Downloaded: 19.08.2021. <http://www.eunpack.eu/sites/default/files/publications/2018-01-31%20D6.2%20Working%20paper%20on%20implementation%20of%20EU%20crisis%20response%20in%20Libya.pdf> Downloaded: 13.02.2022.

<sup>527</sup> Malta Declaration by the members of the European Council on the external aspects of migration: addressing the Central Mediterranean route.; MOLNÁR, Anna, TAKÁCS Lili: The European Union's Response to Mass Migration Through Mediterranean: A Shift from Humanitarian Foreign Policy Actor Towards a Pragmatist Foreign Policy Actor? in: TZIAMPİRIS, Aristotle, ASDERAKI, Foteini (eds.): The New Eastern Mediterranean Transformed. Springer, Cham, 2021. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70554-1> pp. 199-217. ps. 204-205.



The mandate of EUBAM Libya was modified again on 17 December 2018. This new mandate clearly showed the EU's strategic objective, such as the management of migration from the south. The main goal of the mission was to support the Libyan authorities in reforming state security structures with the intention of disrupting organized criminal networks in Libya and the Central Mediterranean region.<sup>528</sup> The EUBAM was also tasked to provide support in capacity-building related to border management and law enforcement. In the end of 2018, the headquarters of the mission was removed to Tripoli and the mandate was extended again.<sup>529</sup> As General Khalifa Haftar's failed offensive against Tripoli started in April 2019,<sup>530</sup> the security situation in the Libyan capital put the mission in a very difficult situation. Thanks to the two-base modus operandi, the workforce of EUBAM Libya was able to switch to work on the other base in Tunis where it still operates.<sup>531</sup> In 2021, with a new interim government sworn in, the situation seemed to reach a calmer period, where political solutions can be found.<sup>532</sup> However, elections planned to 24 December 2021 were postponed indefinitely, the interim Prime Minister Abdelhamid Dbeibah was replaced by Fathi Bachagha by the Tobruk Parliament. The controversial vote held on 10 February 2022 can fuel further political tension in the already divided country since Dbeibah is adamant to hand over the power only to an elected government.<sup>533</sup> Meanwhile the EUBAM Libya continues to operate at least until 30 June 2023.<sup>534</sup>

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<sup>528</sup> European Council: Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/2009 of 17 December 2018 amending and extending Decision 2013/233/CFSP on the European Union Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya). *European Council* December 18. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32018D2009&from=EN> Downloaded: 13.02.2022.

<sup>529</sup> EUBAM Libya becomes a fully-fledged civilian CSDP mission. *European External Action Service* December 17. [https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/55578/eubam-libya-becomes-fully-fledged-civilian-csdp-mission\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/55578/eubam-libya-becomes-fully-fledged-civilian-csdp-mission_en) Downloaded: 13.02.2022.

<sup>530</sup> MOLNÁR, Anna, SZÁSZI, Ivett and TAKÁCS, Lili: Security Sector Reform by Intergovernmental Organizations in Libya in: *International Journal of Euro-Mediterranean Studies* 2021. Vol. 14. Issue 1. pp. 7-48. <https://emuni.si/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Security-sector-reform-by-intergovernmental-organisations-in-Libya-.pdf> Downloaded: 13.02.2022.

<sup>531</sup> About EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM). *European External Action Service* Downloaded: 07.06.2019. [https://eeas.europa.eu/csdp-missions-operations/eubam-libya/3859/about-eu-border-assistance-mission-libya-eubam\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/csdp-missions-operations/eubam-libya/3859/about-eu-border-assistance-mission-libya-eubam_en) Downloaded: 13.02.2022.

<sup>532</sup> "Libya's interim government takes power after handover in Tripoli." <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/3/16/libyas-interim-government-takes-power-after-handover-in-tripoli> Downloaded: 13.02.2022.

<sup>533</sup> Libya's parliament appoints Fathi Bachagha as new Prime Minister. <https://www.africanews.com/2022/02/10/libya-s-parliament-names-new-pm/> Downloaded: 17.02.2022.

<sup>534</sup> EUBAM Libya: Council extends mandate for a further two years. *European Council* June 18. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/06/18/eubam-libya-council-extends-mandate-for-a-further-two-years/> Downloaded: 13.02.2022. ; MOLNÁR, Anna, TAKÁCS Lili: The European Union's Response to Mass Migration Through Mediterranean: A Shift from Humanitarian

The death of Gaddafi in 2011 left Libya in anarchy, which led to a significant spill over affecting even distant countries like Niger.<sup>535</sup> The **EUCAP Sahel Niger** mission was launched in 2012, to support the Nigerien security actors in the fight against terrorism and organized crime. It was to be achieved with the development of an integrated, coherent, sustainable human rights-based approach. Among its tasks, EUCAP Sahel Niger provided both strategic and technical advice and training. Initially, the mission had only one base, in Niger's capital, Niamey. While the mandate extension of 2014 did not include major changes to the mission,<sup>536</sup> in 2016 one more objective was added: to control and fight irregular migration and associated criminal activity.<sup>537</sup> This element is in accordance both with the EUGS and the proposal to use the CSDP missions and operations as tools to manage migration flows.<sup>538</sup>

A further element was added to the mandate in 2016. EUCAP Sahel Niger started to increase its presence and activity in the Agadez region of Niger in 2015, and a field office was established in the city of Agadez in 2016.<sup>539</sup> The creation of a multi-purpose centre was proposed in 2015, in the EAM. This project was clearly intended to affect irregular migration, since the centre is tasked to give information on local protection and resettlement opportunities. The field office worked in close coordination with the IOM and the UNHCR. This multi-purpose centre in Agadez was a pilot project, which led to further assumptions that the EU was planning to set up more centres like this in the Sahel region to track and gain information on migrants' journeys.<sup>540</sup> Finally it was

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Foreign Policy Actor Towards a Pragmatist Foreign Policy Actor? in: TZIAMPIRIS, Aristotle, ASDERAKI, Foteini (eds.): *The New Eastern Mediterranean Transformed*. Springer, Cham, 2021. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70554-1> pp. 199-217. p. 205.

<sup>535</sup> European Council: Council Decision 2012/392/CFSP of 16 July 2012 on the European Union CSDP mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger). *European Council* July 17. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:187:0048:0051:EN:PDF> Downloaded: 13.02.2022.

<sup>536</sup> European Council: Council Decision 2014/482/CFSP of 22 July 2014 amending Decision 2012/392/CFSP on the European Union CSDP mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger). *European Council* July 23. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014D0482&from=EN> Downloaded: 13.02.2022.

<sup>537</sup> European Council: Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/1172 of 18 July 2016 amending Decision 2012/392/CFSP on the European Union CSDP mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger) *European Council* July 19. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32016D1172&from=EN> Downloaded: 13.02.2022.

<sup>538</sup> BISCOP, Sven, REHRL, Jochen (eds.): *Migration – How CSDP can support*. ps. 11-12.

<sup>539</sup> Civilian Mission EUCAP Sahel Niger Factsheet. *European External Action Service* Downloaded: 07.06.2019. [https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/factsheet\\_eucap\\_august\\_2018\\_eng.pdf](https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/factsheet_eucap_august_2018_eng.pdf) Downloaded: 13.02.2022.

<sup>540</sup> European Council: Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/778 of 18 May 2015 on a European Union military operation in the Southern Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED). *European Council*. May 19. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32015D0778> Downloaded: 13.02.2022.

not the EU, but the IOM, with the support of the EU, which established Flow Monitoring Points in Niger, Mali, and more West and Central African countries. These establishments are also entitled to track the number of Sahara crossings, which used to be an information gap in the past.<sup>541</sup>

The 2016 mandate, in line with the EUGS included the coordination with other EU missions and regional security organizations as the G5 Sahel.<sup>542</sup> The EU already stated in 2017 that a regionalization of CSDP missions is needed to be able to support regional security cooperation in the whole G5 Sahel region effectively. The initiative included three ongoing CSDP missions in the Sahel: **EUCAP Sahel Niger**, **EUTM Mali** and **EUCAP Sahel Mali**.<sup>543</sup> The regionalization also aimed to include the stabilization of Libya.<sup>544</sup> The aim of regionalization was to enable CSDP missions to become an effective tool of the EU in countering irregular migration from West Africa in the framework of a comprehensive and integrated approach. This ambition was reinforced when the EUCAP Sahel Niger needed further mandate prolongations in 2018, which were continued to focus on the fight against irregular migration and the reduction of the level of associated crime.<sup>545</sup> In 2019 the CSDP regionalization efforts had been reinforced with adding the task to improve interoperability and support cross-

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<sup>541</sup> Migration Joint Initiative. Flow Monitoring Activities, Methodology and Products in West and Central Africa. *International Organisation for Migration* Downloaded: 19.08.2021. <https://migrationjointinitiative.org/sites/default/files/files/pdf/iomfmpwcaonepagerfinalenv2.pdf> Downloaded: 13.02.2022.

<sup>542</sup> European Council: Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/1172 of 18 July 2016 amending Decision 2012/392/CFSP on the European Union CSDP mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger) *European Council* July 19. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32016D1172&from=EN> Downloaded: 13.02.2022.

<sup>543</sup> The European Union's Partnership with the G5 Sahel Countries. *European External Action Service* Downloaded: 07.06.2019. [https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/factsheet\\_eu\\_g5\\_sahel\\_0.pdf](https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/factsheet_eu_g5_sahel_0.pdf) Downloaded: 13.02.2022.

<sup>544</sup> European Council: Council Conclusions on Mali and the Sahel. 10137/17 19 June *European Council* June 19. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/23993/st10137en17-conclusions-mali-sahel.pdf> Downloaded: 13.02.2022.

<sup>545</sup> European Council: Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1247 of 18 September 2018 amending Decision 2012/392/CFSP on the European Union CSDP mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger). *European Council* September 19. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32018D1247&from=EN> Downloaded: 13.02.2022. ; LOPEZ, E. L. 2017. "Performing EU agency by experimenting the 'Comprehensive Approach': the European Union Sahel Strategy." *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 35 (4), 451-468. Downloaded: 13.02.2022.

border cooperation between the internal security forces of G5 Sahel<sup>546</sup>, and the mandate of the mission was elongated again in 2020 for two years.<sup>547</sup>

The European Union deployed two missions to Mali, to help Bamako to consolidate the situation in the country. **EUTM Mali** was started in 2013, with the aim to provide training to the Malian Armed Forces (Forces Armées Maliennes – FAMa), and to advise on command and control, logistical chain and human resources together with educating FAMa on human rights and the protection of civilians. The mission had to conduct its tasks in close coordination with other actors in the country, the UN peacekeeping mission, MINUSMA, as well as ECOWAS.<sup>548</sup>

The mission was launched in the framework of Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel, under the comprehensive approach.<sup>549</sup> As it was stated before, the EU's Sahel Strategy of 2011 did not mention migration as a security challenge in the region, but it addresses all the root causes of migration. In Mali, the EU addressed fragile governance, violent extremism and radicalization in the Northern regions of the country, and terrorist-linked security threats with the deployment of the EUTM. The mandate of the mission did not include tasks directly linked to the fight against irregular migration, but by addressing the root causes it contributes to it. Via training and advising the FAMa, the mission is an important element in the EU's CSDP toolbox to tackle irregular migration. The first mandate also embeds the need for cooperation with the already existing **EUCAP Sahel Niger**, and also the coordination of the mission's activities with Member States' bilateral actions in Mali and with international and regional actors also present in the region, like the UN, the African Union and the ECOWAS.<sup>550</sup>

The original mandate changed in 2016, when the area of operation of the mission was extended, including the municipalities of Gao and Timbuktu in Northern Mali. A new coordinating actor, the G5 Sahel also had to be added to the list of already existing

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<sup>546</sup> European Council: Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/832 of 22 May 2019 amending Decision 2012/392/CFSP on the European Union CSDP mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger). *European Council* May 23 <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32019D0832&from=EN> Downloaded: 13.02.2022.

<sup>547</sup> European Council: Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1254 of 7 September 2020 amending Decision 2012/392/CFSP on the European Union CSDP mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger). *European Council* September 8. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32020D1254&from=EN> Downloaded: 13.02.2022.

<sup>548</sup> European Council: Council Decision 2013/34/CFSP. *European Council* January 18. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013D0034&from=en> Downloaded: 13.02.2022.

<sup>549</sup> European Council: Council Decision 2013/34/CFSP.

<sup>550</sup> European Council: Council Decision 2013/34/CFSP.

partners.<sup>551</sup> Supporting G5 Sahel Joint Task Force means that the EU is supporting an African home-grown solution to the regional crisis in the Sahel. In 2018, the Council of the European Union extended the mandate of EUTM Mali until 2020, stressing the importance of G5 Sahel even more, which was promoted to be the beneficiary of EUTM's training and advising activities together with the FAMA.<sup>552</sup> This was amended in 2020, when the mission's mandate was extended until 2024, by giving EUTM the task to provide military assistance to the G5 Sahel Forces, as well as to the national armed forces of the regional formation.<sup>553</sup> However, the mandate did not mention the word migration. Instead, the mission itself addresses one of its root causes, the lack of / low level of internal security.

**EUTM Mali**, as a non-executive military training mission is not a classic example for the EU's use of CSDP to fight irregular migration. But, since the mission's objective is to strengthen the FAMA and develop its capabilities, together with supporting the G5 Sahel group, the mission is an important element of the European Union's toolbox. It also gives feedback on how those countries who host the CSDP mission or operation view migration, since the mandates of the different missions have to be approved by them. The fact that Mali did not allow to include migration related tasks to be added to the mandate, sheds some light on Bamako's way of thinking.

**EUCAP Sahel Mali** does not mention the word migration in its mandates either. But EUCAP Sahel Mali is not just a tool to implement the EU's Sahel Strategy, it certainly is a very important element in the EU's toolbox to handle migration, as it is mentioned both in the *Valletta Action Plan* and the EAM.<sup>554</sup> This mission promotes good governance, which is a fundamental element of a stable state, which can provide not just a safe and secure environment to its nationals, but can encourage them to stay, or even to return to their home countries.

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<sup>551</sup> European Council: Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/446 of 23 March 2016 amending and extending Council Decision 2013/34/CFSP on a European Union military mission to contribute to the training of the Malian Armed Forces (EUTM Mali). *European Council* March 24. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32016D0446&from=en> Downloaded: 13.02.2022.

<sup>552</sup> European Council: Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/716 of 14 May 2018 amending and extending Decision 2013/34/CFSP on a European Union military mission to contribute to the training of the Malian Armed Forces (EUTM Mali). *European Council* May 16. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32018D0716&qid=1560271749509&from=EN> Downloaded: 13.02.2022.

<sup>553</sup> European Council: Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/434 of 23 March 2020 amending Decision 2013/34/CFSP on a European Union military mission to contribute to the training of the Malian Armed Forces (EUTM Mali). *European Council* March 24. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32020D0434&from=EN> Downloaded: 13.02.2022.

<sup>554</sup> European Council: Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/778

The EU decided to launch **EUCAP Sahel Mali** in 2014, but the mission formally began in 2015. The youngest EU mission in West Africa is also based on the framework of the 2011 *EU Sahel Strategy*. The objectives and tasks of the civilian mission were to help Malian authorities to restore and maintain law and order through the territory of Mali and improve their efficacy hierarchy in close coordination with other UN and EU missions in the area.<sup>555</sup>

Besides this, the mandate of the mission includes the obligation to establish contacts among the EU missions in Mali, Niger and Libya.<sup>556</sup> The following mandate extensions reinforced these tasks and obligations, adding just a few changes to the mandate. The inclusion of cooperation with the G5 Sahel group's internal security forces was one of the added elements in 2017, together with the support of the implementation of the 2015 Accord for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali.<sup>557</sup>

**EUCAP Sahel Mali** also contributes to the regionalization of CSDP in the Sahel.<sup>558</sup> This was reinforced in 2021, when the new mandate included the need for improvement and coordination with G5 Sahel countries, the reinforcement of G5 Sahel national forces and support information sharing with the group.<sup>559</sup> As we could see, the G5 Sahel structure is supported by the EU in a wide spectrum, which includes the transnational challenge of migration. To address migration in the region, the EU uses the framework of both the *Valletta Action Plan* and the *European Agenda on Migration*.<sup>560</sup> The *European Agenda on Migration* states that migration will be a specific component of ongoing CSDP missions and operations in Niger and Mali.<sup>561</sup> This means that the EU is definitely counting on CSDP missions to handle the so-called migration and refugee crisis. The implementation of the regional approach also

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<sup>555</sup> European Council: Council Decision 2014/219/CFSP of 15 April 2014 on the European Union CSDP mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali). *European Council*. April 15. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32014D0219> Downloaded: 13.02.2022.

<sup>556</sup> European Council: Council Decision 2014/219/CFSP

<sup>557</sup> European Council: Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/50 of 11 January 2017 amending Decision 2014/219/CFSP on the European Union CSDP Mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali). *European Council* January 12. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32017D0050&qid=1560279856809&from=EN> Downloaded: 13.02.2022.

<sup>558</sup> European Council: Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/50

<sup>559</sup> European Council: Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/14 of 7 January 2021 amending Decision 2014/219/CFSP on the European Union CSDP Mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali). *European Council* January 08. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32021D0014> Downloaded: 13.02.2022.

<sup>560</sup> European Council: Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/50

<sup>561</sup> European Council: Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/778



opens up opportunities. In the Sahel, crises cannot be addressed within a country, the solutions cannot remain on a national level.<sup>562</sup>

Over time, the EU's commitment to maintaining the above-mentioned missions became obvious from the pledged financial reference amount, which is intended to cover the expenditures of the missions. The most difficult to assess is the financial reference amount to cover the expenses of EUBAM Libya. This is highly likely related to the vicissitudinous history of the mission. In 2013 the mission got EUR 30,300,000 for 12 months.<sup>563</sup> From 22 May 2014 to 21 February 2016 the financial reference amount was EUR 26,200,000.<sup>564</sup> The differing lengths of the financing periods already suggest the volatility of the security situation in Libya. This idea is supported by the next period, only reaching for six months until 21<sup>st</sup> August 2016, covered by EUR 4,475,000.<sup>565</sup> In the following period, until 30 November 2017, EUBAM Libya got EUR 17,000,000 to cover its expenses.<sup>566</sup> From 1<sup>st</sup> December 2017 to 31<sup>st</sup> December 2018 the sum reached EUR 31,200,000.<sup>567</sup> But for the next period until 30<sup>th</sup> June 2021 the financial reference amount even decreased to EUR 60,038,863.03.<sup>568</sup> The amount for the so far last period from 1<sup>st</sup> July 2021 until 30<sup>th</sup> June 2023 was set in EUR 84,850,000.<sup>569</sup> As Table 7 shows, the monthly financing of EUBAM Libya fluctuated over time significantly. However, since mid-2016 a general increase in the amount is visible, partly because of the changes in the security situation. It is also probable that the two bases of the operation and the migratory pressure on the southern flank of Europe pushed up the financing of the mission.

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<sup>562</sup> According to the interview with a CSDP mission member conducted by the author on 12.03.2020

<sup>563</sup> European Council: Council Decision 2013/233/CFSP

<sup>564</sup> European Council: Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/2276 of 7 December 2015 amending and extending Decision 2013/233/CFSP on the European Union Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya). <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32015D2276> Downloaded: 17.02.2022.

<sup>565</sup> European Council: Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/207

<sup>566</sup> European Council: Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/1342

<sup>567</sup> European Council: Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2162 of 20 November 2017 amending Decision 2013/233/CFSP on the European Union Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya). <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32017D2162> Downloaded: 17.02.2022.

<sup>568</sup> European Council: Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/903

<sup>569</sup> European Council: Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/1009 of 18 June 2021 amending Decision 2013/233/CFSP on the European Union Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya). [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L\\_.2021.222.01.0018.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AL%3A2021%3A222%3ATOC](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2021.222.01.0018.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AL%3A2021%3A222%3ATOC) Downloaded: 17.02.2022.



Table 7: Financial reference amount EUR/month to EUBAM Libya. (Edited by the author)

Financial period	EUR/month	Related event
21 May 2013 – 21 May 2014	2,525,000	Decision on launching the mission
22 May 2014 – 21 February 2016	1,247,619	HQ moves to Tunisia due to security reasons
22 February 2016 – 21 August 2016	745,833	Operating from Tunisia
22 August 2016 – 30 November 2017	1,133,333	Elongation of the mission's mandate, relocation to Libya
1 December 2017 – 31 December 2018	2,400,000	Operating in two bases, Tripoli and Tunis
1 January 2019 – 30 June 2021	2,001,295	General Haftar's military campaign against Tripoli
1 July 2021 – 30 June 2023	3,535,416	Niche for negotiation opens in Libya

The sum grew steadily regarding to EUCAP Sahel Niger from the beginning of the mission. The first financial reference amount was a mere EUR 8,700,000, just slightly increasing in its monthly amount in 2014, with the full financial reference amount at EUR 6,500,000 in 2014. Since July 2014 the financial reference amount continued to increase, first reaching EUR 9,155,000 in the period ending in July 2015.<sup>570</sup> The next one-year period experienced a jump to EUR 26,300,000 to cover expenses until 15<sup>th</sup> July 2017.<sup>571</sup> From 1<sup>st</sup> October 2018 to 30<sup>th</sup> September 2020 the expenditure increased further to EUR 63,400,000.<sup>572</sup> The current financing is in line with the previous trends, reaching EUR 73,758,441.09 for the period from 1<sup>st</sup> October 2020 to 30<sup>th</sup> September 2022.<sup>573</sup> Table 8 shows the constant increase in the financial reference amount, with a significant increase in the budget from 2016.

Table 8: Financial reference amount EUR/month to EUCAP Sahel Niger. (Edited by the author)

Financial period	EUR/ month
16 July 2012 – 31 October 2013	600,000
1 November 2013 – 15 July 2014	684,210
16 July 2014 – 15 July 2015	762,916
16 July 2015 – 15 July 2016	816,666
16 July 2016 – 15 July 2017	2,191,666
16 July 2017 – 15 July 2018	2,583,333
1 October 2018 – 30 September 2020	2,641,666
1 October 2020 – 30 September 2022	3,073,268

<sup>570</sup> European Council: Council Decision 2014/482/CFSP

<sup>571</sup> European Council: Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/1172

<sup>572</sup> European Council: Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1247

<sup>573</sup> European Council: Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1254

The financial reference amount for EUCAP Sahel Mali shows the same tendency starting from EUR 5,500,000 to cover its first nine months. In the next year, until 14<sup>th</sup> January 2016 the amount doubled to EUR 11,400,000. For the period until 14<sup>th</sup> January 2017 the mission got EUR 19,775,000. In the next year the financial reference amount increased further to EUR 29,800,000 until 14<sup>th</sup> January 2018.<sup>574</sup> The amount continued to increase and skyrocketed to EUR 89,100,000 for the two-year period until 2023.<sup>575</sup> According to Table 9, the financial reference amount increased significantly in 2016, which is the same time as the budget of EUCAP Sahel Niger was raised considerably as well.

*Table 9: Financial reference amount EUR/month to EUCAP Sahel Mali. (Edited by the author)*

Financial period	EUR/ month
15 April 2014 – 14 January 2015	611,111
15 January 2015 – 14 January 2016	950,000
15 January 2016 – 14 January 2017	1,647,916
15 January 2017 – 14 January 2018	2,483,333
15 January 2018 – 28 February 2019	2,188,461
1 March 2019 – 14 January 2021	3,097,727
15 January 2021 – 31 January 2023	3,712,500

The previous paragraphs, and Tables 8 and 9 demonstrated that the financing of civilian missions grew over time significantly, with the most visible leap around 2016. This shows that the EU is committed to be engaged in the Sahel. The only military mission, EUTM Mali is financed by the Member States, therefore it is difficult to assess the total spending on the mission. But, after and in consequence of the EUGS, the European Peace Facility was established, which enables the EU to increase its financing on military missions like EUTM Mali.<sup>576</sup>

### **V.2.3 EU INITIATIVES AFTER THE EUGS IN THE CSDP MIGRATION CONTEXT<sup>577</sup>**

The previous sections introduced how CSDP and FRONTEX missions and operations can support the EU's response to the so-called migration and refugee crisis. This subchapter is, however, to investigate how the EUGS changed the CSDP

<sup>574</sup> European Council: Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/50

<sup>575</sup> European Council: Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/14

<sup>576</sup> European Peace Facility. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/european-peace-facility/> Downloaded: 17.02.2022.

<sup>577</sup> Based on: VECSEY, Mariann: What has the EU Global Strategy contributed to the Migration-Africa-CSDP? What has been implemented and what is left to be done. in. BELLOU, Fotini, FIOTT, Daniel (eds.): Views on the progress of CSDP. ESDC 1st Summer University Book. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2020. ISBN 978-92-95201-51-4 doi:10.2855/642046 pp. 91-114.

migration context through its defence initiatives. Even before the introduction of the European Union's Global Strategy, CSDP was started to be seen as a tool to handle migration flows from Africa. The geographical proximity and the common history predestined the close relations between Africa and Europe, which became more important than ever during the so-called migration and refugee crisis. The topic has been addressed in the different frameworks of the EU - Africa relations over time. This section analyses the proceedings in the implementation of the new ideas presented by the EUGS in the past years. For this analysis the three annual follow-ups on the EUGS were used as a guideline. I also collected those ideas related to handling migration which were presented in the EUGS, or one of its follow-up documents, and are still not implemented.

Since the introduction of the EUGS, the EU experienced significant changes. The three annual follow-ups of the EUGS made it easier to analyse what has been done since the introduction of the strategy. The first two documents are proven to be more concise, and focusing on the new initiatives, while the last document is written to look more into the future tasks. To summarise what has been done since the introduction of the EUGS, I used these three documents as guidelines.

The follow-up of 2017 stated that the implementation of the new strategy is moving forward quickly in the security and defence domain. The selected priorities to address in 2016–17 were resilience, integrated approach to conflicts and crises, and security and defence. The EU also pledged to work on the internal–external nexus to be rationalised within the external actions.<sup>578</sup>

This first follow-up reaffirms the EU's self-perception as a global power and security provider. The first big step for the implementation according to the follow-up is the creation of a common development policy, namely the Consensus on Development. The consensus has been made for all the European institutions and Member States.<sup>579</sup> The consensus acknowledges the importance of engaging with Africa and promotes closer cooperation on the international field. It also recognises migration as a complex phenomenon, which requires well balanced, and similarly comprehensive answers from multiple policy areas at the same time. The document

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<sup>578</sup> From Shared Vision to Common Action: Implementing the EU Global Strategy Year 1. [https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/full\\_brochure\\_year\\_1\\_0.pdf](https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/full_brochure_year_1_0.pdf) Downloaded: 12.10.2019. ps. 6-11.

<sup>579</sup> From Shared Vision to Common Action: Implementing the EU Global Strategy Year 1. ps. 6-7.

states that well-managed migration can be a positive contribution to both origin and destination countries, while irregular migration poses major challenges.<sup>580</sup>

The document claims that the first year of the EUGS was focused on prevention: preventing fragile situations from escalation to wars, humanitarian disasters, or new refugee crises. The follow-up states that one of the main tools of prevention is building resilience. It was particularly dominant in the ENP countries, especially in the Southern Neighbourhood. Libya was also engaged within this framework, with the aim of building a resilient society against conflict and migration.<sup>581</sup> The Joint Communication on Resilience was made to identify a strategic approach to resilience, to increase the impact and sustainability of European external action in the whole spectrum of the challenges described by the EUGS.<sup>582</sup>

Among the ongoing tasks to build resilience, the document listed the EU's support for Tunisian civil administration reform. The program is to ensure sustainability through accountable governance, rule of law, and respect for human rights.<sup>583</sup> The EU strengthened its support to Tunisia right after the Arab Spring to build a stable democratic country in its immediate neighbourhood. The cooperation focuses on job creation, good governance, investment in youth, but managing irregular migration is also present within the list of joint efforts.<sup>584</sup>

The work on resilience was also present in the Sahel in the form of different instruments, for example, CSDP missions. The role of the three prominent missions was discussed in the previous section. In the Sahel region the EU supported the establishment of the G5 Sahel Joint Military Force, which is to address security challenges in the region, while the EU engages in development, from job creation to

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<sup>580</sup> The New European Consensus On Development 'Our World, Our Dignity, Our Future' [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/european-consensus-on-development-final-20170626\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/european-consensus-on-development-final-20170626_en.pdf) Downloaded: 12.10.2019. ps. 17-19.

<sup>581</sup> From Shared Vision to Common Action: Implementing the EU Global Strategy Year 1. ps. 12-14.

<sup>582</sup> Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, A Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU's external action [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/joint\\_communication\\_-\\_a\\_strategic\\_approach\\_to\\_resilience\\_in\\_the\\_eus\\_external\\_action-2017.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/joint_communication_-_a_strategic_approach_to_resilience_in_the_eus_external_action-2017.pdf) Downloaded: 12.10.2019. p. 2.

<sup>583</sup> From Shared Vision to Common Action: Implementing the EU Global Strategy Year 1. p. 15.

<sup>584</sup> Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council Strengthening EU support for Tunisia [https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/communication\\_from\\_commission\\_to\\_inst\\_en\\_v6\\_p1\\_859678-2.pdf](https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/communication_from_commission_to_inst_en_v6_p1_859678-2.pdf) Downloaded: 12.10.2019. ps. 2-12.

infrastructure, from health to education. The EU has also launched security sector reforms (SSRs) in different countries, to build sustainable and secure states.<sup>585</sup>

The formerly mentioned internal-external nexus was named as a key element to address migration. It is not a new idea to the EU. The EU has already addressed migration outside its borders, among other transnational challenges.<sup>586</sup> The first follow-up of the EUGS claims that regarding the external nexus the EU implemented short-, mid- and long-term actions to tackle migration and its root causes. The EUGS listed the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants as one of the most important documents on the global level. Among the more actively engaged EU level programs are the EU Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) and the European External Investment Plan (EIP). These tools are to address the economic side of migration, with the aim of job creation and private investment.<sup>587</sup> The EUTF was launched in 2015, with the aim to deliver rapid response to the distressed areas of focus. This tool in itself wants to address the root causes of migration comprehensively. It aims to develop an understanding of the dynamics and drivers of migration, while also supporting resilience and stability.<sup>588</sup> The EIP, however, was newly launched, in line with the EUGS, in 2017. This initiative deals with economics in a more pronounced manner, since its focus is job creation.<sup>589</sup> Besides economics, the EU started to strengthen the cooperation element to tackle migration in accordance with the EUGS. The best institutional elements to enhance cooperation with external partners are EU delegations. During the first year of the implementation of the EUGS the European External Action Service (EEAS) started to work on a more efficient network of delegations.<sup>590</sup> The EU's Partnership Framework on Migration was practically launched together with the EUGS and had its one-year evaluation also in 2017. The framework aims to establish more effective cooperation within origin, transit and destination countries, and with international organisations like the IOM. Supporting voluntary return also falls under the responsibility of this framework, of which the

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<sup>585</sup> From Shared Vision to Common Action: Implementing the EU Global Strategy Year 1. ps. 18-19.

<sup>586</sup> PARKES, Roderik: Managing migration abroad Why, where, what and how? p. 1.

<sup>587</sup> From Shared Vision to Common Action: Implementing the EU Global Strategy Year 1. p. 27.

<sup>588</sup> EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa [https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/content/about\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/content/about_en)  
Downloaded: 12.10.2019.

<sup>589</sup> What is the EU's External Investment Plan [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/eu-external-investment-plan/what-eus-external-investment-plan\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/eu-external-investment-plan/what-eus-external-investment-plan_en) Downloaded: 12.10.2019.

<sup>590</sup> From Shared Vision to Common Action: Implementing the EU Global Strategy Year 1. p. 30.

most remarkable result is the dramatically increased returns from Libya to the countries of origin.<sup>591</sup>

There were significant improvements in the implementation in just the first year of the EUGS. The EU made steps to build resilience in the neighbourhood and further, it introduced new tools and frameworks to tackle irregular migration, and even included CSDP missions in the toolbox to handle migration.

The second follow-up of the EUGS came in 2018, claiming that there have been advances in all five priority areas. The strong intention remained to work in a more coherent way within the EU to address transnational issues like migration. Again, addressing internal–external policy nexus is inevitable regarding this topic.

Institutional changes were made within the EU, which are, one can believe, aiming to answer the question how the EU will reform itself to handle better migration, and other cross-border issues.<sup>592</sup> These changes were made in the field of security and defence, in parallel with ongoing programs, such as the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), all aiming the CSDP missions to become more rapidly deployable and effective. Another crucial step was to establish the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC), which was formed specially to command non-executive missions, the EUTMs, which are all located in Africa. This body was bound to be in close cooperation with its civilian counterpart, the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC). It finally solved the peculiar situation of the EUTMs, creating a command and control structure, which exactly fits the needs of these missions.<sup>593</sup> This is a big step towards enhancing effectiveness, and if one considers that the CSDP started to be seen as a tool to handle irregular migration, this arrangement was very much needed. Also, civilian CSDP missions were to be strengthened in the second year of the implementation of the EUGS, with the aim to increase their effectiveness in tackling organised crime and border management.<sup>594</sup>

The European Peace Facility was proposed in 2018 and established in 2021. It replaced the Athena Mechanism and the African Peace Facility. The new instrument

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<sup>591</sup> Partnership Framework on Migration: Commission reports on results and lessons learnt one year on [https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_IP-17-1595\\_en.htm](https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1595_en.htm) Downloaded: 12.10.2019.

<sup>592</sup> PARKES, Roderik: Managing migration abroad Why, where, what and how? p.4.

<sup>593</sup> EU defence cooperation: Council establishes a Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/06/08/military-mpcc-planning-conduct-capability/> Downloaded: 12.10.2019.

<sup>594</sup> Implementing the EU Global Strategy Year 2 [https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eugs\\_annual\\_report\\_year\\_2.pdf](https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eugs_annual_report_year_2.pdf) Downloaded: 12.10.2019. p. 7.

signifies a huge step forward in the financing of CSDP training missions, which can result in more flexibility and rapidity in their deployment.<sup>595</sup> The new framework can finance up to 30 per cent of the common costs of the operation, or more if the Council decides so.<sup>596</sup> This is a considerable increase in financial support, since the Athena Mechanism funded up to 10 per cent of the common costs of such missions.<sup>597</sup> Another important, but controversial change introduced with the establishment of the European Peace Facility is the possibility to supply military equipment or platforms, designed to deliver lethal force to African countries.<sup>598</sup> This development could open up opportunities, but also raises questions regarding conflicts.

The second follow-up states that a holistic security model became the brand of the EU, with the Sahel being the first field of experiments. The region hosts three CSDP missions and a lot of programs and projects. Investment in the Sahel and in North Africa was seen as an investment in Europe's security. We also have to bear in mind that these investments are mostly deemed to reduce the root causes of irregular migration, which has been seen lately as one of the biggest security concerns of the EU.<sup>599</sup>

The Sahel again occupies a very important place in the follow-up, as well as in European strategic thinking. The support of the G5 Sahel Joint Force is promoted. The Capacity Building in support of Security and Development (CBSD), which was widely criticised for securitizing EU development policy,<sup>600</sup> was announced to help the funding, training, and equipping of African forces. The EIP, which was launched during the first year of the implementation of the EUGS, also remained in place, contributing to the economic development of African countries.<sup>601</sup>

To address migration as a global issue, the EU continued to use the Partnership Framework on Migration. The framework engages Member States and African

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<sup>595</sup> European Peace Facility. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/european-peace-facility/> Downloaded: 17.02.2022.

<sup>596</sup> European Council: Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 of 22 March 2021 establishing a European Peace Facility, and repealing Decision (CFSP) 2015/528. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021D0509> Downloaded: 07.12.2021.

<sup>597</sup> FIOTT, Daniel: The Multiannual Financial Framework and European Defence. <https://www.intereconomics.eu/contents/year/2018/number/6/article/the-multiannual-financial-framework-and-european-defence.html> Downloaded: 07.12.2021.

<sup>598</sup> European Council: Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/509

<sup>599</sup> Implementing the EU Global Strategy Year 2 p. 8.

<sup>600</sup> BERGMANN, Julian: Capacity Building in Support of Security and Development (CBSD): Securitising EU Development Policy? [https://www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/BP\\_24.2017.pdf](https://www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/BP_24.2017.pdf) Downloaded: 12.10.2019. p. 1.

<sup>601</sup> Implementing the EU Global Strategy Year 2 ps. 10-11.



countries, and it was launched under the umbrella of the EAM. It has short-term aims, such as reducing the loss of life in the Mediterranean and increasing the returns to countries of origin.<sup>602</sup> It was visible in the first follow-up document that the framework was really successful in achieving its short-term goals.<sup>603</sup> In the second year of the evaluation, it could focus more on its long-term objective, to tackle the root causes of migration. Another framework policy appeared on the global stage in 2018 to address migration: the Global Compact on Migration, forged by the UN. When the follow-up was made, the prospects of the EU unanimously signing the compact were high. But in December, when the finalisation came, a number of EU Member States chose not to join the new initiative.<sup>604</sup> Therefore, this particular item of the evaluation remains controversial, and a failed action to strengthen global governance.

The EU was successful, however, with other changes. The Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI – Global Europe Instrument) was proposed within the timeframe of the second evaluation.<sup>605</sup> The instrument replaced the ENI, the IPA, the DCI, the PI, the Instrument for Stability and the EIDHR. The inclusion of the new instrument to the 2021–2027 MFF also solved a long-standing controversy with the inclusion of the EDF into the budget. The formerly off-budget instrument provided financial support to the CPA framework, to the OACPS countries.<sup>606</sup>

The second year in the EUGS was stronger in institutional changes and events to enhance closer cooperation with international actors. The formerly launched programs remained in force and continued to support the implementation of the EUGS.

The third follow-up from 2019 broke with the traditions set by the first two documents. It reads as a summarising document which marks the end of a period. From the strategic perspective, it can be such a document since short-term objectives generally have to be realised in 1 to 3 years from the introduction of the strategy itself.

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<sup>602</sup> TARDIS, Matthieu: European Union Partnerships with African Countries on Migration A Common Issue With Conflicting Interests [https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/tardis\\_eu\\_partnerships\\_african\\_countries\\_migration\\_2018.pdf](https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/tardis_eu_partnerships_african_countries_migration_2018.pdf) Downloaded: 07.12.2018. p.13.

<sup>603</sup> From Shared Vision to Common Action: Implementing the EU Global Strategy Year 1. p. 28.

<sup>604</sup> LAESSING, Ulf, RINKE, Andreas: U.N. members adopt global migration pact rejected by U.S. and others <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-un-pact/u-n-adopts-global-migration-pact-rejected-by-u-s-and-others-idUSKBN1O90YS> Downloaded: 15.12.2018.

<sup>605</sup> Implementing the EU Global Strategy Year 2 p. 16.

<sup>606</sup> Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI – Global Europe). [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/funding-and-technical-assistance/neighbourhood-development-and-international-cooperation-instrument-global-europe-ndici-global-europe\\_hu](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/funding-and-technical-assistance/neighbourhood-development-and-international-cooperation-instrument-global-europe-ndici-global-europe_hu) Downloaded: 17.02.2022.

Because of this consideration, or perhaps because the mandate of the former High Representative/Vice President (HR/VP) ended in 2019, the third follow-up mainly summarizes the achievements since 2016 and does not introduce any novelties on handling migration in Africa.

Among these listed accomplishments the most articulated one is the implementation of the integrated approach in the Sahel. The EU is engaged in the region along three main lines, namely political dialogue with the G5, security and stability support with the funding of the G5 Sahel Joint Task Force, and the presence of three CSDP missions, and development cooperation through the EUTF.<sup>607</sup>

What has been done so far is listed in the appendix of the third follow-up. The establishment of the Civilian CSDP is on the track. With the introduction of the EIP, an effective tool has been introduced to address economic hardships in Africa. Closer cooperation with youth and civil society has been achieved within the framework of the JAES, which was reinforced during the 2017 summit.<sup>608</sup>

The implementation of the long-term tasks of the EUGS is still ongoing. In contrast, short-term objectives have already been reached. So now, the mid-, and long-term objectives must gain momentum. These, of course, have to be achieved through sustaining the launched new programs, partnerships and initiatives of all kinds.

The *European External Investment Plan* was also launched in 2017 with the aim of creating jobs and fuelling sustainable growth in Africa and the neighbourhood,<sup>609</sup> thus clearly addressing one of the root causes of migration. This instrument must run in the long-term, so establishing it was just the starting step in the procedure. It must be used in a sustainable way.

In relation to the proposition to intensify cooperation with African partners, the JAES was used more significantly. It is, however, still a challenge to engage with Africa on equal terms.<sup>610</sup> Inequality can be captured also in the Partnership Framework on Migration, where the EU's interests are written down clearly, while the African interests are only drawn in general.<sup>611</sup> Principled pragmatism introduced by the EUGS

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<sup>607</sup> The European Union's Global Strategy Three Years on, Looking Forward [https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eu\\_global\\_strategy\\_2019.pdf](https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eu_global_strategy_2019.pdf) Downloaded: 12.10.2019. p. 24.

<sup>608</sup> The European Union's Global Strategy Three Years on, Looking Forward ps. 37-47.

<sup>609</sup> The European Union's Global Strategy Three Years on, Looking Forward p. 39.

<sup>610</sup> ÖLUND, Maria: Critical Reflections on the Joint Africa-EU Strategy. <https://www.ajol.info/index.php/ad/article/download/87522/77203> Downloaded: 12.10.2019.p. 1.

<sup>611</sup> CASTILLEJO, Clare: The EU Migration Partnership Framework Time for a Rethink? [https://www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/DP\\_28.2017.pdf](https://www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/DP_28.2017.pdf) Downloaded: 12.10.2019. p. 6.

is a positive step in the direction to achieve the aim of real term equality in the EU–Africa relations, however we have seen setbacks during the negotiations about the post-Cotonou agreement.

The most well-known proposal of the EUGS, the integrated approach claimed to be implemented in the Sahel. However, even the third-year follow-up states that the dialogue must be continuous. Therefore, executing the integrated approach will be constant work from the EU’s side, since every new tool must be added to the existing system. Also, the EU still has to work on how to use the integrated approach by decision, and not by coincidence.<sup>612</sup>

The last item, which should be tackled is the internal-external nexus. The EUGS stated that there is no hard line between the internal and external dimensions of EU policies, especially in transnational issues like migration. It is, however, not entirely clear how the EU wants to use or reform its existing system to fit this new approach. CSDP became more flexible in the past years, owing to the introduction of the Civilian CSDP, as well as to the establishment of the MPCC. But in parallel with this, the FRONTEX is getting massive funds and is being reformed.<sup>613</sup> Since both the CSDP and FRONTEX are seen as tools to handle migration, a clarification is needed in the division of roles.

As a new strategic framework, in March 2020, the idea of the creation of the Strategic Compass emerged. The Compass provides more concrete politico-strategic guidance and leads to a common threat perception. It was agreed that the development process for the Strategic Compass should last two years. In the meantime, the differences in the Member States’ threat perceptions need to be taken into account. According to Fiott’s research, more than half of the openly available 25 national security strategies of EU Member States that were analysed agreed on a series of security threats (terrorism, cybersecurity, hybrid threats, organised crime, proliferation, violent conflict, resource and energy supply, espionage, and illegal migration), but might disagree on how to tackle those threats.<sup>614</sup> The Strategic Compass has four thematic areas or baskets to address: crisis management, resilience,

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<sup>612</sup> Common Security and Defence Policy High Level Course, Module I. 23-27.09.2019.

<sup>613</sup> EU Border and Coast Guard Agency: 10 000 operational staff by 2027 <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20190327IPR33413/eu-border-and-coast-guard-agency-10-000-operational-staff-by-2027> Downloaded: 12.10.2019.

<sup>614</sup> Daniel Fiott, ‘Uncharted Territory?’, EUISS Brief, no. 16, July 2020, <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/uncharted-territory-towards-common-threat-analysis-and-strategic-compass-eu-security-and>.

capability development, and partnerships. The crisis management basket could be the most important one for the CSDP. It aims to establish clearer functional and regional priorities on which the EU can focus the CSDP. Given the different strategic cultures, however, this will be a difficult task to achieve. Mainly because of the lack of willingness from Member States to provide resources to missions and operations, the Compass may narrow down the areas of interest to make them manageable, presumably also increasing readiness to deploy the necessary resources.<sup>615</sup>

## V.4 CONCLUSIONS

This chapter analysed the practical steps taken by the European Union to handle irregular migration since 2015. As a starting point, the Central Mediterranean route was introduced to provide a better understanding of the migration pattern of the highlighted route. The analysis also proved that migration routes are quite vulnerable to changes both in the security and in the political environment. As the example showed, migration flows are rapidly responding to political changes. Understanding this was a steppingstone to investigate the tools, focusing on CSDP related instruments of how the EU responded to the increasing volume of migration.

The securitisation of migration made it possible for the European Union to externalise crisis handling and border management, which resonates with my fourth hypothesis. There it was stated that the EU will externalise these activities and even include external actors in the process. The idea to externalise EU solutions appeared in the EUGS when the EU committed itself to addressing these challenges, which have both internal and external dimensions like terrorism or organized crime.<sup>616</sup> This commitment is reflected in the mandates of the CSDP missions, since they are engaged first of all in counterterrorism and organized crime, while handling migration seems secondary.

Politically, CSDP missions and operations gained capital, and became more supported by the EU Member States since 2016. This support shows in the figures of the expenditures of the three missions in the Sahel. The financial framework for all three of them increased in the period of 2016–2018, and then the growth was either

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<sup>615</sup> Christian Mölling, Torben Schütz: ‘The EU’s Strategic Compass and Its Four Baskets’ DGAP Report no. 13, November 2020, <https://www.ies.be/files/dgap-report-2020-13-en.pdf> p. 6.

<sup>616</sup> Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe, A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy.

maintained or the level did not drop significantly. In parallel with the increased funding, the tasks of the missions were modified, too. Where the host state agreed, countering migration was added to the list. This was the case in EUCAP Sahel Niger. There crime related to migration could be added to the mandate.

Where the host state did not find it important to address migration, other tasks were strengthened which still affect migration. The securitisation of migration thus benefited these missions, which take place relatively far from the EU's borders, but the CSDP missions and operations in a closer geographical proximity suffered more from policies, influenced by EU Member States' individual interests, like in the case of EUNAVFOR MED.

The EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia showed that Italy's assertiveness made it possible to launch this operation in the Mediterranean. Also, when its host and main contributor remained dissatisfied with European solidarity, Europeanisation was used again to change the less satisfactory operation into something less damaging to Italy. While we are proceeding closer to the EU's borders, the national political debates have more and more influence on the missions and operations. This is the most visible in the Mediterranean, where Italy was blocking the EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia from the use of its naval assets, which led to the replacement of the operation with EUNAVFOR MED Operation Iriini. The Italian reluctance was manifested in the changed priorities of the tasks of the new operation.

Meanwhile, the presence of FRONTEX operations in the Central Mediterranean preceded the start of the CSDP operations in the area. But FRONTEX never intended to replace either Italy's Mare Nostrum, or the CSDP operations. The tasks of FRONTEX were in line with the agency's profile. Their aim was mainly to support the Italian border and coast guard and conduct SAR operations. Therefore, until now, the FRONTEX operations were proven to be a complementary element to the CSDP operations in the Central Mediterranean. Thus, the articulated clash of overlapping activities and expertise can complement each other if the tasks are drawn carefully.

However, migration also blurred the line of internal and external security. The EUGS not just mention external border management, but also the need of cooperation among CSDP missions and operations, FRONTEX and EU specialized agencies. The need for cooperation among EU missions and operations became visible from the

mandates.<sup>617</sup> The need for cooperation did not stay on paper, it was implemented in the discussed missions. The EUCAPs in the Sahel reached to cooperate with EUCAP Somalia as well.<sup>618</sup> From 2016, every mission and operation is obliged to maintain communication with at least the closest missions and operations. In the case of EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia/Irini, the circle of cooperating agencies became even wider. The operation in the Mediterranean not just obliged to coordinate with EUBAM Libya, but also with the FRONTEX operation in the area.

But the EUGS opened up other opportunities, too, to strengthen the EU's presence in these conflict regions. The European Peace Facility was proposed in 2018 and came into existence in 2021. This instrument brought fundamental changes to the finances of CSDP military missions, like EUTM Mali. While the previous financing instrument, the Athena Mechanism was able to finance up to 10 per cent of the common costs of these types of mission, the Peace Facility increased this amount to 30 per cent or more depending on Council decision. This can in itself reshape CSDP military missions. Another important novelty the Peace Facility introduced is the possibility of supplying African countries with lethal platforms. This used to be impossible since the first review of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement in 2005, due to the introduction of the 'everything but arms' policy. Now, the EU Member States can legally enter this niche as well. This step is, however, a double-edged sword. It certainly lessens, for example, the niche for Russia to sell weapon systems to African countries but also raises questions about security.

Another more technical tool within the EU's structure can also contribute to the deployment of CSDP missions and operations. This is the Permanent Structured Cooperation. This tool through its very existence can be an important element of the CSDP missions and operations. It can address the ever-surfacing problems in the force generation process. If the EU uses it wisely, PESCO can be the solution to the capability gaps. The Council Decision on the establishment of PESCO also highlights that there must be a consistency between the actions taken under PESCO and the Common Foreign and Security Policy.<sup>619</sup>

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<sup>617</sup> Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe, A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy.

<sup>618</sup> According to the interview with a CSDP mission member conducted by the author on 12.03.2020

<sup>619</sup> European Council: Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 of 11 December 2017 establishing permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and determining the list of participating Member States.

<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32017D2315&from=EN>

Downloaded: 17.05.2022. p. 2.

The last element of the most important initiatives after the EUGS is the development of the Strategic Compass. In the future, the Compass may solve some of the problems Operation Sophia had to face. Due to the excessive Europeanisation of national policies, the EU operation in the Mediterranean went through drastic changes. The Strategic Compass, which was introduced in March 2022, is aiming to provide the next comprehensive strategic framework of the EU. This time, with the inclusion of all Member States, the EU aims to set the fundamentals of a common European strategic culture for the first time. This step can also influence the deployment of CSDP missions and make it easier to take any decisions regarding the CSDP. But the EU's very nature prevents it from being as unified as a country. It will possibly remain a regional security complex, with differences in the strategic culture on its four edges. However, the Strategic Compass could provide a solution for the more willing. This approach has certain disadvantages, however, including the promotion of a more fractured Europe instead of a more unified one.

The implementation of the integrated strategy of the EU is proven to be very ambitious but feasible. The bar is set high, and non-fulfilment can cause frustration.<sup>620</sup> However, the regional approach and within it the integrated approach is clearly leading towards a solution.<sup>621</sup> There is a positive probability that changes can be achieved in the region over time with the establishment and parallel utilisation of tools. However, it remains a question if migration can be successfully managed by the use of every tool of the integrated and comprehensive approach of the European Union. To investigate the national approaches, the next chapter consists of the selected case studies.

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<sup>620</sup> According to the interview with a former CSDP mission member conducted by the author on 20.12.2019

<sup>621</sup> According to the interview with a CSDP mission member conducted by the author on 12.03.2020



## CHAPTER VI.

### CASE STUDY: FROM WEST AFRICA TO THE CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN ROUTE

This chapter is dedicated to introducing three case studies on the route from West Africa to the Central Mediterranean. To be able to tackle the attitude of different governments throughout the migration route, countries with varying roles in the migration process were studied. Visibility must be taken into consideration when researching African countries, since data availability and statistics are scarce or outdated. This process follows the logistical approach of case selection. Three countries were selected for a case study on the West African migration route where it was analysed how the EU initiatives were turned into actions. Moreover, it was analysed about the EU's actions if they are necessary and sufficient in these three countries to bring a meaningful change towards the approach on migration. The three countries examined in geographical order from the south to the north are Mali, Niger and Libya. All three of them are hosting EU missions (EUTM Mali, EUCAP Sahel Mali, EUCAP Sahel Niger, EUBAM Libya) on their territories, which provides the countries with visibility. To analyse countries within the same geographical region fits into the EU's intent of regionalization as well as into the integrated approach of crisis management introduced by the EU's Global Strategy of 2016.<sup>622</sup>

Along these lines Mali was selected as a country of origin, Niger as a transit country, and Libya, which, depending on its security situation, is both a transit and destination country. All these countries have gained international attention in recent years. Mali with the Tuareg insurgency, the active Islamist groups and its two coups d'état and the still ongoing unrest in the country, Niger, as it is one of the most important transit countries in West Africa, and Libya, with the Arab Spring and the following years of civil war and anarchy on its territory. Moreover, all three countries are hosting EU missions, which makes them even more visible. This chain of states

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<sup>622</sup> MOLNÁR, Anna: Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy.  
[http://www.nemzetesbiztonsag.hu/cikkek/nb\\_2016\\_2\\_07\\_molnar\\_anna\\_-\\_kozos\\_jovokep\\_kozos\\_cselekvés\\_erosebb\\_europa\\_kozos\\_kul\\_es\\_biztonsagpolitikai\\_strategia.pdf](http://www.nemzetesbiztonsag.hu/cikkek/nb_2016_2_07_molnar_anna_-_kozos_jovokep_kozos_cselekvés_erosebb_europa_kozos_kul_es_biztonsagpolitikai_strategia.pdf)  
 Downloaded: 29.09.2017.

was turned into a test-field of the EU as they form an ideal area to trial both the comprehensive and the integrated approaches. Also, when the idea emerged in 2015 that the CSDP can be used to handle migration, West Africa again seemed a perfect choice for testing.

Besides the EU's interest in Africa, and particularly in the Sahel, its Member States are also eager to secure their national interests in the region. I chose to examine the bilateral relations of France, Germany and Italy with the three African countries. For the process a pragmatic case selection approach was followed. The top three countries which contributed the highest amount of ODA were examined, with the most troops deployed to Africa from the respective countries. The amount of the ODA - besides indicating the economic power of the provider - is important because Africa receives around 30 per cent of the bilateral ODA funding. According to the reported ODA levels in 2021, Germany, France and Italy were the three top ODA contributors from the EU.<sup>623</sup> Regarding military contribution, the same three countries were proven to be the most active in Africa. The bilateral ties of these countries are introduced within the case studies of the respective African states.

By presenting the case studies in geographical order from South to North, the aim was to structure the analysis of the migration route from the beginning to its end. The sections on the different countries do not include a comprehensive country profile. Due to the scope of the dissertation, only recent events are covered with the pertaining selective historical background. The different states are discussed in three subchapters, of which the first section examines the political, economic and social patterns of the country, to understand migration dynamics. The sectors are divided, just as in the push-pull model, to be clearer and more understandable. But all of the three segments must be considered as pieces of the whole puzzle. The second section describes the bilateral relations of the examined country with the selected EU Member States, while the third section introduces how all the elements affected migration in the respective country.

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<sup>623</sup> Preliminary ODA levels in 2021. <https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/ODA-2021-summary.pdf> Downloaded: 01.05.2022. p. 9.

## VI.1 MALI

Mali belongs to the group called the Francophonie. This indicates that it was a former colony of France, along with many other states throughout Africa. The country gained its independence on 22<sup>nd</sup> September 1960, in the decade when large-scale decolonization took place. The newly independent state kept its close ties with the former colonial power, and even joined the Yaoundé Convention established in 1963 with the EEC. Mali, consequently, had

6. Map: Mali (Edited by the author)



been the part of the contractual framework between the EU and the OACPS from the beginning. Bamako was proven to be an eager pupil to learn and implement the Western ways, too: it was considered a model democracy in the Francophonie in 2002, just 10 years before its disintegration.<sup>624</sup>

Mali captured the attention of the EU again in 2012, with the Tuareg insurgency. Since 2012, two EU missions have been deployed to the country, which definitely had an impact on the county's visibility. Mali is also notable from the Hungarian perspective. Since the withdrawal of forces from other EU (EUTM Somalia at the beginning of 2019<sup>625</sup>) and UN (MINUSCA at the end of 2018<sup>626</sup>) missions in Africa, the Hungarian Defence Forces deployed a contingent of 10 to EUTM Mali in 2019, with the expectation of gradually building up presence in the country.<sup>627</sup> By the end of

<sup>624</sup> MARTIN, Philip, MARTIN, Susan and WEIL, Patrick: Best Practice Options: Mali. in: *International Migration*, 2002. Vol. 40. Issue 3. pp. 87–102. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2435.00200> Downloaded: 01.05.2022. ps. 87-88.

<sup>625</sup> NAGY, Sándor: Az Európai Unió Szomáliai Kiképző Missziója 2010–2019 között. [The EUTM Somalia between 2010 and 2019], *Nemzet és Biztonság* 2020, Issue 3. pp. 54–71. DOI: 10.32576/nb.2020.3.5 Downloaded: 24.08.2022. p. 55.

<sup>626</sup> SZENES, Zoltán, APÁTI, Zoltán and DRÓT, László: Jubileumi évfordulók: ENSZ békefenntartás és a Magyar Honvédség. [Jubilee anniversaries: UN peacekeeping an the Hungarian Defence Forces] *Honvédségi Szemle* Vol. 147 Issue 1. pp. 13–32. <https://kiadvany.magyarhonvedseg.hu/index.php/honvszemle/article/view/279/271> p. Downloaded: 24.08.2022. p. 28.

<sup>627</sup> SZÁSZ, Márton: A Magyar Honvédség részvétele az Európai Unió által vezetett kiképzőmisszióban Maliban. [The role of the Hungarian Defence Forces in the EU's training mission in Mali.] *Honvédségi Szemle*, 2019. Vol. 147. Issue 6. pp. 53-73. DOI: 10.35926/HSZ.2019.6.5. p. 66.

2021, Hungary doubled its participation in the EUTM, sending a total of 20 people to the operational theatre.<sup>628</sup> But Mali is not just important because of the deployed CSDP missions, but also because of its role in and approach to international migration. The CSDP missions and the large-scale international presence in general ensures the visibility of the country. The IOM established FMPs provide an added value to the context as well. At the beginning of this research, in 2016, Mali had a unique feature, its own national migration policy, which presents Mali's take on migration.

### VI.1.1 BACKGROUND

Different sectors like demography and economy cannot be assessed alone because it would mislead the research. These sectors are interlinked, and they have a cumulative effect on migration, as migration theories represented. To understand the current state of play in Mali, it is, however, important to know about the history of the country. The intent of the present research is not to provide a detailed account but to offer a selected historical background that helps to understand recent conditions and events better.<sup>629</sup> Before discussing the history of the country, an introduction of the ethnic heterogeneity of Mali is required too. The main linguistically defined ethnonational groups in Mali are the Bambara, 46.3 per cent of the population, located in Southern Mali, Fulani, 9.4 per cent of the population, in Southern Mali, Dogon, 7.2 per cent, in Central Mali, Soninké, 6.4 per cent, in South West Mali, Tuareg 3.5 per cent, in North East Mali. These ethnic groups live in overlapping areas, and they lead different lifestyles; nomadic (Tuareg, Fulani) or permanently settled (Bambara, Dogon).<sup>630</sup> These differences contributed to various conflicts among the ethnic groups over time.

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
<sup>628</sup> WAGNER, Péter: Helyszíni tudósítás az Afrikában szolgáló magyar katonákról. [On-the-spot cover about the Hungarian soldiers deployed to Africa.] 2021.12.06. <https://novekedes.hu/mag/helyszini-tudositas-az-afrikaban-szolgalo-magyar-katonakrol-fotokkal> (Downloaded: 12.05.2022.)

<sup>629</sup> VECSEY, Mariann: A mali válság és a nemzetközi fellépés, különös tekintettel az EUTM Malira. [The Mali Crisis and the International Intervention, With the EUTM Mali in Focus.] 2013. Master's Thesis. 24.11.2013. ps. 15-19.

<sup>630</sup> LEUPRECHT, Christian and ROSEBERRY, Philippe: Political Demography of conflict in Mali. [https://dandurand.uqam.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/2018\\_06\\_Demographie-politique-Mali\\_Leuprecht\\_Roseberry\\_EN.pdf](https://dandurand.uqam.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/2018_06_Demographie-politique-Mali_Leuprecht_Roseberry_EN.pdf) Downloaded: 05.09.2022. p. 13.

Mali gained its independence in 1960 from France.<sup>631</sup> It was not long until the first Tuareg rebellion broke out for the independence of the Azawad<sup>632</sup>, their own nation state. Since 1960, multiple insurgencies broke out with varying success, and all ended with peace contracts with questionable results.<sup>633</sup> So far, the last Tuareg insurgency broke out in 2012.<sup>634</sup> After the Arab Spring and the fall of

Map 10: The Azawad region in Mali. (Edited by the author)



Gaddafi, about 3,000 former mercenaries returning from Libya joined the rebel groups.<sup>635</sup> It was not a surprise that the already weak Malian government was not capable of handling the situation, and the frustrated military led a coup to topple then President Amadou Toumani Touré. Rebel groups in the north exploited the situation and advanced further south.<sup>636</sup> On 6<sup>th</sup> April 2012 the MNLA (Mouvement national de libération de l'Azawad - National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad) proclaimed

<sup>631</sup> Mali at a glance. <http://www.maliembassy.us/index.php/about-mali/mali-at-a-glance> Downloaded: 16.07.2013.

<sup>632</sup> The Azawad is a secular state, which includes the Tuareg population. The area of this country includes the Northern part of Mali and Burkina Faso, the North-Western part of Niger, the South-Western part of Libya and the South-Eastern part of Algeria. It's area is around 2 million km<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>633</sup> BESENYŐ, János The European Union mission in Mali - Hungary's involvement in the mission. SSRN, Contemporary Military Challenges 2013. Vol. 15, Issue 3. ISSN: 1580-1993, pp. 25-37.; BESENYŐ, János, MILETICS, Péter (2013): Országismertető Mali. [Mali Countryprofile] MH GEOSZ, Budapest. 2013. ISBN 978 963 08 7010 8 p. 154. and BONDERSHOLT, Signe F., GYLDENHOLM, Kia C. K.: Conflict in North Mali–Tuareg Livelihood. International development Studies, Roskilde University, 5th semester, spring 2012 – Bachelor [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/277166906\\_Conflict\\_in\\_North\\_Mali\\_-\\_Tuareg\\_Livelihood](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/277166906_Conflict_in_North_Mali_-_Tuareg_Livelihood) Downloaded: 18.07.2013. p. 33-34.

<sup>634</sup> DIALLO, Tiemoko, LEWIS, David (2012a): Mali rebels push south to open third front-sources. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/26/mali-fighting-town-idUSL5E8CQ40020120126> Downloaded: 11.09.2013. September 11.

<sup>635</sup> MARSAL, Viktor: Külföldi katonai beavatkozás Maliban – az Opération Serval háttere és eredményei [International Military Intervention in Mali – The Background and Results of Opération Serval]. in: Nemzet és Biztonság. 2013. Issues 1-2. pp. 99–119. <http://www.nemzetesbiztonsag.hu/letoltes.php?letolt=623> Downloaded: 21.05.2013. p. 101.

<sup>636</sup> DIALLO, Tiemoko, LEWIS, David (2012b): Soldiers say they have seized power in Mali. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mali-army/soldiers-say-they-have-seized-power-in-mali-idUKBRE82L09C20120322> Downloaded: 24.09.2013.

the Azawad, pictured on Map 10, as a secular state, which the international community did not acknowledge. It can be considered a milestone, since the Tuareg had not had an independent nation state before, and lived in oppression during the colonial times, with the settled population being preferred by the colonizers over the nomadic tribes of the North. The Tuareg insurgents therefore achieved their initial aim to control the area.<sup>637</sup> But the MNLA was not any more the leading actor of the events in Northern Mali. Recognising its own weakness, the Tuareg group looked for allies from a pool of Islamist organisations, some of which were labelled as terrorist groups.<sup>638</sup> By April, these groups, like Ansar ad-Din<sup>639</sup>, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)<sup>640</sup> and the MUJAO<sup>641</sup> took over the control of the insurgency. Soon peace negotiations started, but despite the ongoing negotiations and the agreed ceasefire, the power struggle was continuous between different armed groups in the north. The events at the beginning of 2013 reaffirmed the need for international intervention in Mali.<sup>642</sup> François Hollande, then incumbent President of France, provided a rather fast response to his Malian counterpart's request. On 11 January 2013 French troops started to operate in Mali under the name of **Operation Serval**.<sup>643</sup> After the rapid advancement of the French intervention forces, other actors decided to deploy forces to the country,

<sup>637</sup> FELIX, Bate: Mali rebels declare independent 'Azawad'. <https://www.reuters.com/article/ozatp-mali-20120406-idAFJ0E83500820120406> Downloaded: 21.07.2021.

<sup>638</sup> METCALF, Steve: Iyad Ag Ghaly - Mali's Islamist leader. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18814291> Downloaded: 24.09.2013.

<sup>639</sup> Iyad Ag Ghali established the Islamist group in 2011. <http://www.dw.de/mali-islamist-group-ansar-dine-on-us-terror-list/a-16692076> Downloaded: 20.07.2013.

<sup>640</sup> The Al-Qaeda in Maghreb is a jihadist group with Algerian headquarters. It started its operations in the northern part of Mali in 2003. The group uses its current name from 2007. Its leader Abdelmalek Droukel. The group strengthened its position in 2012 in northern Mali. We can find veterans from Iraq and Afghanistan among its warriors. NCTC: Counterterrorism 2013 Calendar, Al-Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). <http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/aqim.html> Downloaded: 25.09.2013.

<sup>641</sup> MUJAO- Mouvement pour l'Unification et le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest-Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa. The MUJAO separated from the AQIM in 2011 and formally announced its existence on 23. October in the same year. The leader of the organisation is Mokhtar Belmokhtar. The group was active until 2014. United Nations Security Council: Mouvement pour l'Unification et le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest (MUJAO) [https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/aq\\_sanctions\\_list/summaries/entity/mouvement-pour-l%E2%80%99unification-et-le-jihad-en](https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/entity/mouvement-pour-l%E2%80%99unification-et-le-jihad-en) Downloaded: 23.07.2021.

<sup>642</sup> SKÖNS, Elisabeth (2016): The implementation of the peace process in Mali: a complex case of peacebuilding. in. SIPRI Yearbook 2016. Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-0198787280 <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/The-implementation-of-the-peace-process-in-Mali.pdf> Downloaded: 23.07.2021. ps. 162-163.

<sup>643</sup> Crisis Group: Africa Report N°201. Mali: Security, Dialogue and Meaningful Reform. ps. 8-11. ; VECSEY, Mariann: A mali válság és a nemzetközi fellépés, különös tekintettel az EUTM Malira. [The Mali crisis and the international intervention, the EUTM Mali in focus] MA thesis, 2013. ; VECSEY, Mariann: A francia beavatkozás első éve Maliban. [The first year of French intervention in Mali] Szakmai Szemle, vol. 2 issue 2 pp. 88-110., 2014



too. The African Union's mission, the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) began in January 2013, but due to financial issues the UN took it over just six months later, under the name of MINUSMA.<sup>644</sup> EUTM Mali emerged in April 2013<sup>645</sup>, and EUCAP Sahel Mali followed in 2014.<sup>646</sup>

In parallel with the deployment of international forces to the country, a complicated peace process started among the parties, with the mediation of Algeria. In 2015 all negotiating parties, namely the Mali government, the Platform and the CMA<sup>647</sup> signed a peace agreement. However, sporadic fights were still present in the country since the Islamist groups had been excluded from the negotiations.<sup>648</sup>

The UN's fears about the implementation of the peace agreement were not unfounded. It did not include all the warring parties, and only applied to the northern parts of the country. By 2016 it became clear that years of neglect resulted in rapidly escalating inter-ethnic tensions in central Mali as well. Fulani herders and Dogon farmers clashed over scarce natural resources, and radical groups capitalised on the conflict.<sup>649</sup> The inter-ethnic violence in the inner Niger delta widened to an Islamist insurgency led by the Katiba Macina group. Bamako's response was military operations against the warring parties. A dialogue to end the conflict was out of question.<sup>650</sup> The public unrest in other parts of the country also increased. It peaked when the Constitutional Court invalidated the result of several hundred polling stations, significantly changing the allocation of seats after the parliamentary elections of 2020. This move led to weeks of protests in Bamako, which resulted in a coup on

<sup>644</sup> MINUSMA History. <https://minusma.unmissions.org/en/history> Downloaded: 20.02.2022.

<sup>645</sup> Council Decision 2013/34/CFSP. *European Council* January 18. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013D0034&from=en> Downloaded: 13.02.2022.

<sup>646</sup> COUNCIL DECISION 2014/219/CFSP of 15 April 2014 on the European Union CSDP mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali). *European Council*. April 15. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32014D0219> Downloaded: 13.02.2022.

<sup>647</sup> Coalition des Mouvements de l'Azawad - Coalition of Azawad Movements

<sup>648</sup> VECSEY, Mariann: Maliból jelentik. [Reported from Mali] pp. 129-143., 15 p. In: CSUZDA, Norbert; FARKAS, László; FEKETE, Csanád; NÉMETH, József Lajos; SZABÓ, Albert; VECSEY, Mariann - KALÓ, József (ed.): Napjaink biztonsági kihívásai, veszélyei és fenyegetései [Security threats and challenges of the present.] Budapest, Hungary: NKE Szolgáltató Nonprofit Kft, 2016 ISBN: 9789634390008 ; SKÖNS, Elisabeth (2016): The implementation of the peace process in Mali: a complex case of peacebuilding. ; International Crisis Group: Mali: la paix à marche forcée? <https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/226-mali-an-imposed-peace-french.pdf> Downloaded: 20.02.2022.

<sup>649</sup> International Crisis Group: Central Mali: An Uprising in the Making? <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/mali/central-mali-uprising-making> Downloaded: 20.02.2022.

<sup>650</sup> International Crisis Group: Speaking with the "Bad Guys": Toward Dialogue with Central Mali's Jihadists. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/276-speaking-bad-guys-toward-dialogue-central-malis-jihadists> Downloaded: 20.02.2022. ; Central Mali: no choice but to flee. <https://www.msf.org/central-mali-no-choice-flee> Downloaded: 20.02.2022.



18 August 2020. The military took over the country repeating the events of 2012.<sup>651</sup> Strong reactions from the international community, ECOWAS, the AU, the EU and the UN pushed the junta to hand over the power to a transitional government. At least on the surface. Ten months after the coup, however, on 21 May 2021 a wave of arrests of the civilian members of the transitional government led to another bloodless coup. The military grabbed power and have been holding it since.<sup>652</sup> Meanwhile the security situation remained unchanged in the country. New tactics towards radical groups, namely engaging them in negotiations about a ceasefire and even peace could, however, have changed the spiral of violence in the country.<sup>653</sup> This has never been truly achieved, though.<sup>654</sup> The appearance of other international actors, notably the notorious Kremlin-linked Wagner Group,<sup>655</sup> notwithstanding, changed the dynamics in Mali.

The precarious security situation and political instability has had its consequences on other sectors as well. The most affected is the economy. Mali occupies the 20<sup>th</sup> place on the list of the world's poorest countries.<sup>656</sup> This might not be the most important factor of the country's economy but provides the context for further data. Since 2014, until the beginning of the pandemic, the country achieved a steady 5.5 per cent average growth. Because of COVID-19 in 2020 the economy was in a decline, and growth started again in 2021. Apart from the above-mentioned deviation caused most likely by the pandemic, quarterly data preceding 2014 shows significant deviations in GDP growth. This is highly likely the consequence of the insurgency in the north.<sup>657</sup> Trends regarding the stability of the country showed a more favourable

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<sup>651</sup> International Crisis Group: Mali : défaire le coup d'Etat sans revenir en arrière. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/fr/africa/sahel/mali/mali-defaire-le-coup-detat-sans-revenir-en-arriere> Downloaded: 20.02.2022.

<sup>652</sup> Mali: Security Council warned of 'endless cycle of instability'. <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/01/1109552> Downloaded: 20.02.2022. ; International Crisis Group: Mali, a Coup within a Coup. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/mali-un-coup-dans-le-coup> Downloaded: 20.02.2022. ; International Crisis Group: Saving Momentum for Change in Mali's Transition. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/304-transition-au-mali-preserver-laspiration-au-changement> Downloaded: 20.02.2022.

<sup>653</sup> International Crisis Group: Mali: Enabling Dialogue with the Jihadist Coalition JNIM. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/306-mali-enabling-dialogue-jihadist-coalition-jnim> Downloaded: 20.02.2022.

<sup>654</sup> According to the interview with a CSDP mission member conducted by the author on 12.03.2020

<sup>655</sup> 'Hundreds' of Russian mercenaries in Mali, EU confirms. <https://euobserver.com/world/154112> Downloaded: 20.02.2022.

<sup>656</sup> Poorest Countries in the World 2022. <https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/poorest-countries-in-the-world> Downloaded: 20.02.2022.

<sup>657</sup> Mali GDP Annual Growth Rate. <https://tradingeconomics.com/mali/gdp-growth-annual#:~:text=GDP%20Annual%20Growth%20Rate%20in,the%20fourth%20quarter%20of%20198>

picture in 2011, when Mali occupied the 79<sup>th</sup> place on the Fragile States Index. This number changed to 19 by 2021, which indicates a serious deterioration of the situation.<sup>658</sup> The country's economy is largely dependent on the export of gold (92.4 per cent). Besides this, agricultural raw material is included in the exports, like raw cotton and oily seeds in bigger amounts.<sup>659</sup>

Table 10: Security and economic indicators - Mali

MALI	Fragile States Index 10 year trend*	Fragile States Index ranking in 2021*	GDP ranking 2017**	GDP nominal 2017 (USD)**	Main export product***	Share of export (main export product) ***	Workforce engaged in agriculture ****	Unemployment in percentage in 2017 ****
	-60	19	117	15.33 bn	gold	92.4 %	80%	7.91 %
* Fragile States Index. <a href="https://fragilestatesindex.org/excel/">https://fragilestatesindex.org/excel/</a> Downloaded: 11.05.2022.								
** GDP by Country. <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/gdp/gdp-by-country/">https://www.worldometers.info/gdp/gdp-by-country/</a> Downloaded: 11.05.2022.								
*** Mali. <a href="https://oec.world/en/profile/country/mli?yearSelector1=exportGrowthYear25">https://oec.world/en/profile/country/mli?yearSelector1=exportGrowthYear25</a> Downloaded: 20.02.2022.								
**** Mali - Economic Indicators. <a href="https://www.economy.com/mali/indicators">https://www.economy.com/mali/indicators</a> Downloaded: 20.02.2022.								

Another aspect which contributes to the increasing uncertainty is the rapid population growth in Mali. The population of the country has almost doubled since 2000, with a yearly average growth of 432,685 persons until 2020. This means that from 10,900,000, people in 2000, the population of Mali reached 20,250,000 until 2020. Trends show that the fertility rate started to drop in the country, but the change is slow, and the rate is still around 6.<sup>660</sup> The forecasts expect that the Malian population will double again by 2030 to reach 44 million.<sup>661</sup> These indicators collectively strengthen and reinforce each other. The existing crisis, the vulnerable economy and livelihoods together with the rapidly growing young population make Mali an ideal subject for migration research.

80 per cent of the workforce of the Malian population is engaged in agricultural work,<sup>662</sup> which is the most vulnerable to environmental impacts, like severe draughts, desertification, erosion and floods. With only about 35 per cent of arable land in the country<sup>663</sup> and an estimated yearly 48 kms southward expansion of the Sahara,<sup>664</sup>

[5.&text=Mali%20GDP%20Annual%20Growth%20Rate%20%2D%20values%2C%20historical%20ata%20and%20charts,updated%20on%20February%20of%202022](#). Downloaded: 20.02.2022.

<sup>658</sup> Fragile States Index. <https://fragilestatesindex.org/excel/> Downloaded: 11.05.2022.

<sup>659</sup> Mali. <https://oec.world/en/profile/country/mli?yearSelector1=exportGrowthYear25> Downloaded: 20.02.2022.

<sup>660</sup> Mali Population. <https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/mali-population/> Downloaded: 20.02.2022.

<sup>661</sup> Sahel Security Brief Mali. <https://www.populationinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Mali-Factsheet.pdf> Downloaded: 20.02.2022.

<sup>662</sup> Mali - Economic Indicators. <https://www.economy.com/mali/indicators> Downloaded: 20.02.2022.

<sup>663</sup> Mali - Economic Indicators.

<sup>664</sup> Displaced by the Desert: An expanding Sahara leaves Broken Families and Violence in its Wake. <https://reliefweb.int/report/mali/displaced-desert-expanding-sahara-leaves-broken-families-and-violence-its->

natural resources and livelihoods are growing scarce. It is not a surprise that ethnic tensions are on the rise under these conditions, with 7.91 per cent of the total labour force being unemployed in 2017.<sup>665</sup>

## VI.1.2 BILATERAL RELATIONS

It is not only the country's own indicators which must be examined. Influential EU Member States can affect international response into a third country, and even the EU's efforts. Additionally, the three countries which were examined (France, Germany and Italy) can have meaningful bilateral cooperation with countries like Mali. Their bilateral relations with Mali are presented in alphabetical order.

France has extensive bilateral relations with Mali as the formal colonial power in the region. It is no surprise that Mali is present in the *2017 review of the French National Security Strategy*. The country had 11 mentions throughout the document, related to aspects such as climate change and military operations.<sup>666</sup> The most recent *Strategic update* seems less concerned not just about Mali, but the whole region as well. In the update of 2021, Mali is mentioned only 4 times and there is no separate chapter for sub-Saharan Africa. The length of the document only halved compared to the review of 2017, so the decrease is somewhat disproportionate. Listing military actions remained the prominent element to the context.<sup>667</sup>

The strategic documents testify the importance of French military actions in Mali. Of these, the perfect example of this was the deployed Operation Serval to the country, launched within days of the received letter of invitation in 2013, at the wake of the current crisis. Paris also pushed for active international intervention in the country, both in UN and EU frameworks.<sup>668</sup>

Around 4,600 troops have participated in the French intervention since 2013, which continued even after the transformation of the intervention to a G5 Sahel force under

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[wake#:~:text=says%20nearly%2098%20percent%20of,livelihoods%20of%20populations%2C%20Reuters%20reported.](#) Downloaded: 20.02.2022.

<sup>665</sup> Mali - Economic Indicators.

<sup>666</sup> Defence and National Security Review 2017.

<https://espas.secure.europarl.europa.eu/orbis/sites/default/files/generated/document/en/DEFENCE%20AND%20NATIONAL%20SECURITY%20STRATEGIC%20REVIEW%202017.pdf> Downloaded: 03.09.2022. ps. 21-22.

<sup>667</sup> Strategic Update 2021. <https://www.stjornarradid.is/library/03-Verkefni/Almannaoryggi/Thjodaryggismal/France%20-%20Strategic%20Review%202021.pdf> Downloaded: 03.09.2022.

<sup>668</sup> SOLD, Katrin: France Presses Ahead with International Operation in Mali.

<https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/france-presses-ahead-international-operation-mali> Downloaded: 20.02.2022.

the name of Operation Barkhane. Moreover, together with willing EU Member States, France established Task Force Takuba, to strengthen counter-terrorism efforts.<sup>669</sup> Task Force Takuba was launched on 27<sup>th</sup> March 2020 with the aim of fighting terrorist groups in the Liptako Gourma region at the border between Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. The Task Force was complementary to Operation Barkhane, and under its commanding structure. Initially 11 European countries - Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and the United Kingdom - signed the political statement to establish Task Force Takuba<sup>670</sup>. Later on, other countries like Hungary joined the initiative.<sup>671</sup> This French initiative can be perceived as an attempt to Europeanise one of the French national interests. France has always communicated its special relationship with the so-called *Françafrique*. This includes the remaining ties with the former colonies, which never ceased after the independence of the countries. The area is important because of its richness in natural resources for example, which can be exploited by France through this special relationship.<sup>672</sup> French presidents in the past, and currently in 2022, emphasised the renewal of the relationship between France and the countries of the Francophonie.<sup>673</sup> Emmanuel Macron, the French President, even highlighted the importance of the Africa project in his speech at Sorbonne in 2017 as a common European interest to address.<sup>674</sup> This clearly shows the intent to involve the EU in originally French national projects. It is also in line with the French European Intervention Initiative proposed by President Macron during the same speech. The initiative is a coalition of the willing, those countries joined who are willing and able to intervene in conflict areas. The signatories of Task Force Takuba and the

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<sup>669</sup> Opération Barkhane. <https://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/afrique/bande-sahelo-saharienne/operation-barkhane/dossier-de-reference/operation-barkhane> Downloaded: 20.02.2022.

<sup>670</sup> Sahel Coalition: The Takuba Task Force is launched. <https://www.coalition-sahel.org/en/la-task-force-takuba-est-lancee/> Downloaded: 02.09.2022.

<sup>671</sup> CSAJBÓK, József: Magyar katonák a Task Force Takuba kötelékében. <https://honvedelem.hu/missziok/magyar-katonak-a-task-force-takuba-kotelekeben.html> Downloaded: 02.09.2022.

<sup>672</sup> LÉBOEUF, Aline and QUÉNOT-SUAREZ, Hélène: La Politique Africaine de la France sous François Hollande. IFRI [https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/quenot\\_suarez\\_leboeuf\\_politique\\_africaine\\_de\\_la\\_france.pdf](https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/quenot_suarez_leboeuf_politique_africaine_de_la_france.pdf) Downloaded: 02.09.2022. p. 8.

<sup>673</sup> DOMINGUES DOS SANTOS, Élisabeth and SCHLIMMER, Sina: Nouveau Sommet Afrique-France. IFRI L'Afrique en questions. 2021. No. 61. [https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/dominguesdosantos\\_schlimmer\\_sommet\\_afrique\\_france\\_2021.pdf](https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/dominguesdosantos_schlimmer_sommet_afrique_france_2021.pdf) Downloaded: 02.09.2022. ps. 3-4.

<sup>674</sup> MACRON, Emmanuel: Initiative for Europe. <http://international.blogs.ouest-france.fr/archive/2017/09/29/macron-sorbonne-verbatim-europe-18583.html> Downloaded: 02.09.2022.

Intervention Initiative are almost the same, too.<sup>675</sup> Thus, France was successful in elevating national ideas onto an EU level, and to bring those countries together who are willing to cooperate with them. The latest developments in Mali, however, influenced the scale of French involvement in the country, and Operation Barkhane as well as Task Force Takuba left Mali in 2022.<sup>676</sup>

Besides the apparent military presence, France has a bit more than 8,500 nationals registered in Mali besides the troops deployed, and multiple bilateral agreements with the country. The connections in the economic sector are somewhat lopsided between the two states. In 2020 France was just the 9<sup>th</sup> export partner of the country with around 0.14 per cent share, worth EUR 6.9 million, while it was the third in import with a little less than 10.4 per cent of share, with a value of EUR 395 million.<sup>677</sup>

Germany does not have deeply rooted historical relations with Mali. However, it was the first country to recognise the West African state's independence. In 2017, France recognised Germany as one of the main allies in the West African operational theatre, and the Levant. France also pledged to encourage further this shift in Berlin's geostrategic focus.<sup>678</sup> The German *White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr* of 2016 is, however, not as explicit either about the Sahel, or Africa as the French.<sup>679</sup>

Germany also had a long succession of Africa policies which seemed to break with other actors' geopolitical approach, and focus on a value oriented policy. This is not an easily manageable task within the European trade policies.<sup>680</sup> The policy of 2019 lists five priority areas: peacebuilding, development, migration, working with African partners and more cooperation with civil society. The German national policy is strongly aligned with the EU's Africa strategy, as one of the major contributors. Thus,

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<sup>675</sup> ZANDEE, Dick and KRUIJVER, Kimberley: The European Intervention Initiative. Clingendael Report, 2019. [https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2019-09/The\\_European\\_Intervention\\_2019.pdf](https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2019-09/The_European_Intervention_2019.pdf) Downloaded: 02.09.2022. p. 4. and MACRON, Emmanuel: Initiative for Europe.

<sup>676</sup> HARRIS, Marielle, DOXSEE, Catrina and THOMPSON, Jared: The End of Operation Barkhane and the Future of Counterterrorism in Mali.

<sup>677</sup> Mali. <https://oec.world/en/profile/country/mli?yearSelector1=exportGrowthYear25&yearlyTradeFlowSelector=flow1> Downloaded: 20.02.2022.

<sup>678</sup> Defence and National Security Review 2017. p. 59.

<sup>679</sup> The Federal Government of Germany: White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr of 2016. <https://issat.dcaf.ch/download/111704/2027268/2016%20White%20Paper.pdf> Downloaded: 03.09.2022.

<sup>680</sup> KAPPEL, Robert: New Horizons for Germany's Africa Policy. [https://pure.giga-hamburg.de/ws/files/21197592/wp303\\_kappel.pdf](https://pure.giga-hamburg.de/ws/files/21197592/wp303_kappel.pdf) Downloaded: 20.02.2022.

a Europeanisation process must have taken place in this case. The German value-oriented policy approach in itself lies close to the EU's way of thinking. In other strategic documents and policy frameworks, the EU highlighted the common values and priorities in the documents as well. In a sense, this is both a continuation to that, and successful influence on EU policies from Germany's side.<sup>681</sup> Nevertheless, according to Kappel, the priorities of the Africa policy are not a real step forward, just the repetition of former statements.<sup>682</sup> Moreover, migration seems to be the main topic of the five priorities. Germany takes the commitment so seriously that it is the main contributor county to the EUTF Africa as well, which, as formerly discussed has mostly migration management related projects. Another aspect of the policy is economy. The exchange between Germany and African countries represented less than 2 per cent of the import and export in 2019. The amount of investments grew to EUR 12 billion in the same year. However, West Africa was not among the beneficiaries of this growth. The majority of investments are going to South (EUR 7 billion) and North Africa (EUR 3 billion). Germany's multiple programs, like the Marshall Plan with Africa and Pro! Africa are also focused on different countries than Mali and Niger.<sup>683</sup> In recent years, however, Berlin took seriously the crises and conflicts and became a major donor country. This is also true in connection with the Sahel; the country pledged EUR 100 million in humanitarian support to the region.<sup>684</sup> Germany was even a less significant trading partner to Mali in 2020 than France. Germany's trade involvement in Mali is only 0.065 per cent of the exports, worth EUR 3.24 million, while 2.82 per cent of the imports, worth EUR 107.3 million .<sup>685</sup>

Besides the general involvement of Germany in the Sahel, the country is still a significant actor in Mali from a different aspect. As mentioned in the French strategic documents, Germany became one of the major partners to France in crisis

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<sup>681</sup> SCHLEGEL, Adrian and ZIAI, Aram: La politique africaine de l'Allemagne vers la reconduction d'un modèle de coopération asymétrique? IFRI, 2021. [https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/a\\_schlegel\\_a\\_ziai\\_politique\\_africaine\\_de\\_lallemagne\\_09.2021.pdf](https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/a_schlegel_a_ziai_politique_africaine_de_lallemagne_09.2021.pdf) Downloaded: 20.02.2022. p. 14.

<sup>682</sup> Germany's new Africa policy. <https://www.dw.com/en/germanys-new-africa-policy/a-48104866> Downloaded: 20.02.2022.

<sup>683</sup> SCHLEGEL, Adrian and ZIAI, Aram: La politique africaine de l'Allemagne vers la reconduction d'un modèle de coopération asymétrique? Downloaded: 20.02.2022. ps. 14-24.

<sup>684</sup> Donor conference for the Sahel region: Germany pledges 100 million euro in humanitarian support. <https://reliefweb.int/report/burkina-faso/donor-conference-sahel-region-germany-pledges-100-million-euro-humanitarian> Downloaded: 20.02.2022.

<sup>685</sup> Mali. <https://oec.world/en/profile/country/mli?yearSelector1=exportGrowthYear25&yearlyTradeFlowSelector=flow1> Downloaded: 20.02.2022.



management. The country therefore engages in conflict prevention and stabilisation in Africa. Germany is actively participating in EU and UN missions in Mali.<sup>686</sup> Berlin's biggest operational theatre and the largest contingent of Bundeswehr troops are deployed to MINUSMA, after the withdrawal from Afghanistan. Germany has altogether 1,200 troops deployed to Mali (MINUSMA and EUTM Mali). Despite France's praise on being an excellent partner, Germany did not take part in Task Force Takuba, despite signing the political statement on establishing the force, and the country is generally not engaging in counter-terrorism activities and does not deploy units to active combat positions.<sup>687</sup>

The Italian security and defence strategy of 2015 defined the Euro-Mediterranean area as the main area of national intervention, and the Sahel an area of national interest. In the Italian strategic document, geographical proximity is listed as the main element defining such an area. Besides this, an element of ownership is apparent, since the strategy declares that Italy has to take leading roles in operations concerning its defined area of national intervention.<sup>688</sup> Rome also leads a pragmatic foreign policy, which did not change course in 2018, when the political landscape changed in Italy with the election of a right-wing government<sup>689</sup> and continued with the introduction of the Africa strategy in 2020. This strategy also highlights Mali as one of its main beneficiaries. Rome therefore engages in Africa in peace and security, migration, and cooperative development among others.<sup>690</sup>

Italy declared in 2021 that among other African states, Mali is a partner of strategic importance in areas like counter-terrorism, the management of migration flows and the stability of the Sahel.<sup>691</sup> This statement was not without preliminaries. Italy took part

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<sup>686</sup> Germany and Mali: Bilateral relations. <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/laenderinformationen/mali-node/blateral-relations/209068> Downloaded: 20.02.2022.

<sup>687</sup> German Defence Minister 'Very Sceptical' About Mali Mission. <https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2022-02-06/german-defence-minister-very-sceptical-about-mali-mission> Downloaded: 20.02.2022.

<sup>688</sup> The Ministry of Defence of Italy: White Paper for international security and defence, 2015. [https://www.difesa.it/Primo\\_Piano/Documents/2015/07\\_Luglio/White%20book.pdf](https://www.difesa.it/Primo_Piano/Documents/2015/07_Luglio/White%20book.pdf) Downloaded: 20.02.2022. ps. 29-39.

<sup>689</sup> MARRONE, Alessandro: The Conte Government: Radical Change or Pragmatic Continuity in Italian Foreign and Defence Policy? <https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaicom1833.pdf> Downloaded: 20.02.2022.

<sup>690</sup> LOBASSO, Fabrizio: Italy and Africa: "Value Oriented Diplomacy" in Action <https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaicom2124.pdf> Downloaded: 20.02.2022.

<sup>691</sup> CASOLA, Camillo, BALDARO, Edoardo: Italy and the Sahel a new national projection towards a greater Mediterranean. [https://www.ispionline.it/sites/default/files/pubblicazioni/ispipb\\_italy\\_africa\\_sahel\\_casola\\_2021.pdf](https://www.ispionline.it/sites/default/files/pubblicazioni/ispipb_italy_africa_sahel_casola_2021.pdf) Downloaded: 20.02.2022.



in the EU missions in Mali from 2013<sup>692</sup>, and is also participated in Task Force Takuba.<sup>693</sup>

Italy even continued viewing the Mediterranean as an area of immediate interest after the Russian invasion in Ukraine started in February 2022. In the same year July, Italy presented its *Mediterranean Defence Strategy*. The wider Mediterranean remained in the geostrategic focus of the country, which includes the Sahel as well. The new strategic document has two focuses, to increase the wider Mediterranean's strategic importance within the EU (and NATO), and to occupy a more active role in fostering regional security and stability. Italy, at least on paper, remained more interested in the southern dimension of security despite the war in the East.<sup>694</sup>

Despite the articulated strategic importance of the country in Italy's defence papers, the connection is not that visible in the trade sector. Italy had the smallest share of the three analysed countries in 2020, representing 0.02 per cent of the exports worth EUR 1.02 million, and 1.41 per cent of imports worth EUR 53.5 million.<sup>695</sup>

The engagement of these countries in Mali is now, however, in question. With the appearance of the Wagner Group in the West African state, France announced its withdrawal from the Sahel, or at least from Mali. Even the regional counter-terrorism strategy is at stake to be continued.<sup>696</sup> The French decision to pull out from the country can influence other actors to leave the country, too. The EU mission in Mali was the result of the Europeanization of French national policy since the country was important for France due to its geographical proximity to Niger's Areva uranium mines. Thus, French withdrawal could also lead to the complete shutdown of the EU missions present in Mali.

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<sup>692</sup> CIOCCA, F. September 16. 2019. "Italian military missions in the world: where they are, what they do, how much they cost." <https://www.lenius.it/missioni-militari-italiane-nel-mondo/> Downloaded: 13.02.2022.

<sup>693</sup> Opération Barkhane.

<sup>694</sup> BORSARI, Federico: Rome Alone? Italy's Mediterranean Defense Strategy. <https://cepa.org/rome-alone-italys-mediterranean-defense-strategy/> Downloaded: 04.09.2022.

<sup>695</sup> Mali.

<https://oec.world/en/profile/country/mli?yearSelector1=exportGrowthYear25&yearlyTradeFlowSelector=flow1> Downloaded: 20.02.2022.

<sup>696</sup> LEALI, Giorgio: France announces Mali troop pullout and rethink of counterterrorism plan for Sahel. <https://www.politico.eu/article/france-partners-troop-withdrawal-mali/> Downloaded: 20.02.2022.

### VI.1.3 MIGRATION IN MALI

Mali has been in a special situation regarding migration since its declaration of independence.<sup>697</sup> Therefore, it does not seem so surprising that the country has a separate ministry dealing with citizens living abroad, the Ministry of Mali Expatriates and African Integration.<sup>698</sup> The diaspora is very important from an economic point of view. The amount of remittances originating from expatriates and sent to the country is above 5 per cent, and in some regions of Mali, like Kayes (on the border with Mauritania, Senegal and Guinea), the culture of migration has been building up over time.<sup>699</sup>

Information on legal entry, legal residence and employment for those involved in migration is a precondition for successful legal migration. In this context, Mali is one of the examples to follow for countries with a significant potential emigrant population in the West African region.<sup>700</sup> Mali, as one of the main countries of origin of irregular migrants in the region, as many other countries, signed multiple conventions in 2006 with various commitments related to these phenomena (Rabat Process). Bamako, however, has been criticized for either forgetting them or is deliberately restrained on these commitments, including the fate of its own citizens on migration routes. However, it is part of the reality that political and economic circumstances make it difficult to realise these commitments.<sup>701</sup> Additional criticism pointed out that besides the restrained political and economic capabilities of the West African country, the uncoordinated presence of too many external actors is not beneficial either for the implementation of any strategy in the G5 Sahel countries, including Mali.<sup>702</sup>

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<sup>697</sup> ADEPOJU, Aderanti (2009): Migration Management in West Africa within the context of ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons and the Common Approach on Migration: Challenges and Prospects. ps. 20-21.

<sup>698</sup> Ministère des Maliens de l'Extérieur et de l'Intégration africaine. <http://maliens-exterieur.gouv.ml/grands-dossiers/> (Downloaded: 29.12.2019.)

<sup>699</sup> Interview with Staff of EU mission and operation No.1. Kirsi HENRIKSSON, Director of the Crisis Management Centre Finland 07.11.2019. made by the author.

<sup>700</sup> ADEPOJU, Aderanti (2009): Migration Management in West Africa within the context of ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons and the Common Approach on Migration: Challenges and Prospects.p. 42.

<sup>701</sup> Mehdi Lahlou: Migration and Development in ECOWAS Countries: What Role for the Maghreb? in: Marie Tremolières (szerk.): *Regional Challenges of West African Migration African and European Perspectives*. [https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/regional-challenges-of-west-african-migration\\_9789264056015-en#page104](https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/regional-challenges-of-west-african-migration_9789264056015-en#page104)  
DOI:<https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264056015-en> Downloaded: 26.10.2019. ps. 101-102.

<sup>702</sup> KWASI, Stellah et al.: The G5 Sahel region: a Desert Flower? <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/the-g5-sahel-region-a-desert-flower> Downloaded:20.01.2020.

Yet Mali both has a strategy and policy on migration. In 2009, the country created a document on the dangers of irregular migration, which is practically an awareness-raising campaign for those considering to leave Mali. In the preamble to the document, we can gain insight into Mali's involvement in international migration. According to the document, it is estimated that in 2009, one third of the country's population, about 4 million people, lived abroad, of which 3.5 million people were located within Africa. The campaign, as its title suggests, does not seek to “curb” migration. The document begins with stating that Mali is a country with a migration tradition. The general aims of the campaign were, of course, to raise awareness of the dangers of irregular migration and the importance of obtaining information before migration decisions are made. Besides this, the objectives include the need to provide information on local job opportunities and to keep partners informed on developments in the issuing regions. The main interest of this third objective is to consult with donor countries on the development of the regions most affected by migration. This latter shows that Mali is not only a country of origin, but a country of destination as well.<sup>703</sup>

After the 2009 campaign, the country took a huge step forward in 2014, with creating its own National migration policy (Politique Nationale de Migration - PONAM). Mali was the second in the region to produce such a document after Nigeria.<sup>704</sup> Some CFA 120 billion (EUR 1.83 billion) has been earmarked for the implementation. According to the document, it is critical to develop a common approach to migration between countries of origin, transit, and destination. The policy grouped the direction of action around eight main points<sup>705</sup> and set the period 2015–2019 as the time frame.<sup>706</sup> The eight points include the following elements: protecting migrants and guaranteeing their security, developing appropriate mechanisms and tools to improve the organization of migration, supporting the reintegration of returning migrants, increasing the human and economic capital of

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<sup>703</sup> Campagne Nationale d'Information et de Sensibilisation sur les Risques de la Migration Irrégulière (édition 2009). [http://maliens-exterieur.gouv.ml/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/migration\\_campagne\\_dinformation\\_sensibilisation\\_edition\\_2009.pdf](http://maliens-exterieur.gouv.ml/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/migration_campagne_dinformation_sensibilisation_edition_2009.pdf) Downloaded: 26.10.2019. ps. 1-3.

<sup>704</sup> Politique nationale de migration : Le Mali parmi les pionniers. <https://niarela.net/societe/diaspora-immigration/politique-nationale-de-migration-le-mali-parmi-les-pionniers> Downloaded: 21.11.2019.

<sup>705</sup> F. Mah Thiam Kone: Politique nationale de migration : 120 milliards de FCFA pour faire de la migration un facteur de développement. <http://bamada.net/politique-nationale-de-migration-120-milliards-de-fcfa-pour-faire-de-la-migration-un-facteur-de-developpement> Downloaded: 21.11.2019.

<sup>706</sup> La Politique Nationale de Migration (PONAM) : Un véritable instrument de gestion des flux migratoires. <http://bamakonews.net/2017/04/la-politique-nationale-de-migration-ponam-un-veritable-instrument-de-gestion-des-flux-migratoires/> Downloaded: 21.11.2019.

migrants, capacity building of migrant and civil society organizations, dialogue and consultation on migration (with partners), raising awareness on migration, rethinking the conditions for foreigners staying and settling in Mali.<sup>707</sup>

The policy, while in line with all international treaties and regulations to which Mali is a party, still has shortcomings. One of them is that it does not name which government entity is responsible for formulating the migration policy. Additionally, the priority of the PONAM is to address the diaspora and related issues, but it also deals to a lesser extent with migrants living in the country. Besides, it is evident that irregular migration poses a major challenge to the country, which is partly addressed together with the topic of human trafficking by a law passed in 2012 to supplement criminal law.<sup>708</sup>

Although curbing irregular migration remains an important issue in Malian politics, it is mainly due to the high number of migrant deaths in the Mediterranean and the Sahara – people who have travelled to their destination with the help of human traffickers. In 2015 alone, 376 deaths were recorded by Malian authorities. Thus, the commitment to the fight against irregular migration is understandable. Informing and educating people about the legal ways of migration is also important for the country.<sup>709</sup> In 2020, 5.7 per cent of the GDP originated from remittances. This, however, shows a slow decline, since in the mid-2010s, remittances reached as high as 6.8 per cent of Mali's GDP.<sup>710</sup>

Mali is not completely following European ideas on migration management. The main problem remains the management of the diaspora and the “reclaiming” of citizens who have settled abroad. Of course, the management of irregular migration also appears in the rhetoric, but the country does not want to stop migration at any rate. Mali's aim is to steer it into legal channels. Meanwhile, the West African country

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<sup>707</sup> DICKO, Bréma Ely: La gouvernance de la migration malienne à l'épreuve des injonctions contradictoires de l'UE. <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/mali/15441.pdf> Downloaded: 21.11.2019. p. 6.

<sup>708</sup> Profil de gouvernance de la migration : la République du Mali. <https://migrationdataportal.org/sites/default/files/2018-05/MGI%20Mali%20final%20%281%29.pdf> Downloaded: 21.11.2019. ps. 3-6.

<sup>709</sup> Bintou Coulibaly: Concepts et enjeux migratoires au Mali : Le ministère des maliens de l'extérieur renforce les capacités des acteurs. <https://www.notrenation.com/Concepts-et-enjeux-migratoires-au-Mali-Le-ministere-des-maliens-de-l-exterieur> (Downloaded: 21.11.2019.)

<sup>710</sup> Personal remittances, received (% of GDP) – Mali. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS?locations=ML> Downloaded: 05.09.2022.

considers it important to develop a common position on migration among countries of origin, transit, and destination.

Given the security and economic situation of Mali, the EU missions present in the country and the projects offered by bilateral partners are necessary. Mali is not interested in tackling migration in the way the EU wants to address it, the country's interest is to have more and more successful migrants. This could be the baseline of cooperation with the EU, since this is an acceptable aim for the two parties. The EU and Member State actions, nonetheless, have a more different assessment. As one of the interviewees highlighted, implementing the integrated approach is ambitious, therefore cannot yet be sufficient. As the trend on Fragile States Index shows, despite all the international presence in the country, the intervention in the country to provide security is also insufficient. Thus, a rather negative picture can be drawn up assessing the situation in Mali.

## VI.2 NIGER

Towards the Central Mediterranean migration route, the next country is Niger. It also belongs to the Francophonie, as it was a colony of France until 3<sup>rd</sup> August 1960. It became independent almost at the same time as Mali. Just as its western neighbour, Niger also joined the Yaoundé Convention at its establishment in 1963, maintaining close ties with the former coloniser. Since then, Niamey has taken part in the cooperation between the EU and the OACPS.

The security situation of the country did not alter significantly from 2011 to 2021. This stagnation cost Niger dearly. Because of the lack of severe violent conflicts, Niger remained almost invisible to the international community. As a consequence, the country had to invite the EU to deploy a mission, EUCAP Sahel Niger, on its territory in 2012, when the conflict in neighbouring Mali started. Gradually, Niger gained more attention in parallel with the looming migration and refugee crisis in the Mediterranean as of 2014–2015. Niger was established as an important element in the migratory process, it was identified as a transit state. Since then, Niamey got the desired attention from the EU. On 15<sup>th</sup> December 2016, the EU offered an EUR 610 million worth package to Niamey under the name of *Enhanced cooperation between the European Union and Niger*. EUR 470 million of the support package was to reinforce state-building efforts in sectors such as education, nutrition and democratic governance,


while an additional EUR 140 million from the EUTF aimed to finance nine projects in line with the Valletta Action Plan: combat human trafficking, improve border controls and fight the root causes of migration.<sup>711</sup> The amount allegedly is not provided only by the EU, but also by France, Germany and Italy.<sup>712</sup>

While the deployed EU CSDP mission provides the necessary visibility to Niger, the FMPs established by the IOM also provide additional information about migration flows in the country. Besides Mali, Niger also released its national policy on migration in 2020, which gives an additional insight in Niamey's take on migration.

## VI.2.1 BACKGROUND

The demographic landscape of Niger is not that different from Mali's. The main ethnic group is the Hausa, representing 53.1 per cent of the total population. This ethnic group is located in the South of Niger. Songhai is the second biggest ethnicity with 21.2 per cent of the population settled along the Niger river. Tuareg is a

Map11: Niger. (Edited by the author)



nomadic group in Northern Niger, with 11 per cent of the population. Traditionally pastoralist Fulani represent 6.5 per cent of the population, spread across the country. The agriculturalist Kanuri ethnic group is settled in Southeast Niger and represent 5.9 per cent of the population. In Niger, as well as in Mali, the heterogeneity of the ethnic groups is not only connected to the spoken language but the lifestyle also.<sup>713</sup> The overlapping areas are, however, less significant, thus conflict dynamics in Niger differ from Mali.

<sup>711</sup> European Commission: Enhanced cooperation between the European Union and Niger. [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO\\_16\\_4375](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_16_4375) Downloaded: 30.06.2022.

<sup>712</sup> Reuters: EU offers 610 million euros to Niger to curb migration. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-eu-niger-idUSKBN144246> Downloaded: 30.06.2022.

<sup>713</sup> Niger, Minorities and indigenous peoples. <https://minorityrights.org/country/niger/> Downloaded: 05.09.2022.

The Tuaregs, nevertheless, play an important role in Niger's modern history as well. In 1991 Tuareg tribes in Niger started a fight for the independence of the Azawag, which carries the same meaning as the Azawad in Mali: prairie. The desired area is located in the North of Niger. Niamey engaged most of its military to suppress the insurgency without any success. The opposing parties sat to the negotiating table with the mediation of France in 1993. The former coloniser had a significant interest to tend to in the country, it relied on the Areva Uranium mines for its nuclear energy and nuclear striking force. Consequently, France was aiming for a lasting peace. The peace agreement, however, was realised only in 1995, and the war in the North continued until 1998 with sporadic fights. This struggle had led to the virtual inclusion of the Tuareg ethnic group in politics.<sup>714</sup> This tendency was prominent also in the early 2000, when Niger was labelled as one of the countries on the track to democracy.<sup>715</sup> Thus, in 2007, when fights renewed between the North and South, the Tuareg rebel groups were fighting for the rights for all people in the north, regardless of ethnicity. The reason for the conflict changed, too. While in the last decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century Tuaregs wanted independence, in 2007 the discovery of natural riches and the distribution of the revenues was the reason for increasing tensions. Nonetheless, parties sat to negotiate in 2009, and not even the military coup in the country could bring back the question of Tuareg independence to the agenda.<sup>716</sup>

The 2010 coup d'état was the result of Nigerien president, Mamadou Tandja's provocation of constitutional crisis. The core of the problem was the referendum initiated by Tandja himself to eradicate presidential term limits and transform the semi-presidential system to a presidential one. The referendum was declared illegal even by the president's political allies. The military staged a corrective coup in consequence but handed the power back to multiparty competition within a year. The next president, Mahamadou Issoufou, Tandja's successor, assumed office in 2011.<sup>717</sup>

In 2012, when the Tuareg insurgency started in Mali, the same was feared in Niger. By that time, President Mahamadou Issoufou, elected in 2010 after a coup,

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<sup>714</sup> LECOCQ, Baz, KLUTE, Georg: Tuareg Separatism in Mali and Niger. *Secessionism in African Politics*, 23–57. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-90206-7\_2 Downloaded: 23.02.2022. ps. 34-40.

<sup>715</sup> DAVIS, John Uniack and KOSSOMI Aboubacar B.: Francophone Africa in Flux: Niger Gets Back on Track. in *Journal of Democracy*, 2001. Vol. 12. Issue 3, pp. 80-87  
<https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2001.0043> Downloaded: 06.09.2022. p. 80.

<sup>716</sup> LECOCQ, Baz, KLUTE, Georg: Tuareg Separatism in Mali and Niger. ps. 34-40.

<sup>717</sup> ELISCHER, Sebastian, MUELLER, Lisa: Niger falls back off track. in *African Affairs*. 2019. Vol. 118. Issue 471. pp. 392–406. doi:10.1093/afraf/ady066 Downloaded: 23.02.2022. ps. 394-395.



demonstrated his commitment to social inclusion. He appointed an ethnic Tuareg as prime minister, and even extended the humanitarian relief packages to the northern regions of the country, where the majority of the Tuaregs live. The president ensured his stance both in favour of Nigeriens and Western partners by joining press freedom initiatives and becoming the head of the G5 Sahel.<sup>718</sup>

Despite the promising start, a decline in democratic developments was on the horizon by 2015–16. Corruption and election fraud marred the system, and the number of demonstrations was on the rise. With neighbouring Mali submerging in a never-ending fight against radical organisations, Niger experienced more and more terrorist attacks as well.<sup>719</sup> By 2020 the Islamic State in the (Greater) Sahara (ISGS) became a dominant power along the Mali-Niger border in the Liptako Gourma<sup>720</sup> region. Terrorist attacks encouraged locals to organise self-defence groups, which also gave opportunity to settle inter-ethnic tensions violently. As in central Mali, in Niger's border area again traditional herder Fulani and Djerma farmers struggle against each other for natural resources.<sup>721</sup>

The increase in violent attacks occurred parallel with the presidential elections, which turned out to be the first transfer of power in the country's history via democratic elections.<sup>722</sup> The security situation remained unchanged, the presence of terrorist groups in the border area, such as the ISGS, JNIM, AQIM and Boko Haram, seems to be continuous, mainly clashing with government forces.<sup>723</sup>

Despite Niger's relative calmness, the country occupies the first place on the UN's least developed countries list according to Human development index ranking.<sup>724</sup> Additionally, the country ranked 10<sup>th</sup> on the list of the poorest countries in the world.<sup>725</sup> The country's GDP has increased since 2014, but its rate was widely fluctuating from 0.9 per cent in the second quarter of 2020 to 7.8 per cent in the second quarter of 2014.

<sup>718</sup> ELISCHER, Sebastian, MUELLER, Lisa: Niger falls back off track. p. 396.

<sup>719</sup> ELISCHER, Sebastian, MUELLER, Lisa: Niger falls back off track. ps. 397-402.

<sup>720</sup> Located between Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso.

<sup>721</sup> International Crisis Group: Murder in Tillabery: Calming Niger's Emerging Communal Crisis. Briefing No. 172 / Africa 28 May 2021. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/niger/b172-murder-tillabery-calming-nigers-emerging-communal-crisis> Downloaded: 18.12.2021.

<sup>722</sup> Niger's top court confirms Mohamed Bazoum's election win. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/3/22/nigers-top-court-confirms-mohamed-bazoums-election-win> Downloaded: 23.02.2022.

<sup>723</sup> International Crisis Group: Crisis Watch, Tracking Conflict Worldwide, Niger. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch> Downloaded: 23.02.2022.

<sup>724</sup> Least Developed Countries 2022, Niger. <https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/least-developed-countries> Downloaded: 23.02.2022.

<sup>725</sup> Poorest Countries in the World 2022.

The fluctuating GDP is highly likely related to COVID-19 and political events in the country.<sup>726</sup> Niger's economy is slightly more diversified than Mali's. Gold remains the main export item, covering 53.7 per cent of exports in 2019, while other oily seeds represent 25.2 per cent, radioactive chemicals (uranium) 7 per cent and petroleum gas 4.99 per cent.<sup>727</sup>

Table 11: Security and economic indicators - Niger

NIGER	Fragile State Index 10 year trend*	Fragile State Index ranking in 2021*	GDP ranking 2017**	GDP nominal 2017 (USD)**	Main export product***	Share of export (main export product)***	Workforce engaged in agriculture****	Unemployment in percentage in 2017****
	3	21	143	8.12 bn	gold	53.7 %	87%	0.35 %
* Fragile States Index. <a href="https://fragilestatesindex.org/excel/">https://fragilestatesindex.org/excel/</a> Downloaded: 11.05.2022.								
** GDP by Country. <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/gdp/gdp-by-country/">https://www.worldometers.info/gdp/gdp-by-country/</a> Downloaded: 11.05.2022.								
*** Niger. <a href="https://oec.world/en/profile/country/ner">https://oec.world/en/profile/country/ner</a> Downloaded: 23.02.2022.								
**** Niger - Economic Indicators. <a href="https://www.economy.com/niger/indicators">https://www.economy.com/niger/indicators</a> Downloaded: 23.02.2022.								

While the Sahelian country faces the same climate related problems as Mali, in particular, desertification, its population is even more vulnerable than its neighbour's, since 87 per cent of the population work in the agricultural sector.<sup>728</sup>

As inter-ethnic tensions are present in the country between traditionally nomadic (Tuareg, Fulani) and sedentary (Hausa, Songhai and Kanuri) groups, there is also a resentment towards the Songhai who have been seen as a dominant group both in the colonial and post-colonial eras, population predictions must be introduced regarding Niger, too.<sup>729</sup> Niger has the world's highest fertility rate,<sup>730</sup> with an average 6.7 children per woman.<sup>731</sup> From 2000, the Nigerien population more than doubled from 11.3 million to 24.2 million people by 2020.<sup>732</sup> The UN estimated that 68.4 million people will live in Niger by 2050.<sup>733</sup>

Paired with already existing ethnic tensions, vulnerable livelihoods, the projected population growth can cause serious problems for the Sahelian country. Inter-ethnic

<sup>726</sup> Niger GDP Annual Growth Rate. <https://tradingeconomics.com/niger/gdp-growth-annual> Downloaded: 23.02.2022.

<sup>727</sup> Niger. <https://oec.world/en/profile/country/ner?yearlyTradeFlowSelector=flow1> Downloaded: 23.02.2022.

<sup>728</sup> Niger - Economic Indicators. <https://www.economy.com/niger/indicators> Downloaded: 23.02.2022.

<sup>729</sup> DAVIS, John Uniack and KOSSOMI Aboubacar B.: Francophone Africa in Flux: Niger Gets Back on Track. p. 81.

<sup>730</sup> Is a demographic disaster unavoidable in Niger? <https://ideas4development.org/en/demographic-growth-niger/> Downloaded: 23.02.2022.

<sup>731</sup> Fertility rate, total (births per woman) – Niger. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN?locations=NE> Downloaded: 05.09.2022.

<sup>732</sup> Niger Population. <https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/niger-population/> Downloaded: 23.02.2022.

<sup>733</sup> Is a demographic disaster unavoidable in Niger?

violence and religious radicalisation both can be an outcome, even in this relatively calm and peaceful state.

## VI.2.2 BILATERAL RELATIONS

Niger as well as Mali has extended bilateral relations with EU Member States. The most obvious is the country's relation with France, the former colonial power. Niger's most important feature from the French perspective is its uranium mines. 94.7 per cent of Nigerien export to France consists of this radioactive ore. While the total share of France in Niger's exports was 1.61 per cent, EUR 41.4 million in 2020, import from France was at 15 per cent, at EUR 406.7 million in the same year.<sup>734</sup> The undisturbed supply of this resource is a fundamental interest for Paris, since more than 70 per cent of the electricity is provided by nuclear power plants in the country.<sup>735</sup> This ensures the constant attention of France towards Niger. France has been cooperating with Niger since 2014 in the framework of Operation Barkhane and Task Force Takuba.<sup>736</sup> Thus, it is no surprise that the country is mentioned three times in the *2017 review of the French National Security Strategy*, and once in the *Strategic update*, mostly in connection with Operation Barkhane,<sup>737</sup> which operated in all G5 Sahel countries until 2022. After the withdrawal from Mali, Niger became the new home of the transformed, reduced operation.<sup>738</sup> France also has multiple bilateral agreements with the country related to economy, culture, science, and technology.<sup>739</sup>

France is not the only European country with bilateral ties to Niger. Relations between Germany and Niger are traditionally built around development, good governance and decentralisation. Germany has also included the country in the *Strengthening the police in Africa program* from 2013, at Niamey's request. The three key areas of the program are border security, evidence gathering and trace analysis, and the development of human resource management. The program also included

<sup>734</sup> Niger. <https://oec.world/en/profile/country/ner?yearlyTradeFlowSelector=flow1>

<sup>735</sup> Does France's emphasis on nuclear power guarantee its energy independence? <https://www.rfi.fr/en/france/20220223-does-nuclear-power-guarantee-france-s-energy-independence-uranium-imported-niger-macron-russia> Downloaded: 24.02.2022.

<sup>736</sup> Opération Barkhane. <https://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/operations/sahel/dossier-de-presentation-de-l-operation-barkhane/operation-barkhane> Downloaded: 22.07.2018. 07. 22.

<sup>737</sup> Defence and National Security Review 2017. and Strategic Update 2021.

<sup>738</sup> Africanews: French forces make Niger new home after being expelled by Mali. <https://www.africanews.com/2022/07/05/french-forces-make-niger-new-home-after-being-expelled-by-mali/> Downloaded: 04.09.2022.

<sup>739</sup> Relations bilatérales, Niger. <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/dossiers-pays/niger/rerelations-bilaterales/> Downloaded: 22.02.2022.

special training to curb illegal arms and drug trade, as well as infrastructure improvements. Under the program, a total of nine border guard stations were built, three with German and six with EU funding. In addition, Germany participates in the EUCAP Sahel Niger contingent.<sup>740</sup> Yet, the country is not mentioned in Germany's most recent White Paper of 2016. Niger is only included as part of the Sahel region, which was identified as one, prone to conflicts, where Germany's main aim is to strengthen legitimate political structures and increase resilience.<sup>741</sup>

Recently, regional security and migration have been introduced to the areas of cooperation. This includes the establishment of a German air transport base in Niamey, which supports MINUSMA. The Bundeswehr also deploys to EUTM Mali, which was largely suspended after the military coup in Mali. 230 of the deployed 300 troops will be stationed in Niger. It will not be the only Germany contingent in the country, since 200 members of the German special forces are already setting up an academy for training elite units for the Nigerien Armed Forces. Nigerien President Mohamed Bazoum welcomed the Nigerien – German military cooperation, and considered it as a model for future cooperation with other partners.<sup>742</sup> Germany along with other nations is committed to stabilising the Lake Chad region, which includes cooperation in provinces of Niger, too. Lastly, Germany also considers Niger as the key transit country for migration in the Sahel. Thus, Berlin launched projects in order to improve migration management, the prevention of organised crime and other migration related initiatives in the country.<sup>743</sup>

Despite the model military cooperation, and Germany's concern of the Sahel, the country was not an important trading partner to Niger in 2020, with only EUR 3.59 million worth of exports and 2.71 per cent, EUR 73.5 million imports altogether.<sup>744</sup>

Italy has also developed bilateral relations with Niger. The establishment of this relationship was well documented in the Italian media since Niger was not one of the

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<sup>740</sup> 50 ans de coopération entre l'Allemagne et le Niger.

<https://niamey.diplo.de/blob/1466612/9ec9a09619a959eea476f2e32b641222/50-jahre-ez-niger-data.pdf> Downloaded: 23.07.2018. ps. 5, 28.

<sup>741</sup> The Federal Government of Germany: White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr of 2016.

<sup>742</sup> ANTIL, Alain and MAURICE, Paul: Après le Mali, quel engagement de l'Allemagne au Sahel? IFRI

[https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/ndc\\_169\\_antil\\_maurice\\_allemande\\_au\\_sahel\\_juin2022.pdf](https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/ndc_169_antil_maurice_allemande_au_sahel_juin2022.pdf) Downloaded: 06.09.2022. ps. 7-18.

<sup>743</sup> Germany and Niger: Bilateral relations. <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/laenderinformationen/niger-node/niger/235448> Downloaded: 24.02.2022.

<sup>744</sup> Niger. <https://oec.world/en/profile/country/ner?yearlyTradeFlowSelector=flow1>

traditional partners of the country. Yet, the new partnership was in line with the *White Paper for international security and defence*, of 2015, which recognised the enlarged the Mediterranean as Italy's area of interest.<sup>745</sup> This was followed by the Italian government's decision at the end of 2017 to deploy 470 troops, 30 military vehicles and 2 aircraft to Niger to support Niamey in curbing illegal trade and migration, and to develop border controls as well as the Nigerien Air Force.<sup>746</sup> The deployment of the forces was planned to start in 2018, with only 120 boots on the ground in the first six months, and then gradually building up the contingent to 470 troops until the end of the year. The contingent was planned to have the following elements: reconnaissance and command and control teams; trainers; medical staff; engineers to aid in infrastructure work; a chemical-biological radiological-nuclear threats unit; logistics support; a force protection unit; and a unit for information collection, surveillance and reconnaissance in support of operations.<sup>747</sup> Of this, 290 soldiers were serving in Niger in 2019, with the aim of combatting illicit trafficking.<sup>748</sup> Italian presence may increase in Niger in 2022.<sup>749</sup> It is notable that, while other countries are generally engaged in counter-terrorism activities in the Sahel, in the case of Italy's military engagement in Niger the main focus is to curb irregular migration.

The Italian pivot to Africa in 2015 experienced a continuity in 2022, despite the events in Ukraine, with the introduction of the *Mediterranean Defence Strategy*.<sup>750</sup> This means that the Italian foreign policy remained on pragmatic grounds since the last White Paper, and the changes in the government did not influence Italian military engagement in the Sahel.

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<sup>745</sup> CECCORULLI, Michela, and COTICCHIA, Fabrizio: "I'll take two.' Migration, terrorism, and the Italian military engagement in Niger and Libya. in. *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 2020. Vol. 25. Issue 2, pp. 174–196. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1354571X.2020.1723291> Downloaded: 04.09.2022. ps. 174-175.

<sup>746</sup> Missioni italiane all'estero 2018: la Camera dei deputati approva. [http://sicurezzainternazionale.luiss.it/2018/01/18/missioni-italiane-allestero-camera-dei-deputati-al-voto/?doing\\_wp\\_cron=1532323134.2363550662994384765625](http://sicurezzainternazionale.luiss.it/2018/01/18/missioni-italiane-allestero-camera-dei-deputati-al-voto/?doing_wp_cron=1532323134.2363550662994384765625) Downloaded: 23.07.2018.

<sup>747</sup> CECCORULLI, Michela, and COTICCHIA, Fabrizio: "I'll take two.' Migration, terrorism, and the Italian military engagement in Niger and Libya. p. 183.

<sup>748</sup> CIOCCA, Fabrizio: Italian military missions in the world: where they are, what they do, how much they cost. September 16. 2019. <https://www.lenius.it/missioni-militari-italiane-nel-mondo/> Downloaded: 13.02.2022.

<sup>749</sup> Prima base interamente italiana nell'Africa occidentale. Mai discussa in Parlamento. <https://pagineesteri.it/2021/12/29/africa/prima-base-interamente-italiana-nellafrica-occidentale-mai-discussa-in-parlamento/#:~:text=Rilevante%20il%20numero%20degli%20uomini,e%20pesanti%20e%205%20aer ei%E2%80%9D>. Downloaded: 24.02.2022.

<sup>750</sup> BORSARI, Federico: Rome Alone? Italy's Mediterranean Defense Strategy.

Next to the strong military cooperation, trade is not a strong aspect of bilateral relations between Italy and Niger. In 2020, even Hungary preceded Italy, both countries contributing only 0.19 per cent to Nigerien exports, at a value of EUR 193,000 in the case of Italy. The countries' share from Niger's import was 0.67 per cent, with a total value of EUR 18.1 million.<sup>751</sup>

Niger took advantage of its geographic location over the years, attracting even transatlantic partners like Canada and the United States of America.<sup>752</sup> Now, with the Wagner Group's presence in Mali, Niamey can further benefit from its cooperative stance. French forces of Operation Barkhane and its international component, Task Force Takuba, can relocate to Niger, where they can continue their tasks.<sup>753</sup> While the new relocations are taking place, Niger also maintains its relations with Germany and Italy, with both countries providing training for the Nigerien armed forces. Besides bilateral relations with EU Member States, Niger enjoys an improved relationship with the EU as well, which peaked in the contribution of EUR 610 million to the country for different projects.

### VI.2.3 MIGRATION IN NIGER

The case of Niger is special because it is not only a transit country, but it has common borders with both Mali and Libya. It means that a migration route leads through it from the heart of West Africa to the Central Mediterranean.

Niger, just as Mali, is a country with a long migration history. The country's central location and the historic past of Agadez as a caravan city and transport hub have made Niger an ideal transit country for migration routes both within Africa and to Europe. Accordingly, Niger's policy on migration has been essentially echoing the term: "travelling is not a crime".<sup>754</sup> This slogan originates from the ECOWAS' aspiration to

<sup>751</sup> Niger. <https://oec.world/en/profile/country/ner?yearlyTradeFlowSelector=flow1>

<sup>752</sup> Opération Naberius. <http://www.forces.gc.ca/fr/operations-etranger-actuelles/op-naberius.page> Downloaded: 23.07.2018. ; US military engagement in Niger and Africa: 3 things to know. <https://www.dw.com/en/us-military-engagement-in-niger-and-africa-3-things-to-know/a-41098602> Downloaded: 23.07.2018. ; Les Etats-Unis équinent l'armée nigérienne pour lutter contre le terrorisme. [http://french.china.org.cn/foreign/txt/2017-12/09/content\\_50095421.htm](http://french.china.org.cn/foreign/txt/2017-12/09/content_50095421.htm) Downloaded: 23.07.2018.

<sup>753</sup> France announces Mali troop pullout and rethink of counterterrorism plan for Sahel.

<sup>754</sup> Interview with Guy-Michel Bolouvi. Niger – A Crossroads of African Migration Networks in: TREMOLIÉRES, Marie (ed.): Regional Challenges of West African Migration African and European Perspectives [https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/regional-challenges-of-west-african-migration\\_9789264056015-en#page1](https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/regional-challenges-of-west-african-migration_9789264056015-en#page1) DOI:<https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264056015-en> Downloaded: 26.10.2019. p. 200.



establish an area of free movement of persons. The regional organisation's policies are fundamentally in line with international law and treaties.<sup>755</sup>

Attitudes towards migration are well characterized by the fact that locals use the French expression “passeur” instead of migrant smuggler. The popular meaning of the term is ferryman, but here it can be literally interpreted as the one who escorts to the other side. In this case, the other side can be just as close as the country's borders, or even the border of the desert.<sup>756</sup> This detail reveals that migrant smuggling is not necessarily considered a crime by locals. The example sends the message that the population is at least neutral, if not positive about the phenomenon. It raises the question why Niger is one of the most committed African countries to cooperate with the EU? The answer lies in the fact that Niger, unlike several of its neighbours, has come to the spotlight of international attention less often. The interactive map of the Global Peace Index, which covers the period from 2008 to 2019, also clearly shows that Niger has consistently been among the more peaceful countries compared with its neighbours such as Mali, Nigeria, Chad, and Libya.<sup>757</sup> The relative peacefulness meant for Niger that it had never really drawn the attention of international actors to itself. The hysteria created by the so-called migration and refugee crisis in Europe thus created an exploitable opportunity, so Niamey could redirect attention to itself.<sup>758</sup> For the time being, this seems to have been profitable for the West African country, as the amount of ODA arriving in the country has increased significantly since 2015. Although the ODA showed a steady upward trend previously, it really leaped forward in 2016, exceeding EUR 1 billion.<sup>759</sup>

In 2015, Niger adopted a law on the prevention and suppression of illegal migration, the rights of victims of human trafficking, and the strengthening of national and international cooperation in the fight against human trafficking and all its forms. The law imposes strict penalties on those who aid in illegal border crossing in any way. Penalties vary from 5 to 10 years of imprisonment and a fine from CFA francs 1 to 5 million of (EUR 1,500 to EUR 7,600) for those who assist illegal border crossing in

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<sup>755</sup> Interview with Guy-Michel Bolouvi. i. m.ps. 204-206.

<sup>756</sup> Interview with Staff of EU mission and operation No.1. Kirsi HENRIKSSON, Director of the Crisis Management Centre Finland 07.11.2019. made by the author.

<sup>757</sup> Global Peace Index. <http://visionofhumanity.org/indexes/global-peace-index/> Downloaded: 26.10.2019.

<sup>758</sup> Interview with Staff of EU mission and operation No.1. Kirsi HENRIKSSON, Director of the Crisis Management Centre Finland 07.11.2019. made by the author.

<sup>759</sup> Net official development assistance and official aid received. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ALLD.CD> Downloaded: 10.04.2020.



or out of Niger, for the usage of fabrication of forged travel documents and for those who give assistance to migrants to stay in Niger irregularly. These former actions can be penalised with up to 25 years of imprisonment and CFA francs 20 million (EUR 30,400) if committed under aggravating circumstances.<sup>760</sup> The legislation, which imposed heavy fines, has caused particular resentment among the Nigerien population because in regions where migratory movements have provided people with some form of livelihood (up to 100,000 people profited from it indirectly in the Agadez region, which is one fifth of the population<sup>761</sup>), criminalizing these activities left the population unemployed in the absence of other options.<sup>762</sup> At least apparently, as various projects have been launched in Niger with the aim of job creation and retraining. Yet these are longer-term processes, the effectiveness of which will only become visible after years.<sup>763</sup> The IOM does not consider this policy to be appropriate either, as it does not address the root causes of migration, but merely demobilizes smugglers and makes the population of one of the world's poorest countries even more vulnerable.<sup>764</sup>

In November 2020 Niger joined those West African states which have their own migration policies. The National Policy of Migration 2020–2035 (Politique nationale de la migration - PNM) is committed to be in line with the UN Sustainable Development Goals, the AU and ECOWAS initiatives. The policy declared that the geopolitical situation of Niger makes the country an ideal transit state, since it connects three African regions, namely west, north and central Africa. The policy also claimed that in Niger two main types of migration must be addressed, urbanisation, which the country labelled as the rural exodus, and circular migration, which mainly includes ECOWAS, Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and Maghreb states. Less than 2 per cent of the Nigerien population took part in inter-continental migration in 2018, while 3.5 per cent of the population resettled in other countries in

<sup>760</sup> Loi N°2015-36. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/60a505e24.html> Downloaded: 15.12.2019 ps. 1-5.

<sup>761</sup> HAHONOU, Eric Komlavi, OLSEN, Gorm Rye (2020): Niger – Europe's border guard? Limits to the externalization of the European Union's migration policy, *Journal of European Integration*, 30 Nov 2020 DOI: 10.1080/07036337.2020.1853717 Downloaded: 23.02.2022. ps.8-9.

<sup>762</sup> Niger : grogne dans le Nord en raison de la baisse de l'immigration clandestine. <https://fr.africanews.com/2019/11/23/niger-grogne-dans-le-nord-en-raison-de-la-baisse-de-l-immigration-clandestine/> Downloaded: 10.01.2020.

<sup>763</sup> Niger: Agadez veut tourner le dos aux passeurs. <https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/9406/niger-agadez-veut-tourner-le-dos-aux-passeurs> Downloaded: 10.04.2020.

<sup>764</sup> Migration: au Niger, les limites de la politique de rétention financée par l'UE. <http://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20181218-migrations-niger-limites-politique-retention-financee-ue-oim-anako> Downloaded: 15.12.2019.

the region according to the national document. The policy has two main objectives, “contributing sustainably to improving the living conditions of migrants and host communities”, and “efficient and effective management of migration”. To formulate the policy, six subcommittees were formed. These subcommittees also indicate the most important topics to be addressed by the policy: governance, employment, protection, diaspora, security in relation to migration, internal and international migration, and transit migration.<sup>765</sup> During the 15-year-long implementation period an all-government approach will be followed; every ministry takes part in delivering certain actions of the policy. For the realisation of the action plan Niger counted with a cost reaching CFA franc 262,847,780,000 (EUR 400,645,000).<sup>766</sup> In 2020, when the policy was introduced, Niger’s total GDP reached EUR 12.08 billion in current prices.<sup>767</sup> This would mean a 2.2 per cent GDP expenditure for 15 years, which seems unrealistic. It must be taken into consideration, however, that the program covers actions to promote the economy, job creation and training on all levels.<sup>768</sup> Despite the good intentions and the apparent commitment to address the root causes of migration, it is plausible that the action plan will not be fully implemented.

Niger’s long-term interest is to cooperate with the European Union; not because the West African country agrees with European policies, but because the EU rewarded Niamey considerably. Even five years after the notorious law criminalising every activity related to migration; it is still socially acceptable. Thus, it is highly likely that Niamey only cooperates with the EU on migration because the country benefited from the cooperation over the years.<sup>769</sup> Despite the national migration policy of 2020 the Agadez region remains vulnerable without its traditional livelihood, which also exposes the population to radicalisation.

The EU’s intervention in Niger is much needed, given the economic situation of the country. Thus, these actions can be considered as necessary. However, the loss of local livelihoods in regions where migration related businesses thrived for a long time, the investment of the EU in vocational training is not fast enough to provide for those in

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<sup>765</sup> Politique nationale de la migration (2020-2035) avec son Plan d’actions quinquennal. <https://www.giz.de/de/downloads/politique-nationale-de-la-migration.pdf> Downloaded: 19.02.2022. ps. 13-32.

<sup>766</sup> Politique nationale de la migration (2020-2035) avec son Plan d’actions quinquennal. p. 69.

<sup>767</sup> Niger - Gross domestic product in current prices. <https://knoema.com/atlas/Niger/GDP> Downloaded: 23.02.2022.


<sup>768</sup> Politique nationale de la migration (2020-2035) avec son Plan d’actions quinquennal. ps. 48-54.

<sup>769</sup> HAHONOU, Eric Komlavi, OLSEN, Gorm Rye (2020): Niger – Europe’s border guard? Limits to the externalization of the European Union’s migration policy, ps. 9-10.

immediate need. Therefore, the EU's intervention is not sufficient in this sense. However, the incoming financial assistance provided also by the EU seems to be sufficient in a sense that meaningful changes were experienced in the country's legal system regarding migration related criminal activity. The EUCAP mission in Niger supports the implementation of these changes in practice. However slow, advancement is visible according to former officials taking part in the EUCAP Sahel Niger.<sup>770</sup> Therefore, the CSDP intervention can be assessed as mostly sufficient.

### VI.3 LIBYA

The colonial status of Libya was not as clear as in the case of Mali and Niger. The area which we know as Libya did not exist as a whole before its unification on 24<sup>th</sup> December 1951. The three main regions, pictured on Map 12, are Tripolitania (North West) and Cyrenaica (East), formerly under Italian and British rule, and Fezzan (South West), under French rule.<sup>771</sup> The three regions are



not, however, clearly distinguishable from each other. One of the contributing factors to this is the location of the borders: they are mainly in the Sahara Desert. The other is the tribal system of the Libyan society; each tribe has its own territory.

<sup>770</sup> Interview with Staff of EU mission and operation No.4. 20.12.2019. made by the author, and Interview with Staff of EU mission and operation No.1. Kirsi HENRIKSSON, Director of the Crisis Management Centre Finland 07.11.2019. made by the author.

<sup>771</sup> H. G.: The United Kingdom of Libya. in. *The World Today*, 1952. Vol. 8. Issue 5. pp. 193-202. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40392522> Downloaded: 05.09.2022. ps. 193-194.

Unlike Mali and Niger, Libya is not included in the OACPS, but engaged in the EMP, and later the ENP, without an association agreement, and is an observer in the Union for the Mediterranean.<sup>772</sup>

Libya is a country of key importance on the migration route to Europe: it is significant because it connects the West African and the Central Mediterranean migration routes, so its turbulent history must be analysed in order to understand Libya's role in the migration phenomenon. Libya is situated on the northern coastline of Africa, south from Italy. Its shores, thus, are relatively close to the southernmost Italian islands. Besides the geographical advantage, Libya also has natural resources, in the shape of hydrocarbons, making it an important country. In 2011 the events of the Arab Spring hit Libya hard, and the country submerged into chaos. After the fall of Muammar Gaddafi, consecutive civil wars succeeded each other and political instability prevailed. The country remained significant in the migration process, mostly because state authority ceased to exist.

### VI.3.1 BACKGROUND

The Arab Spring of 2011 had severe effects on Libya. As the consequence of the revolution, the former dictator, Gaddafi was killed, which left the county in protracted anarchy. Despite the rapidly established National Transitional Council (NTC) and its successor, the UN backed Government of National Accord, prime ministers came and went in rapid succession. The political instability drew away attention from the fact that the government had little control over the Libya's territory.<sup>773</sup> This shows in the three main centres of power: the internationally recognised government in Tripoli, called GNA, the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR), and the Libyan National Army (LNA). The protracted anarchy provided opportunity for radical groups to appear. The eastern city of Benghazi became an Islamist stronghold over time, and the fight for its capture deepened the existing rifts between the GNA and the LNA. General Khalifa Haftar, backed by the LNA, started Operation Dignity to free the city of terrorists. Yet, the campaign from a claimed self-defence turned into a general


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<sup>772</sup> EEAS: European Neighbourhood Policy. [https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/european-neighbourhood-policy\\_en#:~:text=The%20European%20Neighbourhood%20Policy%20\(ENP,their%20mutual%20benefit%20and%20interest](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/european-neighbourhood-policy_en#:~:text=The%20European%20Neighbourhood%20Policy%20(ENP,their%20mutual%20benefit%20and%20interest). Downloaded: 05.09.2022. and EEAS: Union for the Mediterranean. [https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/union-mediterranean-ufm\\_en#51498](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/union-mediterranean-ufm_en#51498) Downloaded: 05.09.2022.

<sup>773</sup> N. RÓZSA, Erzsébet: Az Arab Tavasz [The Arab Spring]. Osiris Kiadó, Budapest, 2015. ISBN 978 963 276 260 9 ps.164-168.

struggle against Islamists. Misrata, a city in western Libya took part actively in the fights, supporting Islamists in Benghazi, elongating the fights for the city, resulting in an intensified conflict between Tripolitania and Cyrenaica.<sup>774</sup>

Map13: Libya. (Edited by the author)



Libya remained dependent on the strongmen concept, which promised the unification of the country and the cessation of fights. Neither of the favourites - General Khalifa Haftar (LNA), Prime Minister Fayez el-Sarraj (GNA), Abderrahman Swehli (head of State Council, GNA) and Aghela Saleh (president of the House of Representatives Tripoli, GNA) - succeeded later on since the tribal system was too fragmented to allow one person to gain majority.<sup>775</sup> Meanwhile, the international community was divided into two groups, those who supported the GNA and those who backed General Haftar. The GNA, as the UN backed legitimate government bore the assistance of Turkey, Qatar and Italy, while General Haftar collected other supporters: France, Russia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. Thus, the power struggle was marred with the clashing interests of international actors as well, even

<sup>774</sup> VECSEY, Mariann: Fegyveres konfliktusok trendjei a kontinensen [Trends of armed conflicts on the continent] In: MARSÁI, Viktor (ed.): Afrika a globalizált világban: Lehetőségek és kihívások [Africa in the globalised World: Opportunities and Challenges] Budapest, Magyarország: Dialóg Campus Kiadó (2019) pp. 223-244., p. 227. ; PUSZTAI, Wolfgang: Libya's Conflict. [https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief%2012%20Libya\\_0.pdf](https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief%2012%20Libya_0.pdf) Downloaded: 27.02.2022.

<sup>775</sup> International Crisis Group: Libya's Unhealthy Focus on Personalities. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/libya/b57-libyas-unhealthy-focus-personalities> 26.02.2022.

showing the picture of a proxy war.<sup>776</sup> The most problematic of this grouping was the opposition of two EU Member States, France and Italy, which led to a lasting row between the two countries. In May 2018, at the height of disagreement, France organised the Paris Summit, which brought together the four competing Libyan strongmen, but Italy was left out of the negotiations.<sup>777</sup>

Fights re-started for the control of the biggest national treasure: crude oil revenues. At the end of 2018 General Khalifa Haftar started his southern campaign with the LNA.<sup>778</sup> The General's aim was to secure oil fields and fight terrorist groups. The operation, which lasted for almost seven weeks, ended on 2<sup>nd</sup> March 2019.<sup>779</sup> With this step, General Haftar gained control over the key oilfields in Libya, but not the revenues. The Libyan oil is sold by National Oil Corporation (NOC) and the payments are received by the Central Bank of Libya. These institutions are both headquartered in Tripoli and declared neutral. However, the NOC condemned the LNA's actions, thus, General Haftar still needed to control Tripoli to influence the revenue allocation.<sup>780</sup> This consideration led to General Haftar's next step, the offensive against Tripoli.<sup>781</sup> It became obvious soon that capturing Tripoli would not be an easy task for the LNA, as a house-to-house fight was unfolding.<sup>782</sup> Despite the military deadlock in Tripoli, both sides, the LNA and the GNA were convinced that the final success is

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<sup>776</sup> ZOUBIR, YAHIA H.: The Protracted Civil War in Libya: The Role of Outside Powers. in. Insight Turkey, 2020. Vol. 22. Issue 4. pp. 11–28, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26981713> Downloaded: 25.02.2022. p.15.

<sup>777</sup> RECHER, Elisabetta: Italy and France: The effects of competition between allies on the regional stability in Northern Africa and on the European Union (an Italian perspective) <https://www.aies.at/download/2019/AIES-Fokus-2019-08.pdf> Downloaded: 26.02.2022. p. 1.

<sup>778</sup> MARSAL, Viktor „Elemző tanulmány a 2019. március 14. és 23. közötti Líbia migrációs kutatásához” <http://kozerthetotudas.hu/2019/04/11/marsai-viktor-elemzo-tanulmany-a-2019-marcius-14-es-23-kozotti-libiai-migracios-kutatasahoz/> Downloaded: 19.09.2019.

<sup>779</sup> Binnie, J. LNA advances across southwest Libya. *Jane's Defence Weekly* 56/11. 2019. p. 16. ; International Crisis Group: After the Showdown in Libya's Oil Crescent. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/libya/189-after-showdown-libyas-oil-crescent> Downloaded: 26.02.2022.

<sup>780</sup> SMITH, Rihannon, PACK, Jason Oil revenue access drives conflict. <https://www.petroleum-economist.com/articles/politics-economics/middle-east/2019/oil-revenue-access-drives-conflict> Downloaded: 19.09.2019.

<sup>781</sup> Eastern Libyan commander orders forces to move on Tripoli. Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-security/eastern-libyan-commander-orders-forces-to-move-on-tripoli-idUSKCN1RG0RT> Downloaded: 12.05.2019. ; MARSAL, Viktor: Egy elfelejtett válság – a harmadik líbiai polgárháború és a migráció. [A forgotten crisis – The third Libyan civil war and the migration]. [https://www.migraciokutato.hu/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/mki\\_elemezes\\_egy\\_elfelejtett\\_valsg\\_a\\_harmadik\\_libiai\\_polgarhaboru\\_es\\_a\\_migracio\\_marsai\\_viktor.pdf](https://www.migraciokutato.hu/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/mki_elemezes_egy_elfelejtett_valsg_a_harmadik_libiai_polgarhaboru_es_a_migracio_marsai_viktor.pdf) Downloaded: 19.02.2022. ps. 3-4.

<sup>782</sup> Libyan forces push back against Haftar in house-to-house battles. Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-security/libyan-forces-push-back-against-haftar-in-house-to-house-battles-idUSKCN1S40Q8> Downloaded: 12.05.2019.



within easy reach. However, months passed without a breakthrough, and the increasing Turkish presence even turned the tide of LNA's military advancement on Tripoli.<sup>783</sup> After almost a year of stalemate at Tripoli and the Turkish supported GNA attack on central Libya, parties were found themselves at their negotiating table again. Different mediators helped to land a ceasefire agreement. One of these was the Berlin Process, a high-level meeting beginning in September 2019, on the stabilisation of Libya, with the inclusion of the main political fractions.<sup>784</sup> Russia and Egypt held preliminary talks, and one and a half years after the beginning of the attack on Tripoli a ceasefire was signed in October 2020.<sup>785</sup> The new ceasefire made it possible to relaunch the Berlin process.<sup>786</sup>

The peace agreement's first and most important follow-up area was the withdrawal of foreign fighters from Libya until 23 January 2021. Further areas included the initiative for common patrolling, demobilising armed groups and confidence-building measures between the practically separated Tripolitania, led by the internationally recognised GNA and Cyrenaica, under the control of General Khalifa Haftar and the LNA. While the international community welcomed the agreement, its reception in Libya was mixed. Sceptics articulated that it was a mistake to accept Haftar as a negotiating partner, and feared that the General would not abide by the first follow-up of the agreement. Nevertheless, the ceasefire raised hopes for a lasting peace.<sup>787</sup>

It soon became clear after the ceasefire agreement that the military related follow-up, such as troop withdrawal and foreign fighter repatriation, is lagging behind. But on the political field quick changes amazed the international community. On 15 March 2021 long standing Prime Minister Fayeze el-Sarraj, the head of the UN backed GNA resigned, handing over power to Prime Minister Abdelhamid Dbeibah, who was

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<sup>783</sup> Timeline: Haftar's months-long offensive to seize Tripoli.

<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/2/19/timeline-haftars-months-long-offensive-to-seize-tripoli>

Downloaded: 26.02.2022. ; International Crisis Group: Stopping the War for Tripoli.

<https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/libya/b069-stopping-war-tripoli>

Downloaded: 25.02.2022.

<sup>784</sup> Second Berlin Conference on Libya: New phase for peace in Libya. <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/laenderinformationen/libyen-node/second-conference-libya/2467486>

Downloaded: 25.02.2022.

<sup>785</sup> International Crisis Group: Fleshing Out the Libya Ceasefire Agreement.

<https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/libya/b80-fleshing-out-libya-ceasefire-agreement> Downloaded: 25.02.2022.

<sup>786</sup> Second Berlin Conference on Libya: New phase for peace in Libya.

<sup>787</sup> International Crisis Group: Fleshing Out the Libya Ceasefire Agreement.

<https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/libya/b80-fleshing-out-libya-ceasefire-agreement> Downloaded: 19.02.2022.



nominated in early February 2021. The new interim government inherited the obligation to implement the ceasefire agreement. Additionally, a roadmap was set to hold elections, both presidential and parliamentary, on 24 December 2021.<sup>788</sup> After the first months of hope in the new government's commitment to changes, the holding of elections became endangered because of the lack of a legal framework, and lack of clarity about general command of the armed forces. Disagreements continued over key positions and the stabilisation process remained fragile.<sup>789</sup>

As election date crept closer and closer, more apparent disagreements suggested that it would be postponed. The legal framework to hold elections was not accepted, candidates for presidency caused disagreements, and even protests were expected in Tripoli. As a reaction, militias got ready by mobilising forces, there was growing fear of reescalation of fights. In December 2021 it became clear that both parliamentary and presidential elections were going to be postponed. The Tobruk based House of Representatives also called for the implementation of a new roadmap with more reasonable timeframe. The body stated that not set dates are needed but a clear path to reach consensus on the elections. Meanwhile Prime Minister Abdelhamid Dbeibah faced a no-confidence vote, and in January 2022 the HoR called for his replacement.<sup>790</sup>

The latest ceasefire agreement seems to crumble in Libya amid political disagreements. Nevertheless, the relatively peaceful period already had an impact on migration in the country, which saw an increase in the figures, according to IOM reports.<sup>791</sup>

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<sup>788</sup> Libya's interim government takes power after handover in Tripoli. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/3/16/libyas-interim-government-takes-power-after-handover-in-tripoli> Downloaded: 30.08.2021.

<sup>789</sup> International Crisis Group: Libya Turns the Page. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/libya/222-libya-turns-page> Downloaded: 19.02.2022.

<sup>790</sup> Tracking Conflict Worldwide, Libya. [https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/database?location%5B%5D=97&date\\_range=last\\_6\\_months&from\\_month=01&from\\_year=2022&to\\_month=01&to\\_year=2022](https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/database?location%5B%5D=97&date_range=last_6_months&from_month=01&from_year=2022&to_month=01&to_year=2022) Downloaded: 27.02.2022.

<sup>791</sup> Libya — Migrant Report 39 (October - November 2021) <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/libya-%E2%80%94-migrant-report-39-october-november-2021> Downloaded: 25.02.2022.

Besides security, other factors also influence migration. Among the three case study countries Libya is the only one where the population increase remained below 2 per cent. This trend is the result of the dramatic decrease in the fertility rate, which dropped under 3 per cent by 2005. In 2005 the total population of Libya was 5.79 million, which reached 6.19 million in 2010. There has been a steady growth of 100,000 person a year

Table 12: Security and economic indicators – Libya (Edited by the author)

LIBYA	Fragile State Index 10 year trend*	Fragile State Index ranking in 2021*	GDP ranking 2017**	GDP nominal 2017 (USD)**	Main export product***	Share of export (main export product)***	Workforce engaged in agriculture****	Unemployment in percentage in 2017*****
	-33	17	91	38.11 bn	oil and gas	93.9 %	17,60%	18.6 %

\* Fragile States Index. <https://fragilestatesindex.org/excel/> Downloaded: 11.05.2022.  
\*\* GDP by Country. <https://www.worldometers.info/gdp/gdp-by-country/> Downloaded: 11.05.2022.  
\*\*\* Libya. <https://oec.world/en/profile/country/lby?yearSelector1=exportGrowthYear25> Downloaded: 19.02.2022.  
\*\*\*\* Distribution of employment across economic sectors in Libya from 2010 to 2019. <https://www.statista.com/statistics/1198825/employment-distribution-by-economic-sector-in-libya/#:~:text=In%202019%2C%20almost%2060%20percent,total%20employment%20in%20the%20country.> Downloaded: 12.05.2022.  
\*\*\*\*\* Libya Unemployment Rate 1991-2022. <https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/LBY/libya/unemployment-rate> Downloaded: 12.05.2022.

since 2010, reaching a total population of 7 million in 2022.<sup>792</sup> The stable but relatively slow increase would mean a significantly lower stress on the government than the growth rates in Mali or Niger. However, the constant instability in the country may also have an effect on the speed of population growth.

Declining economy, which is closely connected to the security situation, changed Libya's role in migration, transforming the North African country from a destination into a transit country. Libya is heavily dependent on oil and gas exports, which represented 93.9 per cent of the country's trade in 2019.<sup>793</sup> Armed conflict in the country has multiple times aimed for the control over natural resources and revenues. So it is not a surprise that Libyan GDP fluctuated in a parallel way with the security situation in the country, reaching a low point in 2016, and after three years of growing, a nadir in 2020 again. The recent ceasefire agreement resulted in a forecasted growth of the GDP.<sup>794</sup> But this increase can easily melt if fights re-escalate in the country.

### VI.3.2 BILATERAL RELATIONS

Geographical proximity is important when a country wants to represent its national interests. This is related to that countries tend to worry more about neighbours than

<sup>792</sup> Libya Population. <https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/libya-population/> Downloaded : 27.02.2022.

<sup>793</sup> Libya. <https://oec.world/en/profile/country/lby?yearSelector1=exportGrowthYear25> Downloaded: 19.02.2022.

<sup>794</sup> Libya GDP. <https://tradingeconomics.com/libya/gdp#:~:text=GDP%20in%20Libya%20is%20expected,according%20to%20our%20econometric%20models.> Downloaded: 19.02.2022.

about distant countries. This also postulates the existence of a shared history of interactions (EMP, later ENP). This is particularly important in the case of Libya, where the decade long political turmoil left protracted uncertainty. The geographical location of Libya suggests such a connection with the EU and at least one of its Member States; Italy. Geographical proximity also suggests that EU or national interests can be pursued more easily.

Libya is of strategic importance, as it was a strategic partner of the EU on migration for long years during the Gaddafi regime. When the regime fell, opportunities opened to reform Libya's most important relations. The section follows the previously introduced pattern to analyse French, German and Italian bilateral relations with Libya.

France was interested in following closely the crisis in Libya in 2011. Paris was certainly looking for an opportunity to expand its foreign policy to North Africa. This would have given France the opportunity to increase its share from Libya's crude oil export.<sup>795</sup> France was thus first to launch its military intervention among Western countries.<sup>796</sup> From 2014, France maintained relations with both the internationally recognised GNA, and the LNA led by General Haftar. The lines of interest were economic (crude oil) and security. The latter was followed closely by Paris in Fezzan region, because France had been engaged in significant counter-terrorism activity in sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>797</sup> The *2017 review of the French National Security Strategy* clearly underlined the continued interest in Libya. It was in the focus from two aspects, migration and terrorism. The country was mentioned 8 times in the review, yet it was not among those where France intervened on a bilateral basis. Libya was highlighted as a country where France was willing to join coalitional forces.<sup>798</sup>

By April 2019 it became obvious that France cooperated with General Khalifa Haftar as well, besides the GNA.<sup>799</sup> This revelation had an impact on bilateral relations between France and Italy, too, which resulted in Paris calling back its ambassador to

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<sup>795</sup> House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee: Libya. 2016. Examination of intervention and collapse and the UK's future policy options. September 14.

<https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmfa/119/119.pdf> Downloaded: 21.05.2022. ps.10-11.

<sup>796</sup> DAVIDSON, Jason W. 2013. "France, Britain and the intervention in Libya: an integrated analysis." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 26. (2): 310-329. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2013.784573> Downloaded: 21.05.2020. p. 315.

<sup>797</sup> RASMI, Farah: *Beyond the War: The History of French-Libyan Relations*. Atlantic Council, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep30743> Downloaded: 06.09.2022. ps. 8-9.

<sup>798</sup> *Defence and National Security Review* 2017. p. 73.

<sup>799</sup> *World Bulletin*. 2016. "French special forces withdraw from Libya's Benghazi." August 11. <https://www.worldbulletin.net/africa/french-special-forces-withdraw-from-libyas-benghazi-h176040.html> Downloaded: 21.05.2020.

Rome.<sup>800</sup> Thus, plans to maximise the influence of France in Libya fell short when the Government of National Accord (GNA) suspended ties with the country in 2019.<sup>801</sup>

France reopened its embassy in Libya in 2021,<sup>802</sup> underlining that the country had never severed ties with Libya even during its civil wars. Paris also took part in organising the Berlin conferences and supports the unification and peace in Libya.<sup>803</sup> These steps were also in line with the *Strategic update* of 2021. Libya remained important, the mentions in the text even grew over time, just the context changed slightly. Migration continued to be one of the major aspects of focus, but terrorism was not mentioned as explicitly as in 2017.<sup>804</sup>

Economic aspects were also reportedly important in the early stages of French intervention in Libya, especially in the import of crude oil. In 2011, France imported 17.6 per cent of the Libyan crude oil. In 2020, this fell to just 7.94 per cent altogether. In 2020 France proved to be one of the major export partners of Libya, with a share of 5.59 per cent, EUR 463.8 million. Yet, in the import segment, France was only responsible for 1.45 per cent of the trade, with a total EUR 168.7 million.<sup>805</sup>

Germany appeared in the Libyan conflict mostly as a donor country. Berlin supported a diplomatic solution to the crisis from the beginning. With its soft power solution approach and relatively small share in the Libyan economy, Germany could remain a credible partner. Germany's share of the Libyan exports was 9.14 per cent, EUR 757.8 million, and 3.45 per cent, worth EUR 401.6 million in imports in 2020.<sup>806</sup> This muted role is echoed by the *White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr* of 2016, where Berlin defines the North African region as an area of instability, where the main line of engagement is prevention and building resilience through the active utilisation of foreign development, and security

<sup>800</sup> Italy and France heal their rift with a treaty. <https://www.politico.eu/article/italy-france-draghi-macron-treaty-rome-paris/> Downloaded: 25.02.2022.

<sup>801</sup> TIDEY, Alice. 2019. "Libya's UN-backed government suspends cooperation with France, accuses it of backing rebel forces." Euronews, April 19. [https://www.euronews.com/2019/04/19/libya-s-un-backed-government-suspends-cooperation-with-france-accuses-it-of-backing-rebel?utm\\_source=feedburner&utm\\_medium=feed&utm\\_campaign=Feed%3a+euronews%2fen%2fnews+\(euronews+-+news+-+en\)](https://www.euronews.com/2019/04/19/libya-s-un-backed-government-suspends-cooperation-with-france-accuses-it-of-backing-rebel?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3a+euronews%2fen%2fnews+(euronews+-+news+-+en)) Downloaded: 21.05.2020.

<sup>802</sup> 'To regain its standing in Libya, France must restore the credibility it lost'. <https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20210329-to-regain-its-standing-in-libya-france-must-restore-the-credibility-it-lost> Downloaded: 25.02.2022.

<sup>803</sup> Relations bilatérales, Libye. [https://www.diplomatique.gouv.fr/fr/dossiers-pays/libye/relations-bilaterales/#sommaire\\_2](https://www.diplomatique.gouv.fr/fr/dossiers-pays/libye/relations-bilaterales/#sommaire_2) Downloaded: 25.02.2022.

<sup>804</sup> Strategic Update 2021.

<sup>805</sup> Libya. <https://oec.world/en/profile/country/lby?yearlyTradeFlowSelector=flow1> Downloaded: 06.09.2022.

<sup>806</sup> Ibid.

instruments. North Africa, including Libya was also identified as a region prone to terrorism and radicalisation. To effectively address this matter, Germany emphasized the importance of international, European and transatlantic cooperation.<sup>807</sup> In line with its White Paper, Germany also consistently supported the GNA from its establishment. In 2017 Berlin seemed to engage exclusively as a donor state with EUR 233 million, most of which was spent on migration related projects.<sup>808</sup> From 2019, when relations between the two most active European partners of Libya soured, Germany took over political tasks as well. The country launched the Berlin process in 2019 to settle the intra-Libyan conflict. This resulted in two high-level meetings, with the inclusion of the Libyan Interim Government.<sup>809</sup> In September 2021 Germany also reopened its embassy in Tripoli, from which Berlin expects the strengthening of bilateral relations.<sup>810</sup>

Italy can be considered as the oldest and closest relation of Libya. Firstly, because Italy was among the early colonising powers on Libyan territory. Secondly, the geographical closeness made possible tight bilateral relations. The Benghazi Treaty of 2008 about friendship, partnership and cooperation even established privileged ties between the two countries. This resulted in the initial hesitation of Italy whether to join direct military actions in Libya. Rome finally joined international forces in the intervention.<sup>811</sup> After the fall of Gaddafi Italy recognised the National Transitional Council (NTC), which was succeeded by the GNA. The Italian decision, however, seemed too late for Libya. Rome lost its credibility and was surrounded by suspicion. It was the ally of the former regime and took sides too late. Rome decided to recognise the NTC because of growing international competition, namely the intensive French and British presence in Libya.<sup>812</sup>

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<sup>807</sup> The Federal Government of Germany: White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr of 2016. ps. 34-44.

<sup>808</sup> MOLNÁR, Anna; MOLNÁR, Éva; TAKÁCS, Lili; VECSEY, Mariann: A nemzetközi jelenlét Líbiában 2011-től napjainkig. [International presence in Libya from 2011 to the present.] Nemzet és Biztonság [http://real.mtak.hu/106492/1/nemzet\\_es\\_biztonsag\\_2019\\_02\\_8\\_molnar\\_molnar\\_takacs\\_vecsey.pdf](http://real.mtak.hu/106492/1/nemzet_es_biztonsag_2019_02_8_molnar_molnar_takacs_vecsey.pdf) 2019: 2 pp. Downloaded: 25.02.2022. ps. 111-112.

<sup>809</sup> Second Berlin Conference on Libya: New phase for peace in Libya.

<sup>810</sup> Foreign Minister Maas in Tripoli: Germany is and remains a committed partner at Libya's side. <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/laenderinformationen/libyen-node/maas-libya/2480980> Downloaded: 25.02.2022.

<sup>811</sup> MOLNÁR, Anna; MOLNÁR, Éva; TAKÁCS, Lili; VECSEY, Mariann: A nemzetközi jelenlét Líbiában 2011-től napjainkig. [International presence in Libya from 2011 to the present.] p. 108.

<sup>812</sup> MORONE, Antonio M.: The Libyan Crisis and Italian Policy: Military Intervention, Border Control and Fossil Exploitation. [https://www.academia.edu/40533208/The\\_Libyan\\_Crisis\\_and\\_Italian\\_Policy\\_Military\\_Intervention](https://www.academia.edu/40533208/The_Libyan_Crisis_and_Italian_Policy_Military_Intervention)

The *White Paper for international security and defence* of 2015 identified the security and stability of the Euro-Mediterranean region, including the Maghreb as of vital national interest. The identified threat originating from the region was terrorism at the time. As previously stated, Italy pledged to take the responsibility to lead missions in the region to enhance its security.<sup>813</sup>

The country became engaged in Libya using both soft and hard power tools and sought to secure its former agenda of the exploitation of hydrocarbons, access to Libya's market and border control to prevent irregular migration.<sup>814</sup>

By 2017 Italy had only partially fulfilled its objectives when the country signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the GNA on combatting illegal migration.<sup>815</sup> Nonetheless, the ceasefire in 2020, after the third episode of the Libyan civil war, provided Italy with a new opportunity to regain influence. Rome successfully renewed the migration deal with the GNA and continued funding the coast guard.<sup>816</sup> In 2021 Italy could capitalise on its new prime minister's reputation and increase its influence in Libya. The two parties even mentioned rebuilding the friendship to the 2008 level.<sup>817</sup> Besides the tools of diplomacy, Italy currently deploys 400 soldiers, 142 military vehicles and 2 air assets to Libya in the framework of a bilateral mission.<sup>818</sup> Operation MIASIT in Libya started in 2018, with an allocated EUR 34 million. This made the operation the most expensive among the newly deployed ones, since the total planned expenditure was EUR 83 million for all missions. During the political debate upon launching MIASIT, migration proved to be the main concern, not terrorism, which was the main threat identified in the Mediterranean in 2015.<sup>819</sup> The

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[Border Control and Fossil Exploitation in Libya in Transition Human Mobility International Conflict and State Building ed by Antonio M Morone Afriche e Orienti n 3 2018](#) Downloaded: 25.02.2022.

<sup>813</sup> The Ministry of Defence of Italy: *White Paper for international security and defence*, 2015. ps. 27-38.

<sup>814</sup> MORONE, Antonio M.: *The Libyan Crisis and Italian Policy: Military Intervention, Border Control and Fossil Exploitation*. Downloaded: 25.02.2022.

<sup>815</sup> *Migranti: accordo Italia-Libia, il testo del memorandum*. [https://www.repubblica.it/esteri/2017/02/02/news/migranti\\_accordo\\_italia-libia\\_ecco\\_cosa\\_contiene\\_in\\_memorandum-157464439/](https://www.repubblica.it/esteri/2017/02/02/news/migranti_accordo_italia-libia_ecco_cosa_contiene_in_memorandum-157464439/) Downloaded: 25.02.2022.

<sup>816</sup> *Italy's New Approach to Libya*. <https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/italys-new-approach-libya> Downloaded: 25.02.2022.

<sup>817</sup> *Italy found its way back into Libya*. <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/italy-found-its-way-back-into-libya/> Downloaded: 25.02.2022.

<sup>818</sup> *Bilateral Assistance and Support Mission in Libya (MIASIT)*. [https://www.difesa.it/OperazioniMilitari/op\\_intern\\_corso/Libia\\_Missione\\_bilaterale\\_di\\_supporto\\_e\\_a\\_ssistenza/Pagine/Contributo\\_nazionale.aspx](https://www.difesa.it/OperazioniMilitari/op_intern_corso/Libia_Missione_bilaterale_di_supporto_e_a_ssistenza/Pagine/Contributo_nazionale.aspx) Downloaded: 25.02.2022.

<sup>819</sup> CECCORULLI, Michela, and COTICCHIA, Fabrizio: 'I'll take two.' Migration, terrorism, and the Italian military engagement in Niger and Libya. ps. 182-183. and 192.



*Mediterranean Defence Strategy* of 2022 underlined Libya's importance to Italy. As one of the main trade and energy partners of Italy, Rome's foreign policy pivot to Africa is even less questionable.<sup>820</sup> Italy was the number one export partner to Libya in 2020, with 21.1 per cent, worth EUR 1.75 billion, while it provided 8.51 per cent, EUR 0.9 billion in import to Libya.<sup>821</sup>

All three EU Member States commented on the recent postponement of the Libyan elections and underlined the importance of the continuation of the electoral process.<sup>822</sup> However, recent political developments in the country make the outcome questionable. Meanwhile, Libya sought partners outside of Europe as well, including Turkey and Russia. This perhaps will not lead to the same situation as it highly likely will in Mali, but certainly broadens the picture.

### VI.3.3 MIGRATION IN LIBYA

Libya, just like Niger, is also dubbed as a migration hub. After all, two bigger migration routes lead to Libya. One is the East African route, connecting Sudan, South Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia. The second is the route through Niger, which the research followed. This latter merges West and Central African routes.<sup>823</sup>

Libya was a major recipient of economic migration within Africa until 2011. The Gaddafi regime's policy of opening up to sub-Saharan labour since 1998 provided a livelihood for almost two million migrants in the oil refining and construction industries until the fall of the dictator.<sup>824</sup>

The Libyan uprising of 2011 changed the country's role in migration processes. Gaddafi's proclamation of Pan-Africanism had intensified already existing racism in the Libyan Arab population before the fall of the regime, which deepened in the population during the 2011 uprising and intensifying tribalism.<sup>825</sup> Migrants arriving in the country, mainly seeking asylum, and higher paying jobs, have begun to see Libya

<sup>820</sup> BORSARI, Federico: Rome Alone? Italy's Mediterranean Defense Strategy. <https://cepa.org/rome-alone-italys-mediterranean-defense-strategy/> Downloaded: 04.09.2022.

<sup>821</sup> Libya. <https://oec.world/en/profile/country/lby?yearlyTradeFlowSelector=flow1> Downloaded: 06.09.2022.

<sup>822</sup> Joint Statement on Libyan Election Process (December 24, 2021). <https://reliefweb.int/report/libya/joint-statement-libyan-election-process-december-24-2021> Downloaded: 25.02.2022.

<sup>823</sup> EHLER, Christian Ehler, VON MARTIUS Lea: Long March for Europe. (Verlag Dr. Köster, Berlin, 2016.) ISBN 978 3 89574 910 0 ps. 69-70.

<sup>824</sup> BIEDERMANN, Zsuzsanna: Migráció Szubszaharai Afrikából Magyarországra és Európába. [Migration from Sub-Saharan Africa to Hungary and Europe]. p. 3.

<sup>825</sup> MARSAL Viktor: A migrációs diskurzus margójára III. – A líbiai válság az európai migráció tükrében. p. 2.



as a transit country in recent years, due to non-existent legislation and hostile reception.<sup>826</sup> The country has proven to be ideal for leaving from Africa to Europe, because of its 1,700 km of Mediterranean coastline.<sup>827</sup>

When fights broke out in 2019 again, there were approximately 140,000 migrants in Tripoli, who were in need for protection.<sup>828</sup> According to the IOM, Libya has a migrant stock of about 820,000 people, mainly from Syria and sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>829</sup> The estimation of the Libyan Ministry of Interior is much higher: it calculated with around 1.5 million irregular migrants in the country. Yet we have to take in consideration that there were no reliable data at the time from Cyrenaica or Fezzan.<sup>830</sup> With Libya becoming an unsafe country to reach and settle in, the protracted situation affected migration patterns.

In recent years Libya increasingly became notorious on the inhumane procedures that the country uses to tackle migration.<sup>831</sup> Decree No. (386) on the establishment of an anti-illegal migration agency was accepted by Libya in 2014.<sup>832</sup> It created the legal background to the agency which commits the atrocities against irregular migrants in Libya. The agency is up and running in 2022 and actively engaged in the deportation of migrants from Libya to their countries of origin.<sup>833</sup>

56 FMPs were installed in Libya to monitor migration flows in and out of the country. The coverage of the country is uneven, not all the regions are included in the project, therefore the figures which the FMPs suggest are still not completely accurate. However, they provide a general picture of migration flows in Libya. These trends

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<sup>826</sup> UNHCR: Mixed Migration: Libya at the crossroads.

<https://www.refworld.org/docid/52b43f594.html> Downloaded: 12.05.2019. p. 73.

<sup>827</sup> Libya. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ly.html> Downloaded: 06.11.2016.

<sup>828</sup> Peyton, Nellie: Migrant women, children denied shelter in Libya's battleground. Reuters.

<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-security-migrants/migrant-women-children-denied-shelter-in-libyas-battleground-idUSKCN1SG1PV> Downloaded: 12.05.2019.

<sup>829</sup> IOM Migration Data Portal [https://migrationdataportal.org/?i=stock\\_abs\\_&t=2019&cm49=434](https://migrationdataportal.org/?i=stock_abs_&t=2019&cm49=434) Downloaded: 19.09.2019.

<sup>830</sup> MARSAL, Viktor: Elemző tanulmány a 2019. március 14. és 23. közötti Líbia migrációs kutatásához.

<sup>831</sup> No Escape from Hell, EU Policies Contribute to Abuse of Migrants in Libya.

<https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/01/21/no-escape-hell/eu-policies-contribute-abuse-migrants-libya> Downloaded: 25.02.2022. ; Inhumane treatment of migrants in Libya: the EU is 'complicit' says filmmaker. <https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20210927-inhumane-treatment-of-migrants-in-libya-the-eu-is-complicit-says-filmmaker> Downloaded: 25.02.2022. ; Libya's migrants and crimes against humanity. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2021/11/02/libyas-migrants-and-crimes-against-humanity/> Downloaded: 25.02.2022.

<sup>832</sup> Decree No. (386) of 2014 on establishing the Anti-Illegal Immigration Agency. <https://security-legislation.ly/en/law/34978> Downloaded: 19.02.2022.

<sup>833</sup> Anti-Illegal Immigration Agency. <https://www.libyaobserver.ly/anti-illegal-immigration-agency> Downloaded: 25.02.2022.

show that migrant stock in Libya comes dominantly from sub-Saharan African countries. The main countries of origin from West Africa are Niger, Nigeria, Ghana and Mali. Data also shows that the number of departures from the Libyan coast is on the rise, as well as the number of those people who were rescued and returned to Libya by the Libyan Coast Guard.<sup>834</sup> Meanwhile EU assistance to Libya reached EUR 700 million between 2014 and 2020. Additionally, under the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) the EU allocated EUR 455 million of which Libya is the main beneficiary. The EUTF provides funding for the protection of migrants, refugees as well as vulnerable people.<sup>835</sup> In the light of the reports about migrants' abuse, it is rather questionable how the money is spent.

The security situation in Libya did not improve over time. According to the Fragile States Index, the situation decreased significantly in the country since 2011. In 2021 Libya occupied 17<sup>th</sup> place in the Fragile States Index.<sup>836</sup> Due to the fact that the EU was not able to provide meaningful support under the CSDP umbrella, this segment of the activity is deemed to be insufficient. The EUBAM moved in and out of the country for multiple times, therefore it is hard to expect an impact. EU assistance to Libya, however, was meaningful during the 2014–2020 MFF. For this period, 700 million EUR had been provided to the country, and additional funds were lined up for Libya. With the rivaling governments in the country, it should, however, be a question who is eligible to receive these funds. Thus, the EU's action to provide assistance is necessary, but it can hardly be assessed as sufficient.

## VI.4 CONCLUSIONS

This chapter analysed three countries along the migration route from West Africa to the Central Mediterranean to establish what effects migrants along their routes. Among the two sub-Saharan case study countries, Mali proved to be a country of

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<sup>834</sup> Libya — Migrant Report 36 (March - April 2021) <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/libya-%E2%80%94-migrant-report-36-march-april-2021> Downloaded: 25.02.2022. ; Libya — Migrant Report 37 (May-June 2021) <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/libya-%E2%80%94-migrant-report-37-may-june-2021> Downloaded: 25.02.2022. ; Libya — Migrant Report 38 (July - September 2021) [https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/52760/dtm\\_libya\\_r38\\_migrant\\_report.pdf](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/52760/dtm_libya_r38_migrant_report.pdf) Downloaded: 25.02.2022. ; Libya — Migrant Report 39 (October - November 2021) <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/libya-%E2%80%94-migrant-report-39-october-november-2021> Downloaded: 25.02.2022.

<sup>835</sup> EU-Libya relations. [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage\\_en/19163/EU-Libya%20relations#:~:text=Since%202018%2C%20the%20EU%20has,UN%2Dled%20peace%20mediation%20efforts](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/19163/EU-Libya%20relations#:~:text=Since%202018%2C%20the%20EU%20has,UN%2Dled%20peace%20mediation%20efforts). Downloaded: 25.02.2022.

<sup>836</sup> Fragile States Index. <https://fragilestatesindex.org/excel/> Downloaded: 11.05.2022.

origin, transit and destination as well. Despite the long-standing political instability and the presence of radical Islamist groups in the country, Bamako has a comprehensive national policy to address migration. The PONAM, however, reflects that Mali's aim is to help its nationals to make a successful migratory journey. Moreover, the policy states that most of the nationals involved in international migration are staying within the region. To the east from Mali is Niger, a traditional transit country, with close linkages to both Mali and Libya. In all three countries Tuareg tribes can be found. While the security situation in Niger stagnated in the last decade, especially compared with Mali and Libya, it is not a surprise that Niamey had a hard time to attract the attention of the international community. In 2015–2016, when migratory pressure on the EU increased significantly, the country capitalised on the given opportunity. Niger gained attention with its extremely cooperative attitude towards the externalisation of European migration policies. This resulted in multiple actions, for example, in the change of the mandate of the EUCAP Sahel Niger; the creation of incredibly harsh legislation, which criminalised all activities related to migration, and most recently a national migration policy, the PNM. Niger embraced the EU's ideas, and continues to show its willingness to cooperate, though with varying success. The PNM sets ambitious aims to fulfil. The Nigerien policy, just as the Malian, claimed that Nigeriens mostly take part in international migration within the region. For both countries the reason behind the preference to remain within the region lays in ECOWAS policies. The regional organisation, of which both countries are members, created a visa free area. Besides the relatively free movement within the ECOWAS, both in West Africa and Central Africa – eight countries in the former, six in the latter region – the CFA franc is used as the national currency<sup>837</sup>, which makes it easier to handle remittances as well.

Trends, however, could change in the long-term, especially because of the rapid growth of the population in both analysed sub-Saharan countries. This fact paired with questionable economic growth and constant political instability can affect the wider region. Signs of this started to be seen when the military ousted the president in

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<sup>837</sup> What is the CFA franc zone? <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fabric/backgrnd.htm>.  
Downloaded: 27.02.2022.

Burkina Faso in 2022. The country's northern parts suffered from the spill-over of Jihadist attacks from Mali in the Liptako Gourma region.<sup>838</sup>

Libya, with its rapidly changing security situation ceased to be a country of destination. Instead, mainly because of the power vacuum in the country, it was proven to be an ideal transit area towards Europe.

The case studies also introduced the national interests of three EU Member States, France, Germany and Italy. In the case of sub-Saharan countries, the influence of France was predominant, while in Libya Italy regained its role as an important actor. Germany generally leads a different kind of foreign policy towards African countries, mainly leaning on an aid-based approach. Germany became a reliable donor country, in parallel with taking part in the international interventions. German Africa policies are generally focused on good governance and development.

In Mali and Niger France showed its commitment to intervene and deploy the military, but the enthusiasm can be related to economic ties. Of these Niger is the main beneficiary, since the country supplies France with considerable amounts of uranium ore. Again, geographical proximity counted since uranium mines are located in North-West Niger. It is a predominantly Tuareg area, and it is relatively close to the border with Mali, where radical extremists threatened to capture the mines. France therefore pursued its national interests when intervening in Mali. In Libya, Paris followed the same agenda with the covert support of General Haftar, in the hope of increasing their share in the oil and gas export.

Italy showed a more pragmatic approach in recent years. Their primary role everywhere is to stabilise the situation and keep migration at a manageable level. Rome started to build up their bilateral chain of relations with all these three countries following this very same priority everywhere.

Recent events in Mali are, however, likely to change again the status quo in the Sahel. The appearance of the Russia affiliated Wagner Group in Mali as advisors enraged Paris. France is now considering the withdrawal of its units, and the recently established international Takuba Task Force from Mali, relocating it to the territory of a more willing partner, such as Niger. Thus, the transit country could gain even more

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<sup>838</sup> Burkina Faso coup: How President Kabore's ouster unfolded.  
<https://www.africanews.com/2022/01/25/burkina-faso-coup-how-president-kabore-s-ouster-unfolded//>  
 Downloaded: 27.02.2022.

benefit from the EU, and Mali could easily lose all its support, especially in the light of the developments of the Ukrainian crisis.<sup>839</sup>

In a sum, the EU's actions in the examined countries provided differing outcomes. The EU mostly had a negative balance in the case of Mali and Libya, considering the necessary and sufficient actions. While in Niger, the EU's policy and the international attention at least did not worsen the situation, and even some minor improvement is visible.

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<sup>839</sup> Missiles rain down around Ukraine. <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-orders-military-operations-ukraine-demands-kyiv-forces-surrender-2022-02-24/> Downloaded: 27.02.2022.

## CHAPTER VII.

### CONCLUSIONS

Throughout the thesis, migration theories; regional West African migration patterns; AU, EU, joint and ECOWAS policies were examined in five chapters, as well as the EU's practical steps to assess the effects on migration. For this, a case study, including three selected African states was developed. I investigated how the policy and practical steps from the EU affected migration in West Africa and migration patterns is the Central Mediterranean route.

I introduced relevant migration theories and defined the theoretical background of the research in the second chapter. The chapter remained theoretical and provided a fundamental understanding for the discussed topic.

While studying the different migration theories, I realised that neither of them assesses migration as a complex phenomenon, and most of the time just two disciplines were used to create a theory. Thus, I intended to create a theory which investigates migration as a complex phenomenon. For this, I decided to combine two of the introduced migration theories, the push and pull model and cumulative causation theory. A comprehensive migration theory must include all the factors which influence the decision on migration; all those which are related to external and internal incentives. When examining migration, it is important to assess the environment of the country of origin first. The first indicator for migration is armed conflict. When a country is not safe and secure, even those people who normally cannot afford the costs of migration tend to change their residence, even if this move is temporary and internal. The second indicator can be the economic one, like poverty, workforce sectoral data. The economic indicator, however, is crosscutting with demographic data, like fertility and population, and climate change, which can also be measured by assessing which countries are the more fragile. Beside this, social indicators must be taken in consideration: the potential culture of migration, the structure of the society – if migration is a family or, in a less likely case, a personal decision – the extent of diaspora. Additionally, some indicators related to the possible country of transit and destination are also needed. The security situation, the legal environment for migration

and additional economic indicators. All these factors should be examined together to assess how likely a migratory decision is from a specific country.

In the third chapter, AU, Europe–Africa joint and ECOWAS policies and strategies were examined, as well as the migration patterns in West Africa. Although data on intra-African migration remained scarce through the years, some improvements were seen with the establishment of the FMPs.

After assessing intra-regional migration routes, EU-Africa relations and EU migration related policies were discussed in chapter four. These were important to analyse, since most of these policies hope to tackle migration either externally or internally.

In chapter five the practical steps of the EU were investigated, along with the introduction of the Central Mediterranean migration route. CSDP and migration must be examined together since 2015, when the idea was introduced to use EU missions and operations to tackle migration outside the EU’s borders.

In chapter six, case studies were developed, analysing three African countries, Mali, Niger and Libya, and EU and Member State actions in these selected states.

## **VII.1 THE RESULTS OF THE RESEARCH**

To investigate the research question on how EU policies affect migration from West Africa to the Central Mediterranean, four hypotheses were created. All related aspects were investigated through the research to prove or discard them. The findings were communicated at the end of each chapter.

1. My first hypothesis suggested that most of the African migratory movements are internal within the continent, and that the pattern will not change in the long term, irrespective of the EU’s policy changes. In chapters two and three – when examining the policies of different organisations and regional migration trends –, I proved that a policy in itself cannot significantly deviate migration patterns, however, in the following chapters I also found that policy changes with an immediate effect on migrant route safety, and the security environment on the migration route together have an effect on the migration patterns, even in the short term. Additionally, I proved that West African migration would remain mostly on the continent in the long term, unless an unexpected event which has immense effect on



migration happens. I verified both parts of the first hypothesis, with an additional finding that multiple events on a migration route can have a multiplier effect and can influence migration patterns in the short term.

2. The second hypothesis of the research was that the EU introduced its integrated approach to crisis management in its Global Strategy in 2016, when regionalisation also gained momentum. The regional approach can change the relationship between the European Union and the African countries, and regional organisations will gain more importance. Whereas the EU has started to implement an integrated approach, it also utilises the regional approach in some cases. After examining how the AU and the EU assess each other and which actors have a history of working together, I verified that regional organisations like the ECOWAS are not active enough to be an eligible partner for the EU. The EU just renewed the CPA, with which the OACPS was divided into three regional protocols. It is proved that the EU is going to follow a continental approach in the future. In addition to the continental approach, regions have gained momentum, but not through regional organisations. Thus, it is expected that the EU's relations to African regional organisations will remain the same. While researching African documents related to migration, I created a unique body of literature of the collected documents, which has never been done before even in international literature. I also verified that the differing approaches towards migration from the African and European perspectives hinder effective cooperation on the matter between the two continental organisations.
3. In the third hypothesis I stated that irregular migration can be successfully managed by using every tool of the integrated and comprehensive approach of the European Union. Unfortunately, tools are just one part of the EU's action to handle migration. I verified that it is highly likely that, with the utilisation of all tools, the EU could successfully engage itself in tackling migration. As it was established through the case studies, the EU actions were necessary, but not always sufficient. The EU must work in the future on how it can make its projects sufficient as well. Throughout the research it became clear that the EU does not understand priorities in the same way

as its African counterparts do. To be able to tackle migration successfully, these differences must be tackled, as stated in the previous paragraph.

4. The fourth hypothesis considers that at European Union level the externalization of the management of irregular migration started, and solutions will be developed to handle migration outside of the borders of the European Union, with inclusion of local actors. This pattern can be seen through Chapter V, which investigates CSDP missions and operations. All the missions and operations are engaged in training, advising, or supporting the security sector reform. The training of the armed forces of a third country can result firstly in expanded security, and also in a reliable local actor who can deal with migration. For this, Niger can be a perfect example, because Niger established a criminal law which penalises migration related crimes and introduced a migration strategy as well since the beginning of the mission in the country. I verified that the practice of externalizing the handling of migration will be continued in the future. Not just on the EU, but at Member State level as well.

## **VII.2 USABILITY OF THE RESULTS**

1. The results of the research can be utilised in further research which examines international migration. As it lists the core documents of migration theory, it can also be used as a collection of relevant literature.
2. The thesis can be used as a baseline to research EU policies related to Africa, as it contains a collection of all pertaining documents.
3. EU policies on migration were also studied via a collected list of documents, which can be utilised as a starting point for further research into the topic.
4. Another novelty about the research is the collection of African documents related to migration. The thesis thus provides baseline knowledge for further research in this area as well.
5. EU CSDP missions constantly change over time. Some of them are transformed, new missions are established, or old ones expire. This thesis provides a comprehensive analysis on CSDP missions and operations in the Mediterranean through Africa, which can be a part of a more holistic research on CSDP.

## VII.4 LIMITATIONS

The limitations of this thesis define the directions of future research possibilities. One of the limitations derives from the use of the case study methodology, which is a highly debated research method in social sciences. One analysed case may or may not be generalised. The case of the West African migration complex may not be generalisable because of the specifics provided by the regional framework of the ECOWAS and even by the EU's Sahel strategies, and its extraordinary level of CSDP engagement in the region. However, the present research can give an outline, or framework for future research concerning other regions. If the same methodology is followed with different regions, comparisons can be made, and new hypotheses can be formulated.

The following limitation is the ability to structure a theory valid for every situation regarding a phenomenon. This is again highly contested in social sciences, if a theory can fully describe a phenomenon.

One of the most imminent limitations of the research was the relatively scarce data on irregular migration within West Africa. It could be seen that, through time, data availability increased, but it is still sporadic, and not as detailed as the number of detected irregular arrivals, which is connected by FRONTEX monthly, and openly available on their website. Over time, this also has the possibility to improve, opening the field for further research relying on timely data pools.

## VII.5 RECOMMENDATIONS

The limitations of this thesis define the directions of future research possibilities. One of them could be the examination of the created migration theory in practice and its further refinement. Testing it, for example, in other regions would show if the theory is truly applicable.

A more complex investigation of the 2018–2020 deviation in the migration pattern in the Central Mediterranean route would also be a possible direction to investigate. This direction would also contribute to a deeper understanding of the deviation of migration patterns in general.

The usage of the terms irregular and illegal migration remained rather mixed through the research period. An investigation on the usage of the terms would provide more context to the political discourse in the EU. It seems a minor question, but with

the securitization having taken place with regard to migration, the evolution of the usage, the connotations and the context in which these expressions are used is important.

In the light of recent events, the unprovoked Russian aggression in Ukraine, the impact of the conflict on African migration patterns could also be examined. The effect may not be immediate, but Ukraine, as a food item provider, is a significant loss to African economy. Thus, the conflict can affect intra-African and inter-continental migration flows as well.

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## **APPENDIX I.**

### **INTERVIEWS**

Between 2016 and 2022 I conducted 15 interviews for the research with the informed consent of the interviewees. The interviews were conducted anonymously, in a semi-structured form, using a pool of open-ended questions.

#### **List of interviewees:**

1. Member State official No.1. 23.08.2016.
2. EU Official No.1. 05.03.2019.
3. EU Official No.2. 14.03.2019.
4. Staff of EU mission and operation No.2. 17.06.2019.
5. Staff of EU mission and operation No.1. Kirsi HENRIKSSON, Director of the Crisis Management Centre Finland 07.11.2019.
6. Staff of EU mission and operation No.3. 20.11.2019.
7. Staff of EU mission and operation No.4. 20.12.2019.
8. Researcher No.1. 27.01.2020.
9. Researcher No.2. 29.01.2020.
10. Staff of EU mission and operation No.5. 03.02.2020.
11. Researcher No.3. 25.02.2020.
12. Staff of EU mission and operation No.6. 12.03.2020.
13. Staff of EU mission and operation No.7. 23.03.2020.
14. Member State official No.2. 08.10.2021.
15. Member State official No.3. 14.03.2022.

#### **The pool of questions:**

1. What are your tasks? What is the task of the directorate you are in?
2. What is the exact job of your unit in formulating EU migration policies?
3. There is a certain ambiguity around using the terms irregular, illegal and undocumented migration. Mostly they appear as synonyms. Does the EU assess these terms differently? What is the difference between them?
4. The EU recently made an effort to strengthen the European Border and Coast Guard Agency. (EBCGA/FRONTEX) Some theorists already accused the EU with building a Fortress Europe. What do you think about this? Is there any idea

on promoting legal means of entering the EU besides the Blue card system, which is for skilled workers?

5. How your unit takes part in comprehensive/integrated approach? How can you describe this in practice?
6. How does your unit work together with other EU agencies/units/DGs?
7. Does your directorate have links or joint projects or cooperation with the EEAS, or other EU agencies, perhaps with missions and operations? How do you work together?
8. How the coherency is realised among different instruments?
9. How do you help each other's work?
10. Did the EU think about how it will retrieve the assistance which now comes from the UK? How?
11. Did the EU think about the possible effects of the BREXIT on the contractual framework either with the ACP or AU, since the anglophones remain in the commonwealth? What is your view on this?
12. How the operations in the Mediterranean are in contact with the EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia and/or EUBAM Libya? How these operations harmonise their activities?
13. The Crime Information Cell stopped to work after the naval element of the EUNAVFOR MED was withdrawn. Why is this? The surveillance is still ongoing with the air assets.
14. The figures show that the Central Mediterranean route lost its primacy among the three routes in the Mediterranean. Does it mean a real shift in the migration patterns? Why?
15. The EU recently made an effort to strengthen the European Border and Coast Guard Agency. Some theorists already accused the EU with building a Fortress Europe. What do you think about this?
16. The West African region, namely Niger, is usually referred as the incubator of the integrated approach. The three EU missions present in the region, the Sahel strategy, the Coordination Cell at the G5 Sahel are the evidence that the EU is really involved in West Africa. Do these countries genuinely cooperate? Since migration is assessed as a positive phenomenon in Africa.
17. What do you think about the idea, that CSDP missions and operations can help to handle migration?
18. Does your unit contribute to the negotiations on the successor of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement?
  - a. Do you think further regionalisation will take place in the agreement? (Not just the continents, but sub-regions as well)
  - b. Will migration get more attention in the new contractual framework?
19. Integrated approach is introduced in 2016. West Africa is seen as a major test field for implementing integrated approach. How does it work there actually?

20. There are different missions in Mali, Niger and Libya. What are the host countries' views on migration, and how they assess the EU missions on ground?
21. On 17 February, news came out on an EU agreement about launching a new mission off the Libyan coasts to ensure arms embargo. Since the plan is to have ships patrolling there by the end of March already, this is likely the suggested reshaping, renaming of EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia. Do you think it is practically the 'continuation' of EUNAVFOR MED? What do you think about the decision?
22. There are a lot of speculations about the outcomes of the situation in Libya. Could you share your thoughts about that? Do you think the EU is still a significant actor in solving the situation there for example?
23. The security situation clearly deteriorated in the West African region. What do you think, will be the effects of these developments in the region, regarding to the EU missions in Mali and Niger?
24. Do you think that the current ethnic conflict, plus the still existing threat posed by different terrorist groups can lead to mass population movements in the region again? If so, do you think that the movement will follow the previous patterns and will remain mostly in the region and on the continent?
25. Do you think that the security situation in Mali can affect the situation in Libya? Taking in consideration that the events of 2012-2013 had certain links to the Arab Spring.
26. Cotonou Partnership Agreement is due to end this year. Do you think the negotiations will be successful, and a new agreement will emerge before the end on 2020? If so, will there be significant changes in the partnership? What changes do you think will take place? Is BREXIT an issue?
27. You worked together with national governments; how do you assess their openness to the SSR? Is the local ownership really there?
28. Are/were the local governments concerned about migration? (IDPs, intra-regional, inter-regional, circular) Do they have harmonised migration policies? (With ECOWAS, AU)
29. Did the EUGS had immediate effects on the mission/s? What were these? Can, for example the change of the mandate in Niger, or the growth in the financing of the mission, be one of these immediate effects?
30. The EUCAP Sahel Niger established a field office in Agadez. How do you assess its role? Is it a useful tool to have?
31. The EU pushed for a closer cooperation among EU missions like EUCAP Sahel Niger, EUCAP Sahel Mali, EUBAM Libya, and EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia. Is/was there an actual exchange among these different missions?
32. There are accusations that the EU delegations are not communicating sufficiently with the missions on the ground. What is your experience with this issue?
33. How would you assess the success of the missions you took part in? What are/were the successful elements, and what needs/ed improvement?
34. How can you assess the attitude of the Malian government towards EUCAP Sahel Mali?

35. Is the Malian government concerned about migration? Does it have a migration policy? Is it harmonised with ECOWAS policies?
36. I assume the deteriorating security situation in the country is the number one priority to solve. How the Malian government tries to solve the problem?
37. How do you think the EU should response to the deteriorating situation in Mali?
38. How do you assess the role of G5 Sahel Joint Task Force in the region?
39. Why do you think the regional approach could be successful in West-Africa with so many challenges going on?
40. How would you assess the CSDP mission's/operation's communication with other actors on the ground?
41. How would you assess the success of the mission you are deployed now? What are the successful elements, and what needs to be improved?
42. How is integrated approach implemented in the host country of the CSDP mission you are deployed to from your point of view?



## APPENDIX II.

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6. Map: European Union, DG ECHO: Influx of refugees and migrants to Europe.  
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